P L D 2023 Peshawar 110

Before Ishtiaq Ibrahim, J

SAEEDULLAH---Petitioner
Versus
LAL SHER and others---Respondents
Criminal Revision No. 70-P of 2022, decided on 10th April, 2023.
(a) Interpretation of statutes---
----Temporary statute---Scope---Temporary nature of Ordinance means that it is
unlikely to have any influence after it expires.
Understanding Statutes, First Edition 1997 S.M. Zafar and Arbab
Muhammad Hasham Khan v. The Crown PLD 1953 Pesh. 72 rel.
(b) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)---
----Preamble---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Pre-amble---Special and
general law---Scope---Special law encompasses various eventualities: individuals,
objectives and domains of activity---Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, caters to
specific persons and Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, addresses a particular subject---
Either of the two laws cannot be characterized as general laws.
(c) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)---
----Ss. 4(4) & 23---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), Ss. 7 & 23---Penal Code
(XLV of 1860), Ss. 324 & 337-A(i)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arms Act (XXIII of
2013), S. 15---United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 40 (2)(b)
(iii)(iv)(vii)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 439---Attempt to commit
Qatl-i-amd, Shajjah-i-khafifah, unlicensed firearm and terrorism---Trial of
juvenile---Jurisdiction---Accused was a juvenile and Anti-Terrorism Court
declined to transfer his case to Juvenile Court---Validity---Provisions of Juvenile
Justice System Act, 2018, take precedence in trial of juvenile accused of
committing terrorist offences as it aligns with legislative intent expressed in Ss.
4(4) & 23 of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018---Three categories of offences-
minor, major, and heinous are mentioned in Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018,
with the last one relevant to terrorism-related act---It is crucial to consider that
certain safeguards; both substantive and procedural, available to minors can only
be ensured through Juvenile Court platform---Such measures include
confidentiality of proceedings, detention in observation homes, support from
probation and social welfare officers to the investigating officer, and the social
investigation report attached to report under S. 173, Cr.P.C.---Spectrum of
rehabilitative penalties, such as probation, community service orders, detention in
juvenile rehabilitation centers and prohibition of capital punishment, are only
envisioned within the parameters of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018---Absence
of such safeguards can affect right of juvenile offenders to a fair trial---Pakistan
has ratified United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child---Trial of a child
as per Art. 40(2)(b)(iii) & (vii) of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child should be conducted in Juvenile Court, ensuring safeguards of their
privacy---Proper procedural measures under Art. 40(2)(b)(iv) of United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child require ensuring the child effectively
participates in trial---Rehabilitative approach to passing sentences has been
emphasized in Art. 40(1) of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child---Juvenile accused committing terrorism offence would be tried by Juvenile
Court established and notified under Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018---High
Court transferred trial of juvenile accused to Juvenile Court---In light of S. 23 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the Juvenile Court would proceed with trial as if it had
taken cognizance of the offence and resume from the stage it was transferred by
Anti-Terrorism Court---Revision was allowed accordingly.
Muhammad Din v. Muhammad Jehangir, PLD 2004 Lah. 779; Muhammad
Rasool and another v. The State PLD 2012 Bal. 122; Qamar Hussain Shah v. The
State PLD 2006 Kar. 331; Mujahid Iqbal v. The State and another 2019 [Link]
1432; Pakistan Medical and Dental Council, through its President v. Muhammad
Fahad Malik and others Civil Appeals Nos. 3 and 4 of 2018; Civil Petition
No.3412 of 2017; Civil Petitions Nos.45 and 64 to 70 of 2018; Qamar Hussain
Shah's case PLD 2006 Kar. 331; People v. Wilcox 237 Ill. 421, 86 N.E. 672; State
v. Johnson 170 N.C. 685, 86 S.E. 788 (N.C. 1915); Gunepally Thammayya and
others v. Sri Rajah Tyadapusapati (1930) 59 MLJ 755; Syed Mushahid Shah and
others v. Federal Investment Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218 and T.V. The
United Kingdom, Application No.24724 of 1994 dated 16th December, 1999 rel.
