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Stolypin's Reforms and Tsarism's Fate

A guide to the Russian Revolution

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100% found this document useful (1 vote)
61 views4 pages

Stolypin's Reforms and Tsarism's Fate

A guide to the Russian Revolution

Uploaded by

Zhi Yi Lim
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Sunway College

A Level - HISTORY 9489/2

Chapter 3: Russian Revolution

Topic: Could Tsarism survived 1906-1917

A. Could Stolypin be the saviour of the Tsar?


B. The constitutional experiment
C. How far had the economy improved by 1914?
D. How revolutionary was Russia in 1914?
E. The impact of the First World War
F. How popular was the February Revolution?
G. Could tsarism have survived?

A. Could Stolypin be the saviour of the Tsar?

Peter Stolypin dominated the Russian government from July 1906, when he became Prime Minister, until
his assassination in September 1911. He first came to notice as a provincial governor in Sartov due to his
vigorous suppression of peasant unrest. A St Petersburg outsider, he was appointed Minister of the
Interior and soon after Prime Minister, although he kept his former post also. He
thus, wielded a considerable amount of power.

Stolypin was a strong supporter of the autocracy and opponent of revolution and disorder. He set up field
court martials in 1906 to crush peasant uprisings. ‘Stolypin’s neckties’ (the hangman’s noose) dealt with
thousands of peasants and nearly 60,000 political detainees were executed or sent into exile or penal
servitude in ‘Stolypin carriages’ (railway cars). He was appointed by, and utterly beholden to, the Tsar and
he never attempted to build a political base of his own. However, like Witte before him, he also believed
that reform was essential to solve Russia’s problems. He believed that industrial progress alone was not
sufficient to take Russia forward and gave his attention to agriculture.

He had two objectives:


1 to feed the rapidly growing population and avoid the cycle of famine and
revolt
2 to create a strong conservative peasantry who would support the regime.
Stolypin was virtually the only Prime Minister of the constitutional decade to see the Duma as a partner in
building a strong Russia. He did not consider that he was limiting the monarch’s authority but rather
giving it a broader social base. In particular, he developed an understanding with the Octobrists (more
conservative liberals) which allowed him to push through his reforms. His success suggested the
possibility of a working relationship between government and elected assembly. Yet he was only really
prepared to work with it on his terms:
• When the Second Duma would not do his bidding, he changed the electoral system drastically to create
one he hoped would be much more amenable. The liberals called this Stolypin’s coup d’état.
• When he was having trouble getting measures through, he cynically used Article 87 of the Fundamental
Laws which allowed him to pass emergency measures by decree when the Duma was not sitting.

In the end it was this last point that brought him down. He wanted to introduce zemstva in the western
provinces to make local government more democratic. However, the upper chamber of the Duma

1
opposed this as landowners feared they would lose their authority. In March 1911, he persuaded the Tsar
to suspend both chambers of the Duma to allow him to force his measure through by decree.

This alienated both houses of the Duma including the majority of the Octobrists who had hitherto
supported him. The Left condemned Stolypin for his policy of repression while the Right considered that
his dangerous reform policies undermined the principles of autocracy or, in the case of the land reforms,
the power of the gentry in the countryside. He proposed a series of reforms to extend civil rights, reform
local government and local justice, and improve education. In the event, he was only able to implement
his programme of agrarian reform using emergency [Link] enmity which confronted him from all sides
demonstrated the difficulty of taking a middle road in Russia. By 1911 his star was waning and had he not
been assassinated, it is likely that he would have been dismissed. Stolypin was a man of contradictions.
On the one hand he supported the autocracy, using fierce and relentless repression to deal with
dissidents; on the other he championed reform. In 1906, he commented to Bernard Pares, a British
historian: ‘I am fighting on two fronts. I am fighting against revolution but for reform. You may say that
such a position is beyond human strength and you may be right.’ He wanted citizens to participate in
political life and build a state based on the rule of law. However, some of his actions contradicted this
– particularly his field court martials, his coup d’état and the use of Article 87.

Perhaps this expressed the problems of trying to modernise Russia within the framework of an autocracy.
Whether Stolypin could have saved tsarism is a matter for conjecture but it is probably fair to say that he
was the Tsar’s last, best hope.

