China’s Emergence as a Superpower
A Graphic Comparison of the United States, Russia, China, and
Other Major Powers
Photo: somartin/Adobe Stock
Report by Anthony H. Cordesman
Published August 15, 2023
Available Downloads
Download the Full Report 6214kb
The Emeritus Chair in Strategy at CSIS is issuing a report written by Anthony H.
Cordesman that compares the key trends in civil and military power in the
United States, developed democracies, China, and Russia. The report is entitled
China’s Emergence as a Super Power: A Graphic Comparison of the United States,
Russia, China, and Other Major Powers. A downloadable copy is attached at the
end of this announcement, and it is available on the CSIS website at [Link]
[Link]/s3fs-public/2023-
08/230811_Cordesman_China_Emerging.pdf?
VersionId=PfyIjoITze29gpLxIY8kFOsuXzqLikV5.
The graphs, maps, and tables in this report only highlight a limited range of the
complex changes involved, and reliable data are often lacking for the years after
2020. They still show, however, that the civil and military role of the world’s
major powers is in a process of dramatic and unpredictable change.
The Key Impact of China’s Emergence as a Major Global Economic
Power
China has emerged as an economic superpower that rivals the United States in
many ways, although the total economic power of modern democracies—most of
which are strategic partners of the United States—vastly exceeds the size of the
Chinese economy, trade efforts, and efforts in technology and research and
development. China also faces major internal challenges created by outside
restrictions and economic sanctions, its handling of Covid-19, and state
interference in its economic development.
Nevertheless, China is already competing with the economies of developed
democratic states on a global level. Its “belt and road” efforts to establish
economic ties to developing states and control critical minerals and resources. It
may succeed in creating a rival economic bloc that can function and grow outside
the “rules-based order” democracies created after World War II, and it is already
competing in its relations with a number of developing states and other
countries.
The trends presented in this report show that this competition may well become
an ongoing confrontation between China and its allies, and developed
democracies and their strategic partners, unless radical changes take place in
Chinese policies and leadership. And—as is discussed shortly—is a growing level
of civil confrontation that is being matched by military confrontation as well.
Russia’s Diminished Global Economic Role
The following graphics show that Russia is not an economic superpower now that
it has lost control of most East European states and many of the Central European
and Asian elements of the former Soviet Union. Russia has long lagged badly in
total economic growth, trade, research and development, and all the other major
areas of economic power. Russia’s size, geographic position, and large oil and gas
reserves do, however, still make it a key global power.
Key Uncertainties in the Civil Impacts of Economic Power
It should be stressed, however, that current trends can only tell part of the story.
Any analysis of economic and civil power will be shaped by many key trends that
cannot be quantified. They include the longer-term impacts of the economic
stresses between and within developed states, the impact of internal politics, the
impact of demographic change and population pressure, and the impact of global
warming. They also include the degree to which the developed democracies can
succeed in cooperating and creating truly functional economic strategic
partnerships. As yet, governments often rely far more on rhetoric about such
cooperation than on taking tangible action, although there are positive indicators
as well.
The graphics in this analysis also do not include the developing world. Here, the
allocation of international economic power has generally favored developed
states. As the UN, World Bank, IMF, and a host of NGO reports make clear, many
states have failed to move towards effective development and face major
challenges from failed or corrupt governance, repression and internal division,
population pressure, limited water supplies, and climate change. For all the
former rhetoric about globalism, this includes at least one-third of the world’s
nations.
At the same time, there are cases like India, where the trends in global power
could move in other directions. While they are not yet positive enough to include
in this analysis, India has overtaken China as the world’s most populous state, has
a GDP of some $9.3 trillion, and ranks high in terms of total military spending.
Several major petroleum states in the Gulf are taking positive steps to develop
beyond a reliance on energy exports, as are some states in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. For all the failings in the developing world, they are also important
potential successes.
The Impact of Trends in Military Power
The graphs and tables that follow show that the United States remains the world’s
largest military power, the one with the most combat experience and highest
levels of total spending and investment in modernization, and the one with the
strongest strategic partners.
It is also clear, however, that the United States already faces growing competition
from China, particularly in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean as well. In the case
of Taiwan, competition has already turned to serious confrontation and the risk
of war. Once again, China has vastly increased its capabilities since 1990, as well
as its military links to other Asia power. Much depends on the United States’
ability to strengthen its strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia,
the Philippines, and other Asian states—as well as European states with major
power projection capabilities like Great Britain and France.
The Uncertainties Driven by the War in Ukraine
At the same time, the United States and its strategic partners face a major
challenge from Russia and one that current U.S. national strategy tends to
seriously understate. As the graphics show, Russia may not have an economy that
can fully support its present conventional forces, but it remains a major threat to
the United States’ European strategic partners and NATO, and the Russian
military threat must be given equal priority with that from China.
The trends shown in this analysis do not generally go beyond 2021 and cannot
reflect the many longer-term changes in the military balance that are growing
out of the war in Ukraine. It is clear, however, that the United States and its NATO
allies are engaged in major proxy war, supporting Ukraine in its defense against
Russia. They also are already rebuilding NATO’s overall level of extended
deterrence against Russia, and doing so at a time when Vladimir Putin, Russia’s
leader, has made it clear that he sees NATO as a major and continuing threat.
There is no current way to predict how the war in Ukraine will change the
overall balance of military power and how and when it will end. It seems almost
certain, however, that as long as Putin rules Russia, the United States and the rest
of NATO will be engaged in a new Cold War, and one which will effectively match
a similar Cold War between the United States and its strategic partners in Asia
and China.
A Return to Nuclear Forces
As the final sections of this analysis also show, these two Cold Wars have a major
nuclear dimension. The race to build up conventional military power is, in some
ways, being outpaced by a new nuclear arms race. This race not only reflects the
near collapse of nuclear arms control but a potential return to major tactical,
theater, and dual-capable nuclear forces. It also is clear that Russia is now only a
supe power to the extent it has inherited a massive legacy of nuclear weapons
and technology from the former Soviet Union.
Tags
China, Russia, and Geopolitics and International Security