DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of

Pampanga
G.R. No. L-2068 | October 20, 1948 | 81 Phil 648

FACTS:
• A warrant of arrest was issued for petitioner Bustos on the strength of the
testimony of the complainant and certain witnesses.
• In the preliminary investigation, his counsel moved that the complainant present
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-
examined. The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking Sec 11 of Rule
108, and the objection was sustained. Said Sec 11 denies the defendant the right
to cross-examine witnesses in a preliminary investigation. Bustos now contends
that said Sec 11 infringes [the now Art VIII, Sec 5(5) of the Constitution]. It is
argued that the rule in question deals with substantive matters and impairs
substantive rights, to wit, his statutory and fundamental right to be confronted
by and to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rule in question impairs substantive rights thereby violating the
constitutional limitation on the rule-making power of the Court.

RULING:
No. The rule in question is an adjective law and not a substantive law which creates
substantive rights. Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is
the first step taken in a criminal prosecution. Therefore, it is not an essential part of
due process of law. It may be suppressed entirely, and thus, mere restriction of the
privilege formerly enjoyed thereunder cannot be held to fall within the constitutional
prohibition. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage where the guarantee of
due process comes into play, he still enjoys to the full extent the right to be confronted
by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. As a rule of evidence, said Sec 11
is also procedural. The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of
Court. We cannot tear down Sec 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without
throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these Rules. The distinction
between “remedy” and “substantive right” is incapable of exact definition. This being so,
it is inevitable that the SC in making rules should step on substantive rights, and the
Constitution must be presumed to tolerate, if not to expect, such incursion as does not
affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but
operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage.

Rule denying accused of his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him in a preliminary investigation held to be only an adjective law and therefore
constitutional (preliminary investigation — not essential part of due process).

***

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. vs. Judge FRANK LOBRIGO Published

G.R. No. 226679 | November 2, 2018| 816 Phil. 789

FACTS:
• Salvador Estipona, Jr. was indicted for violating Section 11 (illegal possession of
illegal drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act as he was
alleged to have been caught in possession of shabu.
• Initially, Estipona pleaded not guilty but later, with the assistance of the Public
Attorney’s Office, he filed a motion to withdraw his initial plea and with a
simultaneous motion to enter into plea bargaining.
• The prosecution opposed the motions on the ground that plea bargaining is not
allowed under Section 23 of RA 9165. Judge Frank Lobrigo, although he agreed
with the points raised by Estipona, denied Estipona’s motion on the ground that
what Estipona was raising was a question on the constitutionality of Section 23
of RA 9165. Judge Lobrigo opined that although Regional Trial Courts have the
power to rule on the constitutionality of laws, he deemed it best not to rule on
the matter as it may have potential ramifications to drugs cases pending before
his sala. Hence, Estipona eventually filed a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is constitutional.
RULING:
No. Pursuant to Section 5 (5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to the Supreme
Court. Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure. Hence, Section 23 of RA 9165, an act of Congress, is
unconstitutional.

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been
defined as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that both the
prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.

The Solicitor-General contended that the action was improper on the grounds that: (1)
the Congress should have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3)
the proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before the Supreme
Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC.

***

CHESTER DE JOYA vs. Judge PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding

Judge of Branch 40, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 162416 | January 31, 2006

FACTS:
• Petitioner Chester De Joya asserts that respondent Judge Placido C. Marquez
erred in finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
• Hence, he filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the
Court to nullify and set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge
against petitioner.
• He likewise continuously refuses to submit to the court’s jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner may be allowed to obtain relief from the courts without
submitting to its jurisdiction.

RULING:
Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and
how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such
jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the
complaint, petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or
petitioner.

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the

voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the
court or by coercive process issued by the court to him, generally by the
service of summons.

c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike
jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary
act or agreement of the parties.

d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by
the pleadings filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-
trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure
of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as
 provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.

e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court
of the thing in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or
garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the court the power
to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction,
as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real
property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.

In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction
over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property
in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest.

In such cases, the service of summons by publication and notice to the defendant is
merely to comply with due process requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation
Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without a license
cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or proceeded against before
our courts or administrative tribunals.

Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from
the courts without submitting to its jurisdiction.

His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent and frustrate the object of this legal
process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first
submit to its jurisdiction.

***

ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., ISAIAS ALBANO, LILY REYES,

JANET BAY, JESUS R. GALANG, AND RANDY HAGOS vs. FRANCISCO R. CO, JR.
G.R. NO. 156759 | June 5, 2013

FACTS:
• On July 3, 2000, respondent, a retired police officer assigned at the Western
Police District in Manila, sued Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid of general
circulation; its Publisher Allen A. Macasaet; its Managing Director Nicolas V.
Quijano; its Circulation Manager Isaias Albano; its Editors Janet Bay, Jesus R.
Galang and Randy Hagos; and its Columnist/Reporter Lily Reyes (petitioners),
claiming damages because of an allegedly libelous article petitioners published
in the June 6, 2000 issue of Abante Tonite.
• The suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 0097907, was raffled to Branch 51 of the
RTC, which in due course issued summons to be served on each defendant,
including Abante Tonite, at their business address at Monica Publishing
Corporation, 301-305 3rd Floor, BF Condominium Building, Solana Street corner
A. Soriano Street, Intramuros, Manila.
• In the morning of September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the
stated address to affect the personal service of the summons on the defendants.
But his efforts to personally serve each defendant in the address were futile
because the defendants were then out of the office and unavailable. He returned
in the afternoon of that day to make a second attempt at serving the summons,
but he was informed that petitioners were still out of the office. He decided to
resort to substituted service of the summons, and explained why in his sheriff’s
return dated September 22, 2005.

ISSUE:
Whether or not jurisdiction over the petitioners have been acquired.

RULING:
Yes. Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in personam –the power of the court to
render a personal judgment or to subject the parties in a particular action to the
judgment and other rulings rendered in the action – is an element of due process that
is essential in all actions, civil as well as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in
rem. Jurisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not required,
and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over
the res that is the subject matter of the action. The purpose of summons in such action
is not the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant but mainly to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process.

The distinctions that need to be perceived between an action in personam, on the one
hand, and an action in rem or quasi in rem, on the other hand, are aptly delineated in
Domagas v. Jensen, thusly:

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter,
is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the
court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the
judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of
the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in
personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person,
as distinguished from a judgment against the property to determine its state. It
has been held that an action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights or obligations; such action is brought against the person. As far as suits
for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in
personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking
to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an
action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the
property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular
property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the
particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests
of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who
joined in the action.

As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant who does not reside
and is not found in the Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction
over his person unless he voluntarily appears in court; but when the case is an action
in rem or quasi in rem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have
jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant
is not essential. In the latter instance, extraterritorial service of summons can be made
upon the defendant, and such extraterritorial service of summons is not for the purpose
of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that the defendant will be informed of the
pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines
belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
On the other hand, when the defendant in an action in personam does not reside and
is not found in the Philippines, our courts cannot try the case against him because of
the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears
in court.

As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil action voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by the act of filing the initiatory pleading. As to the defendant,
the court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by the proper service of the
summons, or by a voluntary appearance in the action.

The significance of the proper service of the summons on the defendant in an action in
personam cannot be overemphasized. The service of the summons fulfills two
fundamental objectives, namely: (a) to vest in the court jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant; and (b) to afford to the defendant the opportunity to be heard on the
claim brought against him. As to the former, when jurisdiction in personam is not
acquired in a civil action through the proper service of the summons or upon a valid
waiver of such proper service, the ensuing trial and judgment are void. If the defendant
knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal
jurisdiction as to him, like voluntarily appearing in the action, he is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. As to the latter, the essence of due
process lies in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence the
defendant may have in support of his defense. With the proper service of the summons
being intended to afford to him the opportunity to be heard on the claim against him,
he may also waive the process. In other words, compliance with the rules regarding the
service of the summons is as much an issue of due process as it is of jurisdiction.

