Chapter 2

Land Rights in Ethiopia

2.1 Introduction

Land is the source of all material wealth; it provides us with all our needs to sustain
on. It is also a major economic asset from which people and nations get significant
profit. In many developing countries, land has been considered as an important
economic and social asset where the status and prestige of people is determined.
Because of such a high importance given to land, as compared to other properties,
the legal protection accorded to land is always strict in nature.
Land is one form of property that is a subject of ownership or other form of use
rights. Property is everything that has material or moral value for human beings…
and guaranteed and enforced by law.1 For legal scholars, “property” refers to
entitlements to resources protected by formal legal institutions.2 Property in the
sense of legally protected entitlements comes in a variety of forms. The paradig-
matic legal property right would be full title to a parcel of land or an object like a
car, real property and personal property (or “chattels”), respectively. But, the law
also affords legally enforceable claims to intangible resources such as intellectual
property.
Different disciplines define “land” differently, in a manner that suits their
objectives. In legal documents, mostly, it is considered as the surface of the earth
and any fixtures on it, such as buildings, fence, tree plants, and improvement to the
land.
For instance, according to Articles 552–554 of the French Civil Code, ownership
of land “involves ownership of what is above and below it.” Unless restricted by
statutes, the owner of a land is considered as owning also the minerals inside the

1
Aubry & Rau 1966. Droit Civil Francis-Property-, Translated by the Louisiana State Law
Institute West Publishing Co. Vol. II, p. 1.
2
Merrill, T. W. & Smith, H. E. 2010. The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Property, New
York, Oxford University Press, p. 3.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 27

D.W. Ambaye, Land Rights and Expropriation in Ethiopia,
Springer Theses, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-14639-3_2
28 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

land and the airspace above the land.3 The basic feature of the above rule is that the
term “land” signifies not only the surface of the earth, the ground, but also things
found beneath the surface and fixtures above, and sometimes the airspace, above the
ground. Of course, the details of ownership beneath and above the ground may be
limited by different legislations. But fixtures, such as trees and buildings are always
considered as part of the land.
Under Ethiopian law, property is either movable or immovable (Article 1126 of
the Civil Code).4 Land and buildings are considered as immovables (Article 1130
Civil Code). Hence, unlike the French one, where “land” includes “the ground and
any fixture on the land”, the Ethiopian Civil Code treats “land” and “buildings” as
two separate types of immovables. Whether buildings should be considered as part
of the land is not clearly envisaged as its French Counterpart Ethiopian law, of
course, follows the French Civil Code, Article 518 which also says “land and
building are immovable by their nature.” But, as already shown above, in another
section of the law, the French Civil Code declares that ownership of surface of land
means ownership of all things above and below the land. In Ethiopia, however,
there is no such kind of encompassing provision in the Civil Code. On top of that,
today, as envisaged under Article 40(3), (7) of the FDRE Constitution, ownership
of land is vested in the state and the people, while ownership of building is given to
the individual. It means, the land surface and the building over the land are owned
by two separate bodies. On the other hand, unless and until they are separated from
the land, trees and crops are considered as part of the land (Article 1133 Civil
Code). In other words, “land” signifies the ground and other fixtures to the land
such as trees, grass, crops, excepting buildings and other similar erections.
In this chapter, land rights are referring to set of legally guaranteed entitlements
or privileges which emanate by being an owner of the land. They may also be
referred to as bundle of right or attributes of ownership. Ownership has not been
defined in the Roman law or the French Civil Code, which is the main source of the
Ethiopian Civil Code. The Romans were not concerned with theoretical definitions,
and as Johnston, in his book, Roman Law in Context, remarked, “The best approach
(taken by the Romans) seems to deal with the main attributes of ownership and
from that allow the meaning of the term to emerge.”5 The attributes of ownership,
according to the Roman law, are usus—the right to use the thing; fructus—the right
to collect benefit offered by a thing; abusus—the right to dispose of a good either
physically (destruction), or from a legal point of view (alienation-transfer gratu-
itously or for consideration).6 In Anglo-American legal system, ownership is best
described as bundle of rights, lists of loosely attached and transferable rights.

3
Aubry and Rau, supra note 1, p. 182.
4
1960. The Civil Code of Ethiopia. Negarit Gazeta: Gazette Extraordinary. Proclamation
No. 165/1960. Hereinafter Civil Code.
5
Johnston, D. 1999. Roman Law in Context, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 22.
6
Munteanu, C. 2005. Historical Remarks on the Legal Notion of Property. Acta Universitatis
Lucian Blaga, 54, p. 58.
2.1 Introduction 29

Some of the land rights which emanate from ownership are the right of use and
enjoyment, right of collecting benefit by renting and leasing, right to give as
mortgage, alienating for consideration such as exchange or sale, and alienating for
free such as inheritance and donation.7

2.2 Land Ownership Regimes

Before proceeding to the discussion of ownership, it is important to provide an

explanation on the nature of land ownership in Ethiopia first. As shall be raised and
discussed in different parts of this dissertation, the Ethiopian land is governed under
two proclamations and provides two classes of land rights. From the outset one
needs to know that land belongs to the common ownership of the Ethiopian people
and the state, and hence it is not subject to sale or other means of exchange. For this
reason, rural farmers and pastoralists are given a right called “holding right” that
provides rights of use and enjoyment, lease/rent, and bequeath (donation or
inheritance). Obviously, this right is short of ownership because of the absence of
the sole right of selling the land. Similarly, urban residents can get land under lease
agreement that guarantees a 99 years use right on the land. Even if the land may be
transferred by sale together with the development or without it (bare land only), it is
highly restricted which makes it also short of ownership (details are presented under
Sects. 2.6.4 and 2.6.5).
Therefore, when it comes to the classifications of the land regimes in Ethiopia, it
is not made from pure ownership right perspective, but from the “holding right”
perspective.
Honoré, in his seminal article, Ownership, conceives ownership as “the greatest
interest in a thing which mature systems of law recognize.”8 Looking into existing
Civil Codes one may find similar expression in the renowned French Civil Code.
The Code under Article 544 describes “Ownership” as “the right to enjoy and
dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way
prohibited by statutes or regulations.” Similarly, the Ethiopian Civil Code under
Article 1204 explains ownership as “the widest right that may be had on a corporeal
thing;” and “such right may neither be divided nor restricted except in accordance
with the law.” In other words, of all property rights a person has over an object,
ownership is the widest and most complete one; and yet, this right may be restricted
for public health, safety, security etc. reasons sanctioned by law.

7
See for example Honoré, A. M. 1961. Ownership. In: A.G. Guest (ed.) Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. He provides list eleven attributes (property
rights) found in any advanced legal system which may also be called bundle of rights: the right to
the possess; the right to use; the right to manage; the right to the income; the right to the capital; the
right to security; the right to transmitting; the absence of any term on possession; a duty to prevent
harm; and the liability to execution, p. 165–179.
8
Ibid., p. 108.
30 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

Land may be held in one of the following four ownership regimes: private,
communal, state or open access. The physical characteristics of the natural resource,
social circumstances, technology change, or population growth dictate one of the
above forms of property ownership solution.9 The idea is to own some land in one
form (e.g. Private, common, state or open access) may be more appropriate perhaps
from ensuring economic efficiency, for conservation/management of resource, for
avoidance of conflict(ensuring justice) or for other reasons instead of another one.
For instance, to hold grazing land in common may be wise than using it privately
(to avoid conflict and ensure justice) or in open access (to conserve the resource).
Assume the grazing land in a village is owned by one individual while other
villagers have no access or alternative food for their cattle. Obviously, people will
feel that the arrangement is unjust and they may resort to violence to get access. As
Anthony Scott has noted, “The mere existence of the institution of private property
is not sufficient to ensure the efficient management of natural resources; the
property must be allocated on a scale sufficient to ensure that one management has
complete control of the asset.”10 As argued by most property right theorists, the cost
of preserving the asset (grazing land) may be higher than the benefit gained from it,
and this makes the ownership unworthy.
On the other hand, if the land is open to all, then the result will be the immediate
depletion and exhaustion of the resource, in this case the grass. In a word, there is
always some kind of rationality behind some form of property ownership
arrangement. In the following sub-topics, an attempt is made to discuss the nature
of the four types of property regimes mentioned above. Based on the current
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (hereafter FDRE) Rural Land Adminis-
tration and Use Proclamation (hereafter RLAUP) and the Civil Code, we shall also
identify what kind of land falls under which regime in Ethiopia.

2.2.1 Private Ownership

Private ownership is a property arrangement in which full and exclusive rights to

decide about the property are given to a single person (natural or artificial) or group
of persons. The owner shall have the right to use, possess, receive income from it,
or alienate it gratuitously or for consideration. As mentioned earlier, in countries
following the Roman law system, the usual way to describe ownership rights is of
usus, fructus, and abusus. Modern writers add one important element to these
rights: the right to exclude others from using and possessing the property.11

9
Stevenson, G. G. 1991. Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use
Applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 4.
10
Scott, A. D. 1955. The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership. Journal of Political
Economy 63, 116–124, p. 116.
11
Snare, F. 1972. The Concept of Property. American Philosophical Quarterly, 9.
2.2 Land Ownership Regimes 31

The experiences of many countries concerning land show that farming plots,
residential land plots, buildings, easements (streets to serve the land property) are
owned privately. In western countries, forest land, small lakes, streets and rural
roads are also subject to private ownership.
The current governing land legislations in Ethiopia are mainly the FDRE Rural
Land Administration and Use (RLAUP) 456/2005 and the Urban Land Lease
Proclamation 711/2011, which are in place to govern rural and urban land
respectively. Besides, the FDRE Constitution, FDRE Expropriation Proclamation
455/2005, and the Ethiopian Civil Code are relevant. Based on the above review,
when one looks at the land ownership in Ethiopia, the ground (surface earth) is not
subject to private ownership (see Article 40(3) of FDRE constitution). Land belongs
to the state and the people, and is not subject of sale and exchange. This means that
it is futile to classify the land paradigms in Ethiopia from pure ownership per-
spective. Rather, the land right provided, as termed in the RLAUP, is known as
“holding right.” It is less of ownership in that the holder lacks the power of sale and
exchange12 (details are given in Sect. 2.6).
Based on the above information, when one looks into the FDRE RLAUP
456/2005, one finds under Article 2(11), “private holdings” referring to private
farming plots given to peasant farmers, pastoralists and semi-pastoralists. It is not
clear about the private plots to be given to pastoralists, though. But, the assumption
is that the plots may be those which the pastoralists will use for settlement or
housing, rather than for grazing, which is communal in nature. Private land plots
that are provided to peasants in the highlands are used for farming and housing. In
urban area, land that is acquired through lease or government grant is considered as
a private possession.

2.2.2 Communal Property

As opposed to private ownership, communal ownership is a property right allo-

cation made in the interest of group of users. Here, there is no single individual in a
privileged position to control and have command over all of the resources. In a
system of communal property, rules governing access to and control of material
resources are organized on the basis that each resource is, in principle, available for
the use of every member alike. As noted by Clark and Kohler, writers on property

12
FDRE Rural Land Administration and Land Use Proclamation, Proclamation No. 456/2005.
Negarit Gazeta. Year 11, No. 44. (hereinafter FDRE RLAUP) Article 2(4) defines “holding right”
as “the right of any peasant farmer, semi-pastoralist and pastoralist… to use rural land for purpose
of agriculture and natural resource development, lease and bequeath to members of his family or
other lawful heirs, and includes the right to acquire property produced on his land… by his labour
or capital and to sale, exchange and bequeath same”.
32 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

law, “The defining characteristic of communal property is that every member of the
community has the right not to be excluded from the resource.”13 In principle, the
needs and wants of every person are considered, and when allocative decisions are
made they are made on a basis that is in some sense fair to all.14
The most usual types of properties owned in common are grazing lands, forest
lands, fisheries, irrigation systems, underground water, water wells, village roads,
neighborhood streets, and so on.
The common feature of such properties is that they are not destined to an
exclusive use of an individual person; every member of the community wants them
equally. The other feature is that most of them are exhaustible, if left to anybody as
open or free access. Even in case of allocation of such properties to specific part of
society, the resources may be quickly depleted and individual members may not be
encouraged to conserve unless the use and enjoyment is regulated by an internal
sets of rules.
This is because people tend to care less for what is common as compared to what
is their own. As modern economists argue, when the incentive to care and conserve
is less than the cost of so doing, people will not go for conservation. One such
modern economic theorist is Harold Demsetz, who argues that people give less care
to what is common property, since the cost of taking care is higher than the benefit
gained. The primary function of private property becomes a guiding incentive to
achieve a greater “internalization of externalities.”15 In this way, individuals are
made to bear the costs and benefits of their own activities, and to absorb the costs of
inflicting spillover effects upon others.
According to Demsetz, if land is held in common, it is likely each user will not
feel the full impact, in terms of the benefits but particularly the costs of his use.
When, for example, many individuals use a forest to produce wood, no one has an
incentive to increase the forest population (e.g. by replanting when a tree is cut),
since the benefits of his doing so will redound to others as well as himself. In other
words, while he internalizes (suffers from or is burdened with) the costs of planting
trees, it will be others who will reap the benefit. If this is the case, any rational
person will not invest his money and time for the care of the forest land, unless he is
sure that the benefit of his doing is by far greater than the cost he incurred; or at
least that he is sure that others will also do the same.
In the absence of such assurance, the common property will be depleted quickly
and will face what Hardin called “The Tragedy of the Commons”, a situation where
common or open access resources exhausted quickly by unregulated

13
Clarke, A. & Kohler, P. 2005. Property Law: Commentary and Materials, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, p. 36.
14
Waldron, J. 1988. The Right to Private Property, Oxford, clarendon press, p. 41.
15
Demsetz, H. 1967. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. The American Economic Review, 57,
347–359, p. 348.
2.2 Land Ownership Regimes 33

overexploitation.16 For this reason privatizing the land resource or setting internal
rules are usually come up as solutions to the problem.
The difference between private ownership and communal ownership is that
while in the former case the owner can sell his property, in the latter case, owner
members may not be able to transfer their right by way of sale, especially to
non-members.
Furthermore, in a well-functioning communal property situation, the users have
certain rights and duties among themselves with respect to possession, use, and
enjoyment of benefits from the resource. For example, in a regulated irrigation
system, all participants have the right to divert water for specific time; they also
have the correlate duty of not exceeding their assigned rate so as not to interfere
with others’ water flow. Although by and large the internal rules governing the use
of the common property are prepared by the members themselves, their enforce-
ment or implementation may need state intervention.17
In Ethiopia according to Article 2(12) of the FDRE RLAUP 456/2005, “com-
munal holding” is “rural land which is given by the government to local residents
for common grazing, forestry and other social services.” This list is just an illus-
trative one and what are given are only examples. The government may allocate
additional land as communal ones, if the local community needs it for some social
or economic activities. Thus, land necessary for religious ceremonies, cultural
festivities, or social gatherings may be permanently allocated to the village com-
munity in common. Besides grazing and forest land, one may also add irrigation
systems (although the irrigable land may be private holding), water wells (espe-
cially in pastoralist areas), small rivers, hills,18 etc. to the list of communal lands.

2.2.3 State Ownership of Land

To describe “state ownership” of land, terms like “public ownership”, “collective

ownership” or “government ownership” are also employed. Under the 1960 Ethi-
opian Civil Code, the term “public domain” is used for the same purpose. In any
case, in this discussion, they shall be used interchangeably as the need arises.

16
Hardin, G. 1968. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248. The concept has
further been used to explain overexploitation in fisheries, overgrazing, air and water pollution,
abuse of public lands, population problems, extinction of species, fuel-wood depletion, misallo-
cation in oil and natural gas extraction, groundwater depletion, wildlife decline, and other prob-
lems of resource misallocation.
17
For a better understanding on the nature of a well functioning communal property see generally
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
18
For example in the past 2 years the government has been transferring holding right of hills and
small mountains to the local people in order the hills to be forested and protected.
34 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

In order to give additional explanation on the subject, it is proper to see the usage
of the terms in some literature and legislations. The terms “state or government
ownership” seem to denote the ownership of land by the political body, a central or
municipal level, while “public or collective ownership” seems to signify the
ownership of land by all the people or by the local community. It does not mean,
however, that this definition would be fully acceptable; one has to rely on the
legislation of the respective country to decide the actual meanings. Writers on
property and land ownership, though, use the above terms interchangeably.19
Equally, others give different meanings. For example, the Chinese Land Law treats
“collective ownership” and “state ownership” differently. Collective is understood
as a village land committee, and farmers are forced to lease farm lands from these
committees:
According to the 1982 Constitution…the structure of land ownership seems relatively clear
that, in principle, natural resources and urban land are state-owned, while suburban and
rural lands are collectively owned.20

In any case, what is important is to know that material resources are answerable
to the needs and purposes of society as a whole, irrespective of the fact that the
decision maker is the central government, a special national committee, or a village
committee. The assumption is that even though it is the state which owns the land,
the objective is to use it in the best interest of society in general. For example, in
many countries21 urban land owned by city municipalities or local governments is
used to benefit society, such as the provision for low cost housing.
Practically, there are no real differences between the dichotomy of the “state or
government” on one hand, and the “collective or public” ownership of land on the
other. My argument is that since the government, as a political body, puts itself as
the representative of the people, the power of administration and allocation of land
property is, most of the time, vested in the hands of the state, and hence the state
becomes the sole decision maker. If, for example, we look into the land ownership

19
For instance Philip Kivell, in his writing on the English and other European countries land
ownership by central or municipal governments, uses the term “public ownership” of land to
replace “state ownership” of land (see generally Kivell, P. 1993. Land and the City: Patterns and
processes of urban change, London, Routledge.; Kivell, P. & McKay 1988. Public Ownership of
Urban Land. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series, 13, 165–178.).
Similarly Jeremy Waldron, fuses both “collective ownership” and “state ownership” as giving the
same meaning when he comments: “sometimes, collective property is presented as special type of
private ownership with the state as the equivalent of a private owner” (Waldron, supra note 14,
p. 40.). Further in her critical work on Property, Margaret Davies, employed “government” and
“public ownership” equivalently (Davies, M. 2007. Property: meanings, histories, theories, New
York, Routledge-Cavendish, p. 64).
20
Ho, P. 2005. Institutions in Transition: Land Ownership, Property Rights, and Social Conflict
in China, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 28.
21
See generally Kivell: 1988, 1992, supra note 19; Bourassa, S. C. & Hong, Y.-H. 2003. Leasing
Public Land: International experiences, Cambridge, Massachusetts Lincoln Institute of Public
policy. The writers raise many European, Asian and Australian cities where in urban land is owned
by the city municipalities or local governments.
2.2 Land Ownership Regimes 35

system in former socialist countries, land was owned by the collective or the public,
but the state was the real decision maker; citizens had use right only.22 In Ethiopia
we find the same approach in reading Articles 40(3) and 89(5) of the FDRE
Constitution, where the “state” and the “people” are considered as two joint owners
of land and natural resources, but the state is represented to administer it on behalf
of the people.
The FDRE RLAUP identifies, under Article 2(13), “forestlands, wildlife pro-
tected areas, state farms, mining lands, lakes, rivers and other rural lands,” as state
holding lands. In this case, “other rural lands” means all land which is not held
privately or communally. State land in Ethiopia means, land held by Federal or
Regional government or by city municipalities. Rural land held by Regional gov-
ernments is administered by woredas, while urban land is administered by
respective city/town administrations. This means woredas and city administrations
have the power to give and take land. The Federal government holds vast tracts of
land found in lowland rural areas of the country destined to be transferred for large-
scale agricultural investments.
All urban land which is not occupied by private lessees is held by the govern-
ment/municipality. Although it is not mentioned in the current lease proclamation,
one can assume that all city streets, sewerage systems, parks, highways, and empty
spaces must belong to the state.
One question that may be raised is that what can be done if the new land
proclamations (urban and rural) fail to address all the issues? Definitely, we go to
the Civil Code. It must be stressed that the land legislations must be considered as
supplements or modifications to the Civil Code. Further, since in no where the Civil
Code is clearly abrogated, as far as its provisions are not contrary to the existing
land legislations, it must continue its function. The concept of public property of
urban areas, both in the Civil Code and the current land legislations is basically
similar. Based on this argument, we may apply the Civil Code provisions on
“public domain” to determine the situation of public/state lands in urban areas.23
The Ethiopian Civil Code under Articles 1444–1459 presents the nature and
status of public lands in urban areas. To see the details, all [urban] lands owned by
the state or administrative bodies are to be treated as “private lands” or as “public
domains” (Article 1444). Although the provision lacks clarity, it must be under-
stood as follows. All land owned by the state (centrally or through its various
branches) is treated either as “private” or as “public.” “Private” means the state
organ that owns (holds in today’s situation) land will have the right to exclude
others from access and use. For example, state business enterprises (such as, banks,

22
See generally Wegren, S. K. (ed.)1998. Land Reform in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, London, Routledge. For example it is said that in Ukraine, like any other place in the then
Soviet Union, in theory, land farmed by agricultural collectives was owned by the collective. In
reality, because Ukrainian farms were subject to the USSR land code and the Model Charter for
collective farms, land was state-owned and workers on these farms assumed the same role as wage
labor in industrial enterprises, p. 49.
23
See Civil Code, Articles 1444–1459.
36 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

insurances, transport companies, telecom companies or energy companies) or

administrative bodies (such as ministry of agriculture, ministry of finance) all
happen to hold land and buildings. There is no reason that they should make their
property open to all, and such land holdings will be treated as private holdings and
governed by the civil code part that governs private property.
On the other hand, there are other types of state lands whose use and enjoyment
are put at a “public disposal”, or by their nature they are “destined to a public
service”. These are the type of land or buildings that are termed as “public domain,”
(Article 1445) and the law tries to define their character. Since the definition of their
character is not enough to identify them, the Code, under Article 1446, provides an
example of such properties: roads, streets, canals, railways; seashores, port instal-
lations and lighthouse; buildings specially adapted for public services such as
fortifications and churches. Thus, roads, streets, railways, canals are examples of
properties put at public disposal.

