Atala PRISM

FOUNDATIONS
OF DECENTRALIZED IDENTITY
Identity Models

ATAL A PR I SM - Foundations of Decentralized Identity 15 Identity models

Centralized model

The first model is probably the easiest to explain, the centralized

model. We are all familiar with these. Examples include government
ID numbers, passports, social media handles, cell phone or internet
providers, etc. These accounts or identities are granted or issued
by a centralized authority–like a government or service provider.
A user in this model has to get permission to have an identity
from the provider.

How does it work?

ACCOUNT The operating model is straightforward. We establish an identity

ORG /
YOU by registering for a new account. In this new account, a password
SERVICE
accompanies a username or email address. This combination
is the credential that authenticates us as identity holders in the
ecosystem. All of our information gets stored with the service.
We have limited access to control our account and its data.

ATAL A PR I SM - Foundations of Decentralized Identity 16 Identity models

Pros & Cons

The positive of this model is that it opened the door to the Internet If we delete our account, we lose access to everything because of
as we know it today. The Internet is vast with helpful information, the lack of data portability. Since we are getting permission, we also
utilities, and services. We needed something at the time, and this do not control access. At any time, our account could get deleted,
was the best solution with the technology available. which would prevent us from taking our data–if it was even possible.
We already mentioned the burden of managing all these accounts,
With new technology that has become available the negatives which is very real. Every service or organization has different security
grow substantially. The first is that we, as individuals, have and privacy policies, for example, varying password lengths and
no representation in this model. We get permission via proxy requirements, which complicates the management aspect.
representation through the service or organization providing limited We owe a lot to this model because it is the Internet we know today
control and access. All of our data belongs to the company, not us, –but there is something better.
which is a problem that is becoming more and more apparent.

What of the “disorder” outside the realm of the

experimental design? Extra-experimental interactions
can in fact prove beneficial when they strengthen
the desired effect. There is no a priori reason for
anticipating what their effects might be; what
is significant is that they lie wholly outside the
experimental model.
Seeing like a State, 1999, p. 291
Federated model How does it work?

The industry came up with an improvement for the centralized The idea is to insert an IDP between the user and the service or
model, named the federated model. It did not solve the root issues, organization. The user has an account with an IDP, and with those
but it alleviated some account management challenges. This credentials, they can access other services. The credentials are
revision introduced identity providers (IDPs). The underlying terms called a single-sign-on (SSO). Sites that use the same IDP are called
may be unfamiliar, but the concept will be familiar. Below are the a federation, hence the federated model name.
most common examples of IDPs people encounter across the
interwebs.

ACCOU NT
ORG /
YOU IDP
SERVICE

ATAL A PR I SM - Foundations of Decentralized Identity 18 Identity models

Pros & Cons

The biggest positive of this model is less account management. a higher chance of having high-dollar customers. The smaller
Being able to use SSO to access other services is extremely bank has fewer customers and could potentially have high-dollar
convenient. However, this benefit introduces many disadvantages customers, but the risk does not guarantee an equal return.
as well. Federations are separate ecosystems, so there is no single
IDP to rule them. Having multiple IDPs means having numerous The return is what is important to hackers or bad actors. They seek a
accounts with different IDPs to access each federation ecosystem. considerable return via financial gain or data that can get exploited
later. These IDPs create central data hubs that present a gold mine
The biggest problem with this model is the security and privacy for these bad actors.
concerns. Because an IDP serves many sites, the security standards
adjust to the lowest common denominator amongst the members. There are several privacy concerns concerning IDPs, because an
This leveling means that if a site has a lower password standard–the IDP can surveil user login activity with each connected account they
entire ecosystem gets lowered to that standard. It also creates have access to all the data connected to the main, and subsequent
a security vulnerability because of the centralization of data. accounts. After creating third-party accounts using an IDP, if we
choose to leave the IDP or the account gets terminated, we lose
Many refer to this risk as a honeypot, but that does not fit. Honeypots, access to related accounts, and all data is lost. Data portability,
by definition, are intentionally constructed traps to lure in attackers. or being able to take information with us wherever we go, is not
This vulnerability is more like a gold mine than a honeypot. Having possible in this model.
millions of users’ data in one place makes it a target. A bad actor
can attack one place and get access with a high probability of This model’s convenience and ease of use trade-offs come with
return or exploitation. severe drawbacks. The identity model we choose to participate in
should have clear rules with transparency about collecting and
In non-technical terms, let’s look at a comparison. If you were given sharing data. This model was the best solution for a long time,
a choice to rob a large bank versus a small bank–which would be but there is a better option.
more profitable? The larger bank has more customers and has

ATAL A PR I SM - Foundations of Decentralized Identity 19 Identity models

Surveillance technologies are nothing new. For as long as there have
been creative minds, people have used them to find ingenious ways
of watching, listening, and tracking one another, and their motives
have been as various as the means. The implications of the topic for
questions of ethics, justice, and human nature have also magnetized
the philosophical imagination.
Technology and the Virtues, 2016, p. 188
Self-sovereign identity model

Until now, the discussion has been around Web 2.0 and earlier Web 3.0 is on the horizon, bringing blockchains, decentralization,
technologies. The introduction of Web 2.0 happened in 2005, and a new identity model: self-sovereign identity (SSI). The question
two years before the first Apple iPhone came to the market. The many have asked is, why do we need a change? The answer is
smartphone revolutionized the way we use the Internet and our relatively simple–what we use today is old, outdated, insecure, and
identity. Mobile banking and insurance companies began going contains many privacy concerns. Technology is becoming essential
digital and created an ease of use for their services. Over the years, in our lives and interlacing with our persona, demanding a better
more and more of the world has become digitized. Technology has way of managing identity.
become essential in our lives, and it is becoming part of our being,
i.e., smartwatches and biodevices.

Why not just take the future as it comes? Why strain to see
any better through the fog of technosocial contingencies
presently obscuring our view? There is a simple answer.
Our growing technosocial blindness, a condition
that I will call acute technosocial opacity, makes
it increasingly difficult to identify, seek, and
secure the ultimate goal of ethics–a life worth
choosing; a life lived well.
Technology and the Virtues, 2016, p. 6
The model

SSI introduces new concepts that turn the existing models on their heads. The control shifts
from the center to the edges–with individuals. Before we get into how it works, let’s look
at twelve principles published by the Sovrin Foundation in 2020 on behalf of the entire SSI
community ([Link]

01. REPRESENTATION 02. INTEROPERABILIT Y 03. DECENTRALIZATION

An SSI ecosystem shall provide the means for any An SSI ecosystem shall enable digital identity data An SSI ecosystem shall not require reliance on a
entity—human, legal, natural, physical, or digital—to for an entity to be represented, exchanged, secured, centralized system to represent, control, or verify an
be represented by any number of digital identities. protected, and verified interoperably using open, entity’s digital identity data.
public, and royalty-free standards.

04. CONTROL & AGENCY 05. PARTICIPATION 06. EQUIT Y AND INCLUSION
An SSI ecosystem shall empower entities who have An SSI ecosystem shall not require an identity rights An SSI ecosystem shall not exclude or discriminate
natural, human, or legal rights relating to their identity holder to participate. against identity rights holders within its governance
to control their digital identity data usage, enabling scope.
this control by employing and/or delegating to agents
and guardians of their choice, including individuals
and organizations, devices, and software.

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07. USABILIT Y, ACCESSIBILIT Y, 08. PORTABILIT Y 09. SECURIT Y
AND CONSISTENCY An SSI ecosystem shall not restrict the ability of An SSI ecosystem shall empower identity rights
An SSI ecosystem shall maximize the usability and identity rights holders to move or transfer a copy of holders to secure their digital identity data at rest
accessibility of agents and other SSI components for their digital identity data to the agents or systems of and in motion. To control identifiers and encryption
identity rights holders, including consistency of user their choice. keys and employ end-to-end encryption for all
experience. interactions.

10. VERIFIABILIT Y AND AUTHENTICIT Y 11. PRIVACY AND MINIMAL DISCLOSURE 12. TR ANSPARENCY
An SSI ecosystem shall empower identity rights An SSI ecosystem shall empower identity rights An SSI ecosystem shall empower identity rights
holders to provide verifiable proof of their digital holders to protect the privacy of their digital identity holders and all other stakeholders to easily access
identity data authenticity. data and to share the minimum digital identity data and verify information necessary to understand the
required for any particular interaction. incentives, rules, policies, and algorithms under which
agents and other components of SSI ecosystems
operate.

These principles tie into the ethical and moral discussion we touched on during the
introduction. We should evaluate techno-moral principles in conjunction with the SSI
principles to ensure we create a platform that serves individual needs and benefits
all humans. For further reading on these 12 techno-moral principles, refer to the
Appendix: Technomoral Principles.
We must be content with pointing out the virtues plausibly most
crucial to such flourishing; especially those under pressure from our
contemporary technosocial practices. The twelve technomoral virtues
that shall be our focus are:
Technology and the Virtues, 2016, p. 120

01 02 03 04
HONEST Y SELF-CONTROL HUMILIT Y JUSTICE

05 06 07 08
COURAGE EMPATHY CARE CIVILIT Y

09 10 11 12
FLEXIBILIT Y PERSPECTIVE MAGNANIMIT Y TECHNOMORAL
WISDOM
How does it work?

A decentralized identifier (DID) is at the core of SSI. A DID is not

magical. It is a string of random characters generated through
cryptography. A DID is like a fingerprint–it is unique to the individual,
and we can have more than one, just like we have multiple
fingerprints.

For each of these DIDs, we have something called public and

PEER private keys. Public keys are known to everyone with little concern–
remember, the DID does not have personal information associated
with it. Only the owner knows the private key of the DID. Which

YOU (ENTIT Y) PEER allows the owner to provide a digital signature, proving they are the
owner. Keys are essential to how SSI works and provides a high level
of security–because even though theoretically possible, it would
be near impossible for someone to fake a cryptographic digital
PEER
signature.

One last thing on DIDs is something directly associated with it called

The DID identifies us–not a name or government-issued ID number. a DID document. This document stores some very simple metadata
It addresses the privacy issue right from the start. Interestingly, a about the DID, namely technical details about how the DID was
new DID pair gets created when we connect with a peer. A peer is created. It is possible to put personal info into the DID document,
any entity with whom we make a connection. The DID pair is critical in the section allotted for additional information,–but it is not
because it prevents collating our data, making it impossible to recommended. The reason is that the DID document can get looked
determine everyone with which we have relationships. up, which would expose that info to the public.

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ZKP
In the diagram, we can see how this would work using a
decentralized identity solution. Instead of presenting our ID,
Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are cryptographic functions, and they we would share our birthdate. Some “ZKP Magic” happens in the
are an extremely complex and technical concept. We will avoid middle, which we will come back to, but, interestingly, the pub gets
much of the minutiae and keep it simple. The purpose of a ZKP is to an answer with a simple yes or no response to the question they
prove something without knowledge–meaning having the ability to genuinely need to know.
prove something without exposing the details.
The “magic” is simply a cryptographic algorithm that demonstrates
This concept is very different than anything we use in the world the authenticity of the data without sharing it. There are many tech
today, so this explanation may not make sense. Let’s look at a terms here, so let’s explain what is happening. An algorithm, which
widespread example explaining this: the pub example. Today, we is a buzzword for performing a calculation or data processing, can
show an ID to a stranger containing our name, address, and date be used to prove we are old enough. This algorithm would know the
of birth, amongst other details–in a location where our inhibitions minimum date for alcohol consumption in our region, which would
may become impaired. The question is: what does the pub need be the baseline of comparison. If our birthdate is greater than or
to know? It is not my age but whether or not I am old enough to equal to the baseline, we can prove we are old enough without
consume alcohol. actually sharing our birthdate.

ZKPs are awesome and provide a secure way of proving facts

without disclosing the information. However, they are not applicable
DATE OF BIRTH YES OR NO in every situation. Deciding where they apply is determined by
the level of assurance needed in a specific use case. A quick
comparison is that a doctor would need to know your medical
history for treatment, but the pub only needs to authenticate a fact.
ZKP MAGIC Disclosing information should be limited where possible, but there
will be situations where it is required to disclose info to another party.

