HISTORY A LEVEL.

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STALIN’S RUSSIA 1924-1941

MR. R. NYAMUDEZA

0777084358

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STALIN’S RUSSIA (1928-1941)

RISE TO POWER

Joseph Stalin’s profile

• Joseph Stalin whose real name was JosefVissarionovichDjugashvili was born on December18
[Link] is widely known to mean “Man of Steel”.
• Stalin (man of Steel) was not his real name, but suited him very well. Richards (2010: 298) comments
that though Stalin was not his real name, but “it suited him very well”. This was so because “man of
Steel” meant everything to do with repression, oppression, heartlessness, ruthlessness among others.
• His real name was JosefVissarionovichDjugashvili. He was born in 1879 in a small town of Gori,
Georgia. As a revolutionary in Tsarist Russia; Stalin spent a large part of his time hiding in exile. He
was not Russian by birth.
• His father was a miserable shoe maker (cobbler) and the family appears to have lived in constant
poverty. It has been suggested by various historians that both admiration of things Russian and his
contempt for middle class intellectuals derived from his consciousness of his humble origins.

• Stalin’s mother was a particularly devout woman and it was largely through her influence that her son
was enrolled as a student, training for the priesthood in a Georgian - Orthodox seminary in Tbilisi.

• Stalin came in contact with MessauneDaosy, a secret organization that was in full swingsupport of
Georgia independence from Russia. Among the members were socialists who introduced Stalin to the
writings of Karl Max and Vladmir Lenin. Stalin then joined the group in 1898.

• Unfortunately, in 1899, Joseph Stalin left the seminary. Other historians argue that it was due to his
failure to pay the tuition thus he withdrew from the seminary. However, other historians argue that
his political views challenging the tsarist regime resulted in Stalin being asked to leave the seminary.

• Stalin argued that he became a Marxist because of his “social position’ and ‘the harsh intolerance and
discipline that crushed him so mercilessly at the seminary” (Morris and Murphy: 2000: 221)

• According to Morris (2000: 221) “the most significant features of his early life were the harshness and
occasional brutality of his father.” Therefore, Stalin became a “ruthless politician”(133)

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• He was slow and steady but very hardworking. He held grudges and generally made his enemies
suffer. He became a leading communist after playing an important role in defending the Bolshevik city
of Tsaritsyn (later Stalingrad) during the civil war. He had become an undisputed party leader by 1929.

RISE TO POWER

The struggle to succeed Lenin was between members of the politburo namely Kamenev, Zinoviev,
Bukharin, Stalin and Trotsky. Initially, Stalin was viewed as unlikely. Trotsky called him “The Party’s most
eminent mediocrity…a man destined to play second fiddle or third fiddle.” Nikolai Sukhanov described
him as “a vague grey blur”. Lenin even suggested in his will that Stalin be removed from his post when he
wrote that “he is too crude and his defect becomes unacceptable in his position as Secretary General. I
therefore propose to comrades that they should devise a means of removing him from his post.”

The most obvious successor was Leon Trotsky, an inspired orator, an intellectual and a man of action. He
was also the organizer of the Red Army.

FACTORS BEHIND STALIN’S RISE

a) Lenin’s legacy.

Lenin kelped Stalin to rise to power in so many ways. One of them was he appointed Stalin on most
important party positions. With Lenin’s backing, Stalin had risen by 1912 to become one of the six
members of the Central Committee, the policy-making body of the Bolshevik Party. He had also helped to
found the Party’s newspaper, Pravda. Before 1917 the Bolshevik Party had been only a few thousand
strong and Lenin had known the great majority of members personally. He had been impressed by Stalin’s
organising ability, insensitivity to suffering, and willingness to obey orders. He once described him as ‘that
wonderful Georgian’, a reference to his work as an agitator among the non-Russian peoples. Ever since
he came back from exile in 1917, Stalin was loyal to Lenin after the latter’s return to Petrograd in April
1917. Lenin instructed the Bolsheviks to abandon all cooperation with other parties and to devote
themselves to preparing for a seizure of power. As a Leninist, Stalin was opposed to the ‘October
`deserters’, such as Kamenev and Zinoviev. Lenin also appointed Stalin based on his knowledge of the
minority peoples, the Commissar for Nationalities. Lenin had believed that Stalin’s toughness well
qualified him for this role. As Commissar, Stalin became the ruthless Bolshevik organiser for the whole of
the Caucasus region during the Civil War from 1918 to 1920.

Stalin was also appointed as the official responsible for the liaison between the Politburo (the Central
Committee inner Cabinet) and the Orgburo (the Party`s bureau of organization). Stalin was on a unique
position to monitor both the Party`s Policy and the Party`s personnel. As Head of the Workers Inspectorate
he was entitled to oversee the work of all government departments. Then, lastly as the General Secretary
, Stalin was the vital linkman with access to the personal files of all party members. He was responsible
for recording and conveying party policy. These positions were never meant to confer power to Stalin and
even when he was put in those positions, nobody appeared to see it as a potent of anything significant.
Moreover, the attack upon functionalism was another lasting feature of Lenin`s period that proved
beneficial to Stalin. This was Lenin`s condemnation of the party`s squabbling which had so irritated him
during the civil war period. What this rejection of functionalism effectively did was to frustrate any serious

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attempt to criticize party decisions or policies. Contrary to the tradition of the internal debate among
Bolsheviks, it became extremely difficult to amount any form of legitimate opposition within the CPSU.
Stalin was a beneficiary of this ban on criticism of the party line. The change of “functionalism” provided
him with a ready weapon for resisting challenges to the authority he had began to exercise
Also, there an associated factor that legitimize Stalin`s position. Stalin became heir to what became
described as “Lenin`s legacy.” By this it meant the tradition of authority and leadership that Lenin had
established during his life time and the veneration in which he was held after his death. Its only a slight
exaggeration to say that in the eyes of the communist party Lenin became a god, his words, actions and
decisions became unchallengeable and all arguments and disputes within the party were settled by
reference to his prescriptions. Lenin became the measure of the corrections of Soviet theory and practice.
Soviet Communism became Leninism. After 1924, if a party member could assume the mantle of Lenin
and appear to carry on Lenin`s work, he could establish a formidable claim to power. This is what Stalin
began to do. Stalin, as made efforts to associate himself with Lenin wherever possible and got off to an
excellent start at Lenin`s funeral. At this funeral, Stalin was the chief mourner whilst his contenders like
Trotsky were absent Stalin made an appealing speech which made people to believe him as a continuation
of Leninism. It is surprising why Trotsky was absent. His excuse was that Stalin had given him the wrong
date, but this simply was not true. Documents show that he learned the real date early enough for him to
have reached Moscow with time to spare. Instead he continued his planned journey and was on holiday
on the day of the funeral. This was hardly the image of a dedicated Leninist. This shows how Lenin played
an integral role to Stalin`s rise to power. To add on in 1924, Stalin was one of the members of the
politburo. The other members included Zinoviev and, Trotsky,Nicolous ,Burkharan, Alexei, Rykov and
Mikhali Tomsky. By 1930 Stalin would overshadow them and outlived them by1940.

b) His personal skill and party manipulation

His great success can be attributed to his own political genius and the mistakes that his rivals persisted in
making. Guided ideologies though they were his opponents were primarily men of theory, Martoststs the
core, rather than men of action. Stalin, meanwhile, never enjoyed a deep understanding of Marxist theory
and was always willing to twist it to his own advantage, a habit that proved useful in the years ahead as
he repeatedly out -intrigued his supposed “comrades” within the party. As a result, Stalin rose to power
as he had an advantage over his other comrades on the Politburo. Also, Stalin showed great skill both on
the creation of a cult of “Leninism” and in the formation at his own image as “the best, the staunchest,
the truest comrade on the arms of Lenin”. (Morris : 1922 : 195 ), this stage management of Lenin` s funeral
was calculated to stop the mind of a primitive, semi-oriental people into a mood of exaltation for the new
Leninist cult given Stalin`s late conversion to Bolshevism, Drosky was at a particular disadvantage in terms
of Leninist Orthodoxy. Stalin`s other great advantage lay in the blameless orthodoxy and simplicity of his
forever private and political life. His image as the uncomplicated and dedicated pedscout, married to the
daughter of an old Bolshevik, contrasted favorably with those of his more sophisticated rivals. As
commissar for Nationalities, moreover, he could claim the successful merging of the national republics
into the union of Soviet Socialist Republic as one of the greatest achievements. As a result Stalin`s
performance at Lenin`s funeral and his reputation perpetuated his rise to power.
Stalin, on the other hand had great political skill and intuition. He had the ability to cut through the
complexities of a problem and focus on the essentials. He was an excellent judge of character, sensing
people’s weaknesses and exploiting them.

Stalin’s initial advantage was having roots in the Bolshevik Party. He had taken many boring but important
jobs as Commissar for Nationalities and that of Secretary-General. He therefore used these positions to
elect his own supporters into important posts. He even transferred supporters of his opponents to remote

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postings. The local organizations chose delegates to national Party Conferences which in turn elected the
Central Committee of the Communist Party as well as the Politburo members. By 1928, Stalin’s supporters
were numerous. This enabled Stalin to overcome the challenges of all possible rivals through 3 main
phases.

c) Weak opponents

Stalin was also able to rise to power because he had weak opponents. Trotsky had weaknesses. Firstly,
he had only joined the Bolsheviks in 1917. Therefore, he was considered a late comer (opportunist).
According to Scadding, “He had not served a long apprenticeship as others had within the party.”
Secondly, Trotsky was arrogant and insensitive. This aroused envy and resentment among the other
Politburo members. During Lenin’s illness he was bitterly critical of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Bukharin. He
accused them of having no future plan or vision. This prompted them to decide to run the country jointly
rather than having a one man show. Therefore, they worked together to prevent Trotsky from becoming
the leader. By 1924, almost all of Trotsky’s support was gone. So, he was forced to resign as Commissar
for military and naval affairs. However, he remained a member of the Politburo. Trotsky was also tricked
by Stalin at Lenin’s funeral. Stalin cabled to tell him that Lenin’s funeral was on the 26th of January instead
of the 27th. He did this because he knew that Trotsky was away in the south of Russia and would not make
it on time. As a result, Trotsky did not come and Stalin appeared as chief mourner as well as Lenin’s closest
friend. This further alienated Trotsky from the Politburo members.

