Chapter I

Climate change resilience for

sustainable development

Key messages
• Climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of the extreme weather and climate events that are
affecting all countries. However, because of their geographical location, reliance on climate-sensitive natural
resources and development gaps in general, developing countries, and low-income countries in particular, are
at the greatest risk of climate hazards. Left unattended, climate hazards are likely to increase poverty, worsen
inequalities, exacerbate food insecurity and cause health problems, among other hardships, which may reverse
years of development progress in some countries.
• Climate hazards also have differential impacts on people and communities within countries. These impacts are
largely determined by deep-rooted socioeconomic inequalities. As a result, they tend to be particularly detri-
mental to the most disadvantaged groups of society, which are hence disproportionately exposed and vulnera­
ble to climate hazards.
• The universal consensus attested by the adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development provides a
unique opportunity to build climate change resilience for sustainable development by addressing the structu­
ral inequalities that perpetuate poverty, marginalization and social exclusion and thus increase vulnerability to
climate hazards.
• To be successful, disaster risk reduction and disaster management, social protection and adaptation strategies
must all be part of a broader development framework which incrementally leads the way to the empowerment
of today’s disadvantaged groups, by improving their asset positions and access to input and product markets; by
extending their access to quality basic services; and by changing the norms that foster their social and political
exclusion.

The international consensus on

sustainable development
In 2015, world leaders took significant steps towards forging sustainable development In 2015, States Members
pathways holding out the promise of eradicating poverty, reversing environmental of the United Nations
took significant steps
degradation and achieving equitable and inclusive societies. From 25 to 27 September 2015,
towards building
Heads of State and Government and High Representatives gathered at United Nations sustainable development
Headquarters in New York to adopt the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,1 which pathways

1 General Assembly resolution 70/1, entitled “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development”.
2 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

will drive global efforts towards achieving sustainable development until 2030. Previous
efforts gave impetus to the adoption of this Agenda.
On 16 July 2015, the Third International Conference on Financing for Development,
held in Addis Ababa from 13 to 16 July 2015, adopted the Addis Ababa Action Agenda
of the Conference,2 which puts forward a global framework for mobilizing resources and
facilitating policy implementation for sustainable development. On 3 June 2015, the General
Assembly endorsed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-2030, 3 which
had been adopted by the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction, held in
Sendai City, Japan, from 14 to 18 March 2015. The Sendai Framework recognizes that it
is the primary responsibility of Governments to reduce disaster risk and loss of lives, and
preserve livelihoods, which will be critical to averting development reversals in the future.
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development recognized that climate change, whose
adverse impacts undermine the ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development,
constitutes one of the greatest challenges of our time and, in that regard, acknowledged the
sessions of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change as the primary forum for negotiating the global response to that challenge.
On 12 December 2015, the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its twenty-first
session adopted the Paris Agreement in which the parties to the Agreement announced
quantitative commitments to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions, the major driver of
climate change, and to supporting adaptation efforts.4
There is global consensus These historic agreements are part of a global consensus on the need to address the
on the need to address inextricable links between the human development and environmental agendas. They signal
the inextricable links
acknowledgement, on the part of developed and developing countries, of the universal
between the human
development and need for an integrated and coherent approach to tackling global development challenges,
environmental agendas including consistent adaptation to climate change. Recognition of the urgency of moving
towards sustainable development pathways comes at times when “warming of the climate
is unequivocal” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014e, p. 2, SPM 1.1) and
is “increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and
ecosystems” (ibid., p. 8, SPM 2).
Building climate World Economic and Social Survey 2016: Climate Change Resilience - An Opportunity
resilience presents a for Reducing Inequalities contributes to the identification of some of the challenges of
unique opportunity implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The evidence points
to reduce inequalities
through far-reaching to the great economic, human and environmental losses brought about by climate hazards
transformative policies which, if left unattended, are likely to continue. The Survey addresses the challenges of
supported by effective strengthening the capacity of countries and people to avoid development reversals from
global partnerships those hazards. Recent data suggest that the world has already warmed 0.85° Celsius
from pre-industrial levels and will continue to experience warming even if greenhouse
gas emissions were immediately brought to a complete halt (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2013). The consequences of the warming of the planet will continue to
challenge the capacity of countries to prevent devastating impacts on people and ecosystems.
This Survey argues that building climate resilience presents a unique opportunity
to reduce inequalities. The persisting inequalities in multiple dimensions have led to
recognition that climate hazards have a differential impact on people and communities. It

2 General Assembly resolution 69/313, annex.

3 General Assembly resolution 69/283, annex II.
4 See FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, decision 1/CP.21.
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 3

has also been recognized that the association between climate hazards and inequalities has
not been sufficiently researched.5 In response, the Survey has chosen to tackle the issue of
climate change resilience, with a focus on the population groups and communities that are
disproportionately vulnerable. It argues that, in the absence of well-assessed, far-reaching
transformative policies at the national level, supported by effective global partnerships,
building climate resilience will remain elusive and poverty and inequalities will likely be
exacerbated. This would pose a fundamental challenge to the implementation of the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Moving climate resilience forward in implementing

the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets set out in the 2030 Agenda explicitly
elaborate on the interlinkages across the economic, social and environmental dimensions of
development and the opportunities to build positive synergies among them. Some of these
interlinkages and synergies are fundamental to facets of building climate change resilience
and reducing inequalities.
Sustainable Development Goal 13 affirms the urgency of taking action to combat
climate change and its impacts by calling for actions to strengthen resilience and adaptive
capacity with respect to climate hazards; to integrate climate change measures into national
policies; and to improve education, awareness-raising and human and institutional capacity
on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning. The
interlinkages between climate change and other dimensions of development are also well
reflected in other Goals. If the frequency and intensity of climate hazards increase, it will
be harder for countries to end poverty and hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition,
promote sustainable agriculture and ensure healthy lives (Goals 1-3). Furthermore, the
sustainability of water and energy systems (Goals 6 and 7) and the safety and resilience
of infrastructure, cities and human settlements (Goals 9 and 11) will be challenged by
climate hazards. Similarly, if climate hazards continue to undermine the ability of countries
to achieve sustained growth and development, full employment and decent work will be
harder to achieve (Goal 8).
Sustainable Development Goal 10, which explicitly addresses the goal of reducing
inequality within and among countries, includes targets focused on improving the income
of the bottom 40 per cent of the population; promoting the social, economic and political
inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic
or other status; eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices; and achieving fiscal,
wage and social protection policies for greater equality. With their references to universality,
many other targets within the framework of the Goals provide the basis for reducing
inequality in its multiple dimensions, encompassing access to key basic services such as
health, education, water and sanitation, and energy (Goals 3, 4, 6 and 7), gender (Goal 5)
and inclusive economic growth (Goal 8).

