7. Adm. Case No.

5285 April 14, 2004

JUDGE NIMFA P. SITACA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIEGO M. PALOMARES, respondent.
Facts:
Judge Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca seeks the disbarment of Atty. Diego M. Palomares, Jr., for
having filed a falsified bail bond.
Judge Nimfa Penaco-Sitaca was the Acting Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the
Regional Trial Court. Among the cases in her sala was Criminal Case No. RTC-1503 for
murder against Dunhill Palomares, a son of Atty. Diego M. Palomares, Jr., herein
respondent. Sometime in September 1997, Atty. Palomares, in representation of
Dunhill, filed a bail bond of P200,000.00 to secure the latter’s release. The bail bond
was purportedly signed and approved by the late Judge Nazar U. Chavez, then
Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City, and with it was a
corresponding order of release signed by RTC Branch 18 Clerk of Court Atty. Glenn
Peter C. Baldado. When informed of the filing by Atty. Palomares of the bail bond,
ostensibly signed by Judge Chavez, Judge Sitaca approved the release of the accused.
When RTC Branch 35 Clerk of Court Atty. Roy P. Murallon later requested Atty. Baldado
to forward to the Ozamis City RTC the original records and supporting documents on
the bail bond, Atty. Baldado, by then already a practicing lawyer, disavowed the
existence of the bail bond. Atty. Baldado wrote to say that per the official records of
Cagayan de Oro RTC, Branch 18, the bail bond did not exist, that no approval was
made by Judge Chavez, and that no order for the release of Dunhill was issued. Atty.
Baldado concluded that the bail bond was a forged document.
Judge Sitaca directed Atty. Palomares to explain. In his letter to Judge Sitaca, Atty.
Palomares stated that he was the corporate legal counsel of Bentley House
International Corporation, and when the bail application was approved for P200,000.00,
he requested the amount from Jonathon Stevenz and Cristina Q. Romarate, Chief
Operations Officer and Treasurer, respectively, of Bentley House International
Corporation. Instead of giving the money, Stevenz and Romarate proposed to utilize the
services of William Guialani. He acceded. Guialani then delivered the release order,
which Atty. Palomares immediately presented to the Branch 35 clerk of court of RTC
Ozamis City. The clerk of court read the release order and then issued the
corresponding order for the release of Dunhill Palomares. Atty. Palomares denied any
wrongdoing in connection with the submission of the falsified bail bond and offered, in
any event, to replace the bail bond with a cash bond.
Judge Sitaca, finding the explanation unsatisfactory, filed disbarment proceedings
against Atty. Palomares.
In its resolution of 19 March 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
In a Report and Recommendation, dated 24 July 2003, Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan held that there was no doubt that the bail bond and order of release were
"fictitious." She stated that while there was no conclusive proof that Atty. Palomares had
been the author of the fictitious bail and release order, it could not be denied, however,
that it was he who presented the papers to the court. Atty. Palomares failed to
satisfactorily explain, she stated, why he had to take a circuitous route and secure the
services of Guialani despite his claim that he could have easily availed himself of the
facilities of other insurance companies. She recommended that Atty. Palomares be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen (18) months. The
recommendation was adopted by the IBP Board of Governors on 30 August 2003 in its
Resolution No. XVI-2002-81.
Issue: Whether the act of the IBP is proper in forwarding the case to the Court despite it
did not conduct formal investigation.
Held:
No.
Administrative complaints for disbarment are referred to the IBP for formal investigation
by the Court after an evaluation by it of the pleadings submitted.1 An ex-parte
investigation may only be conducted when the respondent fails to appear despite
reasonable notice.2 In this case, it would appear that no investigation, not even just
an ex-parte investigation, was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline.
The prevailing procedure for investigation is that expressed in Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court some pertinent provisions of which read:
"SEC. 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. – The National Grievance
Investigators shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated
Bar referred to them by the IBP Board of Governors.
The Court must call for the due observance of the foregoing rules, and it is thus
constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for further proceedings; it is also directed to act on this referral with
dispatch.
8. A.C. No. 6061 October 3, 2003
DR. RAUL C. SANCHEZ, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALUSTINO SOMOSO, respondent
Facts:
In his complaint-affidavit filed before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Dr. Raul C. Sanchez, a member of the medical staff of Sta.
Lucia General Hospital, stated that he was the attending physician of respondent Atty.
Salustino Somoso during the latter’s confinement at the hospital from 31 March to 09
April 1998. When respondent was discharged on 09 April 1998, he urged complainant
that, since it was a public holiday and banks were closed that day for business, the
latter be good enough to accept a check in payment of the hospital bills due
complainant totalling P44,347.00. Although apprehensive at first, complainant was later