Abraham Ascher argues that he had a vision for the transformation of Russia and that his reform
proposals were ‘more feasible and more likely to lead Russia out of the abyss than any other’. Other
historians, however, would maintain that there was no hope of reforming the archaic regime and he was
bound to fail. But in failing to support Stolypin, Nicholas showed his stubborn opposition to reform. After
Stolypin he made a series of disastrous appointments to the government – people at best inefficient, at
worst incompetent.

B. The constitutional experiment

October Manifesto had offered the chance of political change. The setting up of an elected duma was a
major step towards some sort of constitutional government. Was the Tsar willing to take up the
constitutional challenge?
The initial signs were not good. The Tsar made it clear in the Fundamental Laws, issued in April 1906, that
the autocracy was still in the ascendancy:’ The Sovereign Emperor possesses the initiative in all legislative
matters . . .he Sovereign Emperor ratifies the laws. No laws can come into force without his approval.’
This was confirmed when it was announced that there would be a second chamber, the State Council,
with equal powers to the Duma. Half of the State Council’s members would be chosen by the Tsar. Only if
both agreed to legislative proposal would it go forward to the Tsar for approval. Also, Article87 of the
Laws gave the Tsar the right in ‘exceptional circumstances’ to pass his own laws without consulting the
Duma at all. The Tsar also retained control other military, foreign policy and the appointment of
ministers. To many liberals it seemed the Tsar had reneged on his promises in October.

The elections for the Duma employed a complicated system of electoral colleges designed to represent
the different social classes. It was profoundly weighted towards the upper classes. For instance, 2000
landowners were represented by one deputy and 90,000 workers were represented by one deputy.
Despite this, the elections returned the Cadets as the largest party and there was significant

2
representation on the Left despite the fact that the revolutionary parties had boycotted the elections. The
home of the Duma was the Taurid Palace.

First and Second Dumas


When the First Duma met in April 1906, there was immense hostility towards the Tsar. The deputies
demanded that the powers of the Duma should be increased and that elections should be universal and
secret. They also wanted guarantees of certain freedoms, e.g. speech and assembly. There followed two
months of bitter disagreement. The Tsar, horrified by the hostility and lack of respect, dissolved the
Duma. It is reported he said: ‘Curse the Duma. It is all Witte’s doing.’ Two hundred Cadet and Trudovik
deputies went to Vyborg in Finland from where they urged the Russian people not to pay their taxes.
Later they were arrested and disbarred from re-election.

In the elections for the Second Duma, which met in February 1907, the Kadets and the moderates lost out
to increased representation on the Left. There were over 200 left-wing deputies, partly because the
revolutionary parties had ended their boycott. It was much more radical than the First Duma and was
called ‘The Duma of National Anger’. The Second Duma was riven by division and deputies made fierce
attacks on the government. As a result, it lasted only three months.

Learning trouble spot


You need to consider the early dumas in the context of the times to make sense of what was going on
and of the regime’s response. Russia was still very unsettled in 1906. There was a major upsurge in
peasant disturbances and, to a lesser degree, industrial unrest among workers. Also, 141 mutinies took
place in the armed forces from May to July 1906. What was worrying for the regime was that much of
this was political. The peasants were very aware of the First Duma and sent in a large number of
petitions. The Kadets felt there was a chance of winning concessions on key issues and were pitting
themselves against the government. After the First Duma, the government cracked down hard on the
Kadets, closing down their offices and dismissing members of the party from government service.
However, the peasants and workers had confidence in and great hopes for the Second Duma and
flocked to the polls in huge numbers. In St Petersburg over 70 per cent of eligible workers vote.

Third and Fourth Dumas


For the Third and Fourth Dumas, Stolypin decided to change the electoral system to favour the upper and
propertied classes. The peasants and workers were virtually excluded and non-Russian national groups
much reduced. As a result, the Octobrists and right-wing parties predominated. Even so, the Third Duma
was not subservient and questioned the government hard, particularly on state finances. Stolypin was
able to work with the more moderate centre parties to achieve progress in his social and economic
reforms. However, this time he found that it was the right-wing groups and nationalists who tried to put a
brake on his reforms, probably with the support of the Tsar. At least it showed the Duma could work
positively with the government and it did provide a training ground in constitutionalism.