Another weakness of Trotsky was his background. He was a Jew. This was a possible clue to his reluctance
because he felt inhibited by his Jewishness. Trotsky knew that, in a nation such as Russia with its deeply
ingrained anti-Semitism, his race made him an outsider. A remarkable example of his awareness of this
occurred in 1917, when Lenin offered him the post of Deputy Chairman of the Soviet government. Trotsky
rejected it on the grounds that his appointment would be an embarrassment to Lenin and the
government. ‘It would,’ he said, ‘give enemies grounds for claiming that the country was ruled by a Jew.’
It may have been similar reasoning that allowed Stalin to gain an advantage over him at the time of Lenin’s
funeral

Stalin isolated Trotsky through the ideological debate between the permanent revolution and socialism
in one country. Trotsky favoured permanent revolution which emphasizes the spread of the revolution to
the rest of Europe in order to attract foreign investment. In contrast, Stalin argued that socialism was to
be achieved only in Russia, independent of international revolution. Stalin therefore won the support of
the Communist Party as he had shown the belief in the Russian Proletariat.

Stalin also deposed Kamenev and Zinoviev between 1925 and 1927. Zinoviev made the mistake of
supporting Trotsky during the party conference in 1927. Kamenev and Zinoviev were labeled traitors and
expelled from the party. Trotsky finally went into exile where he was murdered by Stalin’s agents.
Kamenev and Zinoviev were later eliminated during the purges in the 1930s.

Bukharin was also eliminated in 1929. It was alleged that he was criticizing Stalin in private. Stalin
denounced him in the press and the Central Committee removed Bukharin from the Politburo.

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Stalin’s manipulation is also seen in his ability to hide the testament left by Lenin. The testament
emphasized on the following: A warning against Stalin as Lenin thought Stalin had too much power in his
own hands. It suggested Stalin should be removed from his post as General Secretary. Lenin was not sure
Stalin was capable of using his authority with sufficient caution. Lenin stated that he thought Trotsky was
the most capable man in the present committee. Lenin thought Trotsky was too preoccupied with the
administrative side of the work.

WHAT ENABLED STALIN TO GAIN POWER AHEAD OF TROTSKY?

Stalin Trotsky

vs

STALIN:

• He took opposition seriously

• He made efforts to build up support in the rank of the party

• Stalin’s policy of socialism in one country was favourable as it appeared to be straight forward.

• He attended Lenin’s funeral which portrayed him as loyal, symphathetic and considerate.

TROTSKY

• He did not take opposition seriously.

• Again he did not make any effort to build up support in the rank of the party.

• The policy of a permanent revolution was not favourable.

• He did not attend Lenin’s funeral which portrayed him as disloyal, unsympathetic, self-conscious
and inconsiderate.

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Why were some Bolsheviks suspicious of Trotsky’s qualities as a potential leader?

➢ Trotsky believed in permanent or world revolution. He felt Communism would not

survive unless the Communist revolution spread to other countries. The Bolsheviks preferred
Stalin’s ideas.
➢ He offended senior party members.
➢ He failed to take the opposition seriously.
➢ He did not gain their support in the party.
➢ His desire for world revolution.

An analysis of how Stalin was able to get supreme power

➢ Firstly, Stalin was able to propel himself to power because he was a clever politician who planned his
bid to power carefully. As secretary general of the communist party, Stalin had the full power of
appointment and promotion to important jobs such as secretaries of the communist party. Historians
argue that Lenin and the party had unintentionally already provided Stalin with the means of assuming
control, this is because Stalin as a bold and clever master planner used his position to replace his non-
supporters with his supporters. By this Stalin aimed to remove all opposition in the party body as he

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 had access to everyone’s files. Stalin’s move of secretly filling important positions with his supporters
shows that Lenin’s government had no clear defined methods of promotion, if it had, Stalin would
have made little progress. His attempts to rise to power would have been fully visible and therefore
preventable. Stalin’s bold move of removing all opposition in the communist party was successful
because non-Stalinist functions were unable to win majority in the government as they were always
voted out by the Stalinist supporters in the party as well as the government, thus enabled Stalin to
win a majority in the government.
➢ Stalin's master-planning and excellent quality of being patient enabled him to rise to power. The
politburo members knew Trotsky as a brilliant speaker, writer as well as the party’s best political
thinker thus it was widely expected that Trotsky would come out as leader after Lenin. The prevailing
view of party members towards Trotsky, as brilliant is an important part of any explanation of
Trotsky’s political failure and stained success. Trotsky was brilliant but arrogant, he offended the
senior members and this aroused resentment among politburo members. This clearly shows that
despite Trotsky’s many gifts and intellectual brilliance he had many weaknesses that undermined his
chances of success. As a result politburo members decided to work jointly to prevent Trotsky from
becoming a leader. No efforts were made to eliminate Stalin from his post as secretary general of the
communist party because they undermined him as they thought that he was incapable of seizing
power. They missed several chances of getting rid of Stalin as they were busy focusing on eliminating
Trotsky. This enabled Stalin to seize power as he silently and patiently filled important positions in the
communist party with his supporters.

HOW THE USSR WAS GOVERNED UNDER STALIN?

STALIN’S AIMS IN GOVERNMENT.

1. Increase industrial production (Industrial modernization)

2. Achieve self sufficiency
3. Resist foreign intervention
4. Crush internal class enemies of the kulaks/ brutal dekulakisation
5. Modernise agriculture through collectivization
6. Improve standards of living
7. Glorification of Stalin and his party
8. Press censorship
9. Introduction of new constitution
10. Increase military strength

‘Permanent Revolution’ versus ‘Socialism in One Country’ ‘Permanent Revolution’

What inspired Trotsky’s politics was his belief in ‘Permanent Revolution’, which was made up of a number
of key ideas:
• Revolution was not a single event but a permanent (continuous) process in which risings took place
from country to country.
• The events in Russia since 1917 were simply a first step towards a worldwide revolution of the
proletariat.
• Individual nations did not matter. The interests of the international working class were paramount.

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• True revolutionary socialism could be achieved in the USSR only if an international uprising took place.
Trotsky believed that the USSR could not survive alone in a hostile world. With its vast peasant population
and undeveloped proletariat, Russia would prove ‘incapable of holding her own against conservative
Europe’. He contended that the immediate task of the USSR was ‘to export revolution’. That was the only
way to guarantee its survival. It should be stressed that at no point did Trotsky call for the Soviet Union to
be sacrificed to some theoretical notion of world revolution. His argument was an opposite one: unless
there was international revolution the Soviet Union would go under. Stalin, however, ignored the subtlety
of his opponent’s reasoning. He chose to portray Trotsky as someone intent on damaging the Soviet Union

‘Socialism in One Country’

Stalin countered Trotsky’s notion of ‘Permanent Revolution’ with his own concept of ‘Socialism in One
Country’.
He meant by this that the nation’s first task was to consolidate Lenin’s Revolution and the rule of the CPSU
by turning the USSR into a modern state, capable of defending itself against its internal and external
enemies.
The Soviet Union, therefore, must work: • to overcome its present agricultural and industrial problems by
its own unaided efforts
• to go on to build a modern state, the equal of any nation in the world
• to make the survival of the Soviet Union an absolute priority, even if this meant suspending efforts to
create international revolution. Stalin used the contrast between this programme and Trotsky’s to portray
his rival as an enemy of the Soviet Union. Trotsky’s ideas were condemned as an affront to Lenin and the
Bolshevik Revolution. An image was created of Trotsky as an isolated figure, a posturing Jewish intellectual
whose vague notions of international revolution threatened the security of the Soviet Union.

POLITICAL POLICIES

Causes of Purges.

1. To consolidate power
2. To eliminate opponents in the party
3. To eliminate communist opponents in Russia
4. To eliminate stalin’s economic opponents.
5. Paranoia
a) PURGES AND SHOW TRIALS

The early purges were started in 1932 with the trial of the Ryutin group. Ryutin was a Right Communist,
who had published an attack on Stalin, describing him as ‘the evil genius who had brought the Revolution
to the verge of destruction’.Ryutin and his supporters were publicly tried and expelled from the Party.
This was the prelude to the first major purge of the CPSU by Stalin. Between 1933 and 1934 nearly one
million members, over a third of the total membership, were excluded from the Party on the grounds that
they were ‘Ryutinites’. The purge was organised by Nicolai Yezhov, Chief of the Control Commission, the
branch of the Central Committee responsible for Party discipline.

At the beginning, Party purges were not as violent or as deadly as they later became. The usual procedure
was to oblige members to hand in their Party card for checking, at which point any suspect individuals
would not have their cards returned to them. This amounted to expulsion since, without cards, members

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were denied access to all Party activities. Furthermore, they and their families then lost their privileges in
regard to employment, housing and food rations. The threat of expulsion was enough to force members
to conform to official Party policy. Under such a system, it became progressively difficult to mount
effective opposition. Despite this, attempts were made in the early 1930s to criticise Stalin, as the Ryutin
affair illustrates. These efforts were ineffectual, but they led Stalin to believe that organised resistance to
him was still possible.

