FEDERATION UNIVERSITY, AUSTRALIA

IIBIT CAMPUS, ADELAIDE

MREGC5007 RISK ENGINEERING

ASSIGNMENT #1

Submitted by:

TUSHAR GROVER

30433213

tgrover@[Link]
Introduction:

My name is Tushar Grover. I am a qualified Mechanical Engineer and have completed my [Link] in
2017. After this, I worked in two MNCs – Hero Cycles Limited & Trident Group for almost 5 years in
Quality Control department & Mechanical Maintenance department. The most recent job I did was in
Trident Group in India. The roles & responsibilities at that position were:

 Took charge independently for mechanical maintenance and operations of HVAC system in
Towel division including Compressor unit plant & H-plants.
 Took on role of managing the mechanical maintenance of various systems, including the water
softening plant, effluent treatment plant, sewage treatment plant, and fire hydrant system.
 Performs investigations relating to equipment malfunctions and resolved any on-site issued &
conflicts
 Monitoring and maintaining spares stock for effective plant operation.
 Daily conducting safety meeting took box task meeting, checking safety measures and arranging
training classes, issuance of height & hot work permits.
 Managed the maintenance staff and external contractors for major rebuilds.
 Sound knowledge & experience of handling team members in a manufacturing environment.
Managed, supervised and coordinated a team of 15-20 team members and other professionals.

I worked in the following projects -

 To decrease specific power consumption (SPC) of Air compressors by 9% (from 0.170 to 0.155)
by installation of independent air pipeline to Home Textile Division in Trident Group.
 Replacement of diffusers in Trident Group’s Effluent Treatment Plants as upgrading of diffusers
MOC from EPDM to PTFE.
 Replacement of hand-railings to ensure 100% safety & enhanced life cycle by replacing MOC
from MS to FRP (>15years) in Water Softening Plant.
 To increase OBR (Output between Regeneration) of Pump house from 391 to 1170by installation
of 8” PPRC pipe for Canal water transfer (650m)

Ans 1A:
1)
The industry I worked previously was a textile manufacturing company where manufacturing of
yarn & terry towels were done and further dyeing and packing were also done. So the hazards
involved were as follows:
1. Chemical Hazards: Skin irritation, respiratory troubles, and other health problems can result
from exposure to various chemicals used in dyeing, printing, finishing, and cleaning
operations.
2. Explosion and Fire Hazards: Cotton, lint, and other flammable elements may be present in
textile mills, raising the possibility of fires and explosions.
3. Mechanical Hazards: Cutting, crushing, and entanglement injuries can be caused by
machinery used in weaving, spinning, and other manufacturing processes.
4. Ergonomic Hazards: Sewing and assembling jobs that require repetitive motions and poor
ergonomics might result in musculoskeletal diseases.
5. Noise Hazards: Textile machinery can produce loud noises that might damage hearing and
cause other health issues.
6. Thermal Hazards: Working in hot environments can result in burns and heat-related illnesses,
such as the heat from steam or the heat from drying ovens.
 7. Dust and Respiratory Hazards: Textile processes can produce airborne dust particles that, if
inhaled, can cause respiratory conditions like bronchitis and asthma.
8. Electrical Hazards: There is a chance of fire and electric shock in the production area due to
electrical equipment and wiring.
9. Slip, trip, and fall hazards: Slippery floors, congested walkways, and uneven surfaces are
common in textile factories, increasing the risk of slip, trip, and fall mishaps.
10. Biological hazards: Inadequate cleanliness and handling of raw materials might foster the
growth of microbes, which could result in diseases.