(d) Islamic law---
----Criminal Justice System---Juvenile offenders---Rights---Islamic Legal System
stresses importance of treating juveniles differently in a justice system---Even
while dealing with serious crimes, Islamic Justice System prefers administrative
penalties for children of a certain age.

2022 P L D Islamabad 228

Before Babar Sattar, J
Mst. MUMTAZ BIBI---Petitioner
Versus
QASIM and 4 others---Respondents
Writ Petition No.4227 of 2021, decided on 9th February, 2022.
(a) Constitution of Pakistan---
----Art. 199---Islamic law---Marriage---Minor---Validity---High Court cannot pass
declaration whether or not purported marriage contract between parties is valid or
not---Doing so requires determining age of minor, which requires recording of
evidence, and High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction cannot undertake such
exercise.
(b) Constitution of Pakistan---
----Art. 4---Rule of law---Object, purpose and scope---Foundational purpose of
rule of law is to enable citizens to order their lives in accordance with provisions of
law and to be able to understand which actions are permissible that citizens are free
to engage in for not having been prohibited, and which actions are proscribed by
law and consequently not to be undertaken.
(c) Interpretation of statutes---
----Harmony---Court, duty of---Scope---Courts are to accord meaning to provisions
of a statute in a manner that they do not contradict intent and purpose of other
statutes to the extent possible---If in view of clear text of a statute such
interpretation is not possible, there are other principles of statutory interpretation
(i.e. as a general matter the law later in time prevails as the latest expression of
legislative intent) applied to lay down for the benefit of citizens the applicable
requirements of law with clarity.
(d) Jurisprudence---
----Adults and minors, actions of---Distinguished---In any rule of law framework, a
distinction is drawn between actions of adults versus actions of children---Adults
are assumed to understand consequences of their actions and are accordingly held
accountable for such consequences---Children are not assumed to have complete
agency and law acknowledges that they may neither understand consequences of
their actions nor can be held completely responsible for such actions---Every State
through legislative enactment determines age at which a person is to be treated as
an individual with autonomy and human agency for purposes of certain actions---
Such is the age at which his or her actions are deemed valid and are to be given
effect as he or she has capacity to understand their consequences and law
accordingly holds such person accountable for them.
(e) Islamic law---
----Source of law---Commentary on Muslim Personal Law by Dinshaw Fardunji
Mulla---Validity---Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla was not a Muslim scholar who can be
accredited with religious expertise to interpret precepts of Islam---Dinshaw
Fardunji Mulla, of Zoroastrian faith by descent, was a legal scholar who authored
treatises on various subjects of law, including contract law and Muslim Personal
Law---Treatise of Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla on Muslim Personal Law is like any
other legal commentary by a scholar of law as opposed to the commentary by a
Muslim jurist with expertise or authority to interpret primary sources of Islamic
Law---Dinshaw Mulla's commentary can therefore not be treated as a source of law
itself but like any other treatise commenting on a subject of law can be used as a
reference and a commentary.
(f) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)---
----Preamble---Object, purpose and scope---Provisions of Juvenile Justice System
Act, 2018 take into account principles of agency and autonomy---While holding
children accountable for criminal conduct proportionally, Juvenile Justice System
Act, 2018, creates a distinction between criminal liability attributable to actions of
minors versus liability flowing from actions attributable to adults---Different set of
policy objects have been provided under Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, for
initiating penal action against minors, driven by considerations of reform as
opposed to deterrence.
(g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 375, 377-A & 377-B---Majority Act (XI of 1875), Ss. 3 & 4---United
Nations Convention on Rights of Child (UNCRC), Arts. 1, 19 & 34---Sexual abuse
against children---Remedies---Provisions of Ss.377-A & 377-B, P.P.C. have been
enacted to discharge Pakistan's obligations under Arts. 19 & 34 of UNCRC---
Object of Ss. 337-A & 337-B, P.P.C. is to criminalize act of exposing children to
obscene or sexually explicit conduct---No act of a sexual nature involving a child
is permissible even if it is with an explicit consent of such child---Child means a
human being below the age of 18 years.
