drones

Review
A Review of Counter-UAS Technologies for Cooperative
Defensive Teams of Drones
Vittorio Ugo Castrillo * , Angelo Manco , Domenico Pascarella and Gabriella Gigante

CIRA—Italian Aerospace Research Centre, Via Maiorise, 81043 Capua, Italy; [Link]@[Link] (A.M.);
[Link]@[Link] (D.P.); [Link]@[Link] (G.G.)
* Correspondence: [Link]@[Link]

Abstract: In recent years, the drone market has had a significant expansion, with applications
in various fields (surveillance, rescue operations, intelligent logistics, environmental monitoring,
precision agriculture, inspection and measuring in the construction industry). Given their increasing
use, the issues related to safety, security and privacy must be taken into consideration. Accordingly,
the development of new concepts for countermeasures systems, able to identify and neutralize a
single (or multiples) malicious drone(s) (i.e., classified as a threat), has become of primary importance.
For this purpose, the paper evaluates the concept of a multiplatform counter-UAS system (CUS),
based mainly on a team of mini drones acting as a cooperative defensive system. In order to provide
the basis for implementing such a system, we present a review of the available technologies for
sensing, mitigation and command and control systems that generally comprise a CUS, focusing on
their applicability and suitability in the case of mini drones.



Keywords: counter-UAS systems; sensing; neutralization; command and control; drones; cooperative systems


Citation: Castrillo, V.U.; Manco, A.;
Pascarella, D.; Gigante, G. A Review
of Counter-UAS Technologies for
1. Introduction
Cooperative Defensive Teams of
Drones. Drones 2022, 6, 65. https://
In recent years, the drone market has had a significant expansion, especially in the
[Link]/10.3390/drones6030065
consumer sector. Drones destined for this market are easily accessible thanks to their
relatively low cost. In addition, the characteristics of weight, size, and the ability to carry a
Academic Editors: Andrzej
payload, such as a camera, allow them to be used in various fields, from the recreational to
Łukaszewicz, Wojciech Giernacki,
the professional sector. In addition, from a research point of view, the use of these flying
Zbigniew Kulesza, Jaroslaw Pytka
platforms helps the development of technologies whose applications have a positive impact
and Andriy Holovatyy
on the community, such as search and rescue operations, intelligent logistics, environmental
Received: 24 January 2022 monitoring or precision agriculture.
Accepted: 24 February 2022 Given the increasing use of these technologies, the issues related to safety, security and
Published: 1 March 2022 privacy must be taken into consideration. Their use could cause damage to the community
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
due to failures and improper or criminal use. A significant increase has been observed
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
in the number of accidents involving drones or unmanned aerial systems (UAS) [1]. For
published maps and institutional affil-
example, improper use in the vicinity of an airport can represent a serious threat to public
iations. safety and a source of discomfort, as evidenced by the hundreds of flights canceled at
London Gatwick airport in a few months of 2018 [2].
For this reason, the development of technologies for the detection, identification and
mitigation of malicious drones has become of primary importance. A countermeasure
Copyright: © 2022 by the authors. system, also called a counter-UAS (C-UAS) or counter-UAS system (CUS), can identify and
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. neutralize an intruder drone classified as a threat.
This article is an open access article From an architectural point of view, an anti-drone system generally consists of the
distributed under the terms and following fundamental sub-systems:
conditions of the Creative Commons
• Sensing system;
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
• Mitigation system;
[Link]/licenses/by/
4.0/).
• Command and control (C2) system.

Drones 2022, 6, 65. [Link] [Link]

Drones 2022, 6, 65 2 of 36

The sensing system consists of one or more sensors capable of collecting information
from the surrounding environment. The mitigation system consists of one or more mitigat-
ing elements capable of disabling, destroying or taking control of the drone identified as a
threat. The C2 system collects data from sensors and executes detection algorithms, based
on which it establishes the presence of a threat, identifies it (i.e., classifies its entity) and
decides the most appropriate tracking and mitigation mode.
There are several C-UAS systems on the market. There are integrated systems that
implement both the detection part and the mitigation part on the same platform, but the
most adopted solution is to separate the mitigation part from the sensing one, distributing it
on different platforms, giving rise to distinct commercial products. For example, most of the
available solutions are ground-based, especially for the sensing part, while the sky-based
part is typically relegated to mitigation. Thus, a single platform may implement only some
of the sub-systems of the CUS (or part of them) and a network architecture is required to
implement the interactions between the platforms.
In this paper, a multiplatform CUS, based mainly on a team of mini drones acting as a
cooperative defensive system, has been used as a reference. Indeed, mini drones represent
an effective solution for the implementation of a CUS, being the ideal platforms for the
proximal sensing and tracking of moving targets (e.g., intruder drones) in high-mobility
scenarios. Moreover, a team of mini drones may be arranged as a mobile sensor network:
on the one hand, the single drones may act as mobile sensor nodes to keep the closeness
with moving targets; on the other hand, a cooperative behavior may be established by
means of the network of drones and a suitable coordination protocol. Such cooperative
behavior may ensure the simultaneous perception and tracking of different moving targets,
and may provide efficient coverage by balancing the load of the sensing and tracking tasks
amongst the sensor nodes. In the end, defensive drones may also be equipped to implement
proper neutralization actions with respect to intruder drones.
In order to provide the basis for the future implementation activities of a cooperative
drone-based CUS, this work presents a review of the available technologies for sensing,
mitigation and C2 systems by means of mini drones. In addition, the paper discusses
some challenges about the key technological enablers for the effective implementation
of these systems. This paper does not provide a review of the available technologies for
the communication network and for the cooperation algorithms, which are exhaustively
described in other works.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definitions
and the basic concepts for cooperative drone-based CUSs. In Section 3, the sensing system
is introduced, with a literature review and a comparison on the sensing techniques that
could be used aboard drones. In Section 4, different neutralization techniques are discussed
and neutralizers using mini drones are highlighted. A detailed description of the C2 system
is provided in Section 5. Section 6 presents some of the technological challenges. Section 7
discusses the main results of the work, while the last section is about the conclusions.

2. Definitions and Basic Concepts for Cooperative Drone-Based Counter-UAS Systems

This section provides the main definitions and the basic concepts about cooperative
drone-based CUSs.

2.1. Drones
A drone or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is an aircraft with no human pilot on-board.
It is the central element of a UAS, which is the set comprised of the aircraft and all the
other elements supporting the service of a drone. In detail, a UAS is made up of the main
following components:
• Airframe, which is the mechanical part of the vehicle, including the propulsion system;
• Navigation and motion sensors that collect the information about the drone position
and its flight trajectory;
  Airframe, which is the mechanical part of the vehicle, including the propulsion
system;
 Navigation and motion sensors that collect the information about the drone position
Drones 2022, 6, 65
and its flight trajectory; 3 of 36
 Flight control system (FCS), which controls the propulsion system and the servos in
order to apply a flight trajectory;
 • Payload, which
Flight control is the(FCS),
system specific equipment
which controls totheaccomplish a givenand
propulsion system mission;
the servos in
 Ground control station (GCS),
order to apply a flight trajectory;which is a computer system or a network of computer
• systems
Payload,on the ground,
which which
is the specific monitor to
equipment and control UAS
accomplish operation;
a given mission;
 • Communication infrastructure,
Ground control station which
(GCS), which is a is the set system
computer of dataorlinks and related
a network equipment
of computer
systems on the ground, which monitor and control UAS operation;
for the communication between the vehicle and the GCS (or other external elements).
• Communication infrastructure, which is the set of data links and related equipment
There are different classifications of drones according to several parameters, such as
for the communication between the vehicle and the GCS (or other external elements).
weight, altitude, endurance, degree of autonomy, etc. Reference [3] provides a survey of
There are different classifications of drones according to several parameters, such as
the main classification of drones. For example, the military domain includes a NATO UAS
weight, altitude, endurance, degree of autonomy, etc. Reference [3] provides a survey of
classification system, which
the main classification is shown
of drones. in Figure
For example, [Link]
It sets three
domainclasses,
includesbased on the
a NATO UAS weight.
The classes are further divided according to other parameters, such as the employment,
classification system, which is shown in Figure 1. It sets three classes, based on the weight.
the operating
The classes arealtitude and theaccording
further divided mission toradius. Accordingsuch
other parameters, to such
as thea employment,
classificationthe
system,
mini dronesaltitude
operating are Class I drones
and the with
mission a weight
radius. lesstothan
According such15 kg, whereassystem,
a classification microdrones
mini are
drones
Class are Class
I drones withI drones with a weight
a maximum energyless than
state 15than
less kg, whereas
66 J. microdrones are Class I
drones with a maximum energy state less than 66 J.

Figure
[Link]’s
NATO’s UAS classificationsystem
UAS classification system
[4].[4].

AAslightly
slightly different
different classification
classificationfor
formicro-, mini
micro‐, andand
mini small UAVs
small (sUAS,
UAVs NATONATO
(sUAS,
Class I) is described in [5] and shown in Table 1. The latter also reports endurance
Class I) is described in [5] and shown in Table 1. The latter also reports endurance and pay- and
load capabilities, as well as weight, altitude, range and same example platforms available
on the market.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 4 of 36

Table 1. Micro-, mini and small UAV classifications based on weight, altitude, range and payload.

Normal Mission
Weight Typical Payload Available UAV
Category Operating Radius, Range
(in kg) Endurance (in h) (in kg) Models in Market
Altitude (in m) (in km)
DJI Spark, DJI Mavic,
Micro <2 <140 5 <1 <1
Parrot Bebop2
DJI Matrice600, DJI
Mini 2–25 <1000 25 2–8 <10 Inspire2, Airborne
Vanguard
AAI Shadow 200,
Small 25–150 <1700 50 4–12 <50
Scorpion 3 Hoverbike

2.2. Multi-Drone Missions

Without the need for an on-board pilot, drones were usually designed to accomplish
the D-cube (dull, dangerous and dirty) envelope [6], which is the set of the following
mission classes: dull, i.e., monotonous or requiring high endurance for human occupants;
dirty, i.e., that could pose a health risk to a human crew; dangerous, i.e., that could result
in the loss of life for the on-board pilot. However, if the region of interest of a mission is
large and/or the mission objectives are several, the execution of a single-drone mission
may solicit a considerable amount of time and may entail poor performance in terms of
mission effectiveness.
Multi-drone missions may overcome this issue. They are essentially missions that
engage two or more drones with some common objectives. Thus, a multi-drone mission
aims at increasing the effectiveness with respect to the equivalent single-drone mission and
requires a sort of collaboration amongst the involved drones.
There is no common agreement about the definitions for this multi-drone collaboration
and the classification of the different levels of collaboration. For the purposes of this work,
the definitions in [7] are adopted and the following levels of collaborations in a multi-drone
setting are considered:
• Isolated individual—in this case, a drone independently acts. It may be piloted, or it
may exhibit a given degree of autonomy for the execution of its mission on its own.
• Group—a group of drones comprised of several isolated individuals, each with their
own mission without coordination, i.e., collaboration is not present.
• Team—a team of drones is a networked set of drones with a common mission, in
which all members are assigned specialized and different tasks to accomplish the
global mission.
• Swarm—a swarm of drones is a uniform mass of undifferentiated drones. Thus,
a swarm is typically composed of a large number of homogeneous drones, which
perform a single task.
According to the above classification, only drone teams and swarms envisage a sig-
nificant collaboration level, which entails a cooperation within the overall system. Such
cooperation should allow the achievement of more complex missions and/or effective
results with respect to isolated individuals and groups of drones. Cooperation is mediated
by coordination (or coordination protocol), which represents the mechanism ensuring
that the activities of the single vehicles keep the desired relationships and that the col-
lective behavior (intended as the set of individual behaviors in the system) achieve the
objectives for the global system. The members of a swarm usually coordinate each other
only through simple and local interactions, whereas the coordination of a team requires
diverse mechanisms for the allocation of several, possibly heterogeneous, tasks. In regard
to the coordination of a swarm, the emergency concept is usually adopted to indicate the
ability of the swarm to achieve a collective behavior for a complex operation by exploiting
limited interactions of the single vehicles, which individually accomplish simple behaviors
and tasks.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 5 of 36

Other definitions and classifications are possible for the collaborative sets of drones.
Indeed, such sets may be also managed as an interoperable system of systems (SoS) in order
to apply the interoperability concepts, as in reference [8]. In any case, the joint performance
of a networked set of drones (teams or swarms) for a common mission is expected to exceed
the sum of the performances achievable in the equivalent single-drone mission. In more
detail, the following general advantages are expected for a typical multi-drone mission
with teams or swarms of drones:
• Multiple simultaneous interventions—the system may simultaneously collect data
from multiple locations.
• Efficiency—the system may split up in order to efficiently cover a large area, optimizing
available resources.
• Complementarity—the system may perform different tasks with growing accuracy.
Clearly, this feature holds for drone teams.
• Reliability—the system assures fault-tolerant missions by providing redundancy and
capability of reconfiguration in the case of a failure of individual vehicles.
• Safety—the team or swarm may usually apply the smallest vehicles for a mission with
respect to the equivalent single-drone mission. For a permit to fly, the usage of smaller
drones is safer than a single great and heavy drone.
• Cost efficiency—a single vehicle to execute some tasks may be an expensive solution
when compared with several low-cost vehicles.