The Fourth Duma was interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War and met intermittently during
the war. Before the war, it attempted some reform of the Orthodox Church and supported the law of
1908 providing for universal education – but progress was slow. It was also critical of the government’s
handling of increasing social unrest, especially the Lena Goldfields Massacre. On the outbreak of the war
the Duma threw itself behind the Tsar and the national war effort. It agreed to suspend itself for the
duration of the war. However, when it became apparent that the government was managing the war very

3
badly, the Duma pressurised the Tsar into recalling it in July1915. It offered the Tsar one last opportunity
to agree to limited constitutional Government.

Summary
Nicholas had shown that he was never really willing to work with or listen to the Duma. He looked for
excuses to close down sessions. He was only concerned with preserving the autocracy, largely because he
believed it was a better way of running Russia. He did not accept that democratic government could be
effective and did not understand that, by passing some of his responsibilities to an elected assembly, he
could avoid the criticism and hostility directed at him from various sections of Russian society. Not all the
blame should be attached to the Tsar. The Kadets’ demands in the First Duma were very radical and they
were not prepared to compromise or be patient. Asa result, the Duma degenerated into quarrels and a
bitter struggle between the Tsar and his supporters on the Right, and the liberals and other parties on the
Left. This did not allow for any relationship of trust and co-operation to develop.

WHY DIDN’T THE TSARJUST GET RID OF THE DUMA ALTOGETHER?


1 He was bound by the agreement in the October Manifesto. He feared a popular reaction if he ditched it.
2 Britain and France were Russia’ sallies in the international are naand the Tsar wanted to give the
appearance of a more democratic Russia.
3 The electoral system was changed to make the Duma more docile.

Common questions

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The October Manifesto of 1905 was a critical document intended to transform Russia by establishing a constitutional government and creating the Duma, a legislative assembly . However, Tsar Nicholas II's actions significantly undermined its impact. By issuing the Fundamental Laws in 1906, he reinforced autocratic principles, retaining substantial powers such as the right to initiate and approve all legislation and the authority to pass emergency laws without the Duma's consent . His reluctance to genuinely collaborate with the Duma, evidenced by his manipulation of electoral processes and disregard for legislative input, limited the potential for meaningful political change and maintained the autocratic status quo . This resulted in continued political unrest and hindered the development of a stable constitutional government .

The Dumas played a pivotal role in Russian politics as bodies meant to represent the people and introduce elements of constitutional governance following the 1905 revolution . However, their effectiveness was consistently undermined by the Tsarist regime. The First and Second Dumas faced closure due to their radical demands and opposition to autocratic rule . The electoral reforms introduced by Stolypin favored upper classes, resulting in Third and Fourth Dumas more compliant with the regime, yet not entirely subservient . Throughout their existence, the Dumas encountered limitations imposed by Tsar Nicholas II, including restricted legislative power and manipulation of electoral and parliamentary procedures, which reflected the Tsar's commitment to preserving autocratic authority rather than enabling effective democratic governance .

Peter Stolypin, who served as the Russian Prime Minister from 1906 until his assassination in 1911, was known for his dual approach of supporting autocracy while simultaneously advocating for reform. He believed in maintaining order through aggressive measures like field court-martials, yet he also introduced reforms aimed at transforming Russia's agriculture to avoid famine and create a conservative peasantry allied with the regime . His implementation of reforms using decrees under Article 87 highlighted his willingness to bypass legislative procedures when necessary . Stolypin's reforms and repressive measures both attracted opposition from various political factions, demonstrating the inherent contradictions in his approach . His balancing act was an attempt to modernize Russia while preserving the autocratic structure, but his failure to establish a stable partnership with the Duma showed the limits of his approach .

Stolypin's reforms had a complex impact on the preservation of Tsarism in Russia. His agrarian reforms aimed at creating a loyal peasant class had the potential to stabilize Russian society by addressing economic issues like famine and peasant unrest . His attempts at reform, contrasted with his repressive tactics (e.g., executions and exile), divided public support . Despite these efforts, Stolypin's inability to foster genuine cooperation with the Duma and his reliance on autocratic measures revealed the challenges of modernizing under an imperial system . Post-Stolypin, Tsar Nicholas II's poor governance choices and continued suppression of political evolution contributed to instability, suggesting that while Stolypin had some positive effects, his inability to transform the political system was a key factor in the eventual downfall of Tsarism .