5 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has already recognized that climate-
resilient development pathways will have only marginal effects on poverty reduction unless structural
inequalities are addressed. At the same time, the Panel has underlined that the importance of struc-
tural inequalities and their association with climate change remain insufficiently researched (Olsson
and others, 2014, pp. 797 and 819).
4 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

The SDGs provide Together, these Goals provide a framework for the implementation of policies that
the framework for address the underlying causes of poverty, vulnerability and the risk of climate change.
tackling the structural Yet, it is important to deepen the understanding of the interlinkages across these Goals
inequalities that increase
vulnerability to climate and their policy implications in order to tackle the structural inequalities that perpetuate
hazards poverty, marginalization and social exclusion, the factors that increase the risk of climate
hazards. Critical aspects of this understanding encompass integration of the various facets
of the environment into development policy; the interaction of climate change with mega-
trends which may magnify its impacts; and a continuum of policies that, while addressing
immediate vulnerabilities, make it possible to incrementally achieve adaptation and
transformative change for sustainable development.
Ensuring consistency Nowadays, the relationship between the economic and social dimensions of
across the economic, development is better understood owing to an extensive body of research and the experience
social and environmental
of countries over the last decades. The trickle-down paradigm which prevailed in the 1980s
dimensions of
development policy was seriously challenged when new research and country experiences demonstrated that
is a core challenge in economic growth did not necessarily translate into human development. This understanding
achieving sustainable led to a major revision of development policies aimed at improving the consistency between
development economic growth and human development objectives. Developing countries made major
efforts to increase investments in education, health, water and sanitation. They introduced
comprehensive social protection programmes and experimented with new regulations
and incentives designed to redirect private investments towards job creation and larger
development objectives. However, those efforts were disconnected, more often than not,
from efforts to meet environmental goals (United Nations, 2016).
Hence, there is much less experience and policy guidance on the integration of the
various aspects of the environment into development policy. Building consistency across
the economic, social and environmental dimensions of development policy will be a core
challenge in building climate resilience and achieving sustainable development. It will
demand greater technical capacities among policymakers and all stakeholders for building
on the interlinkages across the multiple dimensions of development in the event of climate
impacts and for policy responses. It will also be necessary to strengthen the capacities to
negotiate commonly agreed objectives through building upon single-group interests. More
broadly, policy systems as a whole will require systemic changes to enable the more coherent
and more flexible design of integrated policies for climate resilience, with participation
from all relevant stakeholders. For many developing countries, these changes will not be
possible without global partnerships.
Important mega-trends The complexity inherent in addressing the links between the human development
that interact with climate and environmental agendas is compounded by the uncertainty surrounding important
change will shape
mega-trends which will shape development prospects and policy in both the near and the
development prospects
and policy distant future. Despite overall convergence in average per capita income across countries,
within-country inequalities are on the rise. This important trend along with others, such
as globalization and technological change, demographic dynamics, rapid urbanization and
climate change itself, will exert additional pressures leading towards increasing inequalities
both among and within countries. Moreover, if investment in green technologies is
inadequate, if population growth continues to be high, if investment in human capital is
low and if current socioeconomic inequalities remain, then income poverty and inequality
are likely to increase in the future under scenarios where current unmitigated emissions
are high. (See appendix I.1 for a full description of alternative development pathways.)
This clearly points to the importance of understanding the options for building climate
resilience with full consideration given to climate change and socioeconomic mega-trends.
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 5

Based on the evidence, there exists no doubt that moderating or avoiding the risks For many reasons,
associated with climate change and reducing poverty and inequality, involve both miti­ adaptation has received
less attention than
gation (preventing future warming) and adaptation (finding better or safer ways to live on
mitigation and it is only
a warming planet). Unquestionably, the only way to prevent the adverse consequences of recently that adaptation
climate change for human and natural systems is through mitigation. However, effective has become a focus of
policies focused on adaptation are urgently needed as well to enable the building of global attention
resilience; those policies may also assist both in preventing the negative impacts arising
from climate hazards and in slowing the process of climate change. For a number of reasons,
however, adaptation has received less attention than mitigation in the discussions centred
around climate change and it is only recently that efforts directed towards adaptation
are being incorporated in the global policy agenda. First, as adaptation is a public good,
private provision will typically remain below socially desirable levels unless the public
sector intervenes. Second, adaptation, is difficult to address as it requires actions along
the economic, social and environmental dimensions of development, which depend on the
specific context of each country. Finally, there are no clear metrics for assessing adaptation
impacts; that is, unlike mitigation, for which there is a clearly defined metric (namely,
tons of greenhouse gas emissions), assessing adaptation efforts requires a larger number of
indicators closely related to wider development efforts.
This Survey focuses more on adaptation than on mitigation. In doing so, it situates Successful adaptation
adaptation along a continuum of broader development policies for transformation — critical requires broad
development policies
components of which are efforts to address immediate needs (for example, poverty alleviation
aimed at reducing the
and disaster risk reduction and management) while reducing structural inequalities. The structural inequalities
capacity for integrating these policies will be at the centre of the challenge of implementing that leave people
the 2030 Agenda. However, it is important to understand that while these policies will vulnerable to climate
contribute to sustainable development in general, they will at the same time help build the hazards
climate resilience of the particular countries and population groups that are most at risk.

