China's Emergence as a Technology Power in Asia

Joshy M Paul

Advancements in technology are one of the major yardsticks of modernity and states'
evolution from the developing to the developed world. If a country is so determined to
become a global economic military power it focuses on the fusion of commercial and defence
technologies for strategic purposes. Also, military strategy and tactics could be formulated
based on advancements in technology. The United States, with its advanced industrial and
technological base, emerged as the most powerful nation on earth. With its supremacy in
strategic technologies, it followed ‘doctrine driving technology’ strategy, which means that
first propound a doctrine and suitable military systems follow suit. On the other hand, with a
low techno-industrial base during the first three decades of the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) existence, China followed the 'technology determines tactics’ model.1 China has
frequently changed its military doctrine according to the changes in military technology.
This can be seen when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) introduced a new concept of
'winning local wars under modern especially high technology conditions’ in its warfare
strategy in the early 1990s, following the demonstration of high-tech offensive systems by the
US military in the 1991 Gulf War, 2 which later changed into the ‘intelligentized warfare” to
leverage artificial intelligence (AI) and other new technologies.3 Today China is not just the
largest military power in Asia, but it’s technological advancements in certain defence
systems is even superior to the US military. Chinese President Xi Jinping stated at the
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in 2020 that the next thirty years should be
divided into two 15-year periods, in which the country is to basically realise socialist
modernisation by 2035 and become a modern socialist strong country by 2050. 4 China
continues its advancements in technology to become a ‘technological power’, both in military
technology and commercial sectors, when China celebrates the centennial anniversary of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2049 5, This indeed posits an increasing security concern
for India.

In recent years, China has leapfrogged in many of the critical technologies such as renewable
energy, advanced nuclear energy, next-generation telecommunication technologies, big data
and supercomputers, (AI), robotics, electric vehicles, space technology, and e-commerce,
with largely home-based research and development program. According to a Wall Street
Journal report in 2014, “China’s technology sector is reaching a critical mass of expertise,
talent and financial firepower that could realign the power structure of the global technology
industry in the years ahead.”6 The report also quoted a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers as
saying, “Traditionally Chinese companies were fast followers, but we are starting to see true
innovation…” China has overtaken the US in 2016 of the number of academic and research
papers and in the second half of the 2000s, China reached second only to the United States in
research and development (R&D) by many measures, including R&D spending as a share of
GDP.7 China’s R&D spending in 2022 totaled $ 418.2 billion, or 2.54 percent of its gross
domestic product, while the US’ R&D spending was $811. 6 billion. China’s share of global
R&D rose nearly 488 percent from 4.9 percent in 2000 to 23.9 percent in 2019. 8 On the other
hand, the United States, Japan, and Germany saw their collective share of global R&D fall
from 62.6% to 44.5% during the same period.9
However, this progression is not as much a rosy picture as the number indicates; according to
data from the World Bank, the value in return of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) of China
is less than 1 percent of the amount paid to the United States by the whole world in 2015,
while China paid 22 times more than those it received from the rest of the world for the
IPR.10 According to a study on the R&D efficiency and productivity of Chinese firms
indicates that the state sector has significantly lower R&D and productive efficiency than the
non-state sector, and within the non-state sector, foreign firms have higher R&D and
productive efficiency than domestic firms. 11 In the high-tech sector in China, technological
innovation is a state-driven project with funding from the state or through state-owned
companies. For instance, in 2014, Beijing set up China National Integrated Circuit Industry
Investment Fund for semiconductor startups and research and development to help make
China become self-sufficient in chips and a global leader in all segments of the
semiconductor supply chain by 2030.12 In its first financing round of 2014, the Fund raised
$21.8 billion (138.7 billion Yuan), while the second Fund set up in 2019 raised $ 28 billion
(200 billion Yuan) and the third Fund established in 2023 is expected to raise $ 41 billion
(300 billion Yuan).13 Advanced semiconductor chips are being used extensively in various
military systems including hypersonic missiles and sixth-generation fighter aircraft.
Currently, China relies on foreign sources for advanced chips being used in commercial and
military sectors. Its annual chip imports rose from $200 billion in 2013 to $ 300 billion in
2020.14 One of the major objectives of China’s push for ‘technological power’ is to gain a
comparative advantage over the US in military technology. President Xi, in his address to the
Party Congress in 2022, underscored one of his key visions has been to "modernising the
industrial system."15 He has also highlighted a surge in R&D expenditures from 1 trillion
yuan to 2.8 trillion yuan, resulting in China hosting the “largest cohort of R&D personnel in
the world.”16 Also, the Chinese leadership sought to boost output by enhancing efficiency,
with a particular focus on investing in advanced technology (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Advanced technology driving total force productivity

