Euthanasia Legalization in Indiana PIL
Euthanasia Legalization in Indiana PIL
WE CARE …PETITIONER
V.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………………………….3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………..4
● CASES CITED
● STATUTES
● ARTICLES AND LEGAL JOURNALS
● TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
● LEGAL DATABASE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………………..6
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………………….7
ISSUES RAISED……………………………………………………………………………..8
Issue 1: Whether the Public Interest Litigation is maintainable under Article 32 of the
Constitution of Indiana?
Issue 2: Whether the Right to Die comes under the ambit of the Right to Live with Dignity
Issue 4. Whether legalizing active euthanasia violate the sanctity of life and promote self-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………………….9
ARGUMENTS ADVANCE………………………………………………………………….11
SUBMISSIONS/PRAYER…………………………………………………………………...26
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
Art. Article
§ Section
v. Versus
Govt. Government
Ors. Others
Anr. Another
Div. Divisional
Misc. Miscellaneous
cl. Clause
Ltd. Limited
WP Writ Petition
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, 1987 AIR 1159, 1987 SCR (2) 314
P N Kumar and Another v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1988 SCR (1) 732.
Union of India vs. T.R. Verma 1957 AIR 882
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Nooh 1958 AIR 86
Ujjambai v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SUPREME COURT 1621
Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cri LJ 743
P. Rathinam v. Union of India, 1994 AIR 1844, 1994 SCC (3) 394
Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab 1996 AIR 946
Chenna Jagadeeswar and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1988 Crl.L.J.549
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India 1970 AIR 564
Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT
1290, 2011 (4) SCC 454.
Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of India, 198 4 SCC 409
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996.
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1966 3 SCR 744.
A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak, 1988 2 SCC 602
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, 741
Sue Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), (1993) 3 SCR 519.
Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1, AIR 2018 SC
1665.
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039.
Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Santhan, AIR 1996 SC 550.
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC 2426.
State of Punjab v. M.S. Chawla, AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 1225, 1997 (2) SCC
83.
Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union of India & Ors, 1987 AIR 990, 1987 SCR (2) 468
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, [1993] 1 All ER 821.
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STATUTES
LEGAL DATABASE
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
[Link]
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is most humbly submitted in this memorandum that the Petitioner has approached this
1
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Respondents
humbly contest the same.
1
Article 32 in the Constitution of India, 1950.
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warrant and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction ill or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the city of Tumba in the Republic of Indiana, resides an elderly middle-class couple named
Santosh, aged 74, and Sumitra, aged 70 who are retired teachers. Having been married for 45
years, their lives took a tragic turn in January 2021, when Santosh was diagnosed with Skin
Cancer. Subsequently, in the month of September 2021, Sumitra was afflicted with
Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), causing a gradual loss of her ability to move and speak.
The elderly couple did not have any children or family members to look after them. Even
though Santosh himself was suffering from skin cancer he had to frequently take Sumitra to
the Lok Nayak Hospital concerning the treatments of her condition. All this was getting
insurmountably hectic for Santosh and was taking a toll on his health. In a period of two years
the couple spent an exorbitant amount of over 20 Lakhs on Sumitra’s medical care and
treatments, additionally, they were also dealing with the medical expenditure of Santosh’s Skin
Cancer. While dealing with the medical expenses of Sumitra’s treatment, the majority of
Santosh's savings and assets had been depleted by costly and ineffective medical care. Her
condition was worsening every day after she was diagnosed with ALS. She therefore believed
that she did not want to burden her husband and considering the futility of the treatment and
the unbearable pain, Sumitra was willing to seek active euthanasia.
The old couple decided to address the matter of active euthanasia with Dr. Vinay who was
treating Sumitra. Then to their utter dismay, the doctors declined to give active euthanasia to
Sumitra as there is no legislation or law regarding the same.
People sent letters and messages to the NGO explaining their similar medical conditions and
how there should be specific laws and guidelines for active euthanasia. Considering the interest
of the public, in the year 2024, the NGO filed a Public Interest Litigation under Article 32 of
the Constitution of Indiana before the Supreme Court.