Under the Rules of Court, the service of the summons should firstly be effected on the
defendant himself whenever practicable. Such personal service consists either in
handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person, or, if the defendant refuses
to receive and sign for it, in tendering it to him. The rule on personal service is to be
rigidly enforced in order to ensure the realization of the two fundamental objectives
earlier mentioned. If, for justifiable reasons, the defendant cannot be served in person
within a reasonable time, the service of the summons may then be effected either (a) by
leaving a copy of the summons at his residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copy at his office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof. The latter mode of service is
known as substituted service because the service of the summons on the defendant is
made through his substitute.

There is no question that Sheriff Medina twice attempted to serve the summons upon
each of petitioners in person at their office address, the first in the morning of September
18, 2000 and the second in the afternoon of the same date. Each attempt failed because
Macasaet and Quijano were “always out and not available” and the other petitioners
were “always roving outside and gathering news.” After Medina learned from those
present in the office address on his second attempt that there was no likelihood of any
of petitioners going to the office during the business hours of that or any other day, he
concluded that further attempts to serve them in person within a reasonable time would
be futile. The circumstances fully warranted his conclusion. He was not expected or
required as the serving officer to effect personal service by all means and at all times,
considering that he was expressly authorized to resort to substituted service should he
be unable to effect the personal service within a reasonable time. In that regard, what
was a reasonable time was dependent on the circumstances obtaining. While we are
strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness
should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of
the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs.

***

LEONARDO C. ANDRES, et al. vs. Justice Secretary SERAFIN CUEVAS, et al.

G.R. NO. 150869 |June 9, 2005 | 460 SCRA 38

FACTS:
• Leonardo Andres, et al. (Andres, et al.) were the major stockholders of the Rural
Bank of Pandi, Bulacan who filed several petitions before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) against Belen G. Santos, et al. (Santos, et al.) who
were the minority stockholders of the said bank. They alleged that Santos et al.
committed acts of mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interests as directors
and officers of the bank which resulted in the unlawful deprivation of income
from the Andres‘, et al. investments. As a response, Santos, et al. charged Andres,
et al. before the Metropolitan Trial Court with perjury for making willful and
corrupt assertions of falsehood on material matters.
• The City Prosecutor issued its resolution finding probable cause against Andres,
et al. for perjury. They filed a Petition for Review which was dismissed by the
Department of Justice‘s Assistant Chief of State Prosecutor. They appealed to the
Office of the Secretary of Justice. Meanwhile SEC in its decision favored them.
• Secretary of Justice Sivestre H. Bello III directed, by resolution, the withdrawal
of the Information for perjury against the Andres, et al. Around a year later,
Justice Secretary Serafin R. Cuevas directed the refiling of the Information for
perjury against Andres, et al. who moved for a reconsideration of the resolution
of Secretary Cuevas. This was later on denied. Andres, et al. filed a petition for
 certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The verification and certification against non forum shopping appended to the
petition was signed only by Andres. Andres, et al. subsequently filed however, an
Amended Petition to which was appended to the verification and certification
against non forum shopping signed by all of them. The CA dismissed the original
petition. Andres, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
lack of merit by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Cuevas‘
resolution finding probable cause for perjury against the petitioners

RULING:
A party is given the right to file an amended pleading within the time and upon the
conditions specified and without the necessity of obtaining leave of court since a party
may amend his pleading once, whether a new cause of action or change in theory is
introduced, as a matter of right at any time before a responsive pleading is served.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the
furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits
without regard to technicalities.

The appellate court‘s procedural faux pas notwithstanding, on the merits, the petition
fails. Consistent with its policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
investigation, and to leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion
in the exercise of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause
for filing of an information against a supposed offender, this Court finds no reason to
disturb the finding of the appellate court that no grave abuse of discretion attended then
Justice Cuevas‘ resolution finding probable cause for perjury against

***

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76,
San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 102342 | July 3, 1992

FACTS:
• Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court on October 2, 1990 for
violation of a Municipal Ordinance, allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.
• Petitioner moved to quash the said charge on the ground that it had already
prescribed, but the Municipal Trial Court denied the motion forcing the petitioner
to raise it to the Regional Trial Court wherein the respondent sustained the
decision invoking Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,
particularly emphasizing the last paragraph of the said rule, stating that it
applies in all cases.
• Petitioner however contends the decision and files a petition for review of
certiorari before the high court invoking Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 3326 as the provisions that governs
the charge against her being a violation of a municipal ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said offense is covered by the Rules on Criminal Procedure or covered
by the Rule of Summary Procedure.

RULING:
The court ruled that the rule emphasized by the respondent judge only governs cases
that fall under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and is not applicable to all cases as the
said section had begun with for all cases no subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases.

Thus, the respondent judge erred in denying the said motion on the ground that the
offense is governed by section 1, rule 110 of the rules of criminal procedure.

***
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MATEO A. LEE, JR.
G.R. No. 234618 | September 16, 2019

FACTS:
• The case originated from an Information filed on March 21, 2017, charging Mateo
Acuin Lee, Jr., the Deputy Executive Director of the National Council on
Disability Affairs, with the violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877, otherwise
known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The Information detailed
incidents from February 14, 2013, to March 20, 2014, where Lee allegedly
conducted himself in a manner constituting sexual harassment towards Diane
Jane M. Paguirigan, an Administrative Aide VI in the same office.
• Lee filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Prescription
Extinguishing Criminal Liability with Prayer for Outright Dismissal of the Case
on March 30, 2017. This motion was initially denied by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution dated June 2, 2017. Lee subsequently filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated
September 6, 2017, resulting in the dismissal of the case on the grounds of
prescription, and the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
followed in a Resolution dated October 6, 2017.
• The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
of the Office of the Ombudsman, sought reversal of the Sandiganbayan’s
Resolutions, contending that the dismissal on the basis of prescription was
erroneous and citing jurisprudence that the filing of the complaint with the
prosecution office should toll the prescription period.

ISSUES:
• Whether the filing of the complaint for sexual harassment with the Office of the
Ombudsman interrupted the running of the prescription period for violations
under R.A. No. 7877.
• Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in applying the doctrine of prescription as it
relates to violations of city ordinances, rather than special laws.

RULING:
• The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the
Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions. The High Court clarified that for crimes falling
under special laws, such as R.A. No. 7877, the prescription period is governed by
Act 3326, as amended by Act 3763. It held that the prescriptive period for filing
violations under R.A. No. 7877 is three years, and that the running of this period
is interrupted upon the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
for the purpose of preliminary investigation.
• The Court distinguished the present case from Jadewell v. Judge Nelson Lidua,
Sr., asserting that the latter concerned the prescription period for violations of a
city ordinance and did not apply to the case at bar, which involved a special law.
It reiterated the doctrine established in previous jurisprudence, including the
Panaguiton and Pangilinan cases, that the filing of a complaint with the
prosecutor’s office for the purpose of preliminary investigation suspends the
prescription period for violations under special laws.

This case reaffirms the doctrine that for violations of special laws, the prescriptive period
is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused, aligning with the application of Act 3326, as amended by Act 3763, rather than
the Revised Penal Code provisions.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO DIMAANO

G.R. No. 168168 | September 14, 2005

FACTS:
• Maricar Dimaano is the daughter of the accused Edgardo Dimaano.
• A complaint was filed by Maricar charging Edgardo with two counts of Rape and
one count of attempted rape. Maricar alleged that she was only 10 years old when
her father Edgardo started sexually abusing her.
• It was only on November of 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her
mother. The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996.
Maricar and her mother went to Camp Crame upon the advised of a relative. The
 Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the complainant and
found her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-
virgin state.
• On the other hand, the accused denied such accusations. He contended that he
could not have raped Maricar because he was always in the office. He claimed
that it was impossible for him to rape his daughter because there were other
people in the house. He further argued that had he raped Maricar, then she would
have not accompanied him to the Paranaque Police Station to apply for police
clearance.
• The trial court rendered its Decision, convicting Edgardo of the crime of Rape.
Aggrieved, he appealed his case before the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the voluntary and due execution of the Affidavit of Desistance by Maricar
is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint against Edgardo.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that by itself, an Affidavit of Desistance is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in court. A private
complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the rape charge
should proceed, because the case was already filed and must therefore continue to be
heard by the trial court. The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance,
especially when executed afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is
shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble
of having the accused arrested by the police, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts and recounting her anguish in detail, will suddenly
turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. In the
case at bar, Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that
no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature and had shown her resolve to
continue with the prosecution of the cases

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARMANDO TAGUD, SR.