Climate change and variability, and the uneven

impacts of climate hazards
Understanding the association between climate change and inequality requires proper identi­
fication of (a) the climate-induced events that people experience most and (b) the countries
and the population groups within countries that are most vulnerable to those events.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change6 (article 1) defines
climate change as a change in the climate attributed directly or indirectly to human activity
that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is, in addition to natural
climate variability, observed over comparable time periods.7 Climate change takes place

6 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1771, No. 30822.

7 Climate change, as defined by IPCC, refers to a change in the state of the climate that can be identi-
fied (e.g., through use of statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its proper-
ties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or longer. It may be caused by natural
internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and
persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change makes a distinction between climate change
attributable to human activities altering the composition of the atmosphere and climate variability
attributable to natural causes. For more details, see the glossary of terms in IPCC (2014b, annex II).
For the purpose of this Survey, the focus of attention is on climate hazards as the manifestation of
potentially damaging impacts from climate-induced events, regardless of their origin.
6 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

over a period of decades or centuries; what people experience in their daily life is climate
variability and climate extremes.8
The scientific community There is consensus in the scientific community that climate change is increasing the
now agrees that climate frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration and timing of extreme weather and climate
change is increasing the
events, which results in an unprecedented level of climate hazards (IPCC, 2012, p. 7).
frequency and intensity
of climate hazards… Climate hazards are understood as being the potential occurrence of a climate-induced
physical event that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, as well as damage
to and loss of property, infrastructure, livelihoods, service provision and environmental
resources.9 The destruction generated by climate hazards when they hit countries and
people with greater frequency may derail years of development efforts.
For the twenty-first century, scenarios unambiguously predict continuing slow-onset
changes such as higher surface and ocean temperature, ocean acidification and global rise
of sea level. They also predict increased or more intensified extreme weather-related events,
such as heat waves and precipitation extremes. In particular, those scenarios predict the
most severe effects in tropical areas, where most developing countries are located.
…which are likely to slow If left unaddressed, these manifestations of climate change are likely to cause an
down economic growth, increase in poverty incidence and inequalities by slowing down economic growth and
increase food insecurity
exacerbating food insecurity, health problems and heat stress; and to result in surface-water
and exacerbate health
problems, thereby scarcity and increased exposure to storms and precipitation extremes, coastal flooding,
increasing poverty and landslides, air pollution and droughts. They may also induce displacement of people and
inequalities involuntary migration, among other hardships.
Weather-related disasters are becoming more frequent in all corners of the world, with
a total of 6,457 events in 1995-2015, which represents an average of 323 disasters per year.
Those disasters claimed more than 600,000 lives and affected about 4.2 billion people during
the same period (table I.1). Floods constitute the major cause of deaths and had the greatest
effect on people’s lives. The number of people exposed to water-related hazards, together
with storms, lies in the billions. Land-related disasters, such as droughts, landslides and
wildfires, are other major factors affecting people’s lives and their livelihoods. Importantly,
the impacts of these climate hazards are not distributed evenly across countries, or across
and within population groups in countries. This is a critical fact underlying the association
between climate change and inequality.

8 Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state of the climate and may result from the same
factors that explain climate change, as noted above. A climate extreme (i.e., an extreme weather or
climate event) occurs when the value of a weather or climate variable is above (or below) a threshold
value near the upper (or lower) end of the range of observed values of the variable. For simplicity,
both extreme weather events and extreme climate events tend to be referred to collectively as “climate
extremes” (IPCC, 2014b, annex II).
9 The City Climate Hazard Taxonomy developed by C40, a network of the world’s megacities com-
mitted to addressing climate change, classifies climate hazards within five groups of events: (a) mete-
orological: short-term or small-scale weather conditions; (b) climatological: long-term or large-scale
atmospheric processes; (c) hydrological: mass movement of water or a change in the chemical com-
position of water bodies; (d) geophysical: originating from mass movement of solid earth; and (e)
biological: a change in the way living organisms grow and thrive, which may lead to contamination
and/or disease (see [Link]
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 7

Table I.1
Number of people killed or affected by disasters, by type, 1995–2015a
Thousands
Disaster type Number killed Number affectedb
Floods 157 2 300 000
Drought 22 1 100 000
Storms 242 660 000
Extreme temperature 164 94 000
Landslides and wildfires 20 8 000
Total 605 4 162 000
Source: Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) (2015).
a Up to August 2015.
b Those injured, left homeless or in need of emergency assistance, not including those killed.

Uneven impacts across countries

Not all countries experience the effects of climate hazards on their human and natural
systems in the same way or proportion. Scenarios unambiguously predict that tropical areas
are at higher risk of climate hazards. According to the Notre Dame Global Adaptation
Index (ND-GAIN) (Chen and others, 2015),10 for example, countries at the highest risk
of climate change are concentrated in Africa and South and South-East Asia, where the
capacity to prevent (or even cope with) most negative impacts is poor (figure I.1). While
some high-income countries (Italy, Japan and the United States of America) exhibit
relatively high risk levels owing to their high exposure to climate hazards, they possess
greater capacity (resources) to manage those risks.
In absolute terms, total economic losses owing to climate hazards are most significant The effects of climate
for high-income countries. In CRED (2015), total economic losses are defined as the hazards on the human
and natural systems are
estimated cost of damage to property (housing and infrastructure), crops and livestock. uneven across countries
However, because of the distribution of risks and level of development, the greater economic and among population
losses relative to national income are observed in countries at lower levels of income. Low- groups
income countries lost an estimated 5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) during the
period 1995-2015 (figure I.2).11

10 This Index ranks countries’ risk of climate change. Risk is constructed by summing rankings for vul-
nerability and exposure to climate change and the number of weather-related events. Vulnerability is
assessed by considering six “life-supporting sectors”: food, water, health, ecosystem services, human
habitat and infrastructure. Each sector in turn represents three cross-cutting components: the expo-
sure to climate-related hazards, the sensitivity to those impacts and the adaptive capacity to cope or
adapt. Exposure is measured by projected changes in (not levels of ) the following components, some
of which are due to projected climate change: cereal yields, population, water run-off, groundwater
recharge, deaths from climate change induced diseases, length of transmission season of vector-borne
diseases, biome distribution, marine biodiversity, warm period, flood hazard, hydropower generation
capacity and sea-level rise impacts. For the technical treatments of the index, see Chen and others
(2015).
11 See, in this regard, the definition of “estimated damage” found in the glossary for the Emergency
Events Database EM-DAT. Available at [Link]
8 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

Figure I.1
Risk of climate change of all countries, by quintile, 1995–2014

Source: UN/DESA, based

Highest risk
on University of Notre Dame
Global Adaptation Index High risk
(available at Moderate risk
[Link] and Low risk
Centre for Research on the Least risk
Epidemiology of Disasters No data
(CRED) (2015).