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ISSUES RAISED
2. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO DIE COMES UNDER THE AMBIT OF THE RIGHT
NOT?
ABSOLUTE SENSE?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is humbly submitted before the Supreme Court of Indiana that the PIL filed by the “We
Care” NGO is not maintainable. The PIL filed by the NGO on behalf of the elderly couple
is frivolous in nature and does not aim to provide any justice to the elderly couple or to other
people. Article 21 of the constitution of Indiana does not guarantee the right to die under the
right to life. Since no fundamental right of the petitioner has been violated, the PIL is
baseless and should not be entertained by the Court.
2. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO DIE COMES UNDER THE AMBIT OF THE RIGHT
TO LIVE WITH DIGNITY UNDER ARTICLE 21?
The Right to Die does not fall under the ambit of the Right to Live with Dignity under
Article 21, for the sole reason that they are stark opposites of each other. Even if one
considers the guidelines framed by the Court for passive euthanasia or the argument of
prolonged suffering, one should note that ending a life span early in unnatural ways is still
prohibited by law and is against the interpretations given regarding leading a life with
dignity and privacy. There is no legislation governing this positive action as well and
considering the Supreme Court itself has held such an inherent right to die does not exist,
the Petitioners submission through which they approached the court should be disregarded.
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
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It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that Active Euthanasia should not be
legalized in Indiana as there will be a burden on the Courts to adjudicate on the same. The
want for active euthanasia is asked in its widest sense and it shall be the duty of the
legislature to legislate on the same. Without a proper codified law, active euthanasia can be
misused in the country.
It is humbly submitted that legalizing active euthanasia would violate the sanctity of life and
promote self-determination. There is a vast difference between passive and active
euthanasia. While the former balances the principle of sanctity of life and the right to self-
determination of bodily autonomy, the latter prima facie fails to do so.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1.1 The Respondents humbly submit that the public interest litigation is not maintainable
under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indiana.
1.3. It is also submitted that Petitioner has an alternative remedy of approaching the High
Court before knocking on the doors of this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana. In a writ
petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Court found that good and substantial
reasons existed for directing the petitioner to approach the concerned High Court in the first
instance instead of knocking at the doors of this Court straightaway. While directing so, the
Court in the case of Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat3, held that “There is no
reason to assume that the concerned High Court will not do justice. Alternatively, that this
Court alone can do justice. If this Court entertains Writ Petitions at the instance of parties
who approach this Court directly instead of approaching the concerned High Court in the
first instance, tens of thousands of Writ Petitions would in the course of time be instituted
in this Court directly. The inevitable result will be that the arrears pertaining to matters in
respect of which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution will
assume more alarming proportions.”
2
Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
3
Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, 1987 AIR 1159, 1987 SCR (2) 314.
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
1.5. The case of Union of India vs. T.R. Verma5 is often cited as foundational. It
emphasizes that if an alternative, equally effective remedy exists, courts should generally
direct the petitioner to use that remedy instead of issuing a writ petition. Furthermore, in the
cases of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Nooh6 and Ujjambai v. State of Uttar
Pradesh7, the Supreme Court firmly upheld the principle of alternative remedy, stating that
extraordinary writ jurisdiction should not be used to bypass regular legal channels; and the
court again reiterated that writ jurisdiction should not be used as an alternate to regular
appeals, highlighting the value of statutory remedies.
1.5. Fundamental Rights are basic human rights that are conferred upon citizens and are
mentioned in Part III of the Constitution. However, these rights are not absolute rights.
Absolute individual rights cannot be guaranteed by any modern state. The State has the
power to impose by its laws reasonable restrictions as may be necessary in the larger interest.
1.6. It is also asserted that the PIL filed by the “We Care” NGO is not maintainable because
the Constitution of Indiana nowhere mentions the right to die. The right to life and liberty is
guaranteed under Article 218 of the Constitution of Indiana but has no provisions which
grants a person the right to end one’s own life. This act of ending a person’s own life is a
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considered a punishable crime under Section 309 of the Indiana Penal Code which is
4
P N Kumar and Another v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1988 SCR (1) 732.