2.3 Land Tenure and Ownership in Ethiopia

Under the general label “land tenure,” we are concerned with the complex rela-
tionships that exist between categories of individuals and groups in reference to
land and other natural resources. These relationships can be analyzed in terms of
sets of rights and obligations held by these categories of people with regard to the
acquisition, exploitation, preservation, and transfer of land and related resources.24
A recent document published by United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) defines land tenure as a “relationship, whether legally or customarily
defined, among people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land.”25 Rules of
tenure define how property rights to land are to be allocated within societies. They
define how access is granted to rights to use, control, and transfer land, as well as
associated responsibilities and restraints. In simple terms, land tenure systems
determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions.26
For a lawyer, as discussed above, what property right implicates is an entitlement
that is enforced by law. Yet, tenure or property rights are wider than those written
down in law books and enforced by law enforcements. Land tenure also encom-
passes those property rights recognized and enforced under customary systems.
Customary land rights typically include communal grazing lands, private agricul-
tural and residential houses. These rights are evolved indigenously within the local
people. These traditional societies or groups have developed various ways of

24
Clawson, M. 1968. Land. In: Sills, D. L. (ed.) International Encyclopedia of the Social Sci-
ences. USA: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press. Id., p. 562.
25
FAO 2002. Land Tenure and Rural Development, Rome, United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization, p. 7.
26
Ibid.
2.3 Land Tenure and Ownership in Ethiopia 37

controlling land rights in different situations. These cover how land is managed in
relation to members of communities; how land rights can be transferred within the
group; and how land rights can be transferred to other persons outside the group.27
In Ethiopia, in Afar and Somalie Regions customary land tenure is still opera-
tional. Most of the time, community leaders and clan chiefs are at the center of the
allocation and enforcement of rights.28 For generations, land rights in Ethiopia were
governed and enforced by customary system. It was only after the 1960s and 1970s,
that some legal measurements that changed the old system were introduced,
especially with regard to rural land. In this section, an attempt is made to discuss the
three types of tenure systems in Ethiopia, based on the historical, legal and political
ideologies of the periods.

2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia

Pre-1975 Ethiopia is generally characterized as a feudal state, where most of the

land was controlled by the state and feudal lords, and in which citizens were using
land under different tenure arrangements. Such tenure arrangements were custom-
ary by nature and numerous in numbers. Before 1975, there were several types of
land tenure systems which differed from province to province. For the sake of
convenience and because of historical factors, the land tenures will be classified as
northern and southern following the geography of the country. But, before that, let
us see the powers and prerogatives of rulers and emperors of the time.

2.4.1 Land and Imperial Prerogatives

As quoted in Pankhurst, Job Ludolf, a seventeenth century German historian, is said

to summarize the power of Ethiopian kings as follows: “The power of the

27
Arko-Adjei, A. 2011. Adapting Land Administration to the Institutional Framework of Cus-
tomary Tenure: The case of Peri-urban Ghana, Amsterdam, TUDelft, p. 20.
28
See generally, Kabtamu-Niguse. 2012. Land Tenure and Tenure Security Among Somali
Pastoralists: Within the Context of Dual Tenure System. LL.M thesis, Bahir Dar University,
School of Law. As quoted in Kabtamu’s thesis, the government land policy of the Somalie
Regional State confirms the complete control of land by traditional chiefs rather than by gov-
ernment organs: “Because of the fact that all rural land in the region is administered by clan leaders
under the traditional land administration system, government institutions, investors and others who
are in need of rural land should negotiate with clan leaders who determine the amount of com-
pensation. Thus, the willingness of clan leaders are necessary as both the access to land and the
amounts of compensations are determined by the clan leaders and not by government agency,”
p. 128.
38 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

Abyssinian Kings is absolute, as well in Ecclesiastical as Civil Affairs.”29 Other

travelers and writers also testified that Ethiopian monarchs had been absolute over
the people and their objects.30 Concerning land, the general claim, in the feudalistic
Ethiopia, was that all land belonged to the king. Thus, all land rights emanated from
the benevolent gift of the king to his subjects and the Church. The ideological
background behind such claim was that land was acquired through conquest of
local tribes by the Ethiopian kings to whom the land of the conquered was trans-
ferred in ownership as spoil of war. The state demanded an obligation of tribute
from all land (except those which belonged to the church), as tax obligation was
attached to land rather than a person.31 The idea of royal ownership of all land in
Ethiopia was documented by royal chroniclers of different kings.32 For example,
upon the purchase of land by king Lalibela (1200–1250) to construct his well
known rock hewn churches in Roha, his hagiographer asked rhetorically to show
the traditional power of the monarch in the distribution of lands: “who would have
forbidden the king if he had decided to take the land [without purchase]?”33 In his
famous conflict with the monastic leaders, Emperor Amda-Sion (1314–1344) is said
to have demanded their absolute obedience to him because they lived ‘on the land
of the king’. His son and successor, Sayfe-Arad (1344–72), is also said to have
made the claim that ‘God gave (all the) land to me’.34 A more practical example of
this royal prerogative over land is furnished by the abundant records of land grants
made by Ethiopian kings in their name to various churches and monasteries.35

29
Pankhurst, R. 1966. State and Land in Ethiopian History, Addis Ababa, The Institute of
Ethiopian Studies and the Faculty of Law, Haile Sellasie I University, p. 1.
30
During his stay in Ethiopia in the 16th century, the Portuguese priest, Francisco Alvarez,
testifies that the power of the king was absolute (Alvarez, F. 1970 (Originally translated by John
Stanley in 1881). Narrative of the Portuguese Embassy to Abyssinia During the Years 1520–1527,
London, The Hakluyt Society.). A 100 years latter Almeida (a Jesuit priest) said “the Emperor
confiscates and grants all the lands as and to whom he chooses.” (See Pankhurst: 1966 (Ibid),
p. 121.) James Bruce a 17th century Scottish traveler to Ethiopia has also declared that “all the land
is the king’s; he gives to whom he pleases during pleasure and resumes it when it is his will; but
the crown makes no violent use of its power in that respect” (Paul, J. C. N. & Clapham, C. 1972.
Ethiopian Constitutional Development I, a Source Book, Addis Ababa, Haile Sellassie I University
and Oxford University Press, p. 290.). An Ethiopian writer and Minister during the Imperial period
also noted: “the Ethiopian Emperor has an uncontested and boundless power over the territories he
rules. He is both the temporal and spiritual ruler” (Id., p. 58).
31
Ras Alula and Ras Gugissa, two famous governors of different part of the country, have once
said to be declared that “Man is free, land tributary”.
32
Generally see Pankhurst: 1996, supra note 29.
33
Taddesse-Tamrat 1972. Church and State in Ethiopia, 1270–1527, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
p. 98.
34
Ibid.
35
See for example Huntingford, G. W. B. 1965. The Land Charters of Northern Ethiopia, Addis
Ababa, Institute of Ethiopian Studies and the Faculty of Law, Haile Sellassie I University.;
Crummey, D. 2000. Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia: From the Thirteenth
to the Twentieth Century, USA, University of illinois Press.
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 39

2.4.2 Land Tenure System in Northern Ethiopia

The northern part of Ethiopia is the cradle of Ethiopian civilization. It is believed that
after the establishment of the state at the northern city of Axum, around 100 B.C,
it slowly expanded southward until it took its present shape during the late nine-
teenth century.36 As shown above, although all land was considered property of the
emperors, it was distributed to different users on different conditions. Hence, the land
tenure system in the northern part of feudalistic Ethiopia may generally be classified
as private holdings, church lands and state lands.

[Link] Private Holdings (Gult vs. Rist Land)

For centuries, Ethiopian rulers had been distributing land to the nobility and
peasants in the form of gult and rist rights respectively. The natures of gult and rist
rights are fully addressed by the definition that Hoben, an anthropologist, gives to
the terms in his widely read book.37 Hoben writes that gult rights entail “fief-
holding rights” whereas rist rights confer “land-use rights.”38 Other writers,39 as
well, agree that gult (fief) rights confer the ruling class (bale-gult) rights of
collecting tribute, judicial and administrative powers as well as military mobiliza-
tion over the people occupying the land. And those people who actually occupy and
farm the land had a rist (use) right to the land.
The recorded history about gult shows that it started at least during the four-
teenth century.40 A lord who is provided a vast tract of land (3–4 square miles
according to Hoben) as a gult will administer the people occupying it as holders of
rist, collect tribute from them, adjudicate cases arising among them, and use the
able bodies as soldiers during war times. He would retain part of the tribute as a fee
for his services and fully use fees and fines he imposed in his power as a judge.
However, the gult holder had no rights of produce over the land although he may
cultivate part of the land for his private purpose using free local labor.
Referring to a 1917 book, Handbook of Abyssinia, written by an anonymous
writer about the gult system in Tigray, the Northern part of Ethiopia, the historian
Shiferaw Bekele describes the job description of gult-holder as follows:

36
See for example Marcus, H. G. 1994. A History of Ethiopia, Los Angeles, University of
California Press, pp. 10–11, it is said that the drive southward was characterized by the implan-
tation of military colonies followed by feudal like social order, and priests and monks acted as
instrument of pacification and acculturation.
37
Hoben, A. 1973. Land Tenure Among the Amhara of Ethiopia: The Dynamics of Cognatic
Descent Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
38
Id., p. 5.
39
See for example Markakis, J. 2006. Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, Addis Ababa,
Shama Books.; and Crummey: 2000, supra note 35.
40
Taddesse-Tamrat, supra note 33, p. 98.
40 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

The gult-holder, assisted by the local official (shum-adi), fixes the proportion of the state
due which each adi (parish) must pay; he also acts as a court of appeal in civil and criminal
matters from judgments of the shum-adi; he is responsible for peace and order in his gult
and is, of course, the military chief of the district. In return for this he (a) has his land
cultivated free of charge by the ristenyatat (rist holders); (b) receives all of the fines which
he may impose in his judicial capacity; keeps a part, generally one-tenth, of the tribute
collected by him; and (c) receives certain presents, example a sheep from each parish at
Easter.41

Since gult was a kind of public office instead of land right, as a matter of
principle, it was not transferable by inheritance or by sale. Of course, when the
ruler/emperor wishes, the office might be passed to descendants. As exception,
however, the historian Donald Crummey argues otherwise, based on his study of
the seventeenth century Gonderine era. Without abandoning the view that gult was
essentially a tribute right, Crummey argues that gult rights were transferred by sale
and inheritance without necessarily involving the state.42 This is, however, an
exception to the Ethiopian history of property right.
Rist rights, in contrast to gult rights, were land-use rights. In principle, they were
hereditary and could be held by lords and peasants alike. Rist rights were land use
rights claimed by a member of a kin from members of his/her generations of same
ancestor. As described by Hoben, a single estate of gult land, comprising a few
square miles, included within its boundaries strip fields, held as rist by scores or
even hundreds of farmers. The gult holder might also hold some fields as rist within
his estate of gult land.43
For all practical purposes, rist land was like private ownership except the holder
lacked the right to sell the land. The peasant could be able to use, rent, and inherit
the land to family members. In exchange, peasants were obliged to make payment
for variety land related taxes. Selling the land to non-family members was pro-
hibited. Land was then transferred in the form of inheritance from family to children
for generations, which over time reduced the size of the farm lands.
In north Ethiopia, the rist land may have originated with ancestral first holders
through government grant for a loyal service, clearance of forest, or perhaps pur-
chase. Then, the land remained within the family forever and descendants would get
a share of it irrespective of their presence or absence in the area. This land was held
communally by the lineage and was not subject to sale and alienation. It was a
common custom in many places that a person wishing to sell his share must transfer
it to one of the lineage members; outsiders were not allowed to buy the land. In the
north, thanks to this kind of land-holding system, a peasant could claim a plot of
land as long as he could trace his descent. Tenancy in this part of the country was
very minimal compared to the southern part. Some argue that the use-right was
secured in the sense that political authorities, including the Emperor, or landlords

41
Shiferaw-Bekele 1995. The Evolution of Land Tenure in the Imperial Era. In: Shiferaw, B.
(ed.) An Economic History of Ethiopia: The Imperial Era 1941–1974. Dakar: CODESRIA, p. 97.
42
See generally Crummey: 2000, supra note 35.
43
Hoben, supra note 37, p. 5.
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 41

refrained from interventions. As a result, “there was less tenure insecurity or fear of
being evicted from the rist land.”44 The other character of rist in the north was that
the land became highly fragmented because of the ad infinitum division of family
land for many generations. Land disputes related to rist land claims were rampant in
that they constituted 45 % of civil cases in court.45
The obligations of the rist holders were mainly two. The first was giber (land
tax), which mostly amounted to one fifth of the produce or some form of fixed
obligation delivered in kind that would be shared between the local gult-holder and
the central state; and second, asrat (tithe) in which one-tenth of all crops grown had
to be paid to the state.46 These are the two known legal obligations of the peasants
although there were other informal obligations claimed by the nobility.47 According
to the historian Bahru Zewde, the peasant’s “control over his produce and labor
time, was limited by the claims of the nobility, both lay and clerical.”48 The peasant
was forced “to undertake courvéé (forced labor) such as farming, grinding corn, and
building houses and fences that claimed up to one-third of his time.”49 The rist
holder or the peasant was also known as gabbar (which comes from the root word
gibir, tax/tribute) which means tribute/tax payer.

[Link] Government Land

In the socio-political system of the time, institutions did not have any mechanism of
collecting tributes in kind or cash and redistributing them to their staff in turn. What
was done was to parcel out the land and give it to the individuals who would keep
the institution going.50 As we shall discuss below, land was distributed to soldiers,
priests, local administrators, judges, and state servants at various levels as remu-
neration for their service throughout the country. Modern state machinery with
salaried soldiers and civil servants is of recent origin; it came after the Second
World War. Therefore, land owned by the government was distributed to different
people on the condition of serving the state at different levels. Such land might be
reverted to the state in the event of non fulfillment of the obligation by the holder of
the land.

44
Clapham, C. 1988. Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
45
Ministry-of-Information 1968. Yemeret Yizota be Hibretesebawit Ethiopia (Land Possession in
the Republic of Ethiopia), Addis Ababa, p. 51.
46
Hoben, supra note 37, p. 77.
47
For instance Gebre-Wold-Ingida work, infra note 52, p. 306, listed down 24 types of duties
paid or carried out by the peasant to the state or local authorities. Some of those duties had been
abolished during the early 21st century.
48
Bahru-Zewde 1991. A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855–1974, Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa
University Press, p. 14.
49
Id., p. 15.
50
Shiferaw-Bekele, supra note 41, p. 94.
42 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

Shiferaw Bekele51 argues that the whole land tenure arrangement was designed
on some kind of implicit condition. Peasants were obliged to pay tax and to render
manual services to the local gentry in exchange for the land rights they received. A
peasant who failed to pay tax would loss his land. Church land had been distributed
among member of the clergy and lay people on the condition that they would serve
the church in different capacities, and failure to fulfill these obligations would cause
the forfeiture of the land rights. Government land had also been distributed among
different people on condition that they would continue to serve the state. The grand
design in the whole property arrangement was that land was serving as a means to
run the state functionary. In the old days since gold and silver was not found in
abundance,52 the government had heavily relied in the land under its control to run
the state.53 This is done in two ways, by giving land in lieu of salary to those who
directly serve the state and by collecting tax tributes in kind from those who farm
the land, which it may use for different purposes.
Generally speaking, state land is one which is categorized neither as private rist
land nor church land. The two Ethiopian writers on traditional land tenure, Mah-
teme-Sellassie54 and Gebre-Wold-Ingida Work,55 provided us with various types of
state land tenure. The list is long but, here, we reproduce few of them in order to
show its nature. As stated above, land was provided to different people based on the
service they rendered to the state and the names given to the land rights correlated
to the obligations attached to them.

a. Melkagna Rist/riste-gult/siso-gult
According to this system, rist land was given to the malkagna or balabat, local
gentry, because he cleared the forest and started to cultivate it. In other situations, a
balabat who fought local tribes together with the king and brought about a lot of
land to the state was given a rist as a reward, which should remain in his generation
permanently, a semi-freehold right. In addition, such a person was also given a
larger area as his gult. It means, out of the vast area of land given to him as his gult
land, he also got some land as his rist land. Hence, the rist-gult holder would have
the right to the whole produce from his land, and also a right to claim a third as
tribute and a tenth (as tithe) from those who cultivate on the rest of his gult land.

b. Maderia Land
Maderia land was land granted for life, mainly, to government officials, war vet-
erans, and other patriots in lieu of a pension or salary, but the state possessed a

51
Id., p. 94–96.
52
Gebre-Wold-Ingida, W. 1962. Ethiopia's Traditional System of Land Tenure and Taxation.
Ethiopia Observer, 5, pp. 302–339.
53
Shiferaw, supra note 41.
54
Gebre Wold Engida, W., supra note 52.
55
Mahteme-Selassie, W. M. 1957. The Land System of Ethiopia. Ethiopia Observer, 1.; Mah-
teme-Sellassie, W. M. 1970. Zekre Neger, Addis Ababa, 2nd ed., pp. 107–119.
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 43

reversionary right over these land grants. In other words, it was temporarily given to
government civil servants who were assigned to work in some locality in lieu of
salary and it was returned to the state or given out to others when the civil servant
was transferred or sometimes dismissed from his position.

c. Ginde-Bel Land
Ginde-bel Land is land given to persons who maintain government works of var-
ious types, such as ye-zemach meret, land belonged to soldiery, beklo kelabi meret,
land given to those who look after government mules and horses, dingay felach
meret, land given to those who work in the production of quarry for the con-
struction of palaces, medf chagn meret, land given to those who carry and transport
guns and cannons to battle front, dinkuan chagn meret, land given to those who
carry and transport imperial tents, atkilt tekay meret, land given to those who plant
trees and others in the compound of the royal palace, postegna meret, land
belonging to those who transport mails and posts. These people were free from
payment of land tax, but responsible for the asrat (tithe) one. The idea is that land
was given for their services to the state and that they would be allowed to own it as
far as they continue providing the services.

d. Were-genu, Balderas meret

Were-genu is land used for the raising of government cattle. The persons looking
after such livestock were allowed to have maderia land of their own. In other
words, the Were-genu land is dedicated to the feeding and raising of cattle and
production of butter, both for the consumption of the royal palace. Similarly,
Balderas meret is land held by peasants and reserved for the raising of government
horses and mules.

e. Ganne-geb/maad-bet meret
Gann is a large container of Ethiopian local beer made of clay and maad-bet means
kitchen, indicating that this type of land is related to the land selected for the
production of food to the imperial palace. Since it was a custom for the monarchs to
throw (hold) a big traditional feast (gebir) now and then, the palace needed a huge
amount of food, either produced on such land or collected in the form of tax.
Soldiers or peasants who worked on these lands were expected to supply the royal
household with grains grinded once every year.

