REMEDIAL

LAW REVIEW 1
CASE DIGESTS
based on Atty. Henedino Brondial‘s
2020-2021 Syllabus and cases mentioned
during lectures
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

DISCLAIMER

The cases digested herein are those included in Atty. Henedino Brondial‘s syllabus on Remedial Law
Review 1 for the School Year 2020-2021 and those cases mentioned during his lectures. For easy
identification, those cases that are not in his syllabus but were mentioned during his class are marked
in red.

Best efforts were made to complete the digests of cases in said syllabus, but due to lack of time,
some cases will not be included in this work or if included, are not so exhaustive.

The digests are merely tailored based on the understanding of the writers, and are digested based on
the cues that the authors see fit in order to remind themselves of certain facts and circumstances.
These are not, in any way, ―recitation ready‖ digests. Thus, it is imperative, and presumed,
disputably, that the reader had already read the full text of the cases.

As there is a shortage of time, considering that as for our section only had one (1) meeting dedicated
for Criminal Procedure, only a few cases had been included in the Criminal Procedure portion of
this compilation.

We do not guaranty the absolute correctness of this work due to human errors and failure to
understand the case or doctrine perfectly. We apologize in advance for any error you may encounter
in this work.

However, please see to it that the error is an opportunity to learn, as Dean Jose Sundiang puts it
―The beauty of an error is to correct it, and not to perpetuate it.‖

2|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CIVIL PROCEDURE

JURISDICTION OF REGULAR COURTS …………………………………………….1

Sandiganbayan …………………………………………………………………………… 1
Serana v. SB ………………………………………………………………………………. 1
Duncano v. SB ……………………………………………………………………………. 4
De Lima v. Guerrero ……………………………………………………………………… 6
Court of Tax Appeals …………………………………………………………………….. 8
City of Manila v. Judge Cuerdo ………………………………………………………….. 8
CE Casecnan Water & Energy Co. v. Province of Nueva Ecija ……………………….. 11
Sharia‘h Courts …………………………………………………………………………… 13
Lomondot v. Balindong ………………………………………………………………….. 13
Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindong ………………………………………………….. 15
Court-Martial ……………………………………………………………………………... 17
Ombudsman v. Mislang. ………………………………………………………... 17

OTHER KINDS OF JURISDICTION ………………………………………………… 21

Residual Jurisdiction …………………………………………………………………….. 21
DBP v. Carpio …………………………………………………………………………….. 21
Equity Jurisdiction ……………………………………………………………………….. 23
Regulus Dev. Inc. v. Dela Cruz ………………………………………………………….. 23

OTHER CASES ON: ……………………………………………………………………..26

RESIDUAL PREROGATIVES …………………………………………………………. 26
Katon v. Palanca ………………………………………………………………………….. 26

RULES 1 TO 5 ……………………………………………………………………………. 29
ACTIONS: COMMENCEMENT ……………………………………………………… 29
Alday v. FGU Insurance …………………………………………………………………..29

RULE 6; KINDS OF PLEADINGS …………………………………………………….. 32

Alba v. Malapajo ………………………………………………………………………….. 32
Lim Teck Chuan v. Uy …………………………………………………………………… 37
Metrobank v. CPR Promotions ………………………………………………………….. 40
Valdez v. Dabon ………………………………………………………………………….. 43
Republic v. Sandiganbayan ……………………………………………………………… 44
Caneland Sugar Corp. v. Alon …………………………………………………………… 49

RULE 7; PARTS AND CONTENTS OF A PLEADING …………………………….. 51

Alma Jose v. Javellana ……………………………………………………………………. 51
Medado v. Heirs of Antonio Consing …………………………………………………… 55
COA v. Paler ……………………………………………………………………………… 60
Basan v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. ……………………………………………… ……… 62
Uy v. CA …………………………………………………………………………............... 65
People v. Arrojado ………………………………………………………………………... 68
Powerhouse v. Rey ………………………………………………………………………. 71
Heirs of Josefina Gabriel v. Segundina Cebrero ………………………………............. 75

RULE 8; MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADINGS …………….. 77

3|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Fernando Medical Enterprises v. Wesleyan University of the Philippines …………… 77
Go Tong Electrical Supply v. BPI Family Savings Bank ……………………………… 81
Asian Const. & Dev. Corp. v. CA ……………………………………………………….. 84
Benguet Exploration Inc. v. CA ………………………………………………………… 87

RULE 9; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD ……………………………………….. 90

BDO v. Tansipek ………………………………………………………………………… 90
Salvador v. Rabaja ……………………………………………………………………….. 93
Bitte v. Jonas ……………………………………………………………………………… 98

RULE 10; AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS …………………….. 100

Yujuico v. United Resources Asset Mgt. Corp. …………………………………………. 100
Lisam Enterprises v. BDO ………………………………………………………………. 103
Tiu v. PBCom …………………………………………………………………………….. 107
Remington Industrial Sales Corp. v. CA ……………………………………………….. 110

RULE 13; FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS,

JUDGMENTS, AND OTHER PAPERS ……………………………………………….. 112
Palileo v. Planters Dev. Bank ……………………………………………………………. 112
Heirs of Numeriano Miranda v. Miranda ………………………………………………. 116

RULE 14; SUMMONS …………………………………………………………………… 119

Valmonte v. CA …………………………………………………………………………… 119
Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp., v. Tan …………………………………………………... 122
E.B. Villarosa vs. Benito …………………………………………………………………. 125
Santos v. PNOC Exploration ……………………………………………………………. 127
Mason v. CA ………………………………………………………………………………. 130
Jose v. Boyon ………………………………………………………………………………133
Manotoc v. CA ……………………………………………………………………………. 135
Ong v. Co …………………………………………………………………………………. 138
Domagas v. Jensen ……………………………………………………………………….. 141
Dole Phil. v. Quilala ……………………………………………………………………… 144
Green Star Express v. Nissin Universal Robina Corp ………………………………….. 146
Guy v. Gacott ……………………………………………………………………………... 148
G.V. Florida Transit Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation …………………………... 151
VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE ………………………………………………………… 157
Sunrise Garden Corp. v. CA ……………………………………………………………… 157
Tujan-Militante v. Nustad ……………………………………………………………….. 160

RULE 15; MOTIONS ……………………………………………………………………. 162

Republic v. Dimarucut …………………………………………………………………… 162
Acampado v. Cosmilla …………………………………………………………………… 165
Laude v. Gines-Jabalde …………………………………………………………………... 169
De Guzman v. Ochoa ……………………………………………………………………. 172

RULE 17; DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS …………………………………………………. 175

Blay v. Bana ………………………………………………………………………………. 175
Lim Tech Chuan …………………………………………………………………………. 178
Ching v. Cheng …………………………………………………………………………… 181

4|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULE 19; INTERVENTION …………………………………………………………… 187
Ombudsman v. Sison …………………………………………………………………….. 187
Ombudsman v. Chavez ………………………………………………………………….. 190
Anonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Jalandoni ……………………………………………… 193
Rodriguez v. CA ………………………………………………………………………….. 195
Fernandez v. CA ………………………………………………………………………….. 199
Yao v. Perello ……………………………………………………………………………... 202
Pinlac v. CA ………………………………………………………………………………..205
Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio ……………………………………………………………... 208

RULE 23; DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTIONS …………………………………… 211

People v. M.C. Sergio and J. Lacanilao …………………………………………………. 211
Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes ……………………………………………………. 215
People v. Webb …………………………………………………………………………… 220
Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos ……………………………………………………………… 223
Disini v. Sandiganbayan …………………………………………………………………. 225
Go v. People ………………………………………………………………………………. 229

RULE 25; INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES …………………………………….. 232

Phil. Health v. Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital ………………………………………… 232

RULE 31; CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE ……………………………………. 235

CONSOLIDATION …………………………………………………………………….. 235
Republic v. Heirs of Enrique Oribello ………………………………………………….. 235
Marano v. Pryce Gases Inc. ……………………………………………………………… 238
SEVERANCE ……………………………………………………………………………. 240
Metrobank v. Sandoval …………………………………………………………………… 240

RULE 33; DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE …………………………………………….. 244

Bernardo v. CA …………………………………………………………………………… 244
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Del Rosario ……………………………………………….. 247
Cabador v. People ………………………………………………………………………… 249
Claudio v. Saraza …………………………………………………………………………. 251
Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corp. …………………………………………………… 253
Republic v. Gimenez ……………………………………………………………………... 255
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People …………………………………………………………….. 260

RULES 34 AND 35; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS/

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ………………………………………………………………. 265
Republic v. Shell Petroleum Corp. ……………………………………………………… 265
Comglas Corp. v. Santos Car Check Center …………………………………………… 269
PBCom v. Go …………………………………………………………………………….. 271
Adolfo v. Adolfo ………………………………………………………………………….. 275

RULE 36; JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS, AND ENTRY THEREOF ………….. 279
FASAP v. PAL …………………………………………………………………………….. 279

RULE 37; NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION ………………………………… 284

Mendezona v. Ozamis …………………………………………………………………… 284
People v. Li Ka Kim ……………………………………………………………………… 287
5|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua ………………………………………………….. ……… 289
Chua v. People …………………………………………………………………… ……… 292
Senit v. People ……………………………………………………………………………. 296

RULE 40; APPEAL FROM MTC TO RTC ……………………………………………. 300

De Vera v. Santiago ………………………………………………………………………. 300

RULE 41; APPEAL FROM RTC TO CA ………………………………………………. 303

Heirs of Arturo Garcia v. Municipality of Iba ………………………………………….. 303

RULE 42; PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM RTC TO CA …………………………. 305

Maravilla v. Rios ………………………………………………………………………….. 305

RULE 43; APPEALS FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO CA ………………. 308

Galindez v. Firmalan …………………………………………………………………….. 308

RULE 44; ORDINARY APPEALED CASES ………………………………………….. 310

De los Santos v. Lucenio ………………………………………………………………… 310

RULE 45; APPEAL BY CERTIORARI ………………………………………………… 313

Mendoza v. Palugod ……………………………………………………………………… 313
Kensonic, Inc. vs. UNI-Line Multi Resources …………………………………………. 317

RULE 50; DISMISSAL OF APPEAL …………………………………………………… 321

Valderama vs. Arguelles………………………………………………………………….. 321
Fortune Life Insurance vs. COA ………………………………………………………… 325

REMEDIES AGAINST EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS ……………………………… 327

RULE 38; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS ……………………………………………. 327
Mesina v. Meer …………………………………………………………………………… 327
The Provincial Government of Aurora v. Marco ……………………………………….. 332
Thomasites Center for International Studies v. Rodriguez ……………………………. 335
RULE 47; ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT …………………………………………. 338
Diona v. Balanque ……………………………………………………………………….. 338
Santos v. Santos …………………………………………………………………………... 341
Yuk Lik Ong v. Co ……………………………………………………………………….. 343
Lasala v. NFA …………………………………………………………………………….. 346
Manguba v. Morga-Seva …………………………………………………………………. 350
Sibal v. Bquel ……………………………………………………………………………... 353

RULE 39; EXECUTION AND SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS ………………. 355

KINDS OF EXECUTION ……………………………………………………………… 355
Banez v. Banez …………………………………………………………………………… 355
Santos v. COMELEC …………………………………………………………………….. 357
FEBTC v. Toh ……………………………………………………………………………. 360
Stronghold Insurance v. Felix ………………………………………………………….... 363
Abenion v. Shell Petroleum ……………………………………………………………… 366
Ocampo v. Enriquez ……………………………………………………………………... 370
MODE OF EXECUTION ……………………………………………………………… 372
BY MOTION …………………………………………………………………………….. 372
Villareal v. MWSS ……………………………………………………………….. 372
6|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RCBC v. Sera ……………………………………………………………………. 375
BY INDEPENDENT ACTION ………………………………………………………... 377
Davis v. Davis …………………………………………………………………… 377
Panotes v. Townhouse Dev. Corp. …………………………………………….. 380
PROPERTIES EXEMPT FROM EXECUTIONS …………………………………… 382
D‘Armoured Security Agency v. Orpia ………………………………………………….. 382
THIRD PARTY CLAIM ………………………………………………………………… 385
PSALM v. Maunlad Homes, Inc. ………………………………………………………... 385
EFFECT OF JUDGMENT …………………………………………………………….. 388
City of Cebu v. Dedamo ………………………………………………………………….. 388
EFFECT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT ……………………………………………….. 390
Fujiki v. Marinay …………………………………………………………………………. 390
BPI v. Guevarra …………………………………………………………………………... 395

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

ON JURISDICTION ……………………………………………………………………. 400

HOW WAS THE OFFENSE/CRIME COMMITTED ………………………………. 400
De Lima v. Guerrero ……………………………………………………………………… 400
OTHER CASES ………………………………………………………………………….. 402
Duncano v. Sandiganbayan ……………………………………………………………… 402

RULE 110; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES ………………………………………… 404

SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (SEC. 6) ………………… 404
Miguel v. Sandiganbayan ………………………………………………………………… 404

RULE 111; PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS …………………………………… 406

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE
OFFENSE IS DEEMED INSTITUTED (SEC. 1) …………………………………… 406
Solidum v. People ………………………………………………………………………… 406

RULE 112; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION …………………………………….. 408

DEFINITION/DESCRIPTION ………………………………………………………. 408
Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr. …………………………………………………………………. 408
Burgundy Realty Corporation v. Reyes …………………………………………………. 411
WHO MAY CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ……………………… 413
Heirs of Nestor Tria v. Obias ……………………………………………………………. 413