 Source: Alexander E. Farrow, “Modernization and the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy”,
Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, September 2023,
[Link]
%[Link]/JIPA%20-%[Link]
In the national development approach to achieving national rejuvenation in 2049 strategy,
President Xi set an ambitious modernisation drive of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) “to
fully transform the people’s armed forces into world-class forces by 2049” at the 19th Party
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2017. 17 This modernisation mission has
been divided into two stages, that in the first stage from 2021 to 2035, the PLA will seek to
“basically complete” military modernization by 2035, and in the second stage from 2035 to
2049, the PLA will aim to complete its transformation into a “world-class” military in
support of the CCP’s goal of fully realise its renewal as a “great modern socialist country.” 18

Technological innovation has been a major hallmark of PLA modernisation that President Xi
envisioned and has ensured a steady increase in the allocation of funds for defence related
research and development. Even though China's defence expenditure increased marginally
year-on-year during the last five years, funds for research and innovation continued with
higher percentages than the total allocation for the defence budget. For instance, in the 14th
Five-Year Plan (FYP, 2021–25), Beijing announced that it would increase expenditure on
basic research related to defense-industry developments and the role of emerging
technologies in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) ambitious modernisation drive by
10.6% in 2021 and increase its annual R&D spending by more than 7% every year over the
next five years. On the other hand, China’s defence budget increased 7.1 percent in 2022
from the previous year, while it increased 6.8 in 2021 from 2020, and 6.6 in 2020- － the
lowest rate of increase since 1988.19
When Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, he put great emphasis on developing modern
technology and making China a technology powerhouse by 2050 as part of his ‘China
Dream’ project.20 The 13th (2015-2020) and the 14th five-year plans have given increased
importance to developing critical technologies domestically and make China self-sufficient in
it.21 The 13th plan focused on closing the gap with Western hi-tech prowess and lessening
China’s dependency on imported technology, and transforming China into a “manufacturing
superpower”. China unveiled a list of “strategic emerging industries” in September 2020 and
identified 10 core areas where the country should take the lead which include aerospace
technology- including aircraft engines and airborne equipment; advanced numerical control
machine tools and robotics; new-generation information technology; and biopharmaceuticals
and high-performance medical equipment.22 In the case of aerospace technology and aircraft
engines, China made the breakthrough in 2017 with the J-20, China's indigenous fifth-
generation fighter aircraft to match the US’ F-22 Raptor 23 and the first fully home-grown jet
engine ‘Woshan-15’ or ‘WS-15’ in 2023.24 A sixth-generation stealth fighter aircraft program
has been undergoing in China by the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) .25 In
the 14th plan, China is focusing on improving its technological strengths in key areas such as
next-generation artificial intelligence, quantum information, semiconductors, deep space,
deep sea, and polar exploration.26 Next-generation artificial intelligence, quantum
information, and semiconductors are also the key sectors in China’s defence modernisation
especially in missiles, fighter aircraft, and electronic warfare that will bolster PLA’s war-
winning capacity against the superior enemy, the US.
In its pursuit to become a technological power, China unveiled two strategic plans -the "Made
in China 2025 (MIC 2025)” plan in 2015 and the "China Standards 2035” plan in 2018. The
‘Made in China 2025’ plan is a 10-year comprehensive state-led industrial policy to place
China in the league of global high-tech manufacturing countries. It focuses on intelligent
manufacturing in 10 strategic sectors to make China a global powerhouse in high-tech
industries such as robotics, electric cars and new energy vehicles, aviation, next-generation
information technology (IT) and telecommunication, and artificial intelligence.27 The
objective of the MIC 2025 is to have an innovation-driven industrial base, achieve green
development, tech-savvy human talent, more efficient and integrated industry, and attain the
highest parts of global production chains. Beijing wants to reduce China’s dependence on
foreign technology and promote Chinese high-tech manufacturers in the global
marketplace. The MIC 2025 also identifies the goal of raising the domestic content of core
components and materials to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025. 28 While the purpose of “China
Standards 2035” is “to create a blueprint for the Chinese government and leading tech
companies to set global standards for emerging technologies, such as 5G, Internet of Things
(IoT), and artificial intelligence (AI)”29.

