Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA

CATHERINE P. TURO,

Petitioner,
CA-G.R. No. 177382
For: Petition for Review under
-versus- Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC.,

and SPOUSES VICENTITO
CONDEZ JR. AND VIOLETA
CONDEZ

Respondents.

xx -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- xx

PETITION FOR REVIEW

PETITIONER, CATHERINE P. TURO, by and thru the undersigned

counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully avers that:

NATURE OF THE PETITION

1. This is a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised

Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to annul and set aside the
following:

a. Decision dated 24 October 2022 (“Assailed Decision") of the

Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) in
HSAC Case No. REM-A-220706-0765; and

b. Resolution dated 21 December 2022 (“Assailed Resolution”)

of the HSAC in HSAC Case No. REM-A-220706-0765;

2. Certified true copies of the Assailed Decision and Assailed

Resolution are attached in this Petition, as Annexes “A” and “B”,
respectively;

1
 3. The instant Petition also contains a Sworn Certification of
Non-forum Shopping pursuant to Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure;

4. Copies of the instant Petition have been served upon all the
parties concerned as evidenced by the Affidavit of Service attached
hereto;

TIMELINESS OF THE APPEAL

5. On 14 November 2022, a copy of the Decision dated 24

October 2022 of the First Division of the HSAC was received by the
Petitioner;

6. A Motion for Reconsideration dated 28 November 2022

was timely filed by Petitioner but the same was denied thru a
Resolution dated 21 December 2022 promulgated by the Commission
en banc of the HSAC, the dispositive portion of which states:

“ WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion(s) for

Reconsideration filed by complainant-appellant Catherine P.
Turo xxx are (is) DENIED. The Decision dated 24 October 2022
rendered by the First Division of this Commission is AFFIRMED
in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, 21 December 2022.”

Emphasis supplied.

7. On 20 February 2023, Petitioner filed a Motion for

Additional Time to file Petitioner for Review and paid the
corresponding docket fees amounting to Five Thousand Five Hundred
Thirty Pesos (PhP 5,530.00). Given this, Petitioner has additional fifteen
(15) days from 20 February 2023 or until 07 March 2023 to file this
Petition pursuant to Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure;

8. Hence, this Petition is timely filed;

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 THE PARTIES

9. Petitioner Catherine P. Turo (“Petitioner”), is of legal age,

Filipino, and is currently residing at Villa 14, JMR Compound, Building
143, Street 875, Zone 54, Doha, Qatar. She is an Overseas Filipino
Worker (OFW);

10. Respondent D.M. Consunji Inc., (“Respondent DMCI”), is a

corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines and with business address 3/F DACON
Building, 2281, Pasong Tamo Ext., Makati City, Metro Manila;

11. Respondent Vicentito Condez Jr. and Violeta Condez,

(“Respondent Spouses Condez”), are both of legal ages, Filipinos, and are
residing at No. 8 Cypress St. Green City Subdivision, Imus, Cavite.
Respondent Vicentito is a member of the Philippine Airforce;

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS

AND ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS

15. Bonifacio Heights Residences Condominium (BHRC) is a

condominium developed and managed by Respondent DMCI. It was
initially sold exclusively to members of the Philippine Military until it
was eventually offered for sale to civilians under a special requirement
of accommodation or sponsorship by any member of the military in
favor of the civilian;

16. Sometime in 2008, Petitioner decided to look for a

condominium unit to buy for her family to reside when they go home in
the Philippines and when her children decide to study college in the
Philippines. During this time, Petitioner saw BHRC. When she inquired
in the Sales Office of BHRC, a certain Cory Famorcan, a Sales Agent of
Respondent DMCI, told the former that while she is a civilian with no
membership in the Philippine Military she can still purchase a
condominium unit therein provided that a member of the Philippine
Military will sponsor her;

17. By reason of the foregoing representations of Respondent

DMCI’s sales agent, Petitioner approached a distant relative, Respondent
Vicentito (cousin of Alex Estoperez who is the husband of Petitioner’s
sister, Suzette P. Estoperez), to accommodate Petitioner in her intent to
purchase a condominium unit in BHRC. Upon talking to Petitioner about
her intent to buy the said condominium unit, Respondent Vicentito,
without hesitations, positively agreed to give Petitioner the
aforementioned sponsorship;

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 18. On 25 June 2008, the sale ensued and Petitioner successfully
bought Condominium Unit 321 Anilao (“subject property") in BHRC.
Nevertheless, it was upon the advice of Respondent DMCI’s sales agent
that the Contract to Sell be contracted by and between Respondent
Vicentito and Respondent DMCI, while Petitioner will be the former’s
attorney-in-fact by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA). The
format of said SPA was provided for by Respondent DMCI.

