San Beda College Alabang

Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
RULES 72-90

1. JESUSA DUJALI BUOT v. ROQUE RASAY DUJALI

G.R. No. 199885, October 2, 2017

BRIONES
FACTS: Buot filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of deceased Gregorio. In her petition, she
alleged that she was a surviving heir, along with respondent, and others, of Gregorio who died intestate. She annexed
to her petition a list of Gregorio’s properties that are allegedly publicly known, and claimed that since Gregorio’s
death, there had been no effort to settle his estate. Roque Dujali purportedly continued to manage and control the
properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Buot further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her
request to settle the estate. Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio's estate; (2)
a final inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed
in accordance with law among the legal heirs.

Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss, arguing that Buot had no legal capacity to institute the proceedings,
asserting that despite her claim that she was Gregorio’s child with his first wife, she failed to attach any document
proving her filiation.

The RTC initially denied Dujali’s motion to dismiss, agreeing with Buot that the issues raised by Dujali are evidentiary
matters that should be addressed during trial. Dujali then moved for reconsideration, taking into issue the existence
of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. The RTC granted the motion for reconsideration and dismissed Buot’s
petition, ruling that administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio’s estate has already been settled

JARLOS
extrajudicially and that recourse to judicial administration of an estate that has no debt is allowed only when there are
good reasons for not resorting to extrajudicial settlement or action for partition.

ISSUE: Whether RTC properly ordered the dismissal of Buot’s petition for administration

RULING: YES. When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration
proceedings. There are, however, several exceptions. One such exception is Extrajudicial Settlement provided for in
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and
the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs
may do so extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In case of
disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.

Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting administration proceedings if they have
good reasons for choosing not to file an action for partition. Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly,"
"superfluous and unnecessary," resort to judicial administration of cases falling under Section 1, Rule 74 appears to
have become the exception rather than the rule. Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "[w]here partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good
and compelling reasons."

GOYENA
In the case of Pereira v. CA, the Court refused to allow administration proceedings where the only reason why the
appointment of an administrator was sought so that one heir can take possession of the estate from the other heir. It
was held that this was not a compelling reason to order judicial administration. Further, in cases like this, "the claims
of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings
where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event."

In this case, the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of her petition for letters of administration do not
suffice to warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate to administration proceedings. That the extrajudicial settlement
in this case did not cover Gregorio's entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of
the estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether an extrajudicial
settlement that does not cover the entire estate may be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 1 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
reason to order the administration of the estate. Parties seeking to challenge an extrajudicial settlement of estate
possess sufficient remedies under the law and procedural rules.

BRIONES

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 2 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

2. GILDA JARDELEZA, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS v. SPOUSES MELECIO and ELIZABETH

JARDELEZA, JMB TRADERS, INC. and TEODORO JARDELEZA
G.R. No. 167975, June 17, 2015

BRIONES
FACTS: In March 1997, Spouses Gilda and Ernesto Jardeleza commenced a civil case against respondents respecting
several parcels of their conjugal lands. During the pendency of the Civil Case, Ernesto died, and administration
proceedings were commenced in RTC Br. 38, where Teodoro was appointed as the administrator of the estate.

Teodoro, in his capacity as the administrator, filed a motion to dismiss the Civil Case on the ground that because
Melecio, one of the defendants, was also an heir of Ernesto, the properties subject of the action for reconveyance
should be considered as “advances in the inheritance”, and, accordingly, the claim for reconveyance should be heard
in the special proceedings by Br. 38.

RTC Br. 33 granted the dismissal. Thus, Gilda sought for its reconsideration, arguing that she had a personal cause of
action of her own distinct from that of Ernesto; that she neither signed nor consented to the dismissal of the Civil
Case; and that Teodoro should have first sought the approval of Branch 38 as the intestate court considering that the
estate could potentially recover properties belonging to it. Still, the RTC denied her motion.

ISSUE: Whether RTC Br. 33 erred in dismissing the Civil Case

RULING: YES. Firstly, the basis for the dismissal that Teodoro was able to procure all the signatures of the parties
and counsels in his motion was obviously a misrepresentation as it carried only the conformity of Teodoro. Moreso,

JARLOS
Teodoro’s conformity to the dismissal would stand only for the intestate estate of Ernesto, and did not bind Gilda
without whose express conformity the dismissal of the civil case was ineffectual. Gilda’s express conformity was not
merely necessary but indispensable considering that the properties sought to be reconveyed pertained to the conjugal
partnership of Gilda and Ernesto.

Secondly, Gilda correctly posits that the action for reconveyance, which survived the intervening death of Ernesto as
co-plaintiff, should be maintained independently of the Special Proceedings.

Lastly, the jurisdiction of the RTC as a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and probate of a will of a deceased person, and does not extend to the determination of a question of ownership
that arises during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate, unless
the claimants to the property are all heirs of the deceased and they agree to submit the question for determination by
the probate or administration court and the interests of third parties are not prejudiced; or unless the purpose is to
determine whether or not certain properties should be included in the inventory, in which case the probate or
administration court may decide prima facie the ownership of the property, but such determination is not final and is
without prejudice to the right of interested parties to ventilate the question of ownership in a proper action. Otherwise
put, the determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve
title by a court of competent jurisdiction.

GOYENA
In dismissing the civil case, Br. 33 shirked from its responsibility to decide the issue of ownership and to let the
probate court decide the same.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 3 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

3. MARCELO INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, et al. v. JOSE T. MARCELO, JR.

G.R. No. 209651, November 26, 2014

BRIONES
FACTS: In 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was survived by his four compulsory heirs: Edward, George,
Helen and respondent Jose, Jr.

Initially, MIMCO filed a petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr. At first, there
were separate oppositions filed by MIMCO and the compulsory heirs, but ultimately, MIMCO, George and Edward
banded together and opposed Helen’s and Jose, Jr.’s petitions, and prayed for Edward’s appointment as regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Pending issuance of the letters of administration, the RTC appointed Helen and
Jose, Jr. as special administrators.

Eventually, the RTC appointed Edward as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.’s estate. Jose, Jr. filed several motions
questioning Edward’s appointment, which reached the Supreme Court in a case Jose Marcelo, Jr. v. CA. The Supreme
Court in such case affirmed the appointment of the RTC and CA on Edward’s competence and better suited ability to
act as regular administrator of Jose, Sr.s estate.

Despite the same, Jose, Jr. persisted in his opposition of Edward’s actions as administrator and his inventory of Jose
Sr.’s estate. He filed anew serial motions which culminated in the RTC issuing a Decision directing the parties to
submit their project of partition. In a Manifestation and Motion filed by Edward, he informed that court that Jose, Jr.
has already conformed and signed a Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose, Sr.

JARLOS
The partition of Jose, Sr.’s estate as proposed by Edward was granted by the RTC. Thus, in 2001, the intestate
proceedings were archived by the RTC, pending Edward’s submission of proof of payment of estate taxes.

In 2009, Edward died. Wasting no time, Jose, Jr. moved to revive the intestate proceedings involving his father’s
estate, and moved for his appointment as a new regular administrator thereof. Petitioner MIMCO and heirs of
Edward, joined by George, opposed Jose, Jr.’s motion and initially nominated Atty. Reyes as regular administrator.

RTC then issued the assailed Order, appointing Jose, Jr. as regular administrator. Petitioners moved for
Reconsideration, and now moved for the appointment instead of George as administrator, which was denied by the
RTC. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s twin Orders, ruling that the SC ruling on the appointment of Edward as
administrator did not make a finding on Jose, Jr.’s fitness and suitableness to serve as regular administrator.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the appointment of regular administrator is still necessary at this liquidation, partition and distribution
stage of the intestate proceedings

2. Whether Jose, Jr.’s previous non-appointment as regular administrator of the estate bars his present appointment
as such even in lieu of Edward who is now dead.

GOYENA
RULING:
I.
YES. The settlement of Jose, Sr’s estate is not yet through and complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and
distribution stage. The Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, approved by the RTC in its Order dated 16 February
2001, is not yet in effect and complete. Further, there has been no manifestation forthcoming from any of the heirs, or
the parties in this case, regarding the completion of the proposed liquidation and partition of the estate. In fact, as all
parties are definitely aware, the RTC archived the intestate proceedings pending the payment of estate taxes.

The Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate, was divided into two (2) parts: (1) Settlement of the Claims against the
Estate, and (2) After Settlement of the Claims, distribution of the remaining assets of the estate to the four (4)
compulsory heirs. The same document listed payables and receivables of the estate dependent on a number of factors
and contingencies.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 4 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

There has been no showing from either of the parties that the receivables of, and claims against, Jose, Sr.'s estate has
been actually liquidated, much less, if an offsetting occurred with the companies listed in the inventory on one hand,
and Jose, Sr.'s estate, on the other. Although the Marcelo family, in particular the compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., hold

BRIONES
equity in the corporations mentioned in the inventory, considering that the corporations are family owned by the
Marcelos', these corporations are different juridical persons with separate and distinct personalities from the Marcelo
patriarch, the decedent, Jose, Sr.

