STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Others: Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
Caltex vs Palomar GR# L-19650, Sept 29, 1966 “GIFT ENTERPRISE” law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
TOPIC: “noscitur a sociis” (-term under a construction should be intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact
accorded with the nature of the word associated therewith) that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law
Facts: G.R. No. L-12560 September 30, 1958
Caltex created a promo where the criteria of which is to estimate the JOSE ROBLES, petitioner-appellant, [Link] CHROMITE
no. of liters within each hooded Caltex gas stations. Without any fee MINING COMPANY, ET AL “MINERAL LAND”
or consideration, it is open to all vehicle owners and/or licensed
TOPIC: Where the law does not distinguish, we should not
drivers.
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
There are 3 stages of the contest:
Facts:
1st stage- Dealer Contest
2nd stage-Regional Stage (1st prize winner of the dlr stage is raffled) Zambales Chromite Mining Company had a contract with Jose Robles
3rd stage-National Stage (1st prize winners of Reg’l stage are raffled) allowing the latter to mine and sell ores from the said properties
upon payment of royalties, which it failed to do. The Mining
Foreseeing that this contest would involve the extensive use of mails company filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Jose Robles.
for publicizing and for communication, they seek clearance from the
Post Office from the ff set rules of the Revised Administrative Code How it came to SC: Robles filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
involving mails prohibiting the mailing of: the ground that the Justice of Peace did not have jurisdiction, which
was denied. He then again filed a petition for certiorari in the Court
Sec. 1954- any form advertising…to convey any information of 1st Instance quoting that the “land” mentioned in Section 1 Rule
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending 72 did not included mineral land.
in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any scheme, device, or
enterprise for obtaining any money or property of any kind by Issue: If the meaning of the word “land” is all-encompassing to all
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or kinds of lands.
promises.
Held: The appeal was ruled against Robles with costs.
HOW IT CAME TO SC: The Postmaster declined to grant clearance as
Ratio: Any land spoken of in this provision obviously includes all
the scheme falls into the aforesaid. “it is nevertheless a "gift
kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential or mineral. It is a well
enterprise" which is equally banned by the Postal Law
known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does not
Caltex thereupon invoked judicial intervention by filing the present distinguish, we should not distinguish.
petition for declaratory relief praying "that judgment be rendered
declaring its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the G.R. No. 161090 July 4, 2012
Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of
SPOUSES ROMEO LL. PLOPENIO and ROSIELINDA PLOPENIO
the mails. Trial court rendered judgment that the petition does not
represented by GAVINO PLOPENIO, Petitioners,
violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the
vs.
public distribution of the said rules by the mails, to which the
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and LAND BANK OF THE
respondent appealed.
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. “LOW VALUE LAND” “WRONG COURT”
Issues: How is “gift enterprise” defined in this case?
Topic: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.
Decision: Contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we
would brand it as a lottery.
Ratio: Facts: Petitioner-spouses and Edwardo owns 11.8643 and 22.8349
hectares of coconut land, respectively, In 2000, the land of
The Court used the principle of “noscitur a sociis” (-term under a their brother Gavino Plopenio was valued by the Department of
construction should be accorded with the nature of the word Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) at ₱51,125.60 per
associated therewith) hectare. On this basis, petitioners offered their entire landholdings to
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition and
in order to determine the meaning of the phrase “gift enterprise”. In
distribution pursuant to Republic Act No. R.A. 6657.
the Postal Law, it is associated with term “lottery”.
Land Bank then sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing
In a decided case, in 1922, the term lottery is defined as having 3
the land of at much lower price -petitioner-spouses at ₱23,485.00
elements First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.
per hectare and that of petitioner Eduardo at
Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so
₱22,856.62 per hectare.
also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed, which in this
case, it is clear that the proposed contest has not imposed.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners rejected the Notice G.R. No. L-2783 November 29, 1950
of Valuation and Acquisition and referred the matter to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur. EULOGIO R. LERUM and VIOLA FERNANDO, petitioners-appellants;
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, necessary party,
The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank in a Decision vs. “JUDGE’S TESTIMONY”
dated 5 September 2002, a copy of which petitioners received on 27 ROMAN A. CRUZ, ELENA MUÑOZ and NELLO Y. ROA, respondents-
September 2002. appellees.
