0% found this document useful (0 votes)
44 views8 pages

Appeal in Murder Case: Jesalva v. People

Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
44 views8 pages

Appeal in Murder Case: Jesalva v. People

Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v.

Jesalva

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 227306. June 19, 2017.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,[Link] ESPERANZA JESALVA


alias "ROBERT SANTOS",accused-appellant.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J : p

This appeal seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] dated September
28, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-HC-06823. The CA upheld the Decision [2] dated April 14, 2014 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, in Criminal Case No. Q-08-152149, which found accused-
appellant Roberto Esperanza Jesalva alias "Robert Santos" (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder. SCaITA

An Information dated March 31, 2008 was filed charging accused-appellant, Ryan Menieva y Labina
[3] (Menieva) and Junie Ilaw (Ilaw) for the murder of Arnel Ortigosa y Cervana [4] (Ortigosa),committed as
follows:
That on or about the 16th day of September 2007, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill with evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of Arnel [O]rtigosa y Cervana, by then and there
stabbing him with a sharp bladed instrument hitting him on the chest, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Arnel [O]rtigosa y Cervana.

That the crime was committed with qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery
when the offended party was not given opportunity to make a defense as the attack was
sudden, unexpected and without warning.

That the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength for whereas the
accused were armed with a knife and firearm of unknown caliber, the victim was unarmed.

Contrary to law. [5]

A warrant of arrest was issued against accused-appellant, Menieva and Ilaw. [6] However, only
accused-appellant was arrested. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged. [7] Trial ensued.

The facts of the case are as follows:

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 1/8


8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v. Jesalva

On September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m.,Ortigosa, his cousin Renato B. Flores (Flores) and
Manny Boy Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara Quezon City. Later, they decided to go to a
store to buy cigarettes. [8] On their way to the store, Flores noticed accused-appellant standing in a corner
near the store and staring at them. Then, accused-appellant walked away and disappeared. Later, accused-
appellant reappeared, accompanied by Menieva and Ilaw, and followed Ortigosa and his group to the store.
[9]
When accused-appellant and his companions were already in front of Ortigosa, Menieva uttered, "Nel,
ano ba yan?" and proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice with an icepick. Menieva stabbed Ortigosa first on the
right portion of his chest, then on his left armpit. As Menieva stabbed Ortigosa, Ilaw pointed a sumpak at
Ortigosa while accused-appellant pointed at Ortigosa's group and left. [10] cHECAS

After the stabbing, Ortigosa and his group tried to run back to where they were drinking. Before they
reached the place, Ortigosa fell on the ground. His companions rushed him to East Avenue Medical Center
where he died. [11]

The prosecution and defense stipulated on the testimony of Dr. Filemon C. Porciuncula, Jr. (Dr.
Porciuncula),the medico-legal assigned with the Central Police District Crime Laboratory on September 16,
2007. Dr. Porciuncula conducted a post-mortem examination on Ortigosa's cadaver, determined the cause
of death as stab wounds on Ortigosa's trunk and prepared Medico-Legal Report No. 599-07 and Ortigosa's
death certificate. [12]

For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant. Accused-appellant denied any participation in
Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was waiting for his sister on the corner
of Dupax Street. While waiting, he saw and heard people running and shouting which caused him to leave
the place. [13]

On April 14, 2014, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80 rendered a Decision holding that accused-
appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw to kill Ortigosa. [14] The RTC held that Flores positively identified
accused-appellant in open court as the person who stabbed Ortigosa twice with an icepick. [15] As treachery
attended the killing, the crime is murder. The RTC convicted accused-appellant, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds accused ROBERTO
ESPERANZA JESALVA alias ROBERT SANTOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Arnel Ortigosa the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P24,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against accused RYAN MENIEBA y LABINA
and JUNIE ILAW, the same to remain standing until their apprehension. aTHCSE

SO ORDERED. [16]

On September 28, 2015, the CA affirmed with modification the trial court's Decision and held that
conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the three accused. [17] The CA, however,
differed with the RTC's findings regarding accused-appellant's participation in the crime. It determined that it
was Menieva who stabbed Ortigosa and that accused-appellant's participation before, during and after the

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 2/8


8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v. Jesalva

incident was confined to the following: (1) accompanying Menieva and Ilaw to the store where Ortigosa and
his group were; and (2) pointing at the group while Ortigosa was stabbed. [18] The CA also held that the
damages awarded shall earn interest at 6% per annum from finality of judgment until fully satisfied. [19]

Hence, this appeal.