2)
There are several incidents where hazards occur such as failure mode / types of machinery etc.
Mentioned below in detail:
 Chemical Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Improper handling, storage, or mixing of chemicals can lead to
accidental spills or exposure.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Chemical mixing and storage areas, dyeing, printing,
and finishing processes.
 Fire and Explosion Hazards:
Failure Mode: Ignition of flammable materials due to sparks, heat sources, or static electricity.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Presence of cotton, lint, flammable solvents, and
improper electrical equipment in the production area.
 Mechanical Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Uncontrolled machine movement or malfunction, lack of safeguarding
measures.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Textile machinery like looms, spinning machines,
knitting machines, and conveyor belts.
 Ergonomic Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Repetitive movements, poor posture, and inadequate workstations.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Sewing, cutting, and assembling tasks that require
repetitive motions and forceful exertions.
 Noise Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Operation of loud machinery without proper hearing protection.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Textile machines such as looms, compressors, and
printing presses.
 Thermal Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Inadequate insulation or improper handling of hot materials.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Heat from steam generators, drying ovens, and press
machines.
 Dust and Respiratory Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Inadequate ventilation and lack of dust control measures.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Processes like cutting, grinding, and fiber handling
that generate airborne dust particles.
 Electrical Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Faulty wiring, exposed electrical components, and inadequate
grounding.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Electrical panels, motors, and other electrical
equipment in the factory.
  Slip, Trip, and Fall Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Cluttered and poorly maintained work areas.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Production floors, walkways, and storage areas.
 Biological Hazards:
o Failure Mode: Poor hygiene practices and contamination of raw materials.
o Machinery/Equipment/Activity: Handling and storage of raw fibers and materials.

3)
Hazard Manifestation of the Accident Control Measures
• Engineering Controls: Use closed systems for chemical
handling and transfer to minimize exposure. Install local
exhaust ventilation to control fumes. Ensure proper
storage and labeling of chemicals.
Accidental spills, inhalation, and • Administrative Controls: Implement a chemical
Chemical
skin contact with hazardous management program, provide training on safe chemical
Hazards
chemicals. handling, and establish procedures for handling spills and
emergencies.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Provide workers
with appropriate PPE, such as gloves, goggles, and
respirators.
• Engineering Controls: Install fire detection and
suppression systems, fire-resistant barriers, and
explosion-proof electrical equipment.
Fire and
Ignition of flammable materials • Administrative Controls: Implement hot work permits,
Explosion
leading to fire or explosion. restrict smoking in designated areas, and conduct regular
Hazards
fire drills.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Provide fire-
resistant clothing for workers in high-risk areas.
• Engineering Controls: Install machine guards, safety
interlocks, and emergency stop buttons on all machinery.
Regularly inspect and maintain machines to ensure
safety.
Mechanical Entanglement, cuts, and
• Administrative Controls: Provide training on safe
Hazards crushing injuries from machinery
machine operation and establish procedures for
maintenance and repairs.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Encourage the
use of appropriate PPE, such as gloves and safety shoes.
• Engineering Controls: Design workstations
ergonomically, with adjustable chairs, footrests, and
monitor stands.
Musculoskeletal disorders from
Ergonomic • Administrative Controls: Implement job rotation, provide
repetitive movements and poor
Hazards regular breaks, and conduct ergonomic training.
ergonomics
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): None specifically
for this hazard, but workers may benefit from ergonomic
aids like wrist supports.
• Engineering Controls: Install noise-damping materials,
use sound barriers, and provide acoustic enclosures for
noisy machinery.
Hearing impairment and other
Noise • Administrative Controls: Limit exposure time in noisy
health issues due to excessive
Hazards areas, and establish quiet zones.
noise exposure.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Provide workers
with hearing protection devices such as earmuffs or
earplugs.
 • Engineering Controls: Use thermal insulation on hot
surfaces and equipment. Install cooling systems in hot
work areas.
Burns and heat-related illnesses
Thermal • Administrative Controls: Schedule work during cooler
from exposure to high
Hazards times, and provide rest areas with shade and hydration.
temperatures.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Provide heat-
resistant gloves and clothing for workers in high-
temperature areas.
• Engineering Controls: Implement local exhaust
ventilation systems to capture and remove airborne dust.
Use dust collection systems in processes that generate
Dust and Inhalation of airborne dust dust.
Respiratory particles leading to respiratory • Administrative Controls: Limit the duration of exposure
Hazards problems. and rotate workers to different tasks.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Provide workers
with appropriate respirators based on the type and level of
dust exposure.
• Engineering Controls: Regularly inspect and maintain
electrical equipment. Use ground fault circuit interrupters
(GFCIs) in areas with moisture or wet conditions.
Electric shock and fire from
Electrical • Administrative Controls: Develop and enforce electrical
faulty wiring and electrical
Hazards safety procedures, and provide training for workers.
equipment.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Provide workers
with electrical safety gear, such as insulated gloves and
safety shoes.
• Engineering Controls: Keep work areas clean and well-
organized. Install anti-slip flooring and use proper lighting.
Slip, Trip, Slips, trips, and falls due to • Administrative Controls: Implement good housekeeping
and Fall cluttered and poorly maintained practices and conduct regular inspections for potential
Hazards: work areas. hazards.
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): None specifically
for this hazard, but workers may use appropriate footwear.
• Engineering Controls: Provide proper ventilation and
waste disposal systems. Isolate and mark contaminated
areas.
• Administrative Controls: Implement hygiene protocols
Infections and illnesses from
Biological and training on proper handling and disposal of potentially
exposure to harmful
Hazards contaminated materials.
microorganisms
• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Provide workers
with appropriate PPE, such as gloves, masks, and
coveralls when handling potentially contaminated
materials.
 Ans 1B:
1)
What Can Go Wrong Potential Cause(s)