[Link] Church Land

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church had been the biggest beneficiary of state land grant
since its establishment in the early fourth century at Axum (Ethiopian capital from
1st BC–8th AD). There is certain amount of evidence to suggest that the Cathedral
of the Saint Mary at Axum, the monasteries of Abba Garima, and Debre Damo and
44 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

several other religious establishments received grants of land at this time from the
state.56 The traditional practice was for the sovereign to endow cathedrals, churches
and monasteries with land as well as to give land to the ecclesiastics in attendance
upon them.57 The historical records also show that such grants continued well up to
the 21st century. Until the coming of the revolution in 1974, the church was said to
be controlling one third of the land in the country.
This generous benefaction of the state was later on incorporated into the Fitha
Negest (Law of the Kings), which in Ethiopian legal history, was considered as the
first written legal document.58 Concerning land grants and the waiver of tribute/land
tax, Section 40, No. 1540 cum. 1541 of the Fitha Negest reads as follows:
Let the king give honor to the order of the clergy, as did Constantine the Elect, faithful and
righteous king; and as did others who followed him. Let the king be generous with his
wealth. Let he give to each of them according to their ranks. First of all, the king shall give
presents to the bishops; then to the priests, next to the deacons, and then to those who are
below them. He shall exempt them from tributes, presents, and the other favors to be paid to
the rulers. Let him assign something to the churches for the maintenance of the widows, the
orphans and the poor, so that they may entreat God to reaffirm the true faith with the benefit
in the Holy Trinity…59

Church lands were thus the most privileged since they were free from payments of
tributes and land taxes.60 This doesn’t mean, however, that the cultivators of the land
would be exempted from payment of land tax; on the contrary, they were equally
responsible like any other peasant. This means, tax and tributes collected from the
person who cultivated the land would be going to the church coffer instead of that of
the government. In this way, churches were expected to support themselves.
Usually, the land given to the churches and monasteries, as gult land, was vast61
and the church was not expected to cultivate it. Rather, the church land was

56
Pankhurst: 1966, supra note 29, p. 22.
57
Ibid.
58
The Fitha Negest (Law of the Kings) is a sophisticated compilation of legal prescriptions
concerning both religious and secular matters written in approximately the 13th century in Egypt
as a guide to Christian population living within the Moslem society. Originally written in Arabic,
and incorporating laws from Old and New testament, Roman law, and some Moslem principles
and the proceedings of the early councils of Nicaea and Antioch, it is believed that it was translated
to Geez (official state and church language of ancient Ethiopia) in the 15th century, during the
reign of Emperor Zera Yaqob (1434–1468).
59
Fitha Negest (Amharic and Geez Version). Addis Ababa: Tesfa-Gebre-Sellassie Printing Press.
44: 1540–1541, p. 380.
60
Of course, this right was revoked in 1942 by Decree for the Administration of all Church Lands
(Decree No. 2 of 1942), which ordered that church lands should pay tax (to the government) at the
same rate as secular lands. See the full text in Mahteme-Sellassie: 1957, supra note 55, pp. 300,
301.
61
See for example, Crummey, D. & Shumet-Sishagne 1991. Land Tenure and the Social
Accumulation of Wealth in Eighteenth-Century Ethiopia: Evidence from the Qwesqwam Land
Register. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 24, 241–258, p. 247, where it is
mentioned that Emperor Iyasu II (1730–1755) and Etege Mentewab, the dowager empress, granted
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 45

distributed among the people who served it. These people could be from among the
clergy or lay men who supported and served the church in different capacities. Just
like the peasant paid his tax to the government, they paid their taxes to be used by
the church. The general name used for such type of tenure arrangement was Samon
Land. Such land use was, however, as emphasized by Shiferaw above, conditional
in that they had to continue to serve the church by themselves or through proxy. In
most cases, priestly families had to see that one of their children became a priest. As
Alvarez, the sixteenth century Portuguese traveler to Ethiopia, observed: “the sons
of the priests are for most part priests…”62 This fact has survived even in modern
history, as summarized by Markakis as follows:
There is a tendency among the clergy to preserve continuity and privilege within the family
by passing on the priestly office from one generation to the next. A priest family will
normally train one of its sons to enter the service of the church. Since the church provides
traditional education, it is not difficult to get it. In this manner, the family preserves its
rights over church land. Even if a family does not produce a priest from among its
members, it seldom surrenders the land it holds under Samon rights; it simply arranges for a
priest to discharge its obligations to the church, or may even pay a certain amount regularly
to the administrator of the church in lieu of services.63

Concerning the proxy service, Shiferaw, in his study of land grants of five big
churches in Addis Ababa, discussed some interesting facts: that six of the holders of
Samon land, provided to the church of Enteto Mariam were Moslems.64 This means
that although the original holders of the land might be Christians and probably
priests, their descendants had changed their faith to Islam, and have continued to
maintain the land by fulfilling their obligation to the church through proxy services.

2.4.3 Land Tenure System in Southern Ethiopia

The southern, south eastern and south western provinces of Ethiopia were brought
under Emperor Menelik’s rule during the last third of the nineteenth century, above
all between 1875 and 1889,65 and most land of the southern people was expro-
priated/confiscated and alienated to northerners. In areas where the people accepted
Menelik’s rule voluntarily, traditional chiefs were allowed to retain their position

(Footnote 61 continued)
to the Quesquam church in Gonder a sum of 755 gashas (1 gasha is 40 ha) of land to be distributed
among 260 debteras (church scribes).
62
Alvarez, supra note 30, p. 57.
63
Markakis, supra note 39, p. 123.
64
Shiferaw, supra note 41, pp. 93, 94.
65
Pankhurst: 1966, supra note 29, p. 136. These territories were, of course, under Ethiopian rule
up to the 15th century. Then after, because of civil war and expansion of the Oromo people from
the south, the emperors were pulling back to north and established their permanent city at Gonder.
46 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

and land.66 Landed property continued to belong to the inhabitants exactly as in the
older autonomous provinces of the northern part of the country.67 The most suc-
cessful, among these, were the present Wollega, Jimma, and Benishangul regions.
On the contrary, the land of the rebels who resisted the entry of Menelik’s forces,
after being defeated, was confiscated and distributed to nobles, the church,
Menelik’s generals and soldiers, while the people remained landless gabbars.68 The
upper elites were empowered with appropriation of all taxes for themselves by
passing a fraction of it to the sovereign. They were also given estates to cultivate for
their own use.69
Land acquired through confiscation was then distributed on three-thirds or four
quarter basis. The new rulers took either two-third or three-quarters of the land and
left the remaining fraction (one third or one quarter) to the local chief who was then
known as balabat (gentry). This last part of land is known as siso (a third) land. The
big portion of land taken by the new settlers was shared between the church and the
military based on the same principle applied in the Northern provinces. The amount
of land distribution was 1–3 gasha (1 gasha is 40 ha) for a soldier, 10 gashas for
hamsa-aleqa (commander of fifty), 20 gashas for meto-aleqa (lieutenant), 30 ga-
shas for shamble (captain)70 and so on.
Such land was granted on the basis of different conditions or names. Some are
given as rist-gult or siso–gult, such as those given to the local chiefs; some as
maderia (in lieu of salary for civil servant, war veterans, on condition of serving the
state in time of war), and some as ginda bel, on condition of carrying tents,
cannons, guarding prisoners and so on. The land given to the church was parceled
out as samon land in the same fashion as had been done in the north.
A major characteristic of the development was, thus, the allocation of land to the
new administrators and their followers, while leaving the natives landless. People
from the north were encouraged to settle in these new areas and became benefi-
ciaries of land grant or land purchase. This was done for two reasons: first, to
recompense for their service in the war, and second, in order to create “effective
occupation”71 of the newly annexed territories.
The native people, who now became landless, were paradoxically given the
name gabbars. This name did not connote the same meaning as it had in the north;
in the north the name was given for a landed peasant who paid his tax, while in the

66
The Ethiopian method for dealing with their enemies were based on the guidance offered in the
Fitha Negest: “When you reach a city or a land to fight against its inhabitants, offer them terms of
peace. If they accept you and open their gates, the men who are there shall become subjects and
shall give you tributes, but if they refuse the terms of peace and offer battle, go forward to assault
and oppress them, since the Lord your God will make you master of them.” (Markakis, supra note
39, p. 131); Fitha Negest, supra note 59, 44:1552–1555, p. 383.
67
Pankhurst: 1966, supra note 29, p. 136.
68
Shiferaw, supra note 41, p. 151.
69
Ibid.
70
Id., p. 104.
71
Crummey: 2000, supra note 35, p. 223.
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 47

south the person was landless. The gabbars in the south, rather, became servants of
those who took their land.72 Quoted by Pankhurst, C.F. Ray, a traveler to Ethiopia
by that time, reflected that the nobles and their followers had considerable
dependents upon them. The gabbar was a tenant subjected to more onerous burdens
than existed elsewhere. The gabbar was obliged to look after the settlers by cul-
tivating their land, providing labor, building houses and so on for free.73 The
general practice was that a person who got land in the south, reserved some part of
the land for his private use (cultivated by the gabbars for him), and distributed the
remaining part of the land to his gabbars and collected tribute (one third for
himself) and tithe (to the government) and allowed them to subsist on the remaining
produce. A study made by Markakis on Kembata district in the southern provinces
vividly shows the circumstances that existed at the time:
Kenyazmach (commander of right wing) Arado was allotted forty gashas (1,600 ha) of land
for his service in Kambata district. He kept twelve gashas and distributed the rest among his
lieutenants and soldiers. One of these, a man from Gojam named Ayele, was given a total of
four gashas. The native people who found themselves on the land granted to Ayele became
his gabbars (the total family member was 40 people). Ayele settled in the nearby town of
Hosana, the capital of Kembata district. Ayele divided his land into hudad (good land
reserved for him) and other which was distributed among the gabbars. The gabbars culti-
vated the hudad and delivered the entire produce to Ayele. Ayele also collected a third of
the produce from the other land as a tribute for himself, and another tenth which he turned
over to the state as tithe. The gabbars were also required to provide Ayele with firewood, to
grind his share of the grain and deliver it to his home in town, and to repair his house and
warehouses. In addition, they had to offer him obligatory gifts on Christmas, Easter, and
Maskal. Ayele acted as the judge for his gabbars, and in his capacity imposed fines and
collected fees. Whenever he visited his land, the gabbars were obliged to provide him with
a feast.74

On the other hand, the rights of local gentries were remained unaffected because
of Menelik’s decree passed in 1905 (1897 E.C), which declares that in every land
allocation to northern nobles, a third or in some cases half of it should be kept to the
local balabat, gentry.75 This is, as already mentioned above known as siso-gult.
The other characteristic of the southern land tenure was that the introduction of
private ownership of land tenure. It is generally held that private land ownership in
the south evolved out of Menelik’s expropriation and redistribution of land after his
conquest.76 Many evidences and the wordings of the then laws showed that land
was transacted through sale from state to individuals and among individuals.
Emperor Menelik also introduced new land measurement (qelad) and a tax system,
based on the measured lands in the southern regions. The new land taxes imposed

72
Ibid.
73
Pankhurst: 1966, supra note 29, p. 137.
74
Markakis, supra note 39, pp. 162, 163.
75
See as reproduced in Mahteme-Selassie: 1970, supra note 55, p. 109.
76
Pausewang, S. 1982. Peasants, Land and Society: a Social History of Land Reform in Ethiopia,
Munchen, Weltforum-Varlag, p. 36.
48 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

on siso land, maderia land and rist land were actually paid by the actual cultivator,
the gabbars, instead of the owner of the land which increased yet the burdens of the
gabbars and tenants.

2.4.4 Modernization and the Declining Role of Traditional

Land Tenure System

The coming of Emperor Haileselassie I, in 1930, to the throne in the early twenty
first century and his modernist approach of governance started to contribute to the
declining role of the traditional land tenure system, especially to the abolition of the
gult system in 1966. The traditional tax collection system (in kind) did not enable to
generate enough money to the state to create the much needed modern state, with
modern salaried military and bureaucracy. As discussed above, land tax in the form
of tribute and tithe was collected by the gult holder in the northern provinces and
the land owner/holder in the southern parts. Because it was difficult to find enough
gold and dollars, tax was paid in kind77 (grain, salt, honey, cattle and so on). As a
result, government agents were forced to take it to market to change it to cash
money. The system was not efficient and there was no strong bureaucracy to control
its proper collection; land owners used to squander it. Studies show that the share of
land tax was declining compared to indirect taxes (customs tax) throughout the
1940s–1970s.78 To rectify such problem and in order to collect enough money from
land, successive decrees concerning land tenure and land tax were promulgated well
up to the 1970s.
As noted by Hoben, traditionally there was relatively little separation between
political power, the control of land, and wealth. Men who enjoyed high positions of
secular authority usually controlled much land. They were also at the apex of a
redistributional economic organization. They collected tax and tribute from those
over whom they held authority and expended a large portion of it again on the feasts
and followers that were essential to the maintenance of their political power and
their legitimacy in the eye of their subjects.79 So, it was not easy for the government
to weaken the power of the landed autocrats by eroding their traditional power of
tax collection, administration and adjudication. That is why, as we shall see soon,
the reformative process encountered strong resistance not only from the landed
aristocrats but also, ignorantly, from the peasant farmers as well.
Hoben provides four reasons that weakened the traditional power of gult hold-
ers80: the growth of bureaucracy that replaces their administrative power, tax reform

77
Gebre-Wold-Ingida, supra note 52, p. 302, 303.
78
See for example Gilkes, P. 1975. The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia,
London, Julian Friedman Publishers.; Also see Crummey: 2000, supra note 89, p. 239.
79
Hoben, supra note 37, p. 209.
80
Id., pp. 205–209.
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 49

that demands the direct payment of tax to government rather than to gult holders,
emergence and establishment of modern court system that replaces their adjudi-
cation power, and finally the establishment of modern military that took away their
power as collectors of local soldiers. In here, we will briefly look into the tax reform
that had directly affected the land tenure system.
Before the Italian invasion and occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941), the gov-
ernment tried to come up with two decrees81 that tried to reduce the burden of the
gabbars of the southern people. Especially, a decree promulgated on May 9, 1935
tried to reduce the burden of the peasantry by replacing all duties with payment of
30 thalers per gasha.82 But, of course, this was the eve of the Italian invasion and
the rule was not implemented. The government came up with series of laws related
to land tax after the expulsion of the Italian forces (after the Second World War)
which we shall see hereunder. The Italians, during their 5 years occupation, had
abolished all informal taxes and burdens except the land tax (tribute) and the tithe
(asrat). After liberation, the government took advantage of this situation and
continued the process without restoring the previous system. The major laws
enacted after this period are discussed below.

[Link] The 1941 Land Tax Decree

Shortly after he restored his power, Emperor Hailesellassie passed a land tax
decree83 in 1941 that mainly contains three things: first, the law entitled all gov-
ernment officials and agents to salaries; second, all the taxes paid by the gabbars
were to be sent directly to government treasury. In other words, it abolished the
intermediary role of land owners and gult holders.84 Land tax was to be collected by
government agents rather than landlords. Thirdly, it abolished all ‘manual labor,
firewood, grass and miscellaneous dues and taxes’ imposed on the cultivators. This
did not include, however, ginda bel and desta in which tax was paid in the form of
manual labor.

81
These are the law of September 1930 that deals with tax concerning excess land, and the law of
May 1935 that established single land tax. Both are reproduced in Gebre-Wold-Ingida, supra note
52, p. 295–298.
82
Mahteme-Selassie: 1957, supra note 55, p. 297.
83
As reproduced in Gebre-Wold-Ingida, supra note 52, p. 325.
84
For example an Order passed by the Emperor after a year or two reads: “The Ministry of
Finance has submitted that the Asrat and trade or marketing tax which has hitherto been collected
by rist-gult holders shall in future be collected by officers of the Ministry of Finance, and that the
rist-gult holders shall give to the Ministry of Finance any money they hold at present. These rist-
gult holders must also submit in writing the amount left in their hands.” Gebre-Wold-Ingida, supra
note 52, p. 331.
50 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

[Link] The Land Tax Proclamations of 1942 and 1944

Proclamation 8 of 1942,85 promulgated on 30th of March 1942, but had been put
into effect starting from 11 October 1941, brought one important change to the
Ethiopian land tax system; it proclaimed that henceforth all land tax should be paid
in Ethiopian printed dollars rather than in kind. Article 3(ii) of the proclamation put
the amount of taxation based on the size of land area in gasha and its fertility rate. It
classified the land into fertile, semi-fertile and poor, and imposed 15, 10, and 5
Ethiopia dollars respectively for each gasha land holding.
This proclamation lacked clarity in that it was confusing whether or not it
replaced the previous two land taxes (tribute and tithe). In any case, a second
proclamation (Proc. No. 70/1944) that repealed this proclamation was promulgated
in 1944. This was also known as Land Tax Proclamation. This proclamation86
under Article 4 provided a different tax rate for each of the three types of land
fertility. Besides, it provided tax payments in lieu of tithe and tribute tax. For
example for some provinces (Shoa, Arusi, Harar and Wollo) the amount set for
fertile land was $35 in lieu of tithe and $15 in lieu of tax, for semi fertile land $30 in
lieu of tithe and $10 in lieu of tax, and for poor land $10 in lieu of tithe and $5 in
lieu of tax. In effect, this law had doubled the tax obligations of peasants as
compared to the previous law. The other character of this proclamation was that it
did not impose same tax rate for all parts of the country. The Northern provinces
were even allowed to continue with their old system as their land was not yet
measured in gashas. Once again, the law under Article 4 repealed “any other taxes,
services and fees heretofore payable”.

[Link] Education Tax and Health Tax

In spite of the state efforts, the above two proclamations could not greatly enhance
the revenues of the central government, although they did effectively eliminate the
possibility of tax collection by organs other than the state. Hence, to increase the
revenue from the land the government introduced Education Tax in 1947 (Proc.
No. 94/1947) and Health Tax in 1959 (Decree No. 37/1959)87 based on the amount
and fertility of land holdings. This shows that the state was desperate to increase its
tax collection from the land, which in turn aggravated the burdens of the peasant.

