Prepared By: Gulaliii Visiting lecturer University of Lakki Marwat.

Phases of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

1. Exploration and Friendship with All 1947-53:

i. Foundations of the Foreign Policy:

Policy of Quaid-e-Azam

Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan and its first Governor-
General, gave two special talks on radio to introduce Pakistan to the people of the United
States and Australia. He expressed a strong desire to develop friendly ties with other states on
the eve of his meeting with the special representative of the King of Afghanistan in
December 1947. Similar views were expressed when the first ambassadors of Burma
(January 1948), France (January 1948), the United States (February 1948), Turkey (March
1948) and Afghanistan (May 1948) presented their credentials. Outlining the goals of foreign
policy, Jinnah declared:

“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards the nations of the world. We
do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle
of honesty and fair-play in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our
utmost contribution to promotion of peace and prosperity among nations of world. Pakistan
will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and
suppressed peoples of world, and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter”.

ii. Membership of United Nations

Pakistan joined the United Nations on September 30, 1947, as a new member and stayed in
the Commonwealth. Its leadership established contacts with other states, emphasizing
friendship with all, promotion of peace and harmony, support for liberation of the colonized
people, and a strict observance of the principles of international conduct as enshrined in the
UN Charter.

iii. Relations with India

Most of these problems were the product of the partition process, as set out in the 3rd June
1947 Plan and the Indian Independence Act, July 1947. These included

 The division of funds and other assets such as arms, equipment and stores.
 The large scale killing of people at the time of independence
 The subsequent communal riots.
 The religious minorities in the two states.
 The disposal of evacuee property.
 The river-water dispute.

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 The accession of the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu and
Kashmir.
 The outbreak of the first Kashmir war (1947-48).

On top of this were the statements of a number of Indian leaders, including those
belonging to the ruling Congress party, regretting the establishment of Pakistan. Some
even talked about the reunification of India and Pakistan.

iv. Relations with Afghanistan

What compounded Pakistan's security concerns were Afghanistan's irredentist claims on

Pakistani territory. The Afghanistan government refused to recognize Pakistan's sovereignty
over North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan and made divergent claims on
these provinces, which ranged from a demand for the right of self-determination for
Pashtuns/Pathans living in Pakistan and establishment of an independent state comprising
NWFP and Baluchistan, to the incorporation of parts of these provinces into Afghanistan.

India endorsed Afghanistan's claims on Pakistan, and, in mid-1950s, Soviet Union extended a
similar support to Afghanistan in retaliation to Pakistan's participation in US-sponsored
defense pacts. Pakistan's policy makers felt threatened by the spectra of Soviet backed Indo-
Afghan military pressure. The security against such potential threats emerged as cardinal
concern of Pakistan.

v. The Security Imperatives

The security imperatives led the policy makers to pay special attention to the reorganization
of the armed forces that Pakistan inherited after the division of the British Indian military.
Almost all units of the armed forces were regrouped and a new organizational and
administrative network had to be created for them. Pakistan purchased some weapons and
military equipment from a number of Western states for modernization of the three services
of armed forces. British officers were retained and some Pakistani officers were sent to Great
Britain and other Commonwealth states for training. However, pace of modernization was
rather slow until Pakistan joined West-sponsored security pacts in 1954-55.

vi. Relations with USA, USSR and China

Pakistan started with an independent foreign policy and cultivated relations with US, Soviet
Union, and China. United States felicitated the establishment of Pakistan and ambassadorial
level relations were resumed in February 1948.

The Soviet attitude towards establishment of Pakistan was indifferent. Though Pakistan and
the Soviet Union agreed to establish diplomatic relations in April 1948, it was not until
December 1949 that Pakistan's first ambassador resumed his assignment in Moscow. The
Soviet ambassador took up his position in Karachi in March 1950.

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Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognize the People's Republic of China in the first
week of January 1950. The ambassadors of China and Pakistan presented their credentials in
September and November 1951 respectively.

An opportunity to change Soviet indifference knocked in June 1949, when the Soviet Union
invited Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, for an official visit. The invitation
was accepted but the visit did not materialize. Instead, Liaquat Ali Khan visited the United
States in May 1950, and his speeches and statements during this visit manifested a strong pro-
West disposition of the Pakistan government. The Soviet leadership was unhappy over
Liaquat Ali Khan's decision not to visit the Soviet Union.

vii. Relations with Muslim Countries

Pakistan attached importance to its relations with Muslims countries. It actively championed
the cause of Muslims all over world and worked towards promoting harmony & co-operation
amongst Muslim states. It sponsored several unofficial conferences for cultivating a broad-
based consensus on setting up an organization representing all Muslim states. The leaders of
most Muslim states did not show interest in establishing an international forum of the Muslim
states. Some Muslim states ignored Pakistan's initiative; other extended a cautious approval;
still others did not favor the idea.

Indonesia and Egypt had strong reservations about Pakistan's efforts to promote unity in the
Muslim world. Afghanistan was also not prepared to endorse Pakistan's efforts. Pakistani
leadership was disappointed by the response of the Muslim leaders. Pakistan was, however,
able to cultivate very cordial relations with Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

2. Alignment with the West 1953-62:

The second phase of Pakistan's foreign policy was characterized by a transition from an
independent foreign policy to a multifaceted alignment with West. Pakistan entered into a
number of security arrangements with US and obtained economic and military assistance
from that source which entangled Pakistan in Cold War between US and Soviet Union.

Pakistan's alignment policy was shaped primarily by its acute sense of insecurity within the
regional context. Pakistan's security problems primarily with India and secondarily with
Afghanistan were catalyst to Pakistan's frantic search for allies.

The deepening economic crisis in the early 1950s also contributed to this decision. In early
1952, the prices of jute and cotton began to drop in the International market which adversely
affected Pakistan's foreign trade.

Pakistan was also faced with a serious shortage of wheat in 1952-53. The United States came
for Pakistan's rescue by offering a gift of wheat in 1953 which helped to overcome food
shortages and built a lot of goodwill in Pakistan for the donor.

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The choice of United States was not surprising. Apart from US willingness to offer assistance
as a part of its global strategy for the containment of communism, Pakistan leaders had
already given ample evidence of their pro-West disposition.

Their distrust of Soviet Union was quite known which was reinforced by the unearthing of a
pro-Soviet “Rawalpindi Conspiracy” (1951) to dislodge the government in Pakistan. Liaquat
Ali Khan's successors were politically weak and they thought that American economic and
military aid would reinforce their position in the body politic.