G.R. No. 140733 | January 30, 2002

FACTS:
• On May 23, 1998, AAA, employed as a house helper, returned to her family home
for her birthday. That evening, her father, Armando Tagud, Sr., ordered her to lie
face down, stepped on her back, forcibly undressed her, and raped her. AAA’s
brother, CCC, witness to the act, was told by Tagud to leave. When AAA’s mother,
BBB, returned later, AAA informed her of the rape, but BBB felt helpless out of
fear.
• Later, AAA reported the incident to her employer, who then accompanied her to
the Department of Social Welfare and Development and the National Bureau of
Investigation.
• On July 9, 1998, Dr. Labanon conducted a medical examination on AAA,
revealing hymenal lacerations and other signs consistent with repeated sexual
abuse.
• Procedurally, Tagud initially pleaded guilty, hoping for a lesser penalty, but was
advised by the court to plead not guilty. Eventually, he re-entered a plea of guilty,
fully aware of the severe consequences. Even with his plea, the court proceeded
to trial to fully establish the evidence and degree of culpability.

ISSUES:
• Whether the trial court erred in finding Armando Tagud, Sr. guilty of rape beyond
a reasonable doubt.
• Whether the death penalty was appropriately imposed despite the prosecution
not specifying the exact age of the victim in the Information.

RULING:
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s
finding of guilt for rape based on credible and consistent testimony from AAA,
corroborated by medical findings. The Court dismissed Tagud’s arguments
questioning AAA’s credibility and his claim of misleading plea consequences.
 • Imposition of Death Penalty: The Court reduced Tagud’s penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua. The Information did not specifically allege AAA’s exact age,
which is crucial for imposing the death penalty. As per the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and established jurisprudence, qualifying circumstances,
like the victim’s minority, must be explicitly stated in the Information for invoking
the death penalty.

In crimes punishable by death, Information must precisely allege qualifying

circumstances, especially the exact age of the victim when such minor status enhances
the crime’s penalty.

When a law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it must be imposed regardless of

mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZOSIMO CANTOMAYOR Y TAHUM alias Jesus

G.R. No. 145522 | December 05, 2002

FACTS:
• 1990: The alleged crime occurred when Zosimo Cantomayor, the accused,
purportedly raped his 9-year-old daughter, Liezl Cantomayor, multiple times in
their home at Sitio Sumbang, Barangay Iba, Municipality of Cabanglasan,
Bukidnon.
Liezl testified that her father undressed her, touched her breasts, and inserted
his penis into her vagina, causing her pain and threatening harm to silence her.
Liezl sought her mother’s help, but her mother advised her to physically defend
herself next time.
• October 1995: Liezl disclosed the abuse to her great uncle, “Lolo Aning,” who
lived in Cotabato City. Moved by her confession, he took her to Cotabato City and
eventually, she moved to Manila for work.
• 1998: Liezl returned home upon learning that her father shot her brother, Rey.
Liezl filed a parricide case against her father for shooting Rey.
Subsequently, her sister Cristina revealed that she had also been raped by their
father, Zosimo Cantomayor.
Consequently, Liezl and Cristina filed separate rape charges against their father,
though Cristina’s case was dismissed due to her unavailability.
• January 21, 1999: Accused was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea.
• The trial ensued where evidence and testimonies were presented. Liezl provided
her testimony regarding the abuse.
• The accused denied the allegations and proposed a timeline defense, asserting he
was not in the location of the alleged incidents during certain times.
• August 18, 2000: The Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Branch 8,
convicted Zosimo Cantomayor of rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua,
alongside awarding P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
• Accused-appellant challenged the conviction on the grounds that the Information
failed to specify the exact date of the alleged crime, asserting this rendered him
unable to mount a full defense. Cited parallels with People v. Ladrillo to support
this contention.

ISSUES:
• Whether the conviction should be overturned due to the lack of specific dates of
the commission of the crime in the Information.
• Whether the evidence presented sufficiently supports Liezl’s allegations and the
trial court’s conclusions.

RULING:
• The Supreme Court rejected the argument emphasizing that the exact date is not
a material ingredient in the crime of rape. Distinction from People v. Ladrillo was
noted, where the appellant’s defense was alibi corroborated by the fact he was
not in the location as claimed in the Information. Here, Zosimo Cantomayor
admitted that he lived in the same house as the victim during the alleged
incidents. The Court emphasized the precedence that failure to specify the exact
date does not render the Information defective as long as the acts constituting
the crime are clearly described.
 • The credibility and consistency of Liezl’s testimony were upheld. The lack of
contradiction from Zosimo Cantomayor’s timeline and his presence confirmed
Liezl’s allegations. The possibility of Liezl falsely accusing her father out of spite
(for shooting her brother) was deemed less likely than the prolonged sexual abuse
she reiterated with consistency.

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision sentencing Zosimo Cantomayor
to reclusion perpetua and upheld the monetary awards.

The specific date of commission is not a material element for the crime of rape.
Conviction can rest on credible testimonies detailing the alleged acts sufficiently.

The essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will through force
or intimidation, and not the specific date of occurrence.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDUARDO UKAY Y MONTON A.K.A. “Tata”,

TEODULO UKAY Y MONTON A.K.A. “Jun-jun”, GUILLERMO DIANON A.K.A.
“Momong”
G.R. No. 246419 | September 16, 2020

FACTS:
• In Davao City on June 12, 2007, Eduardo Ukay, Teodulo Ukay, Guillermo
Dianon, and Oca Ukay were implicated in two criminal cases. The first, a
Frustrated Murder charge involving Jesse Gerolaga victimized by Eduardo and
Oca Ukay; the second, a Murder charge for the death of Anthony Aloba
implicating Eduardo, Teodulo, Guillermo, and Oca Ukay.
• Accused pleaded not guilty. A confrontation at a convenience store escalated
when Anthony Aloba asked Guillermo Dianon to quiet down during an argument,
leading to a series of assaults resulting in Aloba’s death and serious injury to
Jessie Gerolaga. The defense narrative differed, attributing the initiation of the
conflict and the subsequent assault to Anthony, Jessie, and others.
• The case moved to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, where in 2013,
Eduardo was found guilty of Frustrated Murder, and Eduardo, Teodulo, and
Guillermo were convicted of Murder. The decision was affirmed with minor
corrections by the Court of Appeals (CA) in 2018 concerning the award of
damages. Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants escalated the matter to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
• Whether the Information concerning the crime was sufficient, specifically
regarding the allegation of treachery.
• Whether treachery and other qualifying circumstances were appropriately
considered.
• The relevance of procedural remedies not availed by accused-appellants.

RULING:
• The Supreme Court modified the CA and RTC’s decisions, holding that the
convictions for Murder and Frustrated Murder cannot be upheld due to the
insufficient proof of treachery.
• Instead, it found the accused-appellants guilty of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide, accordingly adjusting the penalties and compensatory damages.
• It cited procedural law, noting the accused-appellants’ waiver of daft Information
disputes by not filing appropriate pre-trial motions.

The Supreme Court clarified and applied the doctrine concerning the sufficiency of
Information in criminal charges, emphasizing the necessity for factual averments
demonstrating the existence of qualifying circumstances such as treachery. It also
reasserted principles concerning waivability of Information defects and recast the
guidelines for establishing treachery in qualitative terms.

***
OMAR VILLARBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 227777 | June 15, 2020

FACTS:
• Omar Villarba was convicted under the Anti-Hazing Act of 1995 for participating
in initiation rites that resulted in liver damage to Wilson Dordas III. The case
navigated through the Philippine justice system, raising issues about formal
amendments to the Information and the sufficiency of allegations thereof.
• The events transpired around September 15, 2001, in Iloilo City, where members
of the Junior Order of Kalantiao, including Villarba, allegedly subjected Dordas
• All accused pleaded not guilty to the original Information. The Information was
formally amended to correct Dordas’s name. Proceedings continued without any
arraignment on the amended Information. Dordas testified about his recruitment
and the subsequent hazing ordeal. Villarba admitted to being a member but
denied inflicting harm. The trial court found Villarba guilty.
• Villarba appealed, arguing issues about the Information’s validity and his non-
arraignment on the amended Information. The Court of Appeals upheld Villarba’s
conviction, emphasizing that the amendment was merely formal and did not
prejudice his defense.