More importantly, the liquidation scheme appears yet to be effected, the actual partition of the estate, where each heir
separately holds his share in the estate as that which already belongs to him, remains intangible and the ultimate
distribution to the heirs still held in abeyance pending payment of estate taxes.

Significantly, even the Liquidation of the Inventory of Jose, Sr.'s estate states that the valuation amount of the shares
of stock as listed therein is based on par value, which may have varied given the passage of time. The same document
delivers a very important notation that the equal distribution of the listed assets of the estate will depend on the
actual selling price of these assets less taxes and other deductions.

To date, more than a decade has passed since the intestate proceedings were archived, thus, affecting the value of the
estate's assets.

From all of the foregoing, it is apparent that the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.'s estate still requires a
regular administrator to finally settle the estate and distribute remaining assets to the heirs of the decedent.

JARLOS
II.
YES. The decision of the trial court appointing Edward as the Administrator of the Estate of Jose, Sr., which decision
had the imprimatur of a final resolution by the Supreme Court, was not merely a comparison of the qualifications of
Edward and Jose, Jr., but a finding of the competence of Edward compared to the unfitness of Jose, Jr.

Because Edward and Jose, Jr. are both compulsory heirs of Jose, Sr., they were, at the time the issue of
administration first cropped, equally preferred to administer Jose, Sr.'s estate. Necessarily, the courts also delved into
the question of their suitableness and fitness to serve as administrator, preferring one over the other, framing it as
Edward being more fit and suited to be administrator:

1. Edward has kept the Marcelo family corporations and his own in good financial condition;
2. The trust reposed by the decedent on Edward who voted on Jose, Sr.'s behalf in a Marcelo corporation; and
3. Edward being made a co-signatory for money deposited for Jose, Jr.'s own children.

Plainly, the RTC in its Order dated 13 December 1991, found Edward competent to serve as regular administrator,
more competent than Jose, Jr., preferred despite equal status in the Order of Preference, manifesting none of the
disqualifications set by law. Still and all, the same Order likewise judged Jose, Jr.'s suitableness and fitness, or lack
thereof, for the office of administrator, albeit in comparison with Edward and not with the rest of Jose, Sr.'s children.
Jose, Jr. was not what Edward was. The fact however, that Edward was made co-signatory for money deposited for

GOYENA
Jose, Jr.'s own children is a telling commentary against Jose, Jr.'s competence, if not integrity.

Contrary to the recent rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals appointing Jose, Jr. as administrator, there is a
previous and categorical ruling on Jose, Jr.'s fitness to serve. Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr.
is unfit and unsuitable to administer his father's estate.

Given the factual considerations that led to the prior findings on the unfitness of Jose, Jr. to act as regular
administrator; the A︎davit of Helen preferring George as administrator; and the conformity on record of the rest of
Jose, Sr.'s heirs to George's administration as reflected in petitioners' Appellants' Brief before the Court of Appeals,
the Letters of Administration is issued to George to facilitate and close the settlement of Jose, Sr.’s estate.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 5 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

4. ERNESTO GUEVARA v. ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON

G.R. No. 48840, December 29, 1943

BRIONES
FACTS: Ernesto and Rosario Guevara are the legitimate children of deceased Victorino. In 1937, Rosario commenced
an action against Ernesto to recover from the latter what she claims to be her strict legitime as an acknowledged
natural daughter of the deceased.

It appears that in 1931, Victorino executed a will, apparently with all the formalities of the law, bequeathing, among
others, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in the
residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan to Ernesto; and "a mi hija Rosario Guevara," a
pair of earrings worth P120. He set aside 100 hectares of a certain parcel of land to be disposed of either by him
during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to defray
his expenses and those of his family up to the time of his death.

Subsequently, Victorino executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto whereby he conveyed to him the Southern half of
the large parcel of land he had disposed by will, in consideration of the sum of P1 and other valuable considerations,
among which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his maintenance
up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses. As to the Northern half, he declared that
Ernesto can repurchase the same from Sr. Rafael T. Puzon.

Subsequently, a registration proceeding had been commenced by Victorino and Ernesto as applicants, and Rosario,
among others, as opposition. But before the trial, Victorino withdrew as applicant and Rosario and her co-oppositors

JARLOS
also withdrew their oppositions, thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto Guevara alone.

When Victorino died, his last will and testament was never presented for probate, nor has any administration
proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only
legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration
proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.

In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and testament in her custody, did
nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator
acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of
21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will.

It was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it
probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter.
Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or
assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the
betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.

ISSUE:

GOYENA
1. Whether the procedure adopted by respondent Rosario is legal
2. Whether the deed of sale and the certificate of title issued to Ernesto is valid

RULING:
I.
NO. Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that the presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its
allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. The Court of Appeals took express notice of these
requirements of the law and held that a will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure
adopted by the respondent. However, Section 1 of Rule 74 does not sanction the non presentation of a will for probate
and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to present it to the court for probate; for
such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the
extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a decedent "without securing letters of administration." It does not

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 6 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the
necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate.

We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs

BRIONES
and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless
those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the
will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the
right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant
case.

In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had received their
respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the
will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of
the will to present it to the court for probate.

Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will,
none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that "no will shall pass either real or
personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court"; and, second, because the probate of a will, which
is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial,
without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator's right to dispose of his property by will in

JARLOS
accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the will thru the means provided by law,
among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court
approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more
than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for
reivindicacion or partition.

We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does not sanction the
procedure adopted by the respondent.

Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance
with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent
notwithstanding the proven existence of a will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due to
the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her by the law.

II.
The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara before a notary
public on July 12, 1933, may be divided into two parts: (a) insofar as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara
the southern half of Victorino L. Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares in consideration of P1 and other valuable
considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar as it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara became the owner of the

GOYENA
northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his own money from Rafael T. Puzon.

As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter's
assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and
efficacious because: "(a) it has not been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less than the value of
the property; and (b) neither has it been proven that the defendant did not comply with the conditions imposed upon
him in the deed of transfer."

The Court of Appeals found that the money with which the petitioner repurchased the northern half of the land in
question from Rafael Puzon was not his own but his father's, it being the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made
by the latter to Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent withdrew her opposition to the
registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter's promise that after paying all the debts of their

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 7 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
father he would deliver to her and to the widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the
interested parties consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone
subject to the implied trust on account of which he is under obligation to deliver and convey to them their
corresponding shares after all the debts of the original owner of said land had been paid.

BRIONES
Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the northern half of the land
described in the will exhibit A and in original certificate of title No. 51691 still belongs to the estate of the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara. In the event the petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any portion thereof, he is under
obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent portion from the southern half of said land that has not yet
been sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara still belongs one half of the total area of the land
described in said original certificate of title, to be taken from such portions as have not yet been sold by the petitioner,
the other half having been lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming the obligation to pay all the
debts of the deceased.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 8 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

5. UY KIAO ENG v. NIXON LEE

G.R. No. 176831, January 15, 2010

BRIONES
FACTS: Respondent Lee filed a petition for mandamus with damages before the RTC of Manila to compel petitioner
to produce his father’s will so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted. He allege that his
father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner
Uy, his mother. Petitioner allegedly refused without any justifiable reason, to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate
and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance despite respondent’s request.

In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner posited that the petition should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof. Petitioner
denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew its whereabouts. She, moreover,
asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was
able to introduce as an exhibit, a copy of the will in another civil case in Valenzuela City. Further, petitioner
contended that respondent should have first exerted efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed
a suit.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for mandamus is a proper remedy in probate proceedings, where the custodian
allegedly refuse to produce the will

RULING: NO. Recognized in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus cannot be used to enforce contractual
obligations. Generally, mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will not lie against an

JARLOS
individual unless some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ is not
appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words,
mandamus can be issued only in cases where the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
afford relief.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here — the
production of the original holographic will — is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that the remedy of
mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the will and that he seeks the
production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting
probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. An adequate remedy is
further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original holographic will.

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of the subject will,
the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his
petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 9 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

6. EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY v. EVANGELINE CALUGAY, et al.

G.R. No. 123486, August 12, 1999

BRIONES
FACTS: In 1990, respondents, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. De
Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990. They
claimed that the deceased was of sound mind when she executed the will on august 30, 1978, that there was no fraud,
undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and that will was written voluntarily.

Petitioners filed an opposition to the petition, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible. This gives the impression that a “third hand” of an interested party other than the “true hand” of the
testator executed the holographic will.

Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the
ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should
appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the
holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of presenting their
evidence, ︎led a demurrer to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish sufficient factual and legal basis for
the probate of the holographic will of the deceased.

JARLOS
The RTC granted the petitioner’s demurrer. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision, citing the case of Azaola
v. Singson, that the rule requiring the production of three witnesses in case a holographic will is contested is merely
permissive. According to the CA, the respondents’ witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the
handwriting and signature in the holographic will were those of the testator herself.

Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal Binanay, the
Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting and signature therein, and
allowed the will to probate.

ISSUE: Whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory
(The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested holographic will, that at least three witnesses
explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the genuine signature of the testator)

RULING: Based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word "shall" connotes a
mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word "shall," when used in a statute is
mandatory.”

From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and disregard the

GOYENA
requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the decision in Azaola vs. Singson, ruling
that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

In this case, the will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who
kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will was in her
possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with other
documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was during the cross-
examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which
contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the
former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 10 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other
documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were
uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.

BRIONES
Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several documents such
as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated June 16, 1978, the strokes are
different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing
unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting
by the deceased.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 11 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

7. SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. v. CA, et al.

G.R. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983

BRIONES
FACTS: Pastor, Sr., a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City, survived by his Spanish wife, their two legitimate children,
and Quemada, an illegitimate child, not natural. In 1970, Quemada filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an
alleged holographic will of Pastor, Sr., which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of
Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor Sr.’s 42% share in the operation of ATLAS of some mining claims in Cebu.

Quemada was then appointed as the special administrator of the entire estate, whether or not affected by the
holographic will. As special administrator, Quemada instituted against herein petitioners an action for reconveyance
of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of
petitioners, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. Pastor, Jr. and his sister
Sofia, then filed their opposition to Quemada’s petition and the order appointing Quemada as special adminitrator.

In 1972, the probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate. The case reached the Supreme Court in G.R.
No. L-46645, wherein the petition was dismissed and remanded to the probate court.

For 2 years after the case was remanded, Quemada persistently filed pleadings asking for payment of his legacy and
seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. Pastor, Jr. and Sofia opposed his pleadings on the ground of pendency
of the rev-conveyance suit with another branch.

A hearing for the intrinsic validity was scheduled by the probate court, but the same was not held due to Pastor, Jr.

JARLOS
and Sofia’s opposition, on the ground of the pendency of the reconveyance suit. While the reconveyance suit was still
being litigated, the probate court, in 1980, issued the assailed order of execution and garnishment, resolving the
question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not
inofficious. This, despite the absence of any statement or claim in the 1972 Order as to the resolution of the issue of
ownership of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of the holographic will.

The order being “immediately executory”, Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment,
and in serving the same on ATLAS. The oppositors, the legitimate children of Pastor, Sr., sought reconsideration
thereof primarily on the ground that the probate court gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of
ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of Quemada’s legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will.

ISSUE: Whether the 1980 Order of the probate court, which ordered for the payment of the legacy in alleged
implementation of the 1972 Order, is valid/ whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity.

RULING: NO. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic
validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of

GOYENA
ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the
Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 which
allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. However, nowhere in the dispositive
portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that
ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic will "with respect to its
extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by
law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed "subject to the outcome of the suit for

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 12 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
reconveyance of ownership and possession of reel and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the
CFI of Cebu."

The probate order conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . .

BRIONES
. that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the
testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not
resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special
administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should
have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated
will."p
That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was
appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that
was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

It was, therefore, an error for the assailed implementing orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with
finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the
dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 13 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

8. REMEDIOS NUGUID v. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID

G.R. No.L-23445, June 23, 1966

BRIONES
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, and without descendants.
Surviving her were her legitimate parents, herein respondents, and 6 brothers and sisters. In 1963, Petitioner
Remedios filed in the CFI of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario on November 17, 1951, some 11
years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with
the will annexed be issued to her.

Respondents opposed the probate of the will, on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of
the deceased, oppositors - who are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line - were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void. Before the hearing on the petition for probate and objection
thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

ISSUE: Whether the court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will

RULING: In this case, yes. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the
probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity
of the will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be represented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said
court — at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

JARLOS
The instant case is of a peculiar situation. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will should be
allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes only after the
court has declared that the will been duly authenticated. But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on
appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

Waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety are practical considerations that induce the court to believe to meet
head-on the issue of the nullity of the provisions of the will in question.

As to the validity of the will:

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct
ascending line — her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits
both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were
they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. The one- sentence will in this case institutes petitioner
as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this
posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

The word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of

GOYENA
petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution
of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at
all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving
it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.

Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir." Considering, however, that the will
before us solely provides for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same.
The entire will is null.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 14 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

9. SOFIA NEPOMUCENO v. CA, et al.

G.R. No. L-62952, October 9, 1985

BRIONES
FACTS: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal, leaving a will duly executed in accordance with the law.
In the said will, testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of
his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he
had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded
wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo
and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The
testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.

Petitioner then filed a petition for the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and asked for the issuance
to her of letters testamentary. The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez, and her children filed an opposition
alleging that the execution of the Will was procured by undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner;
that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her
living in concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus letters testamentary should not be issued
to her.

The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting
with the petitioner from December 1952 until his death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an
idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident.

JARLOS
On appeal, however, the decision of the CFI was set aside and the CA declared the will to be valid except that the
devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Art. 739 in relation with Art. 1028 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and
Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.

RULING: NO. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution
of the extrinsic validity of the Will.

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless
to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.

There appears to be no more dispute at this time over the extrinsic validity of the Will. Both parties are agreed that

GOYENA
the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in
resolving the question of whether or not the probate court correctly denied the probate of Martin Jugo's last Will and
Testament, when it ruled that it was validly drawn.

The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary provision in favor of
the petitioner as null and void. We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to
the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will.
There is also no dispute that the petitioner and Mr. Jugo lived together in an ostensible marital relationship for 22

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 15 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
years until his death. It is also a fact that on December 2, 1952, Martin Jugo and So︎a J. Nepomuceno contracted a
marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Victoria, Tarlac. The man was then 51 years old while the woman was 48.
Nepomuceno now contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married to the
testator.

BRIONES
The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. Petitioner was aware that the deceased was married
to respondent when they cohabited. It would be a story that would strain human credulity to the limit if petitioner did
not know that Martin Jugo was already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage
to respondent Ru︎na Gomez that led petitioner to break off with the deceased during their younger years.

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between persons who
are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give even assuming
that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he
was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 16 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

10. FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, et al. v. CA, et al.

G.R. No. L-31979, August 6, 1980

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Aurelio, while the other petitioners, all surnamed Pizarro, as well as
respondents, are their children. Upon the death of Aurelio, a special proceeding entitled "In the Intestate Estate of the
Deceased Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador. Listed among the
properties of the estate were parcels of land situated in Davao City. Upon agreement of the parties, the court
appointed Gaudencio Corias, clerk of court, as Administrator of the estate.

The court authorized the administrator to sell 2 properties to settle the debts of the estate. The administrator then
moved for the approval of the conditional sale of the Agdao property to Angliongto, wherein it was stipulated that the
vendor was to cause the ejectment of all occupants in the property on or before July 31, 1967, otherwise, the vendee
was to have the right to rescind the sale and demand reimbursement of the price already paid.

On the grounds of having abused his powers and duties, the heirs filed a motions praying that Gaudencio be asked to
resign or removed, and that Letters of Administration be granted instead to Filomena. They also terminated the
services of Atty. Salvador, who had acted likewise as counsel for the Adminsitrator. On March 11, 1967, the
Administrator then moved that he be allowed to resign.

All the heirs, except herein respondents, then moved for the cancellation or rescission of conditional contract of sale
to Angliongto, alleging that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests, since the sale of one of the lots was
more than sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate.

JARLOS
It was only in July 1967 that Gaudencio ceased to be Administrator. Before that, he presented a "Motion to Approve
Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtos stating that the latter had paid the full balance for the lot, which
was granted by the court. It appears that a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of Angliongto. A Rescission
case was also instituted by the heirs except respondents reiterating that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their
interests and that the vendee had failed to pay the last four installments due despite repeated demands. The same was
dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it could not review the actuations of a coordinate branch of the court
besides the fact that a MR was still pending resolution before the Probate Court.

Petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of Appeals on "Certiorari and Mandamus with Prohibition and
Injunction," charging that respondent Judge Reyes gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case
and prayed that he be required to take cognizance thereof and that the Angliongtos be enjoined from exercising rights
of ownership over the property.