Copies of said Contract to Sell with its Supplement and SPA

are hereto attached, marked and made integral part hereof as
Annex “C” and “D”, respectively.

19. A Waiver and Transfer of Rights was also provided by

Respondent DMCI and was executed by and between Respondent
Vicentito and Petitioner. According to Respondent DMCI, this waiver will
be used to transfer the title of the Condominium Certificate of Title
(“CCT”) to Petitioner from Respondent Vicentito upon the release of the
original title which is after full payment of the monetary obligations on
the subject property;

A copy of said Waiver and Transfer of Rights is hereto

attached, marked, and made an integral part hereof as Annex
“E”;

20. In 2014, Petitioner finished paying the monthly

amortizations of the subject property amounting to One Million Nine
Hundred Fifty-Three Thousand Six Hundred and 00/100
(P1,953,600.00) and was told to pay the closing fees to secure the CCT;

Copies of Certification of proof of full payment of monthly

amortizations and the Statement of Account are hereto
attached, marked, and made integral parts hereof as Annex
“F-series”.

21. On 11 May 2015, Petitioner likewise proceeded with settling

the closing fees. Eventually on August 2017, she was notified by
Respondent DMCI, that the CCT was already ready for pick-up;

22. On 25 May 2018, Petitioner, together with her husband,

Francisco E. Turo, went to the office of then DMCI Homes Corporate
Center (“DMCI Homes”) to settle the Real Property Tax (RPT) Billings, as
well as to secure the CCT, as previously notified. Margie Laura from the
Documentation Department of DMCI Homes welcomed Spouses Turo.
Instead of getting the CCT, however, Petitioner was informed that the
CCT cannot yet be handed over to her and she was told that she needs to

4
pay the Storage Fees of the CCT while the same is under the possession
of then DMCI Homes;

23. Petitioner requested the Documentation Department of

then DMCI Homes to waive the storage fees because she has to settle
first the payment of the RPT in staggered basis on or before 29 June
2018. However, then DMCI Homes did not agree;

24. Moreover, the Documentation Department of then DMCI

Homes informed the Petitioner that the SPA, which she previously
submitted, lacks the signature of Respondent Violeta and that Petitioner
needs to submit a new SPA with the Respondent Violeta’s signature as a
requisite for the release of the CCT;

25. Since Petitioner was eager to get her CCT after paying all the
monthly amortizations and other related fees, she started to look for
Respondent Spouses Condez. Nevertheless, they could not be located
momentarily;

26. Petitioner continued to look for Respondent Spouses Condez.

A few days after, Petitioner, together with her daughter Francine P. Turo
and Respondent Vicentito’s nephew, Llyod P. Estoperez, were able to
locate Respondent Vicentito in his office in Villamor Airbase. They
thoroughly explained to him that then DMCI Homes needs a new SPA
with his wife as a co-signatory and gave him documents which he needs
to sign so that Petitioner would be able to secure the CCT from
Respondent DMCI;

27. According to Respondent Vicentito, he could not

immediately sign the documents because his wife, Respondent Violeta
was in America during that time and will be back around August 2018.
Given this, Petitioner told Respondent Vicentito that Francine P. Turo will
just get the documents once his wife is back in the Philippines;

28. Eventually on November 2018, Francine P. Turo texted

Respondent Vicentito and asked for an update regarding the documents.
Nonetheless, the messages she sent fell on deaf ears as no response was
received from him;

29. On 28 March 2019, Francine P. Turo, Suzette P. Estoperez,

and Alex Estoperez went to Respondent Vicentito’s office in Villamor
Airbase to ask for an update regarding the document that the latter
needs to execute together with Respondent Violeta. However, according
to his secretary, Respondent Vicentito was in a seminar;

30. The day after, Alex Estoperez sent a text message to

Respondent Vicentito saying “kung ano problema” referring to the SPA

5
document. According to Respondent Vicentito, it was his wife,
Respondent Violeta who did not want to sign the documents saying
“ayaw niya makialam sa transaction na iyan”;

31. Because of the foregoing series of events with the need to

submit additional yet unnecessary requirements and payments to then
DMCI Homes, Petitioner started to feel frustrated.