The US, however, accuses China that through the MIC 2025 programme government
subsidies facilitate manufacturing and mobilises state-owned enterprises to control a
market that violates international trade rules, as well as poses a security risk. The US
believes that these are critical technologies and China will harness them for PLA
modernisation which will narrow the gap between Washington and Beijing in high-tech
military sector. To achieve the goals of MIC 2025, Chinese companies, both private and
state-backed, invested billions of dollars in foreign companies, notably semiconductor
firms especially in the US, to gain access to advanced technology. For instance, the value
of Chinese acquisitions in the United States peaked in 2016 at over $45 billion. 30 China’s
advancements in high technologies such as AI, Hypersonic weapon technology, stealth
technology for fighter aircraft and new information technology has largely been due to
its collaboration with the US companies. China became the first country ever to develop
hypersonic weapon system. As a result, the US imposed a series of sanctions against
Chinese companies investing in high-tech firms in the US as well as against using
Chinese equipment, like Huawei’s products, by American companies to prevent China
become an advanced technology power. 31 The 2022 CHIPS and Science Act barred US
companies from setting up leading-edge or advanced technology facilities in China for 10
years and prevented sharing less than 15 manometer chips with China 32, while 7 manometer
chips and below are crucial for making advancements in AI, 6 th generation technology,
and quantum computing, which has wider military applications. Similarly, China is
heavily dependent on the West for advanced semiconductor chips, from 2 to 80 percent, and
runs a trade deficit. In 2020, it imported over US $300 billion worth of chips, the country’s
largest imported item, while domestic supply for the entire semiconductor industry was
just 30 percent.33

To decrease dependence on the West for critical technologies and also to stem the
volatility in the process of technological advancements in the civil-military programs,
President Xi announced two strategic drives in the high-tech sector; 'Dual-Circulation’
and ‘China-Plus One’ strategies. The ‘Dual Circulation’ strategy, announced in May 2020,
aims to make China more self-reliant in technology. It comprises external and internal
circulations; the former will remain in contact with the rest of the world, and the latter will
cultivate domestic demand, capital, and ideas and will overshadow the former later. 34 Under
this strategy, China aims to reduce its dependence on foreign tech firms and will gradually
become a major exporter of high technology. The ‘China-Plus One’ strategy aims to
maintain China’s hold in the global supply value chain. Under this strategy, Chinese
companies retain their production facilities inside China, which will cater to the domestic
demands of the international market; these firms also set up production centres in foreign
countries especially in Southeast Asia and Latin America to cater the western market. 35 Trade
data indicates that the US sanctions have not affected the Chinese economy much, though a
slight reduction in 2023, suggesting that enough funds are available for domestic R&D and
technological modernisation of its economy as well as the military (Figure 3)
Figure - Value of export of goods from China from 2013 to 2023(in billion U.S. dollars)

Source: Statista, [Link]