RULE 114; BAIL ………………………………………………………………………… 418

Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia ………………… 418
Enrile v. Sandiganbayan …………………………………………………………………. 420

RULE 115; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED …………………………………………….. 424

RIGHT TO COUNSEL …………………………………………………………………. 424
People v. Lara …………………………………………………………………………….. 424

RULE 116; ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA ……………………………………………. 428

Daan v. Sandiganbayan ………………………………………………………………….. 428
People v. Janjalani ………………………………………………………………………... 431

RULE 117; MOTION TO QUASH …………………………………………………….. 433

7|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
People v. De Leon ………………………………………………………………………... 433

RULE 119; TRIAL ……………………………………………………………………….. 435

THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (RA 8493)
AS AMENDED BY OCA CIRCULAR NO. 101-2017 …………………………………. 435
Imperial v. Joson …………………………………………………………………………. 435
MODES OF DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES ………………………………….. 437
Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos ……………………………………………………………...437
THE ―STATE-WITNESS‖ RULE; REQUIREMENTS ……………………………… 439
People v. Dominguez …………………………………………………………………….. 439
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE …………………………………………………………. 442
Cabador v. People ………………………………………………………………………… 442

RULE 120; JUDGMENT ………………………………………………………………… 444

Abellana v. People ………………………………………………………………………... 444
Basilonia v. Villaruz ……………………………………………………………………….447

RULE 121; NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION ……………………………….. 450

Payumo v. Sandiganbayan ………………………………………………………………. 450

RULE 122-125; APPEALS ……………………………………………………………….. 452

Balaba v. People ………………………………………………………………………….. 452
People v. Olivo ……………………………………………………………………………. 454
Tiu v. People ……………………………………………………………………………… 456
Colinares v. People ……………………………………………………………………….. 457

RULE 126; SEARCH AND SEIZURE …………………………………………………. 459

Veridiano v. People ………………………………………………………………………. 459
Dimal v. People …………………………………………………………………………... 462

8|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

CIVIL PROCEDURE

JURISDICTION
Sandiganbayan (SB)
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA (Serana), petitioner v. SB and People of the Philippines,
respondents
GR 162059 22 January 2008
Petition for review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.:

―MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang
kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?‖

FACTS:

Serana, being then a student of the University of the Philippines – Cebu (UPC), was
appointed by then President Joseph Estrada (Estrada) to be the student regent of the
University of the Philippines (UP), whom will work with the Board of Regents (BOR) for
the year 2000.

Her successor, Kristine Clare Bugayong (Bugayong) and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary
General of the ―KASAMA sa UP‖, which is a student alliance of all student councils, filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property in the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) against Serana and her brother Jade Ian Serana (Ian), allegedly
under the following facts:

Serana through her registered Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc.
(OSFRI) received a total of Php15 million from Estrada, for the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP - Diliman (UPD).

The Ombudsman found probable cause for estafa commited by both Serana and Ian, and
thus filed an information against them on 3 July 2003 in the SB

In the SB:

Serana moved to quash the information on the following grounds:

a) Claimed that the SB has no jurisdiction over the:

1. Offense charged;

Anchored on ―Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act― (RA

3019) that the crime of estafa is NOT among those
crimes/offenses over which the SB has jurisdiction; and

1|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
2. Her person

That a ―student regent‖ is not among those public officers

subjected to the jurisdiction of the SB, as she merely
represented her peers and did not receive any salary.

In effect, she is NOT one of those mentioned as a ―Salary

Grade 27‖ who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
SB.

b) That the money came personally from Estrada, and NOT the government

Ombudsman opposed Serana‘s motion:

a. Anchored on “Revising PD 1486 creating a special court to be known as SB

and for other purposes” (PD 1606), Section 4(b) of which contains a catch-
all phrase “in relation to office”, which does NOT take into consideration the
salary grade.

b. That Serana is a public officer, as a member of the BOR, she is vested with
the general powers of administration and exercise of corporate powers

SB denied Serana‘s motion on 19 November 2003, and likewise the motion for
reconsideration (MR) on 4 February 2004

Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a ―student regent‖ is a public officer, and is within the
jurisdiction of the SB

RULING:

Yes, a student regent is among those who can be prosecuted by the SB. First and foremost,
on the issue of the necessity of compensation to be deemed as a public officer, the Court
defined a ―public officer‖:

―A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public.‖

Nowhere in the above stated definition is it required that compensation an element of a

―public office‖, but rather the fact of such position being conferred by law is sufficient. That
being the case, that Serana has been appointed by then President Estrada, she shall be
deemed as a ―public officer‖ regardless of the absence of compensation.
2|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Likewise, Serana argued that estafa is not among those crimes vested upon the jurisdiction of
the SB under RA 3019. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, jurisdiction of the SB
is determined by PD 1606, and cited the ―catch-all provision‖, to wit:

―Section. 4; Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:

xxx

(b) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including

those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office; x x x‖

In relation to the above cited provision, the public officer must be included in the
enumeration. Unluckily for the petitioner, her position is included:

―(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.‖

As she is a ―regent‖, she is deemed as a trustee, who is within the ambit of the SB‘s
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

3|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
DANILO A. DUNCANO (Duncano), petitioner v. HON. SB (2nd DIVISION) and HON.
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR (OSP), respondents
GR 191893 15 July 2015
Special Civil Action; Certiorari
Peralta, J.:

―As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over
the cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified
as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the
offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain
with the Sandiganbayan‖

FACTS:

The OSP filed a criminal case in the Ombudsman for violation of RA 6713 against
Duncano, then Regional Director (RD) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary
Grade 26 (SG 26), for failure to disclose assets in the ―Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SALN)‖, which includes, among others:

a) Financial/business interests (registered owner) in:

a. Documail Provides Corporation; and
b. Don Plus Trading;
b) Nissan Patrol

As such, prior to arraignment, Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Defer
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest in the SB, claiming that he is an RD with SG26 and
hence NOT subject to the jurisdiction of the SB.

The OSP opposed, on the ground that:

a) The SG27 requirement is applicable only to other executive officers, as the

conjunction used was “and” (RD and higher”), thus separating the RD from other
officers, and thus RD does NOT require SG27 to be within the jurisdiction of the SB;
and
b) The filing of the motion to dismiss is premature, considering that the SB has yet to
acquire jurisdiction over Duncano’s person.

The SB denied the motion, and likewise the MR was denied.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a RD, regardless of SG, is within the jurisdiction of the SB

RULING:

4|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
No, RD must be of SG27 to be deemed within the jurisdiction of the SB. The equivalent of
―regional director of higher‖ is meant by the committee as ―SG27 or higher‖, as evidenced
by the Sponsorship Speech of then Sec. Raul Roco.

The purpose of the law is to concentrate on the ―larger fish‖ rather than the ―small fry‖ in
order to declog the dockets of the court.

In this case, Duncano correctly cited, and is all fours, with the case of Cuyco v. SB where it
was held that the SB has no jurisdiction, as in the latter case, at the time of the commission
of the crime in 1992, the RD was classified as a Director II with a SG of 26, which in the
present case is evidenced by a certification from the BIR:

―…although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as

Director II with Salary Grade 26.‖

Thus, the application of the SG 27 or lower would not apply to Duncano, considering that a
―Regional Director‖ is not among those enumerated which may be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the SB regardless of the SG grade, as in the cases of RD, they MUST BE of
SG 27.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is

GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the
Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioner‘s Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

NOTE:

The following officers had been held as within the jurisdiction of the SB:

a) Member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod (People v. SB);

b) Department manager of Philhealth (Geduspan v. People);
c) Student regent of UP (Serana v. SB);
d) Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefit System’s (AFP-RSBS):
a. Head of the Legal Department (Vice President); and
b. Chief of Documentation (Assistant Vice President) (Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan)

5|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA (De Lima), petitioner v. HON. JUANITA GUERRERO
(Guerrero), et al., respondents
GR 229781 10 October 2017
Special Civil Actions; Certiorari and Prohibition
Velasco, Jr. J.

―Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in
relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the
Sandiganbayan‘s jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers.

In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as
drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the
public officials‘ office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive
jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the
technical aspect of drug-related cases. x x x

Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and
technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.‖

FACTS:

By virtue of investigations done by the Senate and the House of Representatives regarding
dangerous drug syndicates in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), four complaints were filed with
the Department of Justice (DOJ) against De Lima for unlawfully trafficking and trading
dangerous drugs inside it.

Eventually the DOJ Panel prepared Informations which were filed in the RTC of
Muntinlupa, under Presiding Judge Guerrero.

Despite De Lima‘s Motion to Quash the Information, Guerrero still issued a Warrant of
Arrest, which was effected against De Lima which led her being placed under the Philippine
National Police‘s (PNP‘s) custody.

Hence, a direct resort to the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over her case,
considering that she is a public officer, and thus the proper jurisdiction should be with the
SB in that the acts complained of are committed in relation to her office.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the SB has jurisdiction over drug cases involving public
officers

RULING:

No, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165.

6|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Drug cases are vested upon the jurisdiction of the RTC designated as a drug court.
Obviously, drug cases involve a technical matter, to the extent that Judges of said drug court
are given sufficient training in the Philippine Judges Academy. Corollary thereto, it has never
been shown that Justices of the SB has been trained to do such.

While it is true that the SB has jurisdiction over public officers, the RTC designated as a drug
court has been vested by RA 9165 with the EXCLUSIVE authority to hear violations of
such law.

Thus, drug cases are exceptions to the jurisdiction of the SB, even if the offender be a public
officer. In line with this, PD 1606 is the general law on the jurisdiction of the SB, while RA
9165 is a special law excluding from its jurisdiction cases involving drugs. Special law prevails
over a general law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed
with dispatch with Criminal Case No. 17-165.
SO ORDERED

NOTE:

Other procedural aspects involved in this case are as follows:

1. Defect in the verification and certification against forum shopping, where the SC held that
the defect, specifically on the certification, should have caused the dismissal of this petition;
and
2. Doctrine of hierarchy of courts, where the SC rejected De Lima’s claim of sensational case
and her status of being a Senator amounts to a disregard of the hierarchy.
a. If the Court would allow such, then it would lead to a situation where politicians
might directly file to the Court

7|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Court of Tax Appeals (CTA)

THE CITY OF MANILA, petitioners v. HON. CARIDAD GRECIA-CUERDO, et al.,
respondents
GR 175723 4 February 2014
Special Civil Action; Certiorari
Peralta. J.:

―If this Court were to sustain petitioners‘ contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari
petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial
bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter —
precisely the split — jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration
of justice.

The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that
the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax
and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any
other court that may exercise such power.‖

FACTS:

The City of Manila (Manila), through its treasurer Liberty Toledo (Toledo) assessed taxes
amounting to Php19,316,458.77 in accordance with the Revised Revenue Code of Manila
(RRCM), against:

1. SM Mart, Inc.;
2. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.;
3. Star Appliances Center;
4. Supervalue, Inc.;
5. Ace Hardware Philippines;
6. Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.;
7. Jollimart Philippines Corp; and
8. Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines (private respondents)

As payment of taxes is a condition precedent to issuance of the business permit, private

respondents paid such assessment under protest. Eventually, they filed a complaint for tax
refund of illegal/erroneous local business tax, prohibition with prayer to issue TRO
and preliminary injuction in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay, as they averred that
the provisions of RRCM is violative of the Local Government Code, to the extent that it
amounts to double taxation.

In the RTC:

1. Granted the writ of preliminary injunction; and

2. Denied Manila’s MR

8|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Thus, Manila filed a petition for certiorari questioning the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction in the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA:
1. Dismissed the petition, on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the case,
considering that it is a tax refund case, it must be filed with the CTA; and
2. Denied its MR

Thus this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction for certiorari over interlocutory orders
involving tax refund;

RULING:

No, as it would result in split jurisdiction, a situation where in one court may try the main
case while another may resolve ancillary ones. Such is an anathema to the proper
administration of justice.

Rather, it is the CTA who has jurisdiction over such, under RA 9282, which expanded its
jurisdiction, to wit:

―Sec.7. Jurisdiction;
The CTA shall exercise:

a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

xxx

3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in

local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction; x x x‖

While it is true that no express provision providing the CTA to power to issue extraordinary
writs, the Court stated that:

―The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with
respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty
of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.x x x

It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate
jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari.‖
9|Page
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

NOTE:

The case has already attained finality, thus deeming this case as moot and academic.

The above ruling ONLY applies to regular courts, to the extent that there is no need of
express grant of the auxiliary writs. Thus, the rule that express grant of power to QUASI-
JUDICIAL courts is needed in order to exercise such, still stands.

10 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CE CASECNAN AND ENERGY COMPANY, INC. (CE), petitioner, v. THE PROVINCE
OF NUEVA ECIJA (NE), et al., respondents
GR 196278 17 June 2015
Petition for review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.:

―It is settled that it is the CTA which has exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action for
certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case‖

FACTS:

CE entered into a ―build-operate-transfer‖ agreement with the National Irrigation

Administration (NIA) for the development of the Casecnan Project (Project), an irrigation
and power project.

An amendment of the agreement states that the NIA must reimburse CE payments of real
property taxes.

The Provincial Assessor of NE assessed RPT amounting to Php1,279,997,722.70,

representing the years 2002 to 2008, which he contested initially with the NE Local Board of
Assessment Appeals, and eventually to the NE Central Board of Assessment Appeals, but to
no avail.

NE demanded payment of the RPT from CE, but to no avail as well.

