J. S. Asian Stud. 10 (02) 2022. 297-305 DOI: 10.33687/jsas.010.02.

4262

Available Online at EScience Press

Journal of South Asian Studies
ISSN: 2307-4000 (Online), 2308-7846 (Print)
[Link]

Pak-Iran Contemporary Relations: Challenges and Way Forward

a ZafarIqbal Yousafzai*, bArshad Ali Shah
a Independent Researcher and author of “The Troubled Triangle: US-Pakistan Relations under the Taliban’s Shadow”
(Routledge, 2021).
b Secondary School Teacher, Elementary and Secondary Education Department, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan.

*Corresponding author Email ID: iqbalyousafzai786@[Link]

ABSTRACT

Pak-Iran relations are of great importance for both states. Iran was the first state that recognized Pakistan following its
inception, while Pakistan was among the first countries that recognized the new dispensation in Iran in 1979. However,
there have been some stumbling blocks in bilateral relations: India-Iran ties, sectarianism, Jandullah, and the Taliban
are all factors that have harmed relations in the post-9/11 era. However, the changing regional dynamics provide for
opportunities following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. This article looks into the factors that did not allow the
relationship to grow altogether despite the existing potential in the post-9/11 period. The growing India-Iran ties, their
North-South Transport Corridor, and the Indian plan to include Chabahar in it are causing concern in Islamabad. The
militant groups operating near Iran's border in Baluchistan are a cause of serious concern for Tehran. The article argues
the mistrust needs to be bridged to augment cooperation. Moreover, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the
China-Iran comprehensive cooperation agreement are good developments for both Pakistan and Iran to turn the
relationship into a closer partnership. The changing dynamics in the region provide opportunities for both the states to
adopt It is time for both Iran and Pakistan to adopt a mutual approach to regional issues and make a new strategic
partnership with Russia and China. The Pak-China-Russia-Iran Partnership Group will be a stronger one and of great
importance to all members.
Keywords: Pak-Iran relations; Taliban; U.S. withdrawal; India; Jundullah.

INTRODUCTION wars. Iran helped in restoring diplomatic relations

Iran and Pakistan share the same religion, geographical between Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1963.
connection, and cultural resemblance. Hence, despite The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet
some issues, the relations between the two brotherly invasion of Afghanistan brought substantial changes in
states are smooth both at the governmental and public Iran-Pakistan relations. Both countries condemned the
levels. Iran is important in Islamabad's foreign policy as Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan but backed
the latter sees the former as a vital stakeholder for opposite Afghan factions. Iran supported the non-
regional economic prosperity and security. The first Pashtun section, while Pakistan supported the
Muslim country that recognized Pakistan was Iran. On Mujahideen, primarily Pashtun. When the Soviets
February 19, 1950, Iran and Pakistan signed a treaty of withdrew in 1989, the gap remained intact; the countries
friendship. Liaqat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s first premier, continued supporting opposite factions of the warlords,
visited Tehran in 1949, while the Shah of Iran visited further widening the trust deficit. When the Taliban
Pakistan in 1950—the first head of state to visit the moved into Mazar Sharif after taking over Kabul, they
newborn state ( (Khalid, 2020, p. 120). killed several Iranian diplomats and Shia Hazaras in the
Similarly, Pakistan and Iran became part of the U.S.-led north. This broke ties between the Taliban and Iran and
Baghdad Pact in 1955. Iran gave Pakistan full political harmed relations between Pakistan and Iran.
and diplomatic support during India's 1965 and 1971 However, they were unanimous in saying that the