The year 1934 is an important date in Stalin’s rise to absolute authority. It marks the point at which the
purges he began developed into systematic terrorising not of obvious political opponents but of
colleagues and Party members. It is difficult to explain precisely why Stalin initiated such a terror.
Historians accept that they are dealing with behaviour that sometimes went beyond reason and logic.
Stalin was deeply suspicious by nature and suffered from increasing paranoia as he grew older. Right up
to his death in 1953 he continued to believe he was under threat from actual or potential enemies. This
could be because the revolution from above caused great hardships, coercion left many wounds. Within
and outside the Party, they might dream of revenge. Party leaders rendered politically impotent might
seek to exploit the situation. So: liquidate them all in good time, destroy them and their reputations. Such
thinking on Stalin’s part meant that everyone was suspect and no one was safe. In Service’s words, Stalin
saw ‘malevolent human agency in every personal or political problem he encountered’. Purges became
not so much a series of episodes as a permanent condition of Soviet political life.

The terror was intensified after 1934 In Leningrad on 1 December when a man named Leonid Nicolaev
walked into the Communist Party headquarters and shot dead Sergei Kirov, the secretary of the Leningrad
soviet. The apparent motive was revenge: Kirov had been having an affair with the killer’s wife. But
dramatic though the incident was in itself, its significance went far beyond the tale of a jealous husband.
There is a strong probability that the murder of Kirov had been approved, if not planned, by Stalin himself.
Kirov had been a highly popular figure in the Party. A strikingly handsome Russian, he had made a strong
impression at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 and had been elected to the Politburo. He was
known to be unhappy with the speed and scale of Stalin’s industrialisation drive. He was also opposed to
extreme measures being used as a means of disciplining Party members. If organised opposition to Stalin
were to form within the Party, Kirov was the outstanding individual around whom dissatisfied members
might rally. That danger to Stalin had now been removed.

However, Stalin was quick to exploit the situation. Within two hours of learning of Kirov’s murder he had
signed a Decree against Terrorist Acts (also known as 1st December Decree). Under the guise of hunting
down those involved in Kirov’s murder, a fresh purge of the Party was begun. Stalin claimed that the
assassination had been organised by a wide circle of Trotskyites and Leftists, who must all be brought to
account. There followed a large-scale round-up of suspected conspirators, who were then imprisoned or
executed. The assassination of Kirov worsened the terror as it ushered in an era of panic and savagery.
The immediate response was the execution of 114 people, then the execution of Nikolaev and his friends;
then the arrest and imprisonment of the whole of the former Zinoviev and Kamenev tendency, close on
3,000 persons; then the mass deportation of tens of thousands of Leningrad citizens, simultaneously with
hundreds of arrests among those already deported and the opening of fresh secret trials in the prisons.

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During the 1930s, Stalin tightened his grip on the party, the government and the local organizations. By
1938, all criticism and disagreement had been driven underground. Stalin deliberately created a state of
total terror through a series of purges as his first priority.

In early 1933, the party members began to call for the breakup of collective farms, the return of powers
to the trade unions and the removal of Stalin. Stalin and his allies in the Politburo voted for a purge of
dissident party members. N. Lowe explains that “by the end of 1933, over 800 000 members had been
expelled. A further 340 000 were expelled in 1934.”

From 1936 until 1938, the campaign intensified to such an extent that it was called “The Great Terror”.
Hundreds of important officials were arrested, tortured and made to confess to all sorts of crimes.
Innocent citizens were forced to appear in a series of “show trials” at which they were invariably found
guilty and sentenced to death or Labour Camps.

Those who were executed include M.N. Ryutin, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin (Bolsheviks). They had
been helpful in the 1917 revolution. Some who also fell victim are Tukhachevsky, the army commander,
and Yagoda, the leader of the Secret Police. Members of the NKVD (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh
Del [People’s Commissariat Internal Affairs]) were also eliminated. In addition, eleven deputy Commissars
for Defence together with 75 out of 80 members of the Supreme Military Council were executed. The
navy lost all 8 of its admirals. Stalin’s control of the Soviet Union would not have been complete if the
armed services had continued as an independent force. It was essential that they be kept subservient.
Knowing that military loyalties might make a purge of the army difficult to achieve, Stalin took the
preliminary step of organising a large number of transfers within the higher ranks in order to lessen the
possibility of centres of resistance being formed when the attack came. With this accomplished, Vyshinsky
announced, in May 1937, that ‘a gigantic conspiracy’ had been uncovered in the Red Army. Marshal
Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the popular and talented Chief of General Staff, was arrested along with seven
other generals, all of whom had been ‘heroes of the Civil War’. On the grounds that speed was essential
to prevent a military coup, the trial was held immediately, this time in secret. The charge was treason;
Tukhachevsky was accused of having spied for Germany and Japan. Documentary evidence, some of it
supplied by German intelligence at the request of the NKVD, was produced in proof. The outcome was
predetermined and inevitable. In June 1937, after their ritual confession and condemnation,
Tukhachevsky and his fellow generals were shot. To prevent any chance of a military reaction, a wholesale
destruction of the Red Army establishment was undertaken. In the following 18 months:

• All 11 War Commissars were removed from office.

• Three of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union were dismissed.

• 91 of the 101-man Supreme Military Council were arrested, of whom 80 were executed.

• 14 of the 16 army commanders, and nearly two-thirds of the 280 divisional commanders, were
removed.

• Half of the commissioned officer corps, 35,000 in total, were either imprisoned or shot

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Terror also affected Captains of industry and Plant Managers of whom about 751 were eliminated in the
early 1930s. The NKVD, under Beria, hunted down numberless unknowns, notably teachers, university
lectures and engineers. S.J. Lee puts across that, “In general, everyone in the U.S.S.R lost someone in the
purges.” The purge was also a way of forcing the regions and nationalities into total subordination to
Stalin. The show trials that had taken place in Moscow and Leningrad, with their catalogue of accusations,
confessions and death sentences, were repeated in all the republics of the USSR. The terror they created
was no less intense for being localised. For example, between 1937 and 1939 in Stalin’s home state of
Georgia:

• two state prime ministers were removed

• four-fifths of the regional Party secretaries were removed from office

• thousands of lesser officials lost their posts.

This was accompanied by a wide-ranging purge of the legal and academic professions. Foreign
Communists living in the Soviet Union were not immune. Polish and German revolutionary exiles were
rounded up in scores, many of them being subsequently imprisoned or executed. The outstanding foreign
victim was Béla Kun, who was condemned and shot in 1938

The purges were successful in eliminating possible alternative leaders and in terrorizing the masses into
obedience. The Central and Local government, the army and the navy and the economic structures of the
country had been violently subdued.

Stalin used the purges to rule unchallenged with the help of his supporting clique: These are Molotov,
Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zholana, Varoshilov, Butganin, Beria, Malenka and Khrushchev until his death in
1953.

IMPACT OF PURGES
-The red army lost many of its experienced officers and it affected their military ability against the
Germany forces during the second world war.
-science and technology suffered as many intellectual scientists and engineers were persecuted.
-Quality of civil sector decreased as teachers and administrators were executed.
- elimination of older figures made Stalin promote younger man who owed their success to him. This made
them completely loyal.
b) THE CULT OF STALIN

The history of the Soviet Union was rewritten so that Lenin and Stalin were the only real heroes of the
revolution. Every Russian town had a Stalin Square or Avenue and a huge Stalin Statue in the centre. Some
cities were renamed so that they had Stalin’s name. Some of them are Stalingrad, Stalinabad, Stalinstadt,
Stalino, Stalinsk, Stalinisi, Staliniri and many others.

Poets and playwrights praised Stalin either directly or indirectly. Composers wrote music praising him. B.
Walsh notes that “all music and other arts in the U.S.S.R were carefully monitored by the N.K.V.D.” Some
of his praise names include "Great", "Beloved", "Bold", "Wise", "Inspirer", and "Genius." Some speeches
described the dictator as "Our Best Collective Farm Worker", “Father of nations”, "Brilliant Genius of

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Humanity", "Great Architect of Communism", "Gardener of Human Happiness", "Our Best of Best", and
"Our Darling, Our Guiding Star"

c) THE SECRET POLICE

The activities of the secret police, the N.K.V.D. caused disruption and relocation, famine and starvation,
repression of religious groups and incarceration within the Gulag system. According to B. Walsh, “the
Soviet people were crushed into total subjection or at least conformity by a monstrous totalitarian
system.”

The N.K.V.D. also targeted national minorities. Between 1939 and 1940, people of Poland, the Baltic
States, Bessarabia and parts of Finland were thinned out by deportation to Siberia and Central Asia. This
provided for the extensive extreme persecution of the national minorities which occurred after the
German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

d) THE CONSTITUTION

A new constitution was introduced in which everyone including ex nobles, priests, kulaks and White Army
officers were allowed to vote by secret ballot to choose members of the Supreme Soviet.

The adoption of the Constitution coincided with Stalin’s onslaught on the party. The Soviets were
reformed through a new Supreme Soviet of the Union that was based on electoral districts. The Soviet of
the Nationalities reflected the regional and ethnic composition of the country as a whole.

Stalin used the constitution as a means to appease the Russians who were being affected by the purges.
The Constitution was democratic in theory only. The elections were not progressive as there was only one
candidate to vote for in every constituency.

Even though there was mention of “universal human rights” which included freedom of speech, thought,
the press, religion, and public assembly, in reality anybody who criticized Stalin was quickly purged.

ECONOMIC POLICIES

Economic change was Stalin’s immediate priority once his authority had been confirmed. He intended to
transform the Soviet Union into a superpower by equipping it with a huge industrial base. The process
began in 1929 and continued with the interruption of war until his death in 1953.

