Module 7 - Principles, State Policies, and Separation of Powers

Article II, 1987 Constitution: Nature of Provisions

★ Provisions under Article II of the 1987 Constitution are generally not self-executing provisions
○ Absent an enabling law, they are not judicially enforceable
○ They are guidelines or directives addressed to the executive and legislative departments in the enactment
and execution of laws and government policies
○ They aid the judiciary in the exercise of judicial review

Tanada v. Angara, GR No. 118295, 2 May 1997

★ The case of Taňada v. Angara (G.R. No. 118295) was decided by the Philippine Supreme Court on May 2, 1997.
The petitioners, including Senators Wigberto E. Taňada and Anna Dominique Coseteng, Representatives
Gregorio Andolana and Joker Arroyo, and several non-governmental organizations, challenged the
constitutionality of the Philippines' accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the
WTO Agreement violated the 1987 Philippine Constitution, particularly its provisions on economic nationalism
and the protection of local industries. The respondents were members of the Philippine Senate who concurred in
the ratification of the WTO Agreement, along with various executive officials. The petitioners sought to nullify
the Senate's concurrence and prohibit the implementation of the WTO Agreement, claiming it contravened the
constitutional mandate to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. The case was brought to the Supreme Court after the Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 on December
14, 1994, concurring in the ratification of the WTO Agreement.

1. According to the Petitioners, what constitutional mandate was/were violated by the WTO Agreement?

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or
impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before th[e]
Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-
reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to
qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.”

2. Are Principles and State Policies self-executing provisions? Explain.

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation.”

3. Why is it important to anchor causes of action on a specific and operable legal right than a mere constitutional
or statutory policy?

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles are
sourced from basic considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to wade “into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making.” Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in

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Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., explained these reasons as follows:

“It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One
is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational
terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there
are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is
not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in
the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution”

4. Is 2nd par, Sec 10, Art XII of the 1987 Constitution self-executing?

It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance System, et al.,[the
Supreme] Court held that “Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for
its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is
per se judicially enforceable.” However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in
regard to “the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” and not
to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule.

5. Are there enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine
concurrence in the WTO Agreement? What are these provisions?

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the
bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition
and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic
seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

“Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence
on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it
means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue
foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural
resources and public utilities.”

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, GR No. 122156, 3 February 1997

★ The case of "Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System" involves the petitioner, Manila
Prince Hotel Corporation, and the respondents, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC), Committee on Privatization, and Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. The

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controversy arose from GSIS's decision to sell 30% to 51% of its shares in MHC, which owns the historic Manila
Hotel, as part of the Philippine Government's privatization program under Proclamation No. 50 dated December
8, 1986. A public bidding was held on September 18, 1995, with only two bidders: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm. Renong Berhad submitted the highest
bid of P44.00 per share, surpassing Manila Prince Hotel's bid of P41.58 per share. Despite Manila Prince Hotel's
subsequent attempt to match Renong Berhad's bid, GSIS refused to accept it, leading to the filing of the petition.
The lower court issued a temporary restraining order on October 18, 1995, to prevent the consummation of the
sale to Renong Berhad.

1. When is a constitutional provision self-executing? When is it not self-executing?

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action.

2. Must constitutional provisions be presumed self-executing? Explain.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine
when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.

3. If a legislation was passed in relation to the enforcement and operation of a constitutional provision, does that
automatically mean that said constitutional provision is non-self-executing?

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise
of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice
to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that
legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing
constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.

4. May one part of a constitutional provision be self-executing and another non-self-executing?

Yes, a constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.

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5. Is 2nd par, Sec 10, Art XII of the 1987 Constitution self-executing?

Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete
in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable.

When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Oposa v. Factoran, GR No. 101083, 30 July 1993

★ In the landmark case of "Oposa v. Factoran Jr.," a group of minors, represented by their parents, along with the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), filed a complaint against the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. The case, filed as Civil Case No. 90-777
before Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Makati, Metro Manila, sought to address the alleged
violation of the plaintiffs' right to a balanced and healthful ecology. The plaintiffs argued that the continued
granting of timber license agreements (TLAs) by the DENR was leading to the misappropriation and impairment
of the Philippines' rainforests, causing severe environmental damage. They requested the cancellation of all
existing TLAs and a halt to the issuance of new ones. The RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs had
no cause of action and that the issue was a political question. The plaintiffs then filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging the RTC's dismissal.