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unconditional withdrawal of foreign troops solved the 1979 U.S. embassy hostage crisis, the Iran-Israel tussle,
problem. Pakistan emerged as a "front line state" against U.S. support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, U.S. sanctions,
Soviet aggression and received massive military and and Tehran’s contradictory role in the Middle East peace
economic assistance from the international community, process, provided for bitterness in Tehran-Washington
especially the U.S. Iran supported the Shia community in relations. Both adopted a confrontational approach
their resistance against Soviet aggression. However, Iran toward each other. Though for a brief period, the 9/11
did not play an active role because it was engaged in a attacks provided an opportunity for cooperation
war with Iraq that continued for eight years. between Washington and Tehran ( (Zammit, 2015). Iran
Afghanistan's developments, particularly the emergence openly condemned the attacks and later facilitated the
of the Taliban, Pakistan's Shia-Sunni conflict, and U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan in many ways as it
competing interests in Central Asian republics all closed its border to fugitive Al-Qaeda members, agreed
harmed Iran-Pakistan relations in the 1990s. Iran openly to rescue American pilots in distress, allowed its territory
supported the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban and to be used by the U.S. for carrying humanitarian supplies
non-Pashtun group in Afghanistan that did not allow of food and other items to Afghanistan, provided
Islamabad-Tehran relations to flourish. However, the fall intelligence to the Northern Alliance, and played a highly
of the Taliban in the wake of the September 11 attacks constructive role in the Bonn conference for creating an
and Pakistan's earnest efforts to eliminate sectarianism interim government in Afghanistan (Rubin, 2020).
in the country paved the way for close relations between Barnett Rubin once told me that Iran's former foreign
Tehran and Islamabad. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal minister, Jawad Zarif, and General Qasim Sulemani, who
Kharazi visited Islamabad, and both countries vowed to got killed in a U.S. drone strike in Iraq in 2020, were
take the same approach vis-à-vis the Afghan issue. Both instrumental in settling things between the Northern
the countries announced they wanted a multi-ethnic, Alliance and Americans. However, U.S. engagement with
broad-based government in Kabul under the auspices of Iran was short-lived, as in a 2002 State of the Union
the United Nations ( (Iqbal, 2001). It indicated they address, and President Bush declared Iran part of the
support the Bonn Process vis-à-vis the future of "axis of evil" in line with North Korea and Iraq (
Afghanistan. (Heradstveit, What the Axis of Evil Metaphor Did to Iran,
Despite these positive overtures, differences remained in 2007).
some critical areas, like Pakistan's coalition in the war on The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan post-9/11
terror and the U.S. On the other hand, Islamabad was increased Tehran's insecurity. The U.S. blamed Iran for
concerned about Tehran’s close relationship with New interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs. In addition,
Delhi. Another area of disagreement was the matter of the U.S. also accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons.
access to the mineral-rich Central Asian states. Pakistan The U.S. military presence at the Shindand airbase, close
views Gwadar and Karachi’s port of Qasim as the shortest to Iran, and in the neighboring Central Asian countries,
routes, while Iran claims Chabahar and Bander Abbas to Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, critically
be the apt links for communication with the outside augmented Iranian sensitivity to calculated
world. This paper will deal with three factors that encirclement. As one analyst noted:
hampered improvement in Pak-Iran relations after 9/11. For Iran, the most pressing security threat
These are Pakistan's strategic partnership with the U.S., emanating from Afghanistan is not a local
Jundullah, and India's strategic partnership with Iran. externality (such as the problem of Islamic
Similarly, it will analyze how both countries' interests fundamentalists or Afghan refugees) but the
converge in Afghanistan following the fall of Kabul to the military presence of the U.S. Iran is threatened by
Taliban in August 2021. Lastly, the paper offers a way the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, but not
forward for how both countries can resolve their issues. because of competing interests in Afghanistan.
Instead, Iran is threatened because the U.S. is
PAKISTAN-U.S. STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND IRAN trying to stop Iran from becoming a world leader
Before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, both Pakistan and and because of the nuclear standoff in the Middle
Iran had close relations with the U.S. However, after the East.
Islamic Revolution in Iran, a chain of events, such as the On the other hand, Pakistan became a frontline state and