Aims

a. Increase industrial production (Industrial modernization)

b. Achieve self sufficiency
c. Modernise agriculture through collectivization
d. Improve standards of living
e. Establish a war economy

1. INDUSTRIALIZATION

13
THE FIVE YEAR PLAN

Russian industry had been shattered during World War 1. Therefore, Stalin believed that a rapid expansion
of heavy industry was essential to enable Russia to deal with any future attack from countries that hated
communism. Stalin described his industrialisation plans for the USSR as an attempt to establish a war
economy. He declared that he was making war on the failings of Russia’s past and on the class enemies
within the nation. He also claimed that he was preparing the USSR for war against its capitalist foes
abroad.

Stalin introduced the 5 Year Plans that were intended to provide machinery to mechanize farming and
catch up with the Western World. That would make Russia less dependent on the West. It so happened
that the Soviet industrialisation drive in the 1930s coincided with the Depression in the Western world.
Stalin claimed that the USSR was introducing into its own economy the technical successes of Western
industrialisation but was rejecting the destructive capitalist system that went with them. Socialist planning
would enable the USSR to avoid the errors that had begun to undermine the Western economies.

Gosplan, the government body responsible for economic planning, was required by Stalin to draw up a
list of quotas of production ranging across the whole of Soviet industry. The process began in 1928 and,
except for the war years 1941–45, lasted until Stalin’s death in 1953. In all, there were five separate Plans:

• 1st FYP October 1928 to December 1932

• 2nd FYP January 1933 to December 1937

• 3rd FYP January 1938 to June 1941

• 4th FYP January 1946 to December 1950

• 5th FYP January 1951 to December 1955

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN.

The phase was between 1928 and 1932. It emphasized on industry such as coal, oil, iron, steel and
electricity to lay foundation for future and industrial advancement. C. Shepard reports that, “a total of
1500 new industrial plants and 100 new towns were built.” The task of the first five year plan commenced
in 1928, was nothing less than to lay the foundations for the transformation of the Soviet society into an
industrial force comparable to that of the US. Thus, its main emphasis fell upon the production of energy
and of construction materials upon coal, oil, electricity, iron steel and cement.
Successes
• The USSR increased production and created a foundation on which to build the next Five-Year
Plans.
• No matter how badly the figures may have been rigged at the time, the First FYP was an
extraordinary achievement overall. The output of coal and iron and the generation of electricity
all increased in huge proportions. The production of steel and chemicals was less impressive,
while the output of finished textiles actually declined.
• The USSR was rich in natural resources, but many of them were in remote places such as Siberia.
So whole cities were built from nothing and workers taken out to the new industrial centres.

14
 • Foreign observers marvelled as huge new steel mills appeared at Magnitogorsk in the Urals and
Sverdlovsk in central Siberia.
• New dams and hydroelectric power fed industry’s energy requirements. Russian 'experts' flooded
into the Muslim republics of central Asia such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, creating industry
from scratch in previously undeveloped areas.
• machinery output increased, oil production doubled, among others. Pig iron production actually
surpassed its target of 19.0 million tones with an actual production of 21.0 million tonnes. The
success of the first 5-year plan was summarised by Stalin himself when he said after 1932 that,
“We did not have an iron and steel industry. Now we have one. We did not have a machine tool
industry. Now we have one. We did not have a modern chemicals industry. Now we have one.
We did not have a big industry for producing agricultural machinery. Now we have one.”
Failures

The term ‘plan’ is misleading. The First FYP laid down what was to be achieved, but did not say how it was
to be done. It simply assumed the quotas would be met. What the First FYP represented, therefore, was
a set of targets rather than a plan.

As had happened with collectivisation, local officials and managers falsified their production figures to
give the impression they had met their targets when, in fact, they had fallen short. For this reason, precise
statistics for the First FYP are difficult to determine.

Most targets that were set were not met. For example the production of commodities like electricity, coal
and pig iron failed to meet the set targets in million tonnes.

A striking failure of the Plan was the low priority it gave to improving the material lives of the Soviet
people. No effort was made to reward the workers by providing them with affordable consumer goods.
Living conditions actually deteriorated in this period. Accommodation in the towns and cities remained
sub-standard. The Soviet authorities’ neglect of basic social needs was not accidental. The Plan had never
been intended to raise living standards. Its purpose was collective, not individual. It called for sacrifice on
the part of the workers in the construction of a socialist state, which would be able to sustain itself
economically and militarily against the enmity of the outside world.

A series of public trials of industrial ‘wreckers’, including a number of foreign workers, was staged to
impress upon the Party and the masses the futility of protesting against the industrialisation programme.
In 1928, in a prelude to the First FYP, Stalin claimed to have discovered an anti-Soviet conspiracy among
the mining engineers of Shakhty in the Donbass region. Their subsequent public trial was intended to
frighten the workers into line. It also showed that the privileged position of the skilled workers, the
‘bourgeois experts’, was to be tolerated no longer. This attack upon the experts was part of a pattern in
the First FYP which stressed quantity at the expense of quality. The push towards sheer volume of output
was intended to prove the correctness of Stalin’s grand economic schemes. Sheila Fitzpatrick has
described this as being an aspect of Stalin’s ‘gigantomania’, his love of mighty building projects like canals,
bridges and docks, which he regarded as proof that the USSR was advancing to greatness

Second five year plan (1933 – 1937)

15
During the Second phase, between 1933 and 1937, heavy industry remained top priority as well as railway
communications. Chemicals and metallurgy industries grew enormously.
The second five-year plan avoided some of the mistakes of the First Five Year Plan. Its average amount
target was more reasonable, a 14% increase and by virtue of a more experienced and better trained work
force. It avoided some of the waste and poor quality of 1928 – 1932. The second plan, besides the heavy
industry also focused on the improvement of Soviet communications. Railways were double tracked and
this sphere of activity produced many of the “showpieces” of this plan, such as the Moscow –Volga. Before
the end of the second plan a new circumstance began to interfere with the projections of the planners as
the deteriorating international situations diverted to rearmament. Again, the second plan achieved its
aims.

The last phase of 1938 to 1941 was cut short by the outbreak of WWII. More and more resources were
channeled into armaments, tanks, planes and weapons.

After the fighting of the Second World War there were the fourth and fifth five year plans. These had the
task of rebuilding the country from the destruction that was caused by the war. These were between 1945
and 1955. USSR at this stage had been devastated by the war. Officially, 98,000 collective farms had been
ransacked and ruined, with the loss of 137,000 tractors, 49,000 combine harvesters, 7 million horses, 17
million cattle, 20 million pigs, 27 million sheep; 25% of all capital equipment had been destroyed in 35,000
plants and factories; 6 million buildings, including 40,000 hospitals, in 70,666 villages and 4,710 towns
(40% urban housing) were destroyed, leaving 25 million homeless; about 40% of railway tracks had been
destroyed; officially 7.5 million servicemen died, plus 6 million civilians, but perhaps 20 million in all died.
In 1945, mining and metallurgy were at 40% of the 1940 levels, electric power was down to 52%, pig-iron
26% and steel 45%; food production was 60% of the 1940 level. After Poland, the USSR had been the
hardest hit by the war. Reconstruction was impeded by a chronic labor shortage due to the enormous
number of Soviet casualties in the war. Moreover, 1946 was the driest year since 1891, and the harvest
was poor.

The USA and USSR were unable to agree on the terms of a US loan to aid reconstruction, and this was a
contributing factor in the rapid escalation of the Cold War. However, the USSR did gain reparations from
Germany, and made Eastern European countries make payments in return for the Soviets having liberated
them from the Nazis. In 1949, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was set up, linking
the Eastern bloc countries economically. One-third of the fourth plan's capital expenditure was spent on
Ukraine, which was important agriculturally and industrially, and which had been one of the areas most
devastated by the war.

Third Five Year Plan (1938 – 1941)

It was introduced to prepare Russia for the war with Germany. By 1940, a third of government investments
went to the armed forces. Consumer goods were again ignored for spending on defenses. Stalin was now
focused on being protected against an invading force. An advantage of this is that the Soviet military
technology was improving, shown when GOSPLAN ordered the construction of nine new air craft factories
in 1939. Stalin took direct control of the defense industry. In doing this he ended the responsibility that
GOSPLAN had over Russia`s military economy and it is this that brought the third five year plan to an end.
Heavy industry continued to be a priority and coal production grew rapidly.

16
Assessment of the Five Year Plans

SUCCESSES

The 5 Year Plans had a positive impact as production increased. There were huge increases in the number
of railways, canals, dams (Dnieper dam), new cities and gigantic factories e.g. the Stalingrad Tractor
Works.

The 5 Year Plans were financed by the Russians themselves with no foreign investment. However,
hundreds of foreign technicians were brought in and great emphasis was placed on expanding education
in colleges and universities. They were also brought into factories to provide a whole new generation of
skilled workers.

Medals were given to workers who achieved a record output. These were known as the Stakhanovites
after Alexei Stakhanov, a champion miner who in 1935 managed to produce 102 tons of coal in a single
shift.

In judging the scale of Stalin’s achievement, it is helpful to cite such statistics relating to industrial output
during the period of the first three FYPs as are reliable. The data in Table 3.4 are drawn from the work of
the economic historian E. Zaleski, whose findings are based on careful analysis of Soviet and Western
sources

The figures indicate a remarkable increase in production overall.