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Cryptography

Some people have studied cryptography for decades and are Modern cryptography uses complex mathematics, algorithms, and
experts, like historians that study Ancient Egypt, Mayans, or Vikings. computing technology to achieve the same result–but it is infinitely
Cryptography is extraordinarily complex and requires years of study more complex. Instead of replacing the letter A with Z and B with
to understand its complexities. I am not one of those people–I know Y, the introduction to math could replace A with Pi (Archimedes’
the basics, but getting into the nuances is out of my depth. constant), B with Pythagroas’ constant, etc. My example is
elementary, but the possibilities are endless using modern
Cryptography is all around us. If you remember cereal boxes when technology.
you were a child, you may recall the “Secret Decoder Rings.” Those
use an ancient form of cryptography known as transposition The results of these cryptographic algorithms are something called
ciphers. You replace one letter with another to decode a message, it a hash–which is another buzzword. A hash is an unreadable string
is extremely basic, but this is cryptography. of characters. It looks like garbled nonsense when we look at it.
However, if we know the key, we can unlock or decrypt the garbled
Another infamous tool is the Enigma machine used by the German mess to something readable. Remember the public and private
government in the late 1920s and during World War II, which is keys we discussed earlier? The public key encrypts it, while the
another cipher. Cryptography is another popular word that gets private key decrypts it.
tossed around that makes some people uncomfortable. Hopefully,
these common examples can help dispel some of the mysticism
around the word.

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Let’s look at a real-world example of this, it is not quite the same thing that SSI allows, but it
can help demonstrate how this works. There is something called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).
PGP is used to encrypt emails and files. Anyone can look up my key, 8CE2 DA49 F93E E0A5
D792 FF0A A497 4A24 F89C 0010, on this site (www. [Link]). This key allows anyone
to validate that an email coming from me is really from me. However, nobody knows the
private key–only me, so nobody can sign it but me.

If you want to learn more about encryption, IOG has produced several research papers
titled: Impossibility on Tamper-Resilient Cryptography with Uniqueness Properties and
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography from Puncturable Primitives and Obfuscation. There is a
plethora of information on the internet with a simple Google search and many books and
research papers written on this topic.

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Privacy by design

We have already outlined several features of an SSI ecosystem that One last prominent feature of utilizing blockchain with identity is
provide security and privacy. DID pairs prevent collating data, ZKPs audibility. Where this could apply is something like voting.
allow us to prove facts without sharing data, and cryptography We could confirm that a single DID only cast one vote. But what
brings encryption to secure our data. The last point to address is about being able to have several DIDs? Ah yes, so whatever
what gets written on the blockchain. organization or government allows us to vote would require some
credential to prove who we are–which gets issued to a single DID.
We mentioned that it is a bad idea to put personal data in the DID Manipulation would become incredibly difficult–if not impossible
document because that gets written on the blockchain, so it is because blockchains are also immutable–which means that data
public information. Verifiable credentials can be a hash written on cannot be changed once written to the blockchain. Theoretically,
the blockchain, so it may be possible to see that a credential has it is possible, but the level of complexity involved closes in on an
been issued, but none of the details are readable. impossibility.

Another fascinating tidbit to add is that DIDs don’t have to be written

to the blockchain when you connect with peers. This situation would
most likely only apply to friends and acquaintances. The reason the
scope of the connections is limited is due to VCs. When verifying
a verifiable credential there is a need to know the public key of
the issuing DID, in the DID pair–which requires the public key of the
issuing DID to be on the blockchain, enabling permissionless and
privacy preserving verification.
Drawbacks

Any SSI platform’s most significant hurdle is the technology itself. to create a DID–nor a registry process for DIDs. If we add this to
The number one problem driving its adoption is that the tech is what we discussed earlier about not being able to collate data on
complex and complicated. Hard to understand tech scares away a a specific person, it would be near impossible to slip into a future
user base–cryptocurrencies have had a similar challenge. This issue where some entity is constantly tracking and monitoring us.
speaks directly to the user experience. We must ensure the design
flows in a manner that feels natural, and the recovery of a wallet There is some nuance to implementing SSI. There is a requirement
should be intuitive and not complicated. to decentralize for privacy preservation, censorship resistance,
and security. However, there is also a need for some centralization
One of the more prominent concerns regarding any SSI solution is as well. This notion makes many uncomfortable, which is
that it leads to a dystopian future where central authorities control understandable. The need for centralization is to establish trust.
and spy on everything we do. The fear is understandable for those We will dive into why, when, and how this fits into the puzzle in an
who may not understand how SSI works. One thing we have not upcoming section.
mentioned yet is that there is no central authority that allows us

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Technomoral Principles have also created a fierce global debate about privacy norms, which are placed
in a profound tension with new digital ideals of ‘transparency’, ‘sharing’, and ‘open
6.2 Honesty: Respecting Truth [Related Virtues: Trust, Reliability, Integrity]
community’.’ From the international controversy about the United States NSA’s
Honesty is among the most culturally universal virtues. Aristotle identifies spying and exposures by Wikileaks, Anonymous, and Edward Snowden; to the EU’s
honesty (aletheia) as a cardinal virtue. The Confucian term (cheng), often ‘right to be forgotten’; to debates about online anonymity and self-censorship
translated as ‘honesty’ also incorporates broader meanings of integrity or “self- on social networks; to the fallout from the Ashley Madison hack and data dumps,
completion” as the highest good to be attained by moral practice. In Buddhism, human beings around the globe have never been less certain what honesty as a
honesty is embodied in the joint exercise of ‘right view’ (samyag-drsti) and ‘right virtue looks like.
conduct’(sila), which includes the precept of truthful speech. The reasons for the
Technomoral honesty is not just a personal concern but a social and political
importance of this virtue are fairly obvious. Flourishing in interactions with other
one. ICTs have transformed the nature and reliability of evidence in scientific,
people, which is the primary task of ethics and all social life, would be virtually
political, and media contexts, along with public perceptions of whose information,
impossible without a general expectation of honesty, as Kant famously noted.
if anyone’s warrants trust. Indeed public trust in information supplied by traditional
While there is tremendous cultural variance among human conceptions of when
media outlets, academic researchers, governmental bodies, and religious leaders
honesty is demanded, to whom, and what degree or form of candor suffices for it,
has fallen precipitously in recent years as new media practices and ICTs widen the
virtually every human community values the distinction between the honest and
gap between the availability of information and traditional notions of expertise
the dishonest person.
and authority. In the United States, for example, public trust of mass media hit an
Why then describe honesty as a technomoral virtue? After all, if honesty has all-time low in 2015. Meanwhile, the Internet continues to function well as a space
been a moral ideal in almost all societies, regardless of their technosocial for loudly contesting the informational claims of others, but far less well as a
complexity, then one might not expect it to have any special significance for our medium for building reliable public consensus.
inquiry. Yet the virtue of honesty is powerfully challenged by the technosocial
Yet we cannot surrender the moral ideal of honesty. Arguably, the future
developments of the last century, and those to come. This becomes clear
flourishing of humanity depends more than it ever has on our ability to obtain,
as soon as we grasp the conceptual links between honesty, information,
verify, and share reliable information concerning problems such as global climate
and communication. Honesty is about the appropriate and morally expert
change; infectious disease and public health; threats to air and water supplies;
communication of information. Yet this practice has been and continues to be
depletion of energy resources; and ongoing existential threats from nuclear,
radically and globally transformed by ICTs, to use the conventional shorthand for
biological, and other weapons as well as cosmic perils such as near-Earth objects.
information and communication technologies.
Thus as traditional norms, standards, and habits of appropriate disclosure
ICTs, especially those founded on digital computing, have revolutionized how crack under the weight of radical changes in information and communication
we communicate and how we expect information to be communicated to us. practices, it is essential that we consider what norms, standards, and habits will
The exploding literature on the problem of trust in online environments–including replace them. Human flourishing in social environments has never been able
e-commerce, e-government, and social media–is just one aspect of this to endure without established norms of honesty, and there is no reason to think
worldwide phenomenon. The new communication habits enabled and fostered that this has ceased being the case. So what does the virtue of honesty look like
by ICTs are shaping how we define the truth, when and how often we tell it, when in an increasingly digitized information environment? What does a person who
we expect to be told it, where and in whom we expect to find it, how we package handles information in a ‘morally expert’ way look like now? What will she look like
it, how we verify it, and what we do with it and are willing to have done with it. ICTs tomorrow? What is the 21st century technomoral virtue of honesty?

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 Let us define the technomoral virtue of honesty as an exemplary respect for as an umbrella notion that captures both the self-restraint of moral continence
truth, along with the practical expertise to express that respect appropriately in and the deliberate cultivation of right desire that yields genuine temperance.
technosocial contexts. Recall that merely telling the truth, even reliably so, is never That said, why should we consider self-control to be a distinctly technomoral
sufficient for the virtue of honesty, which requires that we tell the truth not only to excellence said, why should we consider self-control to be a distinctly
the right people, at the right times and places, and to the right degree, but also technomoral excellence of character? Self-control is a requirement for any
knowingly, and for the right reasons. As philosopher Harry Frankfurt’s On Bullshit person of virtue, even a monk living on a remote mountaintop entirely cut off from
so concisely explains, honesty is not the same as mere true speech, which can modern technology.
be issued for any number of amoral or vicious purposes, including deliberate Consider, however, how emerging technologies increase the number and variety
obfuscation. How respect for truth gets cashed out in particular technosocial of potential objects of our desire. Compared with past eras, ICTs in combination
contexts will be a central question for us in chapters 7 and 8, when we examine with global transportation systems grant us access to a vastly expanded range of
the ethical implications of new social media and surveillance technologies. But available goods, more aggressively advertise to us their selection and enjoyment
recall that knowing how to express a virtue is largely mediated by our experience by others, and increase the speed with which we can attain, consume, and
of those who are already doing it. So who today do we regard as exemplifying replace them. New media advertising techniques fueled by the power of ‘Big Data’
honesty in the information society? Edward Snowden and Glenn Greenwald? subject us to a constant flow of solicitations custom-tailored to inflame our desire,
Rachel Maddow? David Brooks? Bernie Sanders? Donald Trump? John Oliver? to strengthen our existing consumption habits and expand them to new types of
“Curator of the Internet” George Takei? Mark Zuckerberg? The ‘Impact Team’ goods, and to convince us that our wants and needs are one and the same.
hackers who dumped the Ashley Madison data? If these are not our best models
The ethical implications of these phenomena are significant on individual, local,
of technomoral honesty, then we had better ask ourselves who is. Even better than
and global scales. Our desires and consumption habits reflect the physical and
asking ourselves would be asking those outside our local circles of trust––initiating
emotional health of our persons and our societies. They shape the activities that
a global intercultural dialogue about the role of technomoral honesty in living well.
bind our family and community lives; the kinds and amounts of natural resources
that are extracted, used, priced, and distributed; and the type and amount of
6.3 Self-Control: Becoming the Author of Our Desires environmental waste that is produced by those activities. Not only material
[Related Virtues: Temperance, Discipline, Moderation, Patience] goods but increasingly, virtual goods, relationships, and experiences fill the ever-
This virtue is the ability to reliably and deliberately align one’s desires with the expanding catalog of things we are invited to desire and pursue. Online app
good. There is a long-standing ambiguity in this notion, which is why Aristotle in and game developers encourage us to spend collective billions of human hours
Nicomachean Ethics Book VII carefully distinguishes temperance (sophrosune growing virtual crops in Farmville, massacring pigs with Angry Birds, or solving
or right desire) from mere continence (enkrateia or willful restraint of wrong new puzzles in the Candy Kingdom. Advanced techniques of software design
desire). Likewise, we have seen that Confucian and Buddhist moral traditions psychology magnify the addictive (the preferred software nomenclature is ‘sticky’)
also emphasize self-discipline and the cultivation of right desire, giving the latter qualities of apps, driving users to make more and more in-app purchases, share
higher esteem than the suppression of wrong desire. our monetizable information or contacts, or just keep playing into the wee hours of
the night to reach whatever surprises await us on the next game level.
Yet we saw in chapters 3 and 4 that the willful restraint of wrong desire–aided
by moral education, law, or human exemplars–is the first step on the path to The problem of how to evaluate the worth of these virtual goods in relation
developing right desire. So for our purposes, let us define the virtue of self-control to others will only be exacerbated by the increasing sophistication of digital