85
Full text is reproduced in Gebre-Wold-Ingida, supra note 52, p. 327.
86
Land Tax Proclamation, Proclamation No. 70/1944. Negarit Gazeta. Year 4, No. 2. Also
available in Ewing, W. H. (ed.) 1972. Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia, V. I, Addis Ababa: The Law
Faculty of Haile Sellassie I University, pp. 538–543.
87
Both are reproduced in Ewing, W. H. (ed.) 1972. Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia, V. I, Addis
Ababa: The Law Faculty of Haile Sellassie I University, pp. 473 and 477 respectively.
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 51

[Link] Abolition of Gult and Tithe and Introduction of Income Tax

The government took things one step further to their logical conclusion, in 1966
and 1967, with proclamations which abolished both secular gult and tithe.88
Proclamation 230/1966 that amended the previous land tax, proclamation 70/1944,
clearly dictated those people who cultivate on lands subject to rist gult or siso gult
directly to pay their tax to the Government treasury.89 The same amendment
eliminated the special tax status of those holding rist gult or siso gult rights with
respect to land which they also own.90 Since traditionally gult provides tribute
collection power over gult holders, the transfer of the tribute collection power to
other body eliminates the traditional institution of gult system. If a person whose
land has been subject to rist gult rights had henceforth to pay the land taxes directly
to the Government treasury, there was nothing left for the gultenga, the holder of
the gult rights. His rights had, at a stroke, been eliminated. Gult holders were
allowed to change certain part of their holding to private tenure and the remainder
was divided among the gabbars.
The next step taken by the government was to amend the income tax in 1967 by
introducing agricultural income tax. One of the characteristics of this proclamation
was that it abolished the payment of tithe. As discussed before, cultivators used to
pay a tenth of their produce to the government through the gult holder. Now the
removal of this tax meant again eroding the power base of the bala gults and
thereby reducing the burdens of the peasantry.
Although it cannot be denied that all these steps to some extent alleviated
(especially the last two proclamations) the burdens of the peasantry of the south,
they were not equally appreciated in the northern part of the country. For example,
among the three peasant rebellions that took place in between 1940s and 1960s, the
two that happened in the northern provinces of Tigray and Gojam were made
against tax and land measurement activities of the state. Generally, the land tax
proclamations and land measurements which were meant to enhance the amount of
tax, initiated peasant rebellions in Tigray (1943), in Bale (1967–1970) and in
Gojam (1968).91

88
Crummey: 2000, supra note 35, p. 241.
89
1966. A Proclamation to Amend the Land Tax Proclamation of 1944. Proclamation No. 230/
1966. Negarit Gazeta: Year 25, No. 9. Article 2(a).
90
Id., Article 2(b).
91
For more discussion on the subject, see Gebru-Tareke 1991. Ethiopia: Power and Protest:
Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
52 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

2.4.5 The Question of Land Reform and Inadequate

Government Response

Over the years, the land holding in the southern provinces had slowly changed into
private (freehold) holdings through different decrees. As opposed to the north, land
in the south was freely transferable by way of sale. Like his predecessor, Haile
Sellassie also continued to grant land to different groups. Immediately after the
Italian war, he granted extensive land to patriots, exiles, soldiers and civil servants
as private property. This policy, however, was of little benefit to tenant gabbars.
Indeed, from the nearly 5 million ha of land allocated after 1941, only a few
thousand reached the landless and the unemployed gabbars.92 The concept of rist,
as lineage land property, was not known in this part of the country. Hence, in the
1950s and 1960s extensive land sale was witnessed, especially the transfer from
land owners to new investors.93 But the effect of such measures made the existing
gabbars once and for all landless tenants. Tenants, thus, were forced to cultivate on
share-cropping arrangement which was said to be unjust in that it claimed 75 % of
the produce to the landlord.94
As already mentioned above (Sect. 2.4.4), in spite of the fact that the government
passed laws that forbid other burdens, tenants were subjected to feudal dues like
working on the landlord’s farm and giving him presents on special occasions for
fear of eviction. Powerful lords of the land continued to confiscate peasant’s
property at will and to evict tenants arbitrarily even on the eve of the Revolution.95
In addition to the fact that the system was seen as unjust, it was considered inef-
ficient and unproductive for it did not give the tenants incentive to produce more
because, it was alleged, they lost a lot of the increased produce to the landlord.96
The most radical criticism of the land-tenure system came from the student
movement, which, since the middle of the 1960s, made the slogan “Land to the
Tiller” its main rallying call and the attainment of land reform its main target.
When, as of 1969, the issue surfaced concerning whether the southern part of the
country was not a case of settler colonialism by people from the north, and whether,
therefore, the southern tenants were reduced to this status on land which had once
been their own, land reform acquired a much greater political poignancy than ever

92
Bahru-Zewde: 1991, supra note 48, p. 191.
93
Dessalegn-Rahmato 2006. From Hetrogeneity to Homogeneity: Agrarian Class Structure in
Ethiopia since the 1950s. In: Dessalegn-Rahmato & Taye-Assefa (eds.) Land and the Challenge of
Sustainable Development in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, p. 9. During the
1960s land was transferred by sale to civil servants, small scale traders and the like who anticipate
profit from export of agricultural products.
94
For example, according to different studies, the tenancy rate was 75 % in Hararge, 67 % in
Showa, 62 % in Kaffa, all from the south. On the contrary, in the north was 15 % in Begemder,
20 % in Gojam and 25 % in Tigre.
95
Dessalegn-Rahmato: 2006, supra note 93, p. 8.
96
Andargachew-Tiruneh 1993. The Ethiopian Revolution, 1974–1987: A Transformation From
an Aristocratic to aTotalitarian Autocracy, New York, Cambridge University Press, p. 97.
2.4 Tenure Systems in Pre-1975 Ethiopia 53

before.97 Also, academics, foreign governments and aid agencies were very critical
of the existing land-tenure system and urged for some kind of reform to be adopted.
One of Haile Sellassie’s government responses to these criticisms was the
establishment of a Ministry of Land Reform and Administration to deal with the
matter.98 One notion promoted by that ministry, well before 1974, was the redistri-
bution of individually owned land in excess of 20 ha. A draft proposal to that effect
was shelved for lack of support in government circles. The fact that the government
officials and members of parliament had their economic and hence political power
based on land was often attributed as a cause for the obstruction of the adoption of the
draft proposal. Harold Marcus, a prominent historian on Ethiopia, claims that after the
1960 cope d’état, the Emperor was forced to “rely increasingly on overt military
power for authority and on the aristocracy and oligarchy for administrative support.
Since the last two represented the property-owning classes, Haile Sellassie was
unable to implement significant land reform, in the absence of which the intelligentsia
and the students, at first quietly and then stridently, opposed the regime.”99
The emperor was generally said to be slow in taking a radical and important land
reform that would have a socio-political effect. A contemporary researcher and
professor at the then Faculty of Law at the Haile Sellassie I University, Harrison
Dunning observed that:
Beyond the elimination of personal services, it is difficult to name an objective related to
land and designed to improve the social and political position of the Ethiopian peasantry
toward which even partial action has been taken in the past quarter century. Even public
discussion of such objectives has not occurred. With guidelines so unclear, it is fruitless to
attempt to evaluate the contribution which land reform could make in these areas of
national development.100

By way of conclusion, it can be said that the resistance of the peasantry popu-
lation (because of ignorance on the advantage of land measurement and registra-
tion), internal resistance for land reform from the landed aristocrats, most of whom
sate in both chambers of the parliament,101 and the lack of action by the govern-
ment102 itself to bring about change in the tenure system were the reasons for
absence of meaningful change in the property right arrangement during the eve of
the downfall of the imperial regime.

97
Ibid., p. 98.
98
Ibid.
99
Marcus, H., supra note 36, p. 173.
100
Dunning, H. C. 1970. Land Reform in Ethiopia: A Case Study in Non-Development. UCLA L.
Rev, 18, p. 306.
101
See Shiferaw, supra note 41, p. 128, who told us that bills concerning land reform tabled to
parliament in 1963, 1970 and 1972 were rejected by both parliaments.
102
Dunning, supra note 100, at foot note 152, for example says: “Three draft proclamations had
been submitted to the Council of Ministers by July 1, 1969: a Proclamation to provide for the
Registration of Immovable Property; a Proclamation to provide for the Regulation of Agricultural
Tenancy Relationships; and a Proclamation to provide for a Tax on Unutilized Land. As of
October 1, 1970, none of these drafts had been submitted to Parliament”.
54 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

2.5 The Derg Era: A Radical Shift in Land Policy

Frustrated by the lack of meaningful land reform and driven by the then Marxist
ideology, practiced in some parts of the world, university students started
demanding social, economic and political reforms with the leading motto “Land to
the Tiller.” The demand for change got momentum when the general public and
finally the military and police force followed suit and resulted in the 1974 revo-
lution. The condition of the peasant and the need for radical change that was
advocated at the time can be easily perceived from Dessalegn Rahmato writing:
How can the peasant change his condition? Will it be through better laws, clearer definition
of tenure rights, or improved land registration and cadastral surveys? Can it be done by
granting ownership right to tenants over government-owned land? Or will land reform, but
of kind which does not disturb the equilibrium of the feudal system, provide the antidote?

The peasant problem is too fundamental to be resolved with such facile measures. It is not
the deficiencies of the system that creates rural misery, but the system itself. Peasant
servitude and deprivation will not be eliminated so long as the land-less are under the
economic subjection of the landlord. Only when the direct producers toil for no other but
themselves will they be able to attain emancipation, and to raise their standard of living to a
level consistent with human dignity. In this connection the slogan LAND TO THE TILLER
is indeed subversive.103

The army, being better organized and having better gun power, took advantage
of the situation and appointed itself as the agent of the people. A committee (junta)
selected from all the army branches104 was established to negotiate things with the
emperor and to bring corrupt officials of the ancient regime to justice.105 This
committee (popularly known as Derg), a collection of junior officers, later on
removed the Emperor from his throne in September 1974 and took power itself
promising the election of a popular government in the future. The Derg established
a “provisional military government.” Accordingly, until 1987, the country was
administrated by the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC).
Following its assumption of power, the Derg, started to take radical socio-
economic reforms which had Marxist ethos.106 In the following pages we shall see
the highlights of the rural land and urban land proclamations which were enacted by
the Derg in a bid to transfer all rural and urban land and urban extra houses to state
ownership.

103
Dessalegn-Rahmato 1970. Condition of the Ethiopian Peasantry. Challenger, X. Quoted in
Shiferaw, supra note 41, p. 124.
104
With the highest rank of a Major, the army representatives were delegated from the air force,
police force, navy, and ground forces. The would be president (Mengistu Haile Mariam) himself
was a Major, representing ground forces from the city of Harar.
105
For detail see Andargachew, supra note 96.
106
It was on 20 December 1974 that the Derg’s first fundamental political and economic pro-
gramme, ‘Ethiopian Socialism’, was issued. (Andargachew, Ibid, p. 86). The reforms were dealing
with nationalizations of urban and rural land, financial institutions and heavy and light industries.
2.5 The Derg Era: A Radical Shift in Land Policy 55

2.5.1 Nationalization of Rural Land

When the Derg revealed its ten-point program of “Ethiopian Socialism” on December
20 1974, it declared that “land would be owned by the people.”107 And the “people”
appeared to be identified under point No. 7 which stated that “the right to own land
shall be restricted to those who work on the land”108 which means that land would be
privatized. Nevertheless, when the much anticipated proclamation109 lastly came out
on March 4 1975, the Derg ruled out for public/state ownership of all rural land.
The main reasons for the nationalization of rural land from the previous owners/
holders and its transfer to state ownership are envisaged in the preamble of the
proclamation. Without the need to reproduce the whole preamble, we pinpoint the
main essence as follows:
Whereas, in countries like Ethiopia a person’s right, honor, status, and standard of living is
determined by his relation to land;… that several thousands gas has of land was grabbed by
insignificant number of feudal lords while the masses live under serfdom;… that it is
necessary to change the past injustices and lay a base upon which Ethiopians may live in
equality, freedom and fraternity;…that development could be achieved through the aboli-
tion of exploitation of many by the few;…In order to increase productivity by making the
tiller the owner of the fruits of his labour;…to provide work for all rural people;…it
becomes necessary to distribute land and increase rural income and thereby laying the basis
for the expansion of industry.

To implement this objective, Article 3 of the proclamation clearly declared that:

“all rural lands shall be the collective property of the Ethiopian people,” and it
prohibits any person, business organization (company) or other organization from
holding rural land in private ownership (Article 3.2 of Proc. 31/1975). By doing so,
the law once and for all eliminated any private ownership of rural land, which had
started to flourish in the southern part of the country, and it overnight abolished the
age-old tenure system of the country in general. Further, the law denied any
compensation for the loss of land and any forest and tree-crops thereon. On the
other hand, it provided that fair compensation would be paid for movable properties
and permanent works on the land (Article 3.3). Nonetheless, when it came to
practice, the Derg paid no compensation at all to such properties across the country.
The proclamation, on the other hand, created free access to land to the many
rural landless and tenants. Without discrimination of any kind, the law provided
opportunity for any person, who was willing to cultivate, to get rural land sufficient
for his maintenance (Article 4.1). The size of land to be allocated for a household
was made to be, as far as possible, equal, and allowed for a maximum of 10 ha
(Article 4.3). No person was allowed to use hired laborers to cultivate his land
(except the weak, the sick, widows, and minors (Article 4.5).

107
Andargachew, supra note 96, p. 99.
108
Clapham, supra note 44, p. 45.
109
Public Ownership of Rural Lands, Proclamation No. 31/1975. Negarit Gazeta. Year 34,
No. 26. (Hereinafter cited as Proc. No. 31/1975).
56 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

Until land distribution was to be carried out, it was stated that all “tenants or
hired laborer shall have possessory right over the land they till;” on the other hand,
“a resident landowner who has leased out all his lands shall have the right to equally
share to the land with his tenants” (Article 6.1). The proclamation also abolished
any landlord-tenant relationship, and the tenant was made free from any rent, debt
or any other obligation. Likewise, a landowner who gave his land as antichresis to
his tenants would be free from payment of the debt (Article 6.3). All large-scale
farms, held by private investments, were transferred to state ownership or
cooperatives.
Since land became state/public property, it was also important to delimit the
scope of rights to be given to individual peasants. In this case, it did not give much.
Under a title “Prohibition of Transfer of Land,” Article 5 of the proclamation
declares:
No person may by sale, exchange, succession, mortgage, antichresis, lease or otherwise
transfer his holding to another; provided that upon the death of the holder the wife or
husband or minor children of the deceased or where these are not present, any child of the
deceased who has attained majority, shall have the right to use the land.

Thus, the proclamation completely prohibited any sale, mortgage, antichresis,110

lease/rent, inheritance (outside of family), donation, or exchange of any sort that
affects the land. It seems the government was cautious not to create controversy
with the church and the northern land holders since the proclamation did not say
anything about church lands, and provided separate provisions related to “com-
munal lands”, specifically rist lands. According to some studies, the total amount of
land held by the church by the time was estimated to be 20 % of all arable land and
5 % of all the land in the country.111 Concerning rist land, the proclamation under
Article 19 provides “peasants in rist and dessa areas shall have possessory rights
over the lands they presently till.” It denies any claimant thereafter to come up with
new claims. However, unlike the southern parts, in the north, since every plot of
land was held by peasants, there was no need for the proclamation to come up with
such different provision.
In any case, Articles 3 and 5 of the proclamation had restricted the rights of
transfer of land very much and this had a devastating effect to all the previous land
owners in the south or rist holders in the north. This proclamation was, therefore,
received with mixed sentiments across the country. For tenant farmers and landless
peasants, especially of the southern part of the country, the abolition of land
ownership removed a major source of exploitation in one case, and provided
guaranteed access to land in the other.112 Peasants of the north who owned their

110
According to the Ethiopian Civil Code (Articles 3041 ff and 3117 ff), antichresis is like a
mortgage except that the former is created by contract. The main difference is that in case of
antichresis the immovable (land or building) shall be temporarily delivered/transferred to the
creditor, while in case of mortgage it has to stay in the hand of the debtor.
111
Cohen, J. M. 1977. Rural and Urban Land Reform in Ethiopia. Afri. L. Stud., 14, p. 14.
112
Clapham, supra note 44, p. 47.
2.5 The Derg Era: A Radical Shift in Land Policy 57

own rist land that gave them effective control over it were threatened by a measure
which required their security and put them on equal basis with the landless.113 The
rist holders of the north who considered their right to the land as coming from their
family and no one else, considered it as encroachment in their God given rights.
According to some studies, in the Northern Province of Tigray, farmers out rightly
refuted the law and a war ensued immediately.114 Armed struggle was declared and
carried out by supporters of the old regime and various student led movements
against the Derg, the sole survivor being the present incumbent. Rebellious conflicts
were also arisen in the other Northern provinces of Gonder and Wollo.115
The management and distribution of land was given to peasant associations
(PA), which were formed to cover a minimum area of 800 ha (20 gashas) of
land.116 The functions of the peasant associations were mainly to redistribute land,
maintain common assets, resolve land dispute conflicts, enable development
activities taking place in their areas and implementing villagization programs.117
The system, in a way, looked like the Chinese model where land was owned by
the state and collectives and every village collective was given the power to own,
administer, and lease out land to individual peasants.118 This fact is also observed
by Dessalegn when he said: “the post reform agrarian policies were modeled in part
on the experience of China and Vietnam.”119 Of course, in Ethiopia, it was not the
peasant association that would give land by way of lease. The right was life time in
that peasants were allowed to use it for life and even to pass it as an inheritance to
their spouses and children. In the Chinese model peasants get the land on lease basis
for 15 years (later on amended to 30 years) and the village collective should renew
the contract after its expiry.
Assessment of the land reform carried out in the years that followed the proc-
lamation has been made by many writers.120 The general agreement can be sum-
marized as follows in the work of Dessalegn Rahmato:

113
Ibid.
114
See generally for example Young, J. 1997. Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia The Tigray
People’s Liberation Front, 1975–1991,New York, Cambridge University Press.; Aregawi-Berhe
2008. A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975–1991): Revolt, Ideology
and Mobilisation in Ethiopia, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University, p. 71.
115
See Dessalegn-Rahmato 2009a-a. Land and Agrarian Unrest in Wollo: From the Imperial
Regime to the Derg. In: Dessalegn-Rahmato (ed.) The Peasant and the State: Studies in Agrarian
Change in Ethiopia 1950s–2000s (collection of articles by same author). Addis Ababa: Addis
Ababa university Press, pp. 111–182.
116
Article 8 of Proc. 31/1975.
117
See the detail under Article 10 of Proc. No. 31/1975.
118
See for example, Ho, P., supra note 20, pp. 5–10.
119
Dessalegn-Rahmato 1993. Agrarian Change and Agrarian Crisis: State and Peasantry in Post-
Revolution Ethiopia. Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 63, 36–55, p. 36.
120
See for example Yeraswork-Admassie 2000. Twenty Years to Nowhere: Property Rights,
Land Management and Conservation in Ethiopia Asmara, The Red Sea Press, Inc.
58 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

• Erroneous state policies (villagization, grain requisitioning, resettlement, agri-

cultural, collectivization) which were not discussed with the people at grassroots
level cost the country lots of energy and money.
• The peasant associations (PAs) which were given authority to redistribute land,
maintain, common assets, resolve conflicts and enable development activities
taking place in their areas were captured/hijacked by the state to do its ‘political
work’, such as tax collection, maintaining order, channeling propaganda, req-
uisition grain, and recruiting young men for the war.
• The land reform was successful in that it abolished the landlordism and tenant-
ship in the country and created free access to land to all the landless, but it failed
because (1) it defined land rights as usufructuary rather than private (2) the
mandate given to the PA encouraged them to practice periodic land distribution,
in consultation with local government agents, created tenure insecurity.
• By and large, it replaced the landlord with the state, providing the latter with
direct and uncontrollable access to the peasantry. “In conclusion, the end
product of the land reform was it failed where it succeeded.”121

2.5.2 Nationalization of Urban Land and Extra Houses

[Link] Urbanization and Pattern of Urban Land Ownership

The second very important legislation enacted by the Derg was a proclamation that
nationalized all urban lands and extra rentable houses.122 Before giving the details
about this proclamation, however, few words need to be said about the pattern of
urbanization and urban land right before the revolution.
Urbanization in Ethiopia is a recent phenomenon because of the historical factors
in the country. Many of the middle sized towns in Ethiopia were founded during the
nineteenth century for political-military reasons.123 According to Donald Crummey,
three major institutions shaped Ethiopian towns during the 19th and 20th centuries:
palace, market and church, and these institutions played three roles: political,
economic and cultural.124 The establishment of the current capital, Addis Ababa, in
1886, is the third in line following Axum and Gonder in the ancient and middle age
Ethiopian history respectively. Throughout most of its history, Ethiopia remained a

121
Dessalegn: 1993, supra note 119, pp. 36–40.
122
Government Ownership of Urban Land and Extra Houses, Proclamation No. 47/1975. Negarit
Gazeta, Year 34, No. 41. (Hereinafter cited as Proc. 47/1975).
123
Markakis, supra note 39, p. 197.
124
Bahru-Zewde 2008a. The City Center: A Shifting Concept in the History of Addis Ababa. In:
Bahru-Zewde (ed.) Society, State and History: Selected Essays. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa
University Press, p. 486.
2.5 The Derg Era: A Radical Shift in Land Policy 59

land of small villages and isolated homesteads.125 The reason for the absence of
large settlement of urban areas in Ethiopia for a long time, according to Richard
Pankhurst, was the continuous move of the royal camp. Middle age royal court was
composed of immense agglomerations of population which consisted of not only of
courtiers and warriors, but also numerous non-combatants, among them wives,
servants and slaves, armourers, tent-carriers, muleteers, priests, traders, prostitutes,
beggars, and even a few children.126 On the other hand, some argued that there was
a little need for urbanization, since it contradicted the existing self-sufficient
peasantry life style; urbanization by its nature needs to transfer more land away
from agricultural production to urban settlement.127 And yet, it can be concluded
that modern Ethiopian urbanization flourished during the 20th century because of
political stability (especially during the reign of Emperor Haile Sellassie I), and the
modernization of the country. Most cities in the country flourished around some
economic center such as railway, factory, or trade route.
Addis Ababa was established in 1886 by Emperor Menelik II and it is said that
in the beginning it was a collection of camps where the royal camp was located in a
tent at the center of the high ground. The imperial camp was surrounded by the
Emperor’s servants, and other nobility were granted land for their own and their
followers to construct houses. Over time, because of the insecurity they felt, the
lords and foreign embassies made a request to Menelik for some kind of security
over their holdings. Accordingly, the emperor promulgated a decree128 in 1907 that
recognized private ownership of land, and allowed its free transfer through sale
(Article 3). The decree also created land cadastre system which enabled the reg-
istration of every sale of land and the giving of land ownership certificates to
owners (Articles 5, 10, 11, and 14). Further, it gave a guarantee against arbitrary
confiscation of land by providing compensation in the event of land expropriation
for public purpose activities (Articles 25 and 26). This gave property holders greater
security and a stake in the fate of the city. Not only did the land charter become the
most prized certificate of any urban household but it also contributed to activating
the urban economy through sales and mortgages.129
A detailed study of earlier land tenure in the 17–18th century urban Gonder also
shows that land was held in private hands and subjected to free sale and
exchange.130 Thus, urban land in Ethiopia, from the beginning, was held in private
ownership. During the eve of the revolution, Addis Ababa was by far the biggest