14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for Definition: Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person
Reconsideration which was denied. The denial decision was received interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
on Dec. 21, 2002. Separate petitions before the Special Agrarian executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
Court-RTC were filed 16 days after their receipt of the PARAD’s order. construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order
or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties
They explained that they were allowed to file their appeal 15 days thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is
from the receipt of the Order and since the 15th day fell on a the question of construction or validity of the provisions in an
Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to file their instrument or statute.
appeal until 6 January 2003.
Topic: expressio unius est exclussio alterius "the expression of one
SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had already attained thing is the exclusion of the other".
finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time.
Facts: Attorneys Lerum and Fernando as private prosecutors filed a
From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed petition for declaratory relief for the purpose of testing the
the instant Petitions for Review to Supreme Court which was not in sufficiency and probative value of the testimony of former Judge
accordance with the rules of appeals as stated in the Comprehensive Roman A. Cruz to prove a decree of divorce issued by him.
Agrarian Reform Law.
The judge served as a witness in the bigamy case of Nello Y. Roa, to
Sec. 60-An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special prove that his wife Elena Munoz already secured a decree of divorce
Agrarian Courts by filing a petition for review with the Court of against Roa. The prosecution objected to this move of the defendant,
Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the but the objection was overruled, and so the prosecution filed a
decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final. petition for a writ of prohibition with this court praying that the
The petitioners argued that their petition raise only pure questions respondent judge be enjoined from allowing the defendant to prove
of law, thus it should be filed in SC. the alleged decree of divorce by oral evidence.
Issue: Whether the appeal has any merit. How it came to SC: The prosecution moved for the striking out of
the above testimony of Judge Cruz, and when the motion was
Held: The appeal has no merit, being it filed in the wrong court. It denied, the prosecution again brought the case to this Court
should have been filed at the Court of Appeals as provided by the through certiorari (G. R. No. L-2483), and again the petition was
law. denied. To prove the alleged decree of divorce by oral evidence
proved futile, the private prosecution filed the present petition for
Ratio: While the general rule is that appeals raising pure questions of declaratory relief to SC.
law from decisions of RTCs are taken to this Court the law expressly
states that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals Issue: Whether the subject matter which they want to be tested is
without making a distinction between appeals raising questions of among those mentioned in section 1, rule 66, of the Rules of Court.
fact and those dealing purely with questions of law. (NO)
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law Section 1, rule 66, of the Rules of Court
does not distinguish, neither should we
Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will,
Right to appeal must be exercised only in the manner and in contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected
accordance with the provisions of the law authorizing its exercise. by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any
________________________________________________________ question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or
statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." This
means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant
declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is
deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est
exclussio alterius.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963 G.R. No. 100970 September 2, 1992
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and JULIA
Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of SURPOSA, respondents. “INSURANCE; MURDER”
the Central Bank, respondents. “UREA & FORMALDEHYDE”
TOPIC: "expresso unius exclusio alterius" the expression of one
Topic: Enrolled-bill theory thing is the exclusion of the other
Facts: Petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General “Contra proferentem”- Any clause considered to be
denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical ambiguous should be interpreted against the interest of the party
Co., Inc. on its paid marginal fees for foreign exchange transactions that created it.
on its purchase of urea and formaldehyde---major raw products for
the synthetic resin glue it manufactures. Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular Carlie Surposa was insured with petitioner Finman General
No. [Link] to the provisions in RA 2609, fixing a uniform Assurance Corporation. He died as a result of a stab wound inflicted
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. As a result, by one of the three (3) unidentified men without provocation and
petitioner paid the margin fees amounting to P33,765.42 and warning on the part of the former.