(h) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)---
----Preamble---Marriage---Object, purpose and scope---Contract of marriage is a
contract whereby parties agree to engage in sexual relations, recognized by the
State and society as legitimate, for the purpose of procreation---Consideration and
object of a marriage contract essentially entails two individuals agreeing to engage
in legitimate sexual relations, transforming individuals into a family warranting
state protection---Relationship of marriage does not just entail engagement in
permissible sexual conduct---Purpose of marriage is to enter into a contract
whereby two people agree to become a family and look after one another, and
further agree to bring children into this world and are responsible for safety and
physical and emotional well being of such offspring.
(i) Constitution of Pakistan---
----Arts. 10-A & 199---Habeas corpus, writ of---Plea of marriage---Attaining age
of puberty---Petitioner sought recovery of her minor daughter, abducted by
respondent who entered into marriage with her---Validity---Puberty has to do with
physical aspects of growth of a female child---Merely because a child has grown
physically and biologically to an extent that she can endure sexual activity or
intercourse does not automatically mean that she has legal capacity to marry or
agency to contemplate consequences that marriage entails i.e. that she has mental
and psychological maturity to reach such decision in her own best interest---There
are factors that contribute to a female child reaching puberty---Children as young
as ten or eleven years of age can possibly reach puberty as timing of puberty has
been found to be related to physical characteristics including height, weight and
body mass, as well as diet of individual and her geography etc.---If puberty was to
be applicable test, would that deem a 10-year-old to be competent to contract
marriage and engage in sexual intercourse because she had attained puberty---Early
maturing "adolescents" are at a higher risk for psychological and behavioural
problems because they are not emotionally or formatively ready for major
biological, social and emotional changes comprising puberty---Marriage contract
involving a child under the age of 18 years was a contract prohibited by law,
which, even if executed by a child, was void ab initio---High Court declined to
treat purported Nikahnama between respondent and minor as a basis to release her
in the custody of respondent---High Court declined to determine age of minor
definitively and also did not make any observations as regard liability of
respondent under the provisions of Penal Code,1860, in exercise of Constitutional
jurisdiction as the same would fetter rights of parties involved to due process and
fair trial as guaranteed by Art.10-A of the Constitution---High Court left
determination of such questions to the court of competent jurisdiction before which
such questions would be raised---High Court handed over custody of the minor to
petitioner, who was her mother---Petitioner along with her husband (i.e. the father
of the minor) were responsible to provide for the safety and well being of the
minor---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad and
others PLD 2018 Isl. 385; Mst. Alishba Bibi v. The State and 7 others PLD 2020
Isl. 28; Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmed PLD 1970 SC 323; Muhammad Khalid v.
Magistrate Ist Class and 2 others PLD 2021 Lah. 21; Muhammad Iqbal v. The State
PLD 1983 FSC 9; Mauj Ali v. Safdar Hussain Shah 1970 SCMR 437; Rashad
Nazir v. The State and 3 others 2000 SCMR 1179; Muhammad Bashir v.
Muhammad Usman 2003 SCMR 1339; Muhammad Aslam v. State 2012 [Link]
11; Mst. Shahida and another v. Province of Sindh through Home Secretary, Sindh
and others 2016 [Link] Note 61; Tariq Mahmood and another v. The State 2000
[Link] 226; Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Muree and another 1988
CLC 113; Ms. Shehla Zia and others v. WAPDA PLD 1994 SC 693; Shahab Saqib
v. Sadaf Rasheed W.P. No. 2355 of 2015; Malik Mumtaz Qadri v. State PLD 2016
SC 17; Farooq Omar Bhoja v. Federation (Shariah Petition No. 1 of 2020) and The
Hanover Fire Insurance Company v. Muralidhar Banechand PLD 1958 SC 138 ref.