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close ally of the United States after 9/11 in the war on factors like economic problems, insurgency, and the law-
terror. Pakistan's closeness with the United States was a and-order situation in Balochistan have been a hurdle for
severe concern for Iran. Iran claimed that the U.S. was the project.
using Pakistani soil to destabilize Iran (Kumar, 2008:
776). But no real proof was given, and Pakistan said again SUNNI INSURGENTS: A BIG BOTTLENECK IN
that the U.S. would not be allowed to use its land or IMPROVING PAK-IRAN RELATIONS
airspace for a military attack on neighboring Iran Sunni insurgents who operate in Iran's Sistan-
(Afrasiabi, 2006). Balochistan province are a severe concern for Tehran.
Pakistan and Iran finalized a $7.5 billion gas project Iran blames Pakistan for extending support to these
pipeline in June 2010, which is expected to start natural organizations or at least providing them with a haven in
gas supply to Pakistan in 2014. The project was initially Balochistan. However, Pakistan has denied sheltering
started in 1994 between Pakistan and Iran, in which militants on its soil or turning a blind eye to them. Even
India later included the Iranian request (Khalid, 2020: more clashes occurred between Pakistani and Iranian
122). This is a megaproject in the energy sector between border forces in October 2014, when Iranian guards
Pakistan and Iran. The U.S. had vehemently opposed the entered Pakistani territory, claiming to be looking for
India-Pakistan-Iran (IPI) gas pipeline because this militants who had fled to Pakistan. Jundullah (Soldiers of
project would boost Tehran's economy and thwart its God), a Sunni militant group, was founded in 2002. The
international isolation efforts (Kumar, 2008): 779). In group was led by Abdul Malek Rigi alias Mullah Malik,
addition to helping its economy, the pipeline project based in Sistan-Baluchistan, which is connected to
could be instrumental in boosting Iranian clout in South Afghanistan and Pakistan. The objective of this militant
Asia. Thus, Washington tried to pressure Pakistan and group is to protect the "human rights, culture, and faith
India (both friendly with Washington) to back off the of ethnic Baluchis" in Iran (Zahra, 2009). The group
deal. India pulled out of the agreement in 2008 because leader, Abdul Malek Rigi, was arrested in February 2010
Washington was so strong (Siddiqui, 2009). on a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan. He was hanged in
Nevertheless, Islamabad repelled Washington’s June 2010 by the Iranian government over the charges of
pressure, and the agreement was finally signed in Turkey inciting violence in Sistan-Balochistan.
on June 5, 2009. The United States urged Pakistan to Jundullah is a violent movement against Iran, and many
review its gas pipeline deal with Tehran. "We do not people blame it for terrorist attacks that happened inside
think it is the right time for doing this kind of transaction Iran. In these attacks, Iranian citizens, government
with Iran." The U.S. Secretary of State, Robert Blake, personnel, and security forces, mainly the Iranian
stated during a Washington briefing (Dawn, 2010). Abdul Revolutionary Guards Corps, were targeted. Some of the
Basit, Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson, responded deadliest attacks included the February 2007 bomb
that Islamabad would pursue the gas pipeline project attack that killed 11 Iranians, including Revolutionary
with Iran as a sovereign decision, keeping in view our Guards, and the March 2006 Zahedan bomb attack that
national interest. In March 2013, Pakistan's President killed 22; a suicide explosion in Sistan that killed around
Asif Ali Zardari and Iranian President Mehmud Ahmedi 40 people; the July 2010 bomb attack at a mosque in
Nejad inaugurated the pipeline despite U.S. pressure Zahedan that killed 30 while injuring 300 people; and a
(BBC, 2013). On the inauguration, "Today is a historic suicide attack in the Imam Husain Mosque in Chabahar in
day." "The gas pipeline project is the beginning of a great December 2010 that resulted in the killing of around 35
work," Ahmadinejad told reporters. It is to be mentioned citizens.
that the pipeline from the Iranian side was mostly Iran claims that Jundullah is a rebel group aiming to
completed. Tehran was also ready to give Islamabad a separate the Sunni-dominated area from Iran. However,
$500 million loan for the pipeline construction on the the head of the Jundullah, Abdul Malik Rigi, denied these
Pakistani side. Despite efforts and pressure, Islamabad charges. Iranian media claimed that Abdolhamid, the
did not take Washington's pressure regarding halting the brother of the Jundullah chief, had confessed to Rigi's
gas pipeline project at that time, yet the project is meetings with U.S. officials in Islamabad. Official sources
incomplete in that Washington's reservation over it and in Balochistan have firmly rejected it and maintained that
the sanctions on Iran are prime causes. Similarly, other Pakistan had not allowed its territory to be used for anti-