P6,435.72. Later, they promulgated a memorandum establishing the
procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said Private respondent and the other beneficiaries of said insurance
fee, thus, the Petitioner sought a refund for their payments on the policy filed a written notice of claim with the petitioner insurance
grounds that the Resolution 1529 of the Monetary Board of the said company which denied said claim contending that murder and
Bank, declares that the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is assault are not within the scope of the coverage of the insurance
exempt from said fees. policy.
The Auditor of the Central Bank refused to pass in audit and approve They filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission, finding the
said vouchers for exemption on the grounds that the Sec. 2 of RA Insurance company liable to pay P15,000 the proceeds, with legal
2609 provides for the exemption of “urea formaldehyde” and not interest.
“urea” and “formaldehyde” The petitioner appealed, but the appellate court affirmed the
National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through decision of the Insurance Commission.
its Commissioner, the view that: Hence, petitioner filed petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin discretion on the part of the appellate court in applying the principle
formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea of "expresso unius exclusio alterius" in a personal accident insurance
and formaldehyde. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished policy since death resulting from murder and/or assault are impliedly
product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and excluded in said insurance policy considering that the cause of death
"formaldehyde". of the insured was not accidental but rather a deliberate and
intentional act.
When Petitioner contended that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms Issue:
"urea" and "formaldehyde", and they intended to exempt "urea" and Whether murder is not part of “accidents” being it an intentional act.
"formaldehyde" separately citing the statements made on the floor
of the Senate, the SC ruled that these “statements do not necessarily Whether the appellate court erred in using principle of "expresso
reflect the view of the Senate.” Much less do they indicate the unius exclusio alterius"
intent.
Held by SC: Petition for certiorari with restraining order and
Issue: WON “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
paymentof the margin fee.
Ratio:
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive - 1st issue-
on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of The terms "accident" and "accidental" as used in insurance contracts
separation of powers, the remedy is by amendment or curative have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the
legislation, not by judicial decree. courts in their ordinary and common acceptation.
Ruling: The decision appealed from was affirmed with costs against Accident means that which happen by chance or fortuitously,
petitioner. without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and
unforeseen.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The insured died from an event that took place without his foresight Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court which set
or expectation, an event that proceeded from an unusual effect of a aside the Municipal Trial Court's decision and remanded the case to
known cause and, therefore, not expected. Neither can it be said the DARAB for further adjudication.
that where was a capricious desire on the part of the accused to
expose his life to danger considering that he was just going home Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail; hence, it
after attending a festival. appealed to respondent Court of Appeals but it was dismissed.
According to CA: There is a clear tenancy relationship between the
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that: plaintiff and the defendant, such that the defendant cannot be
ejected from the premises like a common squatter.
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract
shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. The defendant Herminigildo Pascual is occupying and working on the
land holding to help his mother, a bona-fide tenant. He is an
It is well settled that contracts of insurance are to be construed immediate member of the family and is entitled to work on the land
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. Thus Under Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by RA 2263, entitled An
ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be Act to Govern the Relations Between Landholders and Tenants of
interpreted in favor of its beneficiary Agricultural Lands (Leasehold and Share Tenancy), Section 5(a)
2nd issue- defines the term tenant, to wit:
The personal accident insurance policy involved herein specifically Sec. 5.
enumerated only ten (10) circumstances wherein no liability attaches (a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid
to petitioner insurance company. It did not include murder. available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
The appellate court used the principle of " expresso unius exclusio land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent
alterius" — the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
another thing. Since murder and assault, not having been expressly landholder …
included in the enumeration of the circumstances, therefore, they Similarly, the term "immediate farm household" is defined in the
are excluded. same section as follows:
Others: (o) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of
“Adhesion contracts”-only one party imposes the contract to another the tenant, and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or
for the other part not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help
him operate the farm enterprise.
