J.K.

SHAH CLASSES CS EXECUTIVE - JURISPRUDENCE, INTERPRETATION AND GENERAL LAWS

: 50 :
Q: Limitation Bars Remedy, But Does Not Extinguish Rights. Comment
The Law of limitation bars the remedy in a Court of law only when the period of limitation
has expired, but it does not extinguish the right that it cannot be enforced by judicial
process (Bombay Dying & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay). Thus if a claim is satisfied
outside the Court of law after the expiry of period of limitation, that is not illegal as the right
to cause of action always remains. Similarly, even if the defence of limitation is not set by
the other party, the Court cannot accept any suit, appeal or application beyond the period
of limitation.
For example, where the recovery of a debt has become time barred by lapse of the
prescribed period of limitation, the right to the debt is not extinguished. If the debtors,
without being aware of the bar of time, pays the debt he cannot sue the creditor to refund
the money to him on the ground that his claims for recovery of the debt had become time
barred.
Section 3
• Section 3 of the Act provides that any suit, appeal or application must be made within
the period of limitation as specified in Limitation Act.
• If any suit, appeal or application made beyond the prescribed period of limitation, it is
the duty of the Court not to proceed with such suits irrespective of the fact whether
the plea of limitation has been set up in defence or not.
• The provisions of Section 3 are mandatory.
• The Court can suo motu take note of question of limitation. The question whether a
suit is barred by limitation should be decided on the facts as they stood on the date of
presentation of the plaint.
• It is a vital section upon which the whole limitation Act depends for its efficacy.
• The effect of Section 3 is not to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction.
• Therefore, decision of a Court allowing a suit which had been instituted after the
period prescribed is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction. A decree passed in a time
barred suit is not a nullity.
Q: Limitation Act is the statue of Repose, Peace and Justice. Comment
The Limitation Act 1963 prescribes different periods of limitation for filing suits, petitions or
applications. The Act applies to all civil proceedings and some special criminal
proceedings which can be taken in a Court of law unless its application is excluded by any
enactment. The statutes of limitation are statutes of repose because they extinguish stale
demands and quite titles. They lay, at rest, claims which might otherwise have disturbed
the peace of community. They secure peace by ensuring security of rights and secure
justice as by lapse of time, evidence may have been destroyed. In S. C. Parashar v.
CHAPTER 4 LIMITATION ACT, 1963
[Link] CLASSES CS EXECUTIVE - JURISPRUDENCE, INTERPRETATION AND GENERAL LAWS
: 51 :
Vasant Sen, the Supreme Court has rightly observed that the statute of limitation is a
statute of repose, peace and justice. The intension of the law of limitation is not to give a
right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after certain period to a suit to impose
an existing right. The object is to compel the litigant to be diligent in seeking remedies in
courts of law.
Q: Write a short note on Doctrine of sufficient cause
Doctrine of sufficient cause
Section 5 allows the extension of prescribed period in certain cases on sufficient cause
being shown for the delay. This is known as doctrine of “sufficient cause” for condonation
of delay which is embodied in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 5 provides that
any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of
Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed
period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for
not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
The Section is not applicable to applications made under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and also to suits. The Court has no power to
admit a time barred suit even if there is a sufficient cause for the delay. It applies only to
appeals or applications as specified therein. The reason for non-applicability of the Section
to suits is that, the period of limitation allowed in most of the suits extends from 3 to 12
years whereas in appeals and application it does not exceed 6 months.
The party applying for condonation of delay should satisfy the Court for not making an
appeal or application within the prescribed period for sufficient cause. The term sufficient
cause has not been defined in the Limitation Act. It depends on the circumstances of each
case. However, it must be a cause which is beyond the control of the party. In Ramlal v.
Rewa Coal Fields Ltd., the Supreme Court held that once the period of limitation expires
then the appellant has to explain the delay made thereafter for day by day and if he is
unable to explain the delay even for a single day, it would be deemed that the party did not
have sufficient cause for delay. It is the Court’s discretion to extend or not to extend the
period of limitation even after the sufficient cause has been shown and other conditions
are also specified. However, the Court should exercise its discretion judicially and not
arbitrarily.
Following events inter alia amounts to sufficient cause:
1. Wrong practice of High Court which misled the appellant or his counsel in not filing
the appeal should be regarded as sufficient cause under Section 5;
2. In certain cases, mistake of counsel may be taken into consideration in condonation
of delay. But such mistake must be bona fide;
3. Wrong advice given by advocate can give rise to sufficient cause in certain cases;
[Link] CLASSES CS EXECUTIVE - JURISPRUDENCE, INTERPRETATION AND GENERAL LAWS
: 52 :
4. Mistake of law in establishing or exercising the right given by law may be considered
as sufficient cause. However, ignorance of law is not excuse, nor the negligence of
the party or the legal adviser constitutes a sufficient cause;
5. Imprisonment of the party or serious illness of the party may be considered for
condonation of delay;
6. Time taken for obtaining certified copies of the decree of the judgment necessary to
accompany the appeal or application was considered for condoning the delay.
7. Ailment of father during which period the defendant was looking after him has been
held to be a sufficient and genuine cause (Mahendra Yadav v. Ratna Devi & others).
The quasi-judicial tribunals, labour courts or executive authorities have no power to extend
the period under this Section.
The test of “sufficient cause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective
test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of limitation has left
the concept of sufficient cause‟ delightfully undefined thereby leaving to the court a
well-intended discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist
establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The
categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique
experience to be dealt with by the Court as such.
Q: Discuss the law of limitation in relation to legally disabled person
Persons under legal disability
• Section 6 is an enabling section to enable persons under disability to exercise their
legal rights within a certain time. Section 7 supplements Section 6, Section 8 controls
these sections, which serves as an exception to Sections 6 and 7.
• The combined effect of Sections 6 and 8 is that where the prescribed period of
limitation expires before the cessation of disability, for instance, before the attainment
of majority, the minor will no doubt be entitled to a fresh period of limitation from the
attainment of his majority subject to the condition that in no case the period extended
by Section 6 shall by virtue of Section 8 exceeds three years from cessation of
disability, i.e. attainment of majority.
• Sections 6, 7 and 8 must be read together. Section 8 imposes a limitation on
concession provided under Sections 6 and 7 to a person under disability up to a
maximum of three years after the cessation of disability.
• The period of three years under Section 6 of this Act has to be counted, not from the
date of attainment of majority by the person under disability, but from the date of
cessation of minority or disability.
• Both Sections 6 and 7 go together. Section 7 is an extension of Section 6, where the
point of time at which the existence of disability is to be recognized i.e. “the time from
which the period of limitation is to be reckoned”.
• To apply Section 7, disability must exist when the right to apply accrued, i.e., at the
time from which period of limitation is to be reckoned.