ISSUES:
• Whether the amendment to the Information is substantial.
• Whether there is sufficiency of the Information regarding the details of the hazing
act.
• Whether the prosecution successfully proved Villarba’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

RULING:
• The Supreme Court held the amendment (adding ‘III’ to Dordas’s name) as formal,
not requiring a re-arraignment. It ruled the Information’s language sufficiently
informed Villarba of the charges against him, satisfying his constitutional rights.
• On every issue, the Court sided with the lower courts, affirming that the
Amendment did not prejudice Villarba’s defense, the Information was sufficient
to inform him of the charges, and his conviction was supported by credible and
detailed testimony from Dordas.

An amendment is considered formal if it does not alter the essence of the charge, affect
the theory of prosecution, or prejudice the accused’s rights, thereby not necessitating a
re-arraignment.

The Information need not replicate the statutory language, but must describe the offense
in ordinary and concise terms to inform the defendant adequately.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO COSARE

G.R. No. L-6544 | August 25, 1954 | 95 Phil. 656

FACTS:
• This case stems from an incident involving Alberto Cosare, who was accused by
Valeria Pagas of committing “Abuse Against Chastity” on July 1, 1950. Initially,
the complaint was filed and subscribed by Valeria as required by law. This
complaint was first amended on August 3, 1950, by the Acting Chief of Police to
charge Cosare with “Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and Physical Injuries.” A
second amendment on September 23, 1950, retained these charges.
• The Justice of the Peace of Tubigon, Bohol, who received these complaints,
conducted a preliminary investigation. Subsequently, the case was referred to the
Court of First Instance. On January 24, 1951, the Provincial Fiscal charged
Cosare with “Acts of Lasciviousness,” amending the charge on August 29, 1951,
to “Acts of Lasciviousness Thru Qualified Trespass to Dwelling.”
• Cosare challenged the court’s jurisdiction via a motion to quash, but this was
denied on September 1, 1951. At arraignment, he pled not guilty. During trial on
April 3, 1952, Cosare reiterated his motion to quash, asserting the initial
complaint filed by Valeria was the proper one to base jurisdiction. Acknowledging
that the initial preliminary investigation should be tied to Valeria’s original
complaint, the court remanded the case to the Justice of the Peace for a fresh
 preliminary investigation based on Valeria’s amended complaint, which accused
Cosare of acts of lasciviousness.
• On August 25, 1952, the Provincial Fiscal reaffirmed the charge of “Acts of
Lasciviousness.” At trial, Cosare again moved to dismiss the case, this time due
to double jeopardy. This motion was denied. After hearing evidence, the court
found Cosare not guilty of acts of lasciviousness but guilty of qualified trespass
to dwelling, sentencing him to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, a fine of 100
Pesos, and subsidiary imprisonment if insolvent. Cosare then appealed this
decision.

ISSUES:
• Whether or not the accused be convicted of a crime alleged as an aggravating
circumstance after being acquitted of the main charge.

RULING:
The Court noted that both the complaint and information charged Cosare with acts of
lasciviousness and trespass to dwelling. Despite the caption indicating only acts of
lasciviousness, the factual allegations described both offenses, negating the notion that
trespass to dwelling was merely an aggravating circumstance. The Court ruled that the
actual recital of the facts, rather than the title, dictates the charge, supporting the
conviction for trespass to dwelling (U. S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil., 275). Consequently, the
Court upheld the trial court’s decision.

The Court determined that Cosare’s plea of double jeopardy was inapplicable. Simply
put, the case was not dismissed but remanded for a fresh preliminary investigation,
preserving procedural rights particularly requested by the defense. Since the case
continued rather than concluding, double jeopardy did not apply. Furthermore, even if
construed as a dismissal, it occurred with the defense’s consent, nullifying the double
jeopardy claim (Section 9, Rule 113).

The determination of the crime charged is based on the factual allegations within the
complaint or information rather than the heading or title. The facts described underpin
the legal characterization of the offense (U.S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil., 275).

Double jeopardy protections do not apply if a case is remanded for a preliminary

investigation rather than dismissed, particularly when such action is at the request or
with the consent of the defense (Section 9, Rule 113).

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO DIMAANO

G.R. No. 168168 | September 14, 2005

FACTS:
• In 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2)
counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape.
• The complaint for attempted rape stated as follows:
“That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of
execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other
than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.”

ISSUE:
• Whether or not the complaint or information for attempted rape sufficiently
alleged the specific acts or omissions constituting the offense.

RULING:
No. For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged
and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not
allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither
does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts
of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to
rape the complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or
information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint.
This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise, we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature
of the accusation against him. (People vs. Dimaano, G.R. No. 168168, September 14,
2005)

The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to

enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime
will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO NATINDIM, et al.

G.R. No. 201867 | November 04, 2020

FACTS:
• In a grisly series of events that unfolded on the evening of July 29, 1997, a group
comprising Rogelio Natindim, Jimmy P. Macana, and several others, perpetrated
robbery and murder in Sitio Sta. Cruz, Dansolihon, Cagayan De Oro City,
Philippines. The victims, Judith Gunayan and her husband Pepito, were attacked
in their home; Pepito was shot, hacked, and ultimately killed, while the assailants
hogtied Judith and proceeded to rob them of various possessions. Following their
not-guilty pleas, a trial ensued, showcasing evidence from both defense and
prosecution.
• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) delivered a conviction for the accused, which was
subsequently affirmed with modifications by the Court of Appeals (CA). The case
reached the Supreme Court on appeal, primarily contesting the sufficiency of
allegations and the imposition of penalties.

ISSUES:
• Whether or not the circumstance qualifying the crime as murder specifically
alleged in the Information.
• Whether or not the imposition of the death penalty justified.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction with modifications concerning the penalties
imposed and the nature and amounts of damages awarded. Conspiracy was established,
and the murder was qualified by treachery, but the robbery was distinct from the
homicide and therefore treated as separate crimes. Mitigating circumstances for some
appellants were considered but did not significantly alter the majority’s penalties.

This case reiterates doctrines related to conspiracy in the commission of crimes, the
qualification of murder by treachery, and the distinctions between complex crimes and
separate offenses of murder and robbery. It also highlights the procedural necessity of
specifically alleging the qualifying circumstances of the offenses charged.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELIAS LOVEDIORO Y CASTRO

GR No. 112235 | November 29, 1995

FACTS:
• Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St... when a
man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed
the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired.
• The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom
shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the
latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled.
• Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds
on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body.
• As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay filed an
Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of
Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
• After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that
portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not
rebellion.

RULING:
The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and
not rebellion.

Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968,
rebellion is committed in the following manner:
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the
government.

By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving

crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within predetermined... bounds.
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as
such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.

If a crime usually regarded as common, like... homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose
of removing from the allegiance 'to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands
or any part thereof,' then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch
as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former... acquires the political
character of the latter.

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive,
being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of
rebellion are duly proven.

Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist.

Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common
crime alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty could benefit
from the law's relatively benign attitude towards political crimes.

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the
theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but
also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political
offense.
Intent or motive is a decisive factor. It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is
established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not
of rebellion.