(j) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 375, 377-A & 377-B---Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961), S. 5
---Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act (XXI of 2018), S. 3---United
Nations Convention on Rights of Child (UNCRC), Arts. 1, 19 & 34---Constitution
of Pakistan, Art. 9---Child marriage---Consent of child---Puberty, attainment of---
Scope---Child is defined as a person who has not attained age of 18 years---Child
is required to be placed in somebody's care whether it is a parent or guardian or
other caregiver appointed on behalf of State---Complete agency to grant informed
consent for purposes of entering into contract, including a marriage contract cannot
be attributed to such child---Female child below the age of 18 cannot be deemed
competent to freely grant her consent to enter into marriage contract merely
because she manifests physical symptoms of having attained puberty---Test for
legal agency and competence of a female child is her biological age and not
her state of physical and biological growth---Provisions of Ss. 375 & 377-A, P.P.C.
are mandatory provisions and any contract entered with the object of breaching
such provisions or that has effect of breaching such provisions cannot be treated as
a valid contract---Marriage contract in which one of the parties is a child under the
age of 18 is therefore a contract executed for an unlawful purpose and is void ab
initio---Such marriage contract can neither be registered under Muslim Family
Laws Ordinance, 1961, nor can be given effect by a court, as that would
tantamount to defeating provisions of law that have been promulgated to uphold
rights of children guaranteed by Art. 9 of the Constitution read together with the
provisions of United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child---Child under
the age of 18 years is a dependent of an adult whether such adult is a parent or
guardian or other caregiver appointed by the State---State is under an obligation to
uphold and guarantee rights of such child, who cannot be deemed to have
competence or capacity to parent a child of his/her own and act as guardian
endowed with primary responsibility to provide for his/her child while being a
child himself/herself---No one can engage in sexual conduct in any form with a
child and neither can any person invite or entice a child to engage in sexual
conduct in any form, and any invitation or enticement provided to a child to engage
in sexual conduct, even under the cloak of marriage, would fall within the
definition of sexual abuse in terms of S.377-A, P.P.C.---Neither a child under the
age of 18 can consent to engage in sexual conduct in any form, nor can a parent or
guardian of a child, contract a child out to engage in sexual conduct---Child is not
a chattel that can be contracted out by a trustee or guardian to engage in conduct
that child himself/herself cannot grant consent for---No consent can be granted on
behalf of a child by a parent or guardian involving discharge of personal service by
the child or engagement in conduct that is unlawful and prohibited, such as that
required to be performed under a marriage contract---Parent or guardian can deal
with a child's property in his/her best interest but is not at liberty to contract out the
child to engage in a contract of personal service or conduct otherwise prohibited by
law---No exceptions or exclusions have been provided by Ss.375 & 377-A, P.P.C.
to conduct that otherwise qualifies as rape or sexual abuse and would attract even
where the offence is made out against a person who seeks to defend himself on the
basis that such conduct was pursuant to a marriage contract executed by a child
under the age of 18 years or his/her parent or guardian on his/her behest.
2021 P Cr. L J 1050
[Islamabad]
Before Lubna Saleem Pervez, J
MUHAMMAD TOURAIB---Petitioner
Versus
MUHAMMAD TAIMOOR KHAN and another---Respondents
Criminal Miscellaneous No. 1051-BC of 2020, decided on 4th January, 2021.
(a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---
----S. 497(5)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 148 & 149---Juvenile Justice
System Act (XXII of 2018), S. 6---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting, common
object---Release of a juvenile on pre-arrest bail---Cancellation of bail---Scope--
Complainant sought cancellation of pre-arrest bail granted to accused---Allegation
against accused was that he and others had beaten the injured persons and stabbed
them with khanjer---Accused persons and injured persons were juveniles---Reasons
for allowing pre-arrest bail application as mentioned in the impugned order were
that the accused did not repeat the act for causing hurt to the injured, which was on
non-vital part, therefore, there was no intention of causing qatl-i-amd; that
common object was a question of further inquiry; that the punishment for offences
under Ss. 337-F(iii) & 337-N(2), P.P.C., did not fall under prohibitory clause of S.
497, Cr.P.C. and that the accused was not a hardened criminal---Held; S. 6(4) of
Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, provided for refusal to allow bail to a juvenile,
who was above the age of 16 years, arrested for commission of heinous offence but
on the condition that Juvenile Court was satisfied on the basis of reasonable ground
to believe that said juvenile was involved in that heinous crime---Nature of
intention and attempt which resulted in the occurrence of offence would be
collected from the probe into facts and circumstances of the case by the Trial
Court---Additional Sessions Judge had acted according to the mandate of Juvenile
Justice System Act, 2018 and his order did not require interference---Application
was dismissed.