Tsar Nicholas II's management of the Duma was characterized by resistance to genuine collaboration, negatively impacting the long-term stability of Tsarist Russia. His reluctance to respect the legislative autonomy granted by the October Manifesto and frequent use of Article 87 to bypass the Duma's authority weakened any emerging constitutional framework . By altering election laws to favor conservative elements, Nicholas ensured a more compliant Duma but failed to address the broader societal need for political participation and reform . His consistent undermining of the Duma's role fueled political division and disenchantment with autocratic governance. This behavior not only eroded potential support for the regime but also exacerbated disenfranchisement among the reform-minded segments of society, setting the stage for revolutionary forces that ultimately led to the collapse of Tsarism in 1917 .

Peter Stolypin's political strategy involved a paradoxical mix of stern repression and progressive reform, embodying broader tensions within Russian society and governance. His repressive measures, like the use of field court-martials, were intended to suppress dissent and uphold autocratic authority, reflecting traditional governmental emphasis on control and order . Conversely, his reform efforts, particularly agrarian reforms, aimed at modernizing Russia's socio-economic structure and preventing revolutionary upheaval by cultivating a supportive peasant class . These contradictions mirror the conflicting pressures faced by Russian leadership: the necessity to maintain autocracy while addressing the demand for modernization and reform. Stolypin's approach highlighted these tensions, revealing the difficulties of effective reform under an autocratic regime resistant to ceding control, ultimately leading to his failure to secure lasting stability for Tsarism .

Stolypin's agrarian reforms were designed to address economic and social challenges by increasing agricultural productivity and creating a loyal, conservative peasantry. His objectives included feeding the growing population and reducing cycles of famine and revolt by promoting individual land ownership among peasants . These reforms were intended to stabilize rural areas and secure the regime's support base . However, opposition arose from multiple sides: landowners feared losing authority and power, and political factions distrusted Stolypin's use of repressive measures coupled with reforms . Despite some progress, his reforms faced significant political resistance and were criticized for undermining traditional landholding structures while failing to deliver widespread economic benefits in the short term .

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 significantly altered Russia's internal politics and the role of the Duma. Initially, the Duma supported the Tsar and the national war effort, even agreeing to suspend itself, reflecting a temporary unity . However, as the war progressed, the government's inefficiency in managing military operations and the resulting economic and social hardships led to a loss of public confidence. The Duma was recalled in 1915, in part due to increasing pressure on the Tsar to address these issues . The prominent role of the Duma during the war illustrated a brief resurgence of its political influence, as it attempted to offer a platform for reform and criticism of the government's failures. Nevertheless, Nicholas II's reluctance to leverage this opportunity for constitutional change further destabilized his regime and laid the groundwork for revolutionary movements .

The February Revolution of 1917 in Russia was driven by a combination of social and political factors, catalyzed by the stresses of World War I. Socially, widespread discontent stemmed from economic hardship, food shortages, and the immense casualties of war, exacerbating long-standing grievances among workers and peasants . Politically, the failure of Tsar Nicholas II to transition to a constitutional government, alongside his dismissive attitude towards the Duma, fueled dissatisfaction among both liberals and radicals, as the government appeared increasingly disconnected from the populace . The revolution garnered wide-ranging support, from urban workers facing dire conditions to soldiers disillusioned by the war and deserting in large numbers, reflecting a broad-based demand for change across various social strata . The revolution's initial success in deposing the Tsar suggests considerable popularity and a collective desire for political and social reform .

The assassination of Peter Stolypin in 1911 likely curtailed the momentum of reform efforts in Russia and underscored the challenges of modernization within an autocratic framework. Stolypin represented a unique blend of repression and reform, and his death deprived the regime of one of its few leaders willing to pursue a transformative agenda that included agrarian improvements and legal reforms . Following his assassination, Nicholas II's subsequent appointments were marked by inefficiency and incompetence, further diminishing the possibilities for effective governance and reform . Without Stolypin's vision and strategies, the Tsarist regime struggled to implement meaningful changes that could address underlying social and economic issues, weakening the state's capacity to resist the revolutionary pressures that erupted in 1917 .

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