In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization
dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in

terms so general and non-specific... that they offer no explanation as to what
contribution the killing would have made towards the achievement of the NPA's
subversive aims.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WODIE FRUELDA Y ANULAO

G.R. No. 242690 | September 03, 2020

FACTS:
• This case centers on Wodie Fruelda y Anulao (Fruelda), who was accused of
raping AAA inside a storeroom of Jesus the Anointed One Church in XXX City on
April 28, 2014. AAA, a steward of said storeroom and an active church member,
was allegedly attacked by Fruelda, the church’s Bishop’s driver, leading to the
forcible insertion of his fingers into her vagina followed by purported carnal
knowledge while she was in a weakened state. AAA managed to report the
incident, leading to Fruelda’s trial and eventual conviction by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pallocan West, Batangas City. The conviction was affirmed with
modification by the Court of Appeals (CA). However, Fruelda appealed the
decision to the Supreme Court, claiming his innocence based on a defense of
consensual sexual activity stemming from an alleged romantic relationship with
AAA.
• After the information was filed, and Fruelda pleaded not guilty, a full trial was
conducted. Upon conviction by the RTC and the subsequent affirmation by the
CA, Fruelda appealed to the Supreme Court. The core of the legal battle revolved
around the credibility of AAA’s account of non-consensual sexual contact versus
Fruelda’s defense of a consensual relationship.

ISSUES:
• Whether the CA erred in affirming Fruelda’s conviction for rape by carnal
knowledge.
• Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been
considered in sentencing Fruelda.

RULING:
The Supreme Court partly granted the appeal, finding Fruelda not guilty of rape by
carnal knowledge but guilty of sexual assault under Article 266-A (2) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). The Court differentiated the charged offenses of sexual assault and
rape by carnal knowledge, emphasizing the importance of specific factual findings to
sustain a conviction for each. It scrutinized the testimony of AAA, the procedural
handling of the case, and the medical reports to delineate the correct charge. Meanwhile,
the Court acknowledged Fruelda’s surrender as voluntary, adjusting his penalty
accordingly.

This case reaffirms the legal principles concerning the review of rape cases, the intricate
assessment of testimonies in such cases centered on credibility, and the requirements
for the defense of consensual sex to be acceptable. It underscored the necessity of
separate, robust evidence to substantiate claims of consent in contexts allegedly
involving romantic relationships. Additionally, it clarified conditions under which the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could be recognized.

***
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR. vs. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 103102 | March 06, 1992

FACTS:
• The case revolves around the charges against Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., initially
for frustrated murder following the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman on
July 13, 1991.
• The original information, filed on July 19, 1991, in Makati City, specified that the
attack resulted in gunshot wounds which, if not for timely medical intervention,
would have been fatal. Subsequently, Hultman succumbed to her injuries,
prompting the private prosecutor to file on October 31, 1991, an omnibus motion
for leave of court to admit an amended information charging Teehankee with
murder. Teehankee opposed the amendment and subsequent arraignment,
contending the lack of a preliminary investigation for the new charge and other
procedural concerns. His refusal to be arraigned led to his arraignment by the
court’s order and the appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent him.
• Teehankee’s challenge to the trial court’s decisions resulted in this special civil
action before the Supreme Court (SC), seeking to nullify the admission of the
amended information, the arraignment and plea entered, the appointment of a
counsel de oficio, and to compel a preliminary investigation of the amended
charge. The SC opted to proceed without the Solicitor General’s comment to
expedite the case in fairness to Teehankee.

ISSUE:
• Whether or not the Legality and validity of admitting an amended information
involving a substantial amendment without a preliminary investigation after the
prosecution has rested.

RULING:
The SC dismissed Teehankee’s petition, finding no merit in his arguments:

The SC elucidated that, according to the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, an

information can be amended at any stage before the accused pleads. Post-plea, only
formal amendments are allowed. Since the offense in the amended information (murder)
includes the offense in the original one (frustrated murder), it was
considered a form of amendment and not substitution. Thus, no preliminary
investigation or new plea was necessary.

Teehankee’s refusal to participate in the proceedings due to a

perceived legal issue was found baseless, and the trial court’s appointment of counsel
de oficio was deemed within discretion aimed at preventing undue delay.

The SC underscored the trial court’s discretion in scheduling cases, provided it does not
prejudice the accused’s or others’ substantial rights.

An amended information that does not change the nature of the original charge but
rather provides additional detail or alters the stage of execution of the crime can be
admitted without necessitating a new preliminary investigation or plea.

The trial court has broad discretion in the management of cases, including the
appointment of counsel de oficio and scheduling of hearings, to ensure the efficient
administration of justice.

***

PRESENTACION BAUTISTA vs. ANITA F. FERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-24062 | April 30, 1971

FACTS:
• In 1952, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila sold Lot 3, Psd-2870, on
installment to Simeona L. Ricalde and Fructuosa R. Gonzales.
• In 1956, Gonzales assigned all her rights to Ricalde.
• On November 27, 1957, Anita F. Fernandez bought Ricalde’s consolidated rights
and received Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 49717 for the entire lot
measuring 373.10 square meters.
 • Presentacion D. Bautista occupied a 93.275 square meter portion and a house
on the land. When Fernandez demanded that Bautista vacate in December 1957,
Bautista refused.
• Fernandez filed an ejectment suit in January 1958 before the Municipal Court,
which was dismissed, leading Fernandez to appeal to the Court of First Instance
(CFI). The CFI dismissed the appeal on possession grounds on August 30, 1958.
• On September 28, 1958, Fernandez filed a case in CFI alleging ownership over
the whole lot and demanding Bautista’s eviction plus damages.
• Bautista filed an amended answer claiming ownership over the 93.275 square
meter portion, alleging purchase from Cornelia Quiocho.
• On April 25, 1959, the CFI ruled in favor of Fernandez, declaring her the absolute
owner and ordering Bautista to vacate and pay rental fees plus attorney’s fees.
• Bautista appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the CFI’s decision on
December 21, 1964.
• Bautista then appealed to the Supreme Court via certiorari, raising issues
primarily on jurisdiction, non-joinder of indispensable parties, declaration of
ownership, non-invocation of res judicata, and dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUES:
• Whether the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case, argued by
Bautista to be a forcible entry case.
• Whether the non-joinder of Bautista’s husband as a party-defendant was proper.
• Whether the respondent should be declared the owner of the whole lot, including
the portion occupied by Bautista.
• Whether the action was barred by res judicata.
• Whether the complaint should be dismissed.

RULING:
• The Supreme Court found the case to be properly characterized as an accion
reinvindicatoria (for recovery of ownership), not simply for forcible entry. The CFI,
therefore, had jurisdiction as it concerned ownership, notwithstanding a forcible
entry case. Jurisdiction is determined by the nature of the action pleaded (for
recovery of ownership vs. forcible entry).

• The Court acknowledged the procedural lapse of not including Bautista’s

husband (assuming the land and damages involved conjugal property).
Nevertheless, akin to Cuyugan vs. Dizon’s precedent, the Court ordered an
amendment to the complaint to include Bautista’s husband as a party-defendant,
avoiding unnecessary delay and expense. Amendments to complaints can be
mandated to cure non-joinder, promoting justice without undue procedural
hindrances.

• The Court upheld the findings that Fernandez had a legitimate and registered
title (TCT No. 49717) to the entire lot. No sufficient evidence showed her title’s
invalidity due to fraud or prior knowledge of Bautista’s claim.
• The previous rulings in the forcible entry case did not constitute a bar under the
doctrine of res judicata, as the issue of possession alone was resolved previously,
not the title or ownership. A TCT, unless voided by judicial pronouncement,
stands as incontrovertible proof of ownership.

• The complaint sought appropriate remedies consistent with owned property’s

protection. The Court did not find grounds for dismissal. Judgments on
possession (forcible entry) do not preclude actions to determine title or
ownership.

***

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192565 | February 28, 2012 | 667 SCRA 113.

FACTS:
• Desi Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping.
 • The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Bank's two (2) complaints for sum
of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the spouses Eddie and Eliza
Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before the RTC,
Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed and
raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that Tomas
executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she
was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring
under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint
that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same
issue in another tribunal or agency.
• Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid
since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury
case.
• The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction
over the case since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in
Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the
Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-Makati City
subsequently denied Tomas' motion for reconsideration.
• The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul
and set aside the MeTC Makati City orders on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion. RTC-Makati City dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Makati City, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or
Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court, is the right venue of
perjury under Article 183 of the RPC.

RULING:
MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of the
perjury case against the petitioners. Petition denied.

Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only

the place where the criminal action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-fold. First, the
jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can
only hear and try cases involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction.
Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the necessity and justice
of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other
facilities for his defense are available.

Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal cases carries jurisdictional
consequences. In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be instituted
and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where
any of its essential ingredients occurred.

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
Place of commission of the offense. — The complaint or information is sufficient
if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense was committed or
some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an
essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.

Both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases not
only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential
ingredients took place. In other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed
sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or some
of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court.

In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC
for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping. The elements of perjury under
Article 183 are:
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law
or made for a legal purpose.

Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case on the ground of
improper venue, the allegations in the complaint and information must be examined
together with Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On this basis, we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a
finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.

The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject Certificate against
Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to have been committed in Makati City.
Likewise, the second and fourth elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum
Shopping to be under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
Information to have been made in Makati City:
That on or about the 13th day of March 2000 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make untruthful
statements under oath upon a material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer oath which the law requires to wit: said accused stated
in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit . . .

The Court also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood was also
sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City, not Pasay City, as indicated
in the last portion of the Information:
[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of merit of a
complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin docketed as [Civil]
Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union
Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding
involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well
that said material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate
assertion of falsehood.

Tomas' deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she
made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary
public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she
subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-
Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to
Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the
essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

The RPC penalizes three forms of false testimonies. The first is false testimony for and
against the defendant in a criminal case (Articles 180 and 181, RPC); the second is false
testimony in a civil case (Article 182, RPC); and the third is false testimony in other
cases (Article 183, RPC). Based on the Information filed, the present case involves the
making of an untruthful statement in an affidavit on a material matter.

These RPC provisions, however, are not really the bases of the rulings cited by the
parties in their respective arguments. The cited Ilusorio ruling, although issued by this
Court in 2008, harked back to the case of Cañet which was decided in 1915, i.e., before
the present RPC took effect. Sy Tiong, on the other hand, is a 2009 ruling that cited
Villanueva, a 2005 case that in turn cited United States v. Norris, a 1937 American
case. Significantly, unlike Cañet, Sy Tiong is entirely based on rulings rendered after
the present RPC took effect.

In the present case, the Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts
of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the
respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, who, in turn, filed a
complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC. As alleged in
the Information that followed, the criminal act charged was for the execution by Tomas
of an affidavit that contained a falsity.

Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision;
thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which
penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent
person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The
constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is
consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before
a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, we hold that our ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord
with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime
of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the
RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit
since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is
neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.
If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the
place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking
of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed.
In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information
to be constitutive of the crime committed.

***

RUEL FRANCIS M. CABRAL vs. CHRIS S. BRACAMONTE

G.R. No. 233174 | January 23, 2019

FACTS:
• This case revolves around an estafa charge against Chris S. Bracamonte by Ruel
Francis Cabral, triggered by a dishonored postdated check issued under a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for the purchase of shares. The MOA was
executed in Makati City, and the check, also issued there, was dishonored for
insufficient funds. Despite the origins of the transaction and dishonor occurring
in Makati City, Cabral filed the complaint in Parañaque City. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Parañaque dismissed Bracamonte’s Motion to Quash, asserting
jurisdiction premised on the allegation that deceptive negotiations took place
within its territory. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals (CA) overturned the RTC’s
decision, emphasizing that the deceit and subsequent damage—central to
estafa—transpired in Makati City, thereby establishing the proper venue there.
Cabral’s petition to the Supreme Court contested CA’s ruling on jurisdiction and
dismissal.

ISSUE:
• Whether the CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Parañaque City lacked
jurisdiction, thereby dismissing the Information due to the improper venue.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied Cabral’s petition, affirming the CA’s decision. The High
Courtelucidated that criminal jurisdiction and venue are delineated by the locus of the
actus reus or the execution of essential crime elements. In estafa cases predicated on
deceit through negotiable instruments, such as checks, the material representation and
consequential loss need to co-locate with the court’s territorial jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court held that Makati City, being the site of the MOA execution, check
issuance, and dishonor, rightfully holds jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that the jurisdiction of a criminal case,
including the proper venue, is anchored on the place where the offense was committed
or any of its essential components took place. Moreover, it upheld the principle that the
jurisdictional facet of a criminal court over an offense cannot be overridden by
acquiescence, waiver, or delay in asserting it. Jurisdiction and venue are inherently
linked to the scene of the crime or the enactment of essential crime components.

***

MARY ANN RODRIGUEZ vs. HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her official

capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch
104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GLADYS NOCOM
G.R. Nos. 155531-34 | July 29, 2005

FACTS:
• Petitioner Rodriguez was charged with estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. On hearing of the criminal charge of estafa, the respondent judge allowed
the appearance of a private prosecutor to try the civil aspect of the offense
charged. The petitioner opposed said appearance alleging that the private
prosecutor‘s appearance is barred as the civil aspect of the case is already deemed
instituted in the criminal charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is allowed to collect civil damages in both the estafa
and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 cases as to warrant the appearance of a private prosecutor
in the case of estafa.

RULING:
No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to
two distinct criminal offenses: Estafa and violation of BP 22.

However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a
bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the
other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the
offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one

***

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. ASIA DYNAMIC

ELECTRIX CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163597 | July 29, 2005

FACTS:
• On April 4, 2001, Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corporation (petitioner) filed a
complaint for recovery of a sum of money against Asia Dynamic Electrix
Corporation (respondent) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong
City.
• The complaint alleged that the respondent purchased electrical conduits and
fittings amounting to P1,622,467.14 and issued several checks as payment,
which were dishonored by the drawee bank due to insufficient funds or account
closure.
• Despite demands, the respondent failed to pay. The petitioner sought payment of
the purchase amount, plus interest and attorney's fees.
• The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the civil
action was included in previously filed criminal actions for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22), that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure prohibits separate civil actions in B.P. 22 cases, and that the
petitioner was guilty of forum shopping and unjust enrichment.
• The RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the civil action could proceed
independently of the criminal actions as the obligation was ex-contractu and not
ex-delicto.
• The respondent then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the RTC's order, holding that the civil actions were deemed instituted
with the filing of the criminal cases and that the RTC could not acquire
jurisdiction over the same case.
• The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals,
leading to this petition for review.
ISSUES:
• Whether there is an identity of interests, causes of action, and reliefs in Civil Case
No. MC 01-1493 and the criminal complaints for violation of B.P. 22.
• Whether the petitioner guilty of forum shopping.
• Whether the petitioner violates Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure by filing the complaint in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493.

RULING:
• The Supreme Court denied the petition, upholding the Court of Appeals' decision
and resolution. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that upon
filing the criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the recovery
of the amount of the checks was impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. This rule states that the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 includes the corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file a separate civil action is allowed. The rule aims to declog court
dockets by consolidating civil and criminal actions related to dishonored checks
into a single proceeding, thus discouraging the separate filing of civil actions.

The Court found that there was an identity of parties and causes of action
between the civil case and the criminal cases, as the parties in the civil case
represented the same interests as those in the criminal cases, and the relief
sought in both was the recovery of the amount of the checks.

The inclusion of additional checks in the civil case was seen as an attempt to
circumvent the rule against forum shopping.

• The Court emphasized that allowing separate proceedings would result in double
payment and undermine the policy against forum shopping, which seeks to
prevent litigants from seeking the same relief in different fora to increase their
chances of a favorable judgment.

• The Court concluded that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
its decision and resolution.

***

CARMEN L. MADEJA vs. HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON

G.R. No. L-51183 | December 21, 1983

FACTS:
• Dra. Eva A. Japzon: accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the
death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy.
• Carmen L. Madeja: the complaining witness is the widow of the deceased. The
information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja reserving her right
to file a separate civil action for damages." The criminal case still pending,
Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr, Eva A. Japzon for damages in the same court. She
alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon.
• Judge: granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section
3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. According to the respondent judge, "under
the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant civil action
may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action.

ISSUE:
Whether Madeja may file an independent civil action against Dra. Japzon

RULING:
YES. Petition is GRANTED.

The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex delicto, this is manifest
from the provision which uses the expressions ''criminal action" and "criminal
prosecution."

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to
enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the
State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and
initiative to habituate the citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of
their own private rights. It is true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision
cited, a criminal prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State
is the complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most concerned
because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation
for the wrong which peculiarly affects him.