On February 9, 2017, accused-appellant filed a Manifestation In Lieu of Supplemental Brief [20]


requesting that his appellant's brief be adopted as his supplemental brief. On February 13, 2017, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Supplemental Brief [21]
stating that it would no longer file a supplemental brief as it has already substantially and exhaustively
responded to and refuted accused-appellant's arguments in its appellee's brief.

The appeal is meritorious.

As a general rule, we accord respect to the factual findings of the trial court as it is in a better
position to evaluate the testimonial evidence. [22] The rule finds an even more stringent application where
the said findings are sustained by the CA. [23] This rule, however, admits of exceptions, to wit:

But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which can affect the result of the case, this Court is
duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands second only to
life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. x x x [24]

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant conspired with
Menieva and Ilaw in committing the crime of murder.

Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and
purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. [25] We explained the reason for the rule, thus: AHDacC

As a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold, conspiracy requires conclusive proof if we are to maintain in full strength the substance
of the time-honored principle of criminal law requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt before
conviction. x x x [26]

Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a
common purpose to commit the crime. [27] It is not sufficient, however, that the attack be joint and
simultaneous for simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action
and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. It is necessary that the assailants be
animated by one and the same purpose. [28] We held:

"To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need
not even take part in every act x x x. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and
different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole
collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 3/8


8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v. Jesalva

act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals." [29]
Both the RTC and the CA ruled that conspiracy was duly established. In particular, the CA
concluded:
In the present case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the
three (3) accused. From the prosecution's evidence, [Flores] saw accused-appellant at the
corner of the street, who initially disappeared and re-appeared with co-accused [Menieva and
Ilaw].While [Menieva] was stabbing the victim, [Ilaw] was pointing a "sumpak" at the latter,
with the accused-appellant pointing his finger at them before leaving.

[Flores] positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who accompanied


his co-accused [Menieva and Ilaw].He described accused-appellant's participation before the
incident, during the incident, i.e.,while the victim was being stabbed by his co-accused
[Menieva],and after the incident. Evidently, the accused-appellant and company all acted in
confabulation in furtherance of their common design and purpose, i.e.,to kill the victim. Thus,
the court a quo correctly held that conspiracy is present. [30] (Citation omitted.)

We disagree.

To determine if accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw, the focus of the inquiry should
necessarily be the overt acts of accused-appellant before, during and after the stabbing incident. [31]

On accused-appellant's acts before the stabbing incident, the OSG argues that conspiracy to kill
Ortigosa is evident considering the proximity in time between accused-appellant's walking away and re-
appearing accompanied by Menieva and Ilaw. To the OSG, it can be reasonably inferred that when
accused-appellant disappeared, he sought the help of Menieva and Ilaw to carry out the evil plan against
Ortigosa or that accused-appellant signaled the arrival of the victim for his group to execute their criminal
design. [32] cAaDHT

This argument is speculative and remains unsubstantiated. More, it falters as there is no evidence
that accused-appellant and his co-accused had any enmity or grudge against the deceased. In the absence
of strong motives on their part to kill the deceased, it cannot safely be concluded that they conspired to
commit the crime. [33] Likewise, there is no evidence showing that accused-appellant was purposely waiting
for Ortigosa at the time and place of the incident and that Menieva and Ilaw were on standby, awaiting for
accused-appellant's signal. Surely, accused-appellant could not have anticipated that on September 16,
2007, at around 1:00 a.m.,Ortigosa and his group would pass by and go to the store to buy cigarettes.

During and after the stabbing incident, Flores testified that what accused-appellant did during the
stabbing was to point at them before walking away. On cross, Flores admitted that accused-appellant did
not inflict any injury on Ortigosa:
CROSS EXAMINATION OF ATTY. BANDAO

Atty. Bandao to Witness


Q: A while ago, Mr. Witness, you testified that in the early morning of September 16, 2007,
you were in the company of one Arnel Ortigosa, is that correct?

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 4/8


8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v. Jesalva

CROSS EXAMINATION OF ATTY. BANDAO

Witness
A: Yes, sir.