Sarwar Sultan v. The State PLD 1994 SC 133; Sami Ullah and another v.
Laiq Zada and another 2020 SCMR 1115; Hidayat Ullah v. The State PLD 1949
Lah. 21; Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafiq PLD 2009 SC 427; Arshad Iqbal
v. Naeem Khan PLD 2004 Pesh. 11; Naeem Khan v. The State PLD 2004 Pesh. 70;
Fawad Khan v. Jamshed Khan 2018 [Link] 498 and Adam Ali v. The State 2019
MLD 1749 ref.
Afsar Zamin v. The State PLD 2002 Kar. 18 rel.
(b) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)---
----S. 6---Release of a juvenile on bail---Scope---Perusal of S. 6(1) of Juvenile
Justice System Act, 2018, reveals that it is a non-obstante provision mandated with
the obligation for release of a juvenile accused on bail with or without surety, if not
already released under S. 496, Cr.P.C. and if it appeared on the basis of reasonable
grounds that his release will expose him to danger and association with other
criminals, in that condition his custody should be handed over to a suitable person
or juvenile rehabilitation center under supervision of Probation Officer---Language
of S. 6(1) of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, imposes a mandatory restriction
with force that under no circumstances the juvenile shall be kept in the custody of
police or in jail---Section 6(1), subsection (2) of Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018,
also binds the Court to issue direction to the police to trace the guardian of such
juvenile and hand over the custody of the juvenile to him/her---Section 6(3) of
Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, refers to commission of a major or a minor
offence under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, by the juvenile, which
provides that in case of minor/major offence committed by juvenile he shall be
treated as being accused of commission of a bailable offence.
(c) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)---
----Preamble & S. 3--- Beneficial legislation--- Scope--- Legal assistance---
Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 is a beneficial legislation which provides for the
protection of juvenile involved in criminal matters, safeguard his rights and takes
all necessary measures which are in the best interest of the juvenile.
Afsar Zamin v. The State PLD 2002 Kar. 18 rel.
(d) Interpretation of statutes---
----Beneficial legislation---Scope---Beneficial legislation is promulgated to provide
benefit to a class of individuals and, therefore, is to be interpreted in such a manner
that the purpose of the statute should be achieved.

2020 Y L R 589
[Peshawar (Mingora Bench)]
Before Muhammad Ghazanfar Khan and Syed Arshad Ali, JJ
ARIF HUSSAIN---Appellant
Versus
The STATE through A.A.G. and 2 others---Respondents
Criminal Appeal No.101-M and Criminal Revision No. 32-M of 2018, decided on
18th February, 2019.
(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 302(b), 324, 201 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing
disappearance of evidence of offence, common intention---Appreciation of
evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Prosecution case was
that the accused and co-accused committed murder of the nephew of the
complainant and also injured the brother of deceased through dagger blows---
Motive for the occurrence was disclosed to be that both the accused used to tease
the deceased---Record showed that the complainant was not the eye-witness to the
occurrence and at the relevant time he was not available at the place of
occurrence---Complainant had lodged the FIR at 19:35 hours, where he did not
mention that on whose information he had narrated the mode and manner of the
occurrence---Complainant did not mention the name of eye-witness in his first
information report---Mode and manner of the occurrence had been narrated by eye-
witness and injured/eye-witness to the effect that at the relevant time the deceased
and injured were going towards the house of their grandfather, however, at 'Isha
Vela' at about 7:00 p.m. when they reached near a hotel, there the accused emerged
and co-accused got hold of deceased and accused inflicted dagger blows at
deceased---In order to save his brother, the injured got hold of accused, in the
meanwhile, co-accused released the deceased and took the dagger from accused
and inflicted a dagger blow at the back of injured---In support of the prosecution
case, injured appeared as witness and had narrated the story in his court
statement---Although, injured had not mentioned about the presence of the eye-
witness in his examination-in-chief, however, in cross-examination he had fully
explained the incident by mentioning eye-witness not only to have seen the
occurrence but had stated that the said eye-witness and some other persons had
taken him to the hospital---Presence of eye-witness at the spot was also established
from the medical evidence which clearly mentioned that deceased was brought by