• In a little over 12 years, coal production had grown five-fold, steel six-fold, and oil output had
more than doubled. Of note was the building of the city of Magnitogorsk and the White Sea Canal.
• The most impressive statistic is the one showing that electricity generation had quintupled.
• These four key products provided the basis for the military economy which enabled the USSR not
only to survive four years of German occupation but eventually to amass sufficient resources to
turn the tables and drive the German army out of Soviet territory.
• The climax of this was the Soviet invasion and defeat of Germany in May 1945.
• Workers also had some slight benefits from the 5 year plans. For example, the most famous
worker was Alexei Stakhanov. In 1935 with two helpers and an easy coal seam to work on, he
managed to cut an amazing 102 tons of coal in one shift. This was 14 times the average for a shift.

17
 Stakhanov became a 'Hero of Socialist Labour' and the propaganda machine encouraged all Soviet
workers to be Stakhanovites.
• Women also benefitted from the 5 year plans. The first Five-Year Plan revealed a shortage of
workers, so from 1930 the government concentrated on drafting more women into industry. It
set up thousands of new creches and day care centres so that mothers could work. By 1937
women were 40 per cent of industrial workers (compared to 28 per cent in 1927), 21 per cent of
building workers and 72 per cent of health workers. Four out of five new workers recruited
between 1932 and 1937 were women.
• By the late 1930s many Soviet workers had improved their conditions by acquiring well-paid
skilled jobs and earning bonuses for meeting targets. Unemployment was almost non-existent. In
1940 the USSR had more doctors per head of population than Britain. Education became free and
compulsory for all and Stalin invested huge sums in training schemes based in colleges and in the
work place.

FAILURES

However, it should be noted that, the cost of industrialization was paid by the worker.

• The workers were constantly bombarded with propaganda, posters, slogans and radio broadcasts.
They all had strict targets to meet and were fined if they did not meet them.
• Life was very harsh under Stalin. Factory discipline was strict and punishments were severe.
Lateness or absences were punished by sacking, and that often meant losing your flat or house as
well. To escape the hard work and hard discipline, some workers tried to move to other jobs, so
the secret police introduced internal passports which prevented free movement of workers inside
the USSR.
• On the great engineering projects, such as dams and canals, many of the workers were prisoners
who had been sentenced to hard labour for being political opponents, or suspected opponents,
of Stalin, or for being kulaks (rich peasants) or Jews. Many other prisoners were simply
unfortunate workers who had had accidents or made mistakes in their work but had been found
guilty of 'sabotage'.
• On these major projects conditions were appalling and there were many deaths and accidents. It
is estimated that 100,000 workers died in the construction of the Belomor Canal.
• At the same time, the concentration on heavy industry meant that there were few consumer
goods (such as clothes or radios) which ordinary people wanted to buy. In the towns and cities,
most housing was provided by the state, but overcrowding was a problem. Most families lived in
flats and were crowded into two rooms which were used for living, sleeping and eating.
• Wages actually fell between 1928 and 1937. In 1932 a husband and wife who both worked earned
only as much as one man or woman had in 1928 .
• People’s social lives were destroyed by industrialization. Stalin was also quite prepared to destroy
the way of life of the Soviet people to help industrialisation. For example, in the republics of
central Asia the influence of Islam was thought to hold back industrialisation, so between 1928

18
 and 1932 it was repressed. Many Muslim leaders were imprisoned or deported, mosques were
closed and pilgrimages to Mecca were forbidden.
• Industrilisation failed to increase agricultural productivity or to raise the living standards of the
Soviet workers. Stalin’s neglect of agriculture, which continued to be deprived of funds since it
was regarded as wholly secondary to the needs of industry, proved very damaging. The lack of
agricultural growth resulted in constant food shortages which could be met only by buying foreign
supplies. This drained the USSR’s limited financial resources.

2. AGRICULTURE

COLLECTIVIZATION

AIMS

Economic

• To destroy capitalism in agriculture.

• To supply raw materials for industrialisation
• To increase exports
• To modernise Russian agriculture

Political

• To destroy the kulaks (De-kulakisatisation)

• To consolidate Stalin’s power.
• To ensure his total control over the USSR
• To destroy the NEP

Social

• To establish socialism.
• To create labour for industries.

In short, this is all what collectivsation meant.

* Peasants were to put their lands together to form large joint farms (kolkhoz) but could keep small plots
for personal use.

* Animals and tools were to be pooled together.

* Motor Tractor Stations (MTS), provided by the government, made tractors available.

* Ninety per cent of kolkhoz produce would be sold to the state and the profits shared out.

* The remaining 10 per cent of produce was to be used to feed the kolkhoz

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Stalin judged that the only way to raise the capital needed to develop Soviet industry was to use the land.
The necessary first step towards this was the collectivisation of Russian agriculture. This involved taking
the land from the peasants and giving it all to the state. The peasants would no longer farm the land for
their own individual profit. Instead they would pool their efforts and receive a wage. Stalin calculated that
this change would allow the Soviet Union to use the collective profits from the land to finance a massive
industrialisation programme. For him, the needs of the land were always subordinate to those of industry.

Stalin defined collectivisation as ‘the setting up of collective farms and state farms in order to squeeze out
all capitalist elements from the land’. In practice, there was little difference between the two. Both types
of farm were to be the means by which private peasantownership would be ended and agriculture made
to serve the interests of the Soviet state. The plan was to group between 50 and 100 holdings into one
unit. It was believed that large farms would be more efficient and would encourage the effective use of
agricultural machinery. Indeed, the motorised tractor became the outstanding symbol of this mechanising
of Soviet farming.

Efficient farming, so ran the argument, would have two vital results. It would create surplus food supplies
that could be sold abroad to raise capital for Soviet industry. It would also decrease the number of rural
workers needed and so release workers for the new factories.

At its introduction in 1928 it was referred to as voluntary. Stalin claimed that it was the free choice of
peasants, but in practice it was enforced on a very reluctant peasantry. In a major propaganda offensive,
he identified a class of “kulaks” who were holding back the workers revolution. These “kulaks” were
defined as rich peasants who had grown wealthy under the new economic policy. They monopolized the
best land and employed cheap peasant labor to farm it By hoarding their farm produce, and maintaining
artificially high food prices, they were exploiting the needs of the workers and poorer peasants to make
themselves increasingly prosperous .
Unless they were broken as a class, they would prevent the mordenization of the U.S.S.R Starvation which
in many parts of the Soviet Union persisted throughout the 1930s was at its worst in the year 1923 – 33,
when there occurred what is best described as a national famine.

Collectivization had induced a degree of peasant despair that for a revolutionary period destroyed they
always famous stability of Russia agriculture. In large areas of the U.S.S.R, the improved peasantry had
simply stopped producing, either as an act of desperate resistance or through sheer inability to adopt to
the be widening new and violently enforced regime. So great was the was the migration from a rural to
the urban areas that a system of internal passports was introduced in an effort to control a flow. The
communist regime believed that collectivization would improve agricultural productivity would improve
agricultural productivity and would produce grain reserve sufficiently large to feed the growing urban
labor. The anticipated surplus was to pay for industrialization. Collectivization was further expected to
free many peasants for industrial work the cities and to enable the party to afford its political dominance
over the remaining peasantry. During the period of collectivization, some one million kulak households
were deported and never heard from again. As a result, the remaining peasants had collectivization forced
on theme and this resulted in a disastrous disruption of agricultural productivity and a catastrophic famine
in 1923-1933. Although the five- year plan called for a collectivization of only 20% peasant households. By
1940 approximately 97% of all peasant households had been collectivized and private ownership of
property almost entirely eliminated. Forced collectivization helped achieve Stalin's goal of rapid
industrialization, but the human costs were incalculable. Unfortunately, also, the “kulaks” did not warmly

20
accept the collectivization method. Their ruthless attack led to a civil war in the Ukraine were the “kulaks”
murdered the communist agents and reprisal hundreds of “kulaks” were herded by the police into forced
labor camps. The “kulaks” also deliberately destroyed crops and farm buildings. By 1932, the government
had won the opponents in Russia and, (Peacock:1982:313),”the collective farm in Russia had come to
stay.” This shows Stalin's ruthlessness and how her imposed such an act on his people. By 1940,the
peasants had accepted the collective system and were
working it with reasonable efficiency.

SUCCESSES.

• Capitalism was destroyed in agriculture. By 1934 there were no kulaks left.

• Russian agriculture was also modernized. Russian agriculture had barely moved on in methods
from mediaeval times; the wooden plough was the order of the day. With collectivization modern
equipment was introduced. As a result, Russian agriculture was mechanized especially with the
use of tractors.
• By 1941 almost all agricultural land was organized under the collective system. Stalin had achieved
his aim of collectivisation.
• Party control over the countryside was established and private ownership was destroyed. Land
was nationalized and production targets and delivery quotas were as set by the state.
• It also helped to bring urbanisation. The hard fact is that Stalin’s policies did force a large number
of peasants to leave the land. This was a process that Russia needed. Economic historians have
often stressed that there was a land crisis in Russia which predated Communism. Since the
nineteenth century, land in Russia had proved incapable of supporting the growing number of
people who lived unproductively on it. Unless a major shift occurred in the imbalance between
urban and rural dwellers Russia would be in sustained difficulties. The nation needed to change
from an agricultural and rural society to an urban and industrial one. This helped to relieve the
pressure on the land and provided the workforce which enabled the industrialisation programme
to be started. Perhaps all this could be summed up by saying that Stalin’s aims were
understandable but his methods were unacceptable. He did the wrong thing for the right reason.