Atty. Bandao
Q: Now, you claimed that while you were in the company of Arnel Ortigosa, it was then that
Ryan Menieba stabbed him, is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, as far as the accused Robert Santos is concerned, you would agree with me that
he never inflicted any physical injuries or whatever kind of injury to Arnel Ortigosa?

A: Yes, sir. [34] (Emphasis in the original.)


Accused-appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act which shows that
accused-appellant acted in concert with his co-accused to cause the death of Ortigosa. We stress that mere
knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is
not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the
main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active
participation in the furtherance of the common design or purpose. [35] Likewise, where the only act
attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to
its ripening into an overt act, there is no conspiracy. [36] In this case, while accused-appellant's presence
and act of pointing at the victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was ready to
assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no conspiracy. IDSEAH

We emphasize that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. A
conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and
presumption. [37] We repeat:

Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every turn. It


is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances. As such, it must be
established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied
is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt. [38] (Citation omitted.)

In the absence of conspiracy, accused-appellant is responsible only for the consequences of his own
acts. [39] In this case, all that accused-appellant did was to stare and point at the victim and his companions.
These, however, are not crimes.

Neither can accused-appellant be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation nor an


accomplice in the crime of murder. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or
intentionally rendered which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be
executed. Thus, to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice, the
accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. [40] In this case, nothing
in the records shows that accused-appellant knew Menieva was going to stab Ortigosa, thus creating a
doubt as to accused-appellant's criminal intent.

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 5/8


8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v. Jesalva

Indeed, absent any evidence to create the moral certainty required to convict accused-appellant, we
cannot uphold the trial court's finding of guilt. Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond
reasonable doubt before any person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty, or even
property. The hypothesis of his guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with all
of them. [41] Moral certainty, not mere possibility, determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. [42]

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
ROBERTO ESPERANZA JESALVA alias "Robert Santos" is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Accordingly, he is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is lawfully held for another
cause. HCaDIS

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr.,Bersamin, Reyes and Tijam, JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo,pp. 2-13. Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, with Associate Justices Stephen C.
Cruz and Pedro B. Corales, concurring.

2. CA rollo,pp. 12-17. Penned by Presiding Judge Charito B. Gonzales.

3. Also referred to as "Menieba" in some parts of the records.

4. Also referred to as "Artigosa" in some parts of the records.

5. CA rollo,pp. 10-11.

6. RTC records, p. 17.

7. [Link] 24.

8. TSN, November 8, 2011, pp. 3-5.

9. RTC records, pp. 9-10.

10. TSN, November 8, 2011, pp. 4-5.

11. TSN, November 8, 2011, pp. 5-6.

12. RTC records, pp. 111-114.

13. TSN, December 3, 2013, pp. 3-5.

14. CA rollo,p. 17.

15. [Link] 15.

16. [Link] 17.

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 6/8


8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v. Jesalva

17. Rollo,pp. 7-8.

18. Id.

19. Rollo,p. 12.

20. [Link] 23-27.

21. [Link] 28-29.

22. Quidet v. People,G.R. No. 170289, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 1, 11.

23. People v. Cial,G.R. No. 191362, October 9, 2013, 707 SCRA 285, 292, citing People v. Amistoso,G.R.
No. 201447, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 376, 387-388.

24. Quidet v. People,supra.

25. [Link] 10.

26. People v. Tividad,G.R. No. L-21469, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 549, 554.

27. People v. Campos,G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011, 653 SCRA 99, 113.

28. People v. Vistido,G.R. No. L-31582, October 26, 1977, 79 SCRA 616, 621-622.

29. People v. Medice,G.R. No. 181701, January 18, 2012, 663 SCRA 334, 345-346, citing People v. de
Jesus,G.R. No. 134815, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 384, 404.

30. Rollo,pp. 7-8.

31. Quidet v. People,supra note 22 at 12.

32. CA rollo,p. 67.

33. Quidet v. People,supra note 22 at 15.

34. TSN, November 8, 2011, pp. 7-8.

35. People v. Mandao,G.R. No. 135048, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 292, 299.

36. [Link] 304.

37. Li v. People,G.R. No. 127962, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 217, 232-233.

38. People v. Cupino,G.R. No. 125688, April 3, 2000, 329 SCRA 581, 595.

39. Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,G.R. Nos. 43527 & 43745, July 3, 1990, 187 SCRA 123, 133.