ISSUE: Whether the courts correctly dismissed the Rescission case

RULING: NO. As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to be Reviewed. There is no
judicial interference to speak of by one Court in the actuations of another co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the
sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title

GOYENA
was issued in favor of the vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been
consummated; the Order approving the sale, final.

But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to rescind the sale mainly for failure of the
vendees to pay the full consideration thereof, which is a valid ground for rescission. That cause of action was within
the judicial competence and authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a Court of First Instance with exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond
the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court (Branch IV) whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a
matter of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself had stated that petitioners' cause of
action was not within its authority to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court. The cause of action in one
is different from that obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to have taken cognizance of and to

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 17 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
have heard the Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have upheld its
dismissal.

BRIONES

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 18 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

11. ATTY. RICARDO BERMUDO v. FERMINA TAYAG-ROXAS

G.R. No. 172879, February 2, 2011

BRIONES
FACTS: Atty. Bermudo, as executor, filed a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of Hilario, and
for the allowance and probate of the latter’s will. The testator instituted Roxas as his only heir but several persons,
claiming as Hilario’s relatives, opposed the petition. The will was allowed and Roxas was recognized as the sole heir.

When the decision constituting Roxas as the sole heir became final, Atty. Bermudo who also served as counsel for her
in the actions concerning her inheritance filed a motion to fix his legal fees and to constitute a charging lien against
the estate for the legal services he rendered.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bermudo, as administrator, is entitled to collect attorney’s fees

RULING: YES. Roxas asserts that Atty. Bermudo is not entitled to attorney's fees but only to compensation as
administrator in accordance with Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.

But Atty. Bermudo did not only serve as administrator of the estate. He also served as Roxas' counsel in the suit that
assailed her right as sole heir. Atty. Bermudo brought the contest all the way up to this Court to defend her rights to
her uncle's estate. And Atty. Bermudo succeeded. Acting as counsel in that suit for Roxas was not part of his duties as
administrator of the estate. Consequently, it was but just that he is paid his attorney's fees.

Besides, Atty. Bermudo's right to attorney's fees had been settled with finality in CA-G.R. CV 53143. This Court can no

JARLOS
longer entertain Roxas' lament that he is not entitled to those fees.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 19 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

12. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY v. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 170498, January 9, 2013

BRIONES
FACTS: Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent AMC.
It alleged that it made advance payments to AMC for the purchase of plywood and plyboards, covered by Metrobank
checks. The checks were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General
Manager.

Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was commenced. This proceeding was
pending at the time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint against Metrobank.

AMC denied any knowledge of SHCI’s transaction with Chua, claiming it did not receive any money from the latter.
AMC thus asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.

In its Answer, Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and
Hardware, a sole proprietorship owned and managed by Chua. According to Metrobank, Chua then gave the
assurance that the arrangement for the handling of the checks carried AMC's consent and that Chua submitted
documents showing his position and interest in AMC. Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit
fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate, alleging that Chua’s estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would
be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC.

ISSUE: Whether Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate should be allowed

JARLOS
RULING: NO. A distinctive character of Metrobank's fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature — the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not
happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the
claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply because it impleaded Chua's estate for
reimbursement in the same transaction upon which it has been sued by AMC. The CA correctly applied the statutory
construction principle of lex specials derogate general, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is
primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily.

In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the resolution points to the affirmation of the
assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on
quasi- contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims
against a deceased person that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should
have been so ︎led in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 20 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

13. ALAN JOSEPH SHEKER v. ESTATE OF ALICE SHEKER

G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007

BRIONES
FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker. Herein petitioner ︎then filed a contingent
claim for agent's commission due him and reimbursement of the expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by
petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate. The executrix of the
Estate of Alice O. Sheker moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7 (a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner
failed to attach a certification of forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the
money claim was not fi︎led and served personally. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, who then filed a motion for
reconsideration. The motion was later denied, prompting the latter to file a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate
for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification of non-forum shopping.

RULING: The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari. The certification of non-forum shopping
is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim
against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was
initiated upon the ︎filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against
the decedent are mandated to ︎file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective money claims;
otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main

JARLOS
action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being
an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification of non-forum shopping.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 21 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

14. HEIRS OF TEOFILO GABATAN v. CA and LOURDES PACANA

G.R. No. 150206, March 13, 2009

BRIONES
FACTS: The subject lot of this case was declared for taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. Respondent filed a case
alleging that she is the sole owner of said lot, having inherited the same from her deceased mother who was the only
child of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners argued that they are rightful heirs of Juan Gabatan, maintaining that the latter
died single in 1934 without any issue and that Juan was survived by his siblings. These siblings and/or their heirs,
inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous
and uninterrupted possession thereof in the concept of owners for more than (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the
improvements thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent. The RTC however rendered a
decision in favor of respondent. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision declaring the respondents’s claim of
filiation was sufficiently established.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may determine the rightful heirs of the deceased.

RULING: Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in
the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property. The declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right. However, in the case of Portugal vs Portugal-Beltran, the Court
relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court in a proceeding for annulment of title to determine the status of the parties
therein. Similarly in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending
parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special

JARLOS
proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light of the
fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence regarding
the issue of heirship in these proceeding.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 22 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

15. GLORIOSA V. VALARAO v. CONRADO PASCUAL and MANUEL DIAZ

G.R. No. 150164, November 26, 2002

BRIONES
FACTS: FELICIDAD C. PASCUAL died at 71yo leaving a substantial inheritance to her collateral relatives. Petitioner
Valarao initiated a special proceedings for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor over the estate of the
deceased, while respondent Pascual filed with the same probate court a petition for probate of an alleged holographic.
The court denied the probate of the alleged holographic will and gave due course to the intestate settlement of the
estate. Pascual appealed the decision, Valarao on the other hand moved for her appointment as special administratrix
of the estate. Respondent Diaz also asked for his designation as special co-administrator of the estate alongside
petitioner, which was opposed by herein petitioner. Later, the probate court issued an Order appointing petitioner
Valarao as special administratrix. Respondents Pascual and Diaz along with other heirs moved for reconsideration
and further alleged that the motion was pending resolution by the probate court. While the motion for
reconsideration was pending resolution, respondents ︎filed a petition for certiorari to reverse and set aside the
appointment of Valarao, and to order the appointment of respondent Diaz as special co-administrator of the estate.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of RTC, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rejected the application of respondent
Diaz for appointment as special co-administrator.

RULING: The court ruled that there is nothing whimsical nor capricious in the action of the probate court not to
appoint respondent Diaz as special co-administrator. The records manifest that the probate court weighed the
evidence of the applicants for special administrator before concluding not to designate respondent Diaz because the

JARLOS
latter was found to have been remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estate in the early part of his
administration. Verily, the process of decision-making observed by the probate court evinces reason, equity, justice
and legal principle unmistakably opposite the core of abusive discretion correctible by the special civil action of
certiorari under which the appellate court was bound to act. Finally, the extraordinary writ does not operate to
reverse factual findings where evidence was assessed in the ordinary course of the proceedings since perceived errors
in the appreciation of evidence do not embroil jurisdictional issues.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 23 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

16. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ, et al.

G.R. No. 149926, February 23, 2005

BRIONES
FACTS: First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibañez entered into two loan agreements
intended for the payment of 3 tractors. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed promissory notes in
favor of the FCCC. When Efraim died, leaving a holographic will, Edmund was appointed as the special administrator
of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, Edmund and his sister executed a Joint
Agreement wherein they agreed to divide between themselves the 3 tractors and to assume the indebtedness of their
late father to FCCC. A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was then executed by and between FCCC
and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, the former assigning all its assets and liabilities to the latter. Union Bank of
the Philippines sent demand letters for the settlement of the account but the heirs failed to heed the same and refused
to pay. Thus, petitioner ︎filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez. Union Bank
asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs as provided under the Civil Code and that
the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence, hence she cannot deny her liability under the said
document.

ISSUES: Whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid;

RULING: No. In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered
nugatory. The partition being invalid, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor, hence, there can be no

JARLOS
assumption of liability. However, the court with the ︎findings of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently
shown that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its
assets and liabilities. Wherefore the petition is whereby denied as the petitioner's personality to ︎file the complaint is
wanting.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 24 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

17. MARGARITO R. JAMERO v. HON. ACHILLES L. MELICOR, et al.

G.R. No. 140929, May 26, 2005

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioner Jamero filed a case for the administration and settlement of the estate of his deceased mother.
The petition for appointment as regular administrator of the estate was however opposed by petitioner’s brother.
Upon such objections, the court appointed Atty. Bautista as the special administrator pending the appointment of a
regular administrator. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the court.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was also denied due course for not having filed
a motion for reconsideration first, stressing that the MR was filed beyond the prescribed period. Hence, this present
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of special administrator is discretionary to the appointing court and that
being an interlocutory order, the same is not appealable nor subject to certiorari.