persuaded, however, by respondent’s plea of his being a lawyer who can be trusted as
such. Complainant thus accepted two personal checks from respondent.
When deposited, the checks were dishonored. Complainant immediately met with and
informed respondent about it. Respondent promised to redeem the dishonored checks
in cash; he never did.
Ultimately, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On 15 August 2001, the City Prosecutor
issued a resolution holding that the necessary Informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) should be filed against respondent. Pursuant to the
resolution, two Informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against respondent before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. A warrant for his arrest was issued but,
somehow, respondent was able to evade arrest.
Complainant in his administrative complaint submits that respondent is a disgrace to the
law profession and unfit to be a member of the bar, and that he should be disbarred and
his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
Pursuant to an order, dated 31 July 2002, of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), respondent was furnished with a copy of the
complaint and ordered to submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from his receipt of a
copy of the complaint. Despite the receipt of the IBP-CBD order in his two given
addresses, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. Respondent was finally
declared to be in default.1a\^/[Link]
In its report and recommendation, the IBP-CBD found sufficient evidence on record to
substantiate the charges made by complainant against respondent and recommended
that the latter be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. In
Resolution No. XV-2003-177, dated 26 April 2003, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of the IBP-CBD.1awphi1.nét
Issue: Whether the act of Atty. Somoso in issuing checks despite the knowledge that he
knew that his account was already closed violates the CPR.
Held:
Yes.
he Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that:
"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
"Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
"Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
The canons emphasize the high standard of honesty and fairness expected of a lawyer
not only in the practice of the legal profession but also in his personal dealings as well.
A lawyer must conduct himself with great propriety, and his behavior should be beyond
reproach anywhere and at all times.2
When respondent paid, with a personal check from a bank account which he knew had
already been closed, the person who attended to his medical needs and persisted in
refusing to settle his due obligation despite demand, respondent exhibited an extremely
low regard to his commitment to the oath he has taken when he joined his peers,
seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession he should, instead, hold
in high esteem. His conduct deserve nothing less than a severe disciplinary sanction.
9. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., VS. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, A.C. NO. 4749,
JANUARY 20, 2000
FACTS:
a. Soliman M. Santon Jr., the complainant who is also a member of the bar filed a
complaint alleging that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years has
not indicated the proper PTY and IBP O.R. Nos and date in his pleadings.
b. That, he only indicates IBP Rizal 259060 which he has been using for atleast 3
years already. Furthermore, Atty. Llamas sometimes does not indicate any PTR
for payment of professional tax.
c. In which he alleged that in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that
only a duly admitted member of the bar “who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law” and in Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
“default in the payment of annula dues for 6 months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for 1 year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys.”
d. In addition, the track record of Atty. Llamas was also noted in the complaint of
Atty. Soliman which showed that he was not in a good standing because he was
dismissed as Pasay City Judge, was convicted for Estafa, and he was using the
same O.R. No. from 1995, 1996, and 1997.
e. While, Atty. Llamas contended that he made it clear in his income tax return since
1992 that he was only engaged in a limited practice of law, and his principal
occupation is farmer in Calauan, Laguna. He also alleged that he is a Senior
Citizen so he honestly believed that he was exempted under Section 4 of Rep.
 Act. 7432 from the payment of dues in the IBP in his limited practice of law.
Therefore, he did not willfully and deliberately failed and refused to pay the dues
and he is willing to pay all past dues even with interest.
f. The IBP Board of Governors approved the recommendation for suspension from
the practice of law for 3 years.
g. Motion for reconsideration denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Atty. Llmas being a Senior Citizen since 1992 is legally exempted
from of IBP dues.
2. Whether or not Atty. Llamas should be suspended for not paying IBP dues and
misrepresenting that he was paying dues in his pleadings.
HELD:
1. NO, Atty. Llmas being a Senior Citizen since 1992 is not legally exempted from
the payment of IBP dues.
The provisions of RA no. 7432 is not applicable to Atty. Llamas respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return
up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law."