The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries/
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined
therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic
sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical
injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised
Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms
in the same article—some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other
words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

Corpus vs. Paje, L26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them
merely concurred in the result.

ln the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGORIO SUMAYA Y DALOGDOG

G.R. Nos. 93281-84 | November 17, 1994

FACTS:
• On October 30, 1989, Gregorio Sumaya y Dalogdog was charged with rape and
attemptedrape in four separate informations before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Iligan City, Branch 6. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
06-2298, 2304, 2306, and 2305.
• Upon arraignment, Sumaya pleaded not guilty to all charges. The trial on the
merits took place, after which the RTC rendered a judgment finding Sumaya
guilty of the charges.
• Sumaya appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court (SC).
• During the pendency of the appeal, Sumaya died of cardio-pulmonary arrest on
May 22, 1993, while detained at the San Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in
Zamboanga City.
• On July 26, 1993, the SC issued a resolution requiring the plaintiff-appellee to
comment on the death of the accused-appellant.
• The plaintiff-appellee filed a comment citing the ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego,
arguing that while Sumaya’s death extinguished his criminal liability, the civil
liability remained.

ISSUES:
• Whether the criminal liability of Sumaya was extinguished by his death pending
appeal.
• Whether the civil liability arising from the criminal cases was also extinguished
upon Sumaya’s death.

RULING:
• The SC referred to its precedent in People vs. Rogelio Bayotas which held that
upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished since there is no longer a defendant to stand trial. The
criminal liability of Sumaya was therefore extinguished by his death.
 • The SC clarified that civil liability ex delicto, which arises directly from the
criminal offenses charged, was also extinguished upon the death of the accused
if the death occurred pending appeal. The rationale offered was that once the
criminal action is extinguished, the civil action founded on it has no leg to stand
on. The records did not disclose any other civil liability possibly arising from other
sources such as contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict, or law, hence, there were
no other civil claims to adjudicate.

The case reiterated the doctrine in People vs. Rogelio Bayotas that both criminal liability
and civil liability ex delicto are extinguished when an accused dies pending an appeal
of their conviction.
“Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished and the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.”

***
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162135 | August 23, 2010

FACTS:
• Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (Consing) and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz),
obtained loans amounting to P18,000,000 from Unicapital Inc. These loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land registered under de la Cruz’s
name. Unicapital later purchased half of the property for P21,221,500, partly
offset by the amount due under the loans. The other half was purchased by Plus
Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders).
• Unicapital and Plus Builders found that the title to the property was spurious
and demanded the return of the amount paid. Consing and de la Cruz ignored
this demand. As a result, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in Pasig RTC to enjoin
Unicapital from collecting the amount, claiming he acted merely as an agent for
his mother. Meanwhile, Unicapital lodged a criminal complaint for estafa through
falsification of public documents against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati
City Prosecutor’s Office.
• Unicapital also filed Civil Case No. 99-1418 in the RTC of Makati to recover the
sum of money and damages. On January 27, 2000, the Makati Prosecutor’s Office
charged Consing and de la Cruz with estafa through falsification of public
documents. Consequently, Consing moved to defer his arraignment citing the
existence of a prejudicial question due to the pending Pasig and Makati civil
cases.
• The RTC of Makati acceded to Consing’s motion, suspending the criminal
proceedings. Conversely, in a similar case filed by Plus Builders in Cavite (Civil
Case No. 99-95381), the Cavite RTC denied Consing’s motion to defer
arraignment, which was later upheld by the Court of Appeals (CA) and the
Supreme Court.
• The State petitioned in the CA, challenging the Makati RTC’s suspension order
based on the prior Supreme Court ruling in the Plus Builders case. Initially, the
CA dismissed the State’s petition. Upon reconsideration, the CA reversed its
decision, aligning with the Supreme Court’s ruling in the Plus Builders case,
determining that no prejudicial question existed that justified suspending the
Makati criminal proceedings.

ISSUES:
• Whether or not the existence of civil cases involving similar facts as the criminal
cases raise a prejudicial question justifying the suspension of criminal
proceedings.
• Whether or not the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 applicable to the case involving
Unicapital and Consing.

RULING:
• The Supreme Court held that the civil cases do not raise a prejudicial question
warranting the suspension of the Makati criminal proceedings. The Court
referenced its prior ruling in G.R. No. 148193, which clarified that independent
civil actions under Article 33 of the Civil Code, such as those for fraud, can
proceed independently of the criminal cases. Therefore, the civil cases (Pasig and
Manila/Makati) do not impact the determination of Consing’s guilt in the criminal
cases.
 Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that civil actions for defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries may proceed separately from criminal actions without
constituting a prejudicial question.

The mere pendency of civil cases involving questions similar to a criminal case
does not justify suspending the criminal proceedings, especially when the civil
cases can proceed independently under Article 33.

• The Supreme Court affirmed that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was applicable,
despite the difference in complainants (Unicapital and Plus Builders). Both civil
actions were independently instituted based on fraud and were thus not
prejudicial questions affecting the criminal proceedings. The consistency in the
nature of the allegations (fraud) necessitated the same legal interpretation
regardless of the specific complainant.

When civil and criminal actions arise from identical transactions and involve
similar questions, consistent doctrines apply even if the involved parties
(complainants) differ. This maintains judicial consistency and fairness.

***

GEORGE MANANTAN vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107125 | January 29, 2001

FACTS:
• The petitioner Manantan was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela with
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The alleged crime occurred on or
about the 25th day of September 1982 in the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela.
The provincial fiscal filed this information on June 1, 1983 within the
Municipality of Santiago, Isabela.
• The accused was the driver and person-incharge of an automobile with the Plate
No. NGA-816. Manantan willfully and recklessly drove the vehicle in a negligent
manner which ended up sideswiping a passenger jeepney. Which caused the
Jeepney to turn turtle twice that ultimately ended with the death of Ruben
Nicolas, a passenger of the jeepney.
• On a decision dated June 30, 1938 which was later promulgated on August 4,
1988, the trial court reached a decision in favor of Manantan. With the
subsequent turn of events the private respondent spouses Nicolas filed their
notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial court’s judgment.
• The spouses Nicolas prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that
the appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages. The court reached a
decision wherein the Court of Appeals decided in favor of the private respondents.
• With regards to the civil liability the court a quo stated that during the time that
the accident occurred. Manantan was in a state of heavily inebriated after
consuming at least twelve bottles of beer between 9 a.m. to 11 p.m.
• The petitioner opted for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it
vehemently.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acquittal extinguished his civil liability of the accused also.

RULING:
No, it is quite evident that the law recognizes two different kinds of acquittal, with
entirely different effects regarding the civil liability of the accused. First and foremost,
the grounds pertaining to the acquittal of the accused is not the main reason for the act
or omission complained of as a felony. In this particular instance this relinquish the
civil liability for a person who has been found not to be the perpetrator of any act or
omission shall not be and should never be held liable for such an act or omission. This
surmise that there is no delict, civil liability ex delicto is entirely out of the question and
therefore the civil action if there is any. Which will be instituted should be based on the
grounds other the delict that was complained of. The secondary instance is an acquittal
that was based on reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused has not been
duly established. In this case at hand the acquittal was primarily based on reasonable
doubt. It was clearly stated that the accused was recklessly imprudent or negligent.
Which evidently prompted the court to acquit him on the main contention of a
reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in a criminal case if the
accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt. The decision of the Court of Appeals states
that the defendant is civilly liable for negligent and reckless of driving his automobile
which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident and to indemnify the plaintiff
for a sum of money due to the death of Ruben Nicolas.

***

DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM vs. THE 2ND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, ET

AL.
G.R. No. 165751 | April 12, 2005

FACTS:
• On November 15, 2004, Datu Guimid Matalam, the Vice-Governor of Cotabato
City and the Regional Secretary of DAR, and other low-ranking public officials
were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. Allegedly, Matalam illegally and unjustifiably refused to pay the monetary
claims of several employees of the DAR. Later, the Information was amended
charging him of illegally dismissing from the service the complaining employees.
He then insisted that he is entitled to a new preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Matalam is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not
informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses.