ATAL A PR I SM - Foundations of Decentralized Identity 74 Appendix

environments and artificial intelligence. Life online already challenges our self- desires–that is, self-conscious and authentic desires for goods that promote
control on multiple levels, causing many of us to resort to software lockout tools her flourishing with others, as opposed to those that diminish her life. As global
such as Freedom to keep us out of the digital cookie jar for a fixed period of time. information technologies dilute or blunt the effect of those cultural mechanisms
Such tools allow us to complete an important task or spend time with people that previously assisted us in making these distinctions, what new mechanisms
we highly value without being seduced away by the apparently irresistible for shaping human desire are taking their place? In short, how will 21st century
distractions of Facebook, Gmail, Minecraft, and Instagram. Others simply humans acquire the individual and collective virtue of self-control, and what are
surrender to the juggernaut of technosocial distraction. But what does all of this the short and long-term global consequences if we cannot? Our discussions of
say about our state of personal discipline and self-control? new media in chapter 7, surveillance technologies in chapter 8, and biomedical
Let us define the technomoral virtue of self-control as an exemplary ability in enhancement in chapter 10 will engage this question.
technosocial contexts to chose, and ideally to desire for their own sakes, those
goods and experiences that most contribute to contemporary and future human
flourishingˆ. As we noted in chapter 1, flourishing is not mere self-satisfaction or
pleasure, states of mind easily attained by a sociopath or a heroin addict with a
steady supply. Flourishing means actively doing well as a human being; it involves
facts about how our lives are going socially, politically, physically, intellectually,
and emotionally. This invites the question: how do we determine which goods
and experiences help us to live well? Consider the much-discussed digital
fragmentation of cultures. Gone are the days in which one could safely assume
that one’s local peers had read the same books, seen the same movies or news
shows engaged in the same leisure activities, or visited the same places. Even if
we look only toward people we admire as intelligent, discerning, and culturally
literate, we will be hard-pressed to find much uniformity in their consumption
habits. As a result, cultural narratives about what desires individuals should
try to cultivate in order to facilitate not only a good life for themselves, but a
good shared life in community, are rendered increasingly incoherent–as are
the institutions of cultural education, art, and ritual that traditionally steered
individuals onto the path of right desire.

Of course, these developments have positive aspects, not least among them a
great proliferation and global exchange of diverse ideas and images of the good
life. There are very, very many things in life worth wanting, and global information
networks bring ever more attractive options into our view. Yet it is impossible to
choose them all. So the question remains: how do persons develop the virtue
of self-control in this new technosocial environment? A virtuous person in any
time or place must be able to discern and eventually become the author of right

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6.4 Humility: Knowing What We Do Not Know progressively undermined by the rapid rise of antibiotic-resistant bacteria; the
[Related Virtues: Modesty, Reverence, Wonder] spike in the emergence and global reach of formerly unknown pathogens; and the
Compared with honesty and self-control, the moral importance of humility is less persistent spread of ‘lifestyle’ diseases associated with technosocial changes in
universally acknowledged. While humility was often recognized in ancient Greece our diet, air quality, physical activity, and exposure to chemical compounds. Rising
as a check on destructive hubris, for Aristotle the virtuous mean was nothing like infant mortality and stagnant or declining projected lifespans in technologically
humility, but rather the justified pride of the man who correctly recognizes himself advanced nations like the United States are a signal that far from ensuring our
as ‘great of soul’ (megalopsuchia). For Aristotle, to abase oneself is dishonest if one mastery of human health, our present technosocial practices may be pushing this
is actually a good and noble man, and if one is not a good and noble man, one’s goal further from our grasp.
primary aim should be to improve one’s character, not to lower one’s self-regard. Similarly, our attempts to master the new technosocial frontier of the Internet
The influence of Christian perspectives restored humility to prominence in the have proven equally weak: cyberbullying, cybercrime, cyberespionage,
medieval virtue-ethical tradition; in the 13th century, St. Thomas Aquinas described ‘hacktivism’, and even the potential for cyberwarfare are expanding rapidly, and
humility as “keeping oneself within one’s own bounds, not reaching out to things not even the most powerful nations and institutions are presently able to prevent
above one, but submitting to one’s superior.” Since then humility’s reputation as a their spread. The international conduct of ‘bad actors’ is not the only source of
virtue has fluctuated; it was celebrated by Kant, famously rejected by Nietzsche, unpredictable ICT phenomena; consider the aggregate effects and complex
and in the late 20th century came to be increasingly displaced by psychological interactions of otherwise benign electronic agents, such as the high frequency
discourse on the importance of “high self-esteem.” In the East, regard for humility trading algorithms that contributed to the “Flash Crash” of May 2010 and the
as an important character virtue has been more stable. Our prior analyses Knight Capital fiasco in August 2012. Limited understandings of human-technology
showed that for Confucians, humility issues from the habit of reflective self- relations also produce massive design failures such as Microsoft’s notorious AI
examination and expresses itself in the yielding disposition that constitutes the ‘teen’ chatbot Tay, which began spewing neo-Nazi propaganda on Twitter within a
cardinal virtue of ritual propriety or respect (li). We saw that for Buddhists humility day of her 2016 release. Given that new algorithmic techniques for machine ‘deep
is part of the understanding of anatman (not-self) that corrects one’s distorted learning’ resist thorough human inspection or prediction, it should be clear that
sense of personal importance and ego-attachment, both of which obstruct the the digital domain–to which human beings are increasingly linking their materials,
cultivation of right view (samyag-drsti) and right action (sila). political, cultural, and economic resources–is no more the subject of human
‘mastery’ than are the organic domains of human health ecology or climate. We
What role should humility play in a 21st century account of technomoral
must come to terms with the challenge of acute technosocial opacity. Among
virtue? Arguably, 21st century life demands greater humility than we presently
character traits likely to promote human flourishing in this condition, humility is
enjoy. Insofar as the global political, cultural, economic, and environmental
high on the list.
consequences of emerging technologies are proving themselves to be
increasingly complex and difficult for us to predict, increasingly systematic and Let us define technomoral humility as a recognition of the real limits of our
far-reaching in scope, and increasingly challenging for us to mitigate or undo, we technosocial knowledge and ability; reverence and wonder at the universe’s
can no longer afford the modern illusion that our technosocial innovations are retained power to surprise and confound us; and renunciation of the blind faith
conducive to human mastery. that new technologies inevitably lead to human mastery and control of our
environment. Not only is this faith undermined by present conditions, it prevents
For example, the 20th century confidence that modern medical technologies
us from honestly confronting the hard choices we must make about technosocial
would soon grant humans permanent mastery over disease has been
risk. For we cannot evade present risks to human flourishing simply by forgoing

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technosocial innovation. As Nick Bostrom notes, that path exposes us to equally 6.5 Justice: Upholding Rightness
profound, even existential risks. In truth, risk to the future of humankind cannot be [Related Virtues: Responsibility, Fairness, Reciprocity, Beneficence]
eliminated. A humble appreciation of this radical exposure to risk is essential to the The virtue of justice is perhaps the broadest and most varied in its interpretation,
ability to make prudential judgments about how best to proceed in our present in chapters 4 and 5 we discussed the important role of justice (dikaiosune) in
state or technosocial opacity; judgments not only of which technosocial risks to Aristotle’s ethics, where it represents ethical excellence writ large and, more
take, but also how to plan for inevitable technosocial failures, and especially how narrowly, the appropriate extension to others of what is deserved. We contrasted
to preserve the resources, resilience and flexibility needed to cope in midstream this with a Confucian account in which just treatment of others, especially in the
with the unforeseen consequences of our failures and successes. political realm, is subsumed under a broader conception of humane benevolence
Technomoral humility, like all virtues, is a mean between excess and a deficiency. (ren). In classical Buddhism, the topic of political justice is neither as central not
The deficiency is blind techno-optimism, which uncritically assumes that any as well developed as one finds in Aristotle or Confucian literatures. Still, a universal
technosocial innovation is always and essentially good and justified; that sense of justice may be considered equivalent with the Dharma itself: the
unanticipated negative consequences can always be mitigated or reversed complete body of Buddhist learning that mandates unconditional concern for the
by ‘technofixes’ (more and better technology); and that the future of human welfare and dignity of all creatures.
flourishing is guaranteed by nothing more than the sheer force of our creative will Our present concern is the kind of justice most critical to flourishing in the global
to innovate. The other extreme, techno-pessimism, is equally blind and uncritical: technosocial environment. Let us call this technomoral justice. This is divisible
it assumes that new technological developments generally lead to less ‘natural’ into two interrelated but distinguishable character traits. The first is a reliable
or even ‘inhuman’ ways of life (ignoring the central role of technique in human disposition to seek a fair and equitable distribution of the benefits and risks of
evolution), and that the risks to which they spose us are rarely justified by the emerging technologies. The second is a characteristic concern for how emerging
potential gains. This attitude sells short our creative potential, our adaptability, technologies impact the basic rights, dignity, or welfare of individuals and groups.
and our capacity for prudential judgment. Humility, then, is the intermediate Technomoral justice entails reliably upholding rightness (values of non-harm and
state: a reasoned, critical but hopeful assessment of our abilities and creative beneficence), along with fairness (moral desert), and responsibility (accountability
powers, combined with a healthy respect for the unfathomed complexities of for the consequences of one’s actions).
the environments in which our powers operate and to which we will always be
The absence of technomoral justice is an increasingly destabilizing social
vulnerable. The importance of technomoral humility will be a central topic of
phenomenon. Consider the rising tensions in San Francisco, Silicon Valley, and
discussion in chapters 9 and 10 when we examine emerging developments in
other communities worldwide where the ballooning wealth of high-tech investors
robotics and biomedical enhancement, respectively.
and workers has had dramatic effects on the standard of living enjoyed by long-
term area residents and workers. In 2013, local activists in the Mission district of San
Francisco, protesting rising rents and evictions by landlords looking to capitalize
on cash-rich tech renters, repeatedly surrounded and blocked the corporate
luxury shuttles that transport tech employees of Google, Apple and other Silicon
Valley companies to and from their work campuses. Local and national media
wrote about the growing perception of an insular tech community indifferent to
the well-being of their fellow citizens.