Figure I.2
Economic losses of countries from climate hazards, by income group, 1995–2015
1,200 6.0
1,135
Economic losses (billions of US$)
Economic losses (percentage of GDP) 5.0
1,000 5.0
Billions of United States dollars

800 4.0

Percentage of GDP
600 3.0
505

400 2.0
1.3
1.1
190
200 1.0
Source: Centre for Research
on the Epidemiology of 0.2 40
Disasters (2015). 0 0.0
High-income Upper-middle-income Lower-middle-income Low-income

Least developed Countries with a high reliance on agriculture, the majority being least developed
countries, countries in countries, are particularly vulnerable. Current agricultural practices are a major contributor
Africa and small island
developing States are
to environmental degradation through greenhouse gas emissions and poor management
the most vulnerable to of land and water resources. At the same time, agriculture is highly sensitive to climate
climate change change. As temperature rises, crop productivity is predicted to decrease at lower latitudes  —
although it is also expected to increase at mid-high latitudes. Warming, together with
changes in water precipitation and unpredicted climate variability, affects the timing and
length of growing seasons and yields, with strong impacts on farmers’ livelihoods and on
food security more generally (United Nations, 2011b, pp. 74-76). There is evidence for the
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 9

period 1981-2003 that land productivity decreased in sub-Saharan Africa, in South-East

Asia and southern China, in north-central Australia, in the pampas and in the swathes of
boreal forest in Siberia and Northern America (ibid.).
According to IPCC projections, countries in Africa are particularly vulnerable to
climate change impacts. By 2020, between 75 million and 250 million people in Africa
are projected to be exposed to increased water stress owing to climate change and as a
consequence, yields in some countries could be reduced by up to 50 per cent. Agricultural
production, including access to food, in many African countries is projected to be severely
compromised. By 2080, in Africa, an increase from 5 to 8 per cent in arid and semi-
arid land is projected under a range of climate scenarios. Further, the projected cost of
adaptation could amount to 5-10 per cent of GDP.12
In the worst cases, climate change and the associated sea-level rise threaten the very
existence of some small island developing States (such as Kiribati and Tuvalu) because of
the latent risk that their territories may become submerged under water.13 Other island
States are facing severe drought and water shortages.

Uneven impacts across population groups

Not only are the impacts of climate hazards uneven across countries, they are also felt
differently across population groups within countries. While identifying particularly
vulnerable groups globally and at country level remains challenging, it is particularly
important for policymaking directed towards building climate resilience.
Unfortunately, current information systems are not adequate to the challenge of People in low-lying
following trends at the intersection between climate-related events and socioeconomic vul­ coastal areas, drylands,
and mountainous
ne­rabilities. People living in low-lying coastal areas, drylands, and mountainous and remote
and remote areas are
areas and population groups whose livelihoods rely on forest products are particularly at risk. particularly vulnerable
Yet, basic information on population size, socioeconomic characteristics and risk factors
which could help identify those groups remains in the form of very rough approximations.
Some of those groups are difficult to reach owing to their geographical location, but the lack
of basic information is also associated with an insufficiency in the resources for producing
statistics at the level of disaggregation required to identify specific population groups.
In spite of limited information, existing data and studies have enabled important
inferences to be made with regard to the uneven distribution of climate-induced vulner­
abilities and impacts across population groups. For example, despite the increased frequency
of water-related risks such as sea-level rise and coastal erosions, more and more people in
both developing and developed countries have settled in low-lying coastal areas, thereby

12 See fact sheet entitled “Climate change in Africa: what is at stake?”, comprising excerpts from
IPCC reports, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Bali Ac-
tion Plan, as compiled by the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment secretariat. Avail-
able at [Link]
FACT_SHEET_CC_Africa.pdf. Information given above derived from IPCC (2007), “Summary for
Policymakers”.
13 The Government of Kiribati, for example, acknowledges that the relocation of its people may be in­
evi­table, owing to climate change, which would threaten the survival of the country. The Government
has stated that “it would be irresponsible to acknowledge this reality and not do anything to prepare
our community for eventual migration”. See Republic of Kiribati, Office of the President, “Reloca-
tion”, Kiribati Climate Change. Available at [Link]
(accessed 25 January 2016).
10 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

exposing themselves to greater risks (see figure I.3). A study issued by the US Census Bureau
shows that since 1960, there has been a steady increase in the population living in coastal
areas of the United States and concludes that the trend, driven by social, economic and
environmental factors, can be expected to continue (Wilson and Fischetti, 2010).