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Iran activity. On October 18, 2009, seven members of the and said that the whole operation was "run by Iranian
Revolutionary Guards were killed by a suicide bomber authorities."
and 42 other people in Pisheen, an adjacent town with Similarly, on August 28, 2014, Abul Rauf Regi, the
the Iran-Pakistan border. Ahmadi-Nejad, the then younger brother of Abdul Malik Regi, was shot dead in
Iranian President, claimed that Pakistan's soil had been Quetta. Pakistan security forces arrested him, and they
used for the attack. Ahmadi Nejad complained to were supposed to hand him over to the Iranian
President Zardari about the incident, claiming that the authorities (Mir, 2014). However, Jundullah's issue has
perpetrators were in Pakistan and requesting quake severely affected Pak-Iran relations in the new
action. Pakistan and Iran have close brotherly relations, millennium.
but the presence of anti-Iran elements on Pakistani soil
is not justified. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the head of the INDIA-IRAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
Revolutionary Guards Corps, said, "The group of Rigi has Iran has had close and cordial relations with India for a
direct contact with the American and British intelligence long time. During the post-Independence period, India's
services and, unfortunately, the Pakistani intelligence non-alignment policy and Iran’s alignment with the West
service" (Dawn, Iran blames U.S. and Pakistan for attack, determined Indo-Iran relations to a great extent.
2009). However, India's interaction with Iran remained minimal
Iran summoned Pakistan's envoy to Tehran to make a during the first decade of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
strong protest Pakistan's failure to dismantle Jundullah's due to various reasons. Tehran's support of the Kashmir
network on its territory (Mir, June 1, 2009). However, the cause, its soft corner toward the Soviet-installed
two countries adopted a policy of covering the issue. Asif government in Kabul, and its policy on the miserable
Ali Zardari, the President of Pakistan, phoned his condition of the Indian Muslims caused strains over
counterpart and assured him that Pakistan would India-Iran relations. However, despite these irritants,
provide the best possible facilitation to arrest the culprits cooperation between the two states in the economic,
behind the heinous incident if they were inside Pakistan energy, and, to some extent, industrial sectors kept
(Khan, 2009). Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, Iran's minister continuing. India is a big market for Iranian oil and gas,
of the interior, went to Pakistan to talk about how to fight making them natural partners to cooperate in the energy
the Jundullah Group. sector. Iran became one of India's top five energy
Time and again, from Pakistan, Iran has been demanding suppliers in 1999-2000. However, over time, India-Iran
concrete steps to contain Jundullah’s activities. Pakistan oil diplomacy got further momentum, and from 2007 to
has made sincere efforts in this regard. For example, to 2010, Iran remained the second largest exporter of oil to
recover the Iranian diplomat, a raid was conducted by India after Saudi Arabia (Diplomatist, April 2, 2020).
Karachi police in a locality to retrieve an Iranian diplomat When President Trump withdrew from the Joint
who was abducted from Peshawar in November 2008. Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or Iran nuclear
Though the diplomat could not recover, during the deal in May 2018, the Indian imports of Iranian oil were
operation, two policemen died while 35 alleged militants affected.
belonging to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and members of The conclusion of the Cold War and the subsequent
some other banned outfits were arrested. Pakistan dismemberment of the USSR provided both India and
security forces freed 21 Iranian truck drivers held Iran with several opportunities and challenges.
hostage by Jundullah members after heavy gun battles in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and energy security were
the hilly area of Baluchistan in August 2007. Abdolhamid significant areas of interest that brought these two
Rigi, the brother of the Jundullah Chief, was also arrested countries closer. Afghanistan's situation after the Soviet
by the security forces of Pakistan and handed over to withdrawal, especially when the Taliban took control of
Iranian authorities. Earlier, when Abdul Malek Rigi was Kabul, drew Tehran and New Delhi closer. Both states
arrested in February 2010 while on a flight from Dubai to viewed the growth of fundamentalism in the shape of the
Kyrgyzstan, Mohammad Abbasi, Pakistan’s then Taliban as a threat that could destabilize the region. They
Ambassador to Tehran, claimed during a media supported the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban
conference that it was impossible without Pakistan's coalition. Similarly, the energy sector has been a major
support. But the Iranian government denied these claims driving force for India and Iran to come closer. India, a