_____________________________________________________
G.R. No. 120363 September 5, 1997 The defendant, although not the tenant himself, is afforded the
protection provided by law as his mother is already old and infirm
CECILLEVILLE REALTY and SERVICE CORPORATION, petitioner, and is allowed to avail of the labor of her immediate household. He
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIGILDO is entitled to the security of tenure accorded his mother. His having
PASCUAL, respondents. “TENANT” a house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the
tenancy.
Topic: Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure. Petitioner filed a review of Certiorari to SC.
Facts: The petition was with merit.
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation is owns the What petitioner impugns as erroneous is respondent court's
parcel of land where Ana Pascual, its tenant and his son gratuitous pronouncement which effectively granted private
Herminigildo Pascual lives, the latter occupying a portion thereof by respondent not only a home lot, but also the right to maintain
constructing his own concrete house separate from his mother’s. his own house in petitioner's small parcel of land8 despite the
fact that Ana Pascual, the adjudged bona-fide tenant, has
Despite repeated demands, private respondent refused to vacate previously been given a home lot and has an existing house
and insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is helping thereon.
his mother Ana Pascual, petitioner's tenant, to cultivate the land in
question. Issue: Whether the respondent has the right to build a dwelling
separate from the official tenant thereof.
Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit against private respondent
before the Municipal Trial Court Lies on the interpretation of
Municipal Trial Court ordered private respondent to vacate the land Ruling: The decision of the Municipal Trial Court was reinstated.
and to pay "the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees" and "another
sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of [the] complaint." Ratio:
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Section 22, paragraph 3, of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended by Rep. Two yrs. after, a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and
Act No. 2263. This section provides in full as follows: signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-law of the deceased,
accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross
Sec. 22 ignorance of the law and gross misconduct by ignoring the fact that
xxx xxx xxx the victim died, to which he contends, the proper judgment should
be Homicide.
(3) The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot
suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than 3 per cent of The respondent invoked Sec 2 of Rule 116 allowing an accuse to
the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one plead guilty for a lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is
thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a convenient necessarily included in the crime charged.
and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be Issue: Whether the judge was right in invoking the Rule 116, Sec 2
designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his and if it is right to apply the law in its literal meaning given the
dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals circumstances.
and engage in minor industries, the products of which shall accrue to
the tenant exclusively Held: No.
The law is unambiguous and clear. As clearly provided, only a tenant This literal application of the law would lead to injustice. The Civil
is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or Code5 admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at
maintain a house thereon. Under the law, therefore, we find private heart. In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice, Fiat
respondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to justice ruat coelum (Let justice be done though the heavens fall).
construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same
within the very small landholding of petitioner. The judge should have applied Art. 10: In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of Laws, it is presumed that the law
Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argument and making body intended right and justice to prevail.
allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm household to
construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more Others:
than one thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what -Because of this case, Rule 116 was amended—the lesser offense
private respondent wanted this Court to dole-out, then farms will be must be necessarily included in the crime charged.
virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses. How then
can there be "equitable division of the produce and income derived G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997
from the land" and "more efficient agricultural production"
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
Be it emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also vs.
entitled to the protection of the law as one of the purposes of COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by
the "Act" is "to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all
tenants and landholders". 13 The policy of social justice, we surnamed ABISTO, respondents. “OFFICIAL GAZETTE”
reiterate, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply
because it is committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for Topic: where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
the poor", as we said in Galay, et. al. v. Court of is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
Appeals, et. al. 14 "is an imperative of every humane society but room only for application.19 There is no alternative.
only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
Facts:
privilege."
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration ,m. of his title. But he died in the pendency of his
Panfilo Amatan vs Judge Aujero, Admin Matter # petition. His heirs, substituted as applicants.
RTJ-93-956, Sept 27, 1995 “ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE” The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989
dismissed the petition "for want of jurisdiction” noting that the
Topic: Fiat justice ruat coelum "Let justice be done though the applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of
heavens fall. The maxim signifies the belief that justice must be PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
realized regardless of consequences Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Exhibit "E" was only published in the Official Gazette. This was a
Facts: Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" shot dead a certain Genaro requirement of procedural due process.