Figure I.3
Population living in coastal cities with 300,000 inhabitants or more on
1 July 2014, 1950–2015a
Millions
1,200

1,002
1,000
904

800 735

577
600
458
359
400
269
197
Source: United Nations (2015b); 200
Gu and others (2015).
a Preliminary estimates for
2015 only. -
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015

The problem is particularly acute for developing regions where, according to Johnston
(2016), just over 10 per cent of the population (518 million out of 4,912 million) were living
in low-elevation coastal zones (that is, zones less than 10 metres above sea level) in 2000
(table I.2) and 3 per cent (148 million) were living in a 100-year floodplain (that is, a
plain that has a 1 per cent probability of being hit by a flood event in any given year). The
same study predicts that in 2030, 767 million people (about 11 per cent of the population
of developing regions) will be living in a low-elevation coastal zone and 224 million in a
100-year floodplain. These estimates suggest greater exposure to climate hazards and thus
larger climate-related human costs in the future for particular population groups if effective
climate adaptation and mitigation policies are not in place.
The rapid rise in the number of people living near the coast is doubtless to a large
extent a manifestation of two mega-trends: one towards rapid population growth and the
other towards urbanization. However, socioeconomic factors play a role as well: in the
absence of more diversified economies that provide job opportunities in less-exposed areas,
people are settling in low-lying coastal areas in search of a livelihood.
For example, the fishing population was estimated to have reached 43.5 million
by 2006, with much of the “absolute growth in numbers largely explained by the wide
expansion of the aquaculture sector” (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, n.d.). Moreover, “(f)ishers, aquaculturists
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 11

Table I.2
Populations living in low-elevation coastal zones and 100-year floodplains in developing regions,
2000 and 2030
Millions
Population Population living in low- Population living in
elevation coastal zones 100-year floodplains
2000 2030 2000 2030 2000 2030
Africa 811.0 1 562.0 54.0 109.0 13.0 24.0
Asiaa 3 697.0 4 845.0 461.0 649.0 137.0 201.0
Latin America and the Caribbean 521.0 702.0 32.0 40.0 6.0 8.0
Pacific islands 7.0 12.0 1.0 2.0 0.3 0.4
Developing regions, total 4 912.0 7 002.0 518.0 767.0 148.0 224.0
Least developed countries 662.0 1 257.0 93.0 136.0 13.0 21.0
World 6 101.0 8 298.0 625.0 893.0 189.0 271.0
Source: Johnston (2016).
a Including Japan.

and those supplying services and goods to them assure the livelihoods and well-being of a
total of about 520 million people, 7.9 per cent of the world’s population” (ibid.). However,
exploitation and climate change are threatening the collapse of livelihoods derived from
fishing (Jackson and others, 2001). This situation is problematic because the fishing
industry has historically played a major role in providing food security and income and
more recently, aquaculture has played a rapidly growing role. Fishing is, to a large extent,
a low-wage or subsistence-based activity and its decline due to climate change would be
expected to affect large population groups.
Large vulnerable population groups are also found in drylands and mountainous
and remote areas. Populations in these areas largely comprise nomadic, semi-nomadic
and sedentary agricultural inhabitants. Large areas of populated drylands with growing
subsistence populations, in particular, pose challenges to agricultural development and
food security in Africa and large parts of central and South Asia. It is estimated that nearly
2 billion inhabitants in the developing regions were vulnerable to desertification and
drought in 1995, the latest year for which data are available, and the number is considered
to be increasing owing, as in the case of coastal zones, to population growth and migration.
According to Millennium Development Goals reports for Ghana and Kenya, while the
proportion of the population in extreme poverty declined in many regions of those countries,
their poorest and most remote parts witnessed rising poverty rates (Johnston, 2016).
The problem of deforestation is also raising concerns for important population
groups (United Nations, Economic and Social Council, United Nations Forum on
Forests, 2009a; 2009b). According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
(2016a), forests are estimated to contribute to the livelihoods of at least 1.6 billion
people in the world, with some 60 million people, mainly in indigenous communities,
living within forests and another 350 million being highly dependent on forests.
The forest industry, both formal and informal, is estimated to employ roughly
12 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

50 million of the world’s people.14 Deforestation is fundamentally challenging the existence

of those livelihoods. As FAO also estimates, deforestation accounted for a loss of forest
cover of approximately 13 million hectares per year between 2000 and 2005 —  a loss that
could not be compensated by the 5.7 million hectares recovered during the same period
from the natural expansion of forests and forest plantations.
Deforestation and global Indigenous people, in particular, are under siege, as their livelihoods are seriously
warming are threatening affected owing to the alteration of forests. Local human activities that are being undertaken
the livelihoods of
indigenous people and
in and near forests — mostly unsustainable logging, conversion of forests to agricultural
other communities land, conversion of coastal mangrove forests for aquaculture, mining, infrastructure
creation and the expansion of human settlements — as well as forest fires, further accelerate
deforestation and degradation.
Deforestation also increases a community’s risk of experiencing disasters. Forest
degradation lowers the capacity of forests to provide the community with the livelihood
resources needed to withstand and recover from disasters. Deforestation is known to cause
severe floods, river-basin flooding, flash floods, mudslides and landslides (Hammill, Brown
and Crawford, 2005) and leads to an increased number of disasters and extensive damage.
Indigenous people are a particularly vulnerable group. Their vulnerability is linked
not only to deforestation but also to other manifestations of climate change. Their close
relationship with their natural environment makes them particularly sensitive to the
effects of climate change (Baird, 2008). In the worst cases, their way of life, and even their
existence, is being threatened by climate change. For example, in the Arctic, where rises in
temperature are most noticeable, there are some 400,000 indigenous peoples, which include
the Sami of northern Norway, Finland, Sweden and the Russian Federation, for whom
herding reindeer is a way of life. The Sami people had observed signs of climate change as
early as the mid-1980s, when winter rainfall increased. Higher temperatures and increased
rainfall began to make it difficult for reindeer to reach the lichen that they consume. When
temperatures drop, and lichen is covered with ice, many reindeer are likely to starve. In
addition, the thinning of the Arctic ice has made tracking reindeer herds more dangerous,
as the inherited local knowledge regarding safe tracking is then no longer useful.