Fuel supply issues

EGU generates too little power
Mechanical failure of EGU components
Sensor or control system malfunction

Control system malfunction leading to overproduction

EGU generates too much power
Safety system failure to prevent excessive energy generation

Sensor or control system malfunction

ECU fails to control power output
Communication failure between EGU and ECU

Critical component failure within the ECU

ECU completely loses control
Software malfunction or bug in control algorithm

Mechanical failure of ETU components

ETU fails to transport energy to network
Electrical fault in ETU
Environmental conditions affecting energy transport
Critical component failure within the ETU
Complete loss of ETU
Software malfunction or bug in the ETU control system

2)
To create a Fault Tree Diagram (FTD) for the Energy System failure modes, we can represent the top
event "Loss of Energy" and then break down the potential causes based on the provided "What Can
Go Wrong" items. Each cause will be represented as an intermediate event, and we'll connect them
with logic gates to represent how the top event can occur. Here's the Fault Tree Diagram for the
Energy System:

In this Fault Tree Diagram:

• Event 1 represents the failure mode where the EGU generates too little power, leading to a loss
of energy.

• Event 2 represents the failure mode where the EGU generates too much power, which cannot be
controlled by the ECU, resulting in a loss of energy due to a potential system explosion.

• Event 3 represents the failure mode where the ECU fails to control the power output accurately,
leading to a loss of energy.
• Event 4 represents the failure mode where the ECU completely loses control, resulting in a
catastrophic failure and a loss of energy.

• Event 5 represents the failure mode where the ETU fails to transport energy to the network,
causing an environmental impact and a loss of energy.

• Event 6 represents the failure mode where there is a complete loss of the ETU, leading to a loss
of energy due to a potential system explosion.

The Fault Tree Diagram helps visualize the potential causes of the top event, "Loss of Energy," and
provides a structured representation for understanding the relationships between different failure
modes in the Energy System –

3)
The possibility of each failure mode occurring and the financial impact of each incident must be
taken into account in order to calculate a quantitative estimate of the possible financial risk
connected with operating this Energy System. By adding the likelihood and financial impact of
each failure scenario, we can determine the annual projected financial risk.
The following equation determines the annual projected financial risk (in dollars per year):
Annual Expected Financial Risk = Σ (Likelihood of Event * Financial Consequence of Event)

Let's calculate the annual expected financial risk for each failure mode:

