Ynot vs. IAC, G.R.. No.

74457, March 20, 1987

FACTS: The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on
January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.

The confiscation was based on the amendment of Executive Order which prohibits the
transportation of carabao from one province to another and slaughtering of carabaos not complying
with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626.

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld
the trial court. Thus, he filed a petition for review on certiorari. He assailed that the executive order is
unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed
by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained,
as constitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 626-A violates the due process clause of the Constitution?

RULING: Yes. A look at the assailed Order would show that it was promulgated by the President
in the exercise of his legislative authority. This authority, however, is to be exercised whenever in his
judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the
legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required
immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of
instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to
justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the
validity of the executive order.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing, which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. However, there are exceptions. There are instances when the need for expeditions
action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like
a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to
the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are
inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled.
Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses
to protect the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to
protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No.
626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one
of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved
for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the
need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of
our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it
had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear,
first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these
animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy
the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be
measurably and dangerously affected. This rationale satisfies the first requirement.

However, the absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another fails to satisfy the second requirement. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, the
Court would still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded
by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be
validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due
process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings
as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted,
however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the
immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the
petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require
their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.

Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the
right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear
encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.