While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income
does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.

2. YES, not Atty. Llamas should be suspended for not paying IBP dues and
misrepresenting that he was paying dues in his pleadings.

For non-payment: Atty. Llamas admits admits that since 1992, he has engaged in
limited law practice without having paid his IBP dues.
Rule 139-A provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of
the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members
thereof.

SECTION 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of

Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of

law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."
For misrepresentation: By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP
dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO

THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
 *Nakakalokang part. (In view of his advanced age, his express willingness to pay
his dues and plea for more temperate application, the court believe that 1 yr
suspension or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.)

ATTY. LLAMAS SUSPENDED – 1 year

10. [ A.C. NO. 10135. JANUARY 15, 2014 ] EDGARDO AREOLA, COMPLAINANT,
VS. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:

The case is an administrative complaint filed by Edgardo D. Areola also known as

Muhammad Khadafy against Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, from the Public Attorney’s
Office.
The letter of complaint dated November 13, 2006 by Areola stated that he was filing a
complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronsa, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador,
Danilo Perez, and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during
Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees
and stated in her speech:
"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon." She was also allegedly
scolded the detainees when Areola helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings and
filing motions.
Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their pleadings
and filing motions before the RTC Branch 73, Antipolo City, Atty. Mendoza undermined
his capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that
the latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of
Republic Act No. 8942 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998) in the latter’s criminal case for
rape, which was pending before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City. She got
angrier when Seronda retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him
since there was nobody to help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint
Motion for Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying
 on the Complainant and alleged that the respondent asked for ₱2,000.00 to
represent them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she
allegedly scolded Mirador and discredited Areola.5
In the answer of Atty. Mendoza dated January 5, 2007, she contented that the
administrative complaint against her is a harassment tactic of Areola and he is not a
lawyer but represented himself to his co-detainees as one. There was no evidence that
will prove that the respondent received money from the inmates, but she admitted in her
answer that she advised her clients and their relatives to approach the judge and the
fiscal to beg and cry so their motions would be granted and their cases against them
would be dismissed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Areola (not a lawyer) authorized to file a complaint to the attorney,
give legal advice, and file pleadings?
2. Whether or not the respondent violated the Code or Professional Responsibility?

RULING:

1. No, the court agreed with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the
complaint against Atty. Mendoza, there were no documents that would show that
they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. Areola is quite knowledgeable with
Philippine laws. However, no matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a
lawyer. Therefore, he is not authorized to give legal advice and file pleadings by
himself before the courts. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He claims that
he filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca, Mirador and
Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted which would
show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint. They did not sign the
Complaint he prepared. No affidavit was even executed by the said co-detainees
to substantiate the matters Areola raised. Consequently, the Court rejects
Areola’s statements, especially as regards Atty. Mendoza’s alleged demands of
money.

2. Yes, although the complaint of Areola lacks evidence to support the allegations
that she demanded money to the detainies. She admitted that she advised her
clients to approach the judge and fiscl to plead for compassion so their motions
would be granted.
 The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that she made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of
Rule 1.02, states that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed
at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." and
Rule 15.07 in which it states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness." of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public
in our legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence
from external forces or factors22 according to the merits of a case. Atty.
Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.
It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that end, his client’s success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of
the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted
to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is
condemnable and unethical.
In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for
two (2) months as excessive and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s
infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms
of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those
cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The
Court notes that when Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon", she was not
compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark was inappropriate and
unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to cause
dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.
The Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper
advice to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is accordingly meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
act will be dealt with more severely.