Responding to the US’ focus on using cutting-edge technology for military innovation under
the Third Offset Strategy for a long-term military competition with China, the PLA adopted
“intelligentized warfare" strategy in 2019 to respond to the new developments in warfare. 36
The application of new and emerging technologies by the US military such as drones and
unmanned aircraft in Afghanistan and Iraq prompted the PLA leadership to introduce new
concepts and incorporated the “intelligentized warfare” strategy in its latest Defence White
Paper “military strategic guideline for a new era” released in 2019. Intelligentized warfare is
defined as the “ ‘operationalization’ of artificial intelligence (AI) and its enabling
technologies, such as cloud computing, big data analytics, quantum computing, and
autonomous systems, for military applications”. 37 The shift from erstwhile “informationized
warfare” to “intelligentized warfare” is expected to enable the PLA to cater to new
technologies from both civilian and military sectors and change its strategies based on the
advancements in technologies. The “informationized warfare” mainly emphasized the use of
information systems (e.g., improved systems for intelligence, reconnaissance, and
surveillance; advanced command, control, and communications infrastructures) as a force
multiplier, while the “intelligentized warfare” attempted to harness the technological
advancements in the commercial sector for military innovation. 38 China aims to harness the
advancements in the civilian sector for military application through the ‘Civil-Military Fusion
(CMF)’ strategy that is expected to make China a technological power- a strong economy
and a powerful military- by the middle of the 21 st century. China's ability to invent new
weapons and systems based on new-generation technologies will help it achieve a higher
level in the international hierarchy of power.

Civil-Military Fusion in Strategic Technologies

The development of critical defence technologies indigenously had a lackadaisical
performance in China until the 2000s despite the push from Deng Xiaoping as part of his
'four modernisation' strategy. In the eighties, it attempted to develop advanced defence
technology in partnership with the western countries, including the US but collapsed the
project because of the Tiananmen Square incident where the West stopped all defence
technology interactions with China. It later resorted to espionage and reverse engineering to
develop fighter aircraft and allied systems including aircraft engines. Chin has made great
strides in naval technology and missiles but that progress didn’t take place in the aviation
sector. Though it has made fourth and fifth-generation fighter aircraft with copied technology
from Russia and the US but is still unproven in the combat field. Later China turned to
developing the US model of ‘dual-use' technology or 'spin-off' effect for military innovation
and for that the country must have a vibrant techno-manufacturing ecosystem. 'Dual-use'
technologies are commercially developed ones but can be used for developing advanced
military systems.
President Xi Jinping emphasises the integration of technological innovation and market
elements, primarily to advance China's economic and military power, and considers CMF as
a strategic policy to make China a great power. 39 Under CMF the govt seeks to harness new
technologies from the private sector for the benefit of the country’s rapidly modernising
military. It is believed that the fourth industrial revolution (4IR) technologies such as AI and
machine learning, new man-machine interfaces, block-chains, automation and robotics, and
quantum computing are the basis for the future, and CMF is a crucial course for China to
exploit these technologies for advancements in revolution in military affairs. China
understands that the 4IR technological capabilities could provide it a military advantage, and
therefore political leverage, in the decades to come. The inclusion of 13 technocrats in the
24 member elite body politburo of the CCP formed in 2022 indicates how the party looks at
technological innovation in China's future economic and military growth. 40 The CCP ensures
that innovations simultaneously advances economic and military developments and President
Xi personally oversees the CMF strategy’s implementation as he chairs the CCP’s Central
Military Commission and the Central Commission for Military-Civil Fusion Development.
Key technologies being targeted under CMF include quantum computing, big data,
semiconductors, 5G, advanced nuclear technology, aerospace technology, and Artificial
Intelligence (AI).41 China aims to build up "10 strategic emerging industrial bases with global
influence, 100 strategic emerging industrial clusters with international competitiveness, and
1,000 strategic emerging industrial ecosystems with unique advantages”.42 The PLA will be a
major beneficiary of the technological innovation driven by the state.
Advanced dual-use technology is being developed in China through the collaboration of
government, academia, and industry(Figure2). Principally, the state identifies key
technologies through its vision, and controls throughout the process by means of state
funding and regulatory efforts. Then universities, research centers, and laboratories translate
these state priorities into research initiatives. The outcome of the research leads to the
developmental stage and the military integrates these dual-use advancements into its
weaponry.
Figure 2- Civil-military fusion pathway for military applications

Source: Alexander E. Farrow, “Modernization and the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy”,

Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, September 2023,
[Link]
%[Link]/JIPA%20-%[Link]