RULING: The court ruled that the appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory, discretionary on the part
of the RTC and non- appealable. However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. As the Court held in Pefianco vs. Moral, even as the
trial court's order may merely be interlocutory and non-appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same
when it is rendered with grave abuse of discretion.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 25 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

18. JOSE C. LEE, et al. v. RTC OF QUEZON CITY, Br. 85, et al.
G.R. No. 146006, February 23, 2004

BRIONES
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio Ortañez incorporated Phil. International Life Insurance Company, Inc. Upon his death, he left
behind a wife, three legitimate children, and five illegitimate children. Rafael, one of the deceased’s legitimate child,
filed a petition for letter of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortañez. Private respondent Enderes and her
siblings, the illegitimate children, opposed the petition and prayed for the intestate court to appoint a special
administrator. The presiding Judge then appointed Rafael and Jose as joint special administrators of their father's
estate.

During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, the wife and her two children, the special administrators, entered
into a MoA for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, partitioning the estate among themselves.
Thereafter, on two separate occasions, Juliana and Jose, both claiming to be the owners of 1,014 and 1,011
PhilInterlife shares of stocks, sold the same with the right of repurchase to petitioner FLAG, represented by its
president, Lee. For failure of both Juliana and Jose to repurchase the said shares within the agreed period, petitioner
FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of the subject shares of stock.

Private respondent Enderes was then appointed as Special Administratrix of the subject shares. Thereafter, she filed a
motions to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedent’s estate, as well as to declare void
ab initial the deeds of sale of PhilInterlife shares of stock, which were opposed by special administrator, Jose Ortañez.

The RTC granted the motion of Special administratrix Enderes for the annulment of the MOA or extrajudicial

JARLOS
partition of estate. Jose then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA denied the petition, ruling that there
was no legal justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother Rafael
Ortañez and mother Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the
requisite approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be
prejudiced thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to FLAG of the
shares of stock they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.

ISSUE: Whether the MOA or extrajudicial partition of estate between Juliana, Rafael and Jose was valid

RULING: NO. An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art.
533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate
that may be allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that
is, after all debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that
an heir may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case,
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014 and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife)
in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the
intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in
the present case.

GOYENA
Clearly, Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered into a
memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their,
knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the
intestate court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and
Antonio Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court
approval, was likewise void.

Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's estate. Our jurisprudence is clear that
(1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 26 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no
need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition.

The question now is: can the intestate or probate court execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?

BRIONES
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court's
power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before final
adjudication.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 27 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

19. HEIRS OF HILARIO RUIZ v. CA

G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996

BRIONES
FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted
daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs
substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.

Immediately after Hilario’s death, the cash component of his estate was distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private
respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For unknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take
any action for the probate of his father's holographic will.

Four years after the testator's death, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes filed a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz which was surprisingly
opposed by Edmond on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.

One of the properties of the estate which the testator bequeathed to his granddaughters was leased out by Edmond
Ruiz to third persons. Upon order of the probate court to deposit the rental deposit and payments to the court,
Edmond turned over the amount representing the balance of the rent after deducting repair and maintenance
expenses on the estate.

Petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, then filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of

JARLOS
Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes
opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance
of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to the
granddaughters and for the distribution of the testator's properties in accordance with the provisions of the
holographic will.

The probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted respondent Montes' motion in view of
petitioner's lack of opposition.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes' motion for
release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous
motion for release of funds.

Petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of funds in view of the fact
that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been renewed for another year.

Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to
Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.

GOYENA
The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters
until the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not it is proper to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator’s
grandchildren
2. Whether or not it is proper to order the release of titles to certain heirs
3. Whether or not it is proper to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will

RULING:
I.
NO. On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 28 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

"Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person,
during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.”

BRIONES
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased the
right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the testator's
three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no longer minors but
of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states "children" of the deceased
which excludes the latter's grandchildren.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased.

Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides
that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of
their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's estate. The
law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the deceased's grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity.

II.

JARLOS
NO. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is
allowed only under the following conditions:

"Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Notwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in

proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem
proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be
distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.”

And Rule 90 provides that:

"Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance
with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be
heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or

GOYENA
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs."

In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before
payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to
meet those obligations.

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge
apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 29 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left
no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is
one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the

BRIONES
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.

III.
NO. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties
of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and
expenses of administration." Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:

"Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. — An
executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration."

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously
granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate,
and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the

JARLOS
same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of the
necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.

It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-year rental
income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the
lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.

As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is
held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and
possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real
and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court
as to their veracity, propriety and justness.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 30 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

20. EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

G.R. No. 133743, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

BRIONES
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit, out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United
States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973.

Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's
estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100
San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila.

JARLOS
Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo's place of residence prior
to his death.

The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was
the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.

CA: reversed
The appellate court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid

GOYENA
RULING: YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death."

In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence — as
contradistinguished from domicile — of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules —
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 31 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that

BRIONES
is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile.". For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence"
of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards stating that his home/city address is at "100

JARLOS
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa
were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was
validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 32 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

21. ERLINDA PILAPIL, et al. v. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO BRIONES

G.R. No. 150175, February 5, 2007

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata),consisting of her surviving sister, Rizalina
Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina);Rizalina's daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda);and the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in
representation of her two other sisters who had also passed away.

Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the late Maximino Briones (Maximino),composed of his nephews
and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.

Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952,
Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband's estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance.

The CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as the administratrix of Maximino's estate. She
submitted an Inventory of Maximino's properties. The CFI awarded ownership of the aforementioned real properties
to Donata. Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue
thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said properties, now in her name.

Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donata's nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate of Donata.

Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata's intestate estate.

JARLOS
Controversy arose among Donata's heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, based on
two Deeds of Donation, allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed
Erlinda's claim. This Court, however, was no longer informed of the subsequent development in the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda,
appear to be on the same side.

Silverio Briones (Silverio),a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the
intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5
December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals from Maximino's properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC
a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already under his and
his wife's administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio's Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.

The heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs of Donata for the partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of real property.

They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties

GOYENA
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.

RTC = in favor of Maximo

T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to 1/2 of the real properties. It also ordered Erlinda to
reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof.

CA = affirmed RTC decision

SC = reversed

In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through
fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. In the
absence of fraud, no implied trust was established between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 33 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
the New Civil Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but
pursuant to an Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order,
presumed to be fairly and regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino;
hence, making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not

BRIONES
merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of the heirs
of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Maximino may still assail the intestate proceedings

RULING: NO.

On the finding of fraud

As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations between petitioners and respondents shall
be examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, "[i]f property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes." Hence, the foremost question to be answered is
still whether an implied trust under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the present
case.

In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient evidence to establish that Donata
committed fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of title to the disputed
properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to settle

JARLOS
Maximino's intestate estate),which declared her as Maximino's sole heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the
Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and validity. Reproduced below are
the relevant portions of the Decision —

At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs covering the real properties
belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is undisputed that the said
CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted by Donata herself, to settle the
intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable to present a copy of the CFI Order,
but this is not surprising considering that it was issued 35 years prior to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of
their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless,
cannot be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10
p.m.,as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on the TCTs covering the real properties as having declared Donata the
sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not
fatal to the cause of the heirs of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never
questioned. The allegation of fraud by the heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order, but
to the manner or procedure by which it was issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the non-
presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by the RTC, does not amount to a
willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that it would be adverse
to the heirs of Donata if produced. ....

GOYENA
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence on
record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only
submitted a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006, annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners'
opposition to their motion for reconsideration of this Court's Decision. Respondents did not offer any explanation as
to why they belatedly produced a copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to have been "fortunate enough to obtain
a copy" thereof from the Register of Deeds of Cebu.

Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late into the proceedings of this case. Parties
should present all their available evidence at the courts below so as to give the opposing party the opportunity to
scrutinize and challenge such evidence during the course of the trial. However, given that the existence of the CFI
Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that the copy

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 34 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
submitted is a certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order may provide new information vital to a
just resolution of the present case, this Court is compelled to consider the same as part of the evidence on record.

This Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as

BRIONES
earlier stated in the Decision. It was the inventory of properties, submitted by Donata as administratrix of Maximino's
intestate estate, which was dated 2 October 1952. Other than such observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI
Order which could change its original position in the Decision under consideration.

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was
not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind
that the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the
newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by
law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
voluntarily or involuntarily made.

This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate proceedings instituted by Donata
before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge conducted
the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of
publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete
proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to

JARLOS
require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why
Maximino's siblings could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the
CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for respondents allege,
sacrificing the substantive right of respondents to their share in the inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats.

Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and abandonment thereof should only be done in the
most exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this Court in the instant case are disputable
presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence
presented by respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.

Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her husband's sole heir, it was not established that she
did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she indeed committed fraud. This
Court again brings to the fore the delay by which respondents filed the present case, when the principal actors
involved, particularly, Donata and Maximino's siblings, have already passed away and their lips forever sealed as to
what truly transpired between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took place when all these
principal actors were still alive and each would have been capable to act to protect his or her own right to Maximino's
estate. Letters of Administration of Maximino's estate were issued in favor of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the
CFI Order in question was issued only on 15 January 1960.

GOYENA
The intestate proceedings for the settlement of Maximino's estate were thus pending for almost eight years, and it is
the burden of the respondents to establish that their parents or grandparents, Maximino's surviving siblings, had
absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings all these years. As established in Ramos v. Ramos, the degree of
proof to establish fraud in a case where the principal actors to the transaction have already passed away is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, to wit —

"...But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it thus removes from the
parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it operates by
way of presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be
unreasonable, after a great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute circumstances of any
transaction, or to expect a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 35 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
encumbered. The most that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of
memory, and human infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if
the parties are dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to
arrive at probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or

BRIONES
breach of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption is the
other way; as to the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of
injustice and cruelty, to disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the
evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a reasonable doubt(Prevost vs. Gratz,6 Wheat. [U.S.],481, 498).

Moreover, even if Donata's allegation that she was Maximino's sole heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient to
justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, considering the nature of intestate proceedings as
being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of
jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.

On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donata's misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose upon her
the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain respondents' contention
that their right to recover their shares in Maximino's estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence
that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription and laches.

Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code),

JARLOS
then respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares in Maximino's
properties.

The next question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an
action for reconveyance of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance
of the title to the property, not only because registration under the Torrens system is a constructive notice of title, but
also because by registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally
repudiated any other claim to the same.

By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata was able to register and
secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The respondents filed with the
RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in the
name of Donata. Therefore, respondents' action for recovery of possession of the disputed properties had clearly
prescribed.

Moreover, even though respondents' Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of
the disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce their right to the said properties imprescriptible.
While as a general rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is

GOYENA
expressly or impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to emphasize that
Donata had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly. Her assertion
before the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximino's sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of
some other co-owner or co-heir to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for
partition of property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.

On laches as bar to recovery

Other than prescription of action, respondents' right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on
implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to
be enforced, applies independently of prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is
equitable.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 36 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is
based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.

BRIONES
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for barring respondents' action for recovery of
the disputed properties because of laches. This Court pointed out therein that —

In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of Maximino even emphasized that Donata
lived along the same street as some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform them of the CFI
Order, dated [15 January 1960],in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her name of new TCTs
covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court, however, appreciates such
information differently. It actually works against the heirs of Maximino. Since they only lived nearby, Maximino's
siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the status of the estate of their deceased
brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate of Maximino, were also located within the
same area as their residences in Cebu City, and Maximino's siblings could have regularly observed the actions
and behavior of Donata with regard to the said real properties. It is uncontested that from the time of Maximino's
death on 1 May 1952, Donata had possession of the real properties. She managed the real properties and even
collected rental fees on some of them until her own death on 1 November 1977. After Donata's death, Erlinda took
possession of the real properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata
and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion
of all others, which must have already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had
rights thereto.

JARLOS
The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation
as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximino's death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of
Maximino was already settled in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before instituting, on
3 March 1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property
belonging to the estate of Maximino. ...

Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents' conduct before this Court,
particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are consistently displaying a
penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or justification for such delay.

It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law
requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a
party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 37 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

22. AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, et al. v. MA. LOURDES BELEN

G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

BRIONES
FACTS: Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a
Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseo's marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter's marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as
her father.

In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought
her appointment as administratrix of her late father's estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.

The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las
Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for

JARLOS
settlement of decedent's estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their
claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseo's estate.

RTC: in favor of Elise

CA: affirmed

ISSUE: Whether or not proper venue for the filing of the petition is RTC of Las Piñas

RULING: YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as

GOYENA
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 38 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he

BRIONES
resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo's Death Certificate
that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent's residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however,
is not binding on the courts.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985,
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on
the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud
with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners' position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life
in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners' submission that the lower
courts' findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court,

JARLOS
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of
letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in

the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30)
days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person
as the court may select.

GOYENA
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 39 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

BRIONES
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo's estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners' pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 40 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
ESCHEAT

1. CASTORIO ALVARICO v. AMELITA SOLA

G.R. No. 138953, June 6, 2002

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioner Castorio Alvarico is the natural father of respondent Amelita Sola while Fermina Lopez is
petitioner's aunt, and also Amelita's adoptive mother.

The Bureau of Lands approved and granted the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of Fermina over Lot 5,
SGS-3451, with an area of 152 sq. m. at the Waterfront, Cebu City.

Fermina executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to
assume all the obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The
document of transfer was filed with the Bureau of Lands.

The Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the application
from Fermina to Amelita. On May 2, 1989, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3439 was issued in favor of Amelita.

Petitioner filed Civil Case for reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated
the land to him and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same. He averred that the donation to him had
the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.

JARLOS
For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no longer the owner of
the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She
added that the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly
acquired the land as Fermina's rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner.

RTC: in favor of petitioner,

CA: reversed. Petitioner sought reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Who between petitioner and respondent has a better claim to the land

RULING: Sola has a better claim to the land.

|
To prove she has a better claim, respondent Amelita Sola submitted a copy of OCT No. 3439 in her name and her
husband's, a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over the property dated 1983 executed by Fermina in
her favor, and a certification from the municipal treasurer that she had been declaring the land as her and her
husband's property for tax purposes since 1993.

For his part, petitioner Castorio Alvarico presented a Deed of Donation dated January 4, 1984, showing that the lot
was given to him by Fermina and according to him, he immediately took possession in 1985 and continues in

GOYENA
possession up to the present.

Petitioner further contests the CA ruling that declared as a private document said Deed of Donation dated January 4,
1984, despite the fact that a certified true and correct copy of the same was obtained from the Notarial Records Office,
Regional Trial Court, Cebu City on June 11, 1993 and acknowledged before Atty. Numeriano Capangpangan, then
Notary Public for Cebu.

Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be governed by the
provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more different persons.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 41 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.

BRIONES
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she registered the land in her name and, based on the above
mentioned rules, he has a better right over the property because he was first in material possession in good faith.
However, this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support.
For one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption
of regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT
No. 3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the
Original Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title,
once registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of
its registration.

Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the State can
institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Thus:

JARLOS
Sec. 101. All actions for reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper
courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the
land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter
between the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of
Amelita's title. It follows that he cannot "recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the
rightful owner thereof.

Anent petitioner's contention that it was the intention of Fermina for Amelita to hold the property in trust
for him, we held that if this was really the intention of Fermina, then this should have been clearly stated in the Deed
of Self-Adjudication executed in 1983, in the Deed of Donation executed in 1984, or in a subsequent instrument.
Absent any persuasive proof of that intention in any written instrument, we are not prepared to accept petitioner's
bare allegation concerning the donor's state of mind.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 42 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

2. MELCHOR CARO v. SUSANA SUCALDITO

G.R. No. 157536, May 16, 2005

BRIONES
FACTS: Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor's Lot No. 160 from Ruperto Gepilano as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale dated October 21, 1953.

The said lot was situated in Sitio Bangyan, Barrio Calaya, Municipality of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more
or less of 17.9849 hectares.

Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to his son Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters,
and now identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia, Pls-775. Father and son executed a
Deed of Definite Sale dated January 31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.

Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. 6-1, covering the said area
of the property which he bought from his father. The application was, however, opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On
November 6, 1980, the Regional Director rendered a Decision canceling the said application.

Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512, filed an Application for a Free Patent covering the said lot, and was
issued Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor. Sucaldito then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Iloilo City,
which was granted in an Order dated May 7, 1984.

JARLOS
Caro filed a Complaint against Sucaldito for "Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of
Ownership and/or Possession with Damages" before the RTC of Iloilo City. He later filed an amended
complaint, alleging that he was the owner of the subject lot, and had been in possession of the same "since 1953 and/
or even prior thereto in the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously and notoriously." He further alleged
that the said lot had been declared for tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and that the
corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He claimed that Assessor's Lot No. 160 had actually been divided
into two lots, namely, Lot No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had actually been claiming Lot No. 989 (Lot No.
4512), which was located two kilometers away. He lamented that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his
ownership and possession of the said property, the Bureau of Lands did not award it to him.

Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the subject lot in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful
and fraudulent, she had no right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence, as a "trustee of a constructive trust," she was
obliged to return the same to him as the lawful owner.

Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz Br. III, the trial court ruled that Caro had no personality
to file the action for the annulment of the free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only be brought by the
Solicitor General. It held that "an applicant for a free patent who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an
action in court to recover the land, for the court may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and the
Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the public domain through administrative proceedings under the Public

GOYENA
Land Act," or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The trial court further stressed that the remedy of a rival-
applicant for a free patent over the same land was through administrative channels, not judicial, because even if the
oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former does not thereby become the owner of the land in
dispute.

RTC = in favor of Sucaldito

CA = affirmed

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has legal personality to file this action for reconveyance.

RULING: NO, Caro has no legal personality.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 43 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
The Court notes that the petitioner's complaint before the RTC prays for the annulment of the free patent issued in
the respondent's favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to "return" the subject
property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
"[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible but what

BRIONES
is sought instead is the transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right." Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by a
private individual, the property does not go back to the State.

Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by
the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.

Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, or one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit." Corollarily, legal
standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the
questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.

Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being
the owner of the disputed property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a party-in-
interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.

In De la Peña v. Court of Appeals, the Court, in dismissing the petitioner's imputation of fraud in securing a free

JARLOS
patent and title over a parcel of land, declared that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the
property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name.

In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, where the private respondents therein were mere lessees of
the property in question, the Court ruled that as mere lessees, they had "no present substantial and personal interest
with respect to issues involving ownership of the disputed property.”

In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states —

Section 101. All actions for the reversion to the government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in
the proper courts, in the name of the Commonwealth [now Republic] of the Philippines. THAECc

This provision was applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, et al., a case
on all fours with the present one, as follows:

Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may bring the action for reversion. Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action or any action
which would have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued

GOYENA
on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for withholding legal personality from Sumail. He does
not claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his application for a free patent, he had
formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part of the public domain; this, aside from the
declaration made by the cadastral court that lot 3633 was public land. Consequently, even if the
parcel were declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail does not automatically become the owner
thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others who may apply for the same.

To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion
of the land to the government. The petitioner has no personality to "recover" the property as he has not shown that he
is the rightful owner thereof.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 44 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
GUARDIANSHIP

1. PILAR GOYENA v. AMPARO LEDESMA-GUSTILO

G.R. No. 147148, January 13, 2003

BRIONES
FACTS: Respondent filed a “Petition for letters of guardianship” over the person and properties of her sister Julieta,
alleging, among others, that due to old age, general debility, and a “mini-stroke” which Julieta suffered in early 1995,
she is no longer in a position to take case of herself, and needs the assistance of a guardian to manage her interests in
on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises. She also alleged that she has extensive experience in business
management of commercial, agricultural and corporate enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where
Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed
medical services to Julieta Ledesma whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.

Petitioner filed an Opposition, alleging that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to
appoint a guardian to take charge of her person/property. As evident from the letters of Julieta to petitioner, the
former is very able to take charge of her affairs. She also alleged that respondent is not fit to be appointed as the
guardian of Julieta since their interests are antagonistic.

The trial court, in its 1996 Decision, found Julieta incompetent and incapable of taking are of herself and her
property, and appointed respondent as guarding of her person and properties. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision, ruling that Pilar has not shown the authenticity and due execution of the letters which purport to
show the existence of a rift between Julieta and her family and dissatisfaction as to how the businesses were managed.

JARLOS
The CA ruled that there are no antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta, they being co-owners of certain
properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for
appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta.

RULING: NO. Petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error. Petitioner cannot rely on certain
letters of Julieta to establish her claim that there existed a rift between the two which amounts to antagonistic
interests. The first letter of Julieta merely shows Julieta's lack of interest in future investments, not necessarily a
business disagreement, and certainly not per se amounting to antagonistic interests between her and respondent to
render the latter unsuitable for appointment as guardian.

The second letter which shows that: 1) respondent did not visit Julieta when she was confined at the Makati Medical
Center on account of her stroke, 2) there was disagreement as to who should run the hacienda, with Julieta favoring a
certain Cheling Zabaljaurigue, and 3) respondent took over management of the hacienda with their brother Carlos
(Ledesma) supporting her. No inference as to the existence of antagonistic interests between respondent and Julieta
can thus be made.

The third and fourth letters have no relevance to the case at bar.

GOYENA
Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of
Julieta's properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.

The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta
from the Makati Medical Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show her
hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still
placed under the care of doctors after she checked out and was returned to the hospital when she suffered another
stroke.

Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the
appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 45 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner
concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.
Thus, the petition should be dismissed.

BRIONES

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 46 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

2. EDUARDO ABAD v. LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO

G.R. No. 191993, December 5, 2012

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioner Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Maura, alleging that he is
Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street,
Poblacion, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due
to her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties
unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.

Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC gave due course to the same and scheduled it for
hearing. When the petition was called for hearing, nobody entered an opposition and Abad was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. After Abad formally offered his evidence and the case was submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel
Magno filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with an Opposition-in-Intervention.

Leonardo Biason (Biason) filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and attached therewith his
Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of Maura B. Abad.
Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he was not notified of the pendency of the
petition for the appointment of the latter's guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura's
guardian as he cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her
abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as Maura's guardian since he was previously
granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her properties.

JARLOS
RTC rendered a Decision, denying Abad's petition and appointing Biason as Maura's guardian.

Unyielding, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but the RTC denied the same.

Abad filed an appeal to the CA. He argued that the RTC erred in disqualifying him from being appointed as Maura's
guardian despite the fact that he has all the qualifications stated under the Rules. That he was not a resident of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground for his disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the
affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura
to be her guardian.

Abad further averred that no hearing was conducted to determine the qualifications of Biason prior to his
appointment as guardian. He claimed that the RTC also overlooked Maura's express objection to Biason's
appointment.

The CA issued a Decision, affirming the decision of the RTC.

Dissatisfied, Abad filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in a Resolution. Abad filed a Petition
for Review on Certiorari with this Court.|
||

GOYENA
ISSUE: Whether the courts correctly appointed Biason as guardian

RULING: Abad was challenging Biason's qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as
guardian for Maura. However, with Biason's demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving
the merits of the petition. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no
actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.

It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either
the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason's

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 47 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.

Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura's belief that the petition has lost its purpose and even consented to

BRIONES
Maura's prayer for the dismissal of the petition.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 48 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

3. NILO OROPESA v. CIRILO OROPESA

G.R. No. 184528, April 25, 2012

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, a petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be
appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke, that his judgment and memory [were] impaired
and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have
had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and
medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.

The (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.

Petitioner presented the testimonies of his sister and respondent’s former nurse. He rested his case but failed to file
his written formal offer of evidence. Thus, the respondent filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to
have waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not
formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the
Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

JARLOS
The court a quo granted the Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his Demurrer to Evidence. The
trial court granted respondent's demurrer to evidence. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied.

Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by petitioner but this was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is considered an “incompetent” person as defined under Sec. 2, Rule 92 of the
RoC who should be place under guardianship

RULING: NO. A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind
but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their
property without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The
full text of the said provision reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." — Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and
dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have
lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind,
and other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their

GOYENA
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and
definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father's incompetence
consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father's real and
personal properties) and their father's former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of
petitioner's cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 49 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
Even if we were to overlook petitioner's procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father's and
his sister's names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned
properties, which do not in any way relate to his father's alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only

BRIONES
medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to
the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said
report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory
lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average
was indeed competent.

In an analogous guardianship case wherein the soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at issue, we had the
occasion to rule that "where the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion is not necessary [and that] the
observations of the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing the person's state of mental sanity will suffice."

Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated November 14, 2006 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
on the trial court's unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial court highlighted the fatal role that petitioner's
own documentary evidence played in disproving its case and, likewise, the trial court made known its own
observation of respondent's physical and mental state, to wit:

The Court noted the absence of any testimony of a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo
[Link] does not have the mental, emotional, and physical capacity to manage his own affairs. On
the contrary, Oppositor's evidence includes a Neuropsychological Screening Report which states
that [Link], (1) performs on the average range in most of the domains that were tested; (2) is

JARLOS
capable of mental calculations; and (3) can provide solutions to problem situations. The Report
concludes that [Link] possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for mildly impaired
abilities in memory, reasoning and orientation. It is the observation of the Court that
oppositor is still sharp, alert and able. (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 50 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
ADOPTION

1. HERBERT CANG v. CA and SPOUSES CLAVANO

G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

BRIONES
FACTS: Herbert Cang was married to Anna Marie Clavano, with whom he had 3 children. Later, Anna Marie ︎filed a
petition for legal separation when she learned of petitioner’s affair. Petitioner then left for USA where he sought a
divorce decree. The custody of the children was granted to Anna Marie. Years later, private respondents, the brother
and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, ︎filed proceedings for the adoption of the children. The petition bears the consent of
one of the children, as well as the consent of Anna Marie who further alleged therein that her husband had "evaded
his legal obligation to support" his children. Cang opposed said petition, alleging that although his finances were "too
meager" compared to the private respondents, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority over his beloved children." Despite the opposition, RTC approved the adoption. On appeal, petitioner
contends that the petition for adoption was fatally defective on the ground, among others, that his written consent
was not obtained. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not adoption may be valid without the written consent of the biological father.