11. AURORA R. LADIM, ANGELITO A. ARDIENTE, AND DANILO S. DE LA CRUZ V.

ATTY. PERLA D.
RAMIREZ.[ A.C. No. 10372, July 30, 2014 ]
FACTS:

On March 23, 2007, a verified complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty. Perla D.
Ramirez by the Petitioners who were all employees of Lirio Apartments Condominium in
Makati City, where Atty. Ramirez resides.

The complaint stemmed from various incidents from 1990 to 2007 involving
complainants, other employees, lessees, and unit owners of Lirio Apartments
Condominium and Atty. Ramirez. The tenants alleged that Atty. Ramirez kept asking
"impertinent personal questions, knocking on their doors, and using offensive language.
Another tenant complained that Atty. Ramirez kept entering units undergoing repairs "
because of her fear that people [were] damaging the building."

The latest incident involved Atty. Ramirez shouting at the condominium employees and
using offensive language. She accused the maintenance personnel of destroying the
building and the security guards of trying to destroy her car. She also started shouting
that the condominium residents were prostitutes.

Since 2004, Atty. Ramirez has refused to pay any of her association dues.

Atty. Ramirez, on the other hand, filed several cases before the Office of the City
Prosecutor against the condominium employees, accusing them of malicious mischief,
grave oral defamation, slander, and threats. All the cases were dismissed for lack of
merit.

In her position paper before the IBP, Atty. Ramirez did not admit or deny the allegations
in her complaint but stated her long years of service as a government lawyer. She also
expressed that: I do not believe that the three complainants are my equal, therefore, for
reasons above stated I move for the outright dismissal of the complaints charge [sic]
against me.

The IBP Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Ramirez guilty of violating Rule 7.03,
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of
reprimand.

Commissioner Antiquiera found that "respondent's language and choice of words [show]
her lack of respect and decorum in her dealings with other people."

The Commissioner, however, took note of the "forgetful, suspicious, and fearful
attitude"[27] of Atty. Ramirez and complainants' belief that "something must be wrong
with her mentally."
The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution which adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of the Commissioner. However, the IBP Board of Governors
do not believe that a mere reprimand is enough to punish Atty. Ramirez for her actions.

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Ramirez violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:

Yes.

As a lawyer, Atty. Ramirez is sworn to uphold not only her oath but also the provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 states:

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Instead of answering the allegations concerning her rude and disrespectful attitude, Atty.
Ramirez haughtily asked the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to dismiss the complaint
because complainants were not her equal, referring to them as "clerk, janitor, and
maintenance man," respectively. Worse, she flaunted her credentials, believing that
being a former government lawyer allows her to disregard the tenets of her profession.

Her arrogance manifests her lack of moral fitness to practice law. Her disrespect toward
her neighbors and toward complainants shows a blatant disregard to the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Atty. Ramirez's actions do her profession a disservice
and, as such, a penalty higher than a reprimand is in order.

As this court stated in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia: [T]he practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of
the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.

A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred from the practice of law for gross misconduct.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.

— A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

Lawyers should treat everyone with kindness and respect, whether they are colleagues,
members of the court, or the public in general. Anything less would be conduct
unbecoming of one in the legal profession.