Uneven impacts within population groups

Vulnerability to climate The evidence demonstrates that some people and some communities are particularly
change is largely driven vulnerable compared with the rest of the population. This is clear when considering the case
by low income, less
access to resources,
of Nepal, a least developed country, where rising temperatures, erratic rain- and snowfall,
and unfavourable and the unpredictability of the beginning of the monsoon season have resulted in slow
socioeconomic status growth and decreased crop production. In principle, all people and communities whose
more generally livelihood is associated with crop production should be negatively affected by these hazards.
However, Gentle and others (2014) have shown that the impacts are not uniform among
people and communities. Their study shows that the severity of climate-related impacts
depends on geographical location and the vulnerability of households, which is in turn
determined by a number of socioeconomic characteristics such as household size, quality

14 These numbers are all rough estimates lacking a basis in clearly defined concepts and sources. While
the Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015 gives detailed country data on forest employment, it
does not provide an estimate for the total.
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 13

of farmland, social status within the community, education of the head of household, and
access to financial resources.
These socioeconomic factors shape the structural inequalities that perpetuate
poverty, marginalization and social exclusion in the face of climate hazards. In fact, the
interviews conducted by the authors of the study revealed that the number of climate
hazards experienced by Nepalese households was largely concentrated among the poor. On
average, poor households experienced 2.63 climate hazards over the six-year period of the
study; better-off households experienced 1.76 hazards on average. The proportion of the
members of poor households who were injured or killed was 6.3 per cent, while 81.3 per
cent experienced damage to their house, land or livelihood. The corresponding proportions
for well-off households were 2.6 and 55.3 per cent, respectively.
In the Sahel region of Africa, where the livelihood of considerable portions of the
population derives from farming and raising livestock, all farmers and pastoralists are
witnessing the same reductions in the level of rainfall and rising desertification. It is poor
farmers and pastoralists, however, who have been shown to be most vulnerable, given their
limited ability to mobilize the resources necessary for adapting to these climate changes,
which include water and land, and their lack of political power in society (Cotula, 2006;
Silva, 2016).

A framework for understanding risk and policy

All of the above evidence attests to what is to be the core focus of the present Survey. Structural inequalities
Climate change is increasing the frequency and intensity of the extreme weather and climate that reproduce poverty,
marginalization and
events that are affecting all countries. However, it is developing countries, in particular
social exclusion leave
small island developing States, and countries where livelihoods depend on climate-sensitive some population groups
natural resources, that are the most exposed to climate hazards; additionally, they have at higher risk of climate-
fewer resources and less capacity to adapt. In those countries, there is a clear-cut association related hazards
between inequality and vulnerability to climate change. Certain population groups
are particularly at risk owing to their socioeconomic characteristics which leave them
disproportionately exposed and more vulnerable to climate hazards. In most countries, the
disproportionately high risks experienced by particular population groups are determined
by structural inequalities which reproduce poverty, marginalization and social exclusion.
Deepening the analysis of this problem with a view to identifying policies that can act upon
the structural drivers of vulnerability requires a consistent analytical framework.

Exposure, vulnerability and structural inequalities

The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report considers people to be at risk when they are faced with The degrees of exposure
the potentially adverse consequences of an uncertain outcome and where something of and vulnerability of
people determine
value is at stake in the human and natural systems, such as human lives; livelihoods; health;
climate risk
ecosystems and species; and economic, social and cultural assets and service flows arising
out of them (see IPCC, 2014c, annex II: Glossary). In this framework, the intersection
between the occurrence of climate hazards and the exposure and vulnerability of people
and natural systems to them is the central source of risk (figure I.4). Exposure refers to the
presence of people (including their livelihoods), ecosystems and species, or economic, social,
or cultural assets in places that could be adversely affected by climate hazards. Vulnerability
is defined as the propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected, which encompasses
14 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

Figure I.4
Human interface with the climate

Impacts

Vulnerability
Climate Socioeconomic
processes
Natural
variability Inequalities
Hazards Risk Adaptation and
Anthropogenic mitigation
climate actions
change Governance
Exposure

Emissions
Source: UN/DESA, based on and land-use change
IPCC (2014d), p. 3.

two elements: (a) sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and (b) lack of capacity to cope and
adapt. Exposure and vulnerability are thus determined implicitly by the conditions of
poverty, marginalization and social exclusion as they affect specific population groups.
Exposure and Except for a few countries at very low levels of development, where poor living
vulnerability are conditions are widespread, poverty, marginalization and social exclusion are, in most
determined by the
socioeconomic processes
cases, the result of deeply entrenched inequalities regarding access to physical and financial
leading to persisting assets; and access to quality health services, education and employment; and as regards
inequalities the unevenness of the opportunities of people and communities to voice their concerns
and participate in political decision-making. As discussed in the Report on the World Social
Situation 2016: Leaving No One Behind –The Imperative of Inclusive Development (United
Nations, forthcoming), the term social exclusion refers to both the inability of individuals
to participate fully in the economic, social, political and cultural life of the community to
which they belong and the processes leading to their exclusion. The structural inequalities
that result in social exclusion are reproduced by the economic rules, institutions and social
norms that govern societies. Cultural, institutional and political regimes that determine the
differential rights of people according to the difference in their status, as based on gender,
tribal, ethnic or racial markers, have reproduced those inequalities over time.15
Structural inequalities matter when examining the impacts of climate hazards
on people and communities. People and communities are relatively more exposed and
vulnerable to climate hazards when their livelihoods depend on natural resources and they
have few options for diversifying their income sources; when they are without appropriate
access to insurance and financial markets; and when they have low levels of education and
inadequate access to health services or inadequate access to appropriate facilities for persons
with disabilities and older persons.
Policies whose goal is To be effective, the building of climate change resilience must entail addressing the
climate change resilience processes underlying such structural inequalities. This Survey will strive to delineate the
must address the
underlying structural
structural inequalities that most increase vulnerability and exposure to climate hazards.
inequalities that leave
people at high risk 15 See chap. I of the Report on the World Social Situation 2016 (United Nations, forthcoming) for an
extensive discussion on the concept of social inclusion/exclusion.
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 15

The policy implications of such an analysis are most important. If effective actions for
climate resilience are not put in place, climate hazards are likely to exacerbate inequalities,
leading to increasing poverty, marginalization and social exclusion.