Tagsip with deliberate intent to kill. During arraignment of the said
case, Meon and the wife of the victim, in the acquiescence of Judge CA: Respondents appealed the decision to the CA which set aside
Aujero, entered into plea bargaining, where it was agreed that the the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the
accuse will plead guilty to the lesser offense Attempted Homicide title in the name of Teodoro Abistado, ruling that the publishing of
instead of homicide. the initial hearing is merely procedural, and not mandatory.
The respondent Judge Aujero promulgated his decision finding the The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General elevated
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Attempted Homicide. this recourse to the Supreme Court.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Legal basis: Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 themselves solidarily liable to indemnify Luzon Surety Co. Inc. against
any and all damages, costs and and other expenses which the
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, petitioner may sustain or incur in consequence of having become
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest and attorney's fees
the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier related to the loan.
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the
order. 3) On April 27, 1956, PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez
and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of PhP4,577.95, in
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application interest, attorney’s fees and other costs.
for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting. 4) On August 8, 1957, Luzon Surety Co. instituted a third party
complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia.
5) On September 17, 1958, a judgment was rendered ordering
1. By publication. — Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay PNB in solidarity. The same
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial decision likewise ordered the third party defendants Chavez, Garcia
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice and Lacson to pay Luzon Surety Co. the amount to be paid to PNB.
of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and 6) On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to
once in a newspaper of general circulation in the satisfy the claim of the petitioner. A writ of garnishment was soon
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official issued levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said spouses from their sugar plantation.
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest
in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, 7) Spouses Garcia filed a suit for injunction and the trial court ruled
and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all in favor of them.
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. 8.) Luzon Surety petitioned to CA, which the CA affirmed the decision
of the court of 1st instance, leading to Luzon Surety elevating the
case to SC for petition for review.
Issue: Whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general Issue:
circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and
register the title of private respondents. (no) WON the Conjugal Property of Gains could be liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party
Ratio: The law used the term "shall" which denotes an imperative in favour of a surety agreement.
and this indicates the mandatory character of the statute.
Held:
Land registration is a proceeding in rem. 1 An in rem proceeding is
No. Art. 151. Civil Code
validated essentially through publication. This being so, the process
must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be
barred from contesting an application which they had no knowledge (1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
of. He must prove his title against the whole world. benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally
The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this bind the partnership;
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under Art.
or equivocation; there is room only for application.19 There is no 161 is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the
alternative. husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There
must be the requisite showing then of some advantage
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., petitioner, vs. JOSEFA AGUIRRE DE which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. While Garcia by
GARCIA, VICENTE GARCIA and the FOURTH DIVISION OF THE thus signing the agreement may be said to enhance his reputation,
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. “CONJUGAL PROPERTY; such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and
GUARANTOR” fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. Its
language is clear; it does not admit of doubt. No process of
Facts: interpretation or construction need be resorted to. It peremptorily
calls for application.
1) Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co. Inc.,
executed a surety bond in favor of PNB Victorias Branch to guaranty
[G.R. No. L-14787. January 28, 1961.]
a crop loan granted by the latter to Chavez inthe sum of PhP9,000.
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.
2) Vicente Garcia, together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as AUDITOR GENERAL and ISMAEL MATHAY as
Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding
AUDITOR OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
TOPIC: ejusdem generis "general terms may be restricted by specific AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
words, with the result that the general language will be limited by
ELECTIONS, respondent. “GADGET; JINGLE”
the specific language” where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of specific terms, the general word or phrase is held This was a special civil action for prohibition to assail the
to refer to things of the same kind or class as those specified
validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on
and "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos" Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for
FACTS: Colgate Palmolive sought for a refund of the 17% special
campaign purposes.
excise tax it paid on its foreign exchange transactions involving
(Read Jeorgie’s Case Digest)
importation of stabilizer and flavor for the manufacture of dental
care products based on the Exchange Tax Law.