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larger energy consumer, and Iran, a giant energy (CARs) through Pakistan and to make it easier for India
producer, came close to each other as natural partners to send goods to Afghanistan and the CARs.
(Pant, 2004). India has long been trying to get a strong foothold in
Central Asia was another area of cooperation for both Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan from its western
states. Following the September 11 incident, India and border. the opportunity they got in post-9/11
Iran became even closer. In 2003, Syed Muhammad Afghanistan after Karzai became an interim president
Khatami, who was President of Iran at the time, was and the U.S. oversaw Afghan affairs. Several Indian
invited as the chief guest to India's Republic Day Parade. consulates had been established in Afghanistan (near the
This showed how close the two countries were. It is Pak-Afghan border), which are closed now following the
pertinent to mention that India invited its most trusted fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021 (Reuters,
friends to that ceremony as chief guests. The visit ended August 10, 2021). These consulates perpetuated
with the signing of seven MoU, the declaration of New insurgency in Pakistan, particularly in Balochistan and
Delhi, and several agreements. FATA (Zeb, 2003). Professor Christine Fair writes about
There are various reasons for Iran’s closeness to India. these consulates in these words:
The U.S., for decades, has been trying to isolate Iran in the It would be a mistake to completely disregard
community of nations and has imposed strict economic Pakistan's regional perceptions due to doubts
sanctions. To neutralize the effects of these measures, about Indian competence in executing covert
Iran adopted various strategies. One of them is to get operations. That misses the point entirely.
closer to those countries that can afford the U.S. enmity Furthermore, it is unfair to dismiss the notion
and counterbalance the U.S. Therefore, Iran signed that Pakistan's apprehensions about Afghanistan
various military and economic agreements with China, stem partly from its security competition with
Russia, and India. The China-Iran Comprehensive India. Having visited the Indian Mission in
Strategic Partnership, a 25-year-long agreement signed Zahedan, Iran, I can assure you that they are not
between Tehran and Beijing in April 2021, is considered issuing visas as the main activity! Moreover,
a milestone for Iran to minimize the burden of its India has run operations from its missions in
economic sanctions (Baharoon, 2021). Tehran's close Mazar and is doing so from the other consulates
defense cooperation with New Delhi has been a severe it has reopened in Jalalabad and Qandahar along
concern for Islamabad. A scholar described it as: the border. Indian officials have told me privately
Any Indian presence on Iranian military bases, that they are pumping money into Balochistan
even if it is solely to train the Iranians, would (Kazmi, 2009).
allow India a more subtle "operational" use of Despite the nominal Indian population in Mashhad,
early warning, intelligence gathering, etc., Tehran also allowed India to set up a consulate there.
facilities against Pakistan. An Indian military Islamabad raised its concern; however, Tehran assured
presence in Iran, with or without strike Islamabad it would not be used against Pakistani
capability, would enable India in the event of war interests while Tehran would keep a check on them.
with Pakistan to create a "holding threat" along Zahedan, bordering Pakistan, has a robust Indian
its western borders. In fact, India's power over consulate with around 100 Indian families (Montazeran,
Iran has steadily grown as relations between Mumtaz, 2004). Similarly, India established its Bandar
Pakistan and Iran have gotten worse (Zeb, 2003). Abbas consulate in 2002, a source of concern for
In September 2000, Russia, Iran, and India signed the Islamabad. Through this consulate, India can monitor the
North-South Corridor Agreement to connect Mumbai movement of ships through the Persian Gulf. One analyst
with St. Petersburg via Tehran and Moscow. Azerbaijan summarized these concerns in these words:
later joined the agreement in 2005. It reduced transit Numerous analysts of South Asia infer that there
costs and increased India's trade with participating are close security ties between Delhi and Tehran
countries. India has completed a 215-kilometer road because of the Indian consulate in Zahedan, with
from Kabul to Zaranj (Iran), constructed and funded by a likely intelligence presence there. India also
India. The goal of this project is to stop Pakistan from established a consulate in Iran's port city of
trading with Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics Bandar Abbas in 2001, permitting India to