The Chinese government’s military-civil fusion policy has been one of the key drivers of its
advancements in semiconductors, robotics, and its military modernisation program. In its
annual report for 2019, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a
Congressional advisory body, wrote that the military-civil fusion has “spurred innovation and
economic growth through an array of policies and other government-supported mechanisms,
including venture capital funds while leveraging the fruits of civilian innovation for China’s
defence sector.”43 China is now a leading power in 5G technology and has made the first
breakthrough in 6G, which has large civilian applications but was developed for military
purposes.44 For instance, during the first flight test of the hypersonic vehicle in July 2021, a
ten minutes communication blackout occurred during the re-entry stage of the vehicle
because a plasma bubble formed around the hull of the vehicle due to friction with the air as
the vehicle was traveling beyond Mach 5 or hypersonic speed. To overcome the 'black
barrier', China has sought to develop 6G technology based on electromagnetic waves for
communication, but the program is moving slowly due to stringent restrictions by the US on
China in getting advanced chips from the US. 45 Undoubtedly, the defence sector is a major
beneficiary of China’s technological revolution, and leading tech firms closely work with the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

China believes that quantum computing and AI will drive the next revolution in military
affairs, and wants to achieve military dominance through the application of them in next-
generation warfare. China set up National Laboratory for Quantum Information Sciences in
2017 with two major quantum projects; quantum metrology and building a quantum
computer for civilian innovations and national defense efforts. 46 The Laboratory would
collaborate with military and research institutions as well as universities. In October 2021, a
few Chinese researchers announced that "they have built two quantum computers with high
performance speeds which top their Western competitors”, and claimed the new computer
Jiuzhang 2 is "10 million times faster than the world's fastest supercomputer and much more
powerful than Google's 55-qubit Sycamore".47 China launched the quantum satellite Micius
in 2016, and in December 2021, a group of scientists claimed that they created a quantum
communication network in space, using Micius satellite to secure the national power grid
against blackouts and other long-distance attacks. Translating the advancements in Quantum
technology for military purposes, a team of Tsinghua University researchers claimed that a
new quantum radar technology was being developed that could detect stealth aircraft by
generating a small electromagnetic storm, and is capable of determining the type of plane and
the weapons it is carrying. 48 A quantum radar will undoubtedly render fighter aircraft’s
stealth technology useless.

Historically, the US leads the innovation in new and emerging technologies, including AI,
and maintains the edge over the secondary state. However, China, in 2017 announced Next
Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP)’ which called for China to
become the world leader in AI by 2030. The AIDP has three stage plans; 1) reach parity in AI
with world leaders by 2020; 2) take the lead in some areas of AI applications by 2025; and 3)
become a world leader across all aspects of AI (theory, technology, and applications) and a
major world center for AI innovation by 2030.49 The funding for AIDP has been categorised
into four principle areas; application-driven, enterprise-led, market-oriented principles, and
integration and coordination. In 2017, China created a ‘National AI Team’ comprising
leading private companies such as Baidu, Tencent, Huawei, YITU Technology… etc to
develop specific systems based on their domain expertise like Baidu for autonomous driving,
Tencent for medical imaging, Huawei for AI-related software/hardware (infrastructure),
iFlytek for smart audio, and SenseTime for smart vision (Figure 2). 50 In 2018, the State
Council announced research topics for next generation AI megaprojects which include;
Fundamental theories of new generation AI, key generic technologies serving major needs,
and smart chips and systems.51
Figure 2 -China’s National AI Team
Source: Anders C. Johansson, “China's AI Ecosystem”, Stockholm School of Economics,
November 2022, [Link]
generation-artificial-intelligence/