In Tapucar v. Atty. Tapucar: As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must
live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the
ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers
must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of
public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct —
both public and private —fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly. (Emphasis supplied)

"The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor." Taking into account her advanced age
and her "alleged mental issues," we find that the appropriate penalty is suspension for
six (6) months from the practice of law.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Perla D. Ramirez, having been found in violation of Canon 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

12: JOSE FRANCISCO T. BAENS vs. ATTY. JONATHAN T. SEMPIO, [A.C. No.
10378, June 09, 2014];

FACTS:
Before this Court is an administrative case, seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Jonathan T. Sempio (respondent), for violation of Canons 15, 17, 18 and Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), commenced thru a complaint-
affidavit filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) by Jose Francisco T. Baens (complainant).
 This legal battle stemmed when the complainant engaged the services of the
respondent to represent him and file a case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
his wife, Lourdes V. Mendiola-Baens.
The complainant alleged, among others, that the respondent:
(1) despite receiving the sum of 250,000.00 to cover for the expenses in
the said case,6 failed to file the corresponding petition, and it was the
complainant’s wife who successfully instituted the Civil Case for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage;
(2) even with the complainant furnishing him a copy of the Summons
dated December 15, 2008, belatedly filed an Answer and was able to file it only
on March 13, 2009 which was after the 15-day period stated in the Summons;
(3) failed to make an objection on the petition on the ground of improper
venue as neither the complainant nor his wife were and are residents of
Dasmariñas, Cavite;
(4) never bothered to check the status of the case and thus failed to
discover and attend all the hearings set for the case; and
(5) as a result, Civil Case was decided on October 27, 2009 without the
complainant being able to present his evidence.
The respondent denied the allegations in the complaint, and explained that:
(1) after a meeting with the complainant, he drafted the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and asked the complainant to go over said draft
after which he proceeded to file the same with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malabon City;
(2) the complainant was aware that said petition will be filed in Malabon
City as the latter had signed the verification and certification of the petition;
(3) the case became pending and was later on withdrawn because of the
complainant’s refusal to testify;
(4) what contributed to the delay in filing the Answer was the fact that he
still had to let the complainant go over the same and sign the verification thereof;
(5) he was not able to attend the hearings for the case because he did not
receive any notice from the trial court; and
(6) it was only on December 2, 2009 when he found out that the trial court
has already rendered its decision and that the complainant had changed
counsels.
 In the mandatory conference held before the IBP-CBD, only the complainant
appeared; thus, the respondent was declared as having waived his right to further
participate in the IBP proceedings. Nonetheless, in the interest of justice, both parties
were required to submit their respective position papers.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Sempio violated the following Canons: Canon 15 (candor, fairness,
and loyalty), Canon 17 (fidelity to the cause of client), Canon 18 (competence &
diligence) and Rule 18.03 (neglect of legal matter) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
RULING: YES
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust
and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-
mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high
standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to
the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free.16 Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public service, not
money, is the primary consideration.

In this case, the respondent’s reckless and inexcusable negligence deprived his
client of due process and his actions were evidently prejudicial to his clients’ interests. A
lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly
representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases
with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the
client or the court.

The Investigating Commissioner found that the respondent failed to diligently

attend to the case and was grossly negligent in discharging his responsibilities
considering the fact that he has already been fully compensated.

The excuse proffered by the respondent that he did not receive any orders or
notices from the trial court is highly intolerable. In the first place, securing a copy of such
notices, orders and case records was within the respondent’s control and is a task that
a lawyer undertakes. Moreso, the preparation and the filing of the answer is a matter of
procedure that fully fell within the exclusive control and responsibility of the respondent.
It was incumbent upon him to execute all acts and procedures necessary and incidental
to the advancement of his client’s cause of action.

Records further disclose that the respondent omitted to update himself of the
progress of his client’s case with the trial court, and neither did he resort to available
legal remedies that might have protected his client’s interest. When a lawyer agrees to
take up a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting
the latter’s rights.
Evidently, the acts of the respondent plainly demonstrated his lack of candor,
fairness, and loyalty to his client as embodied in Canon 15 of the Code. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client;
he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.

Clearly, it cannot be doubted that the respondent violated Canon 17, and Rule
18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." It further
mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," and that
"a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."

It must be emphasized that after the respondent agreed to handle the

complainant’s case, he became duty-bound to serve his client with competence and
diligence, and to champion his cause with whole-hearted fidelity. By failing to afford his
client every remedy and defense that is authorized by law, the respondent fell short of
what is expected of him as an officer of the Court.

The Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Resolution of IBP and hereby
SUSPENDS Atty. Jonathan T. Sempio from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS
effective immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
13. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED vs. NICOLAS C. TORRES
[A.C. No. 10438, September 23, 2014]

FACTS:
Complainant is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws
engaged in overseas maritime employment.2 It hired respondent, a medical doctor and
a lawyer by profession, as its Legal and Claims Manager who was tasked, inter alia, to
serve as its legal counsel and to oversee the administration and management of legal
cases and medical-related claims instituted by seafarers against complainant’s various
principals. Among the cases respondent handled in his capacity as Legal and Claims
Manager were the claims of seafarers Bernardo R. Mangi (Mangi), Rodelio J. Sampani
(Sampani), Joseph C. Delgado (Delgado), and Edmundo M. Chua (Chua).
In its administrative complaint, it was alleged that per respondent’s request,
complainant issued checks in the amounts of P524,000.00, P652,013.20, P145,650.00,
P97,100.00, and P296,808.40 as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi,
Sampani, Delgado, and Chua.4 However, complainant later discovered that, save for the
check in the amount of P145,650.00 issued to Delgado, respondent never gave the
checks to the seafarers and instead, had them deposited at International Exchange
Bank, Banawe, Quezon City Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1.5 With respect
to Sampani, complainant also discovered that he only received the amounts of
P216,936.00 and P8,303.00 or a total of P225,239.00 out of the requested amount of
P652,013.20, through checks not issued by complainant.6
On October 30, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on
Bar Discipline directly received the instant complaint and on even date, issued an
Order7 requiring respondent to file an answer, but the latter failed to do so. Neither did
respondent appear in the mandatory conference scheduled on March 20, 2009 nor did
he file his position paper.
The Investigating Commissioner found that respondent had indeed requested
and was issued checks as settlement of the respective claims of Mangi, Sampani,
Delgado, and Chua on the pretense that the requested amounts represented what was
lawfully due them.11 However, instead of giving the said checks to the named seafarers,
he deposited the same at the International Exchange Bank, Banawe, Quezon City
Branch, under Account No. 003-10-06902-1,12 except for the check in the amount of
P145,650.00 issued to Delgado.
Respondent belatedly filed his Verified Answer (With Motion to Re-Open
Investigation)14 on March 24, 2010. He explained that he was not able to timely file an
answer because complainant supplied a wrong address to the IBP and filed non-
bailable criminal cases against him which caused his detention in a regular prison cell
and, thus, his inability to comply with the IBP’s directives.
ISSUE/S: W/N the respondent administratively liable for violating the CPR?
RULING: Y
It is fundamental that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly
fiduciary and ascribes to a lawyer a great degree of fidelity and good faith.24 The highly
fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from his client.25 This is the standard laid
down by Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR, which read:brary

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES

OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. x x x.
In the foregoing light, it has been held that a lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by
 his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics.

It is well-settled that “when a lawyer receives money from the client for a
particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing
that the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for
the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his client.”
27 This, respondent failed to do.

Clearly, respondent’s acts of misappropriation constitute dishonesty, abuse of

trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, and betrayal of his client’s
interests which he is duty-bound to protect.28 They are contrary to the mandate of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.” Such malfeasance is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it also reveals a basic moral flaw
that makes him unfit to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Nicolas C. Torres is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

14. [ A.C. NO. 10579. DECEMBER 10, 2014 ] ERLINDA FOSTER, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JAIME V.
AGTANG, RESPONDENT.

Erlinda Foster v. A y. Agtang

Legal Ethics: Borrowing from clients

Facts:
Foster engaged the services of A y. Agtang Erlinda in a realty dispute in Ilocos Norte.
Agtang’s charged Foster an acceptance fee of P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.

Aside from the above-men oned charges A y. Bagtang also collected :

150,000 from Foster as ling fee.
50,000.00 to bribe the judge

On various occasions, Agtang borrowed money from Foster for his personal use, i.e., car repair. Such loan
amounted to P122,000.00. Foster, being prudent, asked for receipts for all funds she handed over to
Agtang.