I. EGU generates too little power: Annual Expected Financial Risk = 1 time/year * $5,000 =
$5,000
II. EGU generates too much power to be controlled by ECU: Annual Expected Financial Risk =
0.005 times/year * $1,000,000 = $5,000
III. ECU fails to control power output accurately: Annual Expected Financial Risk = 2 times/year *
$5,000 = $10,000
IV. ECU completely loses control: Annual Expected Financial Risk = 0.001 times/year *
$10,000,000 = $10,000
 V. ETU fails to transport energy to the network: Annual Expected Financial Risk = 0.02
times/year * $500,000 = $10,000
VI. Complete loss of ETU: Annual Expected Financial Risk = 0.005 times/year * $1,000,000 =
$5,000

Now, let's sum up all the calculated values to get the total annual expected financial risk:

Total Annual Expected Financial Risk = $5,000 + $5,000 + $10,000 + $10,000 + $10,000 + $5,000 =
$45,000

The $45,000 total projected annual financial risk related to managing this energy system. This shows
the expected annual cost that the system's owners should be ready to pay in order to reduce the
likelihood of failures and ensure the reliability and safety of the system.

Ans 1(C):

1)

The level of safety risk that is considered to be acceptable depends on the situation and the particular
activity or sector that is engaged. The complex process of assessing safety risks takes into account a
number of variables, such as the nature of the activity, potential risks, the number of persons at risk,
existing safety measures, social values, and legal and regulatory requirements. A very low degree of
safety risk is acceptable in some circumstances, such as certain high-risk industries like chemical
manufacture or nuclear power plants, due to the potentially catastrophic implications of accidents. In
these situations, strict safety procedures are implemented to reduce the danger as much as feasible.

On the other hand, a little bit of risk may be considered acceptable in routine tasks or businesses with
relatively lower inherent dangers. For instance, there are inherent hazards associated with operating
a motor vehicle and engaging in leisure activities, yet society generally recognizes these risks as
being a normal part of daily life, and safety measures are put in place to lower them to a manageable
level. Finding the right balance between safety and practicality is crucial. It can be unrealistic and
perhaps impracticable from an economic standpoint to try to achieve perfect safety in every sphere of
life or business. In addition, people and society frequently take some risks voluntarily because they
understand that doing so is necessary to obtaining particular rewards or goals. In the end, the
acceptable level of safety risk is a work in progress that requires ongoing evaluation. What was once
viewed as an acceptable degree of risk may alter as technology, knowledge, and society standards
advance. Scientific data, stakeholder feedback, and a thorough understanding of the possible effects
should all be considered when deciding on an acceptable safety risk. While still allowing for
advancement and development, the objective should always be to reduce danger and safeguard
people's health and wellbeing.

Ying Lu a,”Using cased based reasoning for automated safety risk management in construction
industry,” Safety Science Vol 163, 2023 -

This Articles suggests Emerging information technologies like the Internet of Things (IoT) and
computer vision have been used to monitor safety on construction sites in order to control safety in
the industry (Tang et al., 2019). As a result, a lot of information needs to be recorded and preserved,
like digital photos and accident reports. Accident reports are one of them that can be used as a
foundation for preventing subsequent collisions (Goh and Ubeynarayana, 2017). However, from such
a vast amount of data, it could be challenging to extract information that is helpful for safety
management and decision-making (Hartmann and Trappey, 2020). CaseBased Reasoning (CBR)
has consequently become a paradigm for creating intelligent computer systems. Many researchers
chose to use CBR as a prediction tool for safety outcomes because it is an important reasoning
technique that solves new problems by remembering prior, analogous situations and reusing
information and knowledge from the solutions to these situations (Ayhan and Tokdemir, 2019b). This
technique is promising for enabling a more effective and efficient management of construction safety.
In light of this, current literature has begun to pay more and more attention to the integration of new
technology and construction safety management. From risk identification (Kang and Ryu, 2019), risk
assessment (Lu et al., 2021), factor analysis (Goh and Sa'adon, 2015), and risk response (Fan et al.,
2015), they have examined the accidents in the construction business. A domain ontology (SRI-Onto)
was established by Xing et al. in 2019.