2.3. Counter-UAS Systems

In the literature, it is possible to find numerous surveys that have explored the char-
acteristics of anti-drone systems (see for example [5,9–13]). In this regard, the taxonomy
presented in [9] is of particular interest, in which CUS are grouped into two categories:
ground-based and sky-based, depending on their deployment, respectively, on the ground
or in the air using drones or other flying platforms (for example, stratospheric platforms).
Ground-based systems can be of the static type, if installed, even temporarily, in a fixed
manner within the perimeter to be defended, or of the mobile type if installed on-board
land vehicles or transported by hand by humans (human-handled). Sky-based systems are
implemented on board drones, UAS, balloons or stratospheric platforms, and deployed as
needed. They differ in high altitudes and low altitudes, depending on the operating altitude.
The two types of CUSs oppose each other with respect to the level of operational
mobility and the characteristics of weight, size and energy required for operation (size,
weight and power, SWaP). Ground systems have the clear advantage of being able to count
on weak SWaP requirements (increasingly from static systems to human-handled ones),
but have little flexibility in terms of adapting to the unpredictable behavior of malicious
drones. On the other hand, sky-based systems have greater adaptability thanks to the
inherent maneuverability and flexibility that are afforded with the much more stringent
SWaP requirements due to the limited power of the batteries and the low payload capacity
for the lighter flying platforms. In choosing the platform to be adopted, it is important
to consider its advantages and disadvantages and the operational scenario in which the
solution is used.
It is also possible to create a hybrid CUS as a heterogeneous and cooperative network
of different platforms (both ground-based and sky-based) to balance the limits that each
solution would have if used individually. Indeed, although a CUS can consist of a single
platform, it is difficult for such a solution to deal with the threats represented by a malicious
drone or even by several malicious drones, so solutions that offer greater reliability and
spatial coverage are represented by CUSs comprised of multiple platforms. In this case, the
platforms are networked to cooperate, maximizing the effectiveness.

2.4. Cooperative Drone-Based Counter-UAS Systems

This paper is focused on cooperative drone-based CUSs. These represent an instance
of hybrid CUS (as defined in Section 2.3), including a cooperative set of drones. Thus,
Drones 2022, 6, 65 6 of 36

according to the definitions reported in Section 2.2, such a cooperative set represents a team
or swarm of drones.
For the purposes of this work, teams of mini drones (based on the NATO’s UAS
classification system, as shown in Figure 1, or on the classification reported in [5] and
shown in Table 1) are considered as a reference subsystem of the hybrid CUS. This choice is
due to the following expected advantages, which are added to the advantages of a generic
multi-drone mission (described in Section 2.2):
Mobility—mini drones show extreme mobility; it is possible to bring them closer to the
malicious drones and the sensing operations could be done in the proximity of the target.
So, mini drones offer a mobile proximal sensing solution for a CUS, which can improve the
detection and identification phases by lowering the probability of a false alarm.
Coverage expansion—it is possible to increase the coverage of the protected area. In
fact, drones can be easily moved in order to circumvent obstacles and/or monitor areas
that are not covered or not effectively covered by ground platforms. In other words, it
is easy to extend the area protected by the CUS without increasing the number of used
platforms. Nevertheless, proper bases allocation, jointly with re-charging issues, must be
guaranteed. Coverage expansion can also be obtained using a single high-altitude platform,
but supposedly with higher costs.
Deployment flexibility—compared to other flying platforms, they are simpler and
faster to use, allowing lower response times to any threat.
Cooperative sensor network—the defensive team may be arranged as a cooperative
sensor network, i.e., as a set of mobile sensor nodes, which may cooperatively perceive,
identify and track one or more threats from different “perspectives”. This is even more
necessary for mobile proximal sensing to keep the closeness with different moving tar-
gets. Thus, a cooperative sensor network may be implemented for a distribution of the
sensing tasks and a load balancing amongst the sensor nodes. Such network is expected
to be reconfigurable for maintaining optimal performance. Clearly, the same concept
may be applied also for mitigation purposes if the drones are equipped with the proper
neutralization payloads.
Team coordination—as described in Section 2.2, a swarm requires a large mass of
homogeneous vehicles and the coordination of a swarm occurs by means of the emergency
concept. These features are not deemed suitable for a cooperative drone-based CUS.
Indeed, the homogeneity of vehicles may be incompatible with the heterogeneous tasks
in a CUS. Moreover, the large mass of vehicles and the emergency of a swarm imply a
non-deterministic behavior and the absence of a specific organizational structure since they
are based on individuals’ reactions [7]. Thus, it may be difficult to estimate the probability
of success of a mission, which is generally unacceptable for a CUS. To the contrary, a
drone team usually exhibits an explicit organizational structure by means of a deliberated
coordination. A team may also satisfy the requirement about the heterogeneous tasks for
the cooperative drone-based CUS.
Automated decision-making—given the speeds involved in the operating environment
for CUS systems, an automated decision-making capability is essential to aid an operator
in the selection of the most proper actions to manage the given threat scenario or attack
scenario and to enable the fastest possible reactions on the part of the defense system.
Mini drones, with their well-known aptitudes for autonomous behaviors (also as a team),
represent an ideal platform to support such capability.
Neutralization—if the intruder drone(s) did not immediately manifest the malicious
intentions, the defensive team would act in proximity by physically chasing it and would be
ready for mitigation when the threat has manifested [14], thus allowing a higher probability
of success for the neutralization phase. In the literature, there have been several recent
studies on the use of a drone team as a defensive tool (e.g., [15,16]). Indeed, the features for
mobile proximal sensing may be adapted also for mitigation purposes, and some defensive
drones may be equipped with specific electronic or kinetic-mechanical neutralization
Drones 2022, 6, 65 7 of 36

systems in order to perform preliminary mitigation actions and to take advantage of the
closeness to the moving targets.
Scalability—Traditional CUSs lack scalability and are not usually able to face intru-
sions of drone teams or swarms. To the contrary, a defensive team of drones inherently
represents a scalable solution. Indeed, the coordination mechanisms usually exhibit a
scalable computational complexity with respect to the cardinality of the team, especially
when decentralized approaches (i.e., without central decision points) are applied. These
approaches ensure self-configuration and robustness of the team in front of individual
off-nominal events (i.e., failures, communication losses, etc.) or threats (i.e., attacks to the
individual defensive drones). Moreover, with the proper sizing and payload configuration,
a defensive team may detect and track a team or swarm of rogue drones.
The suitability of drone teams for CUS solutions has also been confirmed by state-of-
the-art research works in the fields of autonomous multi-agent systems and cooperative
robotics, which have proposed several applications with some similarities with CUSs’
required capabilities. Indeed, examples of these applications are those related to multi-
robot systems for the observation of multiple moving targets, for which different control
approaches already exist, such as cooperative multi-robot observation of multiple moving
targets (CMOMMT), cooperative search–acquisition–track (CSAT), multi-robot pursuit
evasion (MPE) [17]. In addition, multi-drone systems have been analyzed in terms of
distributed multi-agent systems for multi-target tracking problems [18]. In the end, the
environmental domain presents some advanced multi-drone solutions for environmental
monitoring of dynamic natural threats, such as the ones for tracking the dispersion of
contaminant clouds [19]. Additionally, some current international projects are developing
cooperative drone-based solutions for surveillance and situational awareness applications,
such as the following European projects: ResponDrone [20], which aims at developing a
multi-UAS platform for first responders to enhance their situation awareness in support as-
sessment missions, search and rescue operations, forest fire fighting, etc.; ROBORDER [21],
which aims at developing and demonstrating an autonomous border surveillance system
with unmanned mobile robots, including aerial, water surface, underwater and ground
vehicles, which will incorporate multimodal sensors as part of an interoperable network;
LABYRINTH [22], which proposes a road traffic surveillance by means of a multi-drone sys-
tem; 5D-AeroSafe [23], which aims at developing multi-drone solutions for the monitoring
of airport and waterway daily operations; Drones4Safety [24], which aims at developing a
system of autonomous, self-charging and collaborative drones that can inspect a big portion
of transportation infrastructures in a continuous operation; RAPID [25], which aims at
delivering a fully automated and drone-based maintenance inspection service for bridges,
ship hull surveys and more. All these technologies and solutions represent a sound starting
point for the future cooperative drone-based solutions in the counter-UAS domain.
Besides, some recent works have already analyzed multi-agent systems for CUS,
although they were focused on the single phases of the counter-UAS process, i.e., sensing
or mitigation separately. For example, reference [14] proposed a network of defense
drones, which is capable of self-organizing its formation to intercept malicious drones.
However, this work specifically focused on formation management algorithms to realize
intercept and capture formations for the mitigation of drone intrusions, without considering
neutralization aspects. Instead, reference [26] proposed a multi-drone framework for the
autonomous detection of rogue drones in a defined airspace and detailed the preliminary
development of a hardware and software testbed, based on commercial systems.
Other ongoing research activities are developing a cooperative drone-based CUS
covering all the phases of the counter-UAS process. For example, the SWADAR (Swarm
Advanced Detection And Tracking) project [27] has been awarded the Defense Innova-
tion Prize 2020 ([Link] last accessed on
13 February 2022) ([Link].080, “Innovative Solutions/Technologies for the Countering
of Swarms of UAVs, specifically on the Protection of Static and Dynamic Land Facilities
and Platforms”), assigned by the European Defense Agency (EDA). SWADAR builds an
 Other ongoing research activities are developing a cooperative drone‐based CUS
covering all the phases of the counter‐UAS process. For example, the SWADAR (Swarm
Advanced Detection And Tracking) project [27] has been awarded the Defense Innovation
Prize 2020 ([Link] last accessed on 13
Drones 2022, 6, 65 February 2022) ([Link].080, “Innovative Solutions/Technologies for the Countering 8 of 36
of Swarms of UAVs, specifically on the Protection of Static and Dynamic Land Facilities
and Platforms”), assigned by the European Defense Agency (EDA). SWADAR builds an
intelligent drone-based
intelligent drone‐based network
network forfor mobile
mobile proximal
proximal sensing,
sensing, tracking
tracking and
and neutralization
neutralization
of intruder swarms, as shown in Figure 2. Based on sensing and trackingdata,
of intruder swarms, as shown in Figure 2. Based on sensing and tracking data,SWADAR
SWADAR
autonomously assesses
autonomously assesses the
the behavior
behavior of of the
the rogue
rogue swarm
swarm by by evaluating
evaluating instantaneous
instantaneousand and
variational swarming
variational swarming metrics
metrics (i.e.,
(i.e., cohesion,
cohesion, segregation,
segregation, etc.)
etc.) that
that can
can help
help ininidentifying
identifying
the attack
the attackscenario
scenarioand
andpredicting
predictingthethe course
course of action
of action of swarm
of the the swarm
attack. attack.
Such Such
infor-
information supports the selection of optimal neutralization actions
mation supports the selection of optimal neutralization actions to suppress the enemy to suppress the
enemy swarming
swarming behavior.
behavior. Moreover,
Moreover, SWADAR SWADAR
relies onrelies on on‐board
on-board sensors,
sensors, like LiDAR
like LiDAR (light
(light detection and ranging), optical and infrared sensors, etc., which
detection and ranging), optical and infrared sensors, etc., which are typically available are typically
on
available
the [Link] the market.

Instantaneous Swarming Metrics Variational Swarming Metrics

Cluster Cooperative
t1 Tracking FANET

...
Cohesion
Leader
f‐divergence
Segregation

t0

GCS

On‐demand tracking
application with flight
time and ground segment
Orderliness

(a) (b)
Figure 2. SWADAR concept for assessing
Figure 2. assessing swarming
swarming metrics
metrics (a)(a) and
and for
for multi‐UAV
multi-UAV cooperative
cooperative
tracking (b)
tracking (b) [27].
[27]. The
The left
left part
part shows
shows some
some examples
examples ofof useful
useful metrics
metrics to
to measure
measure thethe swarm
swarm
behavior of intruder drones. Some of these metrics are: the cohesion, the segregation, the
behavior of intruder drones. Some of these metrics are: the cohesion, the segregation, the presence ofpresence
of hierarchical
hierarchical structures
structures andand clusters
clusters andthe
and thef-divergence
f‐divergence(i.e.,
(i.e.,the
thetemporal
temporal variation
variation of
of the
the spatial
spatial
distributions of the swarm).
distributions of the swarm).