Of the P 113k amount it sought for refund, only P 23,958 was
approved by the OIC of the Exchange Tax Administration of the LYDIA O. CHUA , petitioner, vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE
Central Bank on its purchase import of irish moss extract, sodium COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION
benzoate and precipitated calcium carbonate. ADMINISTRATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
However, the Auditor of the Central Bank refused to approve the MANAGEMENT, respondent. “CONTRACTUAL”
amount assessed to be refunded, and posits that the term “stabilizer
TOPICS:
and “ flavors” in the stated in the exemption, refers only to food
products. This is based apparently on the rule of construction--- Doctrine of Necessary Implication: What is implied
"general terms may be restricted by specific words, with the result in the statute is as much a part thereof as that which
that the general language will be limited by the specific language.”
is expressed
Therefore, “stabilizer and flavors” should be construed as one of the
same class as the specific words for which it is associated.
In eo plus sit, simper inest et minus (the greater
includes the lesser)
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter affirmed
the Auditor of CB’s decision. It moved for reconsideration, but
denied by the Auditor Gen., thus, this case was brought to the SC. Petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil
action for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the
Issue: Whether “stabilizer and flavors” for manufacture of dental
benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683 which provides
care products do not fall under the exemption as provided by the
Exchange tax law.
for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation
from the government service as well as for involuntary
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the separation due to reorganization.
respondents are hereby ordered to audit petitioner's applications for
refund which were approved by the Officer-In-Charge of the Coverage:
Exchange Tax Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13.
-all appointive officials and employees of the
Ratio: National Government,
-including government-owned or controlled
It is, in our opinion, that the rule used by the Auditor General is
applicable only to cases where, except for one general term, all the corporations with original charters,
items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. -as well as the personnel of all local government
units.
But this is not true in the aforesaid case, as there are other terms - all regular, temporary, casual and emergency
that does not fall under the category of food—ex. Fertilizer, poultry
employees, regardless of age
feed.
-who have rendered at least 2 years
Thus, on the basis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot
validly be maintained that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in Petitioner, a contractual employee of NIA , filed an
the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to application with NIA. NIA, however, denied the same.
those used in the manufacture of food and food products Petitioner wrote a letter of reconsideration to Civil Service
This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lex non distinguit nec Commission, contending that law merely requires that a
nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, government employee whether regular, temporary,
neither do we distinguish". emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of
government service in order to be entitled to its benefits,
Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors"
which she is more than qualified for.
used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture
of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any CSC RESPONSE
distinction and must construe the words in their general sense
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The CSC in response emphasized that the petitioner’s A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil
employment was co-terminus with the NIA project which is servant, like casual and emergency employees. We
contractual in nature. see no solid reason why the latter are extended
benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the
RA 6683 does not contemplate employees in the
former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No.
coverage.
6683 expressly extends its benefits for early
CSC AND NIA reiterated, retirement to regular, temporary, casual and
emergency employees. But specifically excluded
Petitioner’s employment is coterminous with the from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the
project per appointment hence the completion of AFP including those of the PC-INP.
the project, petitioner’s position became functus expressio unius est exclusio alterius
officio (no further official effect) casus omissus pro omisso habendus est
Her position is not included in its regular plantilla Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in
The express purpose of the law is to reorganize the incongruities and in a violation of the equal protection clause
government, it will not have any application to of the Constitution.
special projects which only exist for a short time.
The maxim to be used in this case is the doctrine of
LYDIA CHUA necessary implication which recognizes that no
statute can be enacted that can provide all the
July 1, 1980-she went to NIA-Watershed Mgt. and details involved in its application. There is always an
Erosion Control project as TEMPORARY EMPLOYEE. omission which may not meet a particular situation.