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monitor ship movements in the Persian Gulf and India, and its connectivity in the region that will boost its
the Strait of Hormuz. From a regional security economic condition. Pakistan wants to thwart any Indian
point of view, the volume of defense trade, effort against Pakistan from the Iranian side. Pakistan
measured in dollars, may be less relevant than cannot afford to allow India to make its political,
the activities that appear to be ongoing, many of strategic, and economic foothold strong in Iran, which
which may be more qualitative. The presence of will threaten Pakistan's interests and security. Hence, it
Indian engineers at Chahbahar and of Indian wants good relations with Tehran for strategic and
military advisors and intelligence officials in Iran economic factors. With Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has
confers on India significant access to Iran. This brotherly relations, and the former extends aid and loans
access is essential for India's ability to project to Pakistan during financial hardships that keep a
power vis-à-vis Pakistan and Central Asia. It bonhomie between Riyadh and Islamabad. However,
gives India a better way to keep an eye on balancing relations with both states is not an easy task to
Pakistan and even lets India use Iran to launch handle.
non-conventional operations against Pakistan
(Fair, 2007). Shia-Sunni factor
However, Iran says that its relations with India are not at Among other irritants in Pak-Iran relations, the Sunni-
the expense of Pakistan. In November 2001, during his Shia rift is also a cause of divergence between the two
visit to Islamabad, Dr. Hassan Rouhani stated that states. Iran, a country with a Shia majority, believed in
Tehran's close relations with New Delhi could help create supporting Shias in Pakistan and employing them in
an environment of talks between India and Pakistan to conflict zones to serve its interests. Alex Vatanka writes
help resolve the Kashmir issue (Montazeran, Mumtaz, about how this factor hampers Pak-Iran relations:
2004). Similarly, Hassan Rouhani, as a president, visited The menace of Shi'a Sunni violence is not only a
Islamabad in March 2016 and called Iran and Pakistan catastrophe for the Pakistani nation, but it is also
"intertwined and interdependent" (Husain, 2016). a yardstick to measure the readiness and abilities
Certain factors have the potential to restrict the further of Tehran to act as a protector of the Pakistani
consolidation of Iran-India ties. India has a close Shi'a. The Iranian authorities go out of their way
partnership with the U.S. and close ties with Israel. India to bear the mantle of the global champion of Shi'a
supported the UNSC resolutions that put sanctions on Muslims. However, while the plight of Pakistani
Iran and voted twice in favor of the IAEA resolution that Shi'as has become a rallying cry for some aspects
called for sanctions against Iran. of the Iranian regime, Tehran's actions rarely
match its most fervent rhetoric about the
PAKISTAN-SAUDI RELATIONS AS A FACTOR suffering of Pakistan's Shi'a ( (Vatanka, Iran and
Iran's close relations with India concern Islamabad, like Pakistan: Security, Diplomacy and American
Saudi-Pakistan cooperation, and this closeness is a Influence, 2015).
bother for Tehran. Iran and Saudi Arabia have been rivals Iran believes the Shia community is under repression in
for a long time. Whenever there is closeness between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and they shall be helped. Iran
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, we see a bonhomie between has a sense of historical superiority based on its Persian
New Delhi and Tehran. The Arab Spring for more than a empire established in the sixth century B.C. that lasted
decade has further broadened the gap between Riyad for centuries. Hence, Iran has regional designs and wants
and Tehran, which has led to proxy wars in the Gulf. Iran to dominate the region. The Iranian Quds Force, one of
has been supporting the Houthi rebels in Yemen, the eight branches of Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps
damaging Saudi-Iran relations considerably. However, (IRGC), operates in Syria, Iraq, and other regional
Pakistan must maintain balance in its relations with both countries to serve Tehran's interests. Similarly, Iran,
Riyadh and Tehran. When the Yemen issue surfaced in since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, has been
2016, Pakistan tried to play the role of mediator rather supporting Shia groups in Syria. When a Salafi militia
than taking sides ( (Vatanka, 2016). Pakistan does not launched a rocket on the shrine of Zainab in Damascus, it
want to antagonize its relations with either state because led to the formation of the Zainabyon Brigade (Zahid,
of its weak economic situation, fraught relations with 2016). Iran recruits Shias from the Kurram tribal district