FAILURES

a) It was met with resistance. For example, In the period between December 1929 and March 1930,
nearly half the peasant farms in the USSR were collectivised. Yet peasants in their millions
resisted. What amounted to civil war broke out in the countryside. There were 30,000 arson
attacks occurred as well as organised rural mass disturbances increased by one-third from 172 to
229. This also included women. For example, In Okhochaya, a village in Ukraine, women broke
into barns where the requisition squads had dumped grain seized from the peasants. There were
cases of mothers with their children being in the front line of demonstrations and of women lying
down in front of the tractors and trucks sent to break up the private farms and impose
collectivisation on the localities. The majority of peasants ate their seed corn and slaughtered
their livestock. There were no crops left to reap or animals to rear

21
 b) It resulted in famine. Even as starvation set in, the little grain that was available was being
exported as ‘surplus’ to obtain the foreign capital that industry demanded. By 1932 the situation
on the land was catastrophic. Starvation, which in many parts of the Soviet Union persisted
throughout the 1930s, was at its worst in the years 1932–33, when a national famine occurred.
Collectivisation led to despair among the peasants. In many areas they simply stopped producing,
either as an act of desperate resistance or through sheer inability to adapt to the violently
enforced land system. Hungry and embittered, they made for the towns in huge numbers. It had,
of course, been part of Stalin’s collectivisation plan to move the peasants into the industrial
regions.
c) Decline in agricultural production. For example, areas such as Ukraine and Kazhakstan suffering
particularly severely. In Kazhaks in this period they lost nearly 90 per cent of their livestock.
Despite severe reprisals and coercion, the peasants were unable to produce the surplus food that
Stalin demanded. By 1939 Soviet agricultural productivity had barely returned to the level
recorded for tsarist Russia in 1913. As a result, there was man-made famine, which in the 1930s
killed between 10 and 15 million peasants.

SOCIAL POLICIES

HOW FAR DID THE RUSSIAN SOCIETY CHANGE BECAUSE OF STALIN’S REGIME?

1. HEALTH

In 1918 Lenin’s Bolshevik government had set up the People’s Commissariat of Health. Its aim was nothing
less than to provide a free health service for all the people. The Commissariat continued to operate in
Stalin’s time with the same objective. But, from the beginning, the sad fact was that Soviet Russia never
had the resources to match its intentions. The disruptions of the civil war period made it impossible to
develop a structured health service on the lines originally envisaged. Things picked up in the better
economic conditions produced by the NEP. Infant mortality dropped and the spread of contagious
diseases was checked. But famine remained a constant threat.

In the 1930s, the collectivisation policy enforced by Stalin created the largest famine in Russian history.
This made the worst hit areas – Ukraine and Kazakhstan – places of death and disease. Such was the scale

22
of the horror that the existing health services in those regions simply could not cope. There was also the
chilling fact that since Stalin refused to acknowledge that there was a famine, no real effort was made by
the central government to deal with its consequences.

However, in the unaffected areas in the 1930s there was a genuine advance in health standards. The
number of qualified doctors and nurses increased and, while the benefits of this may not have reached
the majority of the population, there were spectacular successes which were made much of in Stalinist
propaganda. Sanatoria, for the treatment of tuberculosis, and rest and retirement homes for the workers,
were created. There were even holiday centres in such places as Yalta on the Black Sea where selected
workers were sent as a reward for their efforts.

However, the number who enjoyed such treatment was a tiny fraction of the workforce. The main
beneficiaries of improved medical care were not ordinary Russians but Party members and the
nomenklatura. It was one of the privileges of belonging to the political establishment.

The idea of health for all was never abandoned, but it proved difficult to maintain it as a priority during
the headlong push for industrial growth in the 1930s. It is true that factories and plants were urged to
provide crèches so that more mothers with young children could be employed, but this was done primarily
to meet the needs of industry not those of the mother. Childcare at the factories was regimented by such
measures as the requirement that breast feeding took place at a given time so as not to interfere with
production. One positive result of Stalin’s insistence that Soviet women see their primary role as mothers
producing babies for the nation was the setting up of clinics and a general improvement in the standards
of midwifery and gynaecology.

The impact of living conditions on health

A major barrier to improved public health was the lack of living space for most Soviet families. Nearly all
workers lived in overcrowded apartments. Public housing policy had led to the building of a large number
of tenement blocks in towns and cities. These were usually five-storey structures with no lifts. Quite apart
from their grey, depressing appearance, they were a hazard to health. So great was the overcrowding that
it was common for young families to live with their in-laws, and equally common for four or five families
to share a single lavatory and a single kitchen, which was often no more than an alcove with a gas-ring.
There were rotas for the use of these facilities. Queuing to use the lavatory or to cook was part of the
daily routine. Such teeming conditions did not necessarily mean a dramatic number of deaths but it did
seriously lower the quality of life and made the spread of milder infections such as the common cold and
influenza, and contagions like ring-worm and head-lice, extremely difficult to control

2. WOMEN AND FAMILY

In keeping with their Marxist rejection of marriage as a bourgeois institution, Lenin’s Bolsheviks had made
divorce easier and had attempted to liberate women from the bondage of children and family. As a result
of this, by the end of the 1930s the Soviet divorce rate was the highest in Europe, running at one divorce
for every two marriages. However, this was reversed as women and family now received Stalin’s attention.
He began to stress the value of the family as a stabilising influence in society. He let it be known that he

23
did not approve of the sexual freedoms that had followed the 1917 Revolution, claiming, with some
justification, that Lenin himself had disapproved of the free love movement that had developed around
such figures as Alexandra Kollontai. Stalin argued that a good Communist was a socially responsible one,
who took the duties of parenthood and family life seriously: ‘a poor husband and father, a poor wife and
mother, cannot be good citizens. Stalin’s first major move came in June 1936 with a decree that reversed
much of earlier Bolshevik social policy concerning women and family:

• unregistered marriages were no longer recognised

• divorce was made more difficult

• right to abortion severely restricted

• the family declared to be the basis of Soviet society

• homosexuality outlawed

The effect of Stalin’s policies on women and the family was mixed. The radical measures gave women
more chances to make their own decisions. In Muslim areas, women were also protected from traditional
customs like polygamy and were able to dispense with the veil.

Women were also encouraged to seek formal employment.

Women were given more rights such as encouraging them to work and also to be a housewife. Women
rights such as allowing to work in factories benefitted the economy and this was Stalin’s main focus.
EDUCATION

The initial attitudes of Lenin and the Bolsheviks when they came to power were shaped by their general
desire to reject bourgeois standards. In the field of education this led to an attack on book learning and
traditional academic subjects. For a brief period text books were thrown away, exams abolished, and
schools either shut altogether or opened only for a limited number of days. Young people were
encouraged to learn trades and engage in activities that were of practical value.

However, by the time Stalin came to power it was generally accepted that the dismissal of the old ways
had gone too far. As in so many areas of Russian life, Stalin reversed the trends initiated by the Bolsheviks
after 1917. His driving aim was to modernise the Soviet Union and he believed that to achieve this the
population, especially the young, must be made literate

One of the greatest achievements of the Stalin regime was the expansion of free mass education. At first,
Stalin adopted the Leninist approach of a relaxed discipline and group activity in school based on Marxist
ideas. Stalin encouraged all children aged 8 to enroll in school. Formal education was made a priority. The
need for discipline and order was stressed. It made little sense to insist on strict rules of conduct for
workers in the factories, if schools allowed pupils to behave in a free and easy manner. The education
system must develop the same serious, committed attitude that prevailed in the workplace Many new
training colleges were set up to train the generation of teachers and lecturers. However, the increase in
access to education resulted in problems of declining quality.

24
Key features of the education system developed under Stalin

• Ten years of compulsory schooling for all children.

• Core curriculum laid down: reading, writing, mathematics, science, history, geography, Russian (and for
the national minorities their native language), Marxist theory.

• State-prescribed text books to be used. • Homework to be a regular requirement.

• State-organised tests and examinations.

• School uniforms made compulsory (girls were obliged to have their hair in pigtails).

• Fees to be charged for the last three years (ages 15–18) of non-compulsory secondary schooling. The
emphasis on regulation was not accidental. The intention behind these requirements, which were
introduced during the 1930s, was to create a disciplined, trained generation of young people fully ready
to join the workforce which was engaged through the Five-Year Plans in constructing the new Communist
society.

Results of the reforms

The results of these education policies were impressive:

• Between 1929 and 1940 the number of children attending school rose from 12 million to 35 million.

• By 1939, schooling for 8- to 14-year-olds had become universal in the urban areas.

• Between 1926 and 1940 the literacy rate for the population over the age of nine increased from 51 per
cent to 88 per cent

Universities

In intellectual terms, the Soviet Union’s most prestigious institution was the Academy of Sciences. Based
on the famed tsarist Imperial Academy, it became in the new Russia an umbrella body incorporating all
the major research organisations, some 250 in number with over 50,000 individual members. The term
‘sciences’ translates broadly to cover all the main intellectual and scientific streams: the arts, agriculture,
medicine, management. All the major scholars in their fields were academicians. In 1935 the Academy
was brought under direct government control. In return for increased academic and social privileges, it
pledged itself totally to Stalin in his building of the new Communist society. What this meant in practice
was that all the academicians would henceforth produce work wholly in keeping with Stalinist values.
They would become politically correct.

4. RELIGION

Lenin, Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders were atheists. They accepted Marx’s claim that religion was
merely an invention of the ruling classes to keep the people docile and under control. Marx pointed out
that religion is “the opium of the masses.”

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At first, Stalin’s regime was tolerant towards religious groups as many priests were sympathetic towards
Communist ideals. Relations soon deteriorated in the mid-1930s when many priests became opposed to
collectivization.

Stalin secretly instructed local party organizations to attack churches and priests. Hundreds of churches
and cemeteries were vandalized. Thousands of priests were killed. All religious denominations were
affected by the purges. According to N. Lowe, “the number of working priests fell from about 60 000 in
1925 to under 6 000 by 1941.”

The slaughter of the clergy was not confined to Christians only. Hundreds of Muslim and Jewish leaders
also fell victim. The campaign was relentless such that by 1941, only one in 40 church buildings was still
functioning as a place of worship.

Historians argue that Stalin banned religious worship as he wanted people to have loyalty only to him. A
league of the godless was formed in the process. According to B. Walsh, “belief in God and the words of
priests had to be replaced by the belief in Communism and the worship of its leaders.”

5. THEATRE, ART AND MUSIC

The years 1928-1931 became known as “the Cultural Revolution” when the regime began to mobilize
writers, artists and musicians to wage a cultural war against bourgeois intellectuals. Stalin replaced all
non-Communist writers’ organizations whom he accused of publishing anti-Soviet works abroad.

Stalin himself sometimes read novels in type scripts and would add comments which the authors were
expected to take note of. In the late 1930s, many writers were arrested and kept in labour for long periods
or even executed.

Theatre people also came under attack. A number of actors, actresses, and ballet dancers were sent to
Labour camps. A classified example was the arrest of Meyerhold who was tortured and later shot together
with his wife.

Artists, sculptors and musicians were all expected to play their part in “social realism.” Paintings were
expected to portray scenes from the revolution, the civil war or revolutionary leaders.

Cinemas increased in numbers but not all films found favour with Stalin who became obsessed that he
vetted many scripts himself. S.J. Lee points out that, “He had to be satisfied that they successfully put over
the message that life in the U.S.S.R. was happier in every way than elsewhere in the world.”

6. CULT OF PERSONALITY

One of the things that Stalin had been attacked for was that he had indulged in the cult of personality.
Stalin dominated every aspect of Soviet life, so that he became not simply a leader but the embodiment
of the nation itself. Similarly, the Communist Party became indistinguishable from Stalin himself as a
person. Communism was no longer a set of theories; it was no longer Leninism. It was whatever Stalin
said and did. Soviet Communism was Stalinism.

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From the 1930s on, Stalin’s picture began to appear everywhere. Every newspaper, book and film, no
matter what its theme, carried a reference to Stalin’s greatness. Every achievement of the USSR was
credited to Stalin. Such was his all-pervasive presence that Soviet Communism became personalised
around him. On occasion, in private, Stalin protested that he did not seek the glorification he received
but, significantly, he made no effort to prevent it. Ironically, in view of his later denunciation of Stalin, it
was Khrushchev who did as much as anyone to promote the image of Stalin as a glorious hero. At the trial
of Zinoviev and Kamenev in August 1936, he cursed the defendants as ‘Miserable pigmies!’ and went on:
They lifted their hands against the greatest of all men, our wise vozhd, Comrade Stalin. Thou, Comrade
Stalin, has raised the great banner of Marxism–Leninism high over the entire world and carried it forward.
We assure thee, Comrade Stalin, that the Moscow Bolshevik organisation will increase Stalinist vigilance
still more, will extirpate the Trotskyite–Zinovievite clique and close the ranks of the party around the great
Stalin.”

Khrushchev was the first to coin the term ‘Stalinism’ in 1936 at the introduction of the new Soviet
Constitution: ‘Our constitution is the Marxism–Leninism–Stalinism that has conquered one sixth of the
globe.’ At the trial of Pyatakov and others, before an audience calculated by Pravda as being 200,000 in
number, Khrushchev declared: By lifting their hands against Comrade Stalin they lifted them against all
the best that humanity possesses. For Stalin is hope, Stalin is expectation; he is the beacon that guides all
progressive mankind. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!

At the 18th Congress of the CPSU in March 1939, Khrushchev lauded the Soviet leader as ‘our great
inspiration, our beloved Stalin’, extolling him as ‘the greatest genius of humanity, teacher and vozhd who
leads us towards Communism’

7. PROPAGANDA

The cult of personality was not a spontaneous response of the people. It did not come from below; it was
imposed from above. The image of Stalin as hero and saviour of the Soviet people was manufactured. It
was a product of the Communist Party machine which controlled all the main forms of information –
newspapers, cinema and radio. Roy Medvedev, a Soviet historian, who lived through Stalinism, later
explained: Stalin did not rely on terror alone, but also on the support of the majority of the people;
effectively deceived by cunning propaganda, they gave Stalin credit for the successes of others and even
for ‘achievements’ that were in fact totally fictitious.

Worship of Stalin

Despite the Soviet attack on the Church, the powerful religious sense of the Russian people remained and
it was cleverly exploited by the authorities. Traditional worship with its veneration of the saints, its icons,
prayers and incantations, translated easily into the new regime. Stalin became an icon. This was literally
true. His picture was carried on giant flags in processions. A French visitor watching at one of the May Day
celebrations in Moscow’s Red Square was staggered by the sight of a fly-past of planes all trailing huge
portraits of Stalin. ‘My God!’ he exclaimed. ‘Exactly, Monsieur,’ said his Russian guide.

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However, even May Day came to take second place to the celebration of Stalin’s birthday each December.
Beginning in 1929 on his fiftieth birthday, the occasion was turned each year into the greatest celebration
in the Soviet calendar. Day-long parades in Red Square of marching troops, rolling tanks, dancing children
and applauding workers, all presided over by an occasionally smiling Stalin high on a rostrum overlooking
Lenin’s tomb, became the high moment of the year. It was a new form of tsar worship

Stalin’s wisdom and brilliance were extolled daily in Pravda and Isvestiya, the official Soviet newspapers.
Hardly an article appeared in any journal that did not include the obligatory reference to his greatness.
Children learned from their earliest moments to venerate Stalin as the provider of all good things. At
school they were taught continually and in all subjects that Stalin was their guide and protector. It was an
interesting aspect of the prescribed school curriculum that history was to be taught not as ‘an abstract
sociological scheme’ but as a chronological story full of stirring tales of the great Russian heroes of the
past, such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, leading up to the triumph of Lenin and the Bolsheviks
in 1917. The climax of this story was Stalin, who, building on the work of Lenin, was securing and extending
the Soviet Union. This adulation of Stalin was not confined to history books. There were no text books in
any subject that did not praise the virtues of Stalin, the master builder of the Soviet nation, inspiration to
his people and glorious model for struggling peoples everywhere.

Eulogies of Stalin poured off the press, each one trying to outbid the other in its veneration of the leader.
Typical of the tone and contents was an official biography published by a group of Soviet writers in 1947:
Stalin guides the destinies of a multi-national Socialist state. His advice is taken as a guide to action in all
fields of Socialist construction. His work is extraordinary for its variety; his energy truly amazing. The range
of questions which engage his attention is immense. Stalin is wise and deliberate in solving complex
political questions where a thorough weighing of pros and cons is required. At the same time, he is a
supreme master of bold revolutionary decisions and of swift adaptations to changed conditions. Stalin is
the Lenin of today

Komsomol

A particularly useful instrument for the spread of Stalinist propaganda was Komsomol, a youth movement
which had begun in Lenin’s time but was created as a formal body in 1926 under the direct control of the
CPSU. Among its main features were:

• It was open to those aged between 14 and 28 (a Young Pioneer movement existed for those under 14).

• It pledged itself totally to Stalin and the Party (in this regard it paralleled the Hitler Youth in Nazi
Germany).

• Membership was not compulsory but its attraction to young people was that it offered them the chance
of eventual full membership of the CPSU with all the privileges that went with it.

• It grew from two million members in 1927 to 10 million in 1940.

The idealism of the young was very effectively exploited by Stalin’s regime. Komsomol members were
among the most enthusiastic supporters of the Five-Year Plans, as they proved by going off in their

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thousands to help build the new industrial cities such as Magnitogorsk. It was Komsomol who provided
the flag-wavers and the cheerleaders and who organised the huge gymnastic displays that were the
centre-pieces of the massive parades on May Day and Stalin’s birthday. Every political gathering was a
study in the advancement of the Stalin cult. The exaggeration and the sycophantic character of it all is
clear in the following extract from a speech given by a delegate to the Seventh Congress of Soviets in 1935

FOREIGN POLICY

AIMS

To achieve security for the USSR against Germany invasion.

To attain political recognition by the powerful western nations

To spread communism to the rest of the world

In the 1930s, Stalin, pessimistic about the prospects for revolution in Europe and having burnt his
fingers in China when he tried an alliance with the national bourgeoisie, went for "socialism in one
country." The 1930s saw the industrialization of Russia at a forced tempo and the concomitant
collectivization of agriculture, with all the horrors engendered by that policy. During the early 1930s,
Stalin for all intents and purposes followed an "isolationist" policy in foreign affairs.

The diplomatic isolation practiced by the Soviet Union in the early 1930s seemed ideologically justified
by the Great Depression; world capitalism appeared destined for destruction. To aid the triumph of
communism, Stalin resolved to weaken the moderate social democrats of Europe, the communists'
rivals for working-class support. Conversely, the Comintern ordered the Communist Party of Germany
to aid the anti-Soviet National Socialist German Workers' Party (the Nazi Party) in its bid for power in
the hopes that a Nazi regime would exacerbate social tensions and produce conditions that would lead
to a communist revolution in Germany. Stalin thus shares responsibility for Hitler's rise to power in 1933
and its tragic consequences for the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

Events outside the Soviet Union, however, would not permit such a policy for long. The Japanese had
moved into Manchuria in 1931 and were pushing hard against the borders of the U.S.S.R. and its
satellite, Outer Mongolia. Hitler came to power in Germany, and even a cursory perusal of Mein Kampf
was enough to show his ambitions vis-á-vis the Ukraine. To any Russian leader, Tsar or Commissar, the
worst of all possible worlds is one in which both ends of the empire are under hostile pressure. Sheer
logistics makes a two-front war a Russian nightmare. Under these conditions Stalin opted for "collective
security" with Britain and France and went so far as to join the League of Nations, hitherto referred to
in Moscow as the nest of capitalist bandits. The Comintern now directed the various Communist parties
to ally with any group that was "antifascist," be it the Kuomintang, the British Tories, or the French
bourgeoisie.