CE filed a Complaint for injunction and damages with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction in the RTC of San Jose, NE,
praying for reassessment and ordering NIA as the one supposedly to pay. In the RTC:

Denied the TRO application, but eventually granted a 20 day TRO after an
additional assessment was provided

Ultimately, denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and likewise

the MR.

Thus, CE filed a petition for certiorari in the CA:

Denied the petition for Certiorari, on the ground that the jurisdiction over RPT is
in the CTA.

Likewise, the MR is denied

Thus, this petition, arguing that the case is an ordinary civil case within the ambit of the CA‘s
jurisdiction, as what he is seeking is an injunctive relief and NOT a protest of the
assessments made against it.

11 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a petition for Certiorari over
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case
RULING:

Yes, as stated by the Court:

―The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such

power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and
that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly

interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in
cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.‖

Further, it went on to state that such extraordinary powers are vested within
appellate courts:

―…if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body,

then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.‖

Finally, the Court expounded on the specialization of the CTA:

―The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the
specialized competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review
over local tax cases without mention of any other court that may exercise
such power.‖

Thus, if injunction would be allowed in another court, it would result in a situation

wherein one court may try the main case while the other would try to auxiliary ones,
which is, obviously, absurd.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The November 2, 2010 Decision and

March 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 108441
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

12 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Sharia‘h Courts
OMAIRA LOMONDOT and SARIPA LOMONDOT (Lomondots), petitioners, vs. HON.
RASAD G. BALINDONG, AMBOG PANGANDAMUN (Pangandamun) and
SIMBANATAO DIACA (Diaca), respondents
GR 192463 13 July 2015
Petition for Certiorari
Peralta, J.:

―Shari‘a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice
and two Associate Justices.

Until such time that the Shari‘a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however,
appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be
referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed
of Muslim CA Justices.‖ (Tomawis v. Balindong, 5 March 2010)

FACTS:

Lomondots claim that they are owners by succession of a parcel of land with a land area of
800 sq. metres, and that Pangandamun and Diaca (respondents) encroached their property
by 100 and 200 [Link], respectively, thus lead to the filing of a Complaint for Recovery
of Possession and Damages with prayer for mandatory injunction and TRO in the
Shariah District Court (SDC).

The SDC declared the Lomondots as owners, and an order for respondents to vacate and
remove improvements therein.

After failure of respondents to prove grave abuse of discretion in the SC, and the subsequent
finality of the decision, Lomondots filed for a motion for execution with a prayer for a
writ of demolition in the SDC. The SDC:

Initially granted said motion, but eventually denied it due to ―supervening events‖
in the form of the properties that encroached were not actually within Lomondots
properties, and thus ordered a re-survey.

Denied Lomondots‘ two (2) MRs.

Thus, the Lomondots filed a petition for certiorari in the CA - Cagayan De Oro (CDO).
The CA – CDO:

Dismissed the petition, on 27 April 2010, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, in

light of the fact that the Shariah Appelate Court has yet to exist, and thus the proper
forum would be the SC.

Thus this petition for certiorari

13 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the SC has the jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari coming
from the SDC, considering that the Shariah Appelate Court has yet to be
organized

RULING:

No, it should be the CA who has jurisdiction, as held in the case of Tomawis v. Balindong.
Interestingly, the order of the CA was made on April, while the ruling in the said case was
promulgated in March.

While it is true that a supervening event is an exception to a writ of execution, the following
must be observed:

―A supervening event consists of facts that transpire:

1. After the judgment became final and executor; or of

2. New circumstances that develop after the judgment attained finality, including
matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial because such
matters were not yet in existence at that time.

In no case that the alleged ―supervening event‖ amounts to such, as the placement of the
improvements has already been settled early in the SDC.

As to the propriety of ordering a re-survey, the SC held that it would lead to never ending
cases, as it would allow for modification of an otherwise final judgment. They went on to
state that the ultimate end of cases is for execution, and without out, the victor goes with
nothing.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 9, 2009,

January 5, 2010 and February 10, 2010, of the Shari‘a District Court, Fourth Shari‘a Judicial
District, Marawi City are hereby CANCELLED and SET ASIDE. The Shari‘a District
Court is hereby ORDERED to ISSUE a writ of demolition to enforce its Decision dated
January 31, 2005 in Civil Case No. 055-91.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for
whatever action he may undertake in light of our pronouncement in the Tomawis v. Hon.
Balindong case quoted earlier on the creation of a Special Division to handle appeals or
petitions from trial orders or decisions of the Shari‘a District Court. SO ORDERED.

14 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE,
(Tangkal), petitioner, vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG and HEIRS OF THE LATE
MACALABO ALOMPO (Alompo), respondents
GR 193340 11 January 2017
Special Civil Actions; Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
Jardeleza, J.:

―Muslim … for purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement under Article
143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims.

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a ―Muslim‖ as ―a person who testifies to the
oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam.‖‖

FACTS:

Heirs of Alompo (Heirs) alleged that Tangkal has agreement with their predecessor
regarding a 25-hectare piece of land in Lanao Del Norte which is to be paid to Alompo
within thirty five (35) years, but to no avail. Said land is the site of the municipal hall and a
health center building.

As such, Heirs filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession in the SDC of Marawi. In
the SDC:

Tangkal filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground of improper venue and lack of
jurisdiction. It anchored on the fact that a municipality has no religion or affiliation,
and since it is a real action, it should be filed in Lanao Del Norte;

SDC denied Tangkal‘s motion to dismiss, stating that since the Mayor of Tangkal
is a muslim, it has jurisdiction over it.

Likewise, Tangkal‘s MR was denied. Subsequently, they filed their answer and
raising lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense.

Thus, this petition.

However, the SDC maintains that a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading in

cases within their jurisdiction.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a municipality having a Muslim mayor as to satisfy the

requirement of ―cases between Muslims‖ within the ambit of the SDC‘s
jurisdiction

RULING:

No, a municipality only has secular purposes and cannot have any religion or affiliation. If it
would be allowed, then the separation of church and state will be violated.

15 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Furthermore, to be considered as a Muslim, a person must testify to the oneness of God and
profess the propethood of Muhammad, which obviously cannot be done by a municipality.

The mayor and the municipality he represents are two separate entities, in the same way the
debt of the latter is not the debt of the former.

Thus, that the municipality CANNOT be deemed as a muslim, and only one of the parties is
a Muslim, and the other is not, the case cannot be deemed within the ambit of the SDC‘s
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Shari‘a District
Court of Marawi City in Civil Case No. 201-09 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 201-09 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

16 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Court Martial

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (Ombudsman), petitioner, v. COL. NOEL P.

MISLANG (Mislang), respondent
GR 207926 15 October 2018
Petition for review on Certiorari
Tijam, J.

―In discussing the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code to court-martial
proceedings insofar as those not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-
Martial, this Court had clarified that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an
accused before it is a criminal and not an administrative case.

Nonetheless, in threshing out the court-martial‘s jurisdiction and the nature of offenses
committed by military personnel under the Articles of War, this Court also emphasized its
administrative disciplinary character. x x x

In view of its administrative disciplinary aspect which court-martial proceedings share with
the petitioner, both have the concurrent authority to dismiss respondent from the service.‖

FACTS:

Due to an alleged plan to assassinate the Mayor of Lagayan, Abra, Cecilia Luna (Luna) and
her family, the following complaint-affidavits for violation of the Articles of War, specifically
for Grave Misconduct, against the Commanding Officer of the 41st Infantry Batallion
Mislang, then Governor of Abra Vicente Valera (Valera), and Mario Durwin (Durwin) and
Florencio Baharin (Baharin) of the Military Intelligence Group were filed in the
Ombudsman:

1. On 8 March 2005, by Luna herself; and

2. On 11 March and 13 April 2005, filed by Corporal Eduardo Barcelona (Barcelona) and Evelyn
Rosqueta (Presumptively the wife of Corporal Antonio Rosqueta (Rosqueta), as the latter
was already dead at the time of filing), respectively.

Corporals Barcelona and Rosqueta of the 41st Infantry Battalion alleged that Mislang, as their
Commanding Officer, gave them two (2) caliber .45 pistols and ordered to assassinate Luna
and her family. In the said plan, they coordinated with Durwin, Baharin, and Valera.

At the day of the assassination, the target sons of Luna did not came, which made Mislang
furious and placed both Barcelona and Rosqueta under Absence Without Leave (AWOL)

In response, both Barcelona and Rosqueta filed a complaint with the Intelligence Security
Group on 17 December 2004 where they executed their Sinumpaang Salaysay. Thus they were
reassigned during these times.

17 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Subsequently, Durwin and Baharin called Barcelona and Rosqueta for a meeting. On the way
to a party, it was alleged that Durwin and Baharin shot Barcelona and Rosqueta, which led to
the latter‘s death.

Therefore the filing of the complaint-affidavits in the Ombudsman followed. Mislang did
not submit a counter-affidavit. The Ombudsman held in its Joint Decision in May 2011
that:

There is no basis to include Valera, thus the case against him was dismissed;

That Mislang, Durwin, and Baharin are guilty for grave misconduct, and shall be
dismissed from service.

Worthy of note is that during the pendency of the case, specifically four (4) years after the
filing of the case in the Ombudsman, specifically on 2009, a letter from Mislang‘s counsel
was sent to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law Enforcement Office,
notifying and attaching an Order by the General Court Martial (GCM) of ―Not Guilty‖ on 7
February 2007 on the same set of facts and evidence concerned. Nevertheless, a decision
was made by the Ombudsman

Aggrieved by the Ombudsman decision, Mislang appealed to the CA. He alleged that the
failure to file a counter-affidavit was due to the failure of the Ombudsman to furnish him
copies of the complaint-affidavits against him despite repeated demands. The CA:

Reversed and set aside the Ombudsman Joint Decision, on the following grounds:

1. Failure to observe due process, as a copy of the complaint-affidavits was never

furnished to Mislang;
2. Res inter alios acta rule, in that the confession of a co-conspirator is not sufficient to
hold Mislang liable, absent any independent evidence; and
3. Res judicata, to the extent that the GCM Order bars the Ombudsman to hear the
same case.

Thus, Ombudsman now questions the CA‘s decision, on the following grounds:

1. There was a failure on the part of Mislang to exhaust administrative remedies,

specifically to file a Motion of Reconsideration (MR) with them before proceeding to
the CA;
2. An Ombudsman case, being administrative in nature does not necessarily have to
comply with the res inter alios acta rule, as the affidavits of the co-conspirators are
sufficient and is within the ambit of “substantial evidence”; and
3. That despite the concurrent jurisdiction with the GCM, it nevertheless has authority
to try the same;

ISSUE/s: Whether or not there is failure to exhaust all remedies before resort to the CA;
Whether or not an administrative agency has authority to rule based on
affidavits of conspirators alone; and
18 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Whether or not the Ombudsman may still try the case despite the GCM
already ruling on the same facts

RULING:

1st Issue:
No, there is no failure to exhaust administrative remedies. While it is true that the doctrine
of administrative remedies must be observed before resort to the regular courts, there are
exceptions to such rule, as follows:

1. When there is a violation of due process; or

2. When the question is of a legal nature

In this case, both the exceptions are applicable. As to the first one, the due process clause
was violated by failure to provide Mislang with the complaint-affidavit, which prevented him
to properly plead his defense.

As to the second one, the issue raised to the CA is not a factual question but rather of a legal
nature, as he questioned the non-observance of due process.

2nd Issue:
No, an administrative agency, while not bound by the strict rules of procedural laws, are not
authorized to veer away from evidentiary standards.

As such, substantial evidence is required to warrant a judgment.

In relation to the Rules on Evidence, a confession of a co-conspirator is admissible to the

other co-conspirators only if it is coupled with an independent evidence. No independent
evidence is available nor presented in this case.

It thus follows, that the affidavit of the complainant/co-conspirators, not being supported
by any independent evidence, is insufficient to be considered as ―substantial‖ evidence.

3rd Issue:
No, the Ombudsman has no authority to try the case, given the fact that a concurrent court
had already tried and ruled on the same set of facts and evidence.

In case of courts/administrative agencies having concurrent jurisdiction, the first one who
took cognizance of the case shall assume jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the others.

In fact, the case in the GMC was earlier filed than of that of the Ombudsman.

Further, the records show that a letter was sent to the Ombudsman, as early as 2009, two (2)
years from the latter‘s decision on 2011. Thus, they could have desisted earlier but refused to
do so.
19 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing discussion, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

On the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA);

As an additional argument of Mislang, they claim that a MOA executed between the
Ombudsman and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) precludes the Ombudsman
from taking cases which are non-graft or non-corruption involving military officials, and may
refer the same to the AFP.

However, this argument is untenable. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be vested
by agreement of the parties.

The MOA merely aims to encourage coordination and prevent parallel investigations which
is a waste of time.

Furthermore, the referral is merely ―expected‖ but not ―required‖

On the nature of the court martial;

It was discussed in this case that a court martial may act in two (2) capacities:

1. In an administrative disciplinary character, to those cases which are offenses under the
Articles of War that are service connected and the Manual for Court-Martial; or
2. As a court, insofar as those NOT provided under the Articles of War and the Manual for
Court-Martial, where the Revised Penal Code is suppletory in character

Rationale of military laws;

Military laws are sui generis. Civilian and military are different, to the extent that the disciplines
involved, as well as the authority over them, are different. If military were allowed to seek
recourse to regular courts, military discipline would collapse

20 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

OTHER KINDS OF JURISDICTION

Residual Jurisdiction
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP), petitioner, vs. HON.
EMMANUEL C. CARPIO, et al., respondents
GR 195450 1 February 2017
Petition for review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.:

―Before the trial court can be said to have residual jurisdiction over a case;

1. a trial on the merits must have been conducted;

2. the court rendered judgment; and
3. the aggrieved party appealed therefrom.”