In the
In the US,
US, the
the DARPA
DARPA is is funding
funding the
the Aerial
Aerial Dragnet
Dragnet program
program thatthat seeks
seeks to
to perform
perform
persistent wide-area surveillance of multiple small drones in urban terrain on a city‐wide
persistent wide‐area surveillance of multiple small drones in urban terrain on a city-wide
scale. This
scale. Thisinnovative
innovativesensor
sensorarray should
array be mounted
should be mounted on tethered drones,
on tethered enabling
drones, a non‐a
enabling
line‐of‐sight (NLOS) tracking and identification of a wide range of slow, low‐flying
non-line-of-sight (NLOS) tracking and identification of a wide range of slow, low-flying threats
[28]. [28].
threats
Worthy of
Worthy of note
note is
is also
also the
the European
European project
project JEY‐CUAS
JEY-CUAS (Joint
(Joint European
European System
System forfor
Countering Unmanned
Countering Unmanned Aerial
Aerial Systems)
Systems) [29],
[29], which
which will
will pave
pave the
the way
way for
forthe
thedevelopment
development
of aajoint
of jointEuropean
European counter‐UAS
counter-UAS capability
capability by developing
by developing a new‐generation
a new-generation C-UASC‐UASsystem
based on a modular and flexible plug‘n’play architecture to include the emerging challenge
of mini drones, increasingly used for defense purposes. The solution will contribute to
an improvement of the situational awareness and reaction engagement by reducing the
minimum reaction time.
However, not everything can be achieved through the use of mini drones. In some
cases, ground systems are required—if we consider the case of early detection, it would
be inefficient to keep drones in flight permanently to check for the presence of malicious
drones in the area to be protected. Furthermore, with mini drones, we should consider
SWaP constraints, and consequently, not all of the operations necessary to fight the threat
could be performed via these platforms. For example, it is not possible to use strong
Drones 2022, 6, 65 9 of 36

neutralizers (like high-power electromagnetics or high-power laser), which cannot be

integrated on mini drones due to obvious SWaP constraints. However, mini drones can be
a suitable solution, especially in civil contexts where protection is mainly required towards
small drones.

3. Sensing System
The perception of a threat makes use of the sensing system, consisting of one or more
sensors capable of collecting the information extrapolated from the electromagnetic or
acoustic spectrum, depending on the technology and the signal processing involved. In
general, the perception operation can be divided into the following phases:
• Detection: The finding of one or more object within the airspace to be monitored.
In this first phase, the system is not yet able to distinguish whether the detected
object is actually a drone. This phase can be characterized through the two indicators
“Detection Rate” and “False Alarm Rate”, which express the probability, respectively,
of correct detection and false alarm.
• Classification: Once the detection event has occurred, it is necessary to verify that the
detected object is actually present and that it is a drone. It could happen, for example,
that the target detected in the previous phase is a bird, which has electromagnetic
characteristics that can be similar to those of a drone (the radar cross section or the size
and geometric shape that is possible recognize visually). This verification is also called
“recognition” or “identification”. Subsequently, the system extrapolates some salient
attributes (features) of the drone, such as the type (size, type of propulsion, number of
rotors, model), the possible location of a remote pilot, the presence of a payload and
its typology. This phase may be found in the literature under the term “identification”.
• Localization/Tracking: The target is located by estimating its position in terms of
angle and distance. Triangulation techniques can be used to increase accuracy. Once
the target has been locked in, it must be tracked throughout its flight. Flight trajectory
could also be predicted.
The level of reliability of this information must be as high as possible so that the
C2 system can perform the threat analysis and select and adopt the most appropriate
mitigation measures in the shortest time interval. Detection, recognition and identification
(or classification) could be performed by a single type of sensor if the technology and
associated processing are compatible with the required output. Where this is not the case,
it is possible to adopt a heterogeneous sensing system consisting of sensors with different
technologies, which can contribute, thanks to data/sensor fusion techniques, to obtain a
reliable level of identification and to improve performance in terms of range, detection time
of the anti-drone system, detection rate and reduction of false alarms.
Clearly, to face an attack by a team or swarm of drones, the sensing system should be
enriched with functionalities for the perception and the processing of information about
the features that are strictly related to the teaming or swarming behavior of the attacker.
In more detail, one of the most complex scenarios that an anti-drone system can
face is that relating to the attack of a drone swarm, e.g., for saturation attacks and to
overwhelm the counter-capability of the target’s defense. As for a hostile team, this
scenario requires that the detection capabilities are also used for the extraction of “global”
features that characterize the swarm and not only for the “local” features related to the
drones that compose it. Moreover, specific information should be collected to quantify
swarming metrics (e.g., consistency, cohesion, etc.) related to the swarming behavior. For
this purpose, it may be useful to acquire both local information (e.g., flight configuration,
geometry characteristics and speed) and global information (e.g., number of vehicles,
relative distances, geometry of the swarm, etc.) [30]. Such information will be essential to
infer the mitigation decisions, since they may support the identification of the drones that
represent the “focal points” within the hostile swarm.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 10 of 36

3.1. Sensing Technologies

An anti-drone system, to fulfill its purpose, must be equipped with a sensing system
consisting of one or more sensors, including those of different technologies. There are,
in fact, different types of sensors, which are characterized by the observed phenomenon,
electromagnetic or acoustic, and by the spectrum band they use. For example, image
sensors operate in the electromagnetic spectrum, in all visible frequencies, while a radar
can operate at microwave frequencies.
The first technological distinction to which we can refer for the classification of sensors
is between active and passive sensing. The substantial difference between the two types
is based on the use of energy to “feel” the objects present in space. For active sensors,
an electromagnetic or acoustic radiation is emitted, with which it is possible to directly
measure the distance of objects in space through, for example, the measurement of the delay
between the radiation emitted by the sensor itself and that received by the back-scattered
reflections of the objects. Radars and LiDAR sensors belong to this category. On the other
hand, passive sensors receive energy from the environment and from the object to be
detected, which can be used to reconstruct useful information. Most of the passive sensors
used are optical and infrared cameras.
There are many reviews on the current state-of-the art technology in this wide variety
of sensors, both commercial and academic ones (for example: [31]). Instead, in the following
subsections, we are focusing on the literature with drone-based-only use cases. So, it is
possible to assume that all the following sensing technologies are suitable for use aboard
mini and micro-drones.

3.1.1. Acoustic Sensors

The engine and propellers of the drones generate acoustic waves in the frequency
range between 20 Hz and 20 kHz, which give rise to the acoustic signature of the vehicle.
A single microphone can acquire this information and thanks to the comparison with
a library of acoustic signatures, it can distinguish a drone from other objects and carry
out the identification phase of the aircraft by obtaining information on the model. If the
number of microphones is increased, it is possible to adopt spatial diversity techniques
or use beamforming techniques by arranging the installation of an array of microphones
onboard the drone. In this way, it is possible to estimate the azimuth and elevation of one
or more targets through the direction of arrival (DoA), perform multiple target tracking
and mitigate the ego-noise effects, i.e., the noises of the electric motors and the moving
propellers of the drone itself.
This type of sensor is particularly economical, but is sensitive to environmental noise
and climatic conditions related to wind or temperature and typically has a detection range
that depends also on the microphone array size. This technology is typically used for
ground-based counter-UAS platforms, but no airborne commercial products have been
found. However, as the following articles demonstrate, the dimensions of a microphone
array are compatible with the installation onboard a drone. For example, in [32] and in [33],
some small-sized drones were set up with an array of microphones to locate a generic noise
source. The ability to perform localization and tracking in terms of DoA and to identify
noise sources were analyzed in [34], in which a circular array (ground-based) was used and,
thanks to sound signal processing and array signal processing, an identification success
rate of 80% was shown under the test conditions described in the article.
The detection range depends on the quality of the microphones, the characteristics of
the array and the type of processing performed. In fact, the results that can be found in the
literature vary in a fairly wide range, from 5 m of [35] up to 600 m of [36]. In [37], a ground-
based system of two arrays of four microphones (spaced by 1 m) each was used for the
location of a drone through the calculation of the DoA. Comparable results were obtained
with GPS accuracy and a detection range of 100 m. In [36], a ground-based configuration
was used with the arrangement of the array of tetrahedron microphones. In this case, a
detection range of up to 600 m with a success rate of 99.5% was highlighted, at the same
Drones 2022, 6, 65 11 of 36

time, however, the tracking capabilities were poor. In [38], on the other hand, an array of
120 elements arranged on a spherical structure allowed the detection and identification of
various commercial drones up to about 290 m. It should be noted that the classification
range may be lower than the detection range, as shown by the test campaigns carried out
for the system described in [39].
Finally, an array of eight microphones was used in a scenario that is very similar to
the one considered in this study ([35]), involving a tracker drone and an intruder drone. In
this case, machine learning was used, and signal processing is done in real-time onboard
the aircraft. The detection range was extremely small, equal to about 5 m, but there were
excellent tracking capabilities.

3.1.2. Radio Frequency Sensors

Radio frequency (RF) sensors capture the electromagnetic signals radiated by a ma-
licious drone or by the remote pilot’s radio control, if present. It is, therefore, a passive
method that does not require the transmission of electromagnetic waves and, therefore,
has no restrictions on use (e.g., in an urban environment). Most commercial drones use an
uplink radio channel for remote control commands and a downlink channel for telemetry
and video signal. In the case of autonomous drones, there may be only direct downlink
transmission to the ground control station (GCS) or communication between the nodes of
the network in a swarm. The detection systems based on this technology make use of a RF
receiver between 400 MHz and 6 GHz and an array of antennas for the possible exploitation
of MIMO techniques. The receiver can be implemented through software-defined radio
(SDR) due to the reconfigurability and flexibility characteristics of the radio frequency front-
end and associated baseband processing. RF detection can be performed with techniques
based on a known protocol or recognition of the spectral pattern. In this case, we refer to
drones that communicate with the remote pilot through communication standards such as
IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), a case that covers a large part of commercial drones. In this way, it is
possible to retrieve the MAC address of the device and trace the specific drone model.
In addition to the recognition of the spectrum and the communication protocol, it
is possible to recognize the RF fingerprint of the radio controller and then carry out the
classification of the drone through machine learning techniques, as described in [40]. These
techniques are not very effective if a known pattern is not used, if the communication
scheme has been customized or if the MAC address database is not updated ([41]).
For this reason, techniques based on the localization of the RF signal have been
developed. So, the DoA estimation is carried out in two different ways: based on received
signal strength (RSS) or spectral analysis. In the first case, the results are less accurate than
in the second. For example, in [42], an architecture based on an array of four antennas and
an SDR platform for processing was proposed, in which an angular precision between 1.9◦
and 6◦ was achieved over a coverage range between −60◦ and 60◦ . In [43], an experiment
was presented in which, thanks to the use of commercial SDR platforms (FPGA-based), it
was possible to localize small drones with a maximum range of 75 m. Although previous
publications have been ground-based, they described techniques that could also be used
on-board. In [15], a UAV-based system was described, in which a tracker drone can track
an intruder drone by measuring RSS. The coordinated use of multiple drones for locating
the RF source was also considered in [44,45]. In the latter, the air-to-air communication
channel was simulated and compared with the ground-to-air one in an urban context. The
research aimed to analyze the differences in terms of location accuracy vs. SNR. The results
showed a clear advantage for the air-to-air solution.