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for the war in Syria (author’s discussion). However, a Pakistan for every failure and instability in Afghanistan
local once told me that those killed in the war are buried at the behest of India. The Taliban have good relations
in Iran or Syria, and those are not brought to Pakistan with all the neighboring states, and they assure the world
due to the fear of Pakistani authorities. The Quds force that they will not allow any state to use Afghan soil
has been active in Syria and Iraq, and its leader Qasim against any state. For their stability and legitimacy, they
Sulemani got killed by the U.S. in a drone strike on the will keep their commitments.
outskirts of Baghdad in July 2020. Hence, the Shia factor Fifth, a gap between Iran and India could change Pak-Iran
profoundly impacts relations between both states. relations. When China and Iran come close, it affects Iran-
India relations. Hence, China-Iran closeness and a gap
A WAY FORWARD FOR COOPERATION between India and Iran could provide prospects for Pak-
Pakistan-Iran relations can be further improved Iran relations.
following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Several
factors could lead to close cooperation between both CONCLUSION
states. One, the Taliban factor, has been critical in both The post-9/11 strategic environment of the region
states' relations. There was divergence in the past over brought new opportunities and challenges for Iran and
the Taliban. However, there has been close contact Pakistan, affecting their bilateral and multilateral
between the Taliban and Tehran for the last several years relations. Pakistan and Iran’s interests and concerns are
because their interests converged in Afghanistan. The interlinked in the new regional and global environment.
Taliban's modest approach towards other ethnic groups, Although Pakistan was a close ally of the US, it did not
especially Shias, was vital for Tehran. allow the US any facilities for any adventures against its
Similarly, Iran and the Taliban wish for the United States neighbors, such as Iran. Iran-U.S. confrontation is not in
to leave Afghanistan. This convergence has positive the interest of Pakistan. The region was volatile, which
impacts on Pakistan-Iran relations. Afghanistan is now a badly affected Pakistan's internal security. Both Iran and
place where Tehran and Islamabad can work together Pakistan are the victims of terrorism. The appropriate
and get closer to each other. way to eliminate this menace is to promote close bilateral
Second, the sectarian conflict in Pakistan is under cooperation, intelligence sharing, and mutual trust
control, which has been a severe concern for Tehran. between the two countries. Besides, they should work for
Jundallah activities are minimal, and Pakistan's border the socio-economic uplift of the deprived class of society,
with Sistan-Baluchistan is relatively secure. Previously, where terrorism constantly thrives. Pakistan never
Iran was concerned about the Jandullah insurgency in opposes Tehran's relationship with New Delhi; however,
Sistan-Balochistan. In the same way, there is a problem being a Muslim state, it considers awareness of the
with the Zainabiyoun Brigade, and Tehran needs to Muslim Ummah its responsibility against Indian designs.
rethink its policy of sending Pakistanis to fight in Syria. India desires to create a split in the Muslim world. One of
Third, the China-Iran 25-year Comprehensive the objectives of India's coming close to Iran was to
Partnership will bring Tehran close to Beijing and create misunderstanding between Iran and Pakistan to
Pakistan. The China-U.S. competition brought China and establish her hegemony over the entire region.
Iran close to each other. Similarly, a close friendship The current changing situation in Afghanistan is complex
between Pakistan and China could bring Tehran and yet provides an opportunity for Pak-Iran relations to
Islamabad onto the same page. China, Iran, Pakistan, and share a common approach by supporting a neutral
Afghanistan can work for connectivity and trade with government in Afghanistan that does not allow Afghan
each other. soil to be used against any country. Following the
Fourth, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan is a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, regional
positive development for Pakistan and Iran. The United players are adjusting their policies to obtain the best
States posed a serious threat to Iran in Afghanistan possible deal. It would be a challenging task again for Iran
because the Shindand Airbase in Herat Province and Pakistan to have a unanimous foreign policy toward
bordered Iran. On the other hand, the change of regime Afghanistan. Both countries have had bitter experiences
in Kabul is a good development for Pakistan, as the with past Afghan policies. Pakistan and Iran are also the
previous government had nothing to do but blame most affected countries because of four decades of war in

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Afghanistan. It is time for both countries to start working The U.S. objects to gas pipeline deal with Iran, Dawn.
on a plan to support a broad-based government in Kabul (2010, April 2). Retrieved June 2022, from Dawn:
to bring stability to the region. In Afghanistan, Iran has [Link]
more influence over Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, while objects-to-gas-pipeline-deal-with-iran
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