5
Union of India vs. T.R. Verma 1957 AIR 882
6
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Nooh 1958 AIR 86
7
Ujjambai v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1962 SUPREME COURT 1621
8
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, 1950
9
Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
attempt to commit suicide. In this case the elderly couple has decided to address the mater
of active euthanasia to Dr. Vinay who was treating Mrs. Sumitra, but they declined to the
same as it is unlawful in the State of Indiana to take someone’s life or to abet someone to
take their own life. If any doctor would have performed active euthanasia on Mrs. Sumitra,
they could be punished under Section 302 10 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860 for punishment
for murder or at least under Section 304 11 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860 for punishment
for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
1.7. It is humbly submitted that the petition by the NGO “We Care” lacks the prima facie of
not showing bona fide motive and intention. Private interest of the NGO lies within because
nothing in the PIL says about the damage caused nor any involvement with the elderly
couple. It is evident from the facts stated that We Care NGO has filed the PIL which is
unconstitutional in nature and promoting a social wrong which is also a crime.
1.8. In the case of Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra 12 it was held that the
Section 309 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860, was violative of Article 21 if the constitution
of Indiana. This decision was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana in the case
of P. Rathinam v. Union of Indiana 13 also stating that the right to life under Article 21 of
the constitution of Indiana also includes the right to die. Later in the landmark case of Gian
Kaur v. State of Punjab14 a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court overruled the case of
P. Rathinam v. Union of Indiana. The bench held that the right to life as under Article 21 of
the constitution of Indiana does not include the right to die or the right to be killed. The right
of life stands in the context of the right to live with human dignity and the existence of life
until natural death arrives.
1.9. The underlying intention in creating this special device of Public Interest Litigation was
to universalize access to justice not for feeding private interests with the very ingredients
required to file a PIL not being fulfilled by taking up the Court’s invaluable time.
10
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
11
Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
12
Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra, 1987 Cri LJ 743
13
P. Rathinam v. Union of India, 1994 AIR 1844, 1994 SCC (3) 394
14 Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab 1996 AIR 946
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
2. WHETHER THE RIGHT TO DIE COME UNDER THE AMBIT OF THE RIGHT
TO LIVE WITH DIGNITY UNDER ARTICLE 21?
2.1. The Respondents humbly submit that the Right to Die does not fall under the ambit of
the Right to Live with Dignity under Article 21.
2.2. One must rigorously distinguish between the right to a dignified end when faced with
life's inevitable conclusion and the right to prematurely terminate existence, thereby
truncating the natural arc of one's lifespan.
2.3. In the case of Chenna Jagadeeswar and another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 15, is
the decision by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The challenge to the
constitutional validity of Section 309 IPC was rejected therein. The argument that Article
21 includes the right to die' was rejected. It was also pointed out by Amarethwari, J. speaking
for the Division Bench that the Courts have sufficient power to see that unwarranted harsh
treatment or- prejudice is not meted out to those who need care and attention, this negatived
the suggested violation of Article 21.
2.4. "If a person has a right to live, question is whether he has right not to live.”, The
Bombay High Court stated in paragraph 10 of its judgment that as all the fundamental rights
are to be read together, as held in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India16 what is true of one
fundamental right is also true of another fundamental right. It was then stated that is not,
and cannot be, seriously disputed that fundamental rights have their positive as well as
negative aspects. However, the above analogy is said to be misconstrued. This could have
arisen on account of superficial comparison between freedoms, ignoring the inherent
difference between one fundamental right and the other. It has been argued that the negative
aspect of the right to live would mean the end or extinction of the positive aspect, and so, it
is not the suspension as such of the right as is in the case of 'silence' or 'non- association'
15 Chenna Jagadeeswar and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1988 Crl.L.J.549
16
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India 1970 AIR 564
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
and 'no movement'. It has also been stated that the right to life stands on a different footing
from other rights as all other rights are derivable from the right to live.