32. Worthy it is to mention that Petitioner was faithful in the

performance of her obligations under the entire purchase set up of the
subject property which was, as matter of fact, proposed by Respondent
DMCI. Nevertheless, she finds it totally unjustified that she is denied the
right to get the CCT of the subject property after she has paid the entire
purchase price of the same, including all updated payment of RPT and
closing fees;

33. It is preposterous to ponder that it took Respondent DMCI

almost 10 years to inform her that the signatories of the SPA were
lacking when it is the same SPA that was used when the sale was
executed. If the same in truth and in fact, lacking, it should have been
communicated to her prior to the consummation of the sale way back in
Year 2008;

34. Thus, Petitioner was forced to hire the services of the

undersigned for the purpose of sending demand letters to Respondents
DMCI and then DMCI Homes with a view of securing the CCT;

35. Remarkably, despite repeated demands verbally and

through the demand letters, both Respondent DMCI and then DMCI
Homes, as well as Respondent Spouses Condez failed, refused and
continuously refuse to heed the pleas of the Petitioner, constraining her
to file a Complaint for specific performance with HSAC;

36. Hence, this petition.

GROUNDS RELIED UPON FOR

THE ALLOWANCE OF THE REVIEW

I.
THE HSAC GRAVELY OVERLOOKED THE
TRUTHFULNESS IN PETITIONER’S GOOD
FAITH IN RELYING TO THE
REPRESENTATIONS OF RESPONDENT DMCI

II.

6
 THE HSAC GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE CONTRACT TO SELL BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS SPOUSES CONDEZ AND
DMCI WAS NULL AND VOID

III.
THE HSAC ERRONEOUSLY ORDERED
RESPONDENT DMCI TO REFUND TO
PETITIONER THE AMOUNT OF
PhP1,953,600.00 PLUS CLOSING FEES IN
THE AMOUNT OF PhP60,171.66 WITH
INTEREST OF SIX PERCENT PER ANNUM
RECKONED FROM THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT ON 05 JULY 2021 UNTIL
FULLY PAID WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS
FROM FINALITY OF DECISION

IV.
THE HSAC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
ITS FAILURE AND REFUSAL TO AWARD
MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE PETITIONER.

DISCUSSION

The HSAC gravely overlooked the

truthfulness in Petitioner’s good
faith in her reliance to the
representations of Respondent DMCI.

30. The HSAC declared the parties to be in pari delicto

concerning the purchase of the subject property. HSAC, however,
overlooked the factual circumstances that Petitioner relied in good faith
to the representations of Respondent DMCI.

31. The Supreme Court, in Office of the Ombudsman v. Elipe1,

defines good faith as “an intangible and abstract quality with no
technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among
other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s
1
G.R. No. 239188; November 14, 2018.

7
personal good faith is a concept of his own mind and, therefore may not
conclusively be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty
of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought
to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest
belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and
absence of intention to overreach another.”

32. Simply put, good faith is “an honest intention to abstain from
taking any unconscientious advantage of another. Good faith is an
opposite of fraud and of bad faith, and its nonexistence must be
established by competent proof.”2 As such, “good faith is always
presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.”3
Here, HSAC assumed that Petitioner was at fault by the mere fact that
she actively participated with Respondent DMCI in a transaction which
the latter orchestrated and facilitated;

33. At the onset, it was Respondent DMCI’s sales agents, one of

which was Cory Famorcan, who offered and represented to Petitioner
the purchase setup through a sponsorship or accommodation
arrangement. Petitioner merely relied to the representations of
Respondent DMCI’s sales agent that such purchase setup was acceptable
since such setup is a customary practice in BHRC. Respondent DMCI’s
sales agents assured Petitioner that the she was not the only one with
this kind of purchase setup arrangement as there were others before
her that did the same arrangement;