RULING The written consent of the biological parent may be dispensed with in special cases where the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is “insane or hopelessly intemperate”. However, this court ︎finds that both
the lower court and CA failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on
the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption

JARLOS
unnecessary. In the present case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. While
admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. It would be against the spirit of the law if financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority
over his children. Hence, the petition for adoption was denied.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 51 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

2. TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB v. CA, et al.

G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999

BRIONES
FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Jacob, was appointed to be the Special
Administratrix for the deceased’s various estates by virtue of a reconstructed marriage contract. On the other hand,
private respondent is claiming to be the legally-adopted son of the deceased. To support his claim, Pilapil presented
an order granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased. Pilapil sought to intervene in the settlement proceedings
to claim his share of the estate as the adopted son and the sole surviving heir of Dr. Jacob. Pedro likewise questioned
the validity of the marriage between petitioner and his adoptive father. Petitioner claims that the marriage between
her and Alfredo was solemnized sometime in 1975. However, she was not able to present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document had been lost. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court
ruled for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision upon
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Dr. Jacob.

RULING: The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship, which the
respondent failed to do so. Pilapil's conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown
by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. In the same vein, no proof was
presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in
Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued certifications that there was no

JARLOS
record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the
alleged adoption of respondent. Wherefore the court reversed the lower courts’ decision and granted the present
petition on the ground that the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a mere sham.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 52 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. JOSE HERNANDEZ, et al.

G.R. No. 117209, February 09, 1996

BRIONES
FACTS: Herein private respondent, spouses Munson, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl. The spouses
likewise prayed for the change of the first name of the child to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he
was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and
friends since he arrived at private respondents' residence. Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of
name in the same petition for adoption, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate
proceedings. After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of
herein private respondents, thereby approving the adoption.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the name of the adoptee
embodied in the petition for adoption.

RULING: Yes. It is the change of the adoptee' s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even
if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was
originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a
license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely
upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an

JARLOS
adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this
case, cannot properly be granted. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a
substantial change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change
in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural
requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special
proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its
role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change of
name of the adoptee, all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition sufficient
in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be procedurally
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the corresponding petition

GOYENA
for the latter relief at law.

Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the
rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action.

While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless be some
unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized.

Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a
petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions,
nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 53 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020
conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual
unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of all

BRIONES
matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As already
stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for change of
name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of
causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues
which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits
or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up
individually.

While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the so-
called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even for the
most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably
considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of the
adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and legal
consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.

Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to, private respondents'
privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is exercised, this
time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict compliance with
all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced therefor.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 54 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

4. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA, et al.

G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996

BRIONES
FACTS: Midael Mazon, the prospective adoptive child, had been living with Jaime Caranto since he was 7yo. When
Jaime got married to Zenaida Caranto, the child stayed with them under their care and custody. Years later, the
spouses filed a petition for the adoption of the minor child and prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor.
Moreover, the spouses prayed that first name of the child, which was mistakenly registered as "MIDAEL" be
corrected to "MICHAEL." The Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name
of the child from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a clerical and
innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for adoption, not the correction of an entry
in the civil registry. The RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. The CA affirmed the decision upon appeal.

ISSUES:
[Link] RTC acquired jurisdiction over the petition for adoption
2. Whether private respondents’ prayer for the correction of the name of the child should be granted

RULING:
I.
YES. Petitioner's contention is that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for adoption because
the notice by publication did not state the true name of the minor child. Petitioner invokes the ruling in Cruz v.
Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the
child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a

JARLOS
"substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing." Indeed there was a question of identity
involved in that case. Rosanna E. Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common
experience would indicate.

The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. In this
case the correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as
"Midael" as given name would read "Michael." Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical
one. Changing the name of the child from "Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any
confusion, because both names "can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,
himig)." The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have any objection to the
adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication of notice in this case.

II.
With regard to the second assignment of error in the petition, we hold that both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court erred in granting private respondents' prayer for the correction of the name of the child in the civil registry.

Contrary to what the trial court thought, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies to this case and because its provision
was not complied with, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it ordered the correction of the name of the minor, is
void and without force or effect.

GOYENA
The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors concerning the
civil status of persons. This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to "changes of name." Indeed, it has been the
uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the Civil Code — to implement which Rule 108 was inserted in the rules of
Court in 1964 — covers "those harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly
misspelled."

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of
the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment.

BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 55 of 59

 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption made in compliance
with Rule 99, §4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in
addition the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus

BRIONES
deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the
correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 56 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

5. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioner, Honorato Catindig, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname. He
prayed that Stephanie's middle name “Astorga” be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname
“Garcia” be changed to "Catindig," his surname. Finding the petition meritorious, the court granted the petition for
adoption, hence the minor shall now be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Subsequently, petitioner filed a
motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use GARCIA, the
surname of her natural mother, as her middle name. The trial court denied the petition, hence the present case.

ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is
subsequently adopted by her natural father.

RULING: YES. There is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother's surname. Hence, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. As correctly
pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family Code
recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child's mother as his middle name. Additionally, as aptly
stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's surname as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

JARLOS

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 57 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

6. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v. ROSANNA AGUAS, et al.

G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006

BRIONES
FACTS: Rosanna Aguas filed a claim for death benefits with the SSS upon the death of her husband, Pablo Aguas.
Later, Pablo’s sister contested Rosanna’s claim, alleging therein that the Rosanna had abandoned the family abode to
live with another man. It was further averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, contrary to her claim
that the deceased was survived by his minor child Jeylnn. As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of monthly
pension to Rossana and Jeylnn stating that they no longer qualify as primary beneficiaries. This prompted Rosanna
and Jeylnn to file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission
(SSC). Janet H. Aguas, who asserted that as the adoptive child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as
claimants, claiming she is also entitled to the death benefits.

The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary because of her act of adultery. As for
Jeylnn, the SSC ruled that, even if her birth certificate was signed by Pablo as her father, there was more compelling
evidence that Jeylnn was not his legitimate child. As for Janet, the SSC relied on Leticia's declaration that she was
only adopted by Pablo and Rosanna.

The SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit. This prompted the claimants to elevate the case to
CA, which ruled in favor of the petitioners therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of
Pablo.

JARLOS
RULING: The Court ruled that only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. Jeylnn's claim
was justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate duly authenticated by Civil Registry, which bears the signature
of Pablo. Moreover, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence,
Jeylnn's status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested. Janet Aguas likewise submitted a photocopy
of her alleged birth certificate, however, the same cannot be given any probative weight as it was not verified in any
way by the Civil Registry. Moreover, the alleged adoption of Janet did not undergo any legal proceedings, hence there
are no papers to prove it. Under Section 8(e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, only "legally adopted" children
are considered dependent children. Absent any proof that the family has legally adopted Janet, the Court cannot
consider her a dependent child of Pablo, hence, not a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate
wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at
the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 58 of 59
 San Beda College Alabang
Special Proceedings
S.Y. 2019-2020

7. DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006

BRIONES
FACTS: Petitioner Landingin, now a US citizen, ︎filed a petition for the adoption of the 3 minor child of her deceased
brother. The children were left to the care of their grandmother when their mother left for Italy after their father’s
death. Petitioner manifested her desire to adopt the children when their grandmother passed. She alleged that the
minors are being ︎financially supported by the petitioner, and that she is qualified to adopt. It was likewise alleged
therein that both the adoptive children and her natural children had given their written consent. The mother of
minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she
voluntarily consented thereto. However during the proceedings, petitioner failed to present any evidence to prove that
the mother assents to the adoption. Nevertheless, the court approved the adoption. The OSG appealed before the CA
arguing that without the written consent of the biological mother, the adoption should not have been approved.
Finding merit, CA reversed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the children may be adopted without the written consent of their biological mother.

RULING: NO. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.
The natural right of a parent over a child requires that consent must first be obtained before such parental rights and
duties may be terminated. Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his
consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. Merely permitting the child to
remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment. When the mother left for Italy, she
had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely

JARLOS
impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. It would thus be against the spirit of the law if ︎financial
consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority
over his/her children. Wherefore, the court denied the present petition.

GOYENA
BRIONES; JARLOS; GOYENA Page 59 of 59