125
Pankhurst, R. 1990. A Social History of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Institute of Ethiopian Studies,
Addis Ababa University, p. 275.
126
Ibid.
127
Molla-Mengistu 2009. The Ethiopian Urban Landholding System: An Assessment of the
Governing Legal Regime. In: Muradu-Abdo (ed.) Land Law and Policy in Ethiopia since 1991:
Continuities and Changes. Addis Ababa: Law Faculty, Addis Ababa University.
128
See the full edict in Amharic in Mahteme-Selassie: 1970, supra note 55, pp. 166–171; or an
English version in Pankhurst: 1966, supra note 29, pp. 156–158.
129
Bahru-Zewde: 2008a, supra note 124, p. 490.
130
For good explanation see Crummey: 2000, supra note 35.
60 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

city and center of economy and politics. The city grew fast, inhabiting a consid-
erable population, which was estimated to be between sixty and one hundred
thousand in 1910131 to about 1.1 million during the revolution in 1974.132 Other
towns had insignificant population growth compared to the capital. For example,
according to a 1970s estimate, out of the registered 268 towns, the eight biggest
towns had a population of 25,000 each, while Addis Ababa at that time registered
800,000 inhabitants (one third of all urban inhabitants in the country).133
Much of the land in the city was controlled by insignificantly few elites.
Pankhurst has provided the figures based on the first reliable survey of the city’s
212 km2 made in 1961 as follows:
This survey showed that 58 % of the total area was owned by 1,768 large proprietors each
with more than 10,000 m2, or an average of 71,000 m2 per owner, whereas 24,590 small
proprietors owning less than 10,000 m2 had only 7.4 % of the total, the average size of such
plots being 150 m2. 12.7 % of the land belonged to the Government and foreign embassies.
A further 12 % belonged to the Church, while the remaining, 9.9 %…was a royal land.134

It means 58 % of the surveyed land was held by 6.7 % of the population. An

estimate made 5 years later, in 1966, showed that 5 % of the population in Addis
Ababa owned 95 % of the land in the city.135 Almost all the elites who controlled
rural and urban land ventured in the construction of rental houses, which was an
attractive investment at that time.136 This ranged all the way from the appalling
hovels (slums) of the urban poor to elegant villas which found a ready market
among diplomats and expatriate experts in a city that headquarters international
organizations.137 Land value rose alarmingly from 0.25 birr in the 1950s to 200–
300 birr per m2 in the 1970s (1 USD was about 2 birr).138

[Link] Nationalization of Urban Land and Extra Houses

As discussed above, when the Derg came to power, it first nationalized all rural
lands and natural resources. Then upon the enactment of Proclamation 47/1975 it
nationalized all urban lands and extra houses. The preamble of the Proclamation

131
Pankhurst: 1966, supra note 29, p. 154.
132
Lapiso-G-Delebo 1983 EC. Ye Ethiopia Ye Gebar Sireat-na Jimir Capitalism: 1900–1966
(Ethiopian Gabar System and the Begining of Capitalism: 1908–1974), Addis Ababa, p. 267.
133
Markakis, supra note 39, pp. 198, 199. This was based on the second census of the city.
134
Pankhurst: 1966, supra note 29, p. 154.
135
Mesfin-Wolde-Mariam. Year. Problems of Urbanization. In: Proceeding of the Third Inter-
national Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 1970 Addis Ababa. Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Haile
Sellassie I University, supra note 111, p. 25.
136
For example, during the late 1960s, 60 % of the occupied houses in Addis Ababa were rental
ones. (Cohen, supra note 111, p. 25).
137
Clapham, supra note 44, p. 50.
138
1978. Urban Land and Extra House: From Yesterday to Today (Amharic). Addis Ababa:
Committee established for the Fourth Anniversary of the Revolution.
2.5 The Derg Era: A Radical Shift in Land Policy 61

47/1975 that nationalized “all urban land and extra houses”, justifies its nationali-
zation of urban land on three main counts: to abolish the shortage of land and the
soaring of prices caused by the concentration of land in the hands of a few feudal
lords, aristocrats, high government officials and capitalists; to abolish the exploi-
tation of the many by the few (through uncontrolled rent); and to abolish tax
evasion. The proclamation also aimed to create credit access to the poor once they
got the land and built their houses.139
Like its rural counterpart, Proclamation 47/1975 under Article 3(1) declares that as
of the effective date of the proclamation, all urban lands should be property of the
Government; and no person, family or organization was allowed to hold urban land in
private ownership (Article 3.2). Besides, all extra houses, houses other than one
residential house and another business house were nationalized (Article 13). Houses
owned by minors were immediately nationalized (Article 15) unless his/her parents
did not own their own residential house. It further declares that no person would be
compensated for the loss of urban lands (Article 3.3) although the loss of houses
through nationalization was said to be compensable (Article 18.1). However, in
reality no compensation was paid for the nationalizations of houses.140 But, for those
persons whose livelihood was depended on rent, collected from the nationalized
extra-houses, government allowed payment of pension allowance (Article 21).
Since all urban land became the property of the Government, it was prohibited to
transfer urban land through sale, antichresis, mortgage, succession or otherwise
(Article 4.1). As an exception, however, a widow/widower or children are given the
right to inherit the land. Instead of ownership, urban residents were given lifetime
use right (usually referred as permit system) to the urban land except that holders of
the land were obliged to pay urban land rent (Article 9) and housing tax (Article
11.4). Also, those who used to live in private rental houses were allowed to con-
tinue possessing the houses, but made to continue paying a reduced rent to the state.
It seems, the state once again replaced the urban landlords in controlling urban land
and houses and exacting rent therefrom. Landless people were guaranteed to get not
more than 500 m2 of land to construct a single dwelling house (Article 5.1). People
became full owners of the houses they built on the granted land, and thus, were
allowed to transfer it by way of sale, succession or barter provided that the gov-
ernment would have pre-emption right in case of sale (Article 12.1).
In the same fashion as had been done with the rural land, in here as well, any
relationship that existed between urban landlords and tenants was abolished, and
the tenant was made free from payment of rent, debt or any other obligation arising
from the relationship to the landlord (Article 6.1). Further, the law allowed any
tenant without any dwelling house to possess or retain the land he used to rent
before the enactment of the law (Article 7). Creditors who possessed buildings as

139
Preamble of Proc. 47/1975.
140
According to Andargachew, supra note 96, pp. 94, 95, the government had paid compensation
only to foreign investors who lost their assets to the government. The assets were mainly factories,
large-scale farms, banks and insurances.
62 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

security for a loan were denied any right of attachment to a house. The house was
either to be returned to the debtor (if he has no other dwelling house) or to be
nationalized by the state. The creditor was just expected to search other ways to
collect his money (Article 17). There is no doubt that creditors who lent money on
this basis must have lost their money.
Upon the effective date of the proclamation, all people were prohibited from
renting out their houses and receiving any rent accruing therefrom (Article 20.1).
The state was the only legitimate organ allowed to let properties and receive rent.
The arrangement set in the proclamation was for the state to replace all former
landlords and to receive rent from the lessees. Of course, the amount of rent was
reduced, ranging from 15 to 50 %, depending on the value of the properties. For
instance, houses, which were rented out for 25 birr, had a 50 % reduction in rent,
while for those houses rented out for 300 birr the reduction was 15 % (Article
20.4)). The administration of houses which rented 100 birr and below was given to
local cooperative societies (later on known as Kebeles), while the administration of
those houses that rented above 100 birr per month was given to the Ministry of
Public Works and Housing (later became Housing agency) (Article 20.5; Article
2.15).
The low rental charges, however, left little room for investment in the Kebele
houses resulting in physical and structural deterioration owing to the lack of
appropriate management and maintenance.141 The idea is that people were
encouraged to live in Kebele houses (because they were cheap) rather than con-
structing their own houses. Secondly, since all the rental revenue was transferred to
central government, there was not much left for maintenance and construction by
the Kebeles.142 Further, new land provision for construction was highly restricted,
halting the expansion of the city, which only led the inner city to be densely
populated. Later, squatter settlements and illegal land transactions intensified, and
this forced the Derg to adopt self-help housing cooperatives that helped to tackle the
problem.143

141
UN-HABITAT 2010. The Ethiopia Case of Condominium Housing: The Integrated Housing
Development Programme. Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme.
142
UN-HABITAT 2008. Ethiopia:Addis Ababa Urban Profile. Nairobi: United Nations Human
Settlements Programme, p. 12.
143
Feyera-Abdissa & Terefe-Degefa 2011. Urbanization and Changing Livelihoods: The Case of
Farmers’ Displacement in the Expansion of Addis Ababa. In: Teller, C. & Hailemariam, A. (eds.)
The Demographic Transition and Development in Africa: The Unique Case of Ethiopia. London:
Springer, p. 217.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 63

2.6 The Current Land Tenure System

2.6.1 Land Policy: Two Debates on Ownership of Land

Immediately after the revolution and the assumption of power by the Derg and the
subsequent land reforms conducted by it, various insurgent groups lifted arms
against the Derg. The causes were multifarious, but they may be summed up into
two. The earliest opposition was made by the landed nobilities of northern Ethiopia
whose land was completely nationalized by the government. The second opposition
had come mainly from contemporary university students, who believed that the
revolution was betrayed by the Derg. This was because the Derg declared itself as
the sole vanguard of the revolution and banned any form of political activity. And
yet, there was no basic ideological difference between the Derg and the other
student led opposition groups, as all of them claimed to believe in Socialism. One
of the earliest student dominated armed groups in Ethiopia was the TPLF (Tigray
People’s Liberation Front) which during the late 1980s made a coalition with other
groups from central (Amhara) and southern (Oromo) Ethiopia. This coalition
became known as EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front)
which finally won the war and replaced the Derg in 1991. Since then, the EPRDF is
the incumbent party in the Ethiopian politics.
The EPRDF conducted land reform activities during the struggle (1975–1991) in
the area where it had effective control. The TPLF, a follower of Albanian type of
Socialism and ardent enemy of the feudal nobilities who controlled large amount of
land, carried out smooth land distribution in Tigray.144 After the downfall of the
Derg, in May 1991, the new Transitional Government disbanded all collectivization
and villagization programs based on the consent of the people. Collective farms
were privatized and the government stopped the grain requisition program, allowing
peasants to sell their produce at market value. In December 1992, a new economic
policy was adopted whereby the government declared that until a new constitution
were in place, land would remain under state ownership.145
Judging from the process of the ‘post-socialist transition’ that had been carried
out by the Transitional Government, and above all the free market economy type of
policy that it embraced, many hoped that the new constitution would allow private
ownership of land. However, when it finally came out in 1995, it decided to keep all
rural and urban land under public ownership. According to the FDRE Constitution,
all urban and rural land is the property of the state and the Ethiopian people.146
Accordingly, sale, exchange and mortgage of land are prohibited. As one writer
commented, “by inserting the land policy into the constitution, the current

144
For full discussion see Aregawi-Berhe, supra note 114, pp. 285–290; Young, supra note 114.
145
Tamirat-Layne 1991. Ethiopian Transitional Period Economic Policy. Addis Ababa: Office of
Prime Minister.
146
Constitution of the Federal Demecratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1/1995.
Negarit Gazeta. Year 1 No. 1. Article 40(3) (hereinafter FDRE Constitution.).
64 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

government has effectively eliminated the possibility of flexible application of

policy.”147
In many countries land ownership is not a constitutional issue, but in Ethiopia,
because of its socio-economic importance, land ownership goes beyond being a
mere policy matter. Rather, it is inserted in the Constitution and the issue of its
ownership has become a settled subject. The argument forwarded by the ruling
party for the continuation of land as public/state property rests mainly on two policy
objectives: social equity and tenure security. The FDRE Constitution as well as
other Federal and Regional Land Laws ensure the free access to agricultural land.
The amount of land to be provided to peasant farmers, as far as possible, is made
equal. Accordingly, the policy objective is to ensure equality of citizens in
accessing the land. However, the weakness of this policy objective is that first, it
does not address the urban land; Article 40 of the FDRE Constitution that deals
with property talks only about rural land. Second, it is argued that since there is lack
of arable land in the highlands of the country, equality of access to land is ensured
through transfer of land from large holders to small holders and/or to new comers;
the result being diminution of holding plots (0.5–1 ha). Social equality in Ethiopia
is, thus, a costly one in that equality in privilege is tantamount to equality in
poverty.148
Tenure security is the other policy objective and concern of the state. As
mentioned above, the FRDE Constitution prohibits any sale and exchange of land.
State ownership of land is considered to be the best mechanism to protect the
peasants against market forces. In particular, it has been argued that private own-
ership of rural land would lead to massive eviction or migration of the farming
population, as poor farmers would be forced to sell their plots to unscrupulous
urban speculators, particularly during periods of hardship.149 The justification is
that for large-scale modern farms, there is an abundant idle arable land in the low
lands; both for rain fed and irrigation farming. Most of the farmers, on the other
hand, live in the highlands where there is scarcity of land but large amount of
accumulated human power due to high population density. Allowing the farmer to
sell land here, would lead either to displacing the farmers or converting them to
tenants. In both ways, large amount of capital and labor will be wasted.150 This
argument of the government is criticized for lack of corroborative evidence. Some
researches show otherwise. Some conclude that farmers would not sell their land

147
Samuel-Gebreselassie 2006. Land, Land Policy and Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia:
Options and Scenarios. Future Agricultures Consortium meeting. the Institute of Development
Studies, p. 4.
148
Dessalegn-Rahmato 2009b. An Assessment on the Ethiopian Agricultural Policy. In: Taye-
Assefa (ed.) Digest of Ethiopian National Policies, Strategies and Programmes (Amharic). Addis
Ababa: Forum for Social Studies and The European Union, p. 149.
149
MOIPAD 2001. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Development Policies,
Strategies and Instruments (Amharic). Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information, Press and Audio-
visual Department, pp. 67–90.
150
Ibid.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 65

wholly or partially if given the right to own their plots.151 Another study, conducted
by the World Bank, reveals that most farmers would rather rent their land during
stressful periods compared with any other alternative, such as selling it.152 The
study concludes that the availability of formal land rental markets will serve as a
caution to enable farmers to withstand unfavorable circumstances by temporarily
renting their land rather than selling it.
The state ownership of land has been criticized by researchers and international
donors who favor neo-liberal economic thinking. The usual argument forwarded by
these people against the state/public ownership of land is one that focuses on lack of
tenure security. For them, state ownership of land by default creates tenure inse-
curity since, they argue, the government may use land as political weapon by giving
and taking it away as the case may be.153 They argue that absence of tenure security
for land users provides little or no incentive to improve land productivity through
investment in long-term land improvement measures, increases transaction cost
because of land dispute, and hinders the emergence of property market such as,
credit availability/land mortgage.154 However, the government rejects such fears as
groundless; on the contrary, it claims that government provides better security as is
now taken by regional governments. A good example is the land registration and
certification processes which are being conducted in Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and
the Southern regions which enable farmers to have a land certificate for their
holdings. This gives protection and security to the holder.
The current practice of land registration and certification provides tenure security,
according to a recent study made by the World Bank and others.155 It is also believed
that it brings “significant economic benefits” to users, mainly through rental as
farmers feel secure when the agreement is registered.156 Others, though, still do not

151
See EEA/EEPRI 2002. A Research Report on Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in
Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Economic Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research
Institute.
152
Deininger, K. & Binswanger, H. 1999. The evolution of the World Bank’s Land Policy:
Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges. In Research Observer, Vol. 14. No. 2. Washington
DC, World Bank. Cited Ibid.
153
Tesfaye-Olika 2006. Ethiopia: Politics of Land Tenure Policies Under the Three Regimes, a
Carrot and Stick Rulling Strategy in Ethiopian Politics. In: Tesfaye-Olika (ed.) Ethiopia: Politics,
Policy Making and Rural Development. Addis Ababa: Department of Political & International
Relations, Addis Ababa University, pp. 1–25.
154
Dessalegn Rahmato: 2006, supra note 93, p. 3; EEA/EEPRI, supra note 151, p. 29.
155
See Deininger, K., Daniel-Ayalew, Holden, S. & Zevenbergen, J. 2007. Rural Land Certifi-
cation in Ethiopia: Process, Initial Impact, and Implications for Other African Countries. World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4218. World Bank, p. 14; Palm, L. 2010. Quick and Cheap
Mass Land Registration and computerisation in Ethiopia. Facing the Challenges—Building the
Capacity. Sydney, Australia: FIG Congress, p. 10.
156
Deininger, K., Ayalew, D. & Alemu, T. 2009. Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure
Security, Investment, and Land Markets: Evidence from Ethiopia. Environment for Development,
Discussion Paper Series, EfD DP 09-11 [Online]. Available: [Link]
NEWS/Resources/land_eegistration_in_ethiopia.pdf, p. 29.
66 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

have confidence on the land registration and certification process and conclude that
the process has not brought about the feeling of tenure security. For example,
Dessalegn argued that since the land laws do not avoid completely the possibilities of
future land distribution and since government still possesses the power of taking land
by way of expropriation, farmers could not feel secure on their holdings.157
In general, the debates seem to be based on ideological differences rather than
empirical studies. The private versus state ownership of land by itself is not as such
a decisive factor. What is important is whether or not there are adequate measures
and regulations in place to guarantee tenure security, such as land certification, just
compensation in the event of expropriation, long duration of rights, good gover-
nance, absence of corruption, and easy access of courts. In the following discussion
we shall highlight the rights provided to land holders and judge from there the
protections accorded to the individual land holders.

2.6.2 Governing Land Laws

Ethiopia is a Federal State constituting two special administrative cities (Addis

Ababa and Dire Dawa) that are accountable to the Federal Government and nine
other administrative national regional states, which are autonomous in the admin-
istrative affairs of their people. The powers and functions of the Federal and
Regional Governments are provided in the FDRE Constitution. The power to “enact
laws for the utilization and conservation of land and other natural resources, his-
torical sites and objects” is provided, under the constitution, to the Federal Gov-
ernment.158 Regional Governments are empowered “to administer land and other
natural resources in accordance with Federal laws.”159 To this effect, the Federal
Government enacted a “Land administration and Use Proclamation” (RLAUP) in
1997 (Proc. 87/1997), and then replaced it with the current legislation, proclamation
No. 456/2005. Proclamation 456/2005 delegates regional states with the power to
“enact rural land administration and land use law”160 which is consistent with it
(Proc. 456/2005) in order to implement the FDRE RLAUP at regional level.
Besides, there are other legislations in Ethiopia related to land matters among which
the Urban Land Lease proclamation (Proc. 711/2011) and the Expropriation
Proclamation (Proc. 455/2005) are the main ones. Further, six of the regional states
(Tigray, Amhara, Oromia,SNNPRS, Beni Shangul Gumz, and Afar) have adopted
their own RLAUPs and Urban Lands Holding Lease Regulations in order to
implement the Federal Land Proclamations.

157
See Dessalegn-Rahmato 2009a–b. Land Registration and Tenure Security: A Critical
Assessment. In: Dessalegn-Rahmato (ed.) The Peasant and the State: Studies in Agrarian Change
in Ethiopia 1950s–2000s. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa Univrsity Press.
158
FDRE Constitution, Article 51(5).
159
Id., Article 52(2)(d).
160
Federal RLAUP, 456/2005, Article 17.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 67

2.6.3 The Constitution

The FDRE Constitution under Article 40, that deals with “Right to property”,
provides details about property in general, and land ownership in particular. The
Constitution under Article 40(1) guarantees for every Ethiopian to own “private
property” with all its benefits. Private property includes “any tangible or intangible
product which has value and is produced by the labor, creativity, enterprise or
capital of an individual citizen” (Article 40.2).
Article 40(3) which is the relevant provision concerning land ownership in
Ethiopia states that:
The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is
exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common property
of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to
other means of exchange.