FACTS:

Abad et al. filed for delivery of certificates of title with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of seizure in the RTC against DBP and Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium
Enterprise (GSFME) as Abad et al.‘s guarantor, by virtue of a loan agreement entered into
by Abad et al. and DBP. In the RTC:

DBP filed a motion to dismiss and quash writ of seizure on the ground of
improper venue. It was supplemented to attach a delivery receipt of seizure of the
228 certificates of title by the Sheriff.

Eventually, the RTC granted DBP‘s motion and dismissed the case on the ground
of improper venue.

Subsequently, a motion to order plaintiffs to return titles to DBP and GFSME

was filed, and granted.

However, no delivery of the titles was made. As such, DBP filed a motion to call on
plaintiff‘s bond with the RTC:

RTC denied, as it no longer has residual power

Likewise, the MR was denied

DBP filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the CA, but was dismissed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RTC has residual jurisdiction considering that the case
was dismissed due to improper venue

21 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULING:

No. In this case, there is no trial in the merits considering that the case was dismissed due to
improper venue, which is a dismissal without prejudice.

As a dismissal without prejudice, it CANNOT be the subject of an appeal, and does not bar
re-filing of the case.

Hence, the elements of trial in the merits and an appeal perfected cannot be had in this case
as obviously it cannot be attained.

As to the bond, DBP belatedly filed as the decision is now final and executory. It cannot
likewise avail of equity as there is a law laying the rules for it.

NEVERTHELESS, DBP may resort to other means, including a collection for sum of
money or foreclosure of mortgage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The July 9, 2008 Decision and the January 21,
2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 85719, are AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.

22 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Equity Jurisdiction
REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. (RDI), petitioner, vs. ANTONIO DELA CRUZ (Dela
Cruz), respondent
GR 198172 25 January 2016
Petition for review on Certiorari
Brion, J.:

―The appellate jurisdiction of courts

is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties when an appeal is perfected. On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide
complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special
circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a
given situation.

The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution.‖

FACTS:

Dela Cruz leased two (2) properties in Pasay City from RDI, which can be terminated by the
latter via a written notice, to which it did.

However, Dela Cruz refused to vacate and thus RDI filed an ejectment case in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) against Dela Cruz, thus the MTC ordered Dela Cruz to vacate and pay
the rentals until compliance.

Dela Cruz appealed to the RTC, pending which, the former consigned the
payments as RDI refused to accept such. RTC affirmed the MTC Decision.

However, upon a petition for certiorari filed in the CA, the CA reversed the lower
court‘s decision, dismissing the ejectment case, and eventually became final and
executory.

As the circumstances were against it, RDI filed a motion to withdraw funds deposited by
Dela Cruz in the RTC, to which the RTC granted, and subsequently a writ of execution
was issued.

Again, Dela Cruz filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, which the CA dismissed,
on the ground that the RTC was exercising its equity jurisdiction.

Still not to be hampered, Dela Cruz filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the SC, to which the SC denied.

23 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Thus, after the funds were retrieved, it was however insufficient to cover three (3) years.
Upon motion, RTC granted levy upon the properties of Dela Cruz. Likewise, the RTC
denied Dela Cruz‘ MR.
What follows is an auction, to which Regulus‘ was the highest bidder.

Aggrieved, once again, Dela Cruz file a Petition for Certiorari in the CA, to nullify the
order of RTC directing the levy, but however, was dismissed again. An MR was filed.

All the while, Dela Cruz redeemed the property by paying the purchase price.

But, ruling on the MR on the denial, the CA surprisingly ruled in favour of Dela
Cruz, thus reversed itself and ordering to set aside the RTC orders, on the ground
that the proper authority to issue an execution is the MTC, the court where it
originated and NOT the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and hence
ordered the RTC to remand the case to the MTC. RDI‘s MR was denied.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to order the levy, and assuming it
has, what jurisdiction is being exercised

RULING:

Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction to order the levy, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.

Equity jurisdiction is exercised in the absence of a law, and in the spirit of fairness and
justice. In cases where the law cannot adapt to special circumstances, the court may resort to
such.

It is NOT an appellate exercise, considering that the original case for ejectment has long
been dismissed. The order is merely to ensure restitution to RDI, to provide it with what it
rightfully owns.

Therefore, that the assailed orders (levy) originated in the RTC, the execution should be
sought from it.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The decision
dated November 23, 2010, and the resolution dated August 10, 2011, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 105290 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE .The
orders dated June 30, 2008, and August 26, 2008, of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City, are hereby REINSTATED. Costs against respondent Antonio dela Cruz.
SO ORDERED

NOTE:

RDI posits that the subsequent redemption by Dela Cruz rendered the case moot and
academic and hence should not have been ruled upon by the CA anymore.

24 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
However, the question of jurisdiction presented to the CA suspended the operation of a
case‘s being moot and academic.

25 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

OTHER CASES ON:

Residual Prerogatives
GEORGE KATON (Katon), petitioner, v. MANUEL PALANCA, JR. (Palanca),
LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN FRESNILLO, respondents
GR 151149 7 September 2004
Petition for review on Certiorari
Panganiban, J.

―What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the
courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9
of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 114 of the same rules.‖

FACTS:

Katon requested the Bureau of Forestry of Palawan to reclassify a piece of property in

Sombrero Island, Palawan, from forest land to agricultural land. The inspection was made
both in the presence of Katon and Palanca, the latter being the cousin and alleged overseer
of the former.

During the investigation, it was found that there were no occupants but there were
coconut trees planted therein, allegedly planted by both Katon and Palanca.

After further investigation, the Director of Lands declared that the land is converted
to agricultural land, as it is no longer needed for forest purposes.

As such, a homestead patent application was filed by by Palanca, and was

subsequently granted and issued a Homestead Patent

On the other hand, no application was filed by Katon.

Katon questioned the issuance of the Patent on the ground of fraud, and that the same be
reversed to the public domain. In the RTC:

A motion to dismiss was filed by Palanca, which was granted for failure of Katon
to substitute the legal heirs of another respondent.

The MR was likewise denied, on the ground that it is a third (3rd) MR.

Aggrieved, Katon filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, claiming that it is his first and
only MR. In the CA:

The CA did not limit itself to the issue at hand, as it was found that no application
was made by Katon, thus no title can pertain to him, and thus ultimately cannot have
a valid claim over the land in question. Further, even assuming he has standing, he

26 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
brought the action only twenty four (24) years after the issuance of the patent, and
therefore prescription barred the action.

Therefore, the CA dismissed the case motu proprio, in the exercise of residual
prerogatives.

Katon argues that the dismissal by the CA is misplaced, considering that residual jurisdiction
only allows orders which are for the benefit and protection of the parties and not the
dismissal of the case.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not a court may dismiss a case elevated to it despite the grounds
for such not appearing in the pleadings

RULING:

Yes, as long as it is for any of the following grounds:

1. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;

2. Res judicata;
3. Litis pendentia; or
4. Prescription

The above stated grounds may be validly be invoked by the higher court to dismiss the case
motu proprio, in accordance with its residual prerogatives. Thus, the argument that it cannot
do so under its ―residual jurisdiction‖ is misplaced, considering that it is not the one which
the CA exercised.

Further, it was held that, in this case, the Court held that Katon had no standing either for a
reconveyance or reversion:

1. As to reconveyance, the party must own the land in question;

2. As to reversion, the State must be the claimant, in order to return it to the public
domain

Even assuming arguendo that Katon has authority to file the case, he is estopped by laches,
considering that it was only 24 years after the issuance of the patent when he questioned the
same.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolution

AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on
the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

27 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Residual prerogatives and residual jurisdiction are different, in that the former contemplates
the authority of the higher court where the case was appealed to dismiss the case motu proprio,
while the latter is the authority of the court to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
etc. even after it lost its jurisdiction by virtue of a perfected appeal but prior to transmittal of
records or approval by the appellate court.

28 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULES 1 TO 5
Actions: Commencement
EVANGELINE ALDAY (Alday), petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION
(FGU), respondent
GR 138822 23 January 2001
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

―It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action.

Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.‖

FACTS:

Alday worked as an insurance agent of FGU, by virtue of which the latter filed a case in the
RTC for unliquidated cash advances, unremitted cost of premiums, and other charges
incurred amounting to Php114,650.76. In the RTC:

Alday filed an answer and a counterclaim, alleging that FGU owes her commissions
and bonuses amounting to Php104,893.45, and likewise for damages.

As a response, FGU filed a motion to strike out answer with compulsory

counterclaim and to declare defendant in default, as allegedly, it was filed out of
time

The RTC denied the motion, and likewise the MR was denied

Eight (8) months after the filing of the motion, FGU filed a motion to dismiss
Alday‘s counterclaim, on the ground of non-payment of docket fees.

The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, stating that Alday‘s counterclaim
is merely permissive, and thus needs payment of docket fees before the court
can take jurisdiction of the case. Likewise, the MR was denied

Aggrieved, Alday elevated the dismissal to the CA, in the CA:

The CA affirmed the RTC decision, likewise, the MR was denied

ISSUE/s: Whether or not payment of docket fees is required in counterclaims in order

for the court to acquire jurisdiction

29 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing Alday‘s counterclaims
RULING:

1st Issue:
Payment of docket fees would depend on the type of counterclaim.

In case of a compulsory counterclaim, which is in substance a case arose out of the original
case, payment of docket fees is NOT necessary in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction,
as in this case, the court already acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the parties.

On the other hand, payment of docket fees in a permissive counterclaim is a MUST in order
for the court to acquire jurisdiction, as in this case, it did not arise from the same transaction
and hence it is in effect, a different case.

In this case, the claim for damages is treated as a compulsory counterclaim, considering that
it is a claim for damages arising from the institution of proceedings against Alday, and hence
cannot be dismissed by the non-payment of docket fees. On the other hand, Alday‘s claim
for commissions and bonuses is a permissive counterclaim which requires payment of
docket fees.

2nd Issue:
No, the RTC is incorrect in dismissing Alday‘s counterclaim.

As to the compulsory counterclaim, the dismissal due to non-payment of docket fees is

improper, considering that docket fees are not required in case of a compulsory counter
claim.

On the other hand, as to the permissive counterclaim, dismissal should not be ordered
outright, as held in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano
Asuncion, what should be done is to give the counterclaimant an opportunity to pay the
correct docket fees, and after failure of such, then and only then that the court may order for
its dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 23

December 1998 and its 19 May 1999 Resolution are hereby MODIFIED. The compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages filed in Civil Case No. 89-3816 is ordered
REINSTATED. Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 134) is ordered to
require petitioner to pay the prescribed docket fees for her permissive counterclaim (direct
commissions, profit commissions, contingent bonuses and accumulated premium reserves),
after ascertaining that the applicable prescriptive period has not yet set in. 33
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

The Court, in Valencia v. CA, laid down the criteria to determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive:

30 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s
counterclaim?; and
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

In addition, in Quintanilla v. CA, the Court laid down the ―compelling test of
compulsoriness‖:

‖…a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court.‖

Just to reiterate, mere payment of docket fees do not vest the court with jurisdiction over the
person, rather it is as follows:

1. Filing of the initiatory pleading (complaint);

2. Docket fees:
a. Timely payment; AND
b. Correct amount

31 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 6
Kinds of Pleadings

ARTURO C. ALBA, JR., duly represented by his Attorneys- in-Fact, ARNULFO B. ALBA
and ALEXANDER C. ALBA, petitioner, v. RAYMUND D. MALAPAJO, RAMIL D.
MALAPAJO and the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas, respondents
GR 198752 13 January 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the

following tests:

(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same?

(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants‘ claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?

(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs‘ claim as well as the
defendants‘ counterclaim? and

d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr., duly represented by his attorneys-in-fact, RTC of Roxas City, a
Complaint against respondents Malapajo and the Register of Deeds of Roxas City for
recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or cancellation of title and damages
alleging, among others, that he was the previous registered owner of a parcel of land situated
in Bolo, Roxas City, covered by TCT; that his title was subsequently canceled by virtue of a
deed of sale he allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo for a consideration of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); that new TCT was issued in the name of
respondents Malapajo; that the deed of sale was a forged document which respondents
Malapajo were the co-authors of.

Respondents Malapajo filed their Answer with Counterclaim contending that they were
innocent purchasers for value and that the deed was a unilateral document which was
presented to them already prepared and notarized; that before the sale, petitioner had, on
separate occasions, obtained loans from them and their mother which were secured by
separate real estate mortgages covering the subject property; that the two real estate
mortgages had never been discharged. Respondents counterclaimed for damages and for
reimbursement of petitioner's loan from them plus the agreed monthly interest in the event
that the deed of sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery.

32 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stating, among
others, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of respondents'
permissive counterclaim; and, that assuming without admitting that the two real estate
mortgages are valid, the rate of five percent (5%) per month uniformly stated therein is
unconscionable and must be reduced. Respondents filed their Rejoinder thereto.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to Dismiss
had been Filed alleging that respondents‘ counterclaims are in the nature of a permissive
counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of docket fees and filing of a certification against
forum shopping.

The RTC:

Issued an Order denying petitioner's motion finding that respondents‘ counterclaims

are compulsory. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.