The top-brass of the military made a significant contribution towards building Pakistan-US
relationship. They put their weight in favor of the United States because, in their opinion, the
West was more advanced in economic and technical fields and that the West had sufficient
resources and determination to support its allies.

i. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement

In February 1954, Pakistan agreed on the US initiative to develop close cooperation with
Turkey in the political, economic and cultural spheres. A formal Turkey-Pakistan Agreement
was signed in April 1954, followed by a “Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement” between
the United States and Pakistan in May. The Unites States agreed to provide military
equipment, training facilities and other related services to enable Pakistan to maintain “its
international security, its legitimate self-defense or to permit it to participate in the defense of
area or in the United Nations collective security arrangements and measures.” Pakistan was
obliged not to use the assistance provided under this agreement for undertaking “any act of
aggression against any other nation.” It could not use this assistance for purposes other than
those specified in the agreement.

ii. South East Asia Treaty Organization

In September 1954, Pakistan joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the
Manila Pact. Its members (Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Philippines, Thailand and the US) undertook to develop capacity “to resist attack and counter
subversive activities” and promote cooperation for “economic progress and social
wellbeing.” They pledged that an armed aggression or threat to territorial integrity of a
member state would be considered a threat to all, and that they would consult each other in
order to meet such a challenge. The United States made it clear that the SEATO pledge
applied only to communist aggression or subversion. Pakistan's plea to include all kinds of
aggression was not accepted. (India or Afghanistan)

iii. Baghdad Pact

One year later in September 1955, Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact renamed CENTO in
1959 after Iraq's withdrawal. Pakistan attached greater importance to this pact because it
involved three Muslim states, i.e. Iraq (up to 1959), Turkey and Iran. Great Britain was also
its member; the United States maintained close links with it and participated in its military
committee. The members of the Baghdad Pact agreed to cooperate with each other in the field
of defense and security. The United States made it clear that its participation in military

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committee and assistance for strengthening the defensive capability of the member states
pertained “solely to communist menace and [carried] no connotations with respect to intra-
area matters.”

iv. Defense and Economic Assistance from USA

A bilateral agreement of co-operation was signed between Pakistan and the United States in
March 1959, as an executive understanding. Its preamble declared that US regarded “as vital
to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of independence and integrity of
Pakistan.” Article 2 of agreement provided that US would supply military and economic
assistance to Pakistan as may be mutually agreed upon “in order to assist the government of
Pakistan in preservation of its national independence and integrity and in effective promotion
of its economic development.” Pakistan reciprocated by providing a communication/air base
to the United States at Badaber, near Peshawar, for ten years i.e. from 1959 to 1969.

Pakistan's alignment with the United States yielded several advantages. American economic
assistance grants, loans, goods and services gave a boost to Pakistan's faltering economy. The
most significant contribution was in the field of defense and security where the two states
developed very close ties. Pakistan received grant assistance valued at $650 million, and
credit facilities worth $55 million. The military assistance included arms and ammunition,
artillery pieces, and transport for the Army, aircraft F-104, B-57, F-86, and C-130 for Air
Force, naval defense equipment, including warships, radar and communication equipment.

The US Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG) was set up in Pakistan to advise
and guide the modernization of armed forces and security arrangements. A number of
divisions were re-equipped, and a few new ones were raised, coupled with restructuring of
the defense system. Training facilities in Pakistan were improved and a good number of
Pakistan military officers were sent to United States on different training courses. Pakistan's
Air Force and Navy took part in joint CENTO exercises which enabled them to gain
invaluable experience.

v. Cost of Alignment with West

The alignment with the West was not cost-free. Pakistan's independent foreign policy was
compromised and the prospects for improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union
suffered heavily. The Soviet leaders were extremely perturbed by this development and they
resorted to a two-pronged strategy against Pakistan.

I. First, the Soviet leaders made a blistering criticism of Pakistan's alignment with US and
threatened Pakistan with dire consequences if Pakistan allowed its territory to be used against
Soviet Union.

II. Second, they extended support to India on Kashmir question, describing it an integral part
of India. They also supported Afghanistan's claims on Pakistani territory.

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Pakistan also lost ground with the developing countries. Pakistan was very active in
organizing the Bandung Conference in 1955 but, when spirit of Bandung crystallized into the
Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, Pakistan was excluded because of its participation
in defense pacts.

Despite Pakistan's respect for US security sensitivities, the latter was not prepared to extend
enough diplomatic support to Pakistan in its problems with India. This raised doubts in
Pakistan about the credibility of American support. If Pakistanis were skeptical of American
commitment, questions were raised in US as early as 1957 about the advisability of relying
on Pakistan as a defender of American interest vis-à-vis Soviet Union. However, two sides
played down their difference and continued to cooperate with each other for different reasons.

vi. Relations with China

China avoided an open condemnation of Pakistan's participation in these pacts and showed a
remarkable understanding of the factors that led Pakistan to join the Western camp. However,
Pakistan maintained a safe distance from China and its policy on the seating of China in the
UN wavered; it was more in line with the US Perspective.

3. Transition 1962-71:

i. Re-thinking about Alignment Policy

Pakistan's policy-makers began a review of their alignment with the US in early 1960s as
strains manifested in their relations. Two major developments contributed to this.

 Pakistan was perturbed by the Soviet threat of retaliation when it downed an American
spy plane, U-2, which had taken off from Badaber.
 Importance of land bases declined because United States developed ICBM and nuclear
submarines fitted with missiles. Furthermore, the Kennedy administration, installed in
January 1961, cultivated India and projected it as a counterweight to China.

Pakistan viewed this shift in American policy with concern. In July, 1961, President Ayub
Khan, on a visit to US, cautioned his hosts against the changes in their policy towards South
Asia and highlighted the importance of Pakistan by suggesting that “if there is real trouble,
there is no other country in Asia on whom you will be able to count. The only people who
will stand by you are people of Pakistan, provided you are also prepared to stand by them.”

Despite Ayub Khan's pleadings, the US continued with its policy of cultivating India in total
disregard to Pakistan's concerns. The U.S. and a number of other Western states rushed
weapons and military equipment to India after the Sino-Indian border war in October 1962.
They also conducted joint military exercises with India and offered a nuclear umbrella to
India. Pakistan was perturbed by these developments. What baffled the Pakistani leaders most
was that Pakistan was supplied military equipment in the 1950s only after it joined the US-
sponsored military pacts which incurred diplomatic cost for Pakistan in terms of its relations

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with the developing countries and a number of Muslim states. However, India was not asked
to make any security related commitment in return for arms transfers.

ii. Improving Relations with Soviet Union

Disappointed by the change in the U.S. policy, the Pakistani leaders decided to review
Pakistan’s alignment with the West. Initially, they decided to diversify their interaction in the
international system by improving ties with the socialist countries on mutually beneficial
considerations. Pakistan took a number of steps to improve its relations with Soviet Union
and China during 1961-63.

 They entered into number of agreements for economic and technical cooperation. In
1961, the Soviets offered credit and technical assistance for oil exploration in
Pakistan.
 During visits of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and President Ayub
Khan to Moscow in January and April 1965, new avenues of cooperation were
explored. Ayub Khan was the first head of Pakistani state to visit the Soviet Union.
 Several agreements covering trade, cultural exchanges and machinery for oil
exploration were formulated. Soviet Union consented to assist Pakistan in
implementing 30 development projects during 3rd five-years plan (1965-70).
 Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) resumed its regular air service to china on April
29, 1964. A similar air service was started for Moscow in the same month.