Regarding its means of acquisition, Sub-Article 4 states that Ethiopian peasants

have the right to obtain land without payment and the protection against eviction
from their possession. Likewise, concerning the pastoralists of the lowland areas,
sub-Article 5 declares that Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for
grazing and cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their posses-
sion. Although the peasant is not entitled to private ownership rights to the land
itself, he is guaranteed a “full right to the immovable property he builds and to the
permanent improvements he brings about on the land by his labor or capital,” and
this right includes “the right to alienate, to bequeath, and, where the right of use
expires, to remove his property, transfer his title, or claim compensation for it.”161
Thus, unlike the Derg era, peasants have the full right to their produce and can sell
it at market value. Moreover, the Constitution guarantees peasants against arbitrary
eviction by the state. The Constitution clearly says: “… the government may
expropriate private property for public purposes subject to payment in advance of
compensation commensurate to the value of the property.”162
Concerning urban land, the Constitution said nothing about the acquisition and
transfer of land by urban dwellers. Nevertheless, some interpret Article 40(6) that
deals with “right of investors” to get land, as one that includes urban dwellers as
well.163 Article 40(6) of the constitution envisages that private investors may get
land on the basis of payment arrangement. In other words, unlike peasant farmers
and pastoralists, investors must pay a reasonable fee for the land they get from the
state. Literally, an investor is a person who uses the land for business activities and
his main objective is to reap profit. So, it is obvious that urban dwellers cannot be

161
FDRE Constitution, Article 40(7).
162
Id., Article 40(8).
163
This line of argument was supported by the claims of government officials who argued that the
source of urban land law is Article 40(6) of the Constitution. This was said by officials of the Addis
Ababa Municipality and the ministers of the Urban Construction and Development following the
passage of the controversial lease proclamation in October 2011.
68 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

categorized as investors. Noticing this problem, it seems, some regional Constitu-

tions replace the word “investor” by another word “proprietor.”164 The effect of
such change is that urban dwellers may be included in this definition, since the
word proprietor may also include any person who owns a property.
The basic flow and a reason for controversy in the valuation and compensation
of assets is that the disagreement between Article 40(3) that recognizes joint
ownership of land by people and the state and Article 40(8) which gives com-
pensation only to private property, fixtures on the land but not the land. The
constitution seems to give a right to ownership of land on the one hand, and denies
its benefits on the other.

2.6.4 Rural Land Laws

[Link] Access to Rural Land

Two years after the adoption of the FDRE Constitution, the Federal government
enacted a Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation (RLAUP) (Proc. 87/
1997) that replaced the 1975 (Proc. 31/1975) rural land law. Proclamation 87/1997
was again itself repealed and replaced by the current RLAUP (Proc. 456/2005) in
2005. This proclamation follows the constitutional principle that creates free access
to rural land. It declares that “peasant farmers and pastoralists engaged in agri-
culture for a living shall be given rural land free of charge.”165 A person, above the
age of 18 years may claim land for agricultural activities, and women who want to
engage in agriculture shall also have the right to get and use land.166
This principle of free access to rural land has also been reproduced in the
regional rural land administration and use proclamations (hereafter Regional
RLAUP).167 The conditions attached to this right are, firstly, the person must want
to engage in agricultural activities. In other words, agriculture must be his/her main
means of livelihood or profession. Secondly, s/he must reside in the area where the
agricultural land is located. Although this principle is not clearly seen in the Federal

164
FDRE Constitution, Article 40(6).
165
Federal RLAUP. Proc. 456/2005, Article 5(1).
166
Id., Article 5(2), (3); See also Article 5(1) of Oromia Rural Land Law that says “Any resident
of the region, aged 18 years and above, whose livelihood depends on agriculture and/or wants to
live on, have the right to get rural land free of charge.”
167
See The Revised Tigray National Regional State Rural Land Administration and Use Proc-
lamation, Proclamation No. 136/2007. Tigray Negarit Gazeta. Year 16 No. 1. Article 5(1)
(hereinafter Tigray RLAUP); The Revised Amhara National Regional State Rural Land Admin-
istration and Use Proclamation, Proclamation No. 133/2006. Zikre Hig. Year 11, No. 18. Article 5
(2) (hereinafter Amhara RLAUP); Oromia Rural Land Use and Administration, Proclamation 130/
2007. Article 5(1) (hereinafter Oromia RLAUP); The Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
Regional State Rural Land Administration and Utilization Proclamation, Proclamation 110/2007.
Debub Negarit Gazeta. Year No. Article 5(1) (hereinafter SNNRS RLAUP).
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 69

RLAUP, Regional RLAUPs have clearly envisaged it.168 Thus, residency and
profession are the two important conditions to get rural land in Ethiopia. The reason
seems that since there is shortage of agricultural land in rural areas, because of
population pressure, it is not advisable to give land to those who live elsewhere
(absentee owners) and those who earn income from other professions.
The criticisms raised against this rule are first, the principle of free access to rural
land has, in practice, not been working for shortage of land in rural areas and
because the laws prohibit redistribution of land.169 Second, because of the residency
requirement in the law, peasant farmers are locked in on their land instead of
searching for additional income by staying in urban areas for longer periods.
Thirdly, regional states may abuse “residency requirement” by misinterpreting it as
“nativity requirement” and deny land to those who come from other regions. This is
true, for example, in what happened in February 2012 when the authorities of the
SNNPS evicted about 20,000 peasants from a place called Gura Farda forcefully,
who had migrated from the northern part of the country (Amhara).170 The peasants
claimed that they lived from 2 to 20 years, and finally they were evicted because
their case was labeled as “illegal settlement.” The same incident was repeated in
March 2013, when the Beni Shangul Gumz region evicted and expelled about 5,000
people because they were Amhara ethnic origin coming from Amhara Region.

[Link] Nature and Duration of Land Rights

Concerning the nature of right provided to the farmers, the Federal and Regional
RLAUPs uphold the constitutional principle that denies private ownership to land.
Rather, the RLAUPs provide farmers with a right termed as “holding right.” The
Federal RLAUP defines the term “holding right” as right of peasants and pasto-
ralists “to use rural land for purposes of agriculture and natural resource develop-
ment, lease and bequeath to members of his family or other lawful heirs, and
includes the right to acquire property produced on his land thereon by his labour or
capital and to sale, exchange and bequeath same” (Article 2.4). Similar definitions
have also been adopted by the other regional RLAUPs. The general understanding
today is that peasant farmers will have all the rights of an owner except sale and
mortgage. They can use the land for agriculture production, have full ownership to
the produce collected there from, have right to rent to fellow farmers (share-
cropping), lease to investors, and inherit and donate (as a gift) to family members.

168
See for example, the Amhara RLAUP that uses the phrase “any person residing in the
region…” as a condition to get agricultural land (Articles 5(2), 6(1), 7(1)); The Tigray RLAUP
uses similar words like “any resident of the region” (Article 5(1)).
169
The Federal RLAUP simply says that upon the wish of the people land may be redistributed
(Article 9); the Amhara RLAUP says, if 80 % of the people agree (Article 8); the Oromia RLAUP
completely prohibits redistribution (Article 14).
170
Daniel W. Ambaye, Ethiopia Yemanat (Whose land is the Land [Ethiopia]), News Paper,
Reporter Amharic, March 28, 2012.
70 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

Peasants shall have such rights for lifetime and beyond, since they can donate
and inherit it to others. It has been declared that “…rural land use right of peasant
farmers, semi-pastoralists and pastoralists shall have no time limit.”171 In a way,
this gives tenure security to the holder of the land as the right of using the land and
the investments made thereon will not be threatened by time limitation. It must be
noted that the longer the duration of rights of using land is the better in terms of
ensuring tenure security.
The missing element in the Federal RLAUP is, though, the issue of pastoralist
lands. The pastoralists are people who live in the lowlands of the country depending
on animal husbandry. They do not have a plot of land like the highland farmers to
settle on; they are always on the move in search of food and water for their animals.
Now the point is that how could we define their right of grazing over vast territories
of the lowland as holding right, a right that includes lease, rent and donation? The
type of property regime dominating the areas is more of communal rather than
private holding. The remedy would be for the lowland regions to come up with their
own rural land laws that take into consideration the regional reality.

[Link] Means of Land Acquisition

There are different modalities through which a person may acquire land in Ethiopia.
The Federal RLAUP recognizes the following ways for a person to get rural land:
a. Land Grant
As mentioned above, the constitution and the subsequent land laws have created a
free access to rural land to whomsoever who wishes to engage in agricultural
activities. Any person, who is 18 years and above has the right to get rural land free
of charge. The government, through its different land administration apparatuses, is
empowered to give land to those who are in need of it. Land grant may be made
from unoccupied government lands, communal lands, land reserve (land left
without heirs and claimed back by government, land claimed back by the state
because the holder leaves the area permanently or neglect the land), and finally by
conducting land distribution.172 Land redistribution, as discussed above, has less
appeal to land holders who are supposed to give consent for its distribution.
b. Bequeath
The second means of acquiring land is through inheritance or donation. Any person
who is a member of peasant family may have the right to get rural land from his/her
family through inheritance or donation (Article 5.2 of Proc. 456/2005). A family
member is defined as “any person who permanently lives with holder of holding
right sharing the livelihood of the latter” (Article 2.5). Unlike the family members
who are recognized by the FDRE Revised Family Law (RFC) as those who are

171
Federal RLAUP, Article 7(1); Amhara RLAUP, Article 5(3); Tigray RLAUP, Article 5(1), (b).
172
See Federal RLAUP, Articles 5(2), (3) and 9(1); Amhara RLAUP, Article 7.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 71

related by marriage, blood and adoption, the Federal RLAUP follows a slightly
different path. As can be inferred from the above cited provision, a family member
is one who “lives” with the peasant who holds the land and “shares” his
“livelihood.”
The requirements are basically two: residency and management. It means, first, the
beneficiary must permanently live with the farmer under the same roof (residency
element); and second, s/he must totally rely on the peasant farmer for her/his liveli-
hood and has no other income of her/his own. S/he is under the control and admin-
istration of the farmer (management element). This means, the law does not
specifically require marital or blood relations for a person to be considered as a family
member. Hence, a laborer who has no alternative income of his own and lives with the
farmer, without salary, under the same roof may be considered as family member and
eligible for inheritance. The Amhara RLAUP even goes one step ahead by allowing
inheritance of land by will to any farmer engaged in agriculture.173
By contrast, it is not possible to inherit or donate rural land to one’s children who
live elsewhere or are engaged in other professions. The rationale behind such rule
seems that since land belongs to the state and the people and not a private one, it has
to be transferred to those who are in need of it, irrespective of their blood relations.
Yet, the FDRE RLAUP, except the possibility of passing one’s land to family
members, presumably through expressed testament (will), doesn’t tell the situation
of inheritance during intestate succession. The assumption is that in the absence of
legitimate will left by the deceased landholder, the rules of the RLAUP and the
Civil Code succession part would be applied. Looking into this problem, the
Amhara (ANRS) and the Benishangul Gumz RLAUPs included provisions to settle
the issue. Regulation 51/2007 of the ANRS, for example, under Article 11(7) puts
the beneficiaries of intestate succession in the following priorities: minor children, if
not, family members; children of full age who have no land of their own; children of
full age who have their own landholding; parents. In order to be a legitimate
beneficiary to the intestate succession, all the above people must show interest to
engage in agricultural activities and reside in the area.

c. Lease
The third modality to acquire land is government land transfer to private investors
through lease contract (Article 5(4)(a)). This is the base for the current large-scale
agricultural land transfer practice carried out in the country. Ethiopia is one of the
countries that attract the interest of investors and sovereign states from different
countries. In the past two decades, millions of hectares of land have been trans-
ferred to many foreign and domestic investors ventured in the flowering industry,
bio-fuel, sugar, cotton, palm oil, tea production etc. The Ethiopian government has
a favorable investment policy that attracts foreign direct investment in such sectors.
It has been claimed that so far about 3.5 million ha of land has been transferred to

173
See Article 16(1) of ANRS RLAUP. Whether or not this contravenes with the Federal Rural
Land Law is debatable.
72 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

both foreign and domestic investors, and the government has still a plan to transfer
the same amount of land in the coming 5 years.174 The government, on the other
hand, puts the figure at about 2.6 million175 (2.2 million given by regional states
and 380,000 given by the Federal Government). However, recent press and other
reports176 about actual or proposed large farmland acquisition by big investors have
raised serious concerns about the danger of neglecting local rights and other
environmental concerns. They have also raised questions about the extent to which
such transactions can provide long-term benefits to local populations and their
contribution to poverty reduction and sustainable development.

[Link] Transfer of Land Use Rights

As already mentioned above, land rights could be transferred permanently through

inheritance and donation. Besides, there are other modalities through which land
use rights may be transferred temporarily to others. We can call them commercial
land transactions, to differentiate them from inheritance and gift. To be specific, the
law recognizes rent and lease as the two possible ways to transfer land use rights
temporarily. Sale and mortgage are not yet allowed. The FDRE RLAUP provides a
general provision that allows rent and lease the details of which shall be decided by
regional rural land laws. It generally says that peasants and pastoralists can “lease to
other farmers or investors land from their holding of a size sufficient for the
intended development in a manner that shall not displace them, for a period of time
to be determined by rural land administration laws of regions based on particular
local conditions [emphasis added]” (Article 8.1). It means, the law gives the dis-
cretion of deciding on the duration of the lease period and the amount of land to be
leased out to regional governments. Another point is that the law uses only the term
“lease”, and excludes the word “rent”, whereas regional RLAUPs give different
meanings to the two terms.177
Regional RLAUPs do not follow similar approach in the size of land to be leased
out and the duration of the lease period. For instance, in Tigray, the peasant is

174
Dessalegn-Rahmato 2011. Land to Investors: Large-Scale Land Transfer in Ethiopia. FSS Policy
Debate Series. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, p. 5.; Daniel W. Ambaye Author. 2004 E.C.
Sefafi ye Gibrina Investment le Ethiopia min Yifeyidal? (What is the Benefit of Large Scale Agri-
cultural Investment for Ethiopia?). Reporter. Accessible at [Link]
old_ver/[Link]?option=com_content&view=article&id=4934:2012-01-21-08-27-41&catid=303:
commentary; See also an article published on Fortune News paper, [Link]
Published%[Link].
175
Interview with Ato Essayas Kebede, Director of the Agricultural Investment Directorate,
Ministry of Agriculture, 2011.
176
See for example, Horne, F. 2011. Understanding Land Investment Deals in Africa: Country
Report Ethiopia. Oakland, USA: The Oakland Institute.
177
For example in the Amhara and Oromia RLAUPs “rent” is understood as “transfer of land to
fellow farmers for shorter period of time”, while “lease” is defined as “transfer of land from
farmers to investors or from government to investors for longer period of time.”.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 73

allowed to rent out up to 50 % of the size of his land for 20 years if the lessee uses
modern technology, and 3 years if s/he uses traditional means of production (Article
6(1), (3) of Tigray RLAUP). In Amhara Region, renting land is allowed for a
maximum of 25 years, although the size is not mentioned. There are practices in the
region where farmers rented out the whole of their holdings to small scale investors.
The argument for deviating from the Federal one (which says in a manner that shall
not displace them) is one that depends on recognizing the rationality of the farmers;
that farmers know better for themselves. The Oromia RLAUP follows the Tigray
approach in terms of size and duration. The SNNPRS RLAUP follows a somewhat
different approach. According to Article 8(1) of Proclamation No. 110/2007 of
SNNPRS, the duration of land rented to a peasant by a peasant is 5 years, by a
peasant to investor is 10 years, and by a peasant to those who cultivate perennial
crops is up to 25 years.
Investors who rent land either from the government or peasant farmers have the
right to mortgage their lease right as security to banks (Article 8(4) of Proc. 456/
2005). Regional states have also reproduced this right in their respective procla-
mations. This implies that an investor may lease land from two sources: first from
individual farmers, and second from the government. When we look the practice, it
is the land which is rented from the government that is given as collateral to banks;
not the one rented from peasant farmers. The reasons are firstly, the land rented
from peasants is too small to pass it as mortgage, and secondly, the peasant may not
agree that his land be given as collateral to banks.
Another recent development is that commercial investors who acquire land from
clan chiefs in the lowland Afar Region complained that banks did not recognize the
land deal and hence denied them loan by securing the land. In the nomadic areas of
Afar and Somale Regions of Ethiopia, rural land is controlled and administered by
clan chiefs rather than the state. Even though the Afar Region passed RLAUP and
regulation, this law could not be implemented in the region because of the resis-
tance it encountered from the clan chiefs.178
This is because the land tenure in the lowlands of Afar and Somalie Regions is
customary in nature. The people live by moving from place to place in search of
water and food for their cattle. They have strong attachment to their clan chiefs than
the government. It is the clan chiefs who effectively administer land in the sense of
granting land for housing, defining communal grazing lands and enforcing rights as
well as resolving disputes. It is even alleged that government authorities require the
permission and approval of clan chiefs to expropriate land, and compensation has to
be directly paid to clan chiefs.179
But the Ethiopian legal system does not recognize the customary land tenure and
land administration system operated in these areas. The existing RLAUP was

178
Ethiopian Reporter, Amharic bi weekly, October 28, 2012.
179
See for example Kabtamu, supra note 28, p. 128, 129. Kabtamu claims that government
agencies, investors and others who want land in Somalie Region have to request to and negotiate
with clan chiefs. Clan chiefs are also the ones who determine the amount of compensation and
receive it in the name of the community.
74 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

enacted taking into consideration the highland sedentary life style which is gov-
erned by formal law. For this reason, any land negotiation and deal made with the
clan chiefs is considered as informal and not acceptable by formal institutions, such
as banks.

[Link] Termination of Land Rights

Rural land rights are not immune to government intervention. Hence, a farmer may
be required by law to use his rights in some fashion than another. For instance, a
farmer may not cultivate land having 30° slope, without putting terraces on the land
(Article 13.4). Such restrictions are made for various reasons, such as environ-
mental, equity, health and others. Violation of such obligations may render the loss
of the land itself. Concerning the reasons of loss of the land rights, the proclamation
does not as such give a coherent list. But, one may locate them in different parts of
the proclamation. For instance, it is said that a holder of rural land “shall be obliged
to use and protect his land. When the land gets damaged, the holder of the land shall
lose his use right (Article 10.1).
In general, a review of the Federal as well as Regional RLAUPs reveals that the
following may be considered as reasons for the loss or termination of rural land
rights:
• Permanent employment of the farmer that brings him an average salary deter-
mined by government
• Engagement in professions other than agriculture and for which tax is paid
• Absence of a farmer from the locality without the knowledge of his whereabouts
and without renting the land for more than 5 years
• Following the land for three consecutive years without sufficient reasons
• Failure to protect land from flood erosion
• Forfeiting land right upon written notification
• Voluntary transfer of land through gift
• Land distribution (the loss will be partial)
• Expropriation of land without replacement of another land.

2.6.5 Urban Land Law

[Link] Overview of Past Lease Proclamations

a. Proclamation 80/1993
It has been discussed that urban land was administered by proclamation 47/1975,
which was adopted by the Derg in 1975. After the downfall of the Derg in 1991, the
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) came up with a new urban land law.
Unlike the permit system operational before it, the new urban land law follows a
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 75

lease system. So, for the first time a lease system was introduced in Ethiopia as a
mode of urban land holding when the new law was adopted in 1993.180 Since the
lease system was enacted before the adoption of the Constitution, and since the
constitution does not explicitly say anything about urban land allocation, it can be
argued that this proclamation was the base for the current urban land holding
system, although its constitutionality is questionable.
The objectives of the proclamation, as indicated in its preamble, were summa-
rized as follows: to create equitable distribution of land, to control the growth of
city centers, to increase urban revenue to finance urban infrastructure, to expedite
construction of urban houses to alleviate the existing shortage, to provide land
utilization value[market value of urban land] which was not in existence, to ensure
transparency in land transfer and avoid land speculation, to promote the economic
development of urban centers through involvement of investors, and to ensure
tenure security by providing land rights of longer durations.181
Compared to the permit system of the Derg era, a significant characteristic of this
proclamation is that it allowed a free transfer of lease right in the form of sale,
mortgage and contribution in Share Company (Article 10.1 of Proc. 80/1993). Yet,
according to sub-3 of same Article, the “lessee may not, on transferring his right of
lease, collect income which is higher than the rent of land he paid; nor may he
mortgage such right at a value which is higher than the rent.” Where the lessee
collects or gains higher than what he actually paid as ground rent, he has the duty to
pay back the difference to town administration (Article 10 0.4). The idea was that
the increment in land value would be captured by the government rather than
individuals.

b. Proclamation 272/2002
Proclamation 80/93 was repealed and replaced by the Revised Urban Land Lease
Proclamation (Proc. 272/2002) in 2002.182 The objectives of Proclamation No. 272/
2002 were mainly two: to collect income from land lease in order to assure fair
share from urban land wealth, and to transform the holding system (permit system
of the Derg era) into a lease system.183 Compared to its predecessor, the objectives
of the revised proclamation 272/2002 were few.
Proclamation 272/2002 offers two methods to get access to urban land, unlike its
predecessor which says nothing about the subject. Article 4(1.a) of the proclamation
recognizes “auction” and “negotiation” as the two modalities to acquire urban land.

