1 Process Overview
This paper briefly discusses the safety criteria derivation process described in Section 5.7.1 of the
Design Chapter of the ENA EG-0 Power System Earthing Guide.
Step A: Determine Pcoincidence
(Fault frequency, touch frequency & duration)
Is Pcoincidence < Negligible Limit?
Step B: Determine Pfibrillation
(Determine voltage & clearing time relevant to fault scenario.)
(Determine series impedance applicable to contact scenario
eg crushed rock, footwear, soil resistivity.)
Step C: Calculate Pfatality
Y
Pfatality = Pfibrillation . Pcoincidence
Is Pfatality < negligible limit?
N
Y
Risk/Design
Y Is Pfatality > intolerable limit?
Unacceptable
Step D Redesign to ALARA Risk
(As Low As Reasonably Achievable)
1. Determine next best mitigation
2. Should it simply be done (regardless of cost, for Power System Design
legal or policy reasons) Complete
3. Do a Risk Cost Benefit Analysis (possibly
including VoSL or VOSL)
4. Reiterate for all reasonable mitigation options.
Figure 1: Safety Criteria derivation Methodology
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1.1 Coincidence Calculations (Step A)
The first stage in the derivation process is to determine the likelihood of a person being present at the
time of a fault occurrence (i.e. Pcoinc). While not a customary assessment this is the logical first step
based upon the major significance the coincidence probability plays in the risk profile formulation.
From the equation in Step C of the flowchart, if the maximum acceptable risk of fatality is set to a
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predetermined value (e.g. 10 or 10 Pfatality target), then for a known value of fibrillation probability
there is a value of coincidence probability that determines whether the acceptable risk of fatality has
been met.
If the fault/contact coincidence probability is less than the lower limit for individual and societal risk,
then the risk associated with the hazard scenario is acceptable independent of the fibrillation
probability. Nevertheless there may be an additional reason for undertaking additional earthing or
mitigation measures at the site.
1.2 Fibrillation Probability Calculations (Step B)
If the coincidence value calculated does not meet the individual or societal ‘negligible risk’ targets
then, according to the equation in Step C of the flowchart, the fibrillation probability may be calculated
and used to reduce the fatality probability.
1.3 Calculate Fatality Probability and Assess Risk Profile (Step C)
Using the equation in Step C of the flowchart it is a simple matter to calculate the expected probability
of fatality associated with the specified fault/contact and applied voltage scenario selected. Both
individual and societal risk scenarios should be assessed against the relevant targets. Should the
outcome lie in the intolerable region the risk must be mitigated and re-assessed. If it is assessed to lie
in the ALARA region then the process as outlined in the EG-0 document should be followed.
1.3.1 Individual Fatality Risk Assessment
Using the Argon software tool, the Individual Fatality Risk Assessment can be completed as shown in
Figure 2:
Figure 2: Individual Safety Assessment.
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The output from the process is a design curve that corresponds to the specific probability of fatality
relevant to this design case. If the design is considered compliant (i.e. either has a probability of
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fatality <10 , or is in the ALARA region and deemed to be acceptable), then the design curve is valid
for designs which have the same fault/presence profile. This requires that the number and duration of
contacts be non-varying, as well as the fault frequency. The acceptable voltage/time curve has been
calculated for the range of fault durations shown, allowing for the variation in fault/contact coincidence
with variations in fault duration.
1.3.2 Societal (Multiple) Fatality Risk Assessment
To determine the compliance of a situation involving a societal presence profile, it is necessary to
calculate the societal probability of coincidence associated with multiple fatalities associated with
average exposure characteristics. This is combined with the probability of fibrillation for the design
scenario to determine the societal probability of fatality and the results can be laid over the target F-N
curve.
As a demonstration, for a particular situation involving an exposed population of 100 people (i.e.
number of people that could be reasonably expected to come in contact at one time), the following
results for societal coincidence were obtained:
Table 1: Societal (multiple fatality) F-N risk curve construction example
Probability that N will be coincident Probability that >N will be
Number of people (N)
with a fault coincident with a fault
1 6.378 x 10-3 2.36 x 10-3
2 9.93 x 10-5 3.67 x 10-5
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3 1.04 x 10 3.83 x 10
4 8.02 x 10-9 2.97 x 10-9
For a calculated probability of fibrillation of 0.37 (based upon an applied voltage, fault duration, and
series resistance), the following curve is obtained:
Societal Fatalilty Risk, Population Size = 100
Worst Case Zone: ALARA Region
Figure 3: F-N societal risk curve example.
Because some of the curve shown in Figure 3 example exists in the ALARA region, ALARA principles
are to be used to reduce the risk profile. If the calculated fatality probability lies within the ALARA
region, it is necessary to consider mitigation in the design. Therefore move on to Step D of the
procedure and consider what options are appropriate.
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