Today, China has a well established AI ecosystem and is viewed as a strategic priority of the
CCP. China’s AI industry ranks second to the US sector overall and leads in some categories,
including adoption rates, data, robot installations, journal publications, and supercomputers. 52
In China, AI is deemed as a national priority and leverages central and local governments, the
private sector, academia, and research organizations for AI development. The vice premier
oversees the implementation of strategic AI plans, and the party and the government view
that AI is a game-changing technology and the heart of the future digital economy. Two
ministries supervise the AIDP, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) and the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT); the former coordinates China's AI
development strategies and academic research, the latter, through its network of think tanks
and industry alliances, coordinates fielding and testing of AI applications. China has set up
three AI hubs: the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, Yangtze River, and Pearl River regions for various
AI-related activities (figure 3). Scientific professional associations (SPAs) in China are
closely tied to the CCP and work to implement national strategies by integrating government,
industry, and academia. SPAs and industry alliances are key players in the AI ecosystem.
This will enable the CCP to leverage private companies to drive innovation in AI and
translates the outcome for military applications.
Figure 3 - Top 10 Regions for the AI Industry in China 2018-2022
 Source: Anders C. Johansson, “China's AI Ecosystem”, Stockholm School of Economics,
November 2022, [Link]
generation-artificial-intelligence/

In 2018, the MIIT released a “work plan for key projects for the development of the next
generation of AI,” which included the following 17 priority areas AI related research and
development that are:
1. Intelligent connected cars
2. Intelligent service robots
3. Intelligent unmanned aerial vehicles
4. Medical imaging diagnostic support systems
5. Video image identification systems
6. Intelligent voice interaction systems
7. Intelligent language translation systems
8. Intelligent home appliance systems
9. Smart sensors
10. Neural network chips
11. Open source, open platforms
12. Key technical equipment for intelligent manufacturing
13. Repository of industry training resources
14. Standard testing and intellectual property service platform
15. Intelligent network infrastructure
16. Network security assurance systems
17. Other directions53
Similarly, the MIIT plays a key role in connecting the private sector to the national strategy.
An MIIT-administered scientific research institution, Center for Information and Industry
Development (CCID), published the New Infrastructure Policy White Paper in April 2020,
identifying seven technology areas for the “New Infrastructure” framework that the CCP’s
Central Economic Working Conference approved in 2018 to transform the economy into a
digital economy. The seven identified areas are Artificial Intelligence , Industrial Internet,
Charging Framework for New-Energy Vehicles , Big Data Centers, 5G Infrastructure, Ultra-
High Voltage Power Grid , and Rail Transit.54
Regarding the importance of AI for military modernisation, China’s 2019 Defense White
Paper states that “cutting-edge technologies—like AI, quantum information, big data, cloud
computing, and internet of things (IoT)—have accelerating applications in the military
domains".55 Further, it calls out “military-civil fusion as a key component of force
modernization, including leapfrog development in key areas and building a powerful strategic
support force”. In the military, AI requirements are pushing militaries to make sense of
increasingly data-dense and complex environments and also enhansing Command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.
AI is well-suited to assist sense-making and decision making under complex conditions.
Other military applications of AI include autonomous military vehicles and networked anti-
access area denial capabilities. Currently, most advanced nations agree that AI advancements
require renewed discussion of international norms regarding the use of lethal autonomous
weapon systems (LAWS).
In June 2022, Chinese scientists from the early warning intelligence department of the Air
Force Early Warning Academy in Wuhan claimed that an artificial intelligence technology
was being developed for a missile defence system that can estimate the course of
a hypersonic glide missile as it homes in on a target, and estimate incoming weapon’s
potential kill trajectory.56 An AI powered missile defence system can help initiate a counter
response with a three-minute lead time, as the weapon is traveling at Mach 5 speed in a low-
orbit trajectory which existing radars can detect only at the later stage (figure 4).
Figure 4: Missile defence mechanism and hypersonic glider trajectory
It suggests that China is far ahead of the US in both hypersonic weapon technology as well
anti- hypersonic weapon missile defence system developments. China’s AI powered missile
defence system will make the US strategy of a pre-emptive attack on China's command and
control system ineffective.
Conclusions
China is becoming a member of the league of the world's great powers. Imperial Germany,
with a resurgent economy propelled by the industrial revolution, converted its economic
might into a military might at the beginning of the 20 th century but still was an unsatisfied
power. Its thirst for more power brought Europe into chaos. China is marching from a
developing country into a middle income country by 2035, with a military second only to the
US, but its unsettled territorial ambition has already generated concern not only among the
regional countries but in other continents too. In China, defence modernisation got higher
priority over modernising the market economy in the top echelons of the party, even though
both were launched simultaneously by Deng. It sought to acquire western technology for
military modernisation but had to give up due to the Tiananmen Square incident and the
international political system. However, its military modernization continued with a
domestic economic surge and China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in
2001 boosted its economic growth that sped up the military modernization program. China
became the second largest economy in the world in 2010 surpassing Japan.
Today, Chinese Navy is the largest in terms of the number of ships, while its Air Force is the
second largest, after the US. The economic surge during the first two decades of the current
century has helped to develop a strong navy and air force. However, now it seeks to
transform the Navy and Air Force into tech-savvy forces to match the US forces. To make a
tech-savvy force China needs to have a sound industrial belt as well as tech-savvy human
resource to make innovation in the civilian sector that the PLA can leverage for its
modernisation. Even though the economy is undergoing headwinds in its growth strategy due
to US restrictions as well as a recession in the Chinese economy because of a long COVID-
19 lockdown, the money going for innovation in strategic sectors has not been affected.
China missed the first three industrial revolutions but now wants to be the leader in fourth
industrial revolution (4IR) technologies which will strengthen its economic base that can
propel a sound military industrial complex system in China. China believes that the CMS
strategy will help the PLA leverage technological advancements in the commercial sector for
military modernisation to match the US defence forces in high-tech sectors. How will China
behave by being the most powerful nation on earth is a serious question to ponder.