180
Urban Lands Lease Holding Proclamation, Proclamation No. 80/1993. Negarit Gazeta. Year
53, No. 40.
181
The Preamble of Proclamation 80/1993.
182
Re-enactment of Urban Lands Lease Holding Proclamation, Proclamation No. 272/2002.
Negarit Gazeta. Year 8, No. 19.
183
Mesganaw-Kifelew 2009. The Current Urban Land Tenure System in Ethiopia. In: Muradu-
Abdo (ed.) Land Law and Policy in Ethiopia Since 1991: Continuities and Changes. Addis Ababa:
Ethiopian Business Law Series, Faculty of Law, Addis Ababa University, p. 171; Also, see
Preamble of Proc. 272/2002.
76 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

Nevertheless, sub-Article (1)(b) of the same Article empowers regional cities to

come up with additional means of land acquisition. Accordingly, besides the two
systems mentioned above, the Addis Ababa City Government and other regions
came up with three additional methods: namely, lot, assignment and award.184 Like
its predecessor, this proclamation also allows the free transfer of lease right (Article
13). But as a significant development, unlike proclamation 80/1993, the revised
proclamation did not require the repayment of an enhanced land value gained by the
leaseholder during transfer of the lease right.

[Link] Current Urban Land Lease Proclamation

a. Background, Justifications and Objectives of the Proclamation

Ten years after the adoption of Proclamation 272/2002, the Ethiopian govern-
ment was reconsidering the revision and change of the lease proclamation on
account of reasons discussed hereunder. Accordingly, the FDRE parliament
adopted a new lease proclamation in October 2011.185 The proclamation was one of
the most contentious legislations ever proclaimed as it sparked intense public
debates following its adoption, and public officials were forced to give explanations
almost every day for more than 3 months without interruption.
The reasons offered by government officials for the revision of the existing lease
proclamations are, in fact, reflected in what was later enshrined under Article 4 of
the proclamation as “Fundamental Principles of Lease”:
1. The right to use of urban land by lease shall be permitted in order to realize the common
interest and development of the people.
2. The offer of lease tender and land delivery system shall adhere to the principles of
transparency and accountability and thereby preventing corrupt practices and abuses to
ensure impartiality in the process.
3. Tender shall reflect the prevailing transaction value of land.
4. The urban land delivery system shall give priority to the interests of the public and
urban centers to ensure rapid urban development and equitable benefits of citizens and
thereby ensure the sustainability of the country’s development.

The first principle (Article 4.1) was represented, as we shall see soon, in different
parts of the proclamation. The idea is that it should be the government, and by
extension, the people, who should be benefiting from the lease system. One way to
do this is by capturing the enhanced urban land value instead of allowing specu-
lators to reap it. One of the arguments forwarded by government in the aftermath of
the adoption of the proclamation was that speculators and urban brokers were the
beneficiaries of the lease system. Urban speculators have been profiting by selling
bare land (only lease right) without adding value to it. As noted above,

184
Ibid., p. 173.
185
FDRE Urban Lands Lease Holding Proclamation, Proclamation No. 721/2011. Negarit
Gazeta. Year 18, No. 4.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 77

Proclamation 272/2002, as opposed to Proclamation 80/1993, allowed free transfer

of lease right with the full advantage of capturing the enhanced value of the leased
plots. Proclamation 80/1993, on the contrary, required the lessee to pay back the
difference in profit between what he paid as lease rent and the sale price. But, later
on, when it was replaced by Proclamation 272/2002, this very provision was
deleted. Because of this privilege allowed in Proclamation 272/2002, in the past
10 years, lessees and urban speculators were able to reap the benefit of enhanced
urban land value, while the government was limited to insignificant tax premium.
Government has been complaining that although it expected to generate adequate
income for urban infrastructure from the lease system, it was somebody else who
reaped that. For this reason, as we shall see below, the defunct rule of Proclamation
80/1993 that provides the enhanced value of urban land to government has been
reinstalled in the new proclamation.
The other point addressed by Article 4(2), (3) is that urban municipalities
became corrupt and inefficient in land delivery. Corruption, non transparency and
injustice were reined in the system which created a safe haven for few urban
speculators and brokers. The modalities of land delivery such as negotiation, award
and lot were considered as non-transparent and sources of corruption. Lack of
detailed rules in tender processes was also cited as another reason for corrupt
behavior. Thus, the proclamation is also expected to be instrumental in efficient
land transfer (Article 4(4)). It has been argued that demand for land in urban areas
has been much greater than the supply of land made by the land authorities.
These principles are also encompassed in the objectives of the proclamation. The
objectives of this new proclamation, as envisaged in the preamble, are two: to
satisfy the growing urban land demand which resulted from the fast economic
growth of the country; and to ensure good governance in the development of
efficient land market and a transparent and accountable land administration system
(Preamble of Proclamation 721/2011).

b. Application of Lease System and Fate of Old Possessions

Lease is the only means of land holding system in urban Ethiopia, and except for
those lands which were acquired before the coming of lease system in 1993, it is
prohibited to acquire land through modalities other than lease system (Article 5.1).
However, as an exception, regional governments may identify urban centers to
which this rule may not be applicable, although this may not be longer than 5 years
(Article 5.4). In other words, as a matter of principle, lease shall be the cardinal
tenure system for urban land holding, but in small towns where it is not yet possible
to place leasehold system, other modalities of tenure system (perhaps permit system
or rural holding system) may be used temporarily, for a maximum of 5 years.
What about old possessions? An “old possession” is “a plot of land legally
acquired before the urban center entered into the leasehold system, or a land pro-
vided as compensation in kind to persons evicted from old possession” (Article
2.18). Thus, all land acquired and held during the imperial era, Derg era, and after
that, outside lease system will be considered as old possession. Besides, replace-
ment land given to owners whose land was expropriated may also be considered as
78 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

old possession since the land was given without lease contract. Although it is
difficult to put the exact figure, the number of old possessions in Addis Ababa, for
example, may constitute half of the total properties in the city. So what will be the
fate of such properties?
As a matter of principle, all land in urban areas shall henceforth be transferred
into lease system (generally see Article 5). But, concerning old possessions, it is
said that their fate will be decided by the Council of Ministers upon detailed study
to be made in the future (Article 6.1). In other words, all “old possessions” will not
be converted in mass at once to leasehold. The law, however, requires the con-
version of old possessions into lease system in one of the following events:
• Where a property attached on an old possession is transferred to a third party through
any modality other than inheritance (Article 6.3)
• Informal settlements that have been regularized pursuant to the regulations of regions
and urban administrations (Article 6.4)
• Where an application to merge an old possession with a lease hold is permitted,
(Article 6.6)

Property transfer in this case includes sale, exchange or donation, excepting

inheritance. It must be noted that since land is not saleable, the subject matter of
“transfer” is not the land itself but the immovable on the land, i.e. building. Hence,
whenever a house rested on old possession is sold, exchanged, or donated, the new
owner shall possess the land on lease basis. The other situation is the “regulari-
zation” of informally held possessions. Land may be held and construction of
houses may be carried out without the permission of the urban land administration
offices. In Addis Ababa and many other urban city centers, there are lots of houses
constructed in such a way. The usual measure taken in such cases is demolition of
the informal settlement. But, sometimes, urban centers or regional governments
may pass a specific regulation to regularize, formally register, the informal settle-
ments. If an informal settlement is now regularized, then the new possession
arrangements must be changed to lease system.
The third case in which an old possession should be converted to lease system is
where old possession is to be merged or amalgamated with leased land. It means the
old possession and the leased land must have been bordering each other and now
have changed into one property. What about amalgamation of two old possessions?
The law does not say anything about it, and the assumption is that unless it is
clearly required by the law, it is not mandatory to convert them to lease system. In
relation to this, a directive of the Addis Ababa City Administration says: “where old
possessions are to be merged, they will be administered according to old possession
tenure.”186

186
Addis Ababa City Administration 2004, Land Delivery Service Manual, No. 12/2004 E.C,
Article 18.2.4.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 79

c. Effect of Lease
Transfer of land holding into lease system means that all land in urban areas, after
being identified and registered by the municipality, shall be known as lease land,
and the holder shall enter with the government a lease contract that, among others,
includes lease period and lease price to be paid (Article 16). The lessee will then be
given a “Lease Holding Certificate” that shows the name of lessee, land size,
location, land use purpose, lease price, lease period and so on (Article 17). The
important effect of converting a possession to leasehold is through the payment of a
specified amount of ground rent to the government. In the event of the above three
situations, the lessee will pay “lease benchmark price” (minimum lease price),
which shall be set by every urban center, multiplied by the area of the land size
(Article 6.7). The calculation of this “lease benchmark price” takes into “account
the cost of infrastructural development, demolition cost as well as compensation to
be paid to displaced persons in case of built up areas, and other relevant factors”
(Article 2.11). Currently, the capital city adopted a new lease benchmark price for
various locations of the city and “the new prices range from 1,686 birr per m2
designated as central market places to 191 birr that are grouped as expansion
(suburb) places in the city.”187 The initial payment will not be less than 10 %
(Article 20.2) and the remaining will be paid over long period of time which will be
decided in the contract. This is also true of land plots granted by “allotment” to
those organs specified under Article 12. For others, the amount of payment shall be
determined by the tender (auction) process.
When an old possession is converted to lease system, there is no guarantee that it
will be maintained as it had been in the past. It means the land use (residential,
business, building height etc.), land size, land shape, land rent/tax, initial lease
payment, and so on shall be determined based on the current or existing rules (such
as structural and local plans, land lease regulations, etc.)188 This will, no doubt,
cause a fluctuation in land size (large size of lands may be reduced and small plots
may be enlarged) and the lessee will be compensated for any fixture on the land in
case his land is reduced, and he is obliged to make lease payment for the addition in
case his possession is enlarged (see Article 6.2 of Proc. 721/2011).
The other argument that can be inferred from this change is that this law will
have an impact on the urban land market. The general idea is that the market price
of urban land and housing will increase or decrease. For example, the price of urban
real properties will be too much for the buyer (since he shall pay both the purchase
price and the lease price) if sellers continue to demand the usual price; or it may be
too small for the seller since the buyer by considering the lease price which he is
supposed to pay, will make a smaller offer for the property. On the other hand, the

187
See for example the news as published in a weekly news paper, Capital, of June 2012. Available:
[Link]
for-addis&catid=35:capital&Itemid=27.
188
See details under Article 6 of Urban Land Lease Regulation No. 49/2004 E.C of Addis Ababa
City Administration; Article 7 of Model Urban Land Regulation of Ministry of Urban Develop-
ment and Construction.
80 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

state will be in a safe position since its revenue will be increasing from every
transaction and change made on the lease right.
Although it is not possible to conclude at this time, the early results on lease
auction in the capital city show that land lease price has become very expensive. For
example, in a land lease auction floated by the Addis Ababa City, on October 31,
2012, all the land found at the periphery of the city was sold at a price ranging from
10,000–14,000 birr per m2. This shows an increase in three to fourfold.189 As
mentioned above, the initial bid price for these areas has been fixed as 191 birr per m2.

d. Modalities of Land Acquisition

Tender

Previously, as mentioned above and stipulated by the federal and state lease laws,
there were five modalities of urban land acquisition: auction, negotiation, assign-
ment, award, and lot. Auction and negotiation were the two most important
methods for cities to collect income from land lease transfers. In bigger cities,
auction is still the most utilized method to transfer land from municipalities to
investors. Land was also assigned to civic associations, charitable organizations,
embassies, and international organizations. Award was the least utilized method of
land transfer by urban land authorities to those who contribute extraordinary
accomplishments. Lot or lottery was a mechanism by which urban land had been
distributed to low and middle income citizens. This method was an extension to
what had been exercised by the permit system during the Derg era.
Now, however, since most of the modalities are categorized as bad practices that
opened the door for corruption, the government argued, the law recognizes only
tender (auction) and allotment (land lease transfer without auction) as the two basic
means of lease transfer from government to citizens (Article 7.2 of Proc. 721/2011).
As a matter of principle, every land needed for residential, commercial (agriculture,
industry, or service), and other purposes will be transferred by tender. Bidders will use
the “lease benchmark price” as a base to offer their price, and the highest bidder will be
identified based on the “bid price and the amount of advance payment he offers”
(Article 11.5). To make it more transparent, accessible and free from corruption, the
law allocates more detailed provisions (Articles 8–11) to the tender process.

Allotment
As exception, however, city municipalities may give land by allotment to selected
bodies which have paramount importance to society. “Allotment” is defined in the
proclamation as “a modality of land use right transfer applied for providing urban
lands by lease to institutions that could not be accommodated by way of tender”
(Article 2.10). Whether or not allotment requires payment of the minimum lease
bench price is not known. But, at least, in some cases (such as replacement land

189
This piece of news was published in the English weekly, Capital, Year 14, No. 726 of Nov 4,
2012.
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 81

given to expropriated person and land required for religious worship) it is not
feasible to expect payment. What is clear is, though, those listed under Article 12
(3), (5) are expected to pay a lease bench mark price, as we shall see below.
The following list includes entities or persons eligible to get land by allotment
(Article 12 of the proclamation):
1. (a) office premises of budgetary government entities, (b) social service institu-
tions run by government or charitable organizations, (c) places of worship, (d)
public residential housing construction programs and government approved self-
help housing constructions, (e) use of diplomatic missions and international
organizations, (f) manufacturing industries, and (g) projects having special
national significance and considered by the president of the region or the mayor
of the city administration and referred to the cabinet (Article12.1).
What is interesting among the list is “d”. Under Article 12(1)(d) the beneficiaries
are government condominium housing projects and “government approved self-
help housing constructions.” As discussed above, the land assignment to self-
help construction is something that is maintained from the past. This is the same
with the lot (lottery) type of land allocation that had been applied. This is the
only provision that accommodates the cheaper and/or equitable land transfer to
urban residents. The idea is that since low income group people may not be able
to compete in bidding for urban plots with higher income groups, a special land
allocation system that accommodates their interest is fair and realistic. As
mentioned above, whether or not the beneficiaries under this list are required to
pay lease bench mark price is not known. But the assumption is that, in the
absence of such clear requirement, payment should not be expected.
2. In addition to what we have under (1) above, a person who is displaced from his
house/land (an old possession or leased one) as a result of urban renewal (like in
case of expropriation) shall get a replacement plot by allotment. Under the
FDRE Expropriation proclamation, one of the components of a compensation
package is provision of replacement land (Article 8(4)(a) of Proc. 455/2005) for
the person to build his house, and it will not be logical to expect payment of
lease price for such land.
3. A lawful tenant of government or Kebele owned residential house outside Addis
Ababa shall be entitled to allotment of residential plot of land at benchmark
lease price if displaced due to urban renewal program. In Addis Ababa, he is
entitled to purchase of condominium housing unit (Article 12(3), (4)).
The criticism that one may raise against this modality of land acquisition is that it
will defeat the very purpose of the proclamation, discouraging speculators. This is
because it will be again the rich people who can afford to pay the highest lease bid
price and sell it at profit in the future. The majority of the poor will be excluded
from the system. For example, as already mentioned previously, in the land lease
bid floated on the 31st of October 2012, residential land area whose benchmark
82 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

(floor value) was fixed at 191 birr fetched exaggerated prices ranging from 10,000
to 14,000 birr per m2.190 The government tries to accommodate the interest of the
poor and middle income citizens by providing condominium houses and other
similar mechanisms. But the problem with such systems is that it is corrupt and
inefficient. For example, the Addis Ababa City Administration that started con-
dominium housing construction in 2004 said to be completed and transferred
97,000 houses (up to 2012) to residents, while around 350,000 people are still
awaiting their chance.191 This shows that the performance of the past 8 years in
construction and distribution of housing was not satisfactory.
It seems rather that people opted for illegal land grab (informal settlement) in the
absence of efficient and equitable land distribution. Recent study conducted by the
Addis Ababa city reveals that after the passage of the lease proclamation, massive
land grab has been made by landless urban residents in the expansion areas of the
city. The Addis Ababa City Administration has demolished 7,000 houses and
claimed back 393.3 ha of land from illegal settlers in the six sub-cities of Bole,
Yeka, Nefas-Silk Lafto, Akaki Kaliti, Kolfe Keranio, and Gulele. In connection
with the incident 23 Woreda officials have been removed from their positions and
another 163 are under investigation.192

e. Transfer of Lease Right

Like any other property right, lease right is also freely transferable, although this
time it is burdened with some restrictions. The new lease proclamation declares: “a
lessee may transfer his leasehold right or use it as collateral or capital contribution
to the extent of the lease amount already paid” (Article 24.1) In here, the phrase “to
the extent of lease amount already paid” refers to the collateral and capital con-
tribution, and partly, as we shall discuss below, to the sale of uncompleted con-
structions. Caution is necessary, though, in understanding its implication.
In the previous Proclamation No. 272/2002, there was no limit or restriction to
such right. Lessees who had been transferring either the lease right (bare land) or
lease right with construction (complete or incomplete) on it have been getting the
full profit of the transfer without any restriction. Lots of urban speculators were said
to be benefiting by capturing the full enhanced land value over the years and even
abused it and became “rent collectors.” In other words, it is said that the absolute
freedom, introduced by the previous proclamation, has created the problem of “rent

190
See the weekly Capital, Sunday, 4, October 2012, Year 14, No. 726. The paper expresses its
worry that the poor would be excluded from future dealings of such nature because of this unheard
type of prices offered.
191
See for example a report made by the weekly English The Reporter, Saturday August 18,
2012.
192
An official press explanation given by Ato Getachew Ambaye, City manager of Addis Ababa
City, December, 2012. See details Addis Fortune, Sunday Dec 2, 2012, Vol. 12, No. 657.
Available: [Link] Ethio-
pian Reporter (Amharic), Wednesday Dec 5, 2012, available: [Link]
293-news/[Link].
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 83

seeking” activities. This means that speculators were encouraged to transfer lease
right only, without any construction made on it. This generally did benefit neither
the economy nor the people, since its purpose was filling the pocket of few people
rather than alleviating the housing shortage that exists in the country. The value of
urban land was unreasonably inflated for no reason other than speculation and
confusion. There were ample experiences which show that in recent years, in the
capital as well as in regional cities and towns, land value (bare land) has been
increasing twofold every year without any value added on it.
For this reason, the government has been complaining that speculators purchase
and transfer land without adding value to it. Among others, even real estate companies
were said to have been transferring bare land (lease right to the space only) without
building the necessary construction over it. Because of this, in 2010, the city of Addis
Ababa had reclaimed more than 1 million m2 of land from real estate developers on the
ground that they had been transferring land without adding value thereto.193 To fight
this practice, the new proclamation introduces four strategies that limit the free transfer
of lease right. The government argues, of course, that they were made with the
intention of curbing speculative activities and boosting the state revenue.

Barring repeated transfer

First, the proclamation prevents people who repeatedly transfer leasehold right,
without completion of construction, in anticipation of speculative market benefit,
from participation in a future bid (Article 24.7). This means, the city administration
can prevent selected people, who are identified in selling lease right or unfinished
properties repeatedly from participating in future auctions. The reason behind such
restriction is to discourage speculators who are engaged in the sale and transfer of
unfinished properties; instead, the government wants to encourage them to complete
the constructions before selling, and thereby alleviate the housing problems. The
proclamation does not tell as to how many times people are supposed to transfer
unfinished property before they get banned. The FDRE Model Lease Regulation
(Article 43.1) and Addis Ababa City Directive, however, provide a clue in this
regard. According to Article 56(1) of the directive “if the person transfers unfin-
ished properties three times within 3 years, he shall be barred from any future
bidding in lease for 2 years”.

Supervision of sale

Second, as per Article 24(2) of the proclamation, “If a lessee, with the exception of
inheritance, wishes to transfer his leasehold right prior to commencement or half-
completion of construction, he shall be required to follow transparent procedures of
sale to be supervised by the appropriate body.” Note that this requirement is not
necessary for the sale and transfer of fully completed properties. The implication of
this provision is understood only after reading the next sub Article of this provision.