Pakistan began to plead for the seating for china in the UN and supported China in its efforts
to neutralize American efforts to isolate it at the international level. Chinese were equally
supportive of Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. Zhou Enlai declared Chinese
support to the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir during his visit to
Pakistan in February 1964. They reaffirmed their solidarity with Pakistan during Ayub
Khan's visit to Beijing in March 1965, and stood by Pakistan during the latter's war with
India, first in the Rann of Kutch area (April-May 1965), and then the full-fledged armed
conflict (September 1965). They also began to supply weapons and military equipment to
Pakistan in early 1966.

The scope of Pakistan-China cooperation continued to extend in the diplomatic, economic

(including trade), security, and cultural fields in the subsequent years. The visits of Chinese
President Liu Chao Chi, and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi (March 1966), Zhou Enlai (stopover
visit in June 1966), President Yahya Khan (November 1970) and several senior military
officers, showed that they attached importance to their bilateral relations, and consulted each
other regularly on matters of mutual interest.

iii. Improving Relations with China

Pakistan's relations with China improved more rapidly during the same period. They signed
several agreements in 1963 to expand their bilateral relations.

 These included an agreement on trade, commerce and shipping in January 1963.

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 A border agreement for demarcation of Pakistan-China boundary in March 1963

 An air services agreement in August.
 A barter trade agreement in September.
 Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) resumed its regular air service to china on April
29, 1964. A similar air service was started for Moscow in the same month.

Pakistan began to plead for the seating for china in the UN and supported China in its efforts
to neutralize American efforts to isolate it at the international level. Chinese were equally
supportive of Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. Zhou Enlai declared Chinese
support to the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir during his visit to
Pakistan in February 1964. They reaffirmed their solidarity with Pakistan during Ayub
Khan's visit to Beijing in March 1965, and stood by Pakistan during the latter's war with
India, first in the Rann of Kutch area (April-May 1965), and then the full-fledged armed
conflict (September 1965). They also began to supply weapons and military equipment to
Pakistan in early 1966.

The scope of Pakistan-China cooperation continued to extend in the diplomatic, economic

(including trade), security, and cultural fields in the subsequent years. The visits of Chinese
President Liu Chao Chi, and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi (March 1966), Zhou Enlai (stopover
visit in June 1966), President Yahya Khan (November 1970) and several senior military
officers, showed that they attached importance to their bilateral relations, and consulted each
other regularly on matters of mutual interest.

iv. Diminishing Ties with US

The United States was unhappy over Pakistani's efforts to improve its relations with Soviet
Union and China. The US described Sino-Pakistan air agreement as “an unfortunate breach of
free world solidarity.” It advised Pakistan not to invite Zhou En Lai for an official visit in
1964.

Pakistan did not listen to the U.S. advice. The latter retaliated by withdrawing the offer of
financial assistance for the construction of a new airport at Dhaka, Ayub Khan's schedule
visit to the U.S in April 1965 was postponed. The same happened with meeting of Aid-to-
Pakistan Consortium which was to consider Pakistan's request for aid for 3rd five-years plan.

The divergence between the two states widened as Pakistan was unable to invoke any
security arrangement with United States during course of its war with India in September
1965. The United States imposed an arms embargo on South Asia which adversely affected
Pakistan's combat effectiveness because, unlike India, Pakistan's defense procurement was
almost entirely American. The embargo was partly eased in March 1966 to allow the sale of
non-lethal military equipment (i.e. trucks, medical and engineering supplies and
communication items). One year later, the United States allowed the sale of spare parts for
the military equipment supplied in the past. No new combat equipment was allowed to be
sold to either country but Pakistan was provided with some arms and equipment during 1970-
71 as a “special onetime exception” extended by President Nixon. A total embargo was re-
imposed when a new war broke out between Pakistan and India in November 1971.

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Pakistan procured weapons and military equipment from several non-American sources.
China was the most important source of supply of weapons in the post-1965 war period.
Some equipment was secured through Iran and Turkey. It also secured weapons from France,
Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union. Pakistan also decided to pay more
attention to indigenous production of weapons and defense equipment.

v. Pluralistic Perspective

Pakistan, thus, moved away from the policy of alignment with the West to an independent
and pluralist perspective on foreign relations. It vowed to cultivate mutually advantageous
bilateral relations with all states irrespective of their ideological disposition and argued that
its interaction with one state would neither influence its relations with any other state nor
were these ties directed against any particular state.

Thus, while expanding its relations with the Soviet Union and China, it did not abandon its
membership of the US-sponsored pacts, although their importance was downgraded. It was
Pakistan's determination to pursue an independent foreign policy that it did not endorse Asian
Collective Security System advocated by the Soviet Union in 1969. This proposal envisaged
the establishment of a Soviet-oriented collectivity of states in the backdrop of the widening
rift between the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan, having developed distaste for bloc
politics, could not be inclined towards this proposal. Moreover, Pakistan had cultivated very
friendly and cordial relations with China and it did not want to be a party to any political
networking directly or indirectly aimed at China.

vi. Relations with India

Crisis in East Pakistan and International Response Pakistan's relations with India continued to
be characterized by conflicting national aspirations and mutual distrust. The Kashmir
problem was the major stumbling block in the normalization of their relations. Six rounds of
talks were held between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan on Kashmir during
December 1962 and May 1963 on the initiate of the UK and the US. These talks proved
inconclusive because the two sides refused to show any flexibility in their positions on
Kashmir.

Pakistan and India engaged in following three wars during this period.

 The first war was limited to the Rann of Kutch, an area situated on the Sindh-Gujarat
border, in April-May 1965.
 A full-blown war in September 1965, involving three services of the armed forces.
 India and Pakistan again went to war against the backdrop of the civil strife in the then
East Pakistan in November-December 1971. This war came to an end when Pakistani
troops surrendered to Indian troop in East Pakistan on 16 December 1971. East
Pakistan emerged as an independent state of Bangladesh.

vii. Crisis in East Pakistan and International Response

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The Soviets were disappointed by Pakistan's response to the Asian Collective Security Plan
which brought about a degree of restraint in their interaction with Pakistan. They did not,
therefore, hesitate to send a terse letter to President Yahya Khan after Pakistan embarked on
military action in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) on March 25, 1971. The Soviets were also
perturbed by Pakistan's role in bringing about Sino-American rapprochement in July 1971
which set the stage for U.S. President Nixon's visit to Beijing in February 1972.

Soviets perceived this as the beginning of a Sino-American understanding to their determent.