2.5. Suicide, necessitating volitional actions that extinguish one's existence, constitutes a
clear departure from the protections enshrined within Article 21's 'right to life.' The Article's
fundamental purpose lies in the inviolable preservation of life, rendering the deliberate
termination inherent in suicide an irreconcilable contradiction. Propositions seeking a 'right
to die' within Article 21 prove legally untenable, especially when juxtaposed with other
fundamental rights like freedom of speech, wherein the choice to express oneself or remain
silent lies comfortably within the right's purview. Historical rulings that acknowledge the
non-exercise of freedoms do not establish a precedent for extending Article 21 to encompass
the affirmative act of self-termination.
2.6. The Supreme Court in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab17 further opined, “We are,
therefore, unable to concur with the interpretation of Article 21 made in P. Rathinam. The
only reason for which Section 309 is held to be violative of Article 21 in P. Rathinam does
not withstand legal scrutiny. We are unable to hold that Section 309 I.P.C. is violative
of Article 21. To give meaning and content to the word 'life' in Article 21, it has been
construed as life with human dignity.”
2.7. Any aspect of life which makes it dignified may be read into it but not that which
extinguishes it and is, therefore, inconsistent with the continued existence of life resulting
in effacing the right itself. The right to die', if any, is inherently inconsistent with the right
to life' as is death' with life'. The Supreme court observed that the Right to Life cannot be
devalued while stressing that the right to die with dignity was also a part of Article 21 of the
Constitution. The court noted it will modify 'Living Will' guidelines for passive euthanasia .
Justice KM Joseph also observed, "We are only here to consider improving the guidelines.
We should realise the limitations of the court also. The judgment clarifies that until a law is
made by the legislature. The legislature is much more endowed with skills, talents and
sources of knowledge. We are not experts in medicine. We have to be careful with that.”
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
2.8. While passive euthanasia has been recognized as legal under certain circumstances,
active euthanasia and assisted suicide remain illegal in Indiana. The Supreme Court has held
that such practices are against the sanctity of life and can be easily abused and the court has
also noted that in certain cases, the withdrawal of life support systems may result in a slow
and painful death, which may be seen as a form of active euthanasia. Furthermore, we as a
country do not have legislation governing active euthanasia so for the Petitioners to
approach the Court seeking the same would mean creation of new guidelines or in turn the
Parliament creating such legislation after being directed to do so by the Court which blurs
the doctrine of the separation of powers that so importantly exists therefore the notion that
the right to die falls under the right to life with dignity under Article 21, is on the face of it,
simply unconstitutional.
2.9 Lord Keith observed that in general, it would not be lawful for a medical practitioner
who assumed responsibility for the care of an unconscious patient simply to give up
treatment in circumstances where continuance of it would confer some benefit on the
patient. On the other hand, a medical practitioner is under no duty to continue to treat such
a patient where a large body of informed and responsible medical opinion is to the effect
that no benefit at all would be conferred by continuance of treatment. Existence in a
vegetative state with no prospect of recovery is, in that opinion, regarded as not being a
benefit, and that, if not unarguably correct, at least forms a proper basis for the decision to
discontinue treatment and care. He was of the further opinion that since existence in PVS is
not a benefit to the patient, the principle of sanctity of life is no longer an absolute one. It
does not compel a medical practitioner to treat a patient, who will die if not treated, contrary
to the express wishes of the patient. It does not compel the temporary keeping alive of
patients who are terminally ill where to do so would merely prolong their suffering. On the
other hand, it forbids the taking of active measures to cut short the life of a terminally ill
patient.
2.10. Considering these submissions, even the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
was compelled to definitively deny any violation of the State's positive obligation to
safeguard human life. This conclusion, coupled with the absence of infractions regarding
negative obligations, ultimately led the Court to declare that the implementation of the
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
Conseil d'État judgment would not constitute a breach of Article 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Thus, through its decision in the Lambert case (supra), the
ECHR delicately navigated the intricate terrain between upholding the sanctity of life, on
one hand, and acknowledging the notions of quality of life and individual autonomy, on the
other.