Koc and Gurgun (2022) created an automated preprocessing model based on scenarios to
demonstrate the viability of predicting the severity of construction accidents. A practical approach for
developing project risk response strategies based on case-based reasoning (CBR) was put forth by
Fan et al. (2015). However, construction safety risk management (SRM) is a methodical process that
entails locating sources of uncertainty (risk identification), calculating the likelihood and impact of
ambiguous occurrences on a project (risk analysis), developing response plans (risk response), and
finally tracking the risks (Tah and Carr, 2001). The existing research gap results from the fact that few
studies can incorporate all SRM processes, which are crucial for the success of safety risk
management, while the majority of studies focus on just one phase of SRM. The goal of this project is
to provide a CBR-based platform for automating construction safety management by integrating all
risk management (RM) steps. This work establishes an accident attribute system for accurate and
thorough case representation based on systematic thinking and stakeholder theory in order to
achieve this goal. After presenting an instance, the CBR cycle's development method is thoroughly
introduced. The k-NN algorithm and rough set theory were used in the design of the case retrieval
component of CBR, which increases retrieval accuracy. A mixed risk response paradigm is suggested
with regard to case reuse and revision. Goh and Sa'adon (2015) proved the potential of ML
approaches in identifying factors impacting dangerous behaviours by using artificial neural network
and decision tree on a set of survey data. A model for predicting construction injuries using random
forest and stochastic gradient tree boosting was put out by Tixier et al. (2016). Based on unstructured
datasets of accident reports, they found numerous safety implications for injuries using text mining
algorithms. Similar to this, Goh and Ubeynarayana (2017) used text mining to categorise the data
they had gathered on building accidents.

2)

In risk management and safety assessments, the idea of keeping risk ALARP (As Low As Reasonably
Practical) is frequently employed. It recommends lowering risks to the barest minimum while taking
into account social values, cost-benefit analyses, and technology constraints. The validity of the
principle of keeping risk ALARP can depend on context and interpretation, even though it is
generally sound and well-intentioned.

Benefits of ALARP Principle:

 I. Realistic approach: According to the ALARP principle, it may not always be practicable or
practical to completely remove all hazards. It promotes a practical and doable approach to
risk management by aiming to decrease risks to the lowest feasible level.
II. Cost-effectiveness: Trying to completely eliminate all hazards can be expensive and might
result in inefficiency. The ALARP principle permits a cost-benefit analysis, which compares
the price of risk reduction measures against the potential advantages and effects of
accidents.
III. Stakeholder considerations: ALARP takes into account stakeholders' opinions as well as
knowledge of societal values. The notion enables a more inclusive decision-making process
because different stakeholders may have different risk tolerances and priorities.
IV. Continuous improvement: The ALARP principle recognizes that risk management is a
continuous process and that risk reduction initiatives should advance as knowledge,
technology, and environmental conditions alter.

Cons of ALARP Principle:

a. Subjectivity: The idea of "reasonably practicable" is a flexible one that is amenable to several
interpretations. What constitutes an acceptable amount of risk reduction may be viewed
differently by various parties.
b. Trade-offs: The pursuit of risk ALARP may result in trade-offs between various risks. For
instance, a safety measure could unintentionally raise one sort of risk while reducing another,
therefore a careful balance is required.
c. Possibility of complacency: There is a chance that the ALARP principle may be incorrectly
understood or used, which could result in a lack of enthusiasm for risk management initiatives
and the acceptance of higher than necessary levels of risk.
d. Uncertainty: It can be difficult to ascertain the precise degree of risk that is truly ALARP
because risk assessments frequently include uncertainties and assumptions.

H. Langdalen, E. B. Abrahamsen, and J. T. Selvik, "On the importance of systems thinking when
using the ALARP principle for risk management," Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol. 204,
107222, Dec. 2020.