Since Pakistan was instrumental to the establishment of these ties, the Soviets decided to fall
back on India to pressure Pakistan. Soviet foreign Minister visited New Delhi in August 1971
and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which encouraged India to adopt a more
strident policy towards the civil strife in East Pakistan. India invoked Article 9 of this treaty
in October to secure concrete Soviet support for its policy on the East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
crisis. The Soviets not only extended diplomatic support but also airlifted arms and
equipment to strengthen India's inter-ventionary policies in East Pakistan and its invasion in
November 1971. Accusing Pakistan of resorting to aggression against India, the Soviet Union
exercised veto power thrice in UN Security Council on December 5, 6, and 13, 1971, to stall
a ceasefire resolution, which gave India enough time to overrun East Pakistan.

The United States and China did not endorse Pakistan's military action in East Pakistan but
they avoided any public criticism of Pakistan's policies. Expressing support for the territorial
integrity of Pakistan, the United States endeavored to encourage Pakistan to seek a political
solution to the Bangladesh crisis. Similarly, China extended strong diplomatic support to
Pakistan but advised for a political settlement of the problem.

4. Bilateralism and Non-alignment 1972-79:

The independent approach to world affairs initiated in the mid-1960s shaped up into a policy
of bilateralism and non-alignment during this phase. The mutuality of interests rather than
permanent alignment was the main criterion for cultivating relations with the US, Soviet
Union and China. It was not a policy of equidistance from these states but emphasized
mutuality of interests at the bilateral level without alienating one for the sake of the other.

Pakistan withdrew from the Commonwealth and the SEATO in January and November 1972
respectively. It may be pointed out here that Pakistan returned to the Commonwealth in
September 1989. Pakistan recognized the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea),
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and East Germany in November 1972.

Pakistan diversified interaction by giving more attention to developing economic, trade and
diplomatic relations with the states of Eastern Europe, especially Yugoslavia and Rumania.
Similar interaction was cultivated with several states in Asia, Africa and South and Central
America, hitherto neglected by Pakistan's policy makers.

An important offshoot of independent and non-aligned foreign policy was Pakistan's greater
identification with causes and issues of developing countries. It advocated the restructuring of

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the international economic order to make it more responsive to the needs and aspirations of
developing world.

Pakistan attended the Non-aligned Summit as an observer in 1976 and formally became its
member in September 1979. Earlier in March 1979, Pakistan withdrew from the CENTO.

i. Pak-India Relations towards Improvement

The most perplexing problem faced by Pakistan during this period related to the issues and
problems arising out of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, resulting in the breakup of East Pakistan
and its establishment as an independent state.

India and Pakistan signed a peace agreement at Shimla on July 2, 1972 for dealing with 1971
war related issues which included:

 Return of Pakistani prisoners of war in Indian custody.

 Bangladesh’s threat to put 195 Pakistani POWs on war trials.
 Withdrawal of Indian Pakistani troops on West Pakistan-India border.
 Recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan.
 Normalization of Indo-Pakistan relations.

These issues were tackled during 1972-76. Pakistan recognized Bangladesh in February 1974
on eve of 2nd Islamic Summit Conference held at Lahore. Bangladesh reciprocated by
withdrawing its demand for war trials of 195 Pakistani POWs. These developments produced
a noticeable improvement in Pakistan-India relations. However they continued to view each
other as major adversary. Pakistan was perturbed by India's policy of not relenting on military
build-up and especially the detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974.

ii. Strengthening of Ties with Major Powers

Pakistan's relations with the major powers continued to be based on bilateralism and
mutuality of interests. The friendly ties that developed between Pakistan and China in 1960s
were strengthened during this period. The top civil and military leaders visited each other
quite frequently for consultation on bilateral relations and international and regional affairs.
These meetings produced unanimity of views on most matters and China reiterated its
support to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. A secure and independent
Pakistan was main feature of China's South Asia policy. Their interaction in cultural,
scientific and technological fields also expanded and China made a significant contribution to
Pakistan's economic and industrial (including defense industry) development. It was the main
source of weapon procurement for Pakistan.

Pakistan succeeded in defusing antagonism that marked its relations with Soviet Union
against the backdrop of Bangladesh crisis. The visits of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Moscow in

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1972 and 1974 helped the two sides to understand each other's points-of-view on regional
affairs, and they developed functional interaction, free from overt tension. Their bilateral
trade and economic cooperation expanded during these years. Pakistan's relations with China
expanded rapidly. There were frequent high level exchanges between the two countries,
including the visits of the heads of government and the top level officials of the ministries of
foreign affairs and defense. China extended financial and technological assistance for setting
up defense and civilian industry.

iii. Nuclear Technology and Relations with US

Pakistan's relations with the U.S ranged from cordiality in the beginning to sharp differences
on Pakistan's nuclear program towards the end of this phase. The US reaffirmed support to
Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity, and Z.A. Bhutto visited the US in September
1973 and February 1975 which contributed to reinforcing their bilateral relations. The US
withdrew the arms embargo in stages:

I. Sale of non-lethal equipment and spare parts in 1973

II. Cash sale of weapons on case by case basis in 1975 - a decision welcomed by Pakistan.

Sharp difference arose between Pakistan and US when, in 1976, Pakistan entered into an
agreement with France to acquire a nuclear reprocessing plant. Viewing this as a move on
Pakistan's part to acquire nuclear weapons capability, US worked towards blocking deal and
took several steps to make its displeasure on Pakistan's nuclear policy known to Pakistan:

 Withdrawal of A-7 aircraft offer (1977)

 Suspension of new economic assistance and military sales (1977-78)
 Exclusion of Pakistan from President Carter's trip to Asia when he visited, inter alia,
Iran and India (December 1977-January 1978).

In 1978, the US succeeded in convincing France to withdraw from agreement for supplying a
nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan. When US discovered that Pakistan was secretly
working on setting up uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, it suspended all economic
assistance and military sales to Pakistan in April 1979. On top of this was burning down of
US embassy in Islamabad in November 1979 by a mob, consisting mainly of the students,
which pushed Pakistan-US relations to lowest-ever point.

iv. Pakistan and Muslim World

Pakistan's relations with the Muslim states, particularly the states of the Middle East, touched
new heights of cordiality and trust. These relations served Pakistan's diplomatic, economic
and security needs in the post-1971 period. The states of the Middle East, especially the states
of the Gulf region, extended economic assistance (investment, grants and loans on soft terms)
and diplomatic support to Pakistan. They accommodated Pakistani human-power, which
brought a financial bonanza for Pakistan.

5. Afghanistan and Partnership with United States 1979-90:

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i. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 was event of far-reaching
geo-political ramifications. Pakistan viewed this development as a violation of independence
and sovereignty of neighboring, non-aligned, and Muslim state by superpower.

As Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union were often marred by strains, it felt threatened
by the idea of having to put up with a massive Soviet military presence in the neighborhood,
dreading direct military pressure or a more active Soviet support to the dissident elements in
Baluchistan and NWFP.