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Adding fuel to the fire were a series of objectionable public statements by tech of this virtue. Yet later discussions of courage in the Western philosophical
entrepreneurs such as startup AngelHack CEO Greg Gopman. He shared his tradition, such as that of Aquinas, placed greater emphasis on spiritual or moral
disgust at the homeless “degenerates” and “trash” of San Francisco who fail to courage. Such courage is a reliable tendency to fear grave wrongdoing and a
observe the self-segregating ideal of cities where the “lower part of society keep compromised character more than one fears the other dangers or injuries that
to themselves. They sell small trinkets, beg coyly, stay quiet, and generally stay out one might invite by acting rightly, and in general to intelligently balance measured
of your way. They realize it’s a privilege to be in the civilized part of town and view
and justified fears with measured and justified confidence and hope.
themselves as guests.” Such sentiments are, if nothing else, suggestive of a vicious
deficiency of technomoral justice as defined above. Unlike self-control, which guides one to pursue only those things that are actually
good for oneself to obtain, courage necessitates risk and sacrifice. In all forms
Other emerging deficiencies of technomoral justice include the average
of courage, the courageous agent is willing to endure some injury, forgo some
technology consumer’s detachment from the profound environmental, economic,
legitimate good, or otherwise incur a real loss in order to do what is necessary and
and political harms created by the mining and disposal of rare earth elements
(REE’s) used in electronic devices, and countless other harmful externalities right. This willingness distinguishes genuine courage from its pale facsimiles: acts
generated by global technosocial development yet imposed on the most of seeming bravery by persons blinded by passion or ignorance of the danger,
disenfranchised residents of the planet. Socially destabilizing asymmetries of overconfident in their ability to evade it, or motivated by some greater personal
power are magnified by large-scale data mining, pervasive digital surveillance advantage they expect to gain, such as social acclaim. What is distinctive about
and algorithmic profiling, and robotic and drone warfare. Still we must not ignore the virtue of spiritual and moral courage is that it must manifest itself in an
the potential for emerging technologies to expose, mitigate, or remedy injustice. enduring orientation to one’s world, not just in rare moments of mortal danger
For example, digital surveillance tools are used by oppressive regimes and powers such as those presented in battle. Aquinas emphasizes this ‘steadfastness’ of
and against them. Deciding how such tools can be developed and used more courage (fortitudo) as the backbone of all other virtuous dispositions; to live rightly
fairly and responsibly, on both an individual and a collective human level, is the is to maintain the fortitude to make sacrifices, take risks, or incur injuries (even
domain of technomoral justice. In chapters 7, 8 and 9 we will take a closer look at
death) in the name of the good, when that good is not trivial but of considerable
the effects of new social media, digital surveillance, and military robotics on this
spiritual of moral gravity. Lee Yearley’s analysis of Aquinas’s account of courage
domain.
is particularly helpful here; he notes that it has both a positive and a negative
aspect. Courage demands positive perseverance in one’s active and hopeful
6.6 Courage: Intelligent Fear and Hope pursuit of the good, and forbearance and patience in enduring the pains and
[Related Virtues: Hope, Perseverance, Fortitude] losses inevitably associated with this lifelong pursuit. The virtue of spiritual and
The moral excellence of courage is much discussed in virtue ethics, though moral courage is thus a constant renewal of the choice to live well rather than
its meaning varies widely by cultural and historical setting. In Book III of the badly, whatever else this may cost us.
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines courage (andreia) as the mean between As Yearley notes, courage also plays a central role in Confucian ethics. Kongzi
cowardice and rashness–the disposition to fear “the right things and with the right describes courage (yong) as a virtue not in isolation, but only when supportive
motive, in the right way and at the right time.” The model of physical and martia of moral rightness (yi); yet it seems that the virtuous person cannot do without it,
courage found in soldiers and athletes was central to Aristotle’s understanding since Kngzi more than once identifies it as part of the threefold essence of Way

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(Dao) of the cultivated person (junzi): “The wise are not confused, the Good do find Mengzi’s point no less resonant in our contemporary world.
not worry, and the courageous do not fear.” Historical commentaries on these The Buddhist virtue tradition also grants an important role to moral courage.
passages suggest that this was interpreted to mean that the junzi is marked not Of the ‘Six Perfections’ of moral character in the Mahāyāna canon, one is often
by narrowly martial courage but by moral courage. As Yearley notes, Mengzi’s translated as courage (vīrya) or vigor, but others in the list are also associated
discussions of courage diverge still further from the martial conception, even with moral courage as we have defined it, especially forbearance (ksanti) and
more so than Aquinas, who is still influenced by the heroic Aristotelian model. In strength (bala). Buddhist courage also critically depends on the interaction of two
Mengzi, martial bravery is a mere “semblance” of courage, while the only genuine related virtues discussed in chapter 4: hri, the disposition to be ashamed of doing
article is moral courage, the tendency to fear no evil more than one fears failing evil and apatrapya, the fear of doing evil. The proper habituation and intelligent
to live rightly: “Life I desire, righteousness too I desire; if I cannot get to have both, application of hri and apatrapya produce a disposition of moral courage, insofar
rather than life I choose righteousness…. That is why there are troubles I do not as such a person will reliably and correctly fear living in a morally debased
avoid…. Not only men of worth have a mind which thinks like this, all men have it; it manner more than she fears having to endure the worldly consequences of living
is simply that the worthy are able to avoid relinquishing their hold on it. rightly.
Mengzi is rebutting the objection that moral courage is psychologically What role does moral courage have to play in 21st century technosocial life?
unrealistic. While he paints a picture of moral self-sacrifice that few of us are Certainly the rise of robotic warfare and biomedical engineering confronts us
confident we could mirror his point that ‘all men’ have this original inclination is with many new moral and material fears. It has never been more important
significant. As Yearley notes, Mengzi sees this as the root of natural self-respect, that humans be able to judge rightly what we should most fear, what we can
the unwillingness to allow oneself to be debased. In the rest of the passage, and must hope for, how much to fear or hope, how best to act on our fears and
Mengzi notes that a starving beggar will refuse food given with abuse. Why? hopes, and how much confidence we should have in our efforts to manage the
Because his self-respect and dignity, already endangered by his low social status, risks presented by our technosocial choices. This is even more true given what
in the end are more precious to him than mere survival. He can endure more we have said earlier in this chapter about humanity’s increasing self-exposure to
hunger, even death, but he will not endure his own further debasement. How does existential danger. No longer must we simply weigh the relative risks of our own
this relate to moral courage? material extinction or moral debasement, or even that of our near kin or nation;
In Mengzi’s view, the majority of human beings are humb to the threat to our own the material and moral fate of the entire human family is now implicated by many
dignity posed by the ethically compromised ways in which we allow ourselves of our individual and collective technosocial choices.
to live. We all share the beggar’s natural inclination to preserve his own dignity, Thus it is highly unlikely (barring some astonishing run of blind luck) that our
but due to the relative comfort of our lives this inclination is no longer actively species will continue to flourish on this planet for very long unless communities
engaged, it is not part of our daly awareness. This failure to habitually care for our have at least some success in encouraging their members to individually and
self-respect and moral dignity results in a lack of moral courage; when presented collectively cultivate the virtue of technomoral courage. By this I mean a reliable
with a choice between giving up and some material or social comfort to which we disposition toward intelligent fear and hope with respect to the moral and
are accustomed, and surrendering even more of our moral respectability, our will material dangers and opportunities presented by emerging technologies. As
to endure the former to save the latter is lacking. I expect that many readers will with ordinary moral courage, technomoral courage presupposes the tendency

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to give proper priority to the preservation of our moral well-being and dignity 6.7 Empathy: Compassionate Concerns for Others
over the preservation of material comfort and ease, or in some cases, even our [Related Virtues: Compassion, Benevolence, Sympathy, Charity]
physical safety. However, there is a critical difference between the classical forms The virtue of empathy has a strong pedigree in Confucian and Buddhist virtue
of moral courage and technomoral courage. Someone with moral courage in the traditions, and we will see that seeds of this virtue are planted in Aristotle’s ethics.
classical sense could safely assume that life in general would endure, even if his Yet it is not always classified as a virtue by contemporary thinkers, and is defined
or her own did not. The choice to risk one’s own life rather than accept profound in so many ways that it invites especially careful discussion. Before exploring
moral debasement was therefore a different nature than many of the choices 21st its classical and technomoral significance it will be helpful to first establish a
century humans face, as we collectively confront choices of technosocial policy conventional distinction between empathy and sympathy.
having planetary implications.
Although these terms are used in a variety of contexts, and translate a range
For example, imagine that you are confronted with the choice of supporting of closely related concepts in other languages, for the most part “sympathy”
or resisting a global geoengineering initiative that has a fair chance of refers to a form of benevolent concern for another’s suffering. “Empathy,” on the
dramatically reducing the existential risk to the biosphere posed by rapid global other hand, is often used to describe a form of co-feeling, or feeling with another,
climate change. Assume that putting this plan into action would necessarily synonyms with compassion. Empathy may include sharing feelings of pain,
involve committing various grave injustices: the forced displacement of certain fear, shame, excitement, joy, or other passions. Though we can speak of purely
indigenous peoples from their lands; the imposing of taxes and other material cognitive empathy (i.e., the correct belief that another is experiencing a certain
externalities on communities who were not themselves responsible for the emotion), empathy is often associated with bodily passivity, an experience of
reckless degradation of the environment that the plan aims to mitigate; the being physically affected by another’s emotion. It is an intimate, personalized form
destruction of certain ecosystems in order to improve the conditions for human of relation; I can have sympathy for the misfortunes of a group of anonymous
settlement, and so on. Your support of this plan would implicate you in all of individuals who are more or less interchangeable in my mind, but I typically can
these injustices and thus debase your moral character; but assume for the only empathize with a specific person or set of persons. Even a stranger with
sake of argument that in resisting the plan you would be accepting a significant whom I empathize will appear in my experience not as an abstraction, but as a
increased risk to future human survival. If no better options existed, which would concrete, nonfungible individual with specific emotional experiences.
you judge to be the more morally courageous course of action?
Empathy and sympathy often interact; once I find myself empathizing with the
Contemplating such challenging scenarios should make clear why it is essential specific frustrations and suffering of a wounded veteran in my community who
that we begin seeking now a better understanding of what counts as courage is struggling to adjust to returning home, I may be more inclined to sympathize
in our contemporary technomoral situation, and determining how this virtue with the millions of other veterans facing similar challenges. Likewise, a well-
of intelligent hope and fear can be more widely cultivated among us. In Part III, cultivated and informed general sympathy toward victims of cyberbullying may
discussion of the importance of cultivating technomoral courage will be central to make me more likely to empathize with a student in my child’s school suffering
chapter 9 on robotics and chapter 10 on biomedical human enhancement. severe depression and anxiety as a result of online harassment–even if my own
child is one of the bullies. Empathy and sympathy can also stimulate and be
stimulated by caring activity; thus they are intimately connected with the virtue of

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care described in the next section. Yet one form of empathy qualifies as a moral a spontaneous passion erupting naturally rather than by choice. Virtues, on
virtue in its own right. This is empathy understood not as simple shared affect, nor the other hand, are states of character arising from deliberative choice and
as mere understanding of another’s mental state, but as a cultivated disposition amenable to rational direction, adjustment, and cultivation of expression. In
reliably uniting these affective and cognitive aspects in active concerns for others. contrast, he describes empathy as a natural feeling affecting not only rational
Following psychologist C. Daniel Batson, we can classify this “empathic concern” beings but other animals.
as “a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare.” Why then does Aristotle make empathy a distinctive mark of virtue friendship,
Defined as a technomoral virtue, it is a cultivated openness to being morally noting that this passion is impossible among those lacking in virtue who, due
moved to caring action by the emotions of other members of our technosocial to the absence of a soul worthy of love, cannot even “rejoice or grieve with
world. themselves” much less with a friend? How does it happen that for Aristotle human
There is empirical evidence for the claim that empathic concern can be actively mothers and even birds can empathize, but a bad man cannot? Aristotle’s strong
cultivated as a disposition; as with any virtue, empathy can be expressed more association between empathy and virtue is undeniable, yet puzzling. Note that for
or less wisely. It makes a great difference to my character whether I am moved Aristotle mere mutual goodwill, in the absence of empathic feeling, is insufficient
by empathic concern at the right time and places, by the right people, and with for friendships of virtue. He says that with those for whom we have only goodwill,
the right intensity. For example, if my brother is a malicious hacker facing harsh we wish them well but “we would not do anything with them…nor take trouble
punishment for intentionally defrauding millions of vulnerable senior citizens, my for them.” Empathy here seems to be a motivating factor behind our decision to
own moral excellence in this situation requires my mental and emotional energies engage in caring activity with or for another. But is Aristotle right to assume that
to be adequately attuned to and moved by the suffering of his victims, and not empathy is never cultivated by choice or directed by reason?
inappropriately consumed by concern for my brother’s troubles. On the other This seems implausible if we consult our own experiences. For most humans,
hand, to be wholly indifferent to my brother’s present and future suffering would empathy is a quivering flame that is always near to being extinguished by
also be vicious. The appropriate cultivation of empathy is a particular challenge apathy or cynicism, or our desire to shield ourselves from suffering. To allow the
in our present technomoral condition and deserves special emphasis. We will say full experience of empathy is to open oneself up to being moved by the joys but
more about this shortly. But given that Western ethicists often neglect the virtue of also the pains of others, and many of us choose, often regrettably, to trun away
empathy, it is worth saying a bit more about its classical roots in virtue traditions, from this experience–either by avoiding circumstances that might bring it on,
and how we might defend our characterization of it as a technomoral virtue. or by alternating our thoughts (‘putting up a wall’) to create emotional distance,
Empathy occupies a critical role in the life of virtue Aristotle describes, yet he did perhaps while maintaining a facade of caring behavior. Even after opening
not classify it as one of the virtues, because he lacks a concept of empathy as ourselves to empathy, we must continually choose whether to allow ourselves
a cultivated state or disposition. That said, not only does his account recognize to remain moved by the other’s situation, or to withdraw emotionally and close
empathy as a capacity for ‘feeling with’ others, he makes it a constitutive element ourselves off. The latter can be psychologically necessary, even morally justified–
of friendships of virtue. In empathy, a virtuous person “grieves and rejoices with thus discerning deliberation is called for in the expression of empathy, as with all
(sunalgounta kai sunchaironta)” his friend, in a manner that contributes to his virtues. Still, with repetition of the choice to remain open, we may become more
experience of that person as a “second self.” Still, Aristotle sees empathy as accustomed to or even welcoming of the emotional weight.