1. May Sec 16, Art II of the 1987 Constitution, in and of itself, be used as an anchor for a cause of action? Explain.

Yes, Sec 16, Art II of the 1987 Constitution can be used as an anchor for a cause of action in and of itself.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements noted [by the Court], the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16)
of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form.

The Court declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right —
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology"

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind.
xxx
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

Principles (Article 2, Sections 1-6, 1987 Constitution)

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★ It abides by Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution. These principles are covered by Sections 1-6.
○ SEC. 1- Republicanism
○ SEC 2- Incorporation Clause
○ SEC 3- Civilian Supremacy
○ SEC 4 & 5- Government as Protector of the People; People as Defenders of the State
○ SEC 6- Separation of Church and State

Republicanism
★ Sec. 1 Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. A republic is a form of
government of governance. It follow a set of guidelines that are also seen as representations of democracy. Its
essential features are representation and renovation. Its purpose is to prevent concentration of authority in one
person or group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of
republican institutions. “To secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and to obtain efficiency”
[Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission, 40 O.G. 8th Supp. 57]
Incorporation Clause
★ Sec.2 Article 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. It commences by stating
that the Philippines rejects using war as a tool for achieving national goals. It is solely barred from traveling into
an offensive conflict. However, if any state, nation, individuals, or groups make a conflict it is merely the
Philippines that needs to defend itself.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, GR No. 173037, 9 October 2007

★ The Milk Code’s revised implementing rules and regulations were contested and challenged to be
unconstitutional. The Respondent Department of Health’s position mainly rests on the purported application of
several international instruments on newborn and small child nutrition. And in addition to the Milk Code, which
by the DOH may be implemented by the revised IRR since it is a component of the relevant legislation.

1. What International Instruments are invoked by DOH?

The Court noted that the international instruments invoked by respondents are (1) The United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. These
instruments provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child
mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of families,
and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and lactation.

2. Do these instruments contain specific provisions pertaining to the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes?
How about the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions?

Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS
and various WHA Resolutions.

3. Under the 1987 Constitution, what are the 2 modes by which international law becomes part of the sphere of
domestic law? Explain and distinguish each

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Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

4. Are the ICMBS and WHA Resolutions treaties? If not, have they been transformed into domestic law? If so, how?

The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law
through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of
law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.

5. Does the Milk Code contain a specific provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms
of promotion to the general public of breastmilk substitutes?

The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point
that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms
of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such
materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).

6. Are the WHA Resolutions specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued
breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk
substitutes, binding? If not, have they been adopted as a domestic law? Explain

The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated
with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes. In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which
does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead,
specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban
policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk Code passed by the
constitutionally authorized branch of government, the legislature. Thus, only the provisions of the Milk
Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the
subject RIRR.

7. What are the “generally accepted principles of international law”? What are “general principles of law”? What
is “customary international law”?

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“Generally accepted principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary

international law which are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national
policy, the principle of sovereign immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt
servanda, among others.

Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain “general principles of law” as a primary source of
international law because they have the “character of jus rationale” and are “valid through all kinds of
human societies.”

Custom or customary international law means “a general and consistent practice of states followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris)”

8. Are the relevant WHA Resolutions customary international law?

Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. Respondents have not presented any
evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that any
compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

9. What is a soft law? Is soft law binding international law? Are the relevant WHA Resolutions soft law?
Soft law is an expression of nonbinding norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior. Soft
law is not binding international law as it does not form part of the law of the land and are therefore not a
source of state obligation. It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute “soft law” or non-binding
norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior.

Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, GR No. 139465, 18 January 2000

★ The case "Secretary of Justice v. Lantion" involves the petitioner, Secretary of Justice, and the respondents, Hon.
Ralph C. Lantion, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and Mark B. Jimenez. The
case arose from an extradition request by the United States for Mark B. Jimenez, who was facing charges in the
U.S. On January 18, 2000, the Supreme Court of the Philippines, by a vote of 9-6, dismissed the petition of the
Secretary of Justice and ordered that Jimenez be furnished copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and be given a reasonable period to file his comment with supporting evidence. The Secretary of Justice
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on February 3, 2000, challenging the decision on several grounds,
including the distinction between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation, the absence of a notice
and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law, and the need to balance individual rights with
government interests. The case was further complicated by various motions and manifestations filed by both
parties, leading to the Supreme Court's resolution on October 17, 2000.

1. What are the relevant facts of the case in relation to the discussion on the Doctrine of Incorporation?

On January 13 1997, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential decree No. 1069 “Prescribing
the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The

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Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the
suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter
into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department
and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties. On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice
received from Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other
supporting documents for said extradition.

2. What must courts do in case of conflict between domestic law and international law?

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of
the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). These are some of the dominant
policy considerations in international law that the Court must balance against the claim of the private
respondent that he has a right to be given the extradition documents against him and to comment thereon
even while they are still at the evaluation stage by the petitioner Secretary of Justice, an alter ego of the
President.

3. Should the conflict be irreconcilable, what must prevail?

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and
are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13).

4. Is there a conflict between the RP-US Extradition Treaty and PD No. 1069? Explain.

These two elements of the national legislation are not in conflict with one another. There is no justification
for picking one of the two to be maintained. Rather, we perceived a gap in the RP-US Extradition Treaty’s
provisions, as enacted by Presidential Decree No. 1069. If there isn’t a legislation or legal basis, we have
to follow the guideline or an exercise of the fundamental due process rights of hearing and notification
will not violate the implementing law or the treaty.

Civilian Supremacy

★ Section 3, Article 2, provides: Civilian authority, is at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of
the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the
integrity of the national territory.

Alih v. Castro, GR No. L-69401, 23 June 1987

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★ In the case of Alih v. Gastro, the petitioners Rizal Alih, Nasim Alih, Aisan Alih, Mijal Alih, Omar Alih, Edris
Muksan, Mulsidi Waradil, Billy Asmad, Ramsid Asali, Banding Usman, Anggang Hadani, Warmikhan Hapa,
Gabral Jikiri, Allan Tan, Mujahirin Marajuki, Kennedy Gonzales, Urduja Alih, Merla Alih, and Nuraisa Alih Vda
de Ferolino were involved in a military raid conducted on November 25, 1984. The raid took place at their
compound on Gov. Alvarez Street, Zamboanga City, by more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements
of the home defense forces. The operation, known as a "zona," aimed to search for loose firearms, ammunition,
and other explosives. Initial resistance from the compound's occupants led to a bloody shoot-out, resulting in
casualties. The following morning, the compound surrendered, and sixteen male occupants were arrested,
fingerprinted, paraffin-tested, and photographed against their will.

1. What are the facts relevant to the discussion on civilian supremacy?

The 1973 Constitution’s Article II, Section 8 states unequivocally that “civilian authority is at all times
supreme over the military.” This case demonstrates how the military disregarded this principle by
conducting a warrantless raid and avoiding civil courts that ought to have established probable cause. A
shoot-out ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, resulting in a number of
casualties. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger-printing, paraffin
testing and photographing despite their objection. In its petition for ban and mandamus, the petitioners
presented the court with preliminary restrictive order and injunction. The petitioners claimed that the 1973
Constituion’s guarantees of their constitutional rights had been violated by the seizure of the weapons and
ammunition without a search warrant. Although the respondents acknowledged that the operation was
carried out without a warrant, they justified it by stating that they were following higher-ups' directions and
that the city mayor's assassination had made the peace and order issue worse.

2. Was there a violation of the provision on civilian supremacy?

Yes, there was a violation, the respondents violated the principle that “civilian authority is always supreme
over the military.” They bypassed the civil courts, which were responsible for determining whether there
was probable cause to search the petitioner’s premises. Instead, they carried out the raid without a search
warrant, based solely on their own unauthorized assessment of the petitioner’s guilt. Section 2 (Article 3-
Bill of Rights): The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Government as Protector of the People; People as Defenders of the State

★ Section 4 & 5 of the 1987 Constitution

○ Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may
call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.
○ Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Separation of Church and State

★ Article II Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides: The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
★ Manifestations of the Separation of Church and State
○ Freedom of Religion Clause in the Bill of Rights

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○ Disqualification of Religious sect from political party registration and sectoral representation (Article 6 of
the Constitution)
○ Non-appropriation for sectarian benefit

State Policies (Article 2, Sections 7-28, 1987 Constitution)

★ Article 2, Sections 7-28, 1987 Constitution
○ Independent foreign Policy & Nuclear-free Philippines
○ Just and dynamic social order
○ Promotion of Social Justice
○ Family and youth
○ Fundamental equity of mean and women
○ Promotion of health and ecology
○ Priority to education, science, technology, etc.
○ Protection to labor
○ Self-reliant and independent economic order
○ Land Reform
○ Indigenous cultural communities
○ Independent people’s organizations
○ Communication and information in nation-building
○ Autonomy of local governments
○ Equal access to opportunities for public service
○ Honest public service and full public disclosure

Separation of Powers

★ The doctrine of separation of powers is the principle that divides the government into three branches which are (1)
the legislative branch, (2) the executive branch, and (3) the judicial branch. Each branch has designated powers
and functions according to the Constitution, which is designed to prevent the concentration of authority under one
branch.

Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission, GR No. 47065, 26 June 1940

★ The case involves the Pangasinan Transportation Company, Incorporated (petitioner) and the Public Service
Commission (respondent). The petitioner, represented by C. de G. Alvear, has been operating passenger
transportation services in the provinces of Pangasinan, Tarlac, Nueva Ecija, and Zambales for the past twenty
years under certificates of public convenience issued by the former Public Utility Commission. On August 26,
1939, the petitioner applied to the Public Service Commission for authorization to operate ten additional
Brockway trucks, citing the need to comply with existing certificates and the Eight Hour Labor Law. The Public
Service Commission granted the application on September 26, 1939, but imposed two new conditions: the
certificates would be valid for only twenty-five years, and the company could be acquired by the Commonwealth
of the Philippines or its instrumentalities upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable
depreciation. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on October 9, 1939, which was denied on
November 14, 1939. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court on
November 20, 1939, challenging the constitutionality of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 and its
applicability to existing certificates.

La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, GR No. 127882, 1 December 2004

★ The case of La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos revolves around the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7942, also known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40), and a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30,
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1995, between the Philippine government and Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). The
petitioners, led by the La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc., represented by Chairman F'long Miguel M.
Lumayong, contended that these legal instruments violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. This
constitutional provision mandates that the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources should be
under the full control and supervision of the State. Initially, the Supreme Court ruled on January 27, 2004,
declaring certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, and the FTAA unconstitutional. However, the respondents
filed motions for reconsideration, prompting further deliberations and a subsequent resolution on December 1,
2004.

Bengzon v. Drilon, GR No. 103524, 15 April 1992, No. 173425, 4 September 2012

★ The case "Bengzon v. Drilon" involves petitioners, retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, including Cesar Bengzon, Querube Makalintal, Lino M. Patajo, and Jose Leuterio, among others, who
challenged the constitutionality of the President's veto on pension readjustments. The respondents are Hon.
Franklin Drilon, Executive Secretary; Hon. Guillermo Carague, Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management; and Hon. Rosalina Cajucom, National Treasurer. The case was decided on April 15, 1992. The
petitioners were receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 1797,
which provided for the adjustment of pensions in case of salary increases or decreases for Justices. President
Aquino vetoed provisions in the 1992 General Appropriations Act that would have allowed for the payment of
adjusted pensions, citing concerns about the standardization of compensation and preferential treatment. The
petitioners argued that the veto was unconstitutional and violated their vested rights to pensions, fiscal autonomy,
and the separation of powers. The case was consolidated with Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA, where
retired Court of Appeals Justices had previously requested pension readjustments based on the same laws.

1. What provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Bill did Cory veto?

President Corazon Aquino vetoed parts of the 1992 General Appropriations Bill that dealt with retired justices
receiving modified pensions. In Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA, she specifically vetoed parts of the
measure that allotted monies for retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals to receive
increased pension rates. The President vetoed the particular sections of Section 1 and the entirety of Section 4
of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Legislature on January 15,
1992.

2. What reason was forwarded by Cory to support the veto?

House Bill No. 16297 was vetoed by Aqino citing her belief that it “would corrode the basic premise of the
Government’s joint endeavor to follow the Republic Act’s guidelines for compensation standardization and
enforce them rigorously. The explanation for the veto of the preceding provisions (on In the second
paragraph of query number 1, "the decisions made by this Honorable Court in Administrative In accordance
with Matter No. 91-8-225-CA, the previous appropriations to cover the cost of the departed Supreme Court
justices as well as the Court effectively nullified the appeals that have been enacted.

3. How did the Petitioners address Cory’s reasoning?

The petitioners made a number of claims in an attempt to refute President Corazon Aquino’s justification
for vetoing House Bill No. 16297. By claiming that giving special treatment to a few officials would make
it more difficult for the government to implement the policy of uniform pay for all federal servants, “he
said that retired justices already received preferential treatment over the great majority of state personnel

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under the current laws.” Also the petitioners responded by claiming that the veto was an invalid use of the
President’s item veto power, that it violated the pensioners vested rights, and that it compromised the
judiciary's financial independence. As a result, the petitioners argued that the President’s veto was
predicated on false presumptions and the benefits in question were founded on legitimate, already-existing
statutes that sought to maintain judicial independence by guaranteeing justices suitable pensions.

4. Is Cory’s veto constitutional? Support your answer.

No. The veto by President Cory is therefore unconstitutional. The separation of powers premise is
compromised. A ruling by the Supreme Court cannot be overruled or set aside by the President using his
veto power, which would give the Presidency legislative capabilities that are outside of its purview. It is
beyond the President's authority to repeal existing laws, let alone establish or amend statutes issued by
previous administrations. Sec 3 Article VIII mandates that: Sec 3. “The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released”. As
defined by the Constitution, the financial independence that the Commission on Audit, the Civil Service
Commission, the Judiciary, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Commission on Elections are
considering a guarantee of complete autonomy to distribute and use their resources as wisely and quickly as
their requirements demand.

Maceda v. Vasquez, GR No. 102781, 22 April 1993

★ The case of "Maceda v. Vasquez" involves petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 12
of the Regional Trial Court in Antique, against respondents Hon. Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez and Atty.
Napoleon A. Abiera. The case was decided on April 22, 1993, under G.R. No. 102781, with Justice Nocon as the
ponente. The dispute arose when Atty. Abiera filed an affidavit-complaint on April 18, 1991, alleging that Judge
Maceda falsified his Certificate of Service dated February 6, 1989, by certifying that all civil and criminal cases
submitted for decision had been resolved within the required period, despite knowing that several cases remained
undecided.

1. What case was filed against Petitioner Judge Maceda?

In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent
Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of
Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in
five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further
alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May,
June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total
of seventeen (17) months. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case
despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

2. What argument was forwarded by Petitioner Judge Maceda in relation to Separation of Powers?

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Judge Maceda argues the Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction because the alleged wrongdoing occurred from
the Supreme Court’s responsibility and authority of his judicial functions.

3. Is the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the present case consistent with Separation of Powers?

The Judge is accountable to the State criminally and administratively for their actions before the Supreme
Court. The Ombudsman's probe, however, violates the separation of powers. The Court's authority to
supervise all courts administratively is encroached when it is carried out without any administrative action
being taken.

4. Who may oversee judges and court personnel?

The only body with the power to supervise judges and courts is the Supreme Court as specified in section
6 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the Supreme Court has the power to rule on
administrative matters pertaining to the output and disciplinary actions of the judicial officers.

5. What should have been the proper recourse of the complainant in the case?

The Ombudsman ought to begin the process by referring the petitioner’s certifications of service to the
Supreme Court to assess if the aforementioned certificates accurately represented because the Supreme
Court is the only administrative supervision over all the judges and court employees in accordance with
Section 6 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and it is the proper body to deal with cases related to
administration that involves law enforcement officials.

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