Endnotes
1
Dennis J. Blasko, “ ‘Technology Determines Tactics’: The Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in
Chinese Military Thinking,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 34, no.3, pp: 355-81
2
M. Taylor Fravel, China’s Military Strategy Since 1949: Active Defense, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2019, p. 182.
3
“China's National Defense in the New Era”, Ministry of National Defense of the People's
Republic of China, 2019, [Link]
Accessed on January 2, 2024
4
“14th five-year plan a roadmap that leads beyond the year 2025: China Daily”, The Strait Times, October 27,
2020, [Link]
daily.. Accessed on January 2, 2024
5
Xinhua, "China aims to become world-leading technological power by 2049", Global Times, September 24,
2012, [Link] Accessed on January 4, 2024
6
Juro Osawa and Paul Mozur, “The Rise of China's Innovation Machine”, The Wall Street Journal, January 16,
2014, [Link] . Accessed on
January 12, 2024
7
Yanfei Li, “Understanding China’s Technological Rise”, The Diplomat, August 03, 2018,
[Link] . Accessed on January 6, 2024
8
John F. Sargent Jr. and Marcy E. Gallo, “The Global Research and Development Landscape and Implications
for the Department of Defense”, Congressional Research Service, June 28, 2021,
[Link] Accessed on January 9, 2024
9
Ibid
10
The World Bank, “Charges for the use of intellectual property, payments (BoP, current US$)”,
[Link] . Accessed on January 20,
2024
Anming Zhang, et al, “A study of the R&D efficiency and productivity of Chinese firms”, Journal of
11

Comparative Economics, No. 31 , 2003, pp. 444–464

12
Li Tao, “How China’s ‘Big Fund’ is helping the country catch up in the global semiconductor race”, South
China Morning Post, May 10, 2018, [Link]
fund-helping-country-catch-global-semiconductor-race. Accessed on January 2, 2024

13
Julie Zhu, et, al, “Exclusive: China to launch $40 billion state fund to boost chip industry“, Reuters,
September 5, 2023, [Link]
industry-sources-say-2023-09-05/. Accessed on January 12, 2024
14
Wei Sheng, “China spends more importing semiconductors than oil”, Technode, April 29, 2021,
[Link] accessed on June 20,
2023
15
Alexander E. Farrow, “Modernization and the Military-Civil Fusion Strategy”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs,
September 2023, [Link]
JIPA%20-%[Link]. Accessed on January 21, 2024
16
Ibid.
17
Wang Lei, “China in 2017: Building world-class military forces”, CGTN, December 21, 2017,
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18
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