The dynamics of Soviet foreign relations changed drastically after Stalin recognized the danger posed
by Nazi Germany. From 1934 through 1937, the Soviet Union tried to restrain German militarism by
building coalitions hostile to fascism. In the international communist movement, the Comintern
adopted the popular front policy of cooperation with socialists and liberals against fascism, thus
reversing its line of the early 1930s. In 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, where
Maksim M. Litvinov, the commissar of foreign affairs, advocated disarmament and collective security

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against fascist aggression. In 1935 the Soviet Union concluded defensive military alliances with France
and Czechoslovakia, and from 1936 to 1939 it gave assistance to antifascists in the Spanish Civil War.
The menace of fascist militarism to the Soviet Union increased when Germany and Japan (itself a threat
to Soviet Far Eastern territory in the 1930s) signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. But the West
proved unwilling to counter German provocative behavior, and after France and Britain acquiesced to
Hitler's demands for Czechoslovak territory at Munich in 1938, Stalin abandoned his efforts to forge a
collective security agreement with the West.

International events of the late 1930s showed the power of external ideologies and threats. Waiting for
impending war was literally poured into the air, sounded in the official appeal: "Every young person
must continually bear in mind that our country is in a hostile environment. Strengthening national
defense, relentless mastery of military equipment, assistance in active radical improvement work
osoaviahimovskih and athletic organizations, mobilization readiness of the sacred duty of each and
every young Komsomol member.

So this ideologey was interpreted at the local level: "Let them remember the Nazis as Stalin says, we
want peace, but we are not afraid of threats and will respond double blow for blow warmongers. Let
the Germans will remember these words of Comrade Stalin, and shoved his pig snouts into our Soviet
garden...."

Report by Joseph Stalin, General Secretary, to the Plenum ( Plenary Session ) of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 3, 1937. "Capitalist encirclement -- that is no empty
phrase; that is a very real and unpleasant feature. Capitalist encirclement means that here is one
country, the Soviet Union, which has established the socialist order on its own territory and besides this
there are many countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to carry on a capitalist mode of life and
which surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity to attack it, break it, or at any rate to
undermine its power and weaken it. "

Convinced now that the West would not fight Hitler, Stalin decided to come to an understanding with
Germany. Signaling a shift in foreign policy, Viacheslav Molotov, Stalin's loyal assistant, replaced
Litvinov (who was Jewish) as commissar of foreign affairs in May 1939. Hitler, who had decided to attack
Poland despite the guarantees of Britain and France to defend that country, soon responded to the
changed Soviet stance. While Britain and France dilatorily attempted to induce the Soviet Union to join
them in pledging to protect Poland, the Soviet Union and Germany engaged in intensive negotiations.
The product of the talks between the former ideological foes--the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of
August 23, 1939--shocked the world. The open provisions of the agreement pledged absolute neutrality
in the event one of the parties should become involved in war, while a secret protocol partitioned
Poland between the parties and assigned Romanian territory as well as Estonia and Latvia (and later
Lithuania) to the Soviet sphere of influence. With his eastern flank thus secured, Hitler began the
German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939; Britain and France declared war on Germany two
days later. World War II had begun.

The moral of Ulam's tale from Brest Litovsk to the present would seem to be that when the security of
the Soviet regime is in danger, ideological enemies are welcome as allies. Nowhere was this better
demonstrated than during the 1939-41 period. By early 1939, Stalin lost confidence in his British and
French allies and in rapid order signed the notorious Soviet-Nazi Pact (August 1939) and an agreement
with Japan (spring of 1940). He then sat back to watch the slaughter as the fascist and the democratic

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capitalists made mincemeat of each other. In June 1941, however, his Nazi "friends" proved to be even
more Machiavellian than he, and Stalin had no other recourse than to seek help from the democracies.

Ulam points out that a Communist regime had more to worry about than just the security of the nation.
It also had the problem of maintaining the leader's personal regime within the nation. Thus Stalin in the
first eighteen months of the war with the Germans could not afford to trade space for time recklessly-
he had to sacrifice millions of soldiers in an effort to minimize the German penetration as much as
possible. German errors, Allied aid, and, to give the devil his due, Stalin's fortitude enabled the regime
to survive the Great Fatherland War and emerge victorious.

The Comintern, instrument of a world-wide Moscow-guided revolution, was an eyesore to the

democratic allies; on the other hand, Stalin's hope and conviction that, under the guidance of the
Comintern, popular uprisings would break out in any country that dared to wage war on the Soviet
Union, had been deceived. In the spring of 1943, when the German armies were beginning to retreat
and foreign emigre Communist leaders in Moscow were preparing to return to their own countries to
take over control of Soviet-satellite governments, the open subordination of these leaders to the
Comintern in Moscow was only too obvious. The result was the dissolution of the Communist
International after 24 years of existence. But Stalin never really intended to dissolve this useful
organization. For a time, it continued unofficially to exist, and remained highly active.

SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE FOREIGN POLICY

SUCCESSES

• In 1932, the USSR signs peace pacts with Finland, the three Baltic states, France, Italy and
Poland. The fact that powers such as France and Italy are interested in signing a peace treaty
with the USSR is clearly a success for Stalin. It confirms that these countries have recognized
the USSR as both a nation and a possible threat.
• In 1934, the USSR joins the League of Nations. This is a success, because being let into the league
of nations after being rejected from it in 1920 means that the other powers that are part of the
league have recognized the USSR as a thriving nation in the east.
• In 1935, the USSR signs an assistance pact with Czechoslovakia and France, which means that
France and the USSR will help in case of an invasion. This is a success, because it strengthens
the Franco-Russian relationship. France was one of the main economic powers back then, so
significant progress has been made for trade alliances or similar pacts in the future.
• In 1936, Stalin intervenes in the Spanish civil war. After having to suffer great losses and
realizing that promoting left-side views in other nations might not be liked by the UK and
France, he pulls his troops out of Spain and lets Franco’s fascists win the war and take over the
country. Historians have been arguing whether or not these were his intentions, however, this
matches with Stalin not supporting a World Wide Revolution but rather sticking to socialism in
one country. Also one could argue whether this was indeed a success or rather a failure of
Stalin’s foreign policy. Seeing that the losses he suffered did not really affect Stalin not meeting
his aim of military strength as much as successfully beating Franco’s fascists in the civil war and
raising awareness of a world wide revolution in the UK and in France would have affected his
overall goal of security and not being invaded. The UK in particular would not have welcomed
this, seeing that the Zinoviev-Letter which was found by the UK suggested a Communist
Revolution in Great Britain. The German foreign minister Ribentropp travels to Moscow in 1939
to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact which says that Germany and the USSR will stay at peace with one

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 another for the next ten years.

• Also, in a secret part of the treaty, Poland is divided up between the two nations, and Germany
lets the USSR have the Baltic states. This led Stalin to believe that his foreign Policy was
successful, and that he had effectively managed to avoid the threat of a German invasion. The
signing of this pact could be deemed a success to some extent, however seeing that Germany
invaded the USSR only two years later could be argued to be a failure. One could say that the
Nazis were to invade the USSR anyway, and thus the Molotov-Ribentropp pact actually allowed
for more time to further armament and to develop the USSR’s heavy industries. Ultimately this
might have given the USSR the upper hand and the necessary strength to win the war against
Germany, which makes the signing of the pact a success.

FAILURES

• In 1933, Hitler comes to Power in Germany and cancels the Rapallo Treaty. This is a failure,
because the Rapallo Treaty was a treaty of friendship and economic assistance with the USSR.
First signs of Hitler not sympathizing with the USSR are now seen.
• In 1938, the USSR was left out of the Munich Conference, where the Sudetenland
(Czechoslovakia) was given to Germany (in violation of Versailles) by the UK and France. This was
a failure of Stalin’s foreign policy, because it clearly shows that the USSR was disregarded and
not recognized as a necessary member of the conference. However, one could argue that this
isn’t a failure because the USSR would have disagreed with Germany taking the Sudetenland due
to the assistance pact with the Czechs, but then again, France signed the pact too, why would
the USSR not let Germany take the Sudetenland, both countries were scared of a possible
German invasion and didn’t want to give the Nazis reason for one. After the conference took
place Stalin realized that Germany was expanding eastwards and that he needed to find a deal
with Germany.

• After the Nazi-Soviet pact was signed, Stalin supported the Germans with resources. This is a
failure, because the Germans eventually invaded the USSR and Stalin could have used the
resources to strengthen his own industry and military. One could argue that this prevented the
Germans from invading earlier, however one would be speculating about only a couple of weeks.
Also, Stalin increased the amount of resources given to Germany after the annexation of France
because he wanted to sympathize with Germany, and that hurt his own industry even more.

Overall Conclusion: Stalin’s foreign policy up until 1941 was successful to some extent, because he avoided
a German invasion until he developed the USSR far enough to survive it (after having to suffer from heavy
casualties). He also met his sub-aims of military and industrial strength and recognition by other countries.
They were achieved by signing pacts with other nations, forming trade alliances and not promoting a
world-wide revolution. Historians have argued that Stalin’s foreign policy was not successful because
Germany invaded the USSR, however, Hitler stated that he wished to annex parts of the USSR in his
manifesto “Mein Kampf“ earlier, so a German invasion was predestined to happen, regardless of what
Stalin did.

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