Pakistan demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and supported Afghan
groups, described as Afghan Mujahedeen, in their bid to dislodge Soviets from Afghanistan.
It allowed them to function from Pakistani territory and accommodated over 3 million
Afghan refugees who poured into Pakistan within year of Soviet military intervention in
Afghanistan.

ii. Revival of Pakistan-US Relations

The Afghanistan war proved a turning point in Pakistan-US relations which moved from
lowest point of 1979 to close political, economic and security ties in 1980s. US offered two
packages of economic assistance and military sales to support Pakistan's role in the war
against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Some additional assistance was provided outside of
these packages.

The first six-years assistance package (1981-87) amounted to $3.2 billion, equally divided
between economic assistance and military sales. The U.S. also sold 40 F-16 aircraft to
Pakistan during 1983-87 at cost of $ 1.2 billion outside assistance package. Pakistan paid this
amount in cash partly from its resources and partly from the funds provided by friendly Arab
states.

The second six-year assistance package (1987-93) amounted to $ 4.2 billion. Out of this $
2.28 billion were allocated for economic assistance in the form of grants or loan that carried
the interest rate of 2-3%. The rest of the allocation ($ 1.74 billion) was in the form of credit
for military purchases. The new relationship with the US increased its presence and influence
in Pakistan and the latter developed close ties with the US Central Command (Centcom)
without formally joining it. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the US’s Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked together in passing on weapons, military training and
financial support to Afghan resistance groups. They encouraged the volunteers from the Arab
states to join the Afghan resistance in its struggle against the Soviet troops based in
Afghanistan.

Despite a close Pakistan-US co-operation on Afghanistan, they diverged on Pakistan's

nuclear program, although the United States downplayed this issue and ignored Pakistan's
stride in the nuclear field in order to keep Pakistan on board for the Afghan war.

iii. Pakistan-China Relations

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Pakistan-China relations maintained their steady march towards greater cordiality and a wide
ranging cooperation in various fields. China extended full support to Pakistan in its
interaction with India and endorsed Pakistan's position on Afghanistan crisis. The barter trade
through the Karakoram Highway expanded and China assisted Pakistan in agriculture,
nuclear technology, power generation and heavy industry, especially the defense-related
industry.

iv. Pakistan and the Organization of Islamic Conference

Pakistan maintained cordial relations with the Muslim states which extended support at the
bilateral level and through the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to Pakistan on
Afghanistan issue. Some of the Muslim countries donated cash and goods for helping the
Afghan refugees living in Pakistan. New agreements for expansion of trade, promotion of
economic and technological cooperation, and establishment of joint economic commissions
were signed with several Islamic countries.

A major problem faced by Pakistan in its relations with the Muslim world was that it got
identified with conservative, monarchical and pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East and its
relations cooled off with radical and nationalist states like Libya, Syria and Iraq.

v. Pakistan-India Policy of Dialogues

Pakistan-India relations were marked by the simultaneous pursuance of positive and negative
interaction. There were periods of goodwill and relative harmony but these were short-lived.
However, the redeeming feature of their diplomacy was that they never stopped talking on
the contentious issues. Whenever there was a downward slide a standoff in their relations,
Pakistan or India took the initiative to revive the dialogue. There was more interaction
between two states in 1980s than was the case in past which kept their difference and
problem within manageable limits. Two visits of PM Rajiv Gandhi to Pakistan in December
1988 for participation in the SAARC summit conference and an official visit in July 1989
resulted in considerable improvement in their relations but the goodwill generated by these
visits did not last long.

vi. Geneva Accords on Afghanistan

The search for a negotiated settlement of Afghanistan crisis proved a long drawn affair. The
UN Secretary General's representative initiated peace talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan
in 1982 in order to find a solution to following four interrelated aspects of the Afghanistan
problem:

 Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

 Non-intervention and non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs,
 International guarantees for non-intervention and non-interference.
 The return of Afghan refugees to their homes in safety and honor.

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vii. Post-withdrawal Problems

The post-withdrawal problems, especially an intra-Afghan settlement, haunted the interested

parties to the Afghanistan crisis. The failure to resolve these problems dissuaded the
Pakistan-based refugees from returning to Afghanistan. It soon became crystal clear that
Pakistan would continue to host them for a long time. Pakistan made various attempts to
install a new government in Kabul comprising pro-Pakistan Mujahideen groups.
The US shifted its interest from Afghanistan after withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Afghanistan and left Pakistan alone to cope with the intra-Afghan conflict and a pro-Soviet
government in Kabul. It also reduced its assistance for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
In October 1990, US President George Bush refused to certify that Pakistan didn’t possess a
nuclear explosive device, triggering the imposition of sanctions against Pakistan under the
Pressler Amendment (1985) in Foreign Assistance Act. This disrupted 2nd assistance
package offered in 1987 and discontinued economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan
with the exception of the economic assistance on way to Pakistan. Military sales and training
program were abruptly disrupted and some of the Pakistani military officers under training in
the US were asked to return home.

6. Post-Cold War Era and Pakistan's Dilemmas 1990-2001:

Four major issues dominated Pakistan's foreign policy in 1990s. These were a drift in
Pakistan-US relations, Afghanistan problem, the Kashmir insurgency and its impact on Indo-
Pakistan relations, and the nuclear explosions.

i. Another Drift in Pak-US Relations

Pakistan faced hard choices in the early 1990s. US was no longer willing to underwrite
Pakistan's economic development and modernization of its military because Pakistan had lost
its strategic relevance for the US The decline of Pakistan's strategic relevance was caused by
a host of factors like the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan (1989), the revolt against the
Soviet dominated authoritarian political systems in Eastern Europe (1989-90), the end of the
Cold War (1990), and the breakup of Soviet Union (1991).

The absence of a competing superpower secured the primacy of the US in global politics and
a triumph of western values of liberal democracy and free economy. Afghanistan was no
longer a high priority issue and the US attention focused on consolidation of incipient
democratic trends in Eastern Europe and Russia and management of local and regional
irritants elsewhere.

This shifted US priorities in South Asia from seeking Pakistan's cooperation to non-
proliferation and repairing the damage caused to its relations with India due to its Pakistan-
Afghanistan policies in the 1980s. The United States imposed four types of sanctions against
Pakistan in this phase.

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I. It suspended military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan by invoking Pressler

Amendment in October 1990 in pursuance of its nonproliferation policy.

II. Additional economic sanctions were imposed on Pakistan after it exploded nuclear
devices on May 28 and 30, 1998 in response to explosions by India on May 11 and 13.

III. US imposed more sanction after military takeover in Pakistan on October 12, 1999 under
a U.S. law that called for discontinuation of economic relations with the regimes that come to
power by displacing an elected and constitutional government. The military regime led by
General Pervez Musharraf was placed under these sanctions.

IV. Fourth, limited sanctions were applied to some Pakistani institutions and organizations in
2000, 2001 and 2003 on the pretext that Pakistan received missile technology from China or
Korea in violation of the international arrangements for checking proliferation of missile
technology.