Transformative policies for climate resilience

Sound development policies are the kind of policies, above all, needed to build climate
resilience through building people’s resilience to socioeconomic and climate-related shocks.
Addressing the root causes of vulnerability requires a continuum of policy interventions
leading to the structural transformations that strengthen people’s opportunities and agency.
Today’s policies must lead the way towards achieving the kind of transformations A continuum of policy
required to build inclusive and climate-resilient societies. Disaster risk reduction and disaster interventions is
required to address
management are obviously playing an important role in strengthening the preparedness and
immediate needs and
early warning capacities needed to confront climate hazards. Social protection policies are enable the structural
necessary to protect lower-income groups against the threats of climate hazards. Adaptation transformations needed
policies, such as those entailing the adoption of new crops or improved irrigation systems to build climate-resilient
in agriculture, are critical to preventing a deterioration of livelihoods as a result of climate and sustainable societies
hazards. To be successful, however, these highly specific policy responses must be part of a
broader development framework which leads the way incrementally to the empowerment
of today’s disadvantaged groups by improving their asset positions and access to input and
product markets, by extending their access to quality basic services such as health, education
and sanitation, and by changing the norms fostering their social and political exclusion.
The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, with its vision of
“transforming our world”, provides a unique opportunity to strengthen policymaking
systems in such a way as to enable them to effectively take the lead in the transformation
process required for sustainable development, including the building of climate resilience.
While broad international consensus has supported this view,16 the challenge going
forward is nevertheless centred around the adoption of national policies which will, within
each country’s context and constraints, drive efforts towards poverty eradication, human
development and climate resilience.
There is an extensive literature devoted to the past experiences of countries on
alternative interventions in response to extreme climate hazards. However, there is less
experience with and less recognition of the challenges posed by both slow setting events and
the accumulation of weather-related hazards, which can have devastating consequences on
livelihoods. In the absence of government support, even small changes in temperature or
rain and wind patterns can push people into poverty traps (Olsson and others, 2014). Those
who are the most exposed and vulnerable are also the ones who are already economically
and socially disadvantaged and the least likely to have access to support systems.
Public policy will have to play a critical role in providing public goods for adaptation Climate change
and ensuring that social processes and institutions are flexible enough to learn and adapt adaptation presents a
and assess policy options. Climate change presents a public goods-related problem, one that public-goods related
problem requiring public
policies to address it
16 In fact, in the 2030 Agenda, as adopted by the General Assembly (resolution 70/1), the Heads of State
and Government and High Representatives declared that “(o)n behalf of the peoples we serve, we have
adopted a historic decision on a comprehensive, far-reaching and people-centred set of universal and
transformative Goals and targets”, that “we are setting out a supremely ambitious and transformation-
al vision” and that “(w)e envisage a world free of poverty, hunger, disease and want, where all life can
thrive”.
16 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

produces socially undesirable results. Information and accurate climate forecasts, public
infrastructure, flood control systems, early warning systems, knowledge and technology
are public goods, all of which are essential for adaptation. But it is precisely because they
are public goods that they cannot be provided adequately by the private sector.17 It is thus
public policies that play the critical role in their provision.
In the presence of large development gaps and incomplete markets,18 public policies
also have an important role to play in creating the incentives and regulations capable
of increasing provision by the private sector of the goods and services (including their
accessibility) that facilitate climate change adaptation among vulnerable groups. Inadequate
access to credit and insurance markets constrain people’s options with regard to investing
and protecting their assets under the effects of shocks. Creating the incentives needed to
expand access to credit and insurance markets is an example of government activity that
would contribute to reducing the structural inequalities constraining the capacity of people
to diversify their livelihoods and adapt to climate change.
At the same time, social processes and institutions need to be flexible enough for
learning adaptation and assessment with regard to development options. Climate change
resilience will demand that social, economic and ecological systems become capable of
reorganizing so as to maintain their essential functions, identity and structure, while also
maintaining their capacity for adaptation, learning and transformation.19 This will pave
the way towards sustainable development — as long as the structural inequalities that drive
poverty, social exclusion and vulnerability are addressed.
Building resilience This Survey has been structured to elucidate the distinct ways in which national
requires improved efforts in the most vulnerable countries can confront these challenges. At the same time,
technical and political
it identifies concrete areas where national efforts will need to be supplemented through
capacity to implement
integrated policies with enhanced international cooperation.
participation from all
stakeholders
Organization of the chapters of this Survey
Chapter II reviews the literature on the impact of climate change on human systems
and stresses the need to advance understanding of the link between climate change and
inequalities, both conceptually and empirically. The chapter builds upon the idea that climate
hazards and inequalities are locked in a vicious cycle, whereby those hazards affect people
experiencing socioeconomic vulnerability disproportionately. If resources are not adequate

17 A public good is both non-excludable (i.e., individuals cannot be prevented from using it) and non-
rivalrous (i.e., the use of the good by one individual does not reduce its availability or utility to
others). Common examples include fresh air, national security and street lighting. Providers cannot
discriminate among users or exclude non-payers from the good and therefore have no incentive for
providing the good.
18 Incomplete markets are those where the conditions for market formation are not fully met. In these
circumstances, service provision by private firms satisfies only a small part of potential demand, which
is typically the case for credit and insurance markets within the rural environments of developing
countries.
19 As defined by Shaw (2012, p. 309), climate resilience is a dynamic process of “bouncing forward” (as
opposed to “bouncing back to what it was”), which requires reacting to crises by moving up to a new
state that is more sustainable in the current environment. So described, the resilience-building process
is often called evolutionary resilience, as it entails the ability of complex human and natural systems to
change, adapt and crucially transform in response to climate hazards rather than return to normality
(Davoudi, 2012).
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 17