While in this project, her designation was changed to What is thought at the time of the enactment, to be
personnel asst. an all-embracing legislation may be inadequate to
Starting July 9, 1982, the status became PERMANENT provide for the unfolding events of the future.
until the completion of the project on Dec. 31, 1988 Doctrine of Necessary Implication: What is implied
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in 4 in the statute is as much a part thereof as that
successive projects during a span of 15 years which is expressed. Every stature is meant to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its objective and purpose. (Ex necessitate
NO substantial difference bet. Casual and legis)
Contractual. In eo plus sit, simper inest et minus (the greater
includes the lesser)
The law provides for “regular” personnels but is
unmindful that there is no such specie used in the public Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees:
sector only “temporary” and “permanent”. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
Further, the Admin Code categorizes employment in
the equal protection of the laws."
the public sector as “Career Service” and “Non-Career
Service” Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early
Retirement Law would violate the equal protection clause
Non-career:
WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE EQUAL TREATMENT OF THOSE
". . . (1) entrace on bases other than those of the SIMILARLY SITUATED. Since the contractual employees and
usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; casual employees bear no significant difference.
and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or
Held:
which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or
subject to his pleasure, Co-terminous or project personnel who have
rendered years of continuous service should be included in
CONTRACTUAL EMPLOYEE falls under Non-career
the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file
service.
their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as
Another type is the CASUAL EMPLOYEE where the long as they comply with CSC regulations
employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable Denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
tenure, sporadic and brief in nature. petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under
Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
oppressive. It would be a violation of the equal protection Dist. Engineer sought the opinion of the DPWH Legal
clause. Advisor, who opined that since Republic Act No.
__________________________________________________ 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the
Contractor's License Law, does not provide that a
contract entered into after the license has expired is
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the void and there is no law which expressly prohibits or
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, declares void such contract, the contract is
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL enforceable and payment may be paid.
TREASURER , petitioner , vs. CARLITO LACAP :
“Contractor” Repondent filed a complaint for Specific
Performance and Damages against Petitioner before
TOPIC: the RTC.
"plain meaning rule" or verba legis; Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on
Index animi sermo est (speech is the index of the grounds that the complaint states no cause of
intention)- presumption that the words employed action and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
by the legislature in a statute correctly express its nature of the action since respondent did not
intention or will and preclude the court from appeal to the COA the decision of the District
construing it Auditor to disapprove the claim. (Non-exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies)
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages filed RTC:
by Carlito Lacap (respondent) against the Republic of RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, and Motion for
the Philippines (petitioner) Reconsideration filed by the Petitioner. RTC Ruled
that the respondent be paid the amount of P475,000
Facts: plus interest at 12% from demand until fully paid.
Respondent, doing business under the name and
style Carwin Construction and Construction Supply Ratio:
(Carwin Construction), won in an “Invitation to bid” No one should enrich himself at the expense of
of the Dist. Engineer of Pampanga. another.
He was awarded the contract for the concreting of CA:
Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Petitioner raised the case to CA. CA sustained the
On September 25, 1992, Dist. Engr. Issued a Notice decision of the RTC applying the principle of
to Proceed with the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. estoppel.
The respondent undertook the works, made Principle of Estoppel- the actions of the government
advances for the purchase of the materials and is estopped from questioning the validity of the
payment of labor costs. Contract Agreement
October 29, 1992- Office of the District Engineer of
San Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final SC Held:
inspection of the project and found it 100% Since respondent had rendered services to the full
completed in accordance with the approved plans satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the
and specifications former should be compensated for them.
respondent sought to collect payment for the
Ratio:
completed project.
Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no
The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher in
man ought to be made rich out of another's injury)
favor of petitioner.
However, the DPWH withheld payment from
Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides:
respondent after the District Auditor of the
use an expired or revoked certificate or
Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final
license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and
release of funds on the ground that the contractor's
shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not
license of respondent had expired at the time of the
less than five hundred pesos but not more than five
execution of the contract.
thousand pesos.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit,
The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does nec nos distinguere debemos.
not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void
contracts entered into by a contractor whose
The adoption of the Local Government Code repealing clause
license had already expired.
reading as follows:
______________________________________________
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES executive orders, proclamations and administrative
CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
GAMING CORPORATION, respondents with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
PAGCOR was to establish and operate a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. Its local government vehemently opposed it by It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding
issuing two Ordinances prohibiting the issuance of business the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the
permits to such and prohibiting the operation of a casino itself. doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in
accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal
ISSUE/S: interpretation in favor of the local government units.