The CA:

Dismissed the petition for certiorari saying that there was no proper proof of service
of the petition to the respondents, and that only the last page of the attached copy of
the RTC Order was signed and certified as a true copy of the original while the rest
of the pages were mere machine copies.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents‘ counterclaim, i.e., reimbursement of the loan

obtained from them in case the deed of absolute sale is declared null and void
on the ground of forgery, is permissive in nature which requires the payment
of docket fees and a certification against forum shopping for the trial court to
acquire jurisdiction over the same.

RULING:

NO need for respondents to pay docket fees and to file a certification against forum
shopping for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be
within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that
in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, necessarily connected with the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim or even where there is such a connection, the Court has
no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for adjudication the presence of third
persons over whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if
not set up in the same action.

33 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that
may be filed separately in another case.

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, we have devised the

following tests:

(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants‘ claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs‘ claim as well as
the defendants‘ counterclaim? and
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive
answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory

Based on the above-mentioned tests, we shall determine the nature of respondents‘

counterclaim. Respondents anchored their assailed counterclaim on the following allegations
in their affirmative defenses in their Answer with Counterclaim, thus:
xxxx

10. The plaintiff's cause of action is based on his allegation that his signature on the
Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.

The Deed of Absolute Sale is a unilateral instrument, i.e., it was signed only
by the vendor, who is the plaintiff in this case and his instrumental witnesses,
who are his parents in this case. It was presented to defendants already
completely prepared, accomplished and notarized. Defendants had no hand
in its preparation, accomplishment and notarization.

While the plaintiff claims that his signature on the instrument is forged, he
never questioned the genuineness of the signatures of his instrumental
witnesses, his parents Arturo P. Alba, Sr. and Norma C. Alba, who signed the
said instrument below the words "SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF" and
above the words "Father" and "Mother," respectively.

Furthermore, plaintiff acknowledged in par. 7 of his Complaint that the

stated consideration in the Deed of Absolute Sale is P500,000.00 and he
never categorically denied having received the same.

11. Before the plaintiff sold the property to the defendants, he secured a loan from
them in the sum of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) payable on or
before November 10, 2008. The loan is evidenced by a Promissory Note and secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage dated September 11, 2008, both executed by him,
covering the parcel of land subject of this case, Lot 2332-D, Psd 06-000738. Like the
Deed of Absolute Sale, the Real Estate Mortgage is a unilateral instrument, was
signed solely by the plaintiff, and furthermore, his parents affixed their signatures
34 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
thereon under the heading "WITH MY PARENTAL CONSENT", and above the
words, "Father" and "Mother," respectively.

Prior to this, or as early as July 25, 2008, the plaintiff also obtained a loan
payable on or before September 6, 2008 from defendants' mother, Alma D.
David, and already mortgaged to her Lot 2332-D, Psd 06-000738. The loan is
evidenced by a Promissory Note and a Real Estate Mortgage, both of which
were executed by plaintiff. Again, the Real Estate Mortgage is an unilateral
instrument, was signed solely by the plaintiff and furthermore, his parents
also affixed their signatures thereon under the heading, "WITH MY
PARENTAL CONSENT " and above the words, "Father" and "Mother,"
respectively.

In both instances, the plaintiff was always represented by his parents, who
always manifested their authority to transact in behalf of their son the
plaintiff.

As in the case with the Deed of Absolute Sale, the defendants or their
mother did not have any hand in the preparation, accomplishment or
notarization of the two Promissory Notes with accompanying Real Estate
Mortgages, x x x.

Neither of the two Real Estate Mortgages have been discharged or

extinguished.

12. Considering the foregoing, the plaintiff's allegation that his signature on the Deed
of Absolute Sale was forged, and that the defendants are the "co-authors" of the said
forgery, are absolutely false and baseless.

13. If the Deed of Absolute Sale is declared null and void on the ground of forgery,
then the plaintiff should reimburse the defendants the loan he obtained from them,
which he did not deny having obtained, plus the agreed monthly interest.

Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property by assailing the validity of the
deed of sale on the subject property which he allegedly executed in favor of
respondents Malapajo on the ground of forgery. Respondents
counterclaimed that, in case the deed of sale is declared null and void, they be
paid the loan petitioner obtained from them plus the agreed monthly interest
which was covered by a real estate mortgage on the subject property
executed by petitioner in favor of respondents. There is a logical relationship
between the claim and the counterclaim, as the counterclaim is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim. Notably, the same evidence to sustain respondents'
counterclaim would disprove petitioner's case. In the event that respondents
could convincingly establish that petitioner actually executed the promissory
note and the real estate mortgage over the subject property in their favor
then petitioner's complaint might fail. Petitioner's claim is so related logically
35 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
to respondents' counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials for the
claim and the counterclaim would result in the substantial duplication of the
time and effort of the court and the parties.

Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action;

otherwise, it would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in a
different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed subsequently,
it would meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore, no need for
respondents to pay docket fees and to file a certification against forum shopping for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The Resolutions dated February 28, 2011 and August 31, 2011 issued by the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 05594 dismissing the petition for certiorari and denying
reconsideration thereof, respectively, for failure to show proper proof of service of the
petition to respondents, are SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, we resolve to
DENY the same and AFFIRM the Order dated June 4, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City, Branch 15, denying petitioner‘s motion to set the case for hearing as if a motion
to dismiss had been filed, and the Order dated September 30, 2010 denying reconsideration
thereof.
SO ORDERED.

36 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
LIM TECK CHUAN, petitioner, v. SERAFIN UY and LEOPOLDA CECILIO, LIM SING
CHAN @ HENRY LIM, respondents
GR 155701 11 March 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.

―As can be gleaned from the assailed orders, the RTC erred when it dismissed the case
when the present rules state that the dismissal shall be limited only to the complaint.

A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint.

For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant in
spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action. x x x

In Pinga, the Court clearly stated that the dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily
result to the dismissal of the counterclaim x x x

FACTS:

Antonio Lim Tanhu sold Lot 5357 to the spouses Cabansag. The latter, however, failed to
transfer the title of the property to their names because of their work and travel abroad. In
1988, spouses Cabanag sold the lot to Serafin as evidenced by a Deed of Sale.

To pave the way for the transfer of title to Serafin‘s name, Spouses Cabansag attempted to
have the same transferred under their names first. However, Francisco failed to do so as he
lost the owner‘s copy of TCT No. T-0500 together with other documents pertaining to the
sale of the subject lot. This prompted Serafin to exert efforts to secure copies of the lost
documents himself. On May 15, 1996, Serafin filed a petition before the RTC praying for the
issuance of a new owner‘s duplicate TCT in his name and thereby cancel the title in the name
of Antonio.

The Cadastral Court issued an order to issue a new owner‘s duplication in favor of Serafin.

However, the order was nullified on the ground that the petitioner filed an opposition stating
that he is one of the legitimate descendants of Antonio and that the original owner‘s copy of
the title was in his custody.

In the meantime, a certain Lim Sing Chan has executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
claiming that he is the sole heir of Antonio. In the same document, he sold the lot to
Leopolda in the amount of P 500,000.

Serafin then filed a complaint for quieting of title and surrender of owner‘s copy of certificate
of title. Impleaded as defendants were Leopolda, Henry and the herein petitioner.

Petitioner filed her Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim. For his part, the petitioner
averred in his answer that the lot was never transferred nor encumbered to any person during

37 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Antonio‘s lifetime. The deed of sale in favor of Spouses Cabansag was simulated and spurious,
and was intended to defraud the estate of Antonio. Furthermore, the petitioner questioned
Henry‘s claim that he was an heir of Antonio, much less the only surviving heir of the latter.
Corollarily, the petitioner questioned the validity of Henry‘s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
Leopolda‘s claim of title to the subject property.

A pre-trial conference was held. Thereafter, Serafin and Leopolda both filed a Join Motion to
Dismiss signifying the latter‘s intent to waive her counterclaim for damages.

It provides that Plaintiff Serafin Uy and Defendant Leopolda Cecilio have amicably settled
their differences that whatever claim defendant Lim Teck Chuan may have the same may be
ventilated by said defendant in an appropriate independent action.
Petitioner filed his Opposition praying for the denial of the Joint Motion to Dismiss and
averred that the petitioner has valid counterclaim against the defendant and that she manifests
of his preference that the above counterclaims and cross-claims be resolved in the same case.

Decision of the RTC: The RTC grant the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC said that the relief
sought by Serafin Uy was already satisfied due to amicable settlement. Motion for
reconsideration is also denied.

Then, Petitioner file petition for certiorari directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the plaintiff is valid, despite the opposition by
petitioner and manifestation that he wants his counterclaim and cross claim
be prosecuted in the same case under Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

RULING:

No, the RTC erred when it dismissed the case when the present rules state that the dismissal
shall be limited only to the complaint. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere
dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the
same action.

The case of Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago is quite instructive which this Court finds worth
reiterating.

In Pinga, the Court clearly stated that the dismissal of the complaint does not necessarily
result to the dismissal of the counterclaim. xxx

At present, even Section 2, concerning dismissals on motion of the plaintiff, now recognizes
the right of the defendant to prosecute the counterclaim either in the same or separate
action notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, and without regard as to the
permissive or compulsory nature of the counterclaim.

38 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Orders dated April 25, 2002 and October 21, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu
City, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 4786-L are MODIFIED in that the counterclaim of Lim
Teck Chuan as defendant in Civil Case No. 4786-L is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to hear and decide Lim Teck Chuan‘s counterclaim with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

The 2020 amendments in the Rules does not change the effects of Rule 17;
In his commentaries on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Justice Regalado expounds on
the effects of the amendments to Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17:

Under this revised section [2], where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to
which a counterclaim has been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.
Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should
he opt for the first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting
and reserving his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to
have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been
dismissed, he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to
him of plaintiff‘s motion to dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available to him
regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or permissive. x x x.

39 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, v. CPR PROMOTIONS
AND MARKETING, INC. and SPOUSES CORNELIO P. REYNOSO, JR. and
LEONIZA** F. REYNOSO, respondents
GR 200567 22 June 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Velasco, Jr., J.

―It is elementary that a defending party‘s compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at

the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim.‖

FACTS:

From February to October 1997, respondent CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc. (CPR
Promotions) obtained loans from petitioner MBTC. These loans were covered by fifteen
(15) promissory notes (PNs) all signed by respondents, spouses Leoniza F. Reynoso and
Cornelio P. Reynoso, Jr. (spouses Reynoso), as Treasurer and President of CPR Promotions,
respectively.

To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage on
separate dates. All of the mortgaged properties are registered under the spouses Reynoso‘s
names, except for one TCT, which is registered under CPR Promotions. Thereafter, the
spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety agreement binding themselves solidarily with
CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR Promotions may have obtained from
petitioner MBTC, including those covered by the said PNs, but not to exceed
Php13,000,[Link] maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted, prompting MBTC to file
a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages.

The mortgaged properties covered by the said TCTs were sold at a public auction sale.
MBTC participated therein and submitted the highest bid. As a result, petitioner was issued
the corresponding Certificates of Sale covering the properties subjected to the first and
second public auctions, respectively. Notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties, petitioner MBTC alleged that there remained a deficiency balance of
Php2,628,520.73, plus interest and charges as stipulated and agreed upon in the PNs and
deeds of real estate mortgages. Despite petitioner‘s repeated demands, however, respondents
failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner filed an action for collection of sum of
money against respondents.

The RTC:

Ruled in favor of petitioner that there, indeed, was a balance of Php2,628,520.73,

plus interest and charges, and that respondents are liable for the said amount, as part
of their contractual obligation.

The CA:

40 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Reversed the ruling of RTC and ruled in favor of respondents and ordered the
plaintiff-appellee Metrobank to refund or return to the defendants-appellants
Cornelio and Leoniza Reynoso the amount representing the remainder of the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale, with legal interest of six percent per annum from
the date of filing of the answer with counterclaim on March 26, 1999, until paid.

MBTC‘s Comment:

Petitioner asserts that the CA‘s grant of a refund plus legal interest of six percent
(6%) in favor of respondents is erroneous for two reasons: first, respondents never
set up a counterclaim for refund of any amount; and second, the total
outstanding obligation as of February 10, 1998, to which the full amount of the bid
prices was applied, is Php11,216,783.99 and not Php12,891,397.78, which was used
by the CA in its computation.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were able to timely set up their claim for refund

RULING:

NO. Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim. Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court defines a compulsory counterclaim as follows:

Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim;

A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular
courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party‘s claim and
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the
jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except
that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim
may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if:

(a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence

which is the subject matter of the opposing party‘s claim;

(b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and

(c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature,
except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered
compulsory regardless of the amount.

In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, We have, in

several cases, utilized the following tests:

41 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant‘s claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff‘s claim as well as
the defendant‘s counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the
conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court? This test is the
―compelling test of compulsoriness.‖

Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price
vis-à-vis the amount due should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for
recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both
cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their respective claim.
Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are
absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at
the same time. Third, these two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions.
And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject of separate trials, it would definitely
entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court,
for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence.
The only difference here would be in the findings of the courts based on the evidence
presented with regard to the issue of whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the
amounts due.

Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in
the action for payment of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, We rule that
respondents failed to timely raise the same. It is elementary that a defending party‘s
compulsory counterclaim should be interposed at the time he files his Answer,and that
failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim. As it appears from the records, what
respondents initially claimed herein were moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney‘s
fees. Then, realizing, based on its computation, that it should have sought the recovery of
the excess bid price, respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant‘s
Brief filed before the CA. Unfortunately, respondents‘ belated assertion proved fatal to their
cause as it did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently,
respondents‘ claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 2011
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91424 and its February 13, 2012 Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The award of refund in favor of respondents in the amount of
P722,602.22 with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum is hereby DELETED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

42 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
NELSON P. VALDEZ, petitioner, v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON, JR.,
respondent
AC 7353 16 November 2015
Disbarment
Per curiam

―In other words, the respondent‘s denial is a negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the
admission of substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied.

Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party.‖

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Nelson P. Valdez (Nelson) against
Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. (Atty. Dabon).

 Complainant Nelson charged respondent Atty. Dabon, a Division Clerk of Court of the
Court of Appeals (CA), with gross immorality for allegedly carrying on an adulterous
relationship with his wife, Sonia Romero Valdez (Sonia), which ALLEGEDLY was made
possible by sexual assaults and maintained through threat and intimidation.

 Atty. Dabon denied the charges of grossly immoral and unlawful acts through sexual
assaults, abuses, threats and intimidation. He posited that the allegations of spouses
Nelson and Sonia in their respective affidavits were nothing but pure fabrication solely
intended to malign his name and honor.

 Nowhere in his statement was a clear denial of the alleged affair.

ISSUE: Whether such denial is tantamount to a negative pregnant response

RULING:

Yes. It is clear from Atty. Dabon's Comment that his denial only pertained as to the
existence of a forced illicit relationship. Without a categorical denial thereof, he is
deemed to have admitted a consensual affair with Sonia. Atty. Dabon‘s denial is a
negative pregnant, a denial coupled with the admission of substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied.

The Court decided in favor of complainant. Dabon is disbarred.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent Atty. Antolin Allyson M. Dabon, Jr. GUILTY of
Gross Immorality, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law.
Let respondent‘s name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys immediately. Furnish the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all court throughout the country with
copies of this Decision. SO ORDERED.
43 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS
ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-
MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents
GR 152154 15 July 2003
Certiorari
Corona, J.

―Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings
as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts
in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied.

It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.

Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it
an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party.

It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.

Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),

represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan.

In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the
following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks.

In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury
notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income
from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the
PCGG.

Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.

ISSUE: Whether the kind of denial in respondents' answer qualifies as the specific
denial called for by the rules.

44 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULING:

NO. In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation
contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave
were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall
because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully
acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions.

Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does
not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a
part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall
deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.28

The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose
facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters
they rely upon in support of such denial.

On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However,
she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of
acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other
respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired" without detailing how exactly these
funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion
that the funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual
support which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds
were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family.

Respondents' denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of
the petition.

In Morales vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically
charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter
did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made.

Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by
simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged
in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should
have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.

To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for

forfeiture stated:
45 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how
both respondents clandestinely stashed away the country's wealth to Switzerland and
hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to
prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who
formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of
detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the
deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for
the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.

Respondents' lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that

Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the
same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.

Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as
a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial
facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an
admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant
is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified
are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while
the fact itself is admitted.

In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not
specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in
paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for
forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and
hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of
the respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following
substantial facts:

(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and

(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990.

Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank
deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by
respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8
of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure:

46 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not
specifically denied. xxx.

By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were
pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the Republic's petition for
forfeiture:

23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding
the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to respondent
Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.

24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions
and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude
the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for
lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same
having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.

The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents' answer pertained to the

creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective ending balances and attached
documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic's petition for forfeiture.
Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds.
Her claim that "the funds involved were lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her
part of the existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the
allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the
US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.

The allegations in paragraphs 47 and 48 of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation
and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in
paragraph 52-a of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits
estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by respondents in their
47 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
answer. The respondents did not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and
the existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by
them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing, if a defendant's denial is a negative pregnant, it is
equivalent to an admission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the

Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are
hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

48 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION, petitioner, v. HON. REYNALDO M. ALON,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIP-PINES, and ERIC B. DE VERA, respondents
GR 142896 12 September 2007
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Austria-Martinez, J.

―These vague assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied.
As defined in Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190 (2003), a
negative pregnant is a ―form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at
least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party.

It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.

Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.‖‖

FACTS:

Petitioner filed with the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of petitioner‘s property;
declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held; declaration of nullity of the mortgage
constituted over petitioner‘s property covered by TCT No. T-11292 in favor of respondent;
and award of damages.

 RTC held in suspension the auction sale twice but authorized the third. Petitioner filed
an MR of the trial court‘s Order but was denied. RTC based the allowance of the third
for the following reasons:

P.D. 385 provides that it shall be mandatory for government financial institution to foreclose
collaterals and/or securities for any loan, credit accommodations and/or guarantees granted
by them whenever the arrearages on such account, including accrued interest and other
charges amount to at least 20% of the total outstanding obligation as appearing in the books
of the financial institution. Moreover, no restraining order, temporary or permanent injunction shall be
issued by the court against any government financial institution in any action taken by such institution in
compliance with the mandatory foreclosure provided by said law. x x x The defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines and Eric B. De Vera, Sheriff of this Court, are hereby authorized to proceed with
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on November 15, 1999.

Petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Injunction
but it too was denied.

Petitioner contends that the RTC‘s act of authorizing the foreclosure of its property
amounts to a prejudgment of the case since it amounts to a ruling that respondent has a

49 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
valid mortgage in its favor. Petitioner also argues, among others, that Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 385 is not applicable inasmuch as at the time of the lease to Sunnix, Inc., the
management and control of its operations has already been virtually taken over by
respondent.

 Respondent maintains that: P.D. No. 385 prohibits the issuance of an injunctive order
against government financial institutions; the CA did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion; the RTC Order merely dealt with the propriety of the injunctive order and
not the validity of the mortgage; and the issue of the propriety of the injunctive order
has been rendered moot and academic by the foreclosure sale conducted and the
issuance of a certificate of sale by the sheriff.8

ISSUE: Whether petitioner should be granted with any injunctive relief

RULING:

No. Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner‘s bone of
contention before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were
covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property
covered by TCT No. T-11292. It does not categorically deny that these promissory notes
are covered by the security documents.

These vague assertions are, in fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
denied.

Petitioner‘s allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the granting of any
injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were disputing the amount being sought from
them, upon the non-payment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the
mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with the
doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must show, at least prima
facie, a right to the final relief.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

50 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 7
Parts and Contents of a Pleading

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE (Priscilla), petitioner, v. RAMON C. JAVELLANA (Javellana),

ET AL., respondents
GR 158239 25 January 2012
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Bersamin, J.

For forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential
facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.

Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were unquestioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

FACTS:

On 8 September 1979, Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) entered into a ―Deed of
Conditional Sale‖ with Javellana, concerning two (2) parcels of land located in Guiguinto,
Bulacan for a consideration of one hundred sixty thousand Pesos (Php160,000.00), the first
payment to be given on the date execution of the Deed of Conditional Sale, while the
second payment is to be made upon the registration of the land in Javellana‘s name under
the Torrens system.

In line with the agreement, in case of Margarita‘s incapacity, Juvenal and Priscilla, Margarita‘s
son and daughter, shall be entitled to the payments and cause the registration of the land.

After a while, both Margarita and Juvenal died, leaving Priscilla with the obligation to register
such. However, Priscilla, instead of registering, dumped filling materials in the subject lots
with the intent to turn it into a subdivision.

Thus, Javellana filed an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages
against Priscilla on 10 February 1997 in the RTC:

Javellana alleged that:

At the time of the execution of the deed of sale, he had paid the amount
eighty thousand Pesos (Php80,000.00);

Since 1979, he had actual possession of the said lots;

That as to the remaining balance, he made payments in different dates, upon

Juvenal‘s representation that Margarita needs such as expenses in the
registration of the land;

51 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
That Priscilla once called asking about the ―mortgage‖ on the said land.
However, he clarified that there is no mortgage constituted, but rather it was
sold to him; and

As such, he requests the RTC for an issuance of an issuance of a Temporary

Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary Injunction against Priscilla, for the
latter to stop dumping filling materials and to cause the registration of the
lands under his name.

Priscilla, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action and prescription

The RTC ruled:

Dismissing Priscilla‘s motion to dismiss;

But upon a motion for reconsideration by Priscilla, it reversed itself on 24

June 1999, granting the motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

That Priscilla was not a party to the sale, thus Javellana has no cause
of action against her;

That there were no evidence of the payments made; and

That no suit or demand was made upon Juvenal and Margarita to

register the same

Upon receipt of the copy of 24 June 1999 reversal on 24 June 1999,

Javellana moved for reconsideration after twelve (12) days from receipt or
on 21 July 1999, alleging that Priscilla succeeded to the obligation of Priscilla
to register. The RTC ruled:

Denying Javellana‘s motion on 21 June 2000

Aggrieved, Javellana elevated the case to the CA, filing the following at on or about the
same time:

Via a notice of appeal of the 21 June 2020 RTC Order denying his motion for
reconsideration.

The notice of appeal was filed in the RTC on 19 July 2000, after receiving the
copy on 13 July 2000

Via a petition for Certiorari against the 24 June 1999 and the 21 June 2000 RTC
Orders, which dismissed the petition and denied his motion for reconsideration,
respectively

52 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Priscilla argued the following:

That the 21 June 2020 RTC Order cannot be appealed, considering that it is
a denial of a motion for reconsideration which cannot be the subject of an
appeal;

That Javellana did not perfect his appeal on time, considering that Javellana
filed the MR twelve (12) days from the receipt of the order, he has only three
(3) days or on 16 July 2000 from the denial of the MR on 13 July 2000, and
thus Javellana‘s filing on 19 July 2000 is in excess of the allowable period to
file an appeal as it is already on the 18th day; and

That Javellana is guilty of forum shopping

The CA ruled:

Granting the appeal, thereby reversing the dismissal of the case by the RTC
and ordered its remand to said court, holding:

Priscilla, as the sole heir, succeeds to the obligations of her mother

Margarita

That the action has not prescribed, considering that actions for
quieting of title are imprescriptible

Denying the petition for certiorari, as it found no grave abuse of discretion on

the part of the RTC, and at most an error of judgment, which is correctible
by appeal.

Likewise, Priscilla‘s MR was denied

ISSUE/s: Whether or not Javellana is guilty of forum shopping;

Whether or not the appeal from the MR is a proper remedy; and
Whether or not Javellana filed the appeal out of time;

RULING:

1st Issue:
No, Javellana is not guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping occurs when a party
receiving an adverse judgment institutes the case in other courts based on the same cause of
action, on the same set of facts, with the same parties involved, and would be proved by the
same pieces of evidence, that would eventually lead to res judicata against the other.

It was ruled by the CA that the appeal and the petition for certiorari have different objectives,
to wit:

The appeal has the objective of undoing the RTC‘s dismissal;

53 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

The petition for certiorari has the objective of ―..to prevent (Priscilla) from developing
the subject property and from proceeding with the ejectment case until his appeal is
finally resolved‖

The dangers sought to be prevented in forum shopping are not present in this case, as the
decision in one would not amount to res judicata in the other, considering that at the time of
the petition for certiorari, the CA had not yet ruled in the appeal. Likewise, the difference
lies in that the appeal is a continuation of the original case, while the petition for certiorari is
independent of the original case.

While it is true that there are jurisprudence which ruled that the successive filing should be
deemed as forum shopping, it cannot be applied to this case, as those which are held as
forum shopping raised the same purpose, while in this case, the objectives are different.

2nd Issue:
Yes, the appeal from the motion for reconsideration is a proper remedy.

Appeals can be taken from final orders, while no appeal may be taken from interlocutory
orders as the latter has yet to resolve the case, and the proper remedy would be a petition for
certiorari

The rationale for disallowing appeals on interlocutory orders is to prevent multiple appeals
on incidental matters, which would delay the case.

In line with such, a distinction must be made on the motion for reconsideration‘s
subjectivity to appeal or not. If the motion for reconsideration pertains to the final order,
then appeal is the proper remedy, while if the motion for reconsideration pertains to an
interlocutory order, appeal is not a proper remedy, and hence it must be a petition for
certiorari

3rd Issue:
Yes, the appeal was filed on time.

Considering the ―fresh period rule‖ in Neypes v. CA, a fresh period of fifteen (15) days shall
be counted from the order of denial of the MR or the MNT.

Thus, in this case, Javellana has actually up to the 28th to file an appeal, considering that he
receipt the order of denial on the 13th.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on November 20, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.

54 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ELSA D. MEDADO, petitioner, v. HEIRS OF THE LATE ANTONIO CONSING, as
represented by DR. SOLEDAD CONSING, respondents
GR 186720 8 February 2012
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.

―Where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a common interest in the
property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners executed the
verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from proceeding with
the action. x x x

Verification of a pleading is a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure

the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court
may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict
compliance with the rules.‖

FACTS:

The estate of Antonio Consing, represented by Soledad Consing, through a Deed of Sale With
Assumption of Mortgage, sold to Meritus Rey Melado and Elsa Melado (Spouses Melado),
parcels of land identified as Hacienda Sol, where the spouses would assume the estate‘s loan
with the PNB.

Subsequent to the sale, however, the Estate of Consing offered the subject lots to the
government via the Department of Agrarian Reform's Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) program.
On November 22, 2000, the Estate of Consing also instituted with the RTC of Bacolod City,
an action for rescission and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-11320 against Spouses
Medado, PNB and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City, due to the alleged failure of the
spouses to meet the conditions in their agreement. When the Land Bank of the Philippines
released the check in favor of the estate for the price of the land, the Spouses Medado to
institute Civil Case No. 797-C, an action for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO,
with the RTC of Cadiz City.

On March 9, 2007, the RTC of Cadiz City issued an Order granting Spouses Medado's
application for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction.

Feeling aggrieved, the heirs of the late Antonio Consing (Consing) questioned the RTC's order
via a petition for certiorari filed with the CA. They sought, among other reliefs, the dismissal
of the complaint for injunction for violation of the rules on litis pendentia and forum shopping.
In their comment on the petition, Spouses Medado questioned, among other matters, the
authority of Soledad to sign the petition's certification of non- forum shopping on behalf of
her co-petitioners.

The CA ruled that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case
No. 797-C for injunction during the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission and
damages as this violates the rule against forum shopping.

55 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the rules on verification and certification were substantially
complied with by respondent
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of forum shopping in initiating an
injunction proceeding during the pendency of the action for rescission against
them

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes. Before us, the petitioner contended that the consolidated verification and certification
against forum shopping of the petition filed with the CA was defective: first, for being signed
only by Soledad, instead of by all the petitioners, and second, its jurat cites a mere community
tax certificate of Soledad, instead of a government-issued identification card required under
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. The second ground was never raised by herein petitioner
in her comment on the CA petition, thus, it cannot be validly raised by the petitioner at this
stage.

As regards the first ground, records show that Soledad signed the verification and certification
against forum shopping on behalf of her co-petitioners by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) attached to the petition filed with the CA. The SPA, signed by her co-heirs
Ma. Josefa Consing Saguitguit, Ma. Carmela Consing Lopez, Ma. Lourdes Consing Gonzales
and Mary Rose Consing Tuason, provides that their attorney-in-fact Soledad xxx.

To protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever action necessary and proper relative
and with respect to our right, interest and participation over said properties, xxx pending in
said court and which cases may at any time be elevated to the Court of Appeals and/or
Supreme Court as the circumstances so warrant;

As may be gleaned from the foregoing, the authority of Soledad includes the filing of an
appeal before the CA, including the execution of a verification and certification against forum
shopping therefor, being acts necessary "to protect, sue, prosecute, defend and adopt whatever
action necessary and proper" in relation to their rights over the subject properties.

In addition, the allegations and contentions embodied in the CA petition do not deviate from
the claims already made by the heirs in Civil Case Nos. 00- 11320 and 797-C, both specifically
mentioned in the SPA. We emphasize that the verification requirement is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct, and not the
product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good
faith. We rule that there was no deficiency in the petition's verification and certification against
forum shopping filed with the CA.

In any case, we reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who share a
common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of the petitioners
executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter the court from
proceeding with the action. In Heirs of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. v. Mingoa, Sr., we held:

56 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Even if only petitioner Domingo Hernandez, Jr. executed the Verification/Certification
against forum-shopping, this will not deter us from proceeding with the judicial determination
of the issues in this petition. As we ratiocinated in Heirs of Olarte v. Office of the President:

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court
has also stressed that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial
compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. This is because
the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions regarding the certification of non-
forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be
altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. Thus, under justifiable
circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification
considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.

In HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. Emily Homes Subdivision

Homeowners Association, it was held that the signature of only one of the petitioners in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complied with [the] rules because all the
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense.

The same leniency was applied by the Court in Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, because the lone
petitioner who executed the certification of non- forum shopping was a relative and co-owner
of the other petitioners with whom he shares a common interest. x x x

Here, all the petitioners are immediate relatives who share a common interest in the land
sought to be reconveyed and a common cause of action raising the same arguments in support
thereof. There was sufficient basis, therefore, for Domingo Hernandez, Jr. to speak for and in
behalf of his co-petitioners when he certified that they had not filed any action or claim in
another court or tribunal involving the same issues. Thus, the Verification/Certification that
Hernandez, Jr. executed constitutes substantial compliance under the Rules.

Furthermore, we have consistently held that verification of a pleading is a formal, not a

jurisdictional, requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a
pleading are true and correct. Thus, the court may simply order the correction of unverified
pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules. It is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the complaint or petition signs the verification; and when matters alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are true and correct. It was based on this principle that this Court
had also allowed herein petitioner, via our Resolution dated April 22, 2009, a chance to submit
a verification that complied with Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead
of us dismissing the petition outright.

2nd Issue:
Yes. Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia concur.

57 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendentia are present, i.e., between actions
pending before courts, there exist:

(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions,
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts, and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in
the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration;

Said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens.
Applying the foregoing, there was clearly a violation of the rule against forum shopping when
Spouses Medado instituted Civil Case No. 797-C for injunction notwithstanding the pendency
of Civil Case No. 00-11320 for rescission of contract and damages.

All elements of litis pendentia are present with the filing of the two cases. There is no dispute
that there is identity of parties representing the same interests in the two actions, both
involving the estate and heirs of the late Consing on one hand, and Spouses Medado on the
other. The rescission case names "Soledad T. Consing, for herself and as administratrix of the
estate of Antonio Consing" as plaintiff, with "Spouses Meritus Rey and Elsa Medado, [PNB]
and the Register of Deeds of Cadiz City" as respondents. The injunction case, on the other
hand, was instituted by Spouses Medado, against "(LBP) and the Heirs of the Late Antonio
Consing, as represented by Dra. Soledad Consing." The primary litigants in the two action,
and their interests, are the same.

The two other elements are likewise satisfied. There is an identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for in the two cases, with the reliefs being founded on the same set of facts. In both
cases, the parties claim their supposed right as owners of the subject properties. They all
anchor their claim of ownership on the deeds of absolute sale which they had executed, and
the law applicable thereto. They assert their respective rights, with

Spouses Medado as buyers and the heirs as sellers, based on the same set of facts that involve
the deeds of sale's contents and their validity. Both actions necessarily involve a ruling on the
validity of the same contract as against the same parties. Thus, the identity of the two cases is
such as would render the decision in the rescission case res judicata in the injunction case, and
vice versa.

It does not even matter that one action is for the enforcement of the parties' agreements,
while the other action is for the rescission thereof.

The CA was then correct in ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 797-C
for violation of the rule against forum shopping. The issue on the validity of the subject deeds
of absolute sale can best be addressed in the action for rescission, as against the case for
injunction filed by Spouses Medado. In a line of cases, we have set the relevant factors that
courts must consider when they have to determine which case should be dismissed, given the
pendency of two actions, to wit:
58 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

(1) the date of filing, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be
retained;
(2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the latter
action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and
(3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the issues between the
parties.

We emphasize that the rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent such eventualities as
conflicting final decisions. This Court has consistently held that the costly consequence of
forum shopping should remind the parties to ever be mindful against abusing court processes.
In addition, the principle of res judicata requires that stability be accorded to judgments.
Controversies once decided on the merits shall remain in repose for there should be an end to
litigation which, without the doctrine, would be endless.

Given the foregoing grounds already warranting the denial of this petition, we deem it no
longer necessary to take any action or to now rule on the issue of the non-joinder of the
petitioner's husband in the petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal‘s Decision dated September 26, 2008, which
reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Cadiz City, dated
March 09, 2007, is perforce AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

59 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, represented herein by its Secretary HON.
ARTURO L. TIU, petitioner, v. CELSO M. PALER, respondent
GR 172623 3 March 2010
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Corona, J.

―The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity

created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman.

There was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative,
lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could
sign the verification.
With regard, however, to the certification of non- forum shopping, the established rule is
that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.‖

FACTS:

Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24) with the
Technical Support Service of the Commission on Appointments. On April 8, 2003, he
submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days – from August 1, 2003 to
November 14, 2003. In a memorandum, Ramon C. Nghuatco, Director III of Technical
Support Service, submitted to the Commission Secretary his comments/recommendation on
Paler's application which states:

"1. The request to go on leave of Mr. Paler is contingent upon the completion of his
various Committee assignments.

2. We have already acted favorably on his Leave Applications for 09 June 2003 - 30
July 2003, which may already cover his reasons enumerated under items 1-5.

3. Mr. Paler's Sick Leave Application shall require a medical certificate from the
attending physician advising him of the need to undergo medical operation and the
treatment and recuperation period therefor.‖

Mr. Paler's Application for Leave may be acted upon depending on the
completion of his work load and submission of the medical certificate."

Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003, Paler left for the
United States on June 8, 2003, without verifying whether his application for leave (for
August 1 – November 14, 2003) was approved or denied.

In a letter, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that he was being dropped from the
roll of employees effective said date, due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave and
in accordance with (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 14. Paler's son received the letter on
September 23, 2003.

60 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on February 20, 2004, on the ground
that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.9 The denial was received by Paler's
son on March 18, 2004.

The CSC:

Reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's decision. The appeal of Celso M.
Paler is hereby GRANTED.

In the CA:
the assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the order of reinstatement is DELETED.

PALER‘s Contention: assails Atty. Arturo L. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign
the verification and certification of non-forum shopping on behalf of the Commission
Chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tiu's authority to file the petition and sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping.

RULING:

NO. There was no need for the chairman of the commission himself to sign the
verification. With regard to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established
rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not
by counsel.

The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity created
by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the Chairman
himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who personally knew
the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification. With regard,
however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established rule is that it must be
executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel.

In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman to
sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition in his behalf. There
is nothing on record to prove such authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert
Paler‘s allegation of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.21

Furthermore, the petition is bereft of merit as it merely restates the arguments presented
before the CSC and CA. It does not advance any cogent reason that will convince this Court
to deviate from the rulings of both tribunals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

61 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ROMEO BASAN, DANILO DIZON, JAIME L. TUMABIAO, JR., ROBERTO DELA
RAMA, JR., RICKY S. NICOLAS, CRISPULO D. DONOR, GALO FALGUERA, and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, petitioners, v. COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, respondent
GR 174365-66 4 February 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―While the general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping must
be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one (1) of them, petitioner
Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance with the
procedural requirement.

The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification
requirement.‖

FACTS:

ON FEBRUARY 18, 1998, petitioners Basan among others, filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and money claims against Coca-Cola Bottlers Phillippines alleging that the
respondent dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice.

Respondent Corporation on the other hand argues that it hired petitioners as temporary route
helpers for a period in anticipation of the volume of work in their plants or sale offices. LA
ruled in favor of petitioner finding that they are performing activities necessary and desirable
to the usual business of the petitioner for more than the period for regularization. NLRC
affirmed LA decision only to be reversed by the CA. Hence this appeal.

In addition to issue of employment, respondent contends that the petition should be denied
due course for its verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one
of the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should fail on the ground that its verification and
non-forum shopping has been signed by only one of the petitioners

RULING:

NO. On the procedural issue, We hold that while the general rule is that the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the
signature of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be
deemed substantial compliance with the procedural requirement.

62 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition
have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

Similarly, this Court has consistently held that when under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common
cause of action or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification
requirement.

Thus, the fact that the petition was signed only by petitioner Basan does not necessarily
result in its outright dismissal for it is more in accord with substantial justice to overlook
petitioners‘ procedural lapses. Indeed, the application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed in labor cases to serve the demand of justice

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated August 31, 2005 and Resolution dated August 24, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos. 80977 & 87071 are SET ASIDE.

The Resolutions dated January 30, 2003 and September 24, 2003 of the NLRC in NLRC 00-
02-01419-97, affirming in toto the Decision dated August 21, 1998 of the Labor Arbiter are
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION.

Taking into account petitioners‘ reinstatement in 199934 and petitioner Falguera‘s receipt of
P792,815.64 separation pay,35 respondent is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners the
following: (1) backwages computed from the date their salaries were withheld from them
until their actual reinstatement; (2) allowances and other benefits, or their monetary
equivalent, at the time of their dismissal; (3) attorney‘s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the monetary awards; and (4) interest at six percent (6%) per annum of the total monetary
awards, computed from the finality of this Decision until their full satisfaction.

For this purpose, the records of this case are hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for
proper computation of said awards, deducting amounts already received. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

Verification:

GR: General rule is that the verification xxx must be signed by all the petitioners in a
case.

EX: Substantial compliance when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and

63 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct

Certification Against Forum Shopping:

GR: General rule is that the xxx certification of non-forum shopping must be signed
by all the petitioners in a case.

EX: Substantial compliance under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when

all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action
or defense, as in this case, the signature of only one of them in the certification
against forum shopping substantially complies with the certification requirement.

64 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ANICETO UY, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, MINDANAO STATION, CAGAYAN
DE ORO CITY, CARMENCITA NAVAL-SAI, REP. BY HER ATTORNEY-IN FACT
RODOLFO FLORENTINO, respondents
G.R. No. 173186 16 September 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Jardeleza, J.

―A certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record
to sign on his behalf.

FACTS:

Private respondent Carmencita Naval-Sai filed a Complaint for Annulment of Deed with
Damages before the RTC in Kidapawan City against petitioner.

The subject of the complaint was the deed of sale allegedly executed between Naval-Sai and
petitioner involving Lots No. 54-B-8 and No. 54-B-9.

Naval-Sai prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void ab initio because the alleged
sale between her and petitioner was a forgery. Naval-Sai argued that she never sold the lots
and that her signature in the purported deed of sale is spurious.

Petitioner claimed that he and Naval-Sai entered into a valid contract of sale and that the lots
were sold for value. The corresponding TCTs were issued in his name shortly thereafter and
since then, he had been in complete control of the properties.