193
Addis Fortune, weekly news paper, Vol. 11, No. 539.
84 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

The sub-Article points out that since the seller of the lease will not be entitled to the
full profit of unfinished construction, it is necessary to involve a government agent
to assess the value of construction and current land lease price.
Limitation on transfer of unfinished property
Third, transferring only leasehold right (bare land) or leasehold right with only
half-completed construction gives no benefit at all to sellers. Previously, completed
or not, lease holders used to reap the full benefit of enhanced land value during
transfer of the lease right. Now, however, as a strategy to encourage completion of
construction, to avoid rent seeking activities, and to rather capture the benefit by the
state, the sale and transfer of half completed properties is not attractive. “Half
completed construction” is defined under the proclamation (Article 2.16) differently
for different types of constructions as follows:
(a) In the case of a villa, completion of foundation, columns and top beam;
(b) In the case of a multi-story building, completion of foundation and 50 % of the
total number of floor slabs;
(c) In the case of a real estate development, completion of the construction phase
referred to, as the case may be, in paragraph (a) or (b) of sub-Article (1) of this
Article relating to the entire blocks.
What will happen if a lessee wants to transfer half completed construction or
bare land? The first requirement, as already raised above is, to invite municipal
agent to oversee the sale process. Besides, the amount of money collected by the
lessee is limited to the following items. According to the law, a lessee who wishes
to transfer his leasehold rights before commencement of construction or half-
completed constructions will get first, the effected lease payment including interest
thereon, calculated at bank deposit rate; second, the value of the already executed
construction; and third, 5 % of the transfer lease value (Article 24.3). This 5 %
relates to the difference between the lease purchase price paid and the sales price; in
effect, it must be referred to the gain or profit made by the transfer.194
So far as the first two conditions are concerned, there is no problem in under-
standing the amount of lease price paid (plus the bank based interest rate), and the
amount of money expended for the construction made. The difficulty lies in
understanding the third point: how do we determine the transfer lease value? Are
the lessee and the new beneficiary (e.g. buyer) supposed to deal in the open? What
is the role of the municipality agent at this point? Details, similar in content, are
provided in the Model Lease Regulation and the Addis Ababa City Administration
Lease Regulation and Addis Ababa City Administration Lease Directive.
The Addis Ababa City Administration Lease Directive No. 11/2004 provides
details as described below. As a matter of principle, it is the government, through

194
Look to this type of argument in Mekasha-Abera 2012. Ye Eethiopia Meseretawi ye Lease Hig
Hasabochna Yemiasketlachew Chigroch (Fundamentals of the Ethiopian Lease Law and its
Problems), Addis Ababa, Far East Trading, p. 79. The writer say that “If the lease sales value is
more than the lease price paid at the beginning by the seller, then the seller will be entitled to 5 %
of the difference and the rest of it will go to government.”
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 85

the supervisor mentioned above, that can decide the amount of transfer value
(Article 51.1). The lease transfer value shall be the average value of the current/
market tender value of the locality and the lease value by which transfer was made
to the current lessee (Article 51.2). The government supervisor will take the average
price of the current lease price of the area and the actual lease price for which the
lessee (now seller) got the land. In the absence of an offer by the buyer, this average
value will be the binding transfer value (Article 51.4). If, on the other hand, the
buyer makes an offer that is equal or less than the average value calculated above,
then the transfer is acceptable (Article 51.3). When the average value is less than
the previous lease price, then the relevant body may either take one of the better
values (either the previous or the current one) as transfer value (Article 51.5) or put
the lease land on auction [to get better price] (Article 51.6).195
To make it clearer, let’s assume that Ms. A has bid 200 m2 of land from the city
municipality for 4,000 birr per m2 (total 800,000 birr). Let us again assume that she
has made a 10 % advance payment of 80,000 birr as lease price. Let’s further
assume that she constructed a foundation at a cost of 40,000 birr. Her total cost at
this point amounts to 120,000 birr. For some reason, however, she now wants to
sell the property after 1 year. The bank interest is 5 %.
A further assumption that is made is that the current lease value of land in a
similar location is 5,000 birr per ms and this sums up to a total value of
1,000,000 birr.
Decision (Average value is 900,000)
1. The buyer shall pay birr 900,000
2. The seller (lessee) will get the following:
2:1. 80,000 birr (lease price paid)
2:2. 4,000 (5 % of 80,000)
2:3. 40,000 (construction cost)
2:4. 5,000 (5 % of 100,000 birr profit (900,000–800,000)
3. Total = 129,000 (net Profit for seller = 9,000).
4. Government profit = 95,000 birr.
On the other hand, if the construction is completed or becomes more than half,
then there is no limitation as to the value of the sale price. Hence, the whole purpose
behind limiting the right to the transfer of half-completed properties seems to
encourage owners to complete construction and thereby alleviating the housing
shortage.
The flaw of this provision is that it will not stop the connivance that might be
made between buyers and sellers. It means that it would not be possible to avoid an
under table (internal) agreement that might be carried out between the two. Sec-
ondly, even if it is possible to control the connivance, people will shift radically
from selling unfinished properties to finished ones. For instance, for residential

195
Ibid. Articles 41 and 44 respectively.
86 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

houses, half completed construction refers to construction of foundation, columns

and top beam. Thus, if one puts a roof to the house, then it is considered as a
complete one. As compared to sale price, the difference in cost is indeed very small.
In this way, speculators will shift to this new way of trading properties. Thirdly,
constitutionally speaking, this practice is against the property rights of property
holders. Once the government gets its money from the lease price during original
transfer, why is it that it again insists on sharing the profit from the appreciation of
land value? Of course, the justification is to encourage people to put a building on
the land before they sell it, and to add value to their holdings, but, this should not be
done by violating the constitutional right of property which, among others, gives
the right to collect the increment in property value.

Mortgage of leasehold right

As stated above, leasehold right is subjected to any form of transaction including

sale, lease/rent, inheritance, donation, mortgage, and as capital contribution to a
company. But again, as mentioned previously, the right to mortgage is limited to the
“extent of lease amount already paid” (Article 24.1). This “already paid lease
amount” may be the initial down payment and the yearly installment, if the lease
agreement was made before a year and more. Under Article 24(4) the proclamation
further introduces, as a fourth strategy, the following:
…where a lessee uses his leasehold right as collateral prior to commencement of con-
struction, the collateral value may not exceed the balance of the lease down payment after
considering possible deductions to be made pursuant to Sub-Article (3) of Article 22 of this
Proclamation.

The deductions mentioned under Article 22(3) are “…7 % of the total lease price
in addition to a lease amount that covers the period from the date he took possession
of the land.”
The contents of the above Articles may be summarized as follows:
• Lease right may be mortgaged to the extent of lease payment already made (that
includes down payment and yearly installments).
• If the lease right is without any construction on it, the mortgage value will be
equal to lease payment already made, minus 7 % penalty and unpaid yearly
installments.
To further elaborate this provision, let us closely look into the different sub-
Article s of Article 24 mentioned in this section. Based on Article 24(1), as a matter
of principle, lease right may be used as collateral when borrowing from banks or
creditors in general. But, the amount of money the lessee may borrow against
mortgaging his lease right is restricted to the amount of money s/he has paid so far,
as lease price. This lease price includes the down payment paid at first (e.g. 10 %)
and the following yearly installments. In other words, the land cannot give the lease
holder a value which he had not made on it; what one can get from the land is what
he “sows” on it. This is a radical shift from the previous practice where banks used
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 87

to give higher amount of value to location (to the land only).196 Thus, for example,
a person who had made a total of 100,000 birr lease payment may not borrow more
than this amount by mortgaging his lease right. Of course, if there is a construction,
banks may also consider the value/cost of such construction in their loan calcula-
tion. In other words, the market based location value which used to be given by
banks during loan agreement (e.g. up to 4,000 birr per m2 in Piazza and Mercato,
prime locations in Addis Ababa, the capital city) will be reduced to a much smaller
amount.197
The other point that is incorporated in relation to mortgaging of lease right is
envisaged in Sub-Article 4, which declares that if the lessee used his right as
collateral prior to commencement of construction, then the amount of loan will be a
much lesser one. It is declared that, this time, from the loan to be extended, a
reduction of 7 % of the total lease price agreed in the contract and the total lease
price unpaid (if any) starting from the time the land was delivered to the lessee shall
be made.
To support this with an example, assume the lessee has got the land for a total of
birr 1.2 million. He made a down payment of 10 % (120,000 birr) and continued to
pay for the next 3 years, an annual lease rent of 40,000 (total of 120,000) birr. So far
the total lease price paid is birr 240,000. Suppose also that there is no construction
activity made on the land. If he wants to mortgage the lease right, what he can get is
only birr 223,200 (i.e. 93 % of the total lease price paid). What about if a con-
struction of some value is made on the land? Then the calculation will be com-
pletely different. He will get the whole lease price paid, i.e. 240,000 birr. The above
calculation is mandatory. Concerning the valuation of the construction, complete or
incomplete, made on the land, the right is given to the lending banks to make the
valuation.198
This rule will immediately cut down the amount of loan to an insignificant level.
After the adoption of the proclamation, one of the stern complaints made on the
proclamation was by the business community. Even if their properties (buildings)
might be sold in the open for tens of millions for their location’s sake, banks will
not consider the market value of the property. The kind of valuation banks follow
now is cost replacement; that is, construction value of the building only, which
probably may be 10–20 % of the market value of the property. This means the
difference between the sales value and the mortgage value of the property is
extremely big, and this raises the question of sanity of the system.

196
See for example Daniel-Weldegebriel-Ambaye 2009a. Land Valuation for Expropriation in
Ethiopia: Valuation Methods and Adequacy of Compensation 7th FIG Regional Conference.
Hanoi, Vietnam, 19–22 October 2009 FIG ([Link]
ambaye_3753.pdf). It is said that before the coming of this lease legislations, banks used to give
location value in the capital up to 4,000 birr per m2.
197
See details for example Ibid., p. 30.
198
See Article 59.3 of the Addis Ababa Lease Directive.
88 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

f. Formation and Termination of Lease Contract

Formation of contract

Any person permitted urban land lease holding in accordance with this Procla-
mation shall conclude a contract of lease with the appropriate body (Article 16.1).
The lease contract shall include the construction start-up time, completion time,
payment schedule, grace period, rights and obligations of the parties as well as other
appropriate details (Article 16.2). The assumption is that the general provisions of
contract law envisaged under the civil code will be applied here as well. Chief
among the elements of a lease contract is the lease period. The lease proclamation
has set different lease periods for residential and other activities. As in the case of
the previous proclamation, 99 years has been set for residential purposes and
70 years for industry, 60 years for commerce, and 15 years for urban agriculture
(Article 18).

Termination of contract

The proclamation introduces three situations that may lead to the termination of the
lease contract (Article 25.1):
1. failure to use the land in accordance with Article 21(1), (violation of contract)
2. expropriation of the leased land, and
3. expiry and non-renewal of contract.
The proclamation confirms that except in the case of the above three situations,
“no leasehold land right may be terminated and the lessee cleared from the land”
(Article 26.3). A brief analysis of the three situations is given below.
Violation of contract: According to Article 21(1)(a) “A lessee shall use the land
for the prescribed purpose within the period of time stated in the lease Contract”
(emphasis added). The law is concerned about two things: that the land must be
used for the intended purpose (land use issue), and that construction must be started
within the agreed time (avoiding delay). This means, if the person fails to use the
land for the purpose for which it was designated (e.g. constructing commercial
building instead of residential, building a house contrary to the agreed plan, use the
land for agriculture rather than industrial, etc.), then the city municipality may
terminate the contract. Similarly, failure to commence or finish construction and
commencement of the business (for which the land was provided) may also be
another reason for terminating the contract.
The “land use” obligation is mandatory to follow since the permit of the lease
was made by considering the master plan of the city. Of course, if the master plan
accommodates/permits, the land use may be converted upon the application of the
lessee and an approval by the concerned organ (Articles 21.2 and 3). It must be
noted that one of the purposes of leasehold is to manage urban growth through the
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 89

enforcement and implementation of urban land use regulations.199 The effect of

violating land use, as prescribed under Article 25(3) of Proclamation 721/2011, is
retaking of the land and returning a paid-up land lease price, after deduction of costs
and penalty.
The use of the land within the agreed time implies three things: commencement
and completion of construction and use of land for the intended purpose. The first
two have to do with the construction, while the third is concerned with the oper-
ational activities, such as starting the industry, business, agriculture, etc.
Any lessee must commence construction within the agreed time. This is not an
innovation to this proclamation; it was also included in the previous proclamation.
The difference is that, the current proclamation contains more harsh measures
against those who contravene the lease contract. For example, if one fails to start
construction on time, the land will be reclaimed by the city administration and some
penalty or fee may be imposed on the lessee (Article 22).
Moreover, a lessee who got land by tender or allotment shall complete the
construction according to the agreement. The law provides 24, 36 and 48 months to
complete construction for small, medium and large scale construction activities
respectively. Depending on the type of construction and regulation to be issued by
each city administration, the period may be extended from 6 to 12 months. Where
the lessee fails to complete construction within the agreed time, the contract shall be
terminated and the land will be retaken by the city administration. The lessee is also
obliged to remove any construction activity at his own cost from the land or else the
city may transfer it by tender to another person or remove the property on the land
and then claim the cost from the lessee (Article 23).
Expropriation: Article 21(1)(b) introduces taking of land for other public pur-
pose activities (expropriation) as the second reason to terminate a lease contract.
Unlike the above cases, the lease shall be compensated based on the relevant laws
(Article 25.4). The details of expropriation of leasehold right are discussed below.
Expiry and Non-renewal of Contract: the “non-renewal of the lease period in
accordance with Sub-Article (1) of Article 19” of the proclamation was given as a
third ground to terminate a lease contract (Article 25.1.c). The lease period provided
is different for different purposes. There is also difference between Addis Ababa and
other cities/towns. In determining the maximum lease period of urban land lease
agreement, the law classifies the cities into Addis Ababa and other urban centers. In
both Addis Ababa and other urban centers, a maximum of 99 years is set for the use
of land for residential housing, science and technology, research and study, gov-
ernment office, charitable organizations, and religious institution purposes. Besides,
for all types of urban centers, the maximum period given for urban agriculture is
15 years (Article 18.1.a).
In the case of other land use purposes, in Addis Ababa, the duration given is
90 years for education, health, culture and sports, 70 years for industry, 60 years for

199
One may also further study the contents of the FDRE Building Proclamation No. 624/2009
and FDRE Urban Planning Proclamation No. 574/2008 to see the land use regulations included.
90 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

commerce, and 60 years for others(Article 18.1.b). In other urban centers, a slightly
higher period is arranged: 99 years for education, health, culture, sports, 80 years
for industry, 70 years for commerce, and 70 years for others (Article 18.1.c).
What will happen after the expiry of the lease contract? The lease right may be
renewed upon the application of the lessee, using the prevailing benchmark lease
price of the time (Article 19). It seems the discretion of renewing the contract is
given to the city administration; the city municipality may renew or refuse to renew
the contract. Whether or not the city is required to give good reasons for not
renewing the contract is not known. But, the reading of the FDRE Model Lease
regulation gives a clue which may be used by city centers. Article 48(2) of the
FDRE Model Lease Regulation provides three events in which the lease contract
may not be renewed: change of structural plan, the need of the land for other public
purposes, or the inability of change of the land to current land use purpose.
The effect of non-renewal of contract is that the land will be taken after the
removal of any property erected on the land by the owner. There shall be no
payment of compensation for any property loss caused to the owner. The munic-
ipality is empowered to “take over the land together with the property thereon
without any payment where the lessee has failed to remove the property within the
period” given (Article 25(5), (6)). The possible problem or criticism that may be
forwarded against such provision is that it may create tenure insecurity and hysteria
when the expiry date approaches.

g. Expropriation of Lease Right

Expropriation refers to taking of someone’s immovable property for public purpose
and upon payment of compensation. The details of the concept and nature of
expropriation are discussed in following chapters, and it is sufficient to mention
here that “the appropriate body shall have the power, where it is in the public
interest, to clear and take over urban land upon payment of commensurate com-
pensation, in advance, for the properties to be removed from the land” (Article
25.1). The two most important points one may gather from this provision are that
land may be taken for public purpose activities and upon payment of commensurate
amount of compensation. Urban center may take urban land and any property
thereon, if the land is needed for public purpose activities. A good example, of
public purpose in urban areas may be roads, private investments such as hotels,
commercial and industrial buildings. During such takings, the government is
required to pay compensation commensurate to the loss of property on the land.
This includes the replacement cost of buildings of any sort on the land and the
market value of any other fixtures such as trees and fruits. The valuation and
assessment of such properties shall be made based on the Expropriation Procla-
mation (455/2005) and Regulation (135/2007). Besides the compensation that is
made in terms of cash money for the properties found on the land, the person who
lost the land will also be provided a “substitute plot of land within the urban center”
(Article 25.2).
The first procedure in the process of expropriation is provision of clearance
notice to the holder of the land. According to Article 27(1) of the lease
2.6 The Current Land Tenure System 91

proclamation, “the possessor of the land shall be served with a written clearing
order stating the time the land has to be vacated, the amount of compensation to be
paid and the size and locality of the substitute plot of land to be availed.” And this
notice should be served upon the possessor of the land in not less than 90 days
before the appropriation of the land by the city administration. Any person who
believes that his interest is infringed as a result of the notice has the right to submit a
grievance within 15 days to the appropriate body (Article 28.1). This person may be
the owner of the property who has grievance on the amount of compensation or
another third party who may claim the ownership of the land. The appropriate body
(most probably the administrative body itself) will give its decisions after consid-
ering the application and evidences (Article 28.3).
The Proclamation further provides an opportunity for the aggrieved person to
make an appeal if he was not satisfied by the decision of the appropriate body. The
appeal will be made to an appellate tribunal which shall “be established by regions
or city administrations” (Article 30.1). Thus, this body is outside the hierarchy of
regular courts and is rather affiliated to the administration, since its accountability is
to the region or urban center (see Article 30.3). Its power seems restricted to “urban
land clearing and compensation” cases and “decisions of the Tribunal, except
relating to compensation, on issues of law and facts including claims for substitute
land shall be final” (Article 29.3). So the only appealable issue to regular courts is
the complaint on the inadequacy of compensation, which for many critics is strange
since issue of law is always appealable to higher court far up to the cassation court
itself.

2.7 Summary

This chapter described the land tenure system of Ethiopia from the perspective of
three historical periods. This time span covers from early times up to the current
period. The three historical periods represent three different regimes having three
different ideologies. In feudal Ethiopia (before 1974), land had been controlled by
the elite, in that although peasants of northern Ethiopia were allowed to have
usufructuary right (rist) on their land, they were encumbered with different obli-
gations. The peasants of the southern part of the country, on the other hand, were
evicted from their land during the nineteenth century and became landless gabbars,
servants to the northern settlers who took their land. The Derg, which replaced the
imperial regime, came to power accompanied by famous slogan “Land to the Tiller”
with the objective of distributing land to the tiller, and thereby made the peasant the
owner of the land and any produce wherefrom. However, the first thing the Derg
did was nationalizing all urban and rural lands and extra houses in urban areas,
without payment of compensation. The government replaced the previous land-
lordism in all its forms and it became the sole renter and rent collector. The rural
and urban land laws completely prohibited sale, mortgage, lease/rent, donation, and
inheritance (except to spouse and children) of land. In spite of this, the measure had,
92 2 Land Rights in Ethiopia

at the beginning, got great support from the rural peasantry, especially of the
southern regions of the country. However, because of erroneous policies of the
government that followed thereafter, and the repeated land distribution activities
that carried out, the motto “Land to the Tiller” was aborted.
In 1991, the Derg, a Marxists government, was toppled by the current incumbent
party, and a Transitional Government was established until the adoption of a new
Constitution in 1995. The new FDRE Constitution maintains land ownership of the
Derg by putting ownership of the land under public and state hands. Currently,
there are other land related legislations in the country dealing with urban and rural
lands and natural resources. According to the FDRE Constitution, all urban and
rural lands and natural resources belong to the state and the public.
The rural land laws provide peasants with lifetime rights (holding right) to the
land. This land right includes use, lease/rent, donation and inheritance rights. Sale,
exchange (barter) and mortgage are not allowed. The rights of lease/rent, donation
and inheritance are allowed, but their usage is restricted for different reasons. The
rural land laws also create (at least in principle) free access to rural land although
because of land shortage and restriction on land distribution, this right has not been
realized.
In urban areas, land can be held only through lease system. According to the
newly adopted urban land leasehold proclamation, residents are allowed to get land
only through auction. It is only under exceptional circumstances that land may be
given by allotment (without auction). Compared to the previous lease proclamation,
the new one highly restricts access to urban land. The Constitution stipulates that
land belongs to the “people and the state”, but there is no clue which shows that
urban dwellers are as much owners of their land as their rural counterparts. Sec-
ondly, the different strategies included in the new proclamation restrict the free
transfer of lease right. In the case of sale of unfinished properties, it is the gov-
ernment who shall take the profit. Land literally becomes valueless for mortgage
purposes.
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