to the challenge of recovery from climate hazards, inequality in its multiple dimensions will
deepen. Using evidence from the existing literature, chapter II explores the economic, social
and political channels that shape the structural inequalities through which climate hazards
both increase the level of exposure and susceptibility to damage of disadvantaged groups
and weaken their capacity to cope and to recover. The evidence reviewed points to the need
for a well-integrated continuum of policies, planning and practices for addressing the root
causes of inequalities which impose disproportionate impacts on people when they are hit
by climate hazards. The transformations leading to adaptation and climate resilience need
to be well sustained by assessments and fully supported by a sound policymaking system.
Chapter III introduces the methodologies used in “integrated climate impact
assessments” which combine different types of modelling tools to uncover the interlinkages
across the environmental, economic and social dimensions of development. To the extent
that the occurrence and impacts of climate hazards are associated with a high degree of
uncertainty, integrated assessments have to provide robust estimates of plausible climate
outcomes and policy responses. The chapter argues for the need to sharpen the focus of
these assessments in several ways, targeting the importance of bringing inequalities to the
fore. It is also argued that engaging stakeholders (policymakers, experts and researchers,
vulnerable groups and local communities) in the design of policy scenarios and in the
discussion of policy options is critical to strengthening the political process through
which policy decisions are made. Bringing forth the evidence provided by integrated
climate impact assessments with full transparency regarding both the use of data and the
assumptions built into the modelling tools that facilitate those assessments will critically
improve the knowledge base, policy options and political processes in countries seeking
to build climate change resilience as an integral part of sustainable development policies.
In addition, chapter III focuses on areas where capacities need to be strengthened so that
developing countries can expand the construction and use of assessments.
Improving assessments is only one of the many possible means of strengthening
policymaking. Chapter IV introduces the subject of the complexity of policy decision-
making processes that is introduced when multiple objectives are being pursued within
the continuum of policies required for resilience and sustainability. A central claim of the
chapter is that, given the presence of three factors — the underlying uncertainty of climate
change, the locality where it exhibits its effects, and the interconnected nature of the various
sectors in which its impacts are felt — a policymaking system is required that meets three
core criteria: it has to be coherent, participatory and flexible.
International cooperation will have a critical, supportive role to play in ensuring that
the most vulnerable countries possess the means to strengthen their capacity to forge climate-
resilient development pathways as part of their strategies for sustainable development.
While the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development respects the mechanisms by which
countries make their own policy choices, it also recognizes the importance of development
cooperation, especially within the context of countries with special needs. Chapter V
explores two important areas of international cooperation: international financing for
climate change adaptation and the development of improved systems of information and
data sharing.
18 World Economic and Social Survey 2016

Appendix I.1

Uncertainty of the prospects for the global

distribution of income in 2050 based on
alternative development pathways
Development trends are hedged in by large uncertainties arising from the uncertainty
associated with the estimation of future climate change. Those uncertainties are compounded
by the interaction of climate change with mega-trends related to demographic dynamics,
urbanization, globalization and technological progress. In order to in some way address
these conditions of uncertainty, the international research community has adopted a set of
narratives which consider possible pathways for development. The estimation of plausible
scenarios in the future are produced by different combinations of those mega-trends.
These narratives, known as shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs), were proposed
initially by Kriegler and others (2012). They have gone on to serve in the creation of a
correspondence, which has featured prominently in climate change assessments, between
shared socioeconomic pathways and greenhouse gas concentration trajectories under dif­
ferent mitigation scenarios (or representative concentration pathways (RCPs)).
Each shared socioeconomic pathway is associated with different mitigation and
adaptation challenges depending on the distinct evolution of mega-trends, as illustrated in
table A.I.1.
Alternative shapes of the global distribution of per capita income in the year 2050
have been determined for each of the SSPs from the Global Income Distribution Dynamics
database of the World Bank (Osorio Rodarte, 2016; and van der Mensbrugghe, 2015). An
important finding of this exercise has been that, as shown in figure A.I.1, the overall level of
welfare, inequality and poverty varies significantly, depending on the path taken. Poverty
incidence is highest in those cases where adaptation efforts are weak (SSP3 and SSP4).

Figure A.I.1
Global distribution of income in 2050 based on different shared
socioeconomic pathways
PPP $1.25/day
0.5
SSP1
SSP2
0.4
Density of log of per capita income

SSP3
SSP4
0.3 SSP5

0.2

0.1

0.0
Source: Osorio Rodarte (2016).
$0.3 $1.8 $12.8 $90.0 $885.0 $8,790.0
Per capita income, PPP/day
 Chapter I. Climate change resilience for sustainable development 19

Table A.I.1
Mitigation and adaptation challenges associated with different shared socioeconomic pathways

SSP Challenges Illustrative starting points for narratives

SSP1 Low for mitigation and adaptation Sustainable development proceeds at a reasonably fast
(Sustainability) pace, inequalities are lessened, and technological change
is rapid and directed towards environmentally friendly
processes, including lower-carbon energy sources and
high productivity of land
SSP2 Moderate A case intermediate between SSP1 and SSP3, viewable
(Middle of the road) perhaps as business-as-usual
SSP3 High for mitigation and adaptation Unmitigated emissions are high owing to moderate
(Fragmentation) economic growth, a rapidly growing population and
slow technological change in the energy sector, making
mitigation difficult. Investments in human capital are low,
inequality is high, a regionalized world leads to reduced
trade flows and institutional development is unfavourable,
leaving large numbers of people vulnerable to climate
change and many parts of the world with low adaptive
capacity
SSP4 High for adaptation, low for mitigation A mixed world, with relatively rapid technological devel-
(Inequality) opment in low-carbon energy sources in key emitting
regions, leading to relatively large mitigation capacity
in places where it matters most for global emissions.
However, in other regions, development proceeds slowly,
inequality remains high and economies are relatively
isolated, leaving those regions highly vulnerable to climate
change, with limited adaptive capacity
SSP5 High for mitigation, low for adaptation In the absence of climate policies, energy demand is high
(Conventional development) and most of this demand is met by carbon-based fuels. In-
vestments in alternative energy technologies are low, and
readily available options for mitigation are few. Nonethe-
less, economic development is relatively rapid and is itself
driven by high investments in human capital. Improved
human capital also produces a more equitable distribution
of resources, stronger institutions and slower population
growth, leading to a less vulnerable world which is better
able to adapt to climate impacts
Source: UN/DESA, based on van der Mensbrugghe (2015), table 2.