The U.S. also toyed with idea of declaring Pakistan as a terrorist state during the 1990s for
allowing its territory to be used by militant Islamic groups, Afghan war veterans and others
for launching terrorist acts in Indian administered Kashmir and elsewhere. Pakistan's support
to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (1996-2001) was another issue of contention between
Pakistan and the US. The US tried to mollify Pakistan by releasing weapons and military
equipment Pakistan had paid for before the imposition of the Pressler Amendment and
returned the money in 1996-97 Pakistan had paid for the purchase of new F-16 aircraft under
a special legislation (the Brown Amendment). It is interesting to note that the U.S. returned
the paid amount for F-16 aircraft after adjusting a part of the due amount against the price of
the gain it supplied to Pakistan in the past and storage charges for the F-16 aircraft
manufactured for Pakistan but not delivered to it.

ii. Continuation of the Afghanistan Problem

The Afghanistan problem continued to haunt Pakistan during these years. It had two aspects:
I. The refugee problem.
II. Installation of a government in Kabul that could ensure peace and stability.

Though, UN High Commissioner for Refugees launched various program for encouraging
Afghan refugees to return to their homes, majority of them stayed back. Internal strife in
Afghanistan dissuaded them to go back, a good number of them returned after spending some
time in Afghanistan. International assistance for maintenance of refugees declined, increasing
socio-economic pressures on Pakistan.

Pakistan's effort to install a pro-Pakistan Mujahideen government in Kabul did not succeed.
When the Taliban movement surfaced in the fall of 1994 in Khandhar, managers of Pakistan's
Afghanistan policy co-opted them and facilitated their strides for capturing Kabul, which they
did in the last week of September 1996. Pakistan recognized the Taliban government in May
1997 and secured its recognition from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. No other
country extended recognition to the Taliban government.

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It was not long that the Taliban government incurred the displeasure of the international
community because of its socio-cultural and gender policies. They were also accused of
harboring militant Islamic groups that engaged in violence in different countries. The Al-
Qaeda established its base in Afghanistan and some of the militant and sectarian Pakistan
Islamic groups used Afghanistan as a safe-haven and military training center.

Despite the growing criticism of the Taliban government at the international level, Pakistan
continued to support them and advocated that they should be given Afghanistan's seat in the
UN, a plea that did not evoke much support. Pakistan made unsuccessful attempts in 2000-
2001 to moderate Taliban's socio-cultural policies. It also sought the Taliban's help to round
up the Pakistanis who took refuge in Afghanistan after resorting to violence and sectarian
killings in Pakistan. The Taliban government denied their presence in Afghanistan which
somewhat irritated the Pakistan government but it continued to support the Taliban
government. The continued commitment to the Taliban regime in Kabul adversely affected
Pakistan's reputation at the international level and built strains in its relations with Iran.

The civil strife in Afghanistan adversely affected Pakistan's efforts to cultivate meaningful
economic and technological interactions with states of Central Asia that attained
independence when Soviet Union disintegrated. Some of these states complained about
efforts of the Taliban and Pakistan based militant Islamic groups to cultivate linkages with
the Islamic dissident element in Central Asian states.

iii. Insurgency in Kashmir

The outbreak of insurgency in Indian administered Kashmir in 1989 added a new dimension
to the Kashmir problem. By 1990-91, a number of ex-Afghan Islamic militant groups
identified the situation in Kashmir as a Muslim cause and decided to support the insurgency.
Pakistan's Army and intelligence authorities cultivated these groups and encouraged their role
in Indian administered Kashmir as a low cost strategy to build pressure on India for the
resolution of the Kashmir problem. As India was subjected to criticism at the international
level for mismanaging the political affairs in Kashmir and there were complaints of human
right violations by its security forces, India denied the domestic roots of insurgency in
Kashmir and put the blame for the insurgency on the Pakistan-based militant Islamic groups.
This built strains in India-Pakistan relations and the two countries traded charges and counter
charges on the developments in Kashmir.

India and Pakistan agreed on a framework for peaceful interaction when Indian Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Lahore in February 1999. However, the spirit of this
declaration was destroyed when Pakistan and India engaged in a limited war in the Kargil

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region of Kashmir during May-July 1999. The Indian government felt betrayed by this war
after having signed an agreement for peaceful interaction in February. When, in October
1999, General Pervez Musharraf, assumed power in a coup, Indian government refused to
interact with his government. India pursued policy of no contact with the military government
of General Pervez Musharraf until July 2001 when Pervez Musharraf was invited by
Vajpayee to visit Agra for talks. The Agra summit conference proved inconclusive.

iv. Going Nuclear Power

The last major development in this phase was the decision of India and Pakistan to become
overt nuclear powers. India if had not exploded nuclear devices on May 11 and 13, 1998,
Pakistan would not have gone for nuclear explosions on May 28 and 30. These explosions
were described by Pakistani leaders as the rectification of the strategic imbalance in the
region caused by India's nuclear explosions.

Initially, there were signs that Pakistan might delay nuclear testing. The major factors that
shaped Pakistan's decision to test nuclear devices included:
I. The reluctance of the Western powers to impose tough sanctions against India.
II. Non-availability of credible security guarantees to Pakistan.
III. Pakistani perception that the US administration would not be able to deliver an attractive
package of economic assistance and military sales.
IV. The hawkish and anti- Pakistan statements of India's Union ministers and the senior
members of the ruling party, creating the impression in Pakistan that India might use its
nuclear status to extend its military reach beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir.
V. The growing domestic pressure for testing. The government of Pakistan did not make a
realistic assessment of the implications of testing for Pakistan's troubled economy.

Pakistan's economic crisis accentuated after nuclear testing. However, the government
deflected the criticism by describing it as a guarantee against India's nuclear blackmail.
Pakistan describes its nuclear weapons and missile programs as a part of its policy of
maintaining “minimum credible deterrence” against security threat from India. Given the
wide imbalance in conventional weaponry to the advantage of India, Pakistan attaches much
importance to nuclear and missile programs for ensuring security. Pakistan has offered India
a restraint regime covering nuclear and conventional weapons. India does not want to be
tagged with Pakistan on this issue and favors a global restraint regime that takes care of its

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security concerns vis-à-vis China and fits well with its ambition for being counted as a
leading global actor. As long as India and Pakistan diverge on how best to ensure their
security, Pakistan will assign importance to its nuclear and missile programs for ensuring its
security.

7. Pakistan and Counter Terrorism 2001 Onwards:

i. September 11 and Fight against Terrorism

The terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 had such far reaching implications for
the international system that one can talk of international politics in terms of before and after
these terrorist attacks. The United States, other western countries, Russia and China decided
to adopt effective measures for countering terrorism by non-state and transnational entities on
the highest priority basis. Most other states supported this effort. UN General Assembly
condemned the terrorist attacks and called upon its members to join the global efforts for
combating terrorism and not to allow their territories to be used for such activities.