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
3.1. It is an admitted fact that Indiana has a population of over 1.4 billion people. It is contended
that the legalization of Active euthanasia is sought in the widest sense in the present case. There
can be misuse of it in the country. A large part of the population who cannot afford medical
treatments for a prolonged period even if they can get better would come before the courts to
opt for active euthanasia in the name to end their prolonged suffering and to die with dignity.
3.2. Furthermore, active euthanasia would act as a legal way for someone to kill themselves or
another individual without attracting penal punishment. Currently, Active euthanasia is a crime
under Section 302 18 (punishment for murder) of the 1860 Code or at the very least Section 304
19
of the Indian Penal Code 1860 which deals with punishment for culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.
3.3. It is humbly submitted that this court in the case of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v.
20
Union of India & Ors. and the case of Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of
21
India , have laid down that passive euthanasia stands legal. The Court discussed the
distinction between active and passive euthanasia, where active euthanasia requires an overt
action, whereas passive euthanasia is the act of withdrawal of life support. Active euthanasia
would attract criminal liability, its implementation would take a criminal colour even if its
unintentional.
18 Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 302, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
19 Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 304, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
20
Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT 1290, 2011 (4) SCC
454.
21
Supra.
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
3.4. It is submitted that after the legalization, passive euthanasia did not attract Sections 306 22
and 309 23 of the Indiana Penal Code. Similarly, through legalization, active euthanasia will be
exempted from criminal liability, putting forth, that malicious euthanasia would be exempted
from criminal liability due to its wide legality.
3.5. Section 306 states that- If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of
such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 309 states that- Whoever attempts
to commit suicide and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall be punished
with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both.
3.6. Such legalization would amount to circumventing a criminal colour by legalizing active
euthanasia without there being any procedural safeguards made by the legislature.
Additionally, it is submitted that there are no provisions in the Penal Code for the punishment
of malicious euthanasia. Criminal law at present does not have a codified law to cover cases
under legalized euthanasia and in the absence of such safeguards, it would become easier for it
to be misused.
3.7. As for instance, malicious doctors in rural areas where there is high illiteracy may take
advantage of such legalization and give false diagnoses to instil fear in the public and impose
exorbitant costs for life-sustaining treatment. The Constitution also acknowledges the Right of
a person over his/her own body as a Fundamental Right. In the blanket of this, various other
malpractices could get instigated as there no substantive laws governing the same.
3.8. United States of America- Laws in the United States maintain the distinction between
passive and active euthanasia. While active euthanasia is prohibited, the courts have ruled that
physicians should not be legally punished if they withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining
treatment at the request of a patient or the patient's authorized representative.
22
Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 306, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
23
Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 309, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
3.9. Passive euthanasia is legal in Finland, though active euthanasia had not yet become legal
as of late 2022.
3.10. Passive euthanasia became legal in Germany in 2014, though active euthanasia is still
legally prohibited.
3.11. While active euthanasia is still prohibited in Ireland, a 2010 poll showed that 57% of
adults supported giving terminally ill patients the option to choose euthanization. In certain
circumstances, doctors can legally discontinue life-support efforts such as feeding tubes and
ventilators.
3.12. While active euthanasia is prohibited in Mexico, passive euthanasia, in which a patient
can decline further life-prolonging treatment, is legal.
3.13. Relying on the court’s observation in the Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of
24
India case, the Bench held that Article 142 25, even with the width of its amplitude cannot
be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring the express statutory
provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be
achieved directly. The word “complete justice” was fraught with uncertainty until Article 142
of the Constitution received its first interpretation in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr. 26
which added a rider to the exercise of wide extraordinary powers by laying down that though
the powers are wide, the same is an ancillary power and can be used when not expressly in
conflict with substantive provisions of law. This view was endorsed by a nine-Judge Bench in
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra27 reiterated by a seven-Judge Bench in
A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak 28 and finally settled in Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union
of India 29.
24
Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of India, 198 4 SCC 409.
25
INDIA CONST. art 42.
26
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996.
27
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1966 3 SCR 744.
28
A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak, 1988 2 SCC 602
29
Supra.