In order to decrease the risk of achieving less-than-intended effects on safety and over investments,
we have discussed some fundamental concerns with the ALARP principle regarding how we should
understand the meaning of gross disproportion in this work. At the conclusion of the introduction, we
posed the first query: Is systems thinking acceptable in the context of ALARP? The quick response in
relation to the conversation is yes. There is no conflict between systems thinking, which is viewed as
a means of viewing the whole and interactions, and the ALARP principle's purpose to apply risk-
reducing measures unless they incur significantly disproportionate sacrifices. According to the report,
systems thinking are instead a way to make sure that risks are decreased to the lowest level that is
reasonably practical. Systems thinking are a way to identify and comprehend the settings, which are
distinct decision-making situations necessitate different decision-making principles. Systems thinking
could therefore help the decision-makers give the cautionary principle the proper weight. Systems
thinking can also disclose offset effects and associated uncertainty, which lowers the risk of missing
important costs and benefits connected with new initiatives. The goal of the article is to bring these
difficulties to light and spark conversation, with the hope that doing so may lead to solutions for
integrating systems thinking with the ALARP principle.

3)
SFAIRP stands for "So Far As Is Reasonably Practically" and refers to a principle. It is a risk
management philosophy, similar to ALARP that serves as a guide for decisions and activities related
to safety and risk reduction. The term "SFAIRP," which has its roots in the UK, is frequently used in
relation to laws governing health and safety.

SFAIRP and ALARP share a similar core principle in that they both seek to guarantee that risks are
minimized to the maximum extent feasible while taking into account aspects like technological
viability, cost, and societal values. While conceding that complete risk removal may not always be
feasible or cost-effective, SFAIRP and ALARP both advocate for a pragmatic and balanced approach
to risk management.

ALARP and SFAIRP are similar, yet there is a small distinction between them:

o ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical): ALARP places an emphasis on lowering risks to the
point where doing so is both reasonable and practical, taking into account the previous factors. It
is widely utilized across a number of industries and is increasingly frequently acknowledged in
global risk management practices.
o SFAIRP (So Far As Is Reasonably Practical): On the other hand, the UK's health and safety
regulation framework more frequently employs the phrase SFAIRP. Although the fundamental
idea is similar to ALARP, the Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) approach to risk assessment
and management is specific to UK health and safety laws.

In practice, the fundamental principle of establishing a balance between risk reduction and
practicality is shared by both ALARP and SFAIRP. The particular sector, region, or regulatory
framework where risk management is being used may determine whether to use ALARP or SFAIRP.
The essential objective is always the same: making sure risks are effectively controlled while taking
into account what is practically feasible in a given situation.

K. Russ, "Risk Assessment in the UK Health and Safety System: Theory and Practice," Safety and
Health at Work, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-10, Sep. 2010 –

Common Errors in Risk Assessment and Ways to Fix Them The case studies highlight some of the
common mistakes people make when doing risk assessments. In 2002, HSL conducted a Review of
Risk Assessment Practice [12] and found these and other widespread flaws, which are stated below:
1) Conducting a risk assessment to try to defend an already decided decision; 2) Using a general
evaluation when a site-specific assessment is required. 3) Conducting a thorough Quantitative Risk
Assessment without first determining whether any applicable good practices were present or when
such practices exist. 4) Conducting a risk assessment while utilizing improper "good practice," such
as that of a different business. In industry A, a particular strategy might not be appropriate in industry
B. 5) Making judgments based on individual risk estimations when the relevant metric is cumulative
risk to society. 6) Focusing only on a single activity's risk 7) Spreading out the time required for the
risk assessment among numerous people - this method of risk estimating typically results in the
absence of risks at the points where processes, people, or plants converge. 8) Not including a team
of individuals in the evaluation or leaving out workers who have firsthand experience with the
procedure or activity being evaluated 9) Consultants are ineffectively used 10) Failing to recognize
all risks connected to a specific activity.

It takes time and a qualified multidisciplinary team of individuals to conduct an appropriate and
sufficient risk assessment. There are no quick fixes. Making the commitment to keep risks as low as
 is practically practicable and upholding that commitment by continuously reviewing and reducing
risks is what is meant by good practice.