The US identified the Al-Qaeda movement of Osama bin Laden based in Afghanistan as the
main culprit and declared its intentions to take punitive military measures against Al-Qaeda
movement and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which allowed Al-Qaeda to operate from
Afghanistan. This focused attention on the policies of Pakistan for two reasons.

I. Pakistan supported the Taliban regime in the past and its military and intelligence agencies
had developed multifaceted interaction with the Taliban.

II. Pakistan shared a long border with Afghanistan and its support was important for any US
military operation in Afghanistan.

Given the devastation caused by the events of September 11 and sensing the mood of the
international community, the government of Pakistan turned its back on the Taliban regime
and joined the international community in its counter terrorism drive. Pakistan's decision was
also influenced by the UN General Assembly resolutions which called upon its members to
support the global efforts for combating terrorism. This was a decision against the backdrop
of the international context in September 2001 which helped to protect Pakistan's major
strategic interests of territorial security, protection of its nuclear and missile programs,
Kashmir, and revival of the economy.

Pakistan opened its airspace to US aircraft for military operations in Afghanistan, and granted
permission to US to use three small airports in Sindh and Baluchistan for logistical,
communication and emergency support for US military operations in Afghanistan. The
military and intelligence authorities of the two countries shared intelligence on terrorist
groups and their activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. US security and intelligence
personnel have conducted joint operations in Pakistan with Pakistani security and intelligence

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agencies against the Al- Qaeda and Taliban elements that secretly entered Pakistan after
being dislodged from Afghanistan. The US military authorities and Afghan government
impressed on the Pakistani authorities to flush out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements who
take refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas after engaging in violent activities in Afghanistan.
Pakistan dispatched its troops to the tribal areas in June 2003, which periodically launched
operations against ex-Afghanistan militants in the tribal areas.

ii. Increased U.S. Support

The US reciprocated by withdrawing three categories of economic sanctions against Pakistan

in October-November 2001 and took steps to revive bilateral relations in various fields of
mutual interest, including the economy, trade and investment, socio-economic development
and military modernization and supply of weapons and military equipment.

Direct US assistance to Pakistan has focused on fiscal support, technical and commodity
assistance, enhanced trade, financial and technical support for several sectors like health,
education, food, democracy promotion, child labor elimination, and counter-narcotics. The
US is extending economic and technological assistance to strengthen border security (mainly
Pakistan-Afghanistan border), capacity building for dealing with law and order situation and
especially terrorism, improvement of communication and road building in the tribal areas and
greater record keeping and control of people leaving or entering country through different
entry-exit points. The US economic assistance during 2002-2003 included $600 million as
fiscal support and over $455 million for different development programs. Furthermore,
Pakistan also received payment for use of Pakistani facilities by American troops.

Pakistan also received liberal economic assistance from the World Bank, IMF and Asian
Development Bank for various social development sectors, poverty reduction, and capacity
building for different institutions of state. In December 2001, the Aid to Pakistan Consortium
(Paris Club) recommended to its members the rescheduling of Pakistan's debts amounting to
$ 12.5 billion, for a period of 38 years, including a grace period of 15 years. The US wrote
off and rescheduled its debts. Pakistan received economic assistance, debt relief and trade
concessions from Japan and EU. These measures eased debt repayment pressure and gave
Pakistan sufficient economic space to pursue policies to put its economic house in order.

The US President made new offers of economic assistance during General Pervez
Musharraf's visit to US in the last week of June 2003. He offered a five-year economic
assistance package amounting to $3 billion starting in 2004-05. It is equally divided between
assistance for economic development and military sales. The funds allocated for financial
year 2003 and 2004 (outside of the promised assistance package) will be used to strengthen
security arrangements, road construction and improvement of communication in the tribal
areas. Funding would also be provided for setting up education and health facilities in these
areas. A Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed as a step toward a
free trade agreement. An accord was signed for cooperation in science and technology.

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There is a widespread concern in Pakistan that, as in past, current phase of the reinvigorated
Pakistan-US relations might not continue for a long time. The US would abandon Pakistan
when its strategic interests shift away from in and around Pakistan. The US Secretary of
State, Collin Powell attempted to dispel these concerns during his visit to Islamabad on
March 18, 2004 by announcing that US Administration would soon initiate the process for
designating Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally. Speaking in Berlin on April 2, he said,
“Pakistan is our strongest ally in the fight against terrorism and we want to build up and
strengthen its institutions.”

The status of Non-NATO Ally is neither a formal security arrangement nor a commitment for
supplying weapons. It underscores the importance of the relationship and the long term US
commitment for extending diplomatic support, economic and technological assistance,
cooperation in other related fields and a sympathetic consideration of the request for weapons
supply. (This does not mean that every request for weapons supply will be accepted by the
US). The two sides work together for achievement of the shared goals.

A number of countries relevant to US security and economic interests were bestowed this
status in past. The leading countries among these are Egypt, Kuwait, Japan, Philippines,
South Korea and New Zealand. Despite US decision to assign priority to its relations with
Pakistan, the troubled track record of their relations in the past would continue to cast doubts
about the endurance of the current Pakistan-US relations. The anti-US rhetoric of many
political parties in Pakistan, especially the Islamic parties known for the linkages with the
Taliban and sympathies for Al-Qaeda, reinforces misgivings about credibility of Pakistan-US
relations.

iii. Détente with India- Pakistan's Relations with China and Russia

Pakistan's relations with India witnessed ups and downs against the backdrop of the terrorist
attacks in the U.S. in September 2001. India supported the U.S. war on terrorism but its
leaders were unhappy that US had cultivated Pakistan for its counter terrorism strategy. The
revived Pakistan-US relations perturbed them. They maintained that Pakistan could not be a
partner for counter terrorism because of what the Indian leaders described as Pakistan's deep
involvement with the Taliban and its support to militant Islamic groups engaged in
insurgency in Indian administered Kashmir. They also demanded that the US definition of
terrorism must include the activities of the Pakistan-based Islamic groups in Kashmir. India
insisted that the insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir was nothing but a product of
infiltration of Pakistan based militant Islamic warriors.

India blamed Pakistan for terrorist attacks on India's Parliament on December 13, 2001. It
massed its troops on India-Pakistan border and threatened military action if Pakistan did not
contain the activities of the militant Islamic groups operating in Kashmir. From January 1
2002, India suspended all air and railroad traffic between the two countries, denied over-
flight rights to Pakistani aircraft and downgraded diplomatic relations. Pakistan responded by
mobilizing its troops, and an eye-ball to eye-ball situation developed between the militaries of

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two countries. The tension reached the breaking point at the end of May 2002, but the
diplomatic intervention of the US, UK, and the European Union averted the war.