1. Whether or not Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of
under which subject Ordinances were issued, local the provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress (a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall
“gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any
2. Whether or not the Local Government Code repealed P.D. question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
1869, which gives PAGCOR power to operate casinos in the powers and of the lower local government unit .
country.
This Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and Held:
even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and
as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and
only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs. sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the
Background Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help gambling prohibited by law.
centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos
on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Court’s Ratio:
Gambling is not illegal per se.
CDO, as local political subdivision is empowered to enact there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that
Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what matter, even mentioning it at all. It is up to Congress
is known as the General Welfare Clause. which activities it deems illegal.
-authorizes the local government units to regulate Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
properties and businesses within their territorial limits government units are authorized to prevent or
in the interest of the general welfare. suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this
Petitioner argues: provision excludes games of chance which are not
by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.
Panlungsod may prohibit the operation and casinos Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, we conclude that
because they involve games of chance, which are since the word "gambling" is associated with "and
detrimental to the people. other prohibited games of chance," the word should
That the legislative power endowed to the LGU be read as referring to only illegal gambling which,
includes prohibition of all kinds of gambling, not only like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
“illegal gambling” prevented or suppressed
Code expressly authorized the local government units
to prevent and suppress gambling and other ON THE CONTRAVENTION OF ORDINANCES AGAINST PD
prohibited games of chance … it meant all forms of 1869
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
SC says, the ordinances contravene P.D. 1869 and the 2. The Revised Code was a new law. The Admin
public policy embodied in PAGCOR. Code provides that “no justice of the peace.”
Petitioner says, it is not the ordinances that Since the new law excluded the “justice of the
contravenes the PD as an ordinance cannot prevail peace,” the intention of the framers was to
against a statute. Their theory is that the change has
exclude “justice of the peace”
been made by the Local Government Code itself,
which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority.
Ruling: Issue: Whether the justice of peace is not included in
-If we allow that Local govt. the choice to prevent the prohibition of Sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code.
and suppress gambling, PAGCOR will have no more
games of chance to regulate or centralize as they Held: They are included in the prohibition as
must all be prohibited by the local government units enumerated.
pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them
by the Code. PAGCOR cannot continue to exist Ratio:
except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant
In contrast to the argument of the respondent,
and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a
Cassus omisus can operate only if the omission has
prime source of government revenue through the
operation of casinos. been clearly established. In this case, it was not
omitted, but replace it with the word “judge”. The
Expresso unios est exclusio alterius— intention was to replace the word with a broader term,
-The LGC enumerates the PDs and special laws that not to omit it.
it repeals in the “Repealing Clause”. This did not The broader term “judge” constitutes all kinds
include PD 1869. of judges.
“The strict construction of a criminal statute
Harmonizing to Avoid Conflicts:
Instead of pitting one statute against another in an
does not mean such construction of it as to deprive it of
inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be
exert every effort to reconcile them. construed in the sense which best harmonizes with
- On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. their intent and purpose."
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to The purpose of the said law is to not further
uphold one and annul the other but to give
weaken the weakest link of the judiciary who is the
effect to both by harmonizing them if possible.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances justice of the peace court by allowing them to engage in
should not contravene a statute is obvious. partisan political activities.
- Municipal governments are only agents of the
national government.
- The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
Implied Repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intention.
People v. Manantan
Manantan was a judge of peace charged with
violation of the Revised Election Code for
“electioneering”
Sec 54. No justice , judge, fiscal, treasurer….
Respondent’s arguments:
1. Justice of Peace is not included in the list.
Revised Election Code omitted the words
“justice of the peace” (Cassus Omisus)