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Agency Theory in Accounts Receivable Management

Theoretical Framework on Accounts Receivable

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
23 views3 pages

Agency Theory in Accounts Receivable Management

Theoretical Framework on Accounts Receivable

Uploaded by

07310141
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Theoretical Framework

This study engaged from Berle and Means theory which is known as the Agency

Theory. An agency relationship is defined as a scenario where one individual, known as

the principal, engages another person, referred to as the agent, to act on their behalf or

provide services. In this relationship, the agent is granted authority to make decisions

on behalf of the principal. . They argued that these agents could potentially exploit the

company’s assets for personal gain, potentially engendering a clash of interests

between principals and agents (Gwala & Mashau, 2023). The central concern revolves

around whether these agents act in the best interests of the owners or prioritize their

own interests (Panda & Leepsa, 2017).

Within the context of finance, agency theory addresses issues such as conflicts

of interest and incentive problems that may arise between principals and agents. It

suggests a normative relationship between these parties, particularly focusing on

conflicts between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) within firms. The

theory posits that conflicts arise due to misalignment of interests and non-rational

behaviors of agents (Jensen, 2004), leading to agency costs or problems.

Applied to accounts receivable management, agency theory pertains to the role

of the credit control manager, who acts as the agent of shareholders. The decisions

made by the credit control manager regarding receivables

significantly impact the wealth of shareholders. For instance, failure to effectively collect

from creditworthy customers can lead to reduced revenues and losses due to

decreased sales.
From a point of view, management aims to maximize shareholder wealth by

ensuring the efficient management of accounts receivable. This involves implementing

policies and procedures to encourage timely payments, minimize delinquencies, and

reduce bad debt losses. However, the interests of management may not always align

with those of the agent, as customers may prioritize their own liquidity needs over timely

settlement of debts.

This misalignment of interests can lead to agency conflicts, where customers

may delay payments or default on their obligations, thus adversely affecting the financial

health of the water supply company. Such conflicts underscore the importance of

implementing mechanisms to mitigate agency risks and align the incentives of both

parties towards the common goal of effective receivable management.

The Tabaco City Water District serves as the primary water provider for the entire town

of Tabaco. This research is supported by Agency Theory, where shareholders authorize

the management team to make decisions concerning credit policies, billing practices,

and collections procedures. This approach aims to address conflicts of interest by

aligning the incentives of managers with the goals of shareholders. In the realm of

accounts receivable management, this serve compensation packages for the

management team, incorporating performance-based incentives linked to key metrics

like accounts receivable turnover just like in the research study. By adopting Agency

Theory, the management can foster transparent communication channels between

shareholders and management, promoting accountability and clarity in decisions

pertaining to accounts receivable.

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