3.1.3. Optical Sensors

Optical sensors detect electromagnetic waves in the range of frequencies from infrared
(300 GHz) to ultraviolet (790 THz). It is a passive technology, therefore with low energy
consumption, which can provide two-dimensional images of the surrounding environment.
Optical sensors can be divided into two main categories, depending on the frequency
Drones 2022, 6, 65 12 of 36

band in which they work: visible (VIS) or non-visible. For example, the first category
includes optical cameras, which can detect electromagnetic radiation in the 430–790 THz
frequency range, while the second category includes thermal cameras, which convert
infrared radiation (300–430 THz) into images.
Thanks to image processing techniques based on computer vision (CV), it is possible to
detect, classify and track drones that fall within the field of view (FoV) of the optical sensor.
The aforementioned operations are similar to object detection and tracking, which is a
much-studied problem in the CV field. An object can be detected thanks to features such as
geometric shape or outline and features related to movement between consecutive frames.
In the event that the sensing system is mounted on-board a drone, the dynamism of the
scene must be considered, which introduces problems of variation in lighting conditions
and background characteristics. The sensors that operate in the visible frequency band
show their limits in the case of adverse weather conditions (rain and fog) and the case of
low ambient light such as at night.
Infrared (IR) sensors allow us to overcome these limits ([46,47]) and offer greater
robustness against rapid changes in illumination [48]. Two types of existing approaches in
the literature are essential [49]: direct or feature-based techniques and machine learning
methods. The first category includes algorithms that try to identify a specific region of
interest in the image by looking at the best similarity with a reference representation of the
target. In direct techniques, information on the local gradient is used in each pixel of the
image, while in feature-based techniques, features are used that are followed in a sequence
of frames through specific descriptors. The detection and tracking capabilities are good, as
highlighted in [50], where the processing is based on techniques of background subtraction
and optical flow calculation.
Machine learning techniques are very popular among the scientific community. The
training of a neural network for target detection and classification is one of the most
studied fields of CV. In fact, given the great accessibility of standard optical cameras, this
research area has reached a fairly mature stage. Thanks to the large availability of public
image datasets, UAV detection challenges are often organized at international conference
workshops, such as Advanced Video and Signal-based Surveillance (AVSS) conference and
International Conference on Computer Vision Systems (ICCVS).
Image classification with the deep learning paradigm is one of the most active fields
of research. Most of the works that employ deep neural networks (DNNs) for drone
classification problems utilize a generic object detection architecture, with a powerful DNN
as a classification model targeted for drones. The most used architectures are:
• Single-shot multi-box detectors (SSD)
• Faster R-CNN
A particular SSD architecture is the You Only Look Once (YOLO) model, which has
gained great popularity thanks to a particular computational efficiency that allows its use
also on embedded systems in real time.
The adoption of different CNN architectures (e.g., Zeiler–Fergus (ZF), visual geometry
group (VGG16)) for drone detection has been investigated in [51]. To overcome the limited
amount of data available for training the deep networks, authors exploited transfer learning
from ImageNet and performed a pre-training to fine-tune the models. The experimental
results revealed that VGG16 with faster region-based convolutional neural network (R-
CNN) achieved the best performance among all the considered architectures.
The authors of “Drone Detection in Long-Range Surveillance” [52] worked on a
previous iteration of the same dataset, with quite good results in the detection of small
objects. They applied a Faster R-CNN network with various backbones and showed that
ResNet-101 had the best results.
In [53], a deep-learning-based detection method was adopted, termed YOLOv2, whose
training is performed using an artificial dataset obtained by mixing images of real birds
and drones, each with a different background. The obtained results demonstrated that
Drones 2022, 6, 65 13 of 36

the diversity and the scale of the dataset have a positive impact on the detection and
tracking processes.
The size, weight, required power and cost of the cameras is such that their use on
drones does not find particular impediments and certainly makes it possible to use them as
a sensing system for C-UAS for all operations of detection, identification and tracking.

3.1.4. LiDAR Sensors

LiDAR uses electromagnetic radiation at the optical and infrared wavelengths. It is an
active sensor that emits electromagnetic waves and receives reflected waves, similarly to
the operation of the radar, only at much higher frequencies, between 200 THz and 400 THz.
Thanks to the calculation of the time difference between the emitted and received ray (time
of flight), it is possible to process a 3D map of the surrounding environment and, thus,
obtain the position, direction and speed of the objects in the scene. The speed can also be
calculated from the doppler shift due to moving objects. These sensors are widely used in
the automotive sector for safety systems related to autonomous driving (adaptive cruise
control, lane-keeping, emergency braking). They can be used for simultaneous localization
and mapping (SLAM), which allows robots to orient themselves in an unknown space
and GPS-denied environment. The compact size allows it to be used on-board UAVs, both
as a payload, for example for aerial mapping applications, and as avionics for collision
avoidance systems.
There are different types of LiDAR sensors: those that measure only the range, called
1D, to those that measure the angle of arrival in the azimuth and elevation, as in an optical
camera, and in addition, they obtain information on the range. It should be noted that the
maximum operating range depends on the reflectivity value of the material and the color
of the object hit by the light radiation. Given the wavelengths, the LiDAR (especially in
the 1D case) can have a reduced operation in conditions of fog, clouds or rain, but offers
the advantage of being able to be used also in conditions of low ambient light (at night, for
example). The processing of the data acquired by this type of sensor requires a relatively
low–medium processing effort compared to other types of sensors.
Most publications in the context of counter-UAS systems are ground-based. In [54], a
LADAR (laser detection and ranging) is described, based on LASER, with a peak power
of 700 kW, which allows for the increase of the operating range up to 2 km. In [55], an
interesting experimental test campaign was carried out with a 3D LiDAR system mounted
on a land vehicle to determine the probability of detection for mini drones. The results
showed how, with sensors with a maximum operating range of 100 m, it is possible to have
a high detection success rate for targets within 30 m. In [56], sensor fusion techniques were
applied between a 3D LiDAR sensor and an RGB camera for detection, localization and
tracking applications, with a maximum range of 50 m.
In addition to the CUS systems, publications in the field of collision avoidance systems
(CAS) for UAVs that use sensing techniques based on LiDAR were also considered. The
problem of obstacle detection is very similar to that of the detection/identification and
localization of malicious UAVs. In [57], machine learning and data fusion techniques
were used for the combined use of 3D LiDAR and optical cameras, obtaining an obstacle
detection range of about 30 m. In [58], a 2D LiDAR sensor was used, obtaining a detection
range of about 8 m compared to the sensor’s maximum range of 25 m. The analysis of
the state of the art shows how LiDAR-based technology is widely used for the detection
of targets concerning CUS systems and obstacles concerning CAS. The ability to separate
objects from the background and range measurement are interesting features for this
category of sensors and can be used, for example, in the extrapolation of geometric features
related to a possible scenario involving a hostile swarm.

3.1.5. Radar Sensors

A radar is an active sensor, consisting of a transmitting segment that radiates elec-
tromagnetic waves in the frequency range from 3 MHz to 300 GHz, depending on the
Drones 2022, 6, 65 14 of 36

application. The waves are reflected by the target objects and are received by the receiving
segment of the radar. By properly processing the received signal, it is possible, for example,
to calculate the time of arrival and the frequency shift due to the Doppler effect to obtain
information on the distance and speed of the target. The power of the received signal is
directly proportional to the radar cross section (RCS), a parameter that measures how easily
an object is detectable and which depends on the size, material, distance and angle of the
incident and reflected wave. The RCS of mini-sized drones and their speed have lower
values than that of larger drones and aircrafts for which classic radar systems are designed.
To increase the detection possibilities of drones, the micro movements of vibrating and
rotating structures, such as motors and propellers, can be taken into consideration. In
fact, such structures have a characterizing micro-Doppler signature (mDS) [59]), thanks
to which, they can be recognized. There is a category of radars, called passive, which are
not equipped with a transmitter but use the electromagnetic radiation emitted by external
sources, such as those of the towers for broadcasting the DVB-T television signal, normally
already present in the communication channel. This category will not be taken into consid-
eration because it requires a priori knowledge of these sources and a static installation of
the passive radar.
The main advantages of the radar are related to the robustness against environmental
conditions: the operation is independent of the light conditions and atmospheric conditions.
The disadvantage is that to obtain a high detection range, it is necessary to increase the
transmission power, the limit of which will depend on the power available on-board
the drone. For this reason, it is not possible to use a classic surveillance radar, and the
use of the FMCW type (frequency-modulated continuous wave) is preferred, which has,
among other things, a more affordable cost. Signal processing can be done on software-
defined radio platforms equipped with FPGA technology and RF front-end. The most
popular radars in this area are mmWave and UWB radars, with one millimeter and ultra-
wideband respectively.
The literature analysis ([60–62]) showed that the detection range is typically around
100 m for millimeter-wave radars. In [63], a pair of UWB radars were used to locate a
drone up to about 80 m. The classification skills are very good ([64–67]), thanks to machine
learning techniques. In particular, in [67], the authors were able to discern the weight of
the payload of a commercial drone through the analysis of the mDS. Using a radar system
operating at the 2.4 GHz frequency, the classification allowed recognition of the cases that
belonged to the set {no payload, 200 g payload, 500 g payload} with 90% success and a
maximum detection distance of 100 m. In addition to the analysis of the scientific literature
relating to CUS systems, it is also possible to investigate that relating to the applications of
radar for collision avoidance, as the detection problem is common to the two systems. In
this regard, by deepening the survey proposed in [68], it is possible to confirm the feasibility
of installing these systems on-board small drones, despite the stringent SWaP constraints.

3.2. Sensing Technologies Comparison

As seen, the proximal sensing capability of a team of mini drones is the main clear
advantage over a static, ground-based CUS. For example, the optical occlusion problem
could have a minor impact on a drone-based video sensing system thanks to the possibility
to change the perspective, taking advantage of the mobility of the drone itself. On the
other hand, there is the need for an accurate video stabilization to mitigate the blur effect
due to the drone movement. In Table 2, some pros and cons of using sensing technolo-
gies integrated in mini-drone-based platforms with respect to the static ground case are
summed up.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 15 of 36

Table 2. Pros and cons of using sensing technologies on-board a drone.

Sensing Technique Pros Cons

Possibility to move close to the target and Need for proper ego-noise cancellation
Acoustic
improve the identification task. due to the propellers noise.
Possibility to change the perspective and to
Limited computational power; need for
Optical operate close to the target with a higher
efficient video stabilization.
resolution and better identification capabilities.
Better conditions of the air-to-air channel with
RF
respect to the ground-to-air one.
Possibility to move close to the target and
LiDAR Limited on-board power.
improve the detection phase.
Thanks to the proximal sensing, less power of
Radar Limited on-board power.
the active sensor is required.

Each technology has a different detection range, classification capacity and energy
requirement. For example, the optical sensors in the visible work very well only in line
of sight (LOS) conditions, while the RF sensors can work in non-line of sight (NLOS)
conditions. It is, therefore, impossible to reach a satisfactory situational awareness level
with the adoption of a single technology and, in this regard, the simultaneous adoption of
different sensing techniques is the winning way, as previously addressed in the concept of
the defensive team and the related cooperative sensor network. Using sensor or data fusion
algorithms allows for better results than those that would be obtained individually. For
example, in [69], test campaigns were carried out on a detection system that showed how
the use of the data fusion technique increased the detection rate. These improvements were
achieved at the expense of system complexity and computational effort. The identification
of the technologies that best complement each other is a useful activity in order to optimize
the level of situational awareness with respect to the complexity and cost of the system.
The following tables have been constructed to better highlight the characteristics
of each technology. Table 3 contains a rough estimate of the performance in terms of
“detection”, “classification” and “global features characterization”. It is not easy to establish
the performance of each technology in absolute terms, which is why “low” to “high” range
values have been indicated and express a qualitative judgment based on the literature
reported in the previous paragraphs. It should be noted that the distances detected in
the experimental setups can be numerically very different from the datasheet of the CUS
products that can be found on the market. The explanation of this deviation could depend
on the different level of optimization that an engineering product has in front of the
experimental setup and the different requirements of ground- and sky-based devices.
However, the relationship between the different technologies should be respected beyond
the absolute numerical values.

Table 3. Sensing techniques’ relative performances.

Global Feature
Sensing Technique Detection Range Classification Capability
Characterization
RF Scanner Higher than 150 m High Low
RF RSS Higher than 150 m Low Low
Acoustic Higher than 150 m Medium Low
Lidar Between 50 m and 150 m Low Low
Radar Higher than 150 m Medium Medium
VIS Higher than 150 m High High
IR Lower than 150 m Low Low
Drones 2022, 6, 65 16 of 36

Table 4 is populated with the characteristics of localization/tracking and robustness

against adverse environmental and meteorological conditions.

Table 4. Sensing techniques’ tracking properties and robustness against environmental and meteoro-
logical conditions.

Meteorological Environmental
Sensing Technique Localization Multi-Tracking
Conditions Conditions
RF Spectrum
RF Scanner DoA Possible -
congestion
RF Spectrum
RF RSS DoA Possible -
congestion
Acoustic DoA Yes Wind Noise
Lidar DoA/Range Possible Fog, rain Direct Light
Radar DoA/Range/Speed Yes - -
Optical VIS DoA Yes Fog, rain Night
Background
Optical IR DoA Yes Fog, rain
temperature

The RF, acoustic, radar and optical VIS sensors have a wide detection range, in
particular, the first two are able to work also in NLOS mode. Optical sensors, however, are
not a good choice in the presence of adverse weather conditions, and, in particular, VIS
sensors are unable to work in the absence of light.
As far as the classification process is concerned, optical systems are best expressed
in conditions of proximal sensing. RF and acoustic sensors use machine learning-based
pattern recognition techniques for the identification of remotely piloted amateur drones.
RF systems also allow for the estimation of the position of the pilot in addition to the
specific model of drone used. Radars have good classification capabilities based on the
micro-Doppler signature.
Radar allows the direct estimation of the distance and speed of one or more drones; for
this reason, it can be considered as an adequate technology for the extraction of the global
features of a drone swarm, and for their localization and for operation of tracking. The use
of optical sensors flanked by the ranging capability of the LiDAR allows, in this case, for the
extraction of visual features that allow the determination of the geometric characteristics of
the swarm, such as the occupied area and the flight configuration. Furthermore, tracking is
a task that is typically dealt with via computer vision with a good level of reliability.
Table 5 proposes a subdivision into “main” and “complementary” technologies on the
basis of the information developed so far.

Table 5. Main and complementary technologies.

Task Main Complementary

Detection Radar, Acoustic, RF Optical
Classification Optical, RF, Acoustic Radar
Global Feature Optical, Radar Lidar
Localization Radar, Lidar RF, Acoustic
Tracking Radar, Optical, Acoustic Lidar, RF

For each phase of the sensing, “main” technologies are indicated, which have a high
probability of completing the task successfully. The “complementary” technologies were
considered those that can improve the result obtained by the “main” ones.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 17 of 36

4. Neutralization Systems
Neutralization systems are activated by the command-and-control system to respond
to the threat posed by the detected malicious drone(s). Multiple neutralization systems
can be activated simultaneously in order to cooperate to improve the effectiveness of the
neutralization. Furthermore, these systems can be located on one or more distinct platforms
according to the CUS physical architecture.
According to the classification reported in [9], neutralization systems can carry out the
following actions: warning, control, interruption, disabling and destruction. These actions
are implemented through neutralization techniques, more simply indicated as neutralizers
(or mitigators). Neutralizers have been classified in different ways in the literature. In [9],
neutralizers were divided into physical and non-physical based on whether there was
physical damage to the m-drone. Moreover, in the case of non-physical neutralizers, there
is no contact between the neutralizer and the m-drone, but some of them can actually
cause damage to the m-drone. A similar subdivision was also shown in [10], even if some
neutralizers fell into different classes. However, in [5], the subdivision was made between
electronic neutralizers, based substantially on electromagnetic waves that do not cause
direct damage to the m-drone (for example jamming), and kinetics neutralizers, which
intercept the drone with physical means (for example nets), but the latter ones also include
high power lasers and microwaves. Given that each definition described gives rise to some
ambiguity, the following classification will be adopted:
• Electronic neutralizers, based on the use of electromagnetic waves capable of inter-
rupting (operations), disabling or even destroying (at least partially) a drone;
• Kinetic-mechanical neutralizers, based on the use of mechanical means, which involve
contact between the neutralizer (or a part of it) and the malicious drone.

4.1. Electronic Neutralizers

Electronic neutralizers allow instant actions, can easily aim at the target and are not
affected by environmental agents (for example wind and gravity). They can be implemented
with different techniques, such as cyber-attacks, high-powered electromagnetics and lasers.
Cyber-attacks include jamming and spoofing techniques, which constitute the vast majority
of neutralizers used in the context of UAVs, protocol-based attacks (for example, de-
authentication and address resolution protocol (ARP) cache poisoning in the case of Wi-Fi
networks) and replay attacks. Below a survey is reported.

4.1.1. Radio Frequency Jamming

Radio frequency (RF) jamming techniques allow users to disturb, lower the quality
of or interrupt communications between the malicious drone and the respective remote-
control station. They consist of generating an interfering signal in order to lower the SINR
(signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio) input into the receiver of the m-drone in order
to make it difficult, if not impossible, to receive the information sent by remote control.
Obviously, it is also possible to jam on the remote control in order to disturb any feedback
data sent by the m-drone. A jammed drone can have different reactions depending on how
it is designed [5]: it can make a landing in its current position, it can perform a return-to-
home procedure, it can fall to the ground without control or it can fly in a random direction
with no control.
RF jamming can be applied to other signals in addition to the remote control one. For
example, in [70], jamming was applied to a video link used for the first-person view (FPV)
function, showing the possibility of disabling this function and preventing the operator
from maneuvering the drone in the absence of LOS conditions. Jamming can also be used
to improve the robustness of a wireless communication in the presence of an eavesdropper.
This is the case of cooperative jamming, in which a relay node transmits a jamming signal
at the same time as the legitimate source transmits its message in order to disturb any
eavesdropper [71]. By reversing the perspective, jamming can also be used to increase the
probability of interception of a communication. In [72], for example, a legitimate drone,
Drones 2022, 6, 65 18 of 36

used to follow the flight of two suspicious UAVs in order to prevent any threats, transmits
jamming signals to the receiving UAV in order to force the decrease of the exchanged
data rate and increase the likelihood of interception of information exchanged between
suspicious drones.
There are several radio frequency jamming techniques. In this paper, we refer to
the simplified taxonomy used in [10], but a more detailed one is available in [73]. The
first technique, the noise jamming (also known as barrage jamming), is the simplest to
implement and consists of applying a noisy signal to a portion or to the entire spectral band
occupied by the signal which has to be jammed in order to reduce the channel capacity
and increase the number of errors in the received data. Noise jamming can also be used
in the presence of m-drones equipped with a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) able to offer
autonomy thanks to SLAM techniques. In this case, the interference generated by the
jamming signal may be sufficient to mask the echoes related to the SAR, making the latter
unusable, as highlighted in [74]. The second technique is the tone jamming: in this case,
one or more tones (i.e., narrow band signals) are employed for the purpose of generating
interference. The effectiveness depends on the positioning of the tones and the transmitted
power. The third technique, named sweep jamming, consists of transmitting a narrow
band signal that sweeps the spectrum of frequencies of interest over time. At each instant
of time, only a portion of the spectrum is covered, but in a certain period (the amount
of time necessary to make a complete sweep) the whole band of interest is affected. The
fourth, and final, technique is smart jamming, also known as protocol-aware jamming. It is
applicable when the characteristics of the target signal are known a priori. For example,
if the communication system under jamming uses frequency hopping spread spectrum
(FHSS) and the hopping pattern is known, then the neutralizer can perform the same
frequency hops as the target and reduce the bandwidth required by the interfering signal.
Similarly, if the target communication system uses direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS),
the spreading properties of the signal to be attacked can be used to transmit a jamming
signal possessing a high correlation with respect to the original one in order to increase
the bit error rate of the communication to neutralize. Therefore, smart jamming is both
effective, as it is calibrated precisely on the target signal to be disturbed, and efficient in
power, as it operates only in correspondence with the target signal (in time and frequency).
In any case, if no prior knowledge of the communication system to be neutralized is known,
an analysis of the relevant signal must be carried out in order to identify its characteristics
and weak points. Consequently, SDR technologies are well suited to the implementation
of smart jamming; thanks to their flexibility, they allow for both the analysis of the target
signal and the reproduction of an ad hoc signal to be used as an interfering signal ([75,76]).
The performance of the above jamming techniques can be assessed with respect to
most available communications on commercial drones, i.e., the communications based on
spread spectrum, like the transmission systems ACCST (Advanced Continuous Channel
Shifting Technology), based on FHSS, and FASST (Futuba Advanced Spread Spectrum
Technology), based on FHSS with the addition of Gaussian filtering and DSSS applied on
the data. Furthermore, in order to consider even drones equipped with Wi-Fi connection,
the IEEE 802.11b standard, based on DSSS, and the 802.11g standard, based on orthogonal
frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), can be assessed. The listed systems cannot
complete the panorama of implementable communications, but offer an early coverage of
the transmission protocols (with reference to the physical layer) typically used by drones.
The experimental evaluation of tone, sweep and smart jamming with respect to ACCST
and FASST is shown in [75]. The results showed that smart jamming is significantly more
efficient than tone and sweep jamming—the tone jammer can successfully jam a single
channel of the link but is not sufficient to terminate the remote control link, and the sweep
jammer requires relatively high jammer-to-signal ratios (JSRs) to completely prevent the
communication, whereas smart achieves successful jamming at relatively low JSRs but
requires significant knowledge about the targeted system. In the same work, noise jamming
was also evaluated (with respect to an FHSS/DSSS hybrid system by means of simulations),
Drones 2022, 6, 65 19 of 36

resulting in the techniques which require a higher JSR to prevent the communication. When
considering the impact that the jamming signals have on WLAN devices, a comparison
between noise and tone jamming is shown in [77]. If the jamming signal is stronger than
the desired signal, the 802.11g system cannot operate in any mode unlike the 802.11b
system, which uses lower rate DSSS modes, however, at the certain packet error ratio (PER)
the 802.11g system can offer higher data rates than the 802.1lb system under wideband
jamming. When tone jamming is used, the performance of the 802.11g system depends
highly on the jamming frequency. In DSSS systems, the jamming frequency is not as
important a factor as in OFDM, but higher JSRs are required to increase the PER with
respect to the noise jamming. An experimental comparison between sweep and smart
jamming for the WLAN case is shown again in [75]; in the most extreme cases, the sweep
jammer halted the WLAN communication, while the protocol-aware jammer solely limited
its maximum throughput.
Neutralizers based on RF jamming techniques, also known as jammers, can be in-
tegrated on static, mobile and/or portable ground platforms (examples are illustrated
in [78–80]). It is also possible to integrate them on aerial platforms, like mini drones. Finally,
they can be active, i.e., they continuously transmit interfering RF signals or randomly to
save energy, or are reactive, i.e., they transmit interfering signals only after having deter-
mined that the monitored frequency spectrum is occupied by unknown signals (see [81]).

4.1.2. GNSS Jamming

GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) jamming is not a different technique from
RF jamming, but simply refers to the jamming of GNSS signals. It is treated separately
because of its relevance considering that GNSS signals are typically those most subject to
neutralization. Signals received from satellites are characterized by low power value and,
thus, are vulnerable to interfering signals; therefore, the technique under consideration
can be effective. In fact, as reported in the study in [82], jamming the GPS receiver of a
commercial drone can result in drifting and control difficulties, as well as preventing the
return to home (RTH) procedure from working properly.
To implement GNSS jamming, the same radio frequency techniques illustrated in the
preceding paragraph can be used. These techniques have been analyzed and evaluated in
relation to GPS signals in [83], together with successive pulses jamming, which involves
transmitting a sequence of pulses over time with a small duty cycle to the central frequency
of interest and can be seen as a particular implementation of noise jamming. Best results are
obtained with smart jamming and sweep jamming—the first technique is the most effective
when compared to its purpose (making the GPS signal to the receiver unusable), while the
strength of the second one is the simplicity of implementation, although it should be noted
that the obtained efficiency depends on the speed used to sweep the frequency band.
GNSS jamming can be ineffective when malicious drones are equipped with IMU
sensors. In this case, if the drone is equipped with a remote control link, RF jamming can
also be useful. Similarly, GNSS jamming is highly important with m-drones not equipped
with a remote control (i.e., RF jamming is not applicable), which follow a pre-programmed
route with the aid of GNSS. Consequently, intrinsic weaknesses shown by RF and GNSS
jamming can be compensated for by their simultaneous deployment in order to improve
neutralization effectiveness.
Finally, considering the strategic importance of GNSS services, it should be noted
that much research has been done in order to prevent and/or mitigate GNSS jamming;
some methods, including those ones based on antenna arrays, are illustrated in the study
reported in [5]. Therefore, a CUS shall pay attention to the effects obtained by means of
such a neutralization.

4.1.3. Spoofing
Spoofing consists of generating a plausible fake signal with enough strength to trick the
malicious drone receiver into believing it is the legitimate signal. The signals under spoofing
Drones 2022, 6, 65 20 of 36

can be related to some different applications or devices: remote control communications,

payload data communications, GNSS, sensors. In order to perform spoofing, it is necessary
to know the communication protocol stacks used (not only the physical layer) so that they
can be reproduced. If the stacks are known it is possible to analyze them a priori, otherwise
first it is necessary to determine them in some way. Therefore, spoofing is a complicated
method and not always a successful one. In any case, at least in theory, by using spoofing
techniques, it could be possible to take control of the malicious drone and make it move
away from a protected area. Some examples are shown in [84,85].
As mentioned above, a typical class of signals often involved in spoofing is represented
by GNSS signals. In this specific case, it is possible to make the m-drone land, engage
the autopilot, remain hovering or follow a desired path. Studies presenting methods for
hijacking or disabling a drone using GNSS spoofing are reported in [86–88]. An interesting
study is reported in [89], where the authors determined the necessary conditions for
capturing a drone through GPS spoofing and examined a possible post-capture control
system. Furthermore, two different strategies are depicted: overt spoofing and covert
spoofing. In the first case, the spoofer (i.e., the spoofing-based neutralizer) does not hide its
attempt to “subjugate” the target system and, therefore, does not align the forged signals
with the legitimate ones. In particular, after a first phase in which it jams on the GPS receiver
in order to force it to lose the lock and reacquire all the signals, it can take control, as long as
the counterfeited signals have a power that satisfies two conditions: exceeding the receiver
acquisition threshold and forcing the authentic GPS signals below the aforementioned
threshold exploiting the receiver AGC (automatic gain controller) function. Experimental
trials have shown that when the ratio between the counterfeit signal power (Pc) and the
legitimate signal (Pl) is equal to 10 dB, the previous conditions are satisfied (as confirmed
also in [90]). Instead, in the case of covert spoofing, the spoofer assumes that the GPS
receiver and the navigation system are equipped with spoofing detection techniques, which
must be evaded using appropriate counterfeit signals. Experimentally, it has been verified
that if the spoofer can estimate the speed and position of the target drone with errors under
certain thresholds (respectively below 10 m/s and 50 m), then it can reliably and covertly
take control of the tracking loops of commercial receivers using small Pc over Pl ratio (of
the order of units of dB). Notice that covert spoofing can be generalized and applied to any
type of communication, especially if it has been assumed that the malicious drone receiver
is equipped with anti-spoofing technology. In these cases, the counterfeit signal should be
correlated to the legitimate signal as much as possible and with a similar power level trend
over time, so that it can be confused with the legitimate one.
Rather than generating compatible counterfeit signals, GNNS spoofing can also be
accomplished by meaconing ([10,90]), a technique consisting in interception and retransmis-
sion (at higher power) of the original signal to the malicious drone’s receiver. Whereas the
GPS signal is encrypted, a technique similar to meaconing, called security code estimation
and replay (SCER) ([10,90]), can be used. It provides for the estimation of each symbol of
the used coding by observing the signal received in the corresponding symbol period. The
symbol estimation is continuously updated and is used simultaneously in the spoofing
signal, trying to replicate the encoding as closely as possible.
Finally, spoofing applied to on-board sensors also deserve some attention. In this case,
the spoofing source sends false signals to sensors, which can lead to the destabilization
of the malicious drone control system. For example, as indicated in [91] and in references
reported there, gyroscopes and accelerometers are sensitive to ultrasound at their resonant
frequency and this vulnerability can be attacked. In [92], the authors spoofed the gyroscope
of a drone, causing it to land. However, these attacks require powerful speakers and are
limited in range due to the degradation of the sound wave with distance. Furthermore,
a reference for a possible solution to an acoustic attack is always present in [91]. Other
sensors that can be spoofed are those of the optical flow type. Their vulnerability was
demonstrated in [93], where a method was presented to hijack a drone by spoofing the
camera (thus affecting the stabilization algorithm) by means of a laser and a projector aimed
Drones 2022, 6, 65 21 of 36

at the drone’s surface. Again, in [91], there was evidence of the fact that the presence of a
magnetic field in the vicinity of a drone, in this case the DJI Phantom, always requires the
recalibration of the relative magnetometer before take-off.

4.1.4. Neutralizers Exploiting Protocol-Based Attacks and Replay Attacks

Some cyber-attacks try to exploit the vulnerabilities present in the protocols used in
communication networks to perpetrate malicious actions. These attacks include denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks, which consist in disabling a machine (or network), making it
inaccessible to intended users. Wi-Fi de-authentication, which consists of disconnecting a
user from the relative access point (WAP), and flooding, which consists of sending a large
amount of traffic to the target in order to make it unable to process legitimate messages,
belong to the above family. These attacks can also be aimed at drones. For example, as
documented in [91], some commercial drones based on Wi-Fi communications that do not
require authentication for network access have proved to be vulnerable to de-authentication
and flooding towards the drone network interface controller (NIC). In particular, with de-
authentication, it was possible to disconnect the commercial drone from its remote pilot in
order to activate a security procedure and take advantage of the disconnection window
to take control of it. Another cyber-attack used to disconnect a commercial drone from
its controller is the address resolution protocol (ARP) cache poisoning attack, as shown
in [94]. Many of these attacks can be prevented using a network access with authentication,
but the basic idea can be used to implement a neutralizer to exploit this kind of attack. In
other words, as in the spoofing case, it is possible analyze the protocols used by drones
to determine some weaknesses, at one or more layers of the communication stack, to be
used to carry out neutralization operations. It follows that this kind of neutralizer can
be applicable and effective for commercial drones whose protocols are known. They are
definitively not a robust solution if the above exploited weaknesses can be patched up
by the users, however they could be applicable as a first neutralization technique for
commercial drones used improperly but without illegal purpose.
Other techniques useful to implement as neutralizers are replay attacks. According to
the classification reported in [91], they can be included within the family of protocol-based
attacks. They are based on the interception of a data transmission and its subsequent retrans-
mission with a certain delay and can be used to hijack and disorient a drone. Examples are
reported in [95,96]. In the first case, a drone used by the police was hijacked by exploiting a
replay of the control commands sent to the drone by the ground control station using the
XBee 868LP protocol. In the second case, it was possible to hijack amateur drones using the
MAVLink protocol with replay attack. Therefore, even these kinds of attacks can be taken
in account, but because they are very simple, eventual countermeasures adopted by the
malicious drone(s) should be considered. For instance, the study reported in [97] showed a
detection mechanism applicable to replay attacks based on the authentication of the pilot
who controls the drone manually. The mechanism uses a classifier capable of recognizing
the pilot’s distinctive control style by exploiting data from on-board motion sensors.

4.1.5. High-Power Electromagnetics and Lasers

High-power electromagnetics can be used to create beams of electromagnetic energy
over a broad spectrum of frequencies, in a narrow- or a wideband way, causing a range of
temporary or permanent effects on electronics of targeted drones. According to the classifi-
cation shown in [9] they can be categorized in two classes: narrowband electromagnetics
(also referred as high-power microwaves, HPM), which include high power on a nearly
single-tone frequency, and wideband electromagnetics, which have short pulses in the time
domain and the energy distributed over a wide band. HMP requires very high power on a
single frequency. Consequently, the determination of the effective frequency, which causes
malfunctions in the drone to be attacked, is a key factor.
High-power electromagnetics must be directed precisely towards the target to be
effective, otherwise lethality is significantly reduced and some devices may still function
Drones 2022, 6, 65 22 of 36

after their use. Hence, the assessment of the neutralization effectiveness after a shot is also
an issue. An HPM-type device manufactured by Raytheon is illustrated in [98].
Lasers used as mitigators are capable of disabling or destroying an m-drone. As
described in [9], an electrolaser ionizes the path to the drone and emits an electric current
down the conductive track of the ionized plasma. Lasers can be categorized into low-
power or high-power lasers [9]: low-power ones can be used to neutralize some sensitive
sensors of the drone (for example, electro-optical sensors); high-power ones (operating at
megawatts) can be a real weapon, able to burn part of the drone and destroy it. For both
categories, accurate aiming is required, which implies sufficient time to track the target.
Laser weaknesses are represented by the need for high technological development for their
implementation (for the high-power lasers), sensitivity to weather conditions, accurate
pointing and tracking time. A laser-based neutralizer manufactured by Boeing is illustrated
in [99].
Both high-power electromagnetics and high-power lasers are a strong interdiction
measure, typically used in a military context. In a civil environment, they cannot be a viable
option, especially in crowded areas, due the risk of the uncontrolled drone crashing or of
triggering the deployment of dangerous payloads. Nor are they suitable for airports and
the surrounding space, due to the collateral hazard to aviation operations [5].
Finally, based on limited information available on the market about high-power
electromagnetics and high-power lasers, we can easily deduce that they always show large
size and weight and require a high power supply. Therefore, they can be mainly integrated
into terrestrial platforms (typically they are mounted on tracks) and are not suitable for
low-altitude platforms like mini drones.

4.2. Kinetic-Mechanical Neutralizers

Kinetic-mechanical neutralizers are able to physically block or even destroying m-
drones. Aiming and/or tracking of malicious drones is required in order to effectively
neutralize; in fact, these neutralizers must act as closely as possible to the drone under attack.
Let us briefly examine the various types of the available kinetic-mechanical neutralizers,
mainly using the data of the survey reported in [9].
For the sake of completeness, note that there is also a simple and economical method
of neutralization, classifiable as kinetic-mechanical, not linked to technology and based
on appropriately trained birds. This method, used for example by the Scottish and Dutch
police (see [9] and relative bibliography), is limited to slow and small drones (with respect
to speed and size and of the birds) and is not appropriate to mitigate multiple drones
simultaneously [9]. For obvious reasons, we do not consider it as a possible part of a CUS
system based on mini drones.

4.2.1. Neutralizers Based on Projectiles

These neutralizers are real weapons using projectiles capable of destroying m-drones.
They include machine guns, munitions, guided missiles, artillery, mortars and rockets.
Some of them (guided missiles) may require a guidance and tracking system in order to
track and hit the drone target, while others can be equipped with an optical sensor for
object detection and tracking. They are an expensive solution (the cost per shot is high) and
typically used in military contexts. Finally, they are also capable of causing collateral effects,
as the hit drone can fall to the ground causing damage to people and/or infrastructures.

4.2.2. Collision UAVs

In this case, a dedicated UAV (drone), equipped with detection and tracking capa-
bilities, follows the malicious drone in order to collide and destroy it. The neutralizer
drone requires high speeds to chase the malicious drone and, typically, it is effective for
small drones located in protected areas. Collision UAVs can employ detection methods
based on computer vision techniques and can carry explosives to maximize damage during
impact with the m-drone. They can cause collateral damage, as in the case of projectiles,
Drones 2022, 6, 65 23 of 36

and compared to the latter they are characterized by a higher neutralization delay. In
conclusion, these neutralizers are disposable systems, acting as a hybrid system halfway
between a drone and a missile. An example of a collision UAV is shown in [100].

4.2.3. Nets
Nets are used to trap and immobilize m-drones. They can be projected by a net cannon
(an example is shown in [101]) or can be carried by other drones (an example is shown
in [102]). Nets are useful for neutralizing small drones, which are difficult to intercept
by guns or guided missiles (see bibliography in [9]). They can then be equipped with
parachutes to assure a safe descent for the drone/net assembly and to prevent collateral
damages to other facilities or for forensic analysis. In any case, the effective neutralization
range is short.

4.3. Neutralizers Using Mini Drones

Aerial platforms, like mini drones, show some interesting characteristics, such as high
maneuverability, flexibility and deployment speed, but have limitations in terms of SWaP
constraints. Therefore, as already stated in the previous paragraphs, it is not feasible to
integrate neutralizers like high-power electromagnetics and high-power lasers in these
platforms. In addition, neutralizers based on projectiles are not applicable to mini drones,
both for SWaP constraints and because they are typically designed to be used with the
surface-to-air launcher installed in terrestrial platforms. Small projectiles could be installed
on mini drones, but they can be assimilated to nets. All other shown neutralizers, electronic
and kinetic-mechanical, can be used with mini drones, even if the use of low-power lasers
requires accurate pointing, which could represent a critical issue to solve. In particular, in
the case of collision UAVs, the platform is itself a neutralizer.
The use of mini drones can help to maximize the effectiveness or efficiency of some
neutralization techniques. An example is RF jamming: by exploiting the mobility of a
drone equipped with a jammer, it is possible to approach the m-drone in order to reduce
the power necessary to disturb the signal under attack. Let us assume, for example, that
in the case of a jammer installed on a ground platform, the minimum distance between
jammer and malicious drone is 100 m, and that in the case of a jammer installed on a mini
drone, the aforementioned distance is 10 m. The signal produced by the jammer installed
on the mini drone consequently undergoes an attenuation lower than 20 dB compared to
the signal emitted by the ground platform jammer. This advantage could be partially or
totally compensated considering that in the ground platform, a directive antenna can be
used to amplify the power transmitted in a certain direction, but, as shown in the work
reported in [103], an antenna system capable of offering some directivity can be installed
also on mini drones. Furthermore, multiples drones, which simultaneously transmit a
jamming signal, could be used in a cooperative way to increase the power of the resulting
interfering signal. An example is shown [104], where the authors investigated the problem
of simultaneous tracking and jamming of a rogue drone in a 3D space with a team of
cooperative drones.
Finally, a drone team can be used directly as a neutralization technique. In the work
reported in [16], a drone-based system was proposed for the purpose of intercepting and
escorting an m-drone outside a restricted flight zone. The system consists of a defensive
swarm, which is capable of self-organizing its defense formation in the event of intruder
detection and chasing the malicious drone as a networked swarm. The neutralization
approach is as follows: the swarm forms a three-dimensional cluster around the m-drone
in such a way that the m-drone has a minimum set of movement possibilities. Assuming
that the m-drone is going to avoid collisions with the drones of the swarm to maintain its
functioning, by moving the defensive drones in a cooperative way, it is possible to escort
the m-done outside the restricted flight zone.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 24 of 36

4.4. Comparison of the Neutralizers

A comparison of the neutralizers considered in this paper is shown in Table 6. For
each neutralizer, both features and limitations are shown together with the pros and cons
of using them as integrated in mini-drone-based platforms.