Petitioner also raised special and affirmative defenses of, among others, non-compliance
with the requisite certification of non-forum shopping and prescription. He asserted that
jurisdiction has never been acquired over the parties and the subject matter because the
certification against forum shopping in the Amended Complaint was defective, for having
been merely signed by Naval-Sai's counsel.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the grounds of prescription and a defective
certification against forum shopping.

On the issue of noncompliance with the required certification on non-forum

shopping, the RTC noted that Naval-Sai did not explain why she failed to comply
with the Rules. The RTC cited the case of Five Star Bus Company, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals where we, faced with the similar issue of whether or not to dismiss a
petition on the ground that the certification was signed by counsel, ruled that there
was noncompliance with the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-9118 and that
substantial compliance cannot be applied.

65 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the RTC in the now assailed Decision

Court of Appeals ruled that there was substantial compliance with the requirement
of verification and certification of non-forum shopping. It noted that the original
complaint has a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping signed
by Naval-Sai herself. What was signed by Naval-Sai‘s counsel was the amended
complaint dated July 29, 1999. Its verification and certification carries the statement
―x x x that this [a]mended [c]omplaint should be taken and read together with the
original complaint; x x x‖ which the Court of Appeals found to be a ―cautionary
move‖ tantamount to substantial compliance The Court of Appeals further
explained that the rule on certification against forum shopping was complied with in
the original complaint because although an amended complaint supersedes the
pleading that it amends, it is not an initiatory pleading contemplated under the Rules
of Court.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements on certification of non-forum
shopping

RULING:

No. There was substantial compliance with the requirements on certification against forum
shopping.

A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party,
an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It must be executed by the
party pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

Here, the original complaint contained a proper verification and certification against forum
shopping duly signed by Naval-Sai as plaintiff. The verification and certification in the
amended complaint, on the other hand, was only signed by her counsel, Atty. Norberto L.
Ela. Atty. Ela was not authorized to sign on behalf of Naval-Sai, as in fact, she assigned one
Rodolfo Florentino as agent. The Court of Appeals pointed out that in the certification in
the amended complaint, Atty. Ela specified that it should be taken and read together with
the original complaint. The Court of Appeals took this as a cautionary move on the part of
Naval-Sai, justifying the relaxation of the rules on the ground of substantial compliance. We
find, however, that this cautionary move is ineffectual because under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. For all intents and
66 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
purposes, therefore, the original complaint and its verification and certification ceased to
exist. This, notwithstanding, we find there was still substantial compliance with the Rules.

In the case of Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals, while we said that, strictly, a
certification against forum shopping by counsel is a defective certification, the verification,
signed by petitioner‘s counsel in said case, is substantial compliance because it served the
purpose of the Rules of informing the Court of the pendency of another action or
proceeding involving the same issues. We then explained that procedural rules are
instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice which should be used to
achieve such end and not to derail it.

We also find that the prima facie merits of the case serve as a special circumstance or a
compelling reason to relax the rules on certification against forum shopping.

In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we recognized the flaw in the certification against forum
shopping which was signed only by the counsel, and not by the party. In LDP Marketing, Inc.
v. Monter, there was initially no proof that the one who signed the certification was
authorized to do so in behalf of the corporation. In these two cases, we nonetheless chose to
overlook the procedural lapses in the interest of substantial justice and the existence of
prima facie merit in the petitions.

We have ruled that the general rule is that noncompliance or a defect in the certification is
not curable by its subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where we
exercised leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the
presence of special circumstances or compelling reasons. The rules on forum shopping are
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and ―should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.‖

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let the records of this case be remanded for
further proceedings to the Regional Trial Court of idapawan City, Branch , which is hereby
ORDERED to try and decide the case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

67 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Office of the City Prosecutor,
Department of Justice, Roxas City, petitioner, v. JESUS A. ARROJADO, respondent
GR 207041 9 November 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal case and to uphold the
parties‘ respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case, the prosecution, mindful of its
duty not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do justice, could have simply
refiled the Information containing the required number and date of issue of the
investigating prosecutor‘s Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of
Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various petitions in court to stubbornly
insist on its position and question the trial court‘s dismissal of the subject Information,
thereby wasting its time and effort and the State‘s resources. x x x

Under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings
the number and date of issue of his or her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and expunction of
the pleadings from the records.

Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary
action.

FACTS:

In an Information dated March 23, 2009 respondent (Arrojado) was charged with the crime
of murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz.

In 2009, respondent (Arrojado) filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information filed against him
on the ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the said Information failed to
indicate there in the number and date of issue of her Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922.

Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition to respondent's Motion to Dismiss

contending that:

(1) the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance;

(2) the lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who prepared and
signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges
against persons who have violated the law; and
(3) and administrative edict cannot prevail over substantive or procedural law, by
imposing additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal information.

In 2009, the RTC of Roxas City issued an Order dismissing the subject Information without
prejudice. Then, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court denied it.

68 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA assailing the
Orders of the RTC of Roxas City. In its presently assailed Decision, the CA denied
respondent's petition and affirmed the questioned RTC Orders.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it rules that the failure of the
investigating Prosecutor to indicate her MCLE Compliance number and date
of issuance thereof in the information warranted the dismissal of the same.

RULING:

No. The petition lacks merit.

Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as follows:

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to
INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period.
Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

In harping on its contention that the ends of justice would be best served if the criminal case
would be allowed to proceed in order to determine the innocence or culpability of the
accused, petitioner sounds as if the dismissal of the Information left the prosecution with no
other recourse or remedy so as to irreversibly jeopardize the interests of the State and the
private offended party. On the contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of
the Information, without prejudice, did not leave the prosecution without any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject criminal
case and to uphold the parties' respective rights to a speedy disposition of their case, the
prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do
justice, could have simply re-filed the Information containing the required number and date
of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of
resorting to the filing of various petitions in court to stubbornly insist on its position and
question the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time and
effort and the State's resources.

The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal

construction of procedural rules by arguing that such liberal construction "may be invoked
in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading,
provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least
a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." The prosecution has never shown any
reasonable attempt at compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even when
the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was
filed, the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case,

69 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance
of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 8, 2011 and April 18, 2013, respectively, in C.A.- G.R.
S.P. No. 04540 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

70 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. (Powerhouse), petitioner,
v. ROMELIA REY, et al. (Rey, et al.), and JEJ INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER
SERVICES CORPORATION (JEJ), respondents
GR 190203 7 November 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Jardeleza, J.

―The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution:

(1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors;

(2) the President of a corporation;
(3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager;
(4) Personnel Officer; and
(5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.‖

FACTS:

Powerhouse hired Rey, together with thirteen (13) other Filipinos (Rey et al.) as operators
for its Taiwanese principal Catcher Technical Co. Ltd./Catcher Industrial Co. Ltd. (Catcher),
with compensation of fifteen thousand eight hundred and forty New Taiwan Dollars
(NT$15,840.00).

Rey et al. were deployed on 2 June 2000. After eight (8) months passed, or on February
2001, Catcher informed Rey et al. that they will be reducing working days due to low orders
and financial difficulties. Upon the alleged refusal of Rey et al. to accept the reduced working
days and an alleged voluntarily entered repatriation by them, they have been repatriated to
the Philippines on 11 March 2001.

On 22 March 2001, Rey et al. filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, refund of
placement fees, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney‘s fees against
Powerhouse and Catcher, before the Labor Arbiter (LA), in which:

Rey et al. alleged that:

1. Catcher told them that they will be repatriated due to low orders;
2. They initially refused to be repatriated;
3. They merely accepted the repatriation as Catcher stopped giving them foods, and
merely relied on food donations given by their friends and the church; and
4. Catcher illegally deducted ten thousand New Taiwan Dollars (NT$10,000.00) from
their salaries, evidence by two (2) passbooks given to them in which they were only
allowed to withdraw from the second, while the amount deducted was reflected in
the first.

Powerhouse, on the other hand, alleged that:

71 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
1. Rey et al. voluntarily gave up their jobs, after refusal to the proposed reduced
working days;
2. Payments of settlement were given prior to their repatriation; and
3. By virtue of an alleged transfer of Catcher’s accreditation to JEJ, it must be properly
impleaded as the one who is liable

After the motion to implead JEJ has been granted by the LA, it averred that it
cannot affect the joint and solidary responsibility of Powerhouse with Cather.

The LA ruled in favor of the respondents, holding Catcher, JEJ, and Powerhouse
guilty of illegal dismissal/ pretermination of employment contracts:

―WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [Powerhouse],

William Go, [Catcher], Chen Wei, [JEJ] and Benedicto Javier to jointly and
severally pay complainants the following amounts corresponding to the
unexpired term of their employment contracts or three (3) months salaries
whichever is less and refund of illegally deducted amounts in their wages:

Respondents are further ordered to pay 10% attorney‘s fees.

The complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages and other money
claims are hereby disallowed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.‖

All parties being aggrieved, they appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC): The NLRC:

Affirmed the LA, and further absolved JEJ from liability, and ordered the refund of
the placement fees of Rey et al, and ordered payment of an equivalent of three (3)
months of salary (as it is less than the unexpired term‘s worth of salary).

Powerhouse‘s Motion for Reconsideration (MR) is likewise denied

After receiving the resolution of the NLRC on 21 June 2007, Powerhouse elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA) on 21 August 2007 via a Petition for Certiorari, in which the
signature portion of the Certification against Forum Shopping and Verification
contains their President and General Manager William C. Go‘s (Go) signature.
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the questioned act
as illegal, awarding refund, and absolving JEJ. The CA:

Dismissed the petition, on the ground that the petition is filed beyond the sixty
(60) day period, and that no board resolution allowing Go to sign the Certification
against Forum Shopping and Verification.

Further, even assuming it be on the merits, Powerhouse‘ petition must fail as it failed
to disprove or rebut Rey et al.‘s claims.

72 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
As to JEJ, they held that the transfer must not affect the solidary liability, in line with
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 8042
(RA 8042).

Likewise, the MR was denied.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not Powerhouse properly filed its petition before the CA
Whether or not the NLRC properly ruled payment of salaries by Powerhouse
and Catcher
Whether or not the NLRC is correct in absolving JEJ from liability

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes, the petition was properly filed with the CA. While as a general rule, a board resolution is
required in order for a person to properly sign a Certification against Forum Shopping and
Verification, the following persons are exceptions to the rule, and thus may sign in behalf of
the corporation despite no board resolution to that effect:

1. Chairperson of the Board of Directors;

2. President of a corporation;
3. General Manager or Acting General Manager;
4. Personnel Officer; and
5. Employment Specialist in a labor case.

The rationale in allowing such, is that by virtue of the designation of the above persons, they
are in a better position to ―verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition‖.

As in this case, Go is the President and General Manager, his signature is enough despite the
absence of the Board Certificate. Furthermore, at October of the same year, a board
resolution is passed to that effect. Thus the SC held that the signature is a substantial
compliance.

As to the date of filing, it was ruled that it was filed on time, considering that August 20 is a
special non-working holiday. Following the rule that if the last day falls on a holiday, it
should be filed in the next working day, then the filing in 21 August is within the time
prescribed.

2nd Issue:
Yes, the payment of the unpaid salaries is proper.

In a labor case, the burden of proving that the employee has not been dismissed, or if
dismissed, that the dismissal was legal, and likewise that there were compensations paid to
the employees, is vested upon the employer, as the latter has control over the documents
pertaining to such.
73 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

In this case, Powerhouse and Catcher failed to substantiate any of their defences via
evidence. Even if they presented evidence, they never authenticated such.

However, the Court ruled that the proper amount to be paid is the whole salary pertaining to
the unexpired term, considering that they have already ruled the ―three (3) months‖ worth of
salary as unconstitutional, considering that it is in violation of the equal protection and due
process clause.

3rd Issue:
Yes, the removal of JEJ as a solidary debtor is proper.

Under RA 8042, any transfer by or suspension of the obligation of one agency to another
shall not affect the rights of the workers.

Thus, despite the fact that the accreditation has already been transferred to JEJ, the liability
remains as to Powerhouse, considering that they were the agency at the time the incident
occurred.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 24, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals DISMISSING the petition in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 100196 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each of the respondent employees are
AWARDED their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their respective employment
contracts computed at the rate of NT$15,840.00 per month at an interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this decision until full payment thereof.

Further, the award of placement fees in respondent employees‘ favor shall earn interest at
the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from finality of this decision until full payment
thereof.

Furthermore, the illegally deducted amounts which were ordered to be refunded to

respondent employees, as well as the attorney‘s fees awarded to respondent employees, shall
earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this decision until full
payment thereof. The temporary restraining order issued on March 3, 2010 is hereby
DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.

74 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
HEIRS OF JOSEFINA GABRIEL, petitioners, v. SECUNDINA CEBRERO, CELSO
LAVIÑA, AND MANUEL C. CHUA, respondents
GR 222737 12 November 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―Thus, the rule on the certification against forum shopping has been properly complied
with when it is the agent or attorney-in-fact who initiated the action on the principal's behalf
and who signed the certification against forum shopping.‖

FACTS:

Segundina Cebrero (Cebrero), through her attorney-in-fact Remedios Muyot, executed a real
estate mortgage over the subject property located in Sampaloc, Manila registered under the
name of Cebrero's late husband Virgilio Cebrero (Virgilio) as security for the payment of the
amount of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000.00), pursuant to an amicable settlement entered
into by the parties