India's coercive diplomacy of massing its troops on the Pakistan border in a state of combat
readiness did not lead to war mainly because of the threat of escalation of such a war into a
nuclear conflict and the advice for restraint by friendly countries. India decided to withdraw
its troops in October 2002. Pakistan announced a similar withdrawal of troops from border
area. However, India and Pakistan continued to trade charges and counter charges on a host
of issues and Indian leadership insisted that it would not initiate a dialogue with Pakistan
until Pakistan stopped “cross border terrorism” in Indian administered Kashmir. Pakistan
offered unconditional dialogue on all contentious issue.

On April 18, 2003, Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, offered dialogue with
Pakistan which was readily accepted by Pakistan. This led to the initiation of steps for
normalization of their bilateral relations but no step was taken to initiate a dialogue. In
November, Pakistan's PM Zafarullah Khan Jamali, offered ceasefire on the Line of Control in
Kashmir. India responded positively to this offer and a ceasefire was enforced on November
26. On December 18, President Pervez Musharraf talked of flexibility in Pakistan's traditional
policy on Kashmir by suggesting that Pakistan would be willing to go beyond the stated
position and that he expected similar flexibility from India. He said “we are for UN
resolutions [on Kashmir]. However, now we have left that aside. If we want to resolve this
issue, both sides need to talk to each other with flexibility, coming beyond stated positions,
meeting halfway somewhere... we are prepared to rise to occasion, India has to be flexible
also.”

The behind the scene diplomacy and the prompting by friendly countries made it possible for
Mr. Vajpayee to visit Islamabad in the first week of January 2004 for participation in the
SAARC summit conference. On the last day of the summit, January 6, Pakistani President
Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee issued a joint statement for initiation
of bilateral dialogue on all contentious issues, including Kashmir. Pakistan committed that it
would not allow its territory to be used for terrorist activities of any kind. This was a major
breakthrough in Pakistan-India relations and speeded up the normalization process.

The current goodwill between India and Pakistan can sustain if the dialogue between India
and Pakistan facilitates the solution of the contentious issues. It can be argued that the current
efforts to improve Indo-Pakistan relations are genuine but these efforts can reverse if the
dialogue does not move in the direction of problem solving.

iv. Pakistan's Relations with China and Russia

Pakistan's interaction with China expanded rapidly. The latter provided economic assistance
and technological know-how for various economic development projects, including Gawadar
deep sea port. It also endorsed Pakistan's policy on combating terrorism and sought Pakistan's
cooperation for containing dissident activity in Xinjiang Muslim majority province.

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Russian concern pertained to the reported linkages between the dissident elements in
Chechnya and militant Islamic groups based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The arrest of
Chechnya's activist from the Wana area in March 2004 confirmed that Russian concerns were
not misplaced. Russia supported Pakistan's efforts to contain militant groups based in the
areas adjacent to Afghanistan. Pakistan maintained cordial interaction with the Muslim states,
especially those located in the Gulf region. It supported the Palestinian cause and the two-
state formula. The government of Pakistan floated the proposal for recognition of Israel,
which had to be put aside due to strong domestic opposition.

v. Transfer of Nuclear Technology

Two major issues cropped up with reference to Pakistan's nuclear program.

I. First, much concern was expressed in 2001-2002 about the possibility of some militant
Islamic group launching a terrorist attack on Pakistan's nuclear installations or getting hold of
fissile or radioactive materials, which may be used for making a bomb. The government of
Pakistan assured the international community that its nuclear installations had adequate
security against a terrorist attack or nuclear theft.

II. Second, it was discovered in 2003 that Pakistan's ace nuclear scientist transferred nuclear
material from Pakistan to Iran, Libya and North Korea through a clandestine international
network for material gains. The government de-linked itself from these transfers, claiming
that the government was not involved in these activities. Pakistan's top leaders assured the
international community that Pakistan strictly adhered to non-proliferation of nuclear
materials, technical know-how and weapons.

Diversification of foreign policy under the PPP (2008-2013)

Though the PPP government was plagued with scandals of massive corruption, it did succeed
in diversifying the foreign relations of the country. The US signed the Kerry-Luger Bill in
October 2009 to grant $7.5 billion in non-military aid to Pakistan. Besides, both the civilian
and military leadership played a pivotal role in resetting the Pak-Russia relations through high-
profile visits to Moscow. Importantly, Pak-Iran relations also improved after the signing of the
Iran-Pak (IP) gas pipeline. However, the climate of trust between Pakistan and India, achieved
during the Musharraf era, turned into hostility after the 2008 Mumbai attack, which

Foreign Policy under the PML (N) (2013-2018)

The current democratic dispensation under the PML-N – during premiership of Nawaz Sharif
– achieved two major objectives on the foreign policy front. Firstly, the country has received
the full-membership of the SCO that will tremendously help Pakistan work with China, Russia
and Central Asian Republics in combating the three evils of extremism, terrorism and
separatism in the region. Secondly, China has decided to invest around $60 billion through
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) for upgrading Pakistan’s transport infrastructure
and energy sector. Both the successes will probably make the country a trade hub in the region.

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However, the government has failed to address the ambiguities in the country’s foreign policy.
This is still unclear whether the ill-conceived policy of strategic depth toward Afghanistan –
against India – has been discarded or not. Kabul considers this strategy as a deliberate attempt
to interfere in its affairs. Therefore, Afghanistan has shown its unwillingness to reset its
relations with Pakistan. Ominously, in retaliation, the Ashraf Ghani-led Afghan government
has given India a carte blanche to use eastern provinces of Afghanistan for orchestrating
terrorism inside Pakistan.

Despite the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran by the US, the government has continued to
drag its feet in terms of completing Pakistan’s portion of the IP gas pipeline. This has led
Tehran to further forge its ties with New Delhi. The latter is set to dominate the Central Asian
markets by accessing the region through the Chabahar Port via Afghanistan, thus encircling
Pakistan in South Asia. Islamabad direly needs all-out support of Tehran in successfully
combating the low-intensity insurgency in Balochistan and the menacing Shia-Sunni proxy
war.

The present government has also failed to employ adroit diplomacy in highlighting gross
violations of human rights being committed in the Indian-occupied Kashmir. The Indian lobby
has continued to play the obstructive role in preventing the US from selling F-16s and providing
the remaining Coalition Support Fund to Pakistan. Moreover, the government has failed to
convince the world about Indian sponsoring of terrorism and insurgency inside Pakistan despite
the availability of evidence such as the disclosures of detained Indian spy, Kulbhushan Jadhav.

Despite losing about 50,000 lives and over $120 billion in the war on terror, the US is still
sceptical of Pakistan’s military actions against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan.
Washington has recently passed a bill making the payment of $50 million conditional to
Pakistan’s visible military measures against the Haqqanis. Furthermore, the US is also reluctant
to conclude a civilian nuclear accord with Pakistan and is not supportive of Islamabad’s bid to
join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This manifests the failure of the government in terms
of dexterously using diplomacy to enhance economic and security partnership with the US.

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