Ans 1(D):
Using the stated probabilities for the failure and success of each barrier, we will perform an Event Tree
analysis to determine the likelihood of a "Large & Very Large Fission Release", “Medium Fission Release”
& “Small & Very Small Fission Release”. The overall chance of this outcome will then be calculated by
adding these probabilities.
Fision
Initialing Electricit Emergency
Product Containment Fission Release Probability
Event y Core Cooling
Removal
0.00068161
0.001 0.99 0.85 0.9 0.9 Very Small
5
0.00007573
0.001 0.99 0.85 0.9 0.1 Small
5
0.00007573
0.001 0.99 0.85 0.1 0.9 Small
5
0.00000841
0.001 0.99 0.85 0.1 0.1 Medium
5
0.001 0.99 0.15 0.9 Large 0.00013365
0.001 0.99 0.15 0.1 Very Large 0.00001485
0.001 0.01 Very Large 0.00001

So,

1) The probability for a “Large & Very Large Fission Release” will be (0.00013365 + 0.00001485
+0.00001) = 0.000159
2) The probability for a “Medium Fission Release” will be 0.000008415
3) The probability for a “Small & Very Small Fission Release will be(0.000681615+ 0.000075735
+0.000075735) = 0.000833

Ans 1(E):

1)

In the Fault Tree Diagram:

  "No Power" is an OR gate representing the combination of events where there is either
"No Power," "Lamp Failure," or "Switch Failure."
 "Lamp Failure = 1.00E-04/hr" and "Switch Failure = 1.00E-03/hr" are the given
probabilities of each event.
 "Battery Fails" and "Contact Fails" are the events that lead to "No Power," represented by
the OR gate.
 The Fault Tree Diagram provides a visual representation of the possible failure paths that
can lead to the top event, "No Light." The OR gate indicates that any of the three events
under "No Power" can result in "No Light." Additionally, the events "Battery Fails" and
"Contact Fails" both lead to "No Power," and therefore, they contribute to the overall
probability of "No Light" occurring.

2). To calculate the likelihood of the top event "No Light" happening per hour, we need to consider the
probabilities of the individual causes and their combinations using the Fault Tree diagram provided
earlier.

Given probabilities:
o Lamp Failure = 1.00E-04/hr (Lamp failure per hour)
o Switch Failure = 1.00E-03/hr (Switch failure per hour)
o Battery Fails = 1.00E-04/hr (Battery failure per hour)
o Contact Fails = 1.00E-04/hr (Contact failure per hour)
o Power Failure = 1.00E-04/hr (Power failure per hour)

We have the following conditions:

 No Light happens if any of the following events occur: "No Power," "Lamp Failure," or
"Switch Failure."
 "No Power" happens if either "Battery Fails" or "Contact Fails."

Now, let's calculate the probabilities step by step:

 Probability of "No Power" happening per hour: Probability of No Power = Probability of
Battery fails + Probability of Contact fails = 1.00E-04/hr + 1.00E-04/hr Probability of No
Power = 2.00E-04/hr
 Probability of "No Light" happening per hour (Top Event) = 1.00E-04/hr + 1.00E-03/hr+
1.00E-04/hr+ 1.00E-04/hr+ 1.00E-04/hr= 0.0014/hr
References :

1. Ying Lu a, Le Yin , Yunxuan Deng, Guochen Wu and Chaozhi Li ”Using cased based
reasoning for automated safety risk management in construction industry,” Safety Science Vol
163, 2023
2. H. Langdalen, E. B. Abrahamsen, and J. T. Selvik, "On the importance of systems thinking when
using the ALARP principle for risk management," Reliability Engineering & System Safety, vol.
204, 107222, Dec. 2020.
3. K. Russ, "Risk Assessment in the UK Health and Safety System: Theory and Practice," Safety
and Health at Work, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-10, Sep. 2010
4. S. Tang, D.R. Shelden, C.M. Eastman, P. Pishdad-Bozorgi, X.H. Gao, A review
of building information modeling (BIM) and the internet of things (IoT)
devices integration: present status and future trends Autom.
Constr., 101 (2019), pp. 127-139, 10.1016/[Link].2019.01.020
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