40. People v. Elijorde,G.R. No. 126531, April 21, 1999, 306 SCRA 188, 197.

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 7/8


8/9/24, 2:36 PM G.R. No. 227306 | People v. Jesalva

41. People v. Roche,G.R. No. 115182, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 91, 114, citing Pepito v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 119942, July 8, 1999, 310 SCRA 128, 143.

42. People v. Mandao,supra note 35 at 305, citing People v. Albacin,G.R. No. 133918, September 13,
2000, 340 SCRA 249, 261-262.

[Link] v. Jesalva&refNo=G.R. No. 227306 8/8

Common questions

Powered by AI

To establish conspiracy in a criminal case, it must be shown that two or more persons agreed on the commission of a felony and decided to commit it. Unity of action and purpose is essential, and its elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The acts before, during, and after the commission of the crime may infer the existence of conspiracy, but mere concurrence in time or place is insufficient . In the case of the accused-appellant, the prosecution failed to provide evidence beyond reasonable doubt proving that the accused conspired with Menieva and Ilaw to murder Ortigosa, merely being present and pointing at the group was not considered an overt act of complicity .

This case underscores the necessity of concrete evidence for any conspiracy charge. It highlights that overt, intentional actions must demonstrate collective criminal intent and purpose. Presence at the crime scene or indirect suggestions of approval without evidence of a joint plan or active role are insufficient for conviction, reinforcing the principle of presumption of innocence .

The acquittal underscores the principle that legal responsibility for a crime is personal. Without proving that the accused-appellant undertook actions that materially contributed to the crime with intent, the court could not impose liability for actions solely carried out by Menieva and Ilaw. The accused-appellant's mere knowledge or passive approval of the crime without active participation does not establish criminal liability .

Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, as it can be inferred from the accused's actions before, during, and after the crime if they indicate a common purpose to commit the crime. However, the evidence must conclusively demonstrate unity of action and purpose, which was not sufficiently shown in this case. The accused merely pointing to the victim and his group did not provide strong enough evidence of a conspiracy to murder Ortigosa .

Motive plays a critical role in reinforcing the existence of a conspiracy. In this case, the absence of a proven motive for the accused-appellant to harm Ortigosa weakened the prosecution's argument for conspiracy. Without evidence showing any grudge or intent to harm Ortigosa, the inference of a conspiratorial agreement lacks substance. The court requires a demonstrated criminal intent to substantiate the claim of conspiracy .

In a hypothetical scenario where a conspiracy could be proven, suppose the accused-appellant, Menieva, and Ilaw were caught planning the attack on Ortigosa through recorded conversations or messages, discussing logistics and roles in executing the crime. Furthermore, evidence such as surveillance footage capturing coordinated and prepared actions before, during, and after the crime, with direct involvement (e.g., handing over the weapon or restraining the victim), could significantly strengthen the establishment of conspiracy compared to the vague presence and pointing observed in this case .

The principle of 'proof beyond reasonable doubt' dictates that the prosecution must establish the guilt of the accused with a high level of certainty. In this case, the lack of evidence directly linking the accused-appellant to a conspiracy with Menieva and Ilaw against Ortigosa resulted in an acquittal. The prosecution's failure to demonstrate overt acts indicative of conspiratorial behavior beyond the accused's mere presence and pointing gestures illustrates a failure to meet this burden of proof .

The case demonstrates the judicial system's commitment to protecting individual rights through requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt for convictions, thus preventing unjust penalization based on presumptions. This approach ensures that the liberty of individuals like the accused-appellant is not compromised by speculation or insufficient evidence, while maintaining the course for justice by recognizing the severity and irreversibility of wrongful convictions .

Moral certainty requires that the evidence presented achieves a high degree of conviction, aligning with established facts and logically excluding other hypotheses. In contrast, mere possibility or speculative inference lacks concrete, irrefutable connections between facts and supposed actions of the accused. In this case, speculation about the accused-appellant's role based on gestures did not meet the rigorous standards required for moral certainty .

Passive presence refers to being at the scene without engaging in or encouraging the criminal act, whereas active participation involves actions knowingly contributing to the crime's execution. In the case, accused-appellant's presence and pointing were deemed passive, lacking the intent or action necessary for active participation in Menieva's attack on Ortigosa, failing to establish conspiracy .

You might also like