34. Petitioner was prudent enough that she asked around

within the BHRC neighborhood regarding the purchase setup
arrangement and she found that such purchase setup was a customary
practice in BHRC.;

35. Even during the execution of the Contract to Sell,

Respondent DMCI’s agents were the ones who advised Petitioner who
should be named in the Contract to Sell, provided Petitioner the
documentary requirements such as SPA and Waiver of Transfer of
Rights, as well as instructed Petitioner on what to do to implement the
purchase setup arrangement. All Petitioner had to do was merely follow
the representations and instructions of Respondent DMCI’s sales agents.
Petitioner trusted Respondent DMCI’s sales agents since the latter was a
known brand in the real estate market;

36. Had Respondent DMCI’s sales agents did not entice

Petitioner with the purchase setup through a sponsorship or
accommodation arrangement, then the latter would have looked for
another property to purchase. The totality of these facts only lead us to
2
Cui v. Henson; G.R. No. L-28417; February 25, 1928.
3
Malate Construction Development Corp. v. Extraordinary Realty Agents & Brokers Cooperative;
G.R. No. 243765; January 5, 2022.

8
the truth that Petitioner only relied in good faith to the representations
of Respondent DMCI.

II

The HSAC gravely erred in declaring

that the Contract to Sell between
Respondents Spouses Condez and
DMCI was null and void.

37. HSAC declared that the Contract to Sell is null and void
under Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code on the ground that the said
Contract to Sell was in contravention of Proclamation No. 284, Series
of 2002. In ruling thereof, HSAC laid its basis in one of the whereas
clauses of the said proclamation, to wit:
“ xxxxx
WHEREAS, the national government committed to provide
decent and affordable housing to the personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the assistance of the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), under the AFP Off-Base Housing Program;”
(underscoring supplied)”4

38. While “the whereas clauses spell the reasons for the law" 5,
the Supreme Court, in Dimakuta y Maruhom v. People6, ruled that
“Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are
not part of the operative language of the statute.” Furthermore, whereas
or preambulatory clauses “(is) are not (an) essential part(s) of a statute.
Hence, where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail
over its text. Nor can a preamble be used as basis for giving a statute a
meaning not apparent on its face.”7

39. A reading of said proclamation does not expressly provide

that BHRC should be exclusively sold to members of the AFP. The
proclamation merely identifies certain parcels of lands that will be
reserved as “the AFP Off-Base Housing for the AFP Personnel under the
administration of the then Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council (HUDCC) and mixed-use component, subject to private rights, if
there be any, and to final survey”8. Moreover, the terms and conditions of
4
HSAC Decision dated 24 October 2022.
5
Banco De Oro v. Republic; G.R. No. 198756; August 16, 2016.
6
G.R. No. 206513; October 20, 2015.
7
R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (6th ed., 2009).
8
Proclamation No. 284, Series of 2002.

9
the Contract to Sell did not also mention the said proclamation as
Respondent DMCI’s basis to develop the BHRC. Indeed, if there was a
condition that the buyer of BHRC shall exclusively belong in the AFP
then such condition should have been expressly provided. As far as the
Petitioner is concerned, she was only aware that she can purchase a
condominium unit in BHRC provided she does the purchase setup
arrangement devised by Respondent DMCI’s sales agents;

40. Based on the foregoing paragraphs, there is no reason to

declare that the Contract to Sell between Respondents Spouses Condez
and DMCI is null and void. Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code on
the ground that it was made in contravention of the said proclamation.
Considering that it was Petitioner “who fully paid for the purchase price
of the subject property and settled the closing fees”9, Respondent DMCI,
by virtue of the Contract to Sell, cannot be excused in its obligation to
Petitioner which is to release the CCT to her;

41. Moreover, it is incumbent upon Respondent DMCI to release

the CCT after Petitioner made full payment of the subject property. This
is in accordance with Section 25 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 957, to
wit:

“Section 25. Issuance of Title. – The owner or developer shall

deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full
payment of the lot or unit.

xxxxx”

42. The Supreme Court in New San Jose Builders, Inc. V. GSIS10,
has succinctly ruled that “the primary law providing protective mantle to
real estate buyers is PD 957. Its preamble states that the impetus for state
intervention in these kinds of agreements are the exploitative practices of
developers, subdivision, and condominium sellers and operators. Indeed,
individual property buyers do not have the resources similar to banks and
financial institutions, which can sufficiently inform and protect them from
acts, transactions, and contracts that may challenge or oust them of their
ownership and possession of their subdivision or condominium property.”

43. It is also well-settled that “the seller’s obligation to deliver

the corresponding certificates of title is simultaneous and reciprocal to
the buyer’s full payment of the purchase price.”11 Hence, should a
developer or seller like Respondent DMCI reneged on its obligation to
deliver the CCT to Petitioner after full payment, then the former should

9
HSAC Decision dated 24 October 2022, p. 9.
10
G.R. No. 200683; July 28, 2021.
11
Home Guaranty Corporation v. Manlapaz; G.R. No. 202820; January 13, 2021.

10
recompense the latter. The Supreme Court in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v.
Spouses Fajardo12 aptly discussed that:

“On this score, it is apt to mention that it is the intent of PD

957 to protect the buyer against unscrupulous developers,
operators and/or sellers who reneged on their obligations.
Thus, in order to achieve this purpose, equity and justice
dictate that the injured party should be afforded full
recompense and as such, be allowed to recover the prevailing
market value of the undelivered lot which had been fully paid
for.”

III
The HSAC erroneously ordered
Respondent DMCI to refund to
Petitioner the amount of
PhP1,953,600.00 plus closing fees in
the amount of PhP60,171.66 with
interest of six percent per annum
reckoned from the filing of the
complaint on 05 July 2021 until
fully paid within sixty (60) days
from finality of decision

44. HSAC erroneously ordered Respondent DMCI to refund to

Petitioner the amount of PhP1,953,600 plus closing fees in the amount
of PhP60,171.66. Said amount does not reflect the actual payments
made by the Petitioner pursuant to the sales transaction orchestrated
by Respondent DMCI’s sales agents and to the maintenance of the
subject property;

45. Following the arguments as discussed above, Petitioner

relied in good faith to the representations and machinations of
Respondent DMCI’s sales agents. Jurisprudence provides that a
possessor is “considered in good faith if he is not aware that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.”13 To
reiterate, Petitioner believed that the subject property was hers
pursuant to the purchase setup arrangement facilitated by Respondent
DMCI’s sales agents;

46. Accordingly, Petitioner must be reimbursed for all the

charges incurred because of the payments she made on the subject
property such, consisting of the following:

12
G.R. No. 201167; February 27, 2013.
13
PNB v. De Jesus; G.R. No. 149295; September 23, 2003.

11
 46.1. the interest in the purchase price amounting to One
Hundred Forty-Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-One
Pesos and Ninety-Six centavos (PhP 147,891.96)14;

46.2. the real property taxes paid to reimburse Respondent DMCI

from Taxable Year 2008 to Taxable Year 2017 amounting to
Eighty Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos
and Sixty Centavos (PhP 87,197.60);

46.3. the interest of the real property taxes paid to reimburse

Respondent DMCI from Taxable Year 2008 to Taxable Year
2017 amounting to Fourteen Thousand Four Hundred
Thirty Peso and Five Centavos (PhP 14, 430.05);

46.4. real property taxes paid from Taxable Year 2018 to Taxable
Year 2023 amounting to Forty-Seven Thousand Four
Hundred Nineteen and Two centavos (PhP 47, 419.2); and

46.5. association dues which include the real property tax and
fire insurance on the common areas of the subject property
from September 2008 to current date;

Copies of the foregoing payments on real estate taxes for years

2008 to 2017, including the payments on interests are hereto
attached, marked, and made integral part hereof as Annex “G-
series”

47. Due regard must be given to paragraph 2 of Article 545 of

the New Civil Code which provides that:

“If at time the good faith cease, there should be any natural
or industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part
of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest,
both in proportion to the time of the possession.