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
NATIONAL INTER-COLLEGIATE MOOT COURT COMPETITION- ASTRAEA, 2024
3.14. Active euthanasia in the country stands in conflict with the various provisions of the
30
Indiana Penal Code. Even though the judiciary has wide powers through Article 141 and
Article 142, it still lies the duty of the legislature to enact a law on this sensitive issue that the
judiciary to interfere with the same.
3.15. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 31 a five-judge Bench headed by Y. V. Chandrachud,
C.J. held that “We must leave unto the legislature, the things that are the legislature’s. ‘The
highest judicial duty is to recognise the limits on judicial power and to permit the democratic
process to deal with matters falling outside of those limits.’
3.16. It is submitted that in the present case, guidelines alone cannot resolve this matter. There
needs to be some procedure and law in order to deter the vices that would arise. In absence of
such law and procedure that would be made by the legislature, any guidelines issued by the
court would be futile since active euthanasia will have wider implications in right to life under
Article 21 of the Constitution and its criminal counterparts.
3.17. The Respondent submits, that it is in the hands of the legislature alone to enact upon the
sensitive issue of active euthanasia as is also previously put out by this court 32. Therefore, it
is most humbly submitted that active euthanasia should not be legalized as such is the power
vested in the Legislature to have an in-depth view in the matter and then enact accordingly
upon it.
30
INDIA CONST. art 141.
31
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, 741, para 175.
32
Supra.
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MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
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4.1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that legalizing active euthanasia would
violate the sanctity of life and promote self-determination in its absolute sense for the
contentions stated below:-
4.2. Sanctity of life has been understood historically as excluding freedom of choice in the
self-infliction of death, and certainly in the involvement of others in carrying out that choice.
At the very least, no new consensus has emerged in society opposing the right of the state
to regulate the involvement of others in exercising power over individuals ending their lives.
33
4.3. It is an admitted fact that this Court through its judgement in Common Cause (A Regd.
34
Society) v. Union of India has legalized passive euthanasia. The judgment exemplifies
the application of the doctrine of proportionality, wherein the Court has balanced two facets
of the same right, i.e. the right to life under Article 21. While on one hand, the right to life
creates a compelling State interest in preserving human life, on the other hand, it also assures
the individual autonomy to make decisions concerning his/her own body. The Court has
carried out a measured analysis of the social, philosophical, ethical and economic aspects of
this issue. Comparative jurisprudence has also been of much assistance to the Court while
undertaking this exercise, an exhaustive examination of the international jurisprudence
having been conducted by the members of the bench.
4.4. The legalization of passive euthanasia does not promote self-determination in its
absolute sense. The self-determination for bodily autonomy does not override the principle
of the sanctity of life but rather brings about a balance between them. While a person can
33
Sue Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), (1993) 3 SCR 519.
34
Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 1, AIR 2018 SC 1665.
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approach for passive euthanasia, it is the physician who will then declare for if the person
falls and checks all the boxes to be able to avail it. However, legalization of active euthanasia
would completely vitiate the sanctity of life without any procedural or codified law or any
safeguards.
4.5. It is submitted that the Petitioner has approached this court seeking the legalization of
active euthanasia in a wide sense. Active and passive euthanasia differ vastly from one
another. While the latter requires withholding artificial life support, the former requires the
killing of another patient by active means, i.e. injecting a person with a lethal dose of the
drug. The implications of Active euthanasia would have a tenfold increase than that of
passive.
4.6. In India, although Right to Health was not guaranteed as a Fundamental Right under
Part III of the Constitution of India, it was provided as a requirement for the Governments
to adhere to by virtue of Directive Principles of State Policy and so were made non-
justifiable by the Framers of the Constitution. 35 However, the Indian Judiciary by virtue of
36
Judicial Activism has interpreted these Rights as a Fundamental Right under Article 21
37
of the Constitution through several judgements delivered from time to time in cases
brought before it.
4.7. In the State of Punjab v. M.S. Chawla 38, it has been held that-the right to life ensured
under Article 21 incorporates inside its ambit the right to health and clinical consideration.