eye-witness and was identified by Police Officer---Said eye-witness appeared as
witness, who had fully supported the case of prosecution---Said eye-witness was
not related to the complainant and worked as Police Constable and had not only
justified his presence at the spot but the medical report also established that he was
indeed a natural and an independent eye-witness---Defence had not given any
suggestion regarding his interest in the prosecution of the accused-appellants---
Non-mentioning of his name in the FIR by complainant would not lead to an
inference that he was not available at the spot---Evidence of eye-witness, more
particularly in circumstances that despite the lengthy cross-examination by the
defence, he remained consistent and firmed in his testimony could not be
disbelieved---Said eye-witness had mentioned exact places where at the relevant
time, the complainant-party as well as the accused-appellants were present---
Injured/eye-witness had also supported the prosecution case his presence at the spot
was also established--Appellant, in circumstances, could not have been substituted
for the real culprit---Medical evidence was also in line with the prosecution case---
Presence of the accused-appellant on the spot was further established from his
medical report which was exhibited through---Medical Officer, who had examined
him Accused-appellant had also sustained injuries during the scuffle which further
supported the prosecution case---In the present case, accused-appellant had been
assigned specific role of causing dagger blows upon the vital parts of body of the
deceased--- Prosecution had established its case beyond any shadow of doubt
against the accused persons---Mere fact that at the time of offence the accused-
appellant was below the age of 18 years was no ground for further reduction of
sentence---Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances.
Muhammad Mushtaq v. The State PLD 2001 SC 107; Muhammad Basharat
v. The State 2003 SCMR 554; Iftikhar Ali v. The State 1998 [Link] 2022; Abdul
Rauf and others v. Mehdi Hassan and others 2006 SCMR 1106 and Muhammad
Waris v. The State 2008 SCMR 784 rel.
(b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 302(b), 324, 201 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing
disappearance of evidence of offence, common intention---Appreciation of
evidence---Overwriting on the Murasila---Effect---In the present case, the offence
was committed at 19:00 hours, whereas it was reported at 19:35 and the FIR was
registered at 20:20 hours on the same date---Overwriting appeared on the
'Murasila' relating to the time of occurrence and the time of report---Said
overwriting prima facie showed that probably time of occurrence was brought in
conformity with the time in FIR---Said overwriting, however, did not affect the
prosecution case, because the time of report and registration of FIR had been
mentioned without any overwriting---Time of examination of the deceased (when
injured) also appeared in the medical report as 7:30 p.m.---Said overwriting was
inconsequential and did not appear to be the result of manipulation.
(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 302(b), 324, 201 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing
disappearance of evidence of offence, common intention---Appreciation of
evidence---Recovery---Scope---In the present case, dagger was recovered on the
pointation of both the accused in presence of its marginal witnesses---Recovery
had been conducted on the joint pointation, which was prima facie illegal---
Recovery was only a corroborative piece of evidence.
(d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 302(b), 324, 201 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing
disappearance of evidence of offence, common intention---Appreciation of
evidence---Circumstantial evidence---Scope---If the eye-witnesses remained firm
and straight-forward in their testimony before the court then further corroboration
from circumstantial evidence would not be required.
Shafaat Ali and others v. The State PLD 2005 SC 288 rel.
(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---
----Ss. 302(b), 324, 201 & 34---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, causing
disappearance of evidence of offence, common intention---Appreciation of
evidence---Source of light---Scope---Occurrence had allegedly taken place at 7:00
p.m. and the bulb, source of light was not recovered by the Investigation Officer---
Record/evidence showed that the offence was committed in Bazar/market in front
of a hotel and in the normal course of business in Bazar the presence of light i.e.
bulb could not be ruled out.
(f) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)---
----Preamble--- Juvenility--- Scope---Juvenility of an accused/person alone was not
sufficient for his/her acquittal---Case had to be decided in view of its peculiar facts
and circumstances keeping in view the gravity of the offence having been
committed by the accused.