The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the

two possessors. xxxxx”15

48. Otherwise, “it would be absurd to require the payment of

that charge of a person who does not derive any benefit from the
property.”16

14
As indicated in the Statement of Account.
15
Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
16
Cabigao v. Valencia; G.R. No. 31448; October 10, 1929.

12
 49. Moreover, the monetary award declared by HSAC will result
in injustice and homelessness of Petitioner’s children who are residing
in Manila. Should the monetary award will be given to Petitioner, her
children will have to leave the subject property and they would be
without a home. If they search for a new home to purchase, they will not
find a decent property to buy with the money awarded to them.
Inflation and sudden increase in the prices of real estate in Metro Manila
is so apparent. Furthermore, Respondent DMCI stands to benefit even if
it refunds the amount declared by HSAC since the former may resell the
subject property in its discretion. This is also in keeping with the
jurisprudence in Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. Spouses Fajardo. As such, the
HSAC order should be reviewed.

IV

The HSAC committed serious error in

its failure and refusal to award moral
and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees to the Petitioner.

50. The HSAC committed serious error when it refused to

award moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees to the
Petitioner. Based on the foregoing discussions, the doctrine of in pari
delicto cannot apply since Petitioner acted in good faith. Thus, the crux
of the controversy is whether the respondents acted in bad faith. Given
the peculiarity of the case, HSAC did not consider the totality of the
circumstances that brought all the parties in this case.

51. Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides that “every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.” As held by the Supreme Court in CJH Development Corp. v.
Aniceto17:

“Article 19 puts a “primordial limitation on all rights.” It

mandates that the norms of human conduct be observed in
the exercise of one’s rights. While a right may be granted by
law, it may not be exercised in a way that causes damage to
another, giving rise to a legal wrong. Article 19, which only
lays down a rule of conduct, is read together with Articles 20
and 21, which authorize an action for damages. Article 20
pertains to damage to arising from a violation of law, while
Article 21 provides damages for those who suffered material
and moral injury.”
17
G.R. No. 224006; July 6, 2020.

13
 52. The Court also held that “while Article 19 of the New Civil
Code may have been intended as a mere declaration of principle, the
“cardinal law on human conduct” expressed in said article has given rise
to certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his rights but does so
arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in
keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. The
elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: 1) there is a legal
right or duty: 2) which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.”18

53. Furthermore, “bad faith is not merely bad judgment or

simple negligence, but a “dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives
or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Similarly, malice
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad
faith or bad motive.”19 Suppletory, “in all contractual, property to other
relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.”20

54. In this case, there was evident bad faith on the part of
Respondent DMCI.

54.1. One, it was incumbent upon Respondent DMCI to comply

if it was required to sell the condominium units in BHRC
to members of the AFP;

54.2. Second, it was Respondent DMCI’s duty to deny potential

buyers if such buyers do not meet the requirement, i.e.
members of the AFP;

54.3. Third, it was Respondent DMCI’s sales agents, who

offered, orchestrated, and facilitated the purchase setup
arrangement through accommodation or sponsorship;

54.4. Fourth, Respondent DMCI’s sales agents lead Petitioner

to believe that such purchase setup arrangement was
customary and acceptable;

54.5. Fifth, it was Respondent DMCI’s sales agent who

provided Petitioner the SPA and Waiver and Transfer of
Rights, and even instructed the latter what to do with the
same;

18
Navarro-Banaria v. Banaria; G.R. No. 217806; July 28, 2020.
19
See Note 14.
20
Article 24, New Civil Code.

14
 54.6. Sixth, due to the representations and machinations of
Respondent DMCI’s sales agents, Petitioner parted with
her hard-earned money;

54.7. Seventh, Respondent DMCI received all the payments

made by Petitioner pursuant to the purchase of the
subject property;

54.8. Eighth, after Petitioner fully paid the necessary

payments, Respondent DMCI failed, refused, and
continuously refuse to release the CCT in contravention
of the latter’s obligation to do so as discussed above;

54.9. Nineth, Respondent DMCI’s failure and refusal was based

on the ground that the SPA previously submitted during
the execution of the contract lacks the signature of
Respondent Violeta Condez; and

54.10. Lastly, Respondent DMCI notified Petitioner of this

insufficiency after full payment was made by the latter
and almost 10 years after the said SPA was submitted to
the former.

55. Based on the foregoing paragraph, Respondent DMCI was

dishonest with its transaction with Petitioner in order for the former to
financially gain from the latter’s innocence. The act of taking undue
advantage of Petitioner’s ignorance and status as an OFW is unjust,
unfair, and uncalled for which should not be countenanced.

56. Petitioner would like to emphasize that had it not been for
Respondent DMCI’s assurance that the said purchase set up is
customary and acceptable, she would have not bought the subject
property under the conditions narrated above. Like any other OFW, her
only purpose is to acquire a property in Manila where her children can
decently live while she and her husband are earning and working
abroad.

57. If Respondent DMCI was really true to their intention as real

estate developer or seller and thought of their customer’s best interest,
then they would have offered Petitioner another condominium project
suitable for the latter. Alternatively, if Respondent DMCI did not allow
her to buy the subject property from the start, Petitioner could have
looked for other condominium units sold in the real estate market.
However, this was not so in this case. As such, this whole issue which
led to filing the case would have not been at bar now if Respondent
DMCI was not greedy to sell the subject property to Petitioner.

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 58. Furthermore, with a high regard to prudence, Respondent
DMCI should not be allowed to blatantly and whimsically ask Petitioner
to revise the SPA with the need for Respondent Violeta to sign the same.
If said SPA indeed needs the signature of Respondent Violeta, it should
have been communicated to Petitioner at the earliest opportunity when
the SPA was sent and submitted to Respondent DMCI, and not belatedly
such as when full payment has been made by the Petitioner and almost
ten years after the said SPA was submitted to Respondent DMCI.

59. Similarly, had it not been for Respondent DMCI’s guaranty

and machinations, there is no reason for Petitioner to meet with
Respondent Vicentito Condez to ask him to accommodate her in buying
the subject property. It is only rightful to conclude that the entire
arrangement was chaotic because of Respondent DMCI’s fault;

60. Even if Respondent DMCI is the main cause of this issue,

Respondent Spouses Condez, however, also had their share of bad faith
when they failed, refused, and continuously refuse to provide an update
SPA. In fact, the filling of the case would not have happened if they
accommodated the updated SPA as requested by Petitioner. However,
they were being greedy in stalling or delaying to provide the updated
SPA knowing that the subject property has been fully paid and the CCT
is about to be released. The unreasonable delay on the part of
Respondent Spouses Condez should not be tolerated;

61. Given that the respondents of this case acted in bad faith,
the parties should be held liable for their respective acts.

62. Petitioner begs for the indulgence of this Honorable Court

to reconsider the foregoing order.

RELIEF

PRESCINDING THEREFROM, it is respectfully prayed unto this

Honorable Court of Appeals to:

1. Give due course to this Petition for Review;

2. Nullify and set aside the Decision dated 24 October 2022 as

well as its Resolution Re dated 21 December 2022 of the
Human Settlements Adjudication Commission and;

3. Order Respondent DMCI to release to Petitioner the

Condominium Certificate of Title on Condominium Unit 321
Anilao in Bonifacio Heights Residences Condominium; or in
the alternative order Respondent Spouses Condez to

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 execute and sign a new Special Power of Attorney in favor of
Complainant with his and his wife’s signature for the
purpose of submitting it to DMCI to secure the
Condominium Certificate of Title; or in another alternative,
order Respondent Spouses Condez to buy the subject
condominium unit if the latter do not agree to execute the
needed SPA on the basis of the Fair Market Value and/or
Current Selling Price of said condominium unit;

Other relief just and equitable under the circumstances is likewise

prayed for.

Most Respectfully submitted.

Quezon City for the City of Manila. 01 March 2023.

RO MEGAN LEA B. ABIOG

Counsel for Petitioner
7G Manhattan Heights Tower B
General Romulo St., Araneta Center
Cubao, Quezon City
romeganleaabiog@[Link]
+63284051784

By:

RO MEGAN LEA B. ABIOG

Roll No. 65734
IBP No. 283391; 11 January 2023; Makati Chapter
PTR No. 9569890; 10 January 2023; Makati City
MCLE Compliance No. VII-0018823

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Copy furnished:

HUMAN SETTLEMENTS ADJUDICATION COMMISSION

First Division
6th Floor, HLURB Bldg., Kalayaan Avenue
corner Mayaman Street, Diliman, Quezon City

ATTY. REYNALDO A. SAN GABRIEL

SAULOG & DE LEON LAW OFFICES
Unit 1704 & 1705, 88 Corporate Center,
141 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City

ATTY. CRISANTO U. PASCUAL

Block 3, Lot 31, Manila Street,
Golden City Subdivision,Phase 2,
Imus City, Cavite, 4103

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 REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION

The Clerk of Court

Court of Appeals
City of Manila

G r e e t i n g s:

Please submit the foregoing PETITION FOR REVIEW for

consideration and approval of this Honorable Court immediately upon
receipt thereof.

RO MEGAN LEA B. ABIOG

COMPLIANCE
(With Sections 2, 4, 5 and 7, Rule 13
of the Rules of Civil Procedure)
- and -
EXPLANATION
(Pursuant to Section 11, same Rule 13)

Undersigned counsel, hereby respectfully states that a copy of this

PETITION FOR REVIEW was served by registered mail to:

HUMAN SETTLEMENTS ADJUDICATION COMMISSION

First Division
6th Floor, HLURB Bldg., Kalayaan Avenue
corner Mayaman Street, Diliman, Quezon City

ATTY. REYNALDO A. SAN GABRIEL

SAULOG & DE LEON LAW OFFICES
Unit 1704 & 1705, 88 Corporate Center,
141 Valero Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City

ATTY. CRISANTO U. PASCUAL

Block 3, Lot 31, Manila Street,
Golden City Subdivision,Phase 2,
Imus City, Cavite, 4103

By depositing a copy thereof on 06 March 2023 in the post office of

_________________, as evidenced by Registry Receipt Nos. ______________,
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_______________, ________________ hereto attached and indicated after the
name(s) of the addressee/s and with instructions to the postmaster to
return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered.

The mode of service by registered mail, instead of personal

service was resorted to for the following reason:

Heavy volume of deliveries/services/filing of equally important

pleadings/motions/notices by the messengers of herein undersigned
counsels in other Courts/tribunals and to adverse parties required to be
served/furnished with copy/ies thereof;

RO MEGAN LEA B. ABIOG

20
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
______________City, Metro Manila )

AFFIDAVIT OF FILING AND SERVICE

I, JOHNIEL MORALES TUANDO, of legal age, for and in behalf of

Atty. Ro Megan Lea B. Abiog with address at 7G, Manhattan Heights
Tower B, General Romulo Street, Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City,
after being duly sworn, depose and say:

On ____________, I served copies of “Petition for Review” in the case

entitled Turo v. DMCI and Spouses Condez, before the Court of
Appeals in the following manner:
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS By Registered Mail, as
ADJUDICATION COMMISSION evidenced by Registry Receipt
First Division No. ____________________ issued by
6th Floor, HLURB Bldg., Kalayaan the Post Office on _____________,
Avenue which is attached to the original
corner Mayaman Street, Diliman, copy hereof.
Quezon City

ATTY. REYNALDO A. SAN By Registered Mail, as

GABRIEL evidenced by Registry Receipt
SAULOG & DE LEON LAW No. ____________________ issued by
OFFICES the Post Office on ______________,
Unit 1704 & 1705, 88 Corporate which is attached to the original
Center, 141 Valero Street, copy hereof.
Salcedo Village, Makati City

ATTY. CRISANTO U. PASCUAL By Registered Mail, as

Block 3, Lot 31, Manila Street, evidenced by Registry Receipt
Golden City Subdivision,Phase 2, No. ____________________ issued by
Imus City, Cavite, 4103 the Post Office on ____________,
which is attached to the original
copy hereof.

JOHNIEL MORALES TUANDO

Affiant

21
 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _________________ in
___________ City affiant personally known to me to be the same person
who executed this affidavit and exhibiting to me his
___________________________ with number _____________________.

Doc. No. _____;

Page No. ____;
Book No. ____;
Series of 2023.

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