Table 6. Comparison of the neutralization techniques and their suitability with mini drones.

Neutralizers Features Limitations Pros and Cons with Drones

• Interfering RF signals are • Mini drones can provide
used to lower the SINR • Ineffective with limited power for the RF
(signal to interference plus autonomous malicious jamming
noise ratio) to the receiver drones (i.e., without • Needed power for RF
of the malicious drone command-and-control jamming can be decreased
• Can be used with land links) approaching the defensive
platforms (static, mobile, • The range of use depends drone to the malicious one
portable) or even aerial on the power delivered by • A lower jamming power
platforms (included the jammer and the decreases unwanted
mini drones) distance between the interference
• Can interrupt or lower the jammer and the malicious • Needed RF power per
quality of the drone drone can be further
command-and-control link • Can create unwanted decreased using more
RF Jamming of the receiver drone interference, disturbing drones simultaneously
• Directional antennas can other communications • A defensive drone can be
be used to minimize (even critical ones) used as a relay node,
unwanted interference • Regulatory restrictions can transmitting a jamming
• Allows users to increase limit its use signal in order to disturb
the interception capacity of • Can cause uncontrolled an eavesdropper
a UAV communication flights or crashes of the • Using more drones
• Can increase the security malicious drones with simultaneously
level of a communication possible collateral damage surrounding a malicious
(cooperative jamming) • Anti-jamming techniques drone could allow users to
• If the receiver of the can undermine its counter some
malicious drone gets effectiveness anti-jamming techniques
saturated, there are not (e.g., those ones based on
countermeasures the angle of arrival)

• Can interrupt the GPS

connection of the
malicious drone • Ineffective with malicious
• Makes it more difficult to drones equipped with
control the malicious IMU sensors
drone • Dangerous if used near
• GNSS signals are weak areas where satellite
and vulnerable (if not navigation is required
encrypted), therefore this • It can cause uncontrolled
• Same pros and cons as for
GNSS Jamming technique can be simple to flights or crashes of the
the RF jamming technique
apply malicious drones with
• In some cases, it can possible collateral damage
prevent the • Regulatory restrictions can
return-to-home function limit its use
• Can be used with land • Anti-jamming techniques
platforms (static, mobile, can undermine its
portable) or even aerial effectiveness
platforms (including mini
drones)
Drones 2022, 6, 65 25 of 36

Table 6. Cont.

Neutralizers Features Limitations Pros and Cons with Drones

• Information on the
systems that are integrated
• Can be used to replace the in the malicious drone
(sensors, link C2) must be • No substantial advantages
C2 link or the GNSS
available compared to static
service, allowing users to
• An accurate analysis of the platforms other than the
control the malicious
communication link or of possibility of exploiting
drone
the sensors to be attacked the mobility of drones to
• Can be applied to
must be carried out increase the operative
on-board sensors to
Spoofing • The technique is often range
destabilize the malicious
complex and could not be • Sensor spoofing could be
drone control system
successful (e.g., it is not not suitable with mini
• Can be used with land
ineffective for encrypted drones (e.g., pointing
platforms (static, mobile,
GPS) accuracy of the sensor to
portable) or even aerial
• Regulatory restrictions can be spoofed could be an
platforms (included mini
limit its use issue)
drones)
• Anti-spoofing techniques
can undermine its
effectiveness

• Exploit vulnerabilities in • If the vulnerabilities of the

drone communications • No substantial advantages
communications have
protocols compared to static
been corrected, they are
• Are often easy to platforms other than the
Protocol-Based and ineffective
implement possibility of exploiting
Replay Attacks • Can be mitigated with the
• Allow to hijack a malicious the mobility of drones to
help of machine learning
drone, destabilize its flight increase the operative
(e.g., in the case of replay
or cause return-to-home range
attacks)
procedures

• Can damage the electronic • Accurate pointing towards

systems of the malicious the malicious drone is
drone required
• Can be of two different • Lethality for the malicious
categories: narrowband • Not suitable for mini
drone could be low
(high power over a narrow drones because they
High-Power • It is difficult to assess the
frequency spectrum) and require large size and
Electromagnetics effectiveness obtained
wideband (short pulses in weight and a high power
with this mitigation
the time domain) supply
• Can cause uncontrolled
• Aggressive flights or crashes of the
countermeasure malicious drones with
characterized by an possible collateral damage
extended range of action

• Require accurate pointing

• Wind and gravity also
need to be considered
(depending on the type of
• Traditional neutralizer the projectiles) • Small projectiles could be
(ammunition, guided • Can cause crashes of the installed on mini drones,
Projectiles missiles, etc.) but they can be assimilated
malicious drone with
• Fast response times possible collateral damage to the nets case
• High cost per shot in the
case of missiles equipped
with a tracking and
detection system
Drones 2022, 6, 65 26 of 36

Table 6. Cont.

Neutralizers Features Limitations Pros and Cons with Drones

• Require capabilities of
• Require detection and tracking and approach to
tracking capabilities of the the malicious drone to be
malicious drone to be impacted
impacted • Low-speed pursuit can • The drone itself is a
Collision UAVs • Are a hybrid system neutralizer
result in delays in
between a projectile and a neutralization
small UAV • The crash following the
• Effective for small drones impact can cause collateral
damage

• Small distance from the

• Not appropriate at airports malicious drone to
as they can cause side neutralize can be obtained
• Can be projected from
effects to other aircrafts thanks to the mobility of
cannons or from flying
• They need small distances mini drones
platforms (included mini
from the malicious drone • The defensive drone must
drones)
to have an effective track and pursue the
• Nets equipped with
neutralization malicious one
parachutes allow a safe
• Accuracy can depend on • Another approach is based
Nets landing of the malicious
the surrounding on a team of drones
drone
environmental conditions forming a
• After the capture of the
• Variable reaction times three-dimensional cluster
malicious drone,
depending on the behavior around the malicious
information can be
of the malicious drone drone in order to limit or
extracted from its
• Effectiveness also depends force its movement
hardware
on the behavior of the possibilities. The team of
malicious drone drones can be seen as
a “net”.

5. Command and Control Systems

The command-and-control system (C2) is one of the sub-systems of a CUS and it is
an essential part for the implementation of the automated decision-making feature, which
has been addressed in Section 2. Indeed, it is in charge of (possibly automated) high-level
decision-making operations, such as:
• Providing a classification of the attack scenario to assess its threat level, based on the
feedbacks coming from the sensing system;
• Granting permission to fly over a specific protected area (for non-malicious drones);
• Selecting the proper mitigation techniques to be used based on the attack scenario and
its threat level;
• Planning CUS operations and monitoring their execution.
By means of the previous capabilities, the C2 system may aid the operator in facilitating
the automated decision-making for mitigation actions. It can also perform the supervision
and the management of the other sub-systems in a CUS. However, it may be convenient to
distribute these functions by deploying them in dedicated systems, especially in the case
of a cooperative drone-based CUS. In other words, the C2 system may be implemented
not as a single centralized decision-making entity, but as a coordinated set of distributed
decision-making entities. The rationale behind this assumption is as follows: a single
management system could not be feasible in a complex application, such as a CUS with a
higher number of platforms, in which some of the operations to be performed require a
high degree of autonomy. A single decision-making entity would not be able to provide
complete control of all the platforms, but it would have, at most, partial control over
the operations performed by the individual platforms, despite having an overview of
the threat represented by the malicious drone(s). A centralized decision-making system
Drones 2022, 6, 65 27 of 36

would be extremely complex, both for the required computational capacity and for the
communication network to be used to connect the various platforms. The latter, in fact,
should be able to convey all the raw data collected by the platforms to the C2 system and
to spread all the commands given by this latter system to the platforms of the CUS.
Clearly, one of the most critical design aspects of the C2 system is related to its
planning capability, which has to guarantee an automated execution and has to affect
the defensive team as a whole. Indeed, this capability represents the key enabler for the
automated decision-making feature of the system. Generally speaking, planning is the
reasoning side of acting and is an abstract and explicit deliberation process that chooses and
organizes actions by assessing the current environment’s situation (i.e., through automated
situational awareness) and by anticipating the expected outcomes of the planned actions.
This deliberation aims to achieve some predefined objectives as best as possible. It has to
be implemented according to the principles of automated planning, which is an area of
artificial intelligence (AI) that studies this deliberation process from a computational point
of view [105].
The addressed planning problem includes aspects of different planning cases, such
as activity planning (which is concerned with the allocation of activities or targets to a
given entity), route planning (which is concerned with the synthesis of routes from a
starting position to a set of targets a in a given area of interest), perception planning
(which is concerned with the planning around sensing actions for gathering information),
communication planning (which is concerned with the planning of communication actions
for the cooperation between different entities, both human and artificial), etc. All these
planning cases may be combined in the mission planning case, which is related to the
planning of actions or tasks by projecting the results of those actions according to a model
of the involved entities and by evaluating the desirability of those results. In the specific
case of an unmanned system (UMS) and of a network of unmanned systems (NUMS),
mission planning is defined as the process for the synthesis of a sequence of tasks in terms
of tactical objectives, a route (general or specific), timing and coordination actions [106].
According to these definitions, mission planning mainly refers to a strategic horizon, since it
represents a decision-making process to set objectives and tasks and to compute high-level
steps (e.g., routes, sensing actions, communication actions, etc.) to satisfy the assigned
objectives and tasks. Thus, it usually covers a wide temporal and spatial range with
respect to the missions. The outcomes of the mission planning process have to be provided
to tactical planners (e.g., the autopilots of the single vehicles), which have to compute
short-term and short-range actions (e.g., the real trajectories) to satisfy the assigned tasks.
In the reference CUS, the C2 system has to optimize the operations carried out by the
CUS and solve the mission planning process by:
• Computing the set of tasks to be carried out to counter the identified threat;
• Processing the optimal schedule (i.e., assignment and ordering) of the tasks, e.g., the
allocation and the sequencing of the target areas to be protected and of the vehicle
counter activities (in terms of detection, identification, classification, tracking and
neutralization) to be executed;
• Operating over the entire time horizon and space horizon of the threat resolution.
Thus, it is a strategic planning level that sets the general objectives (the threat resolution
strategy) and articulates the high-level steps to achieve them. Moreover, the reference
mission planning is a dynamic (i.e., online) mission planning to face the dynamic threat
scenario of the drone attack. Generally speaking, it is possible to carry out, where necessary
or convenient, the following hierarchical decomposition for the C2 system: a module of the
system may be explicitly in charge of the coordination of the team by means of a defensive
team planning. Such a module is fed by the mission goals and the data of the team and
deliberates the defensive tasks for all the vehicles by evaluating their effectiveness from
the point of view of the team’s mission and by considering the team’s relationships and
possible conflicts. It could be integrated in all the drones in order to obtain a decentralized
architecture, in a single drone (working as team leader) or a in ground platform in the case
rones 2022, 6, x FOR PEER REVIEW 28 o

Drones 2022, 6, 65 relationships and possible conflicts. It could be integrated in all the drones 28 of 36in orde
obtain a decentralized architecture, in a single drone (working as team leader) or
ground platform in the case of a centralized architecture. Instead, lower‐level plann
integrated in all the
of a centralized drones, are
architecture. in charge
Instead, of the
lower-level planning
planners, logic for
integrated the
in all thesingle
drones,vehicle
are in charge of the planning logic for the single vehicle and are fed
are fed by the team plan that is deliberated at the higher level. The functionalby the team plan architec
that is deliberated at the higher level. The functional architecture of this planning logic is
of this planning logic is illustrated in Figure 3.
illustrated in Figure 3.
Mission Planning

Coordination

Mission Goals and Defensive Team

NUMS Data Planner

TEAM LOGIC

VEHICLE LOGIC
Low‐Level Control

Task Planner Navigation Guidance Autopilot

Route Planner

Vehicle Planning

Drone

Figure 3. Functional architecture of the planning logic for the C2 system. Such logic is divided into
Figure 3. Functional architecture of the planning logic for the C2 system. Such logic is divided
team logic and vehicle logic. The former contributes to the planning of the actions of the overall team.
team logic and vehicle logic. The former contributes to the planning of the actions of the ov
Starting from the team plan, the latter performs the planning and the execution for the single vehicle.
team. Starting from the team plan, the latter performs the planning and the execution for the si
vehicle. The functional architecture in Figure 3 is compliant with the multilevel optimiza-
tion principle [107] in order to ensure that the CUS-wide objectives and constraints are
respectively optimized
The functional and satisfied
architecture inalong
Figurethe 3hierarchy. In particular,
is compliant with the the global planning
multilevel optimiza
problem is broken into simpler problems, which are independently solved. Moreover, the
principle [107] in order to ensure that the CUS‐wide objectives and constraints are resp
upper levels coordinate the solutions of the decoupled problems of lower levels by means
tively optimized and
of management satisfied along the hierarchy. In particular, the global planning p
functions.
lem is broken
The above intohierarchical
simpler problems,
decompositionwhich
can are
also independently
be used for operations solved. Moreover,
provided by the
per the other
levels systems thatthe
coordinate comprise
solutionsthe CUS. Detection
of the decoupled carriedproblems
out through ofthe simultaneous
lower levels by mean
use of multiple drones is an example. In this case, based on the number of drones making
management functions.
up the detection system, a model based on “cooperative autonomous systems” can be
The above
applied, hierarchical
characterized decomposition
by a collection of distinct can also be used
decision-making for operations
entities provided
(one per drone)
the other
or by asystems
centralizedthat comprise
control the CUS.
implemented intoDetection carried
a drone hired as theoutteam through theboth
leader. In simultane
the solutions, similarly to the previous case, the detection activity associated
use of multiple drones is an example. In this case, based on the number of drones mak with drones
could
up the be subdivided
detection system,into detection
a modelplanning
based on (the mission planning),
“cooperative aimed at coordinating
autonomous systems” can be
the steps to complete the specific detection operation, and trajectory/flight planning (the
plied, characterized by a collection of distinct decision‐making entities
vehicle planning), consisting of the generation of the trajectories of the individual drones
(one per drone
by abetween
centralized
specificcontrol
navigationimplemented intoby
points (scheduled a the
drone hiredplanning).
detection as the team leader. In both
solutions, similarly
Regardless to shown
of the the previous case,
hierarchical the detection
decomposition, activity
it is clear associated
that the with dro
use of mini
drones could inherently require decentralization of C2 operations
could be subdivided into detection planning (the mission planning), aimed at coordi in order to simplify the
overall CUS architecture.
ing the steps to complete the specific detection operation, and trajectory/flight plann
([Link] planning),
Technological consisting of the generation of the trajectories of the individ
Challenges
drones between
A CUS based on mininavigation
specific points
drones can exploit (scheduled
some byofthe
peculiarities detection
these platforms planning).
that give
added value compared
Regardless to CUS based
of the shown on other types
hierarchical of platforms. The
decomposition, it isfundamental
clear thataspect
the use of m
drones could inherently require decentralization of C2 operations in order toofsimplify
concerns the use of teams, which allows operators to rework some of the techniques

overall CUS architecture.

Drones 2022, 6, 65 29 of 36

detection, classification, tracking and mitigation systems in order to maximize performance

and effectiveness. However, in order to use drone teams, it is necessary to investigate and
develop still-challenging technologies. These technologies are listed below.

6.1. Team Coordination

The coordination mechanism (i.e., the underlying mechanism to achieve a cooperative
behavior) may concern: the imposition of an artificial interaction structure as a control or
communication structure, aspects of the task specification, interaction dynamics of agent
behaviors, etc. This may be seen as the “society design” or “macro design” of a multi-agent
system, that is, the synthesis of a logical and physical protocol to ensure that the single
agents interact to successfully achieve the global tasks and to avoid pursuing conflicting
strategies or plans [108]. Coordination may be also defined as the “process by which an
agent reasons about its local actions and the (anticipated) actions of others to try and
ensure the community acts in a coherent manner” [109]. These definitions highlight that
an effective coordination requires that each agent has to consider the actions of the other
agents and that the main achievement is related to coherency, i.e., the goodness of the joint
behavior according to the performance of interest for the given problem.
In regard to the design of the coordination mechanism of a team for a given application,
one critical point concerns the decision-making architecture, centralized or decentralized.
Note that, for the distinction between a centralized and decentralized coordination from
an algorithmic perspective, stricter criteria should be adopted, which establish that a
coordination of a planning problem is centralized if [110]:
• A single agent solves the overall problem; or
• All the agents solve the same overall problem; or
• The agents employ a wide number of communications (or a wide communication
band) to plan their coordinated actions; or
• The agents exchange full plans.
To the contrary, a coordination is decentralized if the agents make their decisions
independently and if they employ limited communications (i.e., to exchange positions,
maps, etc.). This algorithmic classification introduces a degree of decentralization and influ-
ences the theoretical and technical challenges to deal with for the coordination of teams of
unmanned vehicles. Indeed, the maximization of the degree of decentralization represents
a crucial aspect, looking also at the most recent works. However, such maximization should
also consider additional issues, often overlooked in the modelling, including the following
realistic scenarios: failures and cyberattacks, sensing noise and modelling uncertainties,
intermittent or limited communication, etc.

6.2. Team Communication Network

Considering the mobility characteristics of the drones belonging to a team, the com-
munication network will be a FANET with certain requirements of throughput, latency,
transmission robustness, multiple access, flexibility and with constraints of available energy
in relation to the mobile nodes (i.e., drones). A review on the communications perspectives
of FANETs, with key enabling wireless technologies, applications, challenges and open
research topics, is shown in [111]. In particular, the following key elements must be taken
care of.
• Routing—the algorithms used must be able to support a routing table capable of
rapidly adapting to the continuous topological variations of the network due to the
mobility of drones. A survey of routing techniques in FANETs is shown in [112].
• Reliability and security—the network must ensure availability and integrity (and,
depending on the application, confidentiality) of the communication between the
nodes, characteristics that can be obtained both by operating at a physical level and at
some higher levels.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 30 of 36

• Scalability—some network drones competing in the execution of a task may need to be

replaced for technical reasons or due to the exhaustion of their energy resources, so it
is necessary to add other drones to the team to efficiently complete the assigned task.
• Quality of service—different performances must be guaranteed according to the type
of information transmitted and the level of criticality.
• Placement—the drones may need to be appropriately arranged in the 3D space in order
to maximize the amount of information exchanged and minimize the time required
for the exchange, so as to satisfy any energy constraints characterizing the nodes
themselves. Clearly, this aspect also falls within the problem of coordination.

6.3. Team Simulation Framework

As previously mentioned, a CUS is a complex system that integrates multiple plat-
forms and different technologies, and the use of a team of drones further emphasizes
its complexity. Therefore, having a framework available to simulate the behavior of the
CUS and its systems, in particular, those based on teams, would allow users: to carry
out a sizing of the aforementioned systems, so that they can be “calibrated” based on the
area to be protected and on the possible threat (consisting of one or more m-drones), to
simulate scenarios in which teams are used and evaluate the performances by the CUS and
to develop and verify the procedures to be adopted for managing the threats.
Simulation can be used in different phases of the CUS development. The functional
allocations could be supported by a modelling framework of the systems, where different
architectural choices can be modelled, and by simulation and stressing or failure scenar-
ios, through which it is possible to assess the architecture according to different aspects.
Accordingly, looking also at the engineering guidelines on architectural assessment, CUS
system architecture metrics could be identified and assessed by means of simulation. The
architecture can be assessed with respect to its safety (for example to avoid bottle necks, or
single points of failures), its efficiency and in terms of the coverage of the extension area or
the coverage of different adversarial conditions.
The simulation can be used to build scenarios of attacks to verify the effectiveness
of the CUS and also to assure its evolutive behavior. Attack-building can leverage on
different techniques. The goal-based strategies aim to maximize the damages induced
by the attacking drones to the critical infrastructure. In this way, the assessment from
the CUS system of the threat scenarios can be verified and can be improved, assuring its
continuous learning. Going deeper in the simulation chain, the attacking drones can be set
up by using the generative adversarial networks (GAN), very promising techniques for
image synthesis, in order to ensure proper data for the training of the employed artificial
intelligence techniques
Finally, simulation can allow for the understanding of the proper human–machine
balancing and the level of automation of the CUS system.

7. Discussion
For the purposes of this work, teams of mini drones have been considered as a refer-
ence subsystem of the hybrid CUS. This choice was due to several advantages in terms
of mobility, coverage expansion, deployment flexibility, team coordination, automated
decision-making, neutralization and scalability. The suitability of drone teams for CUS solu-
tions was also confirmed by the analysis of the state-of-the-art research works in the fields
of autonomous multi-agent systems and cooperative robotics. Moreover, some current in-
ternational projects are developing both cooperative drone-based solutions for surveillance
and situational awareness applications, as well as cooperative drone-based CUS.
In regard to the sensing phase, this work argues that the proximal sensing capability
of a team of mini drones is the main clear advantage over a static ground-based CUS.
Drone-based video sensing systems are less affected by the optical occlusion problem, but
there is the need for an accurate video stabilization to mitigate the blur effect due to the
drone movement. Moreover, drone teams represent an ideal solution to balance the pros
Drones 2022, 6, 65 31 of 36

and cons of the different sensing technologies by means of a hybrid configuration of the
team and data fusion techniques. The selection of the technologies that best complement
each other is a useful activity in order to optimize the level of situational awareness with
respect to the complexity and cost of the system, considering the specific requirements (i.e.,
range, accuracy, etc.) of the application.
In regard to the neutralization phase, the use of mini drones can help in maximizing
the effectiveness or efficiency of some neutralization techniques. For example, RF jamming
may exploit the mobility of a single drone to reduce the power necessary to disturb the
signal under attack, or the mobility of multiples drones, which can be used in a cooperative
way to increase the power of the resulting jamming signal. Moreover, a drone team can be
used directly as a neutralization technique, or small projectiles could be installed on mini
drones, offering a similar solution to the nets case. In any case, for some techniques, it must
be taken into account that the target pointing required by the neutralization integrated in
the defensive drones can be a challenging issue.
In regard to C2 systems, teams of drones are prone to automated decision-making capa-
bilities according to the multilevel optimization principle. Based on the number of drones,
a model based on “cooperative autonomous systems” can be applied, which is usually
characterized by a collection of distinct decision-making entities for the decentralization of
C2 operations.
In the end, the implementation of a cooperative drone-based CUS raises several
technological challenges, in terms of team coordination, team communication network
and team simulation framework. All these challenges are also related to the reworking of
some of the techniques of detection, classification, tracking and mitigation systems, in order
to maximize performance and effectiveness by exploiting the underlying coordination
network of the team.

8. Conclusions
This paper focused on the concept of a multiplatform CUS, which consists of a team
of mini drones acting as an autonomous and cooperative system. In order to evaluate the
feasibility of this concept, the paper provided a systematic review of the main technological
pillars: sensing, mitigation and command and control. The analysis has confirmed the
effectiveness of the proposed system, while also highlighting the need for decentralization
of command-and-control operations. Moreover, the paper discussed some key challenges
in terms of team coordination, communication network and simulation framework.
Future work will regard the detailed design, the sizing and configuration of the
cooperative drone-based architecture for a specific scenario (e.g., intrusion in critical infras-
tructures such airports) and preliminary implementation and testing of basic capabilities
(coordinated detection of intrusions, cooperative tracking, etc.).

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, V.U.C., A.M., D.P. and G.G.; investigation, V.U.C. and
A.M.; writing—original draft preparation, V.U.C. and A.M.; writing—review and editing, D.P. and
G.G.; visualization, V.U.C., A.M., D.P. and G.G.; supervision, V.U.C. All authors have read and agreed
to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was funded by the national project MATIM (Maturazione Tecnologie Innova-
tive Mini e Micro Droni), with grant PRORA (Programma Nazionale di Ricerche Aerospaziali) DM662.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Drones 2022, 6, 65 32 of 36

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