RULING:
Yes. According to the SC, if the petitioner is not to be given a new PI for the amended
charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to
present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith
and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process. Although
the charge remained the same, which is violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 as amended,
the prohibited act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure to pay monetary claims
to illegal dismissal, and he was not given the opportunity to submit his evidence on the
absence or presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to the illegal
dismissal. Accused has not waived his right to a new PI and in fact asked for one.

***

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDILBERTO GOMEZ

G.R. No. L-29086 | September 30, 1982

FACTS:
• In 1962, four criminal cases were filed by the prosecuting Fiscal before the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga City.
• The defendants were charged with Estafa through falsification of public
documents.
• The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3083, 3084, 3088, and 3128.
Defendants included Edilberto Gomez, Prudencio N. Cichon, Cesar V. Castillo,
Pedro Cuento, Lorenzo Delantar, Jesus F. Atilano, Paulino T. Duma, and two
unidentified persons referred to as John Doe and Richard Doe.
• Three cases had certifications from prosecuting officers that preliminary
investigations were conducted and the accused were believed to be guilty.
• In the fourth case, the district judge conducted the preliminary investigation and
issued warrants for the arrest of the accused.
• All accused were released on bail after their arrests.
• On June 22, 1966, the accused filed a motion to declare the informations and
warrants of arrest null and void, arguing non-compliance with the New Rules of
Court regarding preliminary investigations.
• The lower court initially denied the motion but later reversed its decision upon
reconsideration, dismissing the cases without prejudice to their refiling.
• The prosecution appealed this dismissal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
• Whether the failure to observe the provisions of the New Rules of Court regarding
preliminary investigations render the informations and warrants of arrest null
and void?
 • Whether the accused waive their right to a preliminary investigation by entering
a plea of not guilty.

RULING:
• No, the failure to observe the provisions of the New Rules of Court regarding
preliminary investigations did not render the informations and warrants of arrest
null and void.
• Yes, the accused waived their right to a preliminary investigation by entering a
plea of not guilty.

The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal by the lower court. Preliminary
investigations were terminated in 1962, before the New Rules of Court took effect on
January 1, 1964. Rules 112 and 113 of the New Rules of Court were not applicable.
Required preliminary investigations were conducted, as evidenced by the certifications
in the informations and the actions of the district judge.

Even if preliminary investigations had not been conducted, the absence did not affect
the court's jurisdiction or render the informations defective.
Cited People vs. Casiano: If defendants had raised the issue of the absence of
preliminary investigations before entering their plea, the court should have conducted
the investigation or ordered the fiscal to do so.

By entering a plea of not guilty without raising this issue, the defendants waived their
right to a preliminary investigation.

Objections to the lack of preliminary investigations must be raised before the plea;
otherwise, they are deemed waived.

The Supreme Court ordered the lower court to proceed with the trial of the criminal
cases.

***

ERNESTO J. SAN AGUSTIN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 158211| August 31, 2004 | 437 SCRA 392

FACTS:
• Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same with the NBI
charging petitioner Barangay Chairman Ernesto San Agustin with serious illegal
detention alleging that the petitioner detained her husband Vicente Tan without
lawful ground. The investigation of the NBI found that the victim TAN was
mistaken as a “snatcher” and was turned over to petitioner San Agustin where
Tan was beaten and locked up. Luz Tan (complainant) went to the barangay hall
and inquired but they denied having seen the victim Tan.
• Later on, an inquest investigation was conducted by the State prosecutor. She
came out with a Resolution which was affirmed by the Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor, finding probable cause against the petitioner for serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that he was
illegally arrested and subjected to an inquest investigation; hence, he was
deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation. He also prayed that he be
released from detention and that the prosecutor conduct a preliminary
investigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be released on the ground that it did not conform
with Section 7 Rule 112 which requires preliminary investigation to be conducted before
the information is filed.

RULING:
NO. An inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully arrested
without a warrant. Although the procedure does not conform with Section 7 Rule 112,
it is not a ground to nullify the arrest.

The warrantless arrest or the detention of the petitioner in the instant case does not fall
within the provision of Section 5, Rule 113. The inquest investigation conducted is void
because under Rule 112, Section 7, an inquest investigation is proper only when the
suspect is lawfully arrested without a warrant:

SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest investigation has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor,
the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the
proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or
person.

The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court but merely the regularity of the proceedings. It does not impair the validity of the
Information or otherwise render it defective. Neither is it a ground to quash the
Information or nullify the order of arrest issued against him or justify the release of the
accused from detention. However, the trial court should suspend proceedings and order
a preliminary investigation considering that the inquest investigation conducted by the
State Prosecutor is null and void. The RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the City Prosecutor to conduct a
reinvestigation which is merely a review by the Prosecutor of his records and evidence
instead of a preliminary investigation as provided for in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Whether or not there is a need for a preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation
to Section 9 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure depends upon the
imposable penalty for the crime charged in the complaint filed with the City or Provincial
Prosecutor's Office and not upon the imposable penalty for the crime found to have been
committed by the respondent after a preliminary investigation. In this case, the crime
charged in the complaint of the NBI filed in the Department of Justice was
kidnapping/serious illegal detention, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua to death.

***

ALEJANDRO C. MIRANDA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 232192 | June 22, 2020

FACTS:
• Alejandro C. Miranda was charged with rape through sexual assault under Article
266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Republic Act No.
7610.
• The incident occurred on April 6, 2006, in Muntinlupa City, where Miranda
allegedly inserted his penis into the anal orifice of a six-year-old boy, AAA.
• The Information was filed by the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City on April 12,
2006.
• Miranda, assisted by Atty. Melita Pilar P. Brias of the Public Attorney's Office,
pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on May 17, 2006.
• The RTC granted Miranda's Motion to Reduce Bail, setting it at P70,000.00 for a
cash bond or P80,000.00 for a bail bond.
• During the trial, it was established that AAA was playing in front of Miranda's
house when he was pulled inside, undressed, and sexually assaulted.
• AAA reported the incident to his stepfather, BBB, who then informed the
barangay police.
• Miranda was invited to the barangay hall and detained after AAA identified him
as the assailant.
• Miranda denied the charges, claiming he treated AAA as his own son.
• On February 12, 2010, the RTC convicted Miranda, sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years
and one day of reclusion temporal.
• Miranda was also ordered to pay P25,000.00 each in civil and moral damages.
• The CA affirmed the conviction on July 30, 2014, with modifications to the
damages awarded.
• Miranda's subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied, leading him to
file a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
• Whether Alejandro C. Miranda's warrantless arrest and detention lawful?
• Whether Miranda properly convicted of rape through sexual assault under Article
266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Republic Act No.
7610?

RULING:
• The Supreme Court ruled that Miranda's warrantless arrest and detention were
not lawful.
• The Supreme Court affirmed Miranda's conviction for rape through sexual
assault but modified the penalty and damages awarded.

The Supreme Court found that Miranda's arrest did not fall within the purview of a
lawful warrantless arrest under Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

The barangay police did not witness the crime, nor did they have personal knowledge of
the facts indicating Miranda was the offender.
The information they acted upon from AAA's stepfather did not constitute personal
knowledge.

Consequently, Miranda should have been entitled to a preliminary investigation before

the Information was filed.

The absence of a preliminary investigation did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction or
the validity of the Information.

By voluntarily pleading not guilty, Miranda waived his right to question any irregularity
in his arrest or the absence of a preliminary investigation.
The Supreme Court held that Miranda was correctly convicted of rape through sexual
assault under Article 266-A (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610.

The victim's testimony was categorical and credible, detailing how Miranda inserted his
penis into the victim's anus.

The Court emphasized that rape, regardless of the manner of its commission, is a
heinous crime causing incalculable damage to the victim's dignity.

The Court modified the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of 12 years, 10 months,

and 21 days of reclusion temporal as the minimum, to 15 years, six months, and 20
days of reclusion temporal as the maximum.

Additionally, the Court increased the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages to P50,000.00 each, with all damages subject to a legal interest rate of six
percent per annum from the finality of the decision until fully paid.