The Supreme Court in Vincent v. Union of India 39, accentuated that a healthy body is the
very establishment of all human activities. Article 47 40, a Directive Principle of State Policy
in such manner lays pressure on the improvement of general health and the denial of
medications harmful to health as one of the essential obligations of the State. It is the
paramount duty of the State to protect the health of its citizens and not take into its hands
condone a person’s death by another person.
35
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, AIR 1989 SC 2039.
36
Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Santhan, AIR 1996 SC 550.
37
Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samiti v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC 2426.
38
State of Punjab v. M.S. Chawla, AIR 1997 SUPREME COURT 1225, 1997 (2) SCC 83.
39
Vincent Panikurlangara v. Union Of India & Ors, 1987 AIR 990, 1987 SCR (2) 468.
40
INDIA CONST. Art 47.
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4.8. The Supreme Court has observed that among common law jurisdictions, all adults with
the capacity to consent have the right to self-determination and autonomy even to refuse
medical treatment, despite entailing a risk of death. In case a patient has made a valid
Advanced Directive, provided it is free from reasonable doubt, then such Living Will has to
be executed, the court held. The doctrine of informed consent firmly entrenched in American
Tort Law, is relevant for the notion of bodily integrity pertaining to medical treatment and
a patient may refuse medical treatment. The Supreme Court has referred to the 17 Law
Commission of India report, which summarised Airedale's case in the following words. The
Supreme Court has referred to the 17th Law Commission of India report, which summarised
Airedale's case 41 in the following words: 42
4.9. If a patient capable of giving informed consent refuses to give consent or has, in
advance, refused such consent, the doctor cannot administer life support systems to continue
his life even if the doctor thinks that it is in the patient's interest to administer such system.
The patient's right to self-determination is absolute. But the duty of a doctor to save life of
a patient is not absolute. He can desist from prolonging life by artificial means if it is in the
best interests of the patient. Such an omission is not an offence. The doctor or the hospital
may seek a declaration from the Court that such withholding, which is proposed, will be
lawful. The Apex Court further observed that a patient has right to care for his bodily
integrity and may refuse medication in order to die with peace and dignity especially when
his life is at the brink of extinction. This conduct of a patient may not compare with suicide
in any way. No one can be compelled to undergo forced medical intervention otherwise
doctor may be held guilty of committing ‘assault’ or ‘battery’. It is pertinent to note that this
above view is taken in view for passive euthanasia where the individual was in a permanent
vegetative state.
4.10. It is the contention of the Respondent that any law that allows euthanasia and assisted
suicide constitutes a serious violation of a government's responsibility to protect the lives of
all its citizens, without exception. The law is in violation of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, where the most fundamental human right is declared to be
the right of every innocent person to the integrity of his/her life, a right that should be
41
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, [1993] 1 All ER 821.
42
Law Commission of India, 196th Report on “Medical Treatment to Terminally 111 Patients (Protection of
Patients and Medical Practitioners” (2006).
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protected by law. That right is declared to be equal, inherent, inviolable, and inalienable
integrity is not to be made dependent on its quality at a particular time, and the right should
neither be taken away nor given away.
4.10. Therefore, considering the contentions above, legalizing active euthanasia would
violate the sanctity of life and promote self-determination in its absolute sense as although
right to die with dignity is now a fundamental right under the Constitution, however active
euthanasia would have wide implications with its legalization. In view of the “best interest
of the patient” the right to self-determination completely overrides the principle of sanctity
of life under active euthanasia.
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PRAYER
WHEREOF, in light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited
the Respondent humbly prays before this Hon’ble court that it may be pleased to adjudge and
declare that:
1. The Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable under Article 32 of the Constitution
of Indiana.
2. The Right to Die does not come under the ambit of the Right to live with dignity under
Article 21.
4. Legalizing active euthanasia would violate the sanctity of life and promote self-
And may pass any other Order or Judgement as this Hon’ble court may deem fit in the interest
of Justice, Equity, Fairness and Good Conscience.
For this act of kindness, the Respondent shall be duty bound forever pray.
SD/-
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