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Johnson v. m'intosh Facts: Plaintiff claims title to land that he got from Indian chiefs in 1773 and in 1775. The Indian chiefs were working under the proper authority of their tribes when they sold their lands to the plaintiff. Issue: Do the U.S. courts recognize Indians sale of titles of land to private individuals? Holding: No Rationale: The Europeans conquered the land from the Indians and Indians were only given the occupancy rights and they were never given the right to sell their land. According to the court, absolute property rights cannot be shared by 2 different entities. Therefore, England originally enjoyed the absolute property rights to the lands in question and the Indians only enjoyed the occupancy rights to the land. After the Revolutionary War, England transferred these absolute rights to the United States. Therefore, the Indian chiefs did not enjoy the right to sell the land to private individuals.

Pierson v. post Facts Post (P) was in pursuit of a fox while hunting with his hounds. Pierson (D) killed and captured the fox despite knowing that Post had been pursuing it. Neither party owned the land on which they were hunting. Post brought suit in trespass on the case, contending that he acquired title to the fox when he began to hunt it. Pierson asserted that Post did not have control over the fox and therefore had not acquired any property interest in it. The trial court entered judgment for Post and the plaintiff appealed. Issue Does the mere fact that a person is pursuing a wild animal grant that person a right to the animal? Holding and Rule No. The mere fact that a person is pursuing a wild animal does not grant that person a right to the animal. In order to obtain title to a ferae naturae (wild animal) a person must take it. The first to kill and capture is the superior rule of law. Had Post mortally wounded the animal, it would have been sufficient to show possession since this would have deprived the animal of its natural liberty. However, the plaintiff was only able to show pursuit and therefore acquired no property interest in the animal. Disposition Reversed.

2 Dissent The death of a fox is a matter of public interest. As a matter of public policy our decision should offer the greatest possible encouragement to the destruction of this animal. Because it was nearly certain that Post would have captured the fox the judgment should be affirmed. Notes The dissent sought to reward the pursuer for his effort. The majority rule however is very easy to administer. See Paradine v. Jane for another property law case brief involving an issue of possession in connection with a lease of real estate. Ghen v. rich Facts Plaintiff Ghen killed a whale at sea leaving his identifying bomb-lance in the whale. The custom and usage in the whaling industry in Cape Cod had been that one who kills a whale using a specially marked bomb lance owns the whale. If such a whale were found on a beach the finder would notify the killer and receive a finders fee. The whale later washed up on shore 17 miles away and was discovered by Ellis. Ellis knew or should have known of the custom and usage of the whaling industry regarding the finding of a lost whale killed by another. Ellis sold the whale at auction to defendant Rich who then shipped off the blubber. Ghen discovered the fate of the whale and initiated a libel action against Rich to recover the value of the whale. Issues Can the court look to custom and usage within an industry to determine the rule of law regarding the ownership of property? Who is the owner of a whale that was harpooned and then found on shore by another? Holding and Rule Yes. The court can look to custom and usage within an industry to determine the rule of law regarding the ownership of property. The party who harpoons the whale is the owner even if it is later discovered on the shore by another. The rule that the killer of a whale is the rightful owner has been recognized and acquiesced in for many years and embraces an entire industry. The rule requires the first taker to do all that is possible under the circumstances and offers reasonable salvage to the finder for securing or reporting the property. Unless it is sustained, the whaling industry must necessarily cease, for no person would engage in it if the fruits of his labor could be appropriated by a chance finder.

3 Disposition Judgment for plaintiff Ghen. See Pierson v. Post for another property law case brief involving an issue of property rights in animals ferae naturae, i.e. animals that are wild by nature and not domesticated. Keeble v. hickeringill Facts: Keeble (P) placed duck decoys and nets in a pond on his land and sold the captured ducks for profit. Hickeringill fired guns near Keebles land merely to frighten and drive away the ducks, not to capture them for himself. Keeble brought an action in trespass on the case and was awarded 20 pounds. Hickeringill appealed. Issue: Can a party recover against another for malicious interference with his ability to use his land for pleasure and profit? Holding and Rule: Yes. A party can recover against another for interfering maliciously with his ability to use his land for pleasure and profit. Keebles use of his property to capture ducks and sell them for profit was lawful. Every man has the right to use his land for his pleasure and profit. An action lies in all cases where a defendant commits malicious acts interfering with the profession or livelihood of another. However, if Hickeringill had set up decoys on his own property to capture them for himself, no action would lie because he has as much liberty in the use of his land as the plaintiff. Disposition: Affirmed. Notes: This is a property law case, not a torts case. Keeble did not bring this lawsuit to recover for the value of waterfowl he was unable to capture as a result of Hickeringills actions. The judgment was compensation for Hickeringills interference with the use of his real estate. See District of Columbia v. Heller for a constitutional law case brief addressing the issue of whether the Second Amendment to the Constitution grants a private right to own and keep guns on ones property.

Popov v. Hayashi Facts

Popov (P) and Hayashi (D) brought baseball gloves hoping that they would catch Bonds record setting home run baseball. A cameraman captured the

event on videotape. Just as Popov caught the ball he was overwhelmed by a mob engaged in violent and illegal behavior. Popov was buried face under several layers of people. He intended to establish and maintain possession of the ball but at some point it left his glove. Hayashi was standing near Popov and was involuntarily forced to the ground. While on the ground Hayashi saw the loose ball and took it but committed no wrongful act. The plaintiff brought suit for conversion, trespass to chattel, injunctive relief and constructive trust.

Issue
If an actor undertakes significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of abandoned personal property and the effort is interrupted by the unlawful acts of others, does the actor have a legal pre-possessory interest in the property?

Holding and Rule

Yes. Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal property of another. There must be actual interference with the plaintiffs dominion. Wrongful withholding of property can constitute actual interference even where the defendant lawfully acquired the property. If a person entitled to possession of personal property demands its return, the unjustified refusal to give the property back is conversion. The act constituting conversion must be intentionally done. There is no requirement however that the defendant know that the property belongs to another, and the defendant need not intend to dispossess the true owner of its use and enjoyment. The injured party may elect to seek either specific performance to regain the property or monetary damages. Trespass to chattel, in contrast, exists where personal property has been damaged or where the defendant has interfered with the plaintiffs use of the property. Actual dispossession is not an element of the tort of trespass to chattel. Conversion does not exist unless the baseball rightfully belongs to Popov. Before it was hit it belonged to Major League Baseball. At the time it was hit it became intentionally abandoned property. The first person who came in possession of the ball became its new owner. Where an actor undertakes significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of a piece of abandoned personal property and the failure to

continue the effort is interrupted by the unlawful acts of others, the actor has a pre-possessory interest in the property. This pre-possessory interest constitutes a qualified right to possession which can support a cause of action for conversion. An award of the ball to the plaintiff would be unfair to Hayashi. It would be premised on the unsupported assumption that Popov would have caught the ball. An award of the ball to the defendant would unfairly penalize Popov. It would be based on the unsupported assumption that Popov would have dropped the ball. Each man has a claim of equal dignity as to the other and both plaintiff and defendant have an equal and undivided interest in the ball. Popovs cause of action for conversion is sustained only as to his equal and undivided interest. In order to effectuate this ruling, the ball must be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.

Disposition
Judgment reversed. The court ordered that the ball be sold and the profits divided equally. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California for a property law case brief in which the California Supreme Court held that a patient did not have a cause of action for conversion against his doctor who had patented a cell line using Moores bodily tissues without his knowledge or consent.