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 Empathy as compassionate concern, then, must be exquisitely and quite In the Analects, shu is described as “one word that can serve as a guide for one’s
consciously cultivated if it is to endure and thrive rather than wither on the vine. entire life,” tempering the fixed requirements of duty or loyalty (zhong). It thus
Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar point with respect to the virtue Aquinas plays an essential role in practical wisdom, by motivating the discerning flexibility
characterized as pity (misericordia). MacIntyre reminds us that “our affections and in the application or moral conventions that is essential to the junzi’s exemplary
sympathies are generally, if not always, to a significant degree in our control, at character.
least in the longer run.” According to MacIntyre, not only is misericordia a virtue, it Shu plays a critical role in Mengzi’s account of virtue as well; he tells us that “in
is one of the “virtues of acknowledged dependence” most crucial to our flourishing seeking to be human (ren)... there is nothing that comes closer to it than working
as human animals, one that Aristotle mistakenly devalues from his illusory hard at shu.” Here we see a parallel with our distinction between empathy as
standpoint of masculine invulnerability and privilege. a natural, spontaneous passion and empathy as a deliberately cultivated
Had Aristotle realized this, he would have recognized empathy as a virtue state. For while empathy is something that we must ‘work hard’ to acquire as a
essential to a good life. For without appropriate empathy, we would not participate virtue, Mengzi famously claimed that any normal human being will experience
in the highest forms of human fellowship, as even he admits. We must make a compassionate horror at the sight of a child about to fall down a well, and that
distinction that Aristotle did not: between empathy as a natural, uncultivated, and “all human beings have a heart/mind (xin) that cannot bear to see the sufferings
unchosen passion, and the deliberate enrichment of this basic capacity into a of others.” This “commiserating heart/mind” is the natural “seed” or “sprout” or
moral virtue of empathic concern, one that presupposes the natural capacity to empathic response from which the mature virtue of shu may be cultivated, given
be affectively moved by another but requires intelligent choice and habituation proper habituation and effort.
to be properly directed and reliably expressed. This distinction has the further The concept of empathy also resonates strongly with two Buddhist virtue
advantage of resolving the earlier puzzle: that is, how a bird can empathize (in concepts we encountered previously: compassion (karunā) and sympathetic joy
the first, uncultivated sense), while a bad person cannot (in the second, morally (muditā). Their pairing addresses an element of empathy too often neglected in
cultivated sense). In short, Aristotle would likely have recognized empathy as a the West––namely, the moral importance of being moved by the joys of others as
virtue had he enjoyed a better view of the integration and co-development of well as their pains. As distinct from loving-kindness (maitrī), which is a universalized
moral emotion and moral reason in human beings, as well as the essential nature benevolence without the implication of emotional attachment to a specific other,
of human vulnerability in grounding ethical human relations. karunā and muditā imply the emotional passivity of being affected by another’s
In Asian virtue traditions the virtue of empathy is more straightforward. In the state of being. They therefore convey the emotional concreteness required by
Confucian moral tradition, the virtue of shu is generally translated as “empathy,” our concept. However, from a Buddhist standpoint, the more cultivated one is, the
“empathic reciprocity,” “sympathetic concern,” or “understanding,” where more inclined one is to extend karunā and muditā without discrimination. While it
‘understanding’ means not detached intellection but the ability to place oneself is still concrete beings who elicit the bodhisattva’s empathic concern, for her the
in the situation of another, to intuitively grasp not only what they are going distinction of kinship and political affiliation are increasingly irrelevant to her moral
through but what it demands as a moral response. The Confucian concept of affections.
the ‘heart-mind’ (xin) does not artificially divide empathic feeling from moral Buddhist teachings are explicit that empathic concern is a virtue that must be
intelligence, and Confucians readily conceive of empathy as a cultivated virtue. actively cultivated through moral practice. As Buddhist scholar Dale Wright notes:

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For the most part, compassion is something we learn to feel… we cannot feel their screens, declining to make eye contact or respond to requests for assistance
compassion simply by deciding to feel it, or by telling ourselves that it is our or companionship, even from friends and family members. Were further empirical
responsibility to feel it. We do, however, have the capacity to develop compassion research to bear out some version of the ‘digital narcissism hypothesis,’ it would
by cultivating our thoughts and emotions in ways that enable it. This is the function certainly bode poorly for the future of human flourishing in the absence of some
of the practice of giving. Making generosity of character [dāna] an explicit aim of effective intervention. Of course, even if the hypothesis is correct, it asserts only a
self-cultivation, we sculpt our thoughts, emotions, and dispositions in the direction correlation. It does not identify the cause of this supposed trend. Suspicious that
of a particular form of human excellence. digital culture itself may be partly to blame are understandable, but at this point

Contrary to Mengzi, this suggests that whatever innate compassion or empathy far too broad and untethered to reliable data to be of much use.

we have is extremely limited in its moral power. Yet even here, natural empathy’s Assuming for now that digital culture does not make us into narcissists, can
appropriate expansion is seen as the primary goal of moral practice. Over time, it facilitate the wider cultivation of empathy? After all, the information society
such practice gradually habituates me to outward-facing concerns and exposes enables us to be virtual firsthand witnesses to human tragedies and joys in a
me more intimately to others’ sufferings and joys. For a Buddhist, these gradually manner never before possible. That said, many lament new media’s allowance of
“soften” and eventually erase formerly hard boundaries between self/other, kin/ emotionally low-investment acts of ‘click-concern’ and ‘hashtag activism,’ such
stranger, citizen/alien, human/animal, and other dualistic gradations of empathic as ‘liking’ or retweeting stories, as socially acceptable responses to events that
concern. Yet Confucians still hold these distinctions as morally significant. Thus would normally call for more robust expressions of empathic concern and care.
we see that there is great cultural variance concerning empathy’s appropriate Others worry that digital culture encourages a form of ‘empathy burnout,’ where
expression, but a strong case for it as a cultivated moral virtue. endless worry that digital culture encourages a form of ‘empathy burnout,’ where

Is it however a technomoral virtue? In scholarly and media circles it is common endless social media stories and video feeds of suffering and tragedy, as well as

and intercultural and religious hatreds in a world that, thanks to information just a the stream of joyous life events shared by our peers, eventually lead to emotional

media projection, and if real, whether and to what extent it implicates technology, overload, numbness, or resigned indifference.

are serious questions for future empirical study. Most would agree, however, Fortunately, we do not need to know if digital culture contributes to declining
that the global information commons has certainly not solved the problem human empathy in order to take action. We already know that future human
perpetuates the greatest obstacles to human flourishing: war, oppression, flourishing is unlikely without a great expansion of empathic concern–for we have
sexual, religious and racial hatred and violence; abuse of women, children, said that the global empathy deficit is a major obstacle to human flourishing
and the elderly; and widespread poverty, famine, disease, and environmental today, and has been for millenia. The moral need for more human empathy is
degradation. not a novelty of the digital age. But the need is growing, not just because some

Not only has digital culture not alleviated the world’s empathy deficit, but cause the increasingly networked and interdependent nature of the human family

consider the controversial claim by some researchers that ‘digital natives’ raised entails that we shall find ourselves exposed to ever more circumstances that

on information technology and new media are increasingly deficient in empathic seem to call for it. Consider the global soul-searching following the 2014 outbreak

concern and/or prone to pathological narcissism. Such reports are embraced by of Ebola about which victims of the disease we ought to have been moved to take

many who feel increasing alarm at a society of people constantly absorbed in into our care, and where, by whom, how soon, and how well; the same questions

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arose in the Syrian refugee crisis for 2015. Determining who we ought to feel lack the moral skill, knowledge, or resources to offer effective care–indeed this is a
empathy for, when, and to what degree, is a moral problem that is getting ever key reason why charitable organizations and caring professions exist, in order that
harder, not easier, to get right. If human flourishing on an increasingly networked we may enable others to care for those for whom we empathize or sympathize
and interdependent planet is going to be virtually impossible without the broader but are ill-positioned no care ourselves. Conversely , a virtuous person’s exercise
cultivation of empathy as a virtue, then we had better start working a lot harder at of moral care need not, in every case or context, be motivated by immediate
it, Chapters 7, 8, and 9 take a closer look at how we might begin to do this in light of empathic concern. Caring virtue can be exercised toward beings physiologically
the unique challenges for technomoral empathy posed by new media, pervasive incapable of suffering or joy, or in ways that are routing rather than provoked by
digital surveillance, and advanced robotics. immediate compassion.

However, there is a sense in which virtuous care, even when not attended by
6.8 Care: Loving Service to Others immediate experiences of empathic concern, must still be motivated by a general
[Related Virtues: Generosity, Love, Service, Charity] feeling for the importance of loving service to others. Skillful caring practices and
dispositions are often thought to grow out of the labors of maternal, paternal, and
Now we come to a virtue with no perfect equivalent in classical traditions,
filial care; hence the view of many care ethicists that the common experience of
though it has close relatives in Christian virtues such as love and charity. Another
women as primary family caregivers is an especially relevant source of ethical
near analogue is the cardinal Confucian virtue of ren, not in its broader sense as
understanding. There is much debate about whether an ethics of care should be
‘complete virtue’ but in its narrower meaning of ‘humane benevolence’: a reliable
subsumed under a more encompassing framework of virtue ethics, or whether
tendency to actively foster the good of others to whom one is bound by familial
it represents a theoretically independent way of thinking about ethics. This book
or political ties. In Buddhism the virtue closest to what is meant by ‘care’ is dāna,
takes the former view; care may well be a cardinal virtue, but it is not clear that all
usually translated as ‘generosity.’ As one of the Six Perfections of character in
other virtues can be satisfactorily defined as extensions of caring disposition.
the Mahāyāna tradition, dāna expresses itself in habits of material and spiritual
giving, which simultaneously foster liberation from personal attachments and What special relevance does the virtue of care have to contemporary
deep concern for the welfare of others. The virtue of care corresponds nearly to technosocial life? Why have we chosen it as a technomoral virtue? Consider
all, but exactly to none of these classical concepts, although the Confucian virtue how systems of social and economic privilege have long allowed individuals to
of ren may be nearest, due to its foundation in the moral responsibilities of familial divest themselves of the responsibility for caring practices by delegating these
love. The concept of care as a virtue is also associated with the late-20th-centruy responsibilities to hired substitutes or, increasingly, by using technology to meet
emergence of care ethics, an approach rooted in feminist critiques of traditional needs that previously could only be met by the active labor of human caregivers.
rights-based theories of ethics. On care ethicist Joan Tronto’s view, human beings who enjoy such privilege risk
becoming less and less capable of competent care, less emotionally comfortable
We will define technomoral care provisionally as a skillful, attentive, responsible,
with close proximity to vulnerability and weakness, less attentive and responsive
and emotionally responsive disposition to personally meet the needs of those
to need, and less responsible for themselves and others. Insofar as the practice
with whom we share our technosocial environment. Care is closely related to the
of skillful caring is a formative experience in cultivating the moral self, this
virtue of empathy as compassionate concern, yet these virtues are not the same.
degradation of care is potentially devastating to our collective flourishing.
Someone maybe morally moved by empathy to alleviate another’s suffering but

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 Is the use of technology to relieve us of labors and burdens a bad thing? Few hand? Is such a delivery that much less intimate in its care than having boxes of
would object to the modern use of cranes to lift and position massive objects, food and medicine shoved from the back of an aid truck as it moves on to the
mechanical filters to clean wastewater, or to the invention of the cotton gin. Future next village? In each of the chapters that constitute Part III of this book, we will
technological innovations will continue to reduce human exposure to the ‘three take great care not to reflexively regard emerging technologies as the enemy of
D’s’: work that is ‘dull, dirty, and//or dangerous.’ Yet the work of human caring can caring virtue, but instead to consider how emerging technologies can promote
itself be dull, dirty, and even dangerous; from the rocking of a crying child to the human flourishing by being successfully integrated within our caring practices.
changing of an aging parent’s diaper to the efforts of a medic or aid worker in That said, the danger remains that our current cultural trajectory will bypass this
a war zone. Technology promises relief of these labors too; many middle-class integration, and instead seek only the most technologically expedient routes for
parents today already own a mechanical rocking cradle or swing to soothe their meeting others’ needs without concern for our moral need to cultivate ourselves
infant, and the predicted rise of ‘carebots’ may soon allow Davd’s or Junior’s as full caring persons. This delicate relationship between emerging technologies
diaper to be discreetly changed by a robot. Likewise, military research agencies and technomoral care will be the central focus of chapter 9’s treatment of social
such as the United States’ DARPA have funded research into robotic field medics, robotics.
and NGO’s are looking to use cheap drone aircraft to safely deliver food and
medicine to war-torn villages.
6.9 Civility: Making Common Cause
It is hardly necessary to point out that less exhausted and stressed parents, [Related Virtues: Respect, Tolerance, Engagement, Friendship]
fewer wounded medics, and fewer aid-workers taken hostage by militant
Civility has close associations with both classical and contemporary virtue
warlords would all be good things. However, if we recall the view of care ethicists
concepts. Yet the challenges of 21st century life demand a new conception of
that we become moral selves largely by teaching ourselves to actively respond
technomoral civility. Provisionally, let us define this as a sincere disposition to
to and meet the needs of others, we see the attendant moral cost of a trend
live well with one’s fellow citizens of a globally networked information society: to
toward expanding technological surrogates for human caring. Without intimate
collectively and wisely deliberate about matters of local, national, and global
and repeated exposure to our mutual dependence, vulnerability, weakness,
policy and political action; to communicate , entertain, and defend our distinct
concern, and gratitude for one another, it is unclear how we can cultivate our
conceptions of the good life; and to work cooperatively toward those goods of
moral selves. Even Aristotle, whose moral point of view is famously deficient in its
technosocial life that we seek and expect to share with others. It is a disposition to
acknowledgement of ‘feminine’ virtues and human vulnerability, notes that moral
‘make common cause’ with all those with whom our fates are now technosocially
excellence and flourishing requires the opportunity to meet the needs of others,
intertwined.
not in distant or mediated acts of assistance but in close relations such as those
of friendship. This virtue is much more demanding that what the narrow use of the English
term ‘civility’ implies, namely self-restrained and polite engagement. Technomoral
Yet an enriched understanding of 21st century care must intelligently incorporate
civility is a far more robust form of cosmopolitan civic-mindedness, a reliably
the assistance of technology rather than dismiss it out of hand; will a caring
and intelligently expressed disposition to value commercial ethical life in a global
person of exemplary practical wisdom refuse the opportunity to deliver lifesaving
technosocial context and to act accordingly. A habit of mere politeness does
medicine or food by drone simply because it is not given with the touch of a
not entail this virtue, for a person who wishes that she did not have to suffer the

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political opinions of others, or invite their input, or share the goods of technosocial to contemporary political life. A likely reason is the assumption that Aristotle’s
life with them, may remain politely ‘civil’ if behaving rudely or obstinately toward notion of civic friendship has limited application to modern liberal societies; after
them is likely to frustrate her own aims. Genuine technomoral civility would all, his notion is rooted in a classical conception of political flourishings in which
obviate such a strategy: I would remain polite precisely because my sincere wish civic friendship can be predicated on the close intimacies of a shared life (suzen)
is to construct and share the good life with others in my world. And while the virtue in near proximity with citizens with whom we have much in common. How could
of civility often involves politeness, this is a defeasible relation. In some cases, this notion possibly carry over to large liberal states predicated on tolerance
the aims of technomoral civility may necessitate behavior that is conventionally of cultural diversity and individual pursuits, much less to a globally networked
impolite, but essential to the vitality of deeper civic connections. planet?

Civility resonates strongly with the Confucian concept of ren in its political Among those who have explored this question is Sibyl Schwarzenbach, who
context–that is, the extension beyond the biological family of humane argues that civic friendship is in fact essential to the functioning of liberal states.
benevolence toward others in one’s political community. As we noted in chapter She asserts that much of the work of civic friendship that holds liberal states
5, for Confucians civic virtue retains the emotional tones of love, respect, and together is the politically invisible work of women who habitually reproduce
care that mark familial bonds, although political affections must be appropriately relationships of civic affection through practices of care. Moreover, she points out
tapered so as not to obscure the special priority of family life. In Buddhist ethics an important and often sidelined dimension of Aristotle’s concept of philia politiké:
civic virtue is less explicit, insofar as it is folded into broader moral obligations to namely, that it involves not only citizens’ concern for one another’s welfare, but
others. As we noted in chapter 5, the universality of Buddhist benevolence aims more specifically a concern for one another’s character. That is “citizens of the
to foster a fundamental transformation and enlargement of one’s sense of who best polis care about what ‘kind of persons’ their fellow citizens are.” They do this
counts as fellows of one’s moral community. Thus on the one hand, Buddhism not merely as a matter of instrumental advantage (i.e., because vicious neighbors
would seem to license the movement toward a more cosmopolitan, global pose a threat), but because they see intrinsic value in sharing life with ‘good
conception of civility such as the one we have articulated. Yet our conception people.’
would not go far enough for a Buddhist. While technomoral empathy and care Schwarzenbach also notes the importance for civic friendship of the mutual
can and should be extended well beyond civic and even human circles, civility is trust and goodwill secured by social justice of fairness, which supports a public
necessarily restricted in scope to those with whom we can deliberate about, share perception that all are “in this together.” On Schwarzenbach’s view, this has clear
conceptions of, and engage in cooperative activity to together attain the good implications even for large liberal states. She notes that nothing in Aristotle’s
life. account requires that I actually know or interact with all, or even most, of my
In this respect our concept of civility remains close to Aristotle’s. Aristotle civic friends. What it does require of each citizen is that he be “informed” about
emphasizes the importance of civic friendship (philia politiké) in the Nicomachean the nature, history, and standard of living of citizens in other parts of the state,
Ethics and in the Politics, noting that it “seems to hold states together, and and be actively “concerned” about their welfare. A citizen shows this concern
lawgivers seem to care for it more than justice. Much has been written about the by educating himself about their local hardships (malnutrition, poverty, floods,
relationship between civic friendship and other forms of friendship in Aristotle; tornadoes, disease); being supportive of collective assistance (not begrudging
less has been written about how Aristotle’s notion of civic friendship might apply the effective use of his tax dollars for their aid); and being willing to perform direct

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public service as appropriate. Cultivating such sentiments and habits would be an Unfortunately, contemporary technosocial life is not reliably conducive to the
essential part of the virtue of technomoral civility. formation of civic will, nor to the social, economic, and political justice that it

One might question how such a virtue can be compatible with the pluralistic presupposes. As Schwarzenbach notes, contemporary liberal states do not

norms of toleration and individualism that define modern liberal societies. How reliably and explicitly support those acts of public care that would constitute the

can these cohere with a civic virtue that, as we have said above, entails a strong expression of civility among a people. Instead, she argues, the norms of social

interest in the moral character of one’s fellow citizens? Whose moral character? and political life are presently still oriented primarily toward production of goods
and services rather than reproduction of supportive civic ties and friendships.
Which cultural norms of human excellence shall prevail? Schwarzenbach’s
They are also, she claims, still reflective of a distorted view of caring practices that
answer is that in a tolerant liberal society, civic virtue no longer entails a special
sees these as exclusively personal and domestic, rather than public and political.
interest in the private morality of others, but rather a narrower interest in their
She suggests that this was in fact not the view of Aristotle, who repeatedly spoke
public moral character. That is, a civil person will have a strong interest in
in the Ethics and the Politics of care (epimeleia) and of public or common care in
supporting and maintaining her fellow citizens’ capacities for excellence in public
particular (koinon epimelein).
deliberation and action. For this only a shared legal system and constitution,
effective and widespread civic education, and shared public norms of mutual Indeed many if not all of the technomoral virtues we have named fit together as

goodwill, concern, and toleration would appear to be essential. aspects of a potentially public technomoral character conducive to flourishing
in a globally networked society. The cultivation of this character is arguably
When we think on a global scale, many of these commonalities are lacking or
an essential precondition of the successful pursuit of the technomoral goods
infeasible, but is it unreasonable to think that some minimal set of norms could
of global human security, community, understanding, wisdom, and justice
emerge for global technosocial discourse and action? Don’t we already have
highlighted in chapter 2. Unfortunately, our present condition is one of widening
widely shared ideas of who are the worst civic actors on this stage–those who
political and economic inequality in low-and high-tech societies alike, as well as
are least capable, cooperative and expressive of a desire to enjoy the goods of
a disturbing coarsening and fragmentation of civic discourse at all levels. The
technosocial life together? If we have sufficient exemplary cases to generate a
handwringing of political and media experts has done little to mitigate civility’s
roughly shared concept of global civic vice, why think it impossible to cultivate a
decline, as we can see on Twitter, political talk shows, blogs, and news sites (many
rough sense of global civic virtue–a state of public moral character expressed by
of which have famously had to disable their online comments section as a result).
those international actors who are most admirable, reasonable and reliable in
A global atmosphere of civic insecurity and distrust has been amplified by recent
their cooperative technosocial endeavors/ Let us not forget that while humans are
revelations about massive data collection, cyberespionage, and cybersabotage
not among the most cooperatively inclined creatures, we are far from the least.
by governments, corporations, and other non-state actors.
From the International Space Station to the Large Hadron Collider to the near-
eradication of polio, we are clearly animals capable of effective, extended, and At the same time, emerging technologies have a clear potential to foster the

complex international cooperation on a massive scale when we are sufficiently rekindling of civility and the skills of making common cause. Social media are

motivated. We demonstrably do not lack the ability to make common cause with powerful tools for stimulating our interest in the character, history and welfare

others, even on a global scale. We do lack the consistent will. of distant others. They can help us to educate ourselves about hardships others
in our local or global community have faced. For example, public education

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regarding the hardships faced by lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender persons 6.10 Flexibility: Skillful Adaption to Change
has been greatly furthered by social media campaigns such as the “It Gets Better” [Related Virtues: Patience, Forbearance, Tolerance, Equanimity, Mercy]
project, as well as many smaller-scale uses of technology to convey the storeies ‘Flexibility’ is a funny name for a virtue. When we think of someone who is ‘morally
of LGBT people. These are often credited with contributing to a surprisingly rapid flexible,’ we usually mean someone wholly lacking in virtue! Yet the reader will
boost in public support for LGBT rights in the United States and other countries. recall that flexibility was an important characteristic of the morally expert person
Even surveillance technologies can foster civility by provoking public outrage in Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist virtue traditions, and will not be wholly
and jointed action against forms of pervasive and profound injustice that these surprised to see it appear as a technomoral virtue. In the technomoral context, let
technologies make newly visible. In recent years such tools have been used to us provisionally define it as a reliable and skillful disposition to modulate action,
motivate a broad range of civic actions against the surreptitious abuse of racial belief, and feeling as called for by novel, unpredictable, frustrating, or unstable
minorities, women, the homeless, children, the elderly, the disabled, and other technosocial conditions. This virtue is critical to our ability to cope with acute
vulnerable populations. technosocial opacity.
ICTs and new media also offer newly expedient means of rendering global Flexibility is closely related to other moral virtues, including patience or
assistance to those whose needs have become known; consider the surges forbearance. Aristotle defines patience (praotes) as a “slowness to anger”; more
in online donations to victims of earthquakes, typhoons, and floods, or the broadly, a disposition to moderately forbear frustration, disappointment, injury,
phenomenon of ‘crowdfunding’ via sites like Kiva and others that finance small or insult (through extreme forbearance would be deficient, since there are things
local projects around the world for social benefit. For better or for worse, social which will make a just and virtuous man rightfully angry.) Another trait related to
media are also used as means of collectively policing emerging norms of global flexibility is tolerance of the shortcomings of others. As we saw in chapter 4, Kongzi
public character; consider the 2015 Internet uproad over the illegal killing of a lion was described as wholly free of the vice of rigidity or intolerance (gu). As he says
in Zimbabwe by a Minnesota dentist; or the 2013 ‘Tweet heard ‘round the world’ in explaining his own willingness to be employed by an imperfect minister, the
of Justine Sacco, the American public relations executive who Twitter joke about junzi is “so hard that grinding will not wear him down, so pure that dyeing will not
African AIDS victims just prior to getting on a plane to Johannesburg ignited stain him black.” The virtuous person can afford to be flexible and tolerant when
a gleeful Internet countdown to her inevitable firing and global humiliation, particular circumstances warrant it, without becoming morally compromised
facilitated by the hashtag #HasJustineLandedYet. Such practices are all too often himself. Thus flexibility as a virtue is not opposed to integrity or moral uprightness–
infected with the vices of vigilantism, including malice and reckless disregard, and it is enabled by them.
have a long way to go to become morally mature. Yet for all their immaturity they
Like Aristotle, however, Kongzi thought this virtue had limits; as shown by his
are gestures of collective desire for a more civil, just, and caring global society.
firm rejection of the idea of repaying injury with kindness. He asks, “With what,
Chapters 7 and 8 will further examine the complexity of emerging interactions
then, would one repay kindness?” Instead, he suggests, one should repay injury
between new social media, surveillance technologies, and the cultivation of
with “uprightness,” and repay kindness with kindness. Kongzi rejects any form of
civility in technomoral life.
flexibility that indulges the vicious rather than leading them toward rightness, or
that indicates an unwillingness to make moral distinctions. Thus for both Aristotle
and Kongzi, flexibility is a virtue that must remain attuned to and upholding of the

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correct moral standard, even if the manner in which this is done must be patient, flexible public technomoral character. As we have noted, emerging technologies
sensitive to circumstances, and generous in spirit. from global transportation networks to ICTs increase our exposure to a plurality

Buddhist virtue ethics has its own virtue of flexible tolerance, patience or of conceptions of the good life, many of which are incommensurable with one

forbearance: ksānti, one of the Six Perfections of character in the Mahāyāna another in part or in whole. Mere exposure to such conflicts is nothing new. The

tradition. Ksānti reflects a disposition to patiently endure suffering, including existence of incompatible systems of moral life was a well-known and widely

injuries to body or ego caused by others, and to endure without fear or anger discussed classical phenomenon; Confucian literature reflects on the junzi’s

those new, truer perceptions of reality to which Buddhist practice exposes one. potential engagement with ‘barbarian’ tribes, and Aristotle reflects on the starkly

The Mahāyāna poet Śāntideva says that “no spiritual practice is equal to tolerance different value-conceptions expressed in the political constitutions of Athens

(ksānti). This is because the experience of anger is intrinsically anathema to and Sparta–not to mention the vast moral distance he perceived between

mental clarity and enlightened perception; in this way, the exemplary Buddhist Greek and non-Greek ways of life. The truly novel challenge of our contemporary

practitioner must be far less inclined to it than the Aristotelian phronimos, in whom technosocal environment is the extent to which 21st century technology networks–

praotes makes room for appropriate, intelligent, and measured anger. Even the the speed, range, and power of which have grown by many orders of magnitude

Confucian junzi will probably be less flexible and patient than the Buddhist sage, in mere decades–ensure the radical and virtually irreversible interdependence of

though he will eschew the volatility of anger for something more like sternness. these morally incommensurable cultures and communities.

Ksānti adds an important new dimension of flexibility, beyond mere tolerance The result is a qualitative shift in the problem of moral and cultural diversity.

for imperfect people. Ksānti requires that one also be flexible enough to Although our species has been dangerously slow to realize it, the stakes are no

accommodate new and uncomfortable truths or realities. One must not only be longer limited to our ability to form temporary alliances against hostile political

able to bend for others when appropriate, but also to bend to newly revealed or actors, nor to our short-term economic productivity and access to capital in a

emerging dimensions of the world. This enables that practice of upāya-kauśalya global financial system. The extent of our new interdependence even goes beyond

or ‘skillful means’ encountered in chapter 5, which permits the moraly expert the increasingly global character of scientific, literary, and artistic endeavors, or

Buddhist to adapt to the uncommon moral reality of a given situation in ways our access to worldwide information networks and an encompassing ‘Internet

that may require the modulation or even suspension of the moral conventions of things.’ Today our access to even the most basic necessities of biological

of sīla. We saw this flexibility in Aristotle as well, where practical wisdom enables existence–breathable air, clean water, minerals, protein-rich foods, dry land, and a

prudential judgments when standing moral conventions are inadequate. Likewise, livable climate–depends inextricably upon the technosocial practices, beliefs, and

Confucians eschew rigidity and praise flexibility in adapting to uncommon attitudes of global others.

dimensions of moral life–as in Mengzi’s case of the man who must not let ritual Given this shift, the disposition to be flexible only with those with whom we
propriety stop him from laying hands on his brother’s drowning wife. share a distinctive conception of the good life is no longer viable. Not even the

Classical virtue traditions value flexibility as a way to honor moral truth, that liberal mantra ‘live and let live’ captures the newly flexible disposition we need to

which is based on reality rather than delusion. It grants no license to yield to cultivate if we are to continue to flourish as a species; for that outdated mantra

falsehoods or morally alien norms. Here we confront the boundary between assumes that we still have the practical luxury of leaving others to their own

classical and liberal notions of tolerance, and the ‘hard problem’ for cultivating a devices, and just staying out of their way. Instead, we face a changed world in

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which our individual and local fates are largely conditioned by what humans deliberative participation will be grossly ineffective at best and harmful at worst,
collectively and globally practice. The good life cannot be reliably secured for any not to mention profoundly unjust. We can find evidence of this on a smaller scale
of us without the global coordination of practically wise courses of technosocial in the litany of ineffective or counterproductive laws regulating the Internet that
action that unfold in a stable and intelligently guided manner over the have been passed by legislative powers lacking either the technical expertise or
comparatively long-term, in many cases on timescales significantly longer than the expansive user knowledge base needed to craft a prudent law governing the
the average human lifespan. Yet we continue to live out our individual lives in local Internet.
communities grounded in differently sedimented histories of moral meaning and There are of course many other, arguably stronger, moral reasons not to
value. What role can a new, technomoral virtue of flexibility play in all of this? tolerate the systematic disenfranchisement of women or the poor. My point is
At the start of this section, we defined technomoral flexibility as a reliable and simply that the emerging need for the cultivation of global technomoral agency
skillful disposition to modulate action, belief, and feeling as called for by novel, and wisdom gives us all a new incentive to push back on those who would
unpredictable, frustrating, or unstable technosocial conditions. We now add inhibit that cultivation among their people. In contract, the parties to a cultural
that today, this entails something not seen as virtuous by classical traditions: an disagreement about whether individual data privacy is an inviolable human right
intelligent and habituated disposition to forbear those cultural value-systems and (a view widely held in the European Union) or a selfish luxury (a common view in
beliefs that do not significantly impair the ability of their possessors to cultivate some East Asian countries) can afford to acknowledge and at least temporarily
and exercise practical wisdom in matters of global technosocial concern. In forbear these philosophical differences in the interests of good faith negotiations
chapter 6 we have been building up a constellation of virtues that can together of international agreements and global technology standards that necessarily
constitute global public character, and technomoral flexibility is a critical part of it. affect the personal privacy of their peoples. Here, flexibility makes room for diverse

Thus the capacity for global technomoral agency is one plausible criterion cultural interests and values to have a voice in the debate, without the implication

for deciding which differences in cultural norms warrant mutual forbearance that any compromise ultimately reached decides the underlying value question

in the interests of global civility and flourishing, and which norms cannot safely or declares invalid the sincerely held value commitments of any particular group.

be tolerated because they are objectively inimical to such agency and thus to We must therefore aim to cultivate technomoral flexibility, a child of the liberal
the flourishing of our species and planet. For example, any local conception of virtue of tolerance that aims to enable the co-flourishing of diverse human
‘feminine virtue’ that is incompatible with the education or civic visibility of women societies. Yet unlike a version of liberal tolerance that merely counsels us to ‘live
is globally intolerable on this criterion. Women shape the technosocial practices and let live,’ technomoral flexibility requires that we cultivate a global capacity
and habits of every culture–thus their systematic exclusion from deliberative to actively deliberate together and agree upon prudent courses of technosocial
processes that aim to prudently guide such practices is globally self-defeating. action, even with people whose conceptions of the good life vary substantially
Likewise, a cultural norm that enables only a small wealthy or technocratic elite from our own. This will produce inevitable conflict, insofar as we may disagree
to acquire and exercises the virtues of public character is globally intolerable; on where the human ship should be heading, so to speak. The defining feature
for again, it is entire peoples, not simply the powerful few, who carry out in of our present technosocial reality, however, and the one that distinguishes it
daily life the technosocial practices and habits that must now be intelligently from the liberal dilemma, is that no one’s community can choose to ‘get off the
steered. Global technosocial policy created without robust stakeholder input and ship.’ Our immediate fates are now inextricably interlinked with those of the other

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passengers. In each of the remaining chapters we will have an opportunity picture of desires and values that I hold in view. It is this ‘holding in view’ that is
to reflect on the challenges of techomoral flexibility in an age of new media, the exercise of moral perspective. In our example, a virtuous person would be
surveillance, robotics, and human enhancement technology. able to hold in view her own standing desire not to be a selfish, impatient, or rude
person, as well as the desires and values of the equally frustrated gate agent and
fellow passengers, and the mechanics and crew who rightly value safety over
6.11 Perspective: Holding on to the Moral Whole
on-time departures. Moral perspective is an essential disposition of a virtuous
[Related Virtues: Discernment, Attention, Understanding]
person; I cannot be patient, honest, compassionate, or just person unless I act in
The notion of moral perspective as a virtue has no precise classical analogue. these ways fairly reliably, and it does not seem that I will be able to do so unless
Proper moral perspective is implied by the more comprehensive virtue of practical I can reliably maintain moral perspective when I think and act. As Bommarito
wisdom (phrónēsis) in Aristotle, as well as by the virtue of wisdom or ‘intelligent emphasizes, keeping moral perspective is a lot harder than retaining moral
awareness’ (zhi) in Confucian ethics, and the concept of wisdom (prajñā) in knowledge. I can intellectually know and believe that my needs and desires are
Buddhism. Yet it also has associations with the perceptual faculties of moral not all that special or important in the ‘big picture,’ but that doesn’t mean that I will
attention we discussed in chapter 4. Moral perspective can be roughly defined actually be able to see the world in that light when my desires are activated.
as a reliable disposition to attend to, discern, and understand moral phenomena
Yet my perspective does need to be cognitively successful–that is, responsible to
as meaningful parts of a moral whole. The technosocial applications of moral
the reality of the moral whole it keeps in mind. For example, Bommarito notes that
perspective will hold our interest here, but because moral perspective is holistic by
a person who is characteristically meek and never puts her needs above those
definition, its exercise cannot be limited to narrowly technosocial phenomena.
of others is not virtuous, because she fails to keep in proper perspective those
Comparative Buddhist scholar Nicolas Bommarito has developed a helpful needs and desires of hers which really are important in her moral environment.
account of moral perspective as an outlook that grounds familiar virtues such as Such a person might risk her own physical safety just to avoid inconveniencing or
patience and modesty. In his discussion of the perceptual dimension of Buddhist irritating a close relative, and this would be the vice of servility, not virtue.
patience (ksānti), Bommarito describes moral perspective as entailing not a
At the end of chapter 5 we discussed those Buddhist exercises in imaginative
personalized outlook on the world and its value (in the way an English speaker
‘perspective-taking’ that foster the moral practice of appropriately extending
might say “well, that’s my perspective,”) but rather a morally proper “sense of
empathic concern. We also referred to other, secular techniques of narrative
scale.” For example, this scale is engaged when I react patiently to the delayed
and artistic expression as ways of stretching our sense of the moral whole; of
boarding of my flight because reading on my laptop about the one that just
seeing and ‘holding in view’ more of the important relations, obligations, and
crashed into the ocean has “given me some perspective.” Moral perspectives
interdependencies between ourselves and others; of conceiving and feeling the
helps us to estimate the relative important of competing values and desires and
moral meaning of others’ needs, desires, and interests alongside our own. Thus
offer us “a sense of our place in a larger context,” as when a soldier might say,
a reliable disposition to hold an appropriate moral perspective is, in addition to
“When I see that photo of my unit, it gives me some perspective and I feel I’m part
enabling other virtues, a virtue that can be deliberately cultivated in its own right.
of something more important than myself.”

Moral perspective allows me to see how my own desire at a given moment (say,
my desire to board ‘my’ flight sooner) is more properly scaled within a holistic

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Still, what is a proper moral perspective? Doesn’t this presuppose a single correct species–even the ability of the planet to support life at all. In the 21st century,
view of moral reality, one true scale by which the importance of ours and others’ the job of keeping proper moral perspective is both more difficult, and more
desires and interests should be judged? Isn’t this obviously incompatible with the important, than it has ever been.
global ethical pluralism we have endorsed? Yes, but really no. Yes, because there Moreover, emerging technologies offer ever-new ways to both undermine and
is far more widespread agreement about moral scales than we acknowledge. enrich our moral perspective. From the rise of the ubiquitous ‘selfie’ enabling
The clinical sociopath’s moral scale will be agreed to be wildly off by the vast grinning self-celebrations at funerals and, notoriously, even concentration camps,
majority of informed judges. So will the pathological narcissist’s. So will the person no self-tracking apps that allow you to obsess over everything from the number
who throws violent tantrums at gate agents whenever ‘her’ flight gets delayed, of steps you take in a day to the number of people who ‘like’ your cat photos,
who quietly and knowingly dumps gallons of toxic sludge into a local stream technosocial life can make our perspective seem suffocatingly small. Yet it can
rather than taking it for safe disposal, or who knowingly builds a grade school with also be used as a tool to enlarge our moral perspective with humor–as with the
substandard concrete in order to skim a few extra bucks. While the consensus will widely popular Twitter hashtag lampooning #firstworldproblems–or with the
never be perfect, even locally, there is a well-established global sense of proper intimacy, as with the many uses of social media and even digital surveillance to
moral perspective and a large number of human behaviors and judgments make the experiences, desires, and interests of marginalized peoples and classes
widely regarded as contrary to it. globally visible and more immediately visceral. Our aim in Part III will be to take
And yet, despite all this agreement, there are individual, local, and cultural a closer look at how greater moral perspective might improve our use of these
differences in moral perspective that cannot be elided, and that we arguably and other technologies, and in turn how the ethical use of emerging technologies
should not merely tolerate, but welcome. At the finest levels of discrimination there might aid us in our efforts to enlarge and enrich our moral perspective.
is no single true scales of desires, values, and interests, nor need there be in order
for us no have widely shared, even globally resonant conceptions of virtue. All we
6.12 Magnanimity: Moral Leadership
need for the latter is an understanding of what habits are generally conducive
[Related Virtues: Equanimity, Courage, Ambition]
to human self-cultivation, which material and technosocial conditions are most
essential to our flourishing together as a global and interdependent human The Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity, or megalopsuchia (greatness of soul or

family, and which among our various visions of the good life are consistent with spirit), has been the object of much modern critical scorn. It is often associated

that end. What, then, is the distinctly technomoral significance of the virtue of with an entitled sense of political and personal superiority, and the idea that

moral perspective? Our growing interdependence in a networked world entails a virtuous person ought to believe and feel himself ‘above’ the troubles and

that we will confront more and more choices the implications of which are global concerns of others. Understood in this sense, we might see magnanimity

in scope. The need for proper moral perspective becomes ever more apparent as inimical to the technomoral virtues of justice, empathy, care, civility, and

as our actions and their consequences magnify in scale; as the potential impact perspective we highlighted above, and thus a better candidate for a technomoral

of our technosocial choices widens, the desires, values, and interests that come vice. So what should the reader make of its presence here?

into view become more numerous and more challenging for us to rank. Such First, we should note that while the characterization given above might well have
considerations are of far greater moral significance than ever before, up to and described some members of the Athenian polis that Aristotle greatly admired,
including the immediate and long-term survival and vitality of ours and other this would be the result of a failure by Aristotle to correctly apply his own concept.

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First, his concept of magnanimity or ‘greatness’ is an explicitly moral one, thus there is much to admire in a person whose ego is neither a giant sucking black
excluding political and economic status as conditions of its satisfaction, except hole of need, nor packed to the brim with a bunch of morally vacuous honors and
insofar as in a particular society these happen to be contingent prerequisites ‘successes.’
for one’s moral development (as Aristotle thought some degree of material and A similar sense of moral nobility is embodied in the Confucian ideal of the junzi,
political fortune were). The point here is that an inflated sense of superiority, or one who is repeatedly described as above pettiness and who neither overestimateds
that is based on one’s political or economic status rather than one’s character, nor undervalues his moral worth. In Buddhism the notion is more problematic,
is by definition contrary to the virtue of magnanimity. Only a morally excellent as the very concept of ‘self-worth’ or being ‘great in soul’ is metaphysically
person who has cultivated virtue to an exceptional degree (is unusually just, misleading and hence morally destructive. Yet there is a behavioral equivalent
honest, wise, etc.) can be a megalopsuchos (‘great-souled man’). of magnanimity in the Buddhist image of the exemplary person, who is certainly
Furthermore, the sense in which the ‘great-souled’ or magnanimous person is ‘above’ petty concerns and ego contests, and who has cultivated the moral
‘above’ the common person is chiefly concerned with their lack of pettiness–their resources to absorb the pettiness of others without being ruffled or moed from
unwillingness to defile their virtue by scrabbling in the dirt over trivial advantages, calm equanimity (upeksā).
honors, titles, prizes, or other ego-boosting trifles. The great-souled person does What, then, is the relevance of this classical ideal for 21st century life? Who talks
not ignore these things because he wishes to be above others, rather he is above or thinks about being ‘noble’ any more? This is precisely my point. Magnanimity
others just because he tends to ignore these things. The things the great-souled enables and encourages moral ambition and moral leadership, two things
person values are more valuable. The magnanimous person is the one who has sorely lacking in our contemporary technosocial milieu. Moral ambition can be
a sense of nobility and self-worth founded in a lifetime of moral and social efforts described as the ability to ‘think big’ in one’s moral aims. The magnanimous,
rather than relatively meaningless zero-sum contests of ego. The magnanimous those with justified moral ambition, are able to go beyond what most of us can
person can afford to be generous in spirit where others are not. He can absorb a afford in the moral realm (often little more than ‘I’m going to try to be slightly
petty insult without having to repay it. He can warmly greet the person who has less of a selfish jerk today.’) The magnanimous can pursue and lead others in
pretended not to notice his arrival. He can let the other car swoop into ‘his’ parking moral projects that require enduring courage, deep wisdom, expansive empathy,
space at the mall without responding like a rabid dog. extraordinary care, and tolerance for great frustration and conflict–because they
Of course there is no doubt that Aristotle’s conception of magnanimity is riddled have successfully cultivated these virtues as resources for such projects.
with indefensible gender, ethnic, and class bias. Property-owning Greek men Of course most who view themselves as great moral leaders more likely
could be great-souled. Women, Persians, and slaves could not. It is also true that suffer from a self-aggrandizing messiah complex, one reason that many of us
ancient Greek culture would have fostered specific acts of magnanimity that regard anyone who identifies himself as a moral beacon with understandable
many contemporary citizens of more egalitarian societies would rightly find suspicion. Nor is anyone born or destined to be great-souled, although some
obnoxious or obscene. But does that make a contemporary re-conception of the people’s native psychology or life circumstances might offer more favorable
‘great-souled’ or magnanimous person incoherent? I hope my readers will admit conditions for extraordinary moral development. Still, those who have managed
that, no matter how unenlightened Greek thinkers may have been on the subject to cultivate themselves well can take on, in concerrt with others, projects that
of who can or cannot qualify as magnanimous, they were right in this respect:L would be impossibly daunting for the morally average person to lead: fostering

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peace and goodwill between warring groups with a lengthy record of mutual 6.13 Technomoral Wisdom: Unifying the Technomoral Virtues
atrocities; transforming a whole culture’s prejudices about a despised ethnic The greatest of the virtues is the one we will say the least about, for it
group, women, or LGBT persons; ending practices of slavery or the poaching of encompasses the totality of what has already been said. Whole books have been
wild animlals. Persons or ordinary moral character can and should contribute written on Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom or phrónēsis, but as with Kngzi’s
much to these aims, and the vast majority of us involved in such efforts are just notion of ren in its broader use, moral wisdom is best understood as a term for
morally ordinary people doing our best, and getting out when the frustrations and ‘complete virtue,’ representing the successful integration of a person’s moral
disappointments become too much for us to bear. Yet it is hard to see how such habits, knowledge, and virtues in an intelligent, authentic, and expert manner.
projects can be reliably sustained and coordinated over the long-term without Thus a person of moral or practical wisdom just is a person who reliably puts into
the moral energies of the truly magnanimous. practice the seven moral habits articulated in Part II, and who has used those
The magnanimous are those who have rightly earned the moral trust of others, habits to cultivate and integrate the virtues essential to flourishing in their given
who can inspire, guide, mentor, and lead the rest of us at least somewhere in moral world. Such a person is not perfect but nevertheless exemplary–flawed
the vicinity of the good. It is not an unrealistic ideal. There have been many such but far better than most, finding more pleasure and joy in living well and rightly
people in history, some famous, most unfairly forgotten, people who were still than most of us get from living badly or thoughtlessly, and exhibiting flashes of
imperfect but far better than most, and who helped others to be better and do authentic moral beauty in action that give the rest of us pause.
better. Yet does our contemporary technosocial world foster and support the Technomoral wisdom is therefore a virtue in a different sense from the others.
ambitions of genuine moral leaders? Can we name specific living individuals who It is not a specific excellence or disposition, but a general condition of well-
we trust to lead us wisely and morally through the thicket of global technosocial cultivated and integrated moral expertise that expresses successfully–and in an
dilemmas facing humanity? Who can reliably guide us in making prudent choices intelligent, informed, and authentic way–each of the other virtues of character
about the expansion of global digital surveillance tools, armed robots, automated that we, individually and collectively, need in order to live well with emerging
software systems? I will let that question hang in the air, rather than attempt to technologies. Each of the other eleven technomoral virtues find their highest
answer it. If the reader sees clear evidence that global technomoral leadership expression when integrated in the actions of a person with technomoral wisdom.
is in great or even adequate supply, then I am happy to be wrong. But if I am not
Having already laid down the justification, conceptual framework, and content
wrong, then it is time to ask how human flourishing in the 21st century can benefit
for an account of the technomoral virtues, our concern in Part III will be narrowly
from a revival of magnanimity as a technomoral virtue, and how we might be
practical and applied: identifying how the technomoral virtues individually, and
able to achieve it.
technomoral wisdom in general, can aid us in coping with the rapid emergence
of new technological powers from an increasingly opaque and unpredictable
technosocial horizon.

Technology and the Virtues, 2016, p. 120-155

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