Later however, Foster learned that she lost the case due to Agtang’s negligence and incompetence in
dra ing the complaint. She also found out that the ling fee therefor was only P22,410 (not P150k).
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 Further, it turned out that Agtang was once the lawyer of the opposing party. When she asked Agtang to
return her the balance, the said lawyer failed to do hence the present admin case.

IBP board Recommenda on:

Ordered A y. Agtang to return the money borrowed as well as the balance of ling fee.
Suspension of 3 months.

Issue:
1. Whether A y. Bagtang violated the CPR?
2. Whether the court may order A y. Bagtang to return the money?

Ruling:
1. Yes. Respondent violated the CPR A y. Bagtang was disbarred.

Rule 1.0 Canon1

Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or decei ul conduct.”
In this case, Agtang is guilty of engaging in dishonest and decei ul conduct, both in his professional and
private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled Foster into believing that the ling fees for her case were
worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of
the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he resorted
to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty.
When asked to return the balance, he failed and refused to do so and even had the temerity that it was
all the client’s idea. . A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presump on that he has appropriated the same for his own use in viola on of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross viola on of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public con dence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
It is clear that Agtang failed to ful ll this duty. He received various amounts from Foster but he could not
account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authen city of the receipts presented by Foster.

Rule 16.04 of Canon 16:

Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of jus ce, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
ma er he is handling for the client.”
In the rst place, Agtang should have never borrowed from Foster, his client. Second, his refusal to pay
re ects his baseness. Deliberate failure to pay just debts cons tutes gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanc oned with suspension from the prac ce of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administra on of jus ce and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal
pro ciency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s
faith and con dence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all mes, faithfully perform their
du es to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of nancial
obliga ons.
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 The acts of the Agtang cons tute malprac ce and gross misconduct in his o ce as a orney. His
incompetence and appalling indi erence to his duty to his client, the courts and society render him un t
to con nue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.

2. May the Court order Agtang to return the money he borrowed from Foster?

No. The Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a
private capacity because its ndings in administra ve cases have no bearing on liabili es which have no
intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the o cer of the court is s ll t to be allowed to con nue as a member of the Bar.
The only concern of the Court is the determina on of respondent’s administra ve liability. Its ndings
have no material bearing on other judicial ac ons which the par es may choose against each other. To
rule otherwise would in e ect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administra ve cases are
led directly with the Court.

15. MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES v. ATTY. ROBERTO "ARGEE" C.

GUEVARRA
A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016

Facts:
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical
Group, Inc. On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina
"Josie" Norcio, who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched
surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and
making her ill in 2009.

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online
social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant.

The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account
that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire
medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause.

Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks that allegedly
threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without factual basis and without proof.

Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made with the object to
extort money from her, as apparent from the following reply made by respondent on a
comment on his Facebook post.

Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to
inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as
well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand letter
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dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent.

Issue
1. Whether or not complainant violated the right of privacy of respondent, claiming that
they were "private remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his
circle of friends.
2. Whether it is violative of the freedom of expression
3. Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable based on the
allegations of the verified complaint.

Ruling

First Issue
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user's
profile, as well as information uploaded by the user.

Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social
networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first necessary that said user manifests
the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to
prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization
of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of
his or her right to informational privacy.

The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting
complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the
latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of
Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that
the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his
circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.

Restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee
absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's
circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person
is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who
was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under
the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is
negated.

Second issue
No. Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like
all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. The constitutional right of freedom of
expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy
their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were
ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant
and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people
to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the
name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed
criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured
("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a
boycott of BMGI's services all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that
Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with
conviction for criminal negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation "to act
with justice."·

Third Issue:
Yes. The subject Facebook posts are in complete and utter violation of the following
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,

respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he
must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and
decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an
officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and
maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage
who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the
cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant
breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned.

Penalty: suspension from the practice of law for a period of one year

16. A.C. No. 11724 (Formerly CBD No. 14-4109). July 31, 2018
HDI HOLDINGS PHILIPPINES, INC., COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. EMMANUEL N.
CRUZ, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

HDI is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. In its complaint, HDI alleged that they retained the services of Atty. Cruz as
its in-house corporate counsel and corporate secretary. In the beginning, HDI's directors
and officers were pleased with Atty. Cruz's performance, thus, in time, he earned their
trust and confidence that he was eventually tasked to handle the corporation's important
and confidential matters. Ultimately, Atty. Cruz became a friend to most of HDI's
directors, officers and staff members.

However, HDI lamented that Atty. Cruz's seeming friendliness was apparently a mere
facade in order to gain the trust of HDI's officers and directors for his financial gain. HDI
averred that through Atty. Cruz's deception and machinations, he managed to
misappropriate a total of P41,317,167.18, in the following manner:
1. Misappropriation of the cash bid and unpaid personal loans;
2. Deceiving HDI as to the true selling price of the Quezon City property which
resulted in overpayment, remain unpaid;
3. Fabricating a fictitious sale by executing a fictitious contract to sell and deed of
sale in order to obtain money from HDI, remain unpaid;
4. Collecting rental payments, without authority and thereafter failed to turn over to
HDI, and
5. Executing fake Secretary’s Certificate appointing himself as authorized person to
receive the payment of lease rentals.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Cruz be disbarred from practice of law for
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Rules 16.01, 16.02, 16.03,
16.04 and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The IBPBoard of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Cruz is guilty of violation of CPR?

RULING: YES.

In the instant case, Atty. Cruz has chosen to remain silent despite the severity of the
allegations against him. He was given several opportunities to comment on the charges
yet no comment came. Silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied
admission of the truth thereof. Consequently, we are left with no choice but to deduce
his implicit admission of the charges levelled against him. Qui tacet consentive videtur.
Silence gives consent.

We find that the evidence submitted by HDI, albeit secondary evidence only being mere
photocopies, when put together with Atty. Cruz' written confession and his subsequent
non-cooperation during the proceedings before the IBP, would give a convincing
conclusion that indeed Atty. Cruz is guilty of said reprehensible acts.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE

LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Good moral character is necessary for a lawyer to practice the profession. An attorney
is expected not only to be professionally competent, but to also have moral integrity.
Atty. Cruz failed in these respects as a lawyer.

This Court also sees it fit to note that the CPR strongly condemns Atty. Cruz's conduct
in handling the funds of HDI.

Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the Code provides:

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those others kept by him.

The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on
the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from his client. In this case, he should promptly account to the client how the money
was spent. If he does not use the money for its intended purpose, he must immediately
return it to the client.

Records reveal that he likewise violated Canon. 16.04 of the CPR, which states that "[a]
lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling/or the client."
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction
must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The measure of good faith
which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher
standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arm’s length.

This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy
position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no
presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney's
favor. Clearly, in the instant case, Atty. Cruz's acts of contracting unsecured personal
loans and receiving money as loan proceeds from HDI, and thereafter failing to pay the
same are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing.

We, thus, likewise tind Atty. Cruz equally liable for violating Canon 7 of the CPR which
reads: Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

The Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to
maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith and confidence in the judicial system
is ensured.

Considering the above-cited infractions, it is, thus, beyond dispute that Atty. Cruz
demonstrated not just disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the
trust of his client and, in general, the public. For taking advantage of the trust and
confidence of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct and
fraudulent acts for personal gain, and disrespecting the IBP due to non-compliance of
its directive to file comment, His acts constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his
office as attorney. His propensity to defraud his client, and the public in general, render
him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar. Atty.
Cruz, indeed, deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.

Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and
confidence reposed in them by their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court found them guilty of gross misconduct
and disbarred them.

Fallo: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. EMMANUEL

CRUZ, guilty of gross misconduct by violating the Canon of Professional Responsibility
through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, and willful disobedience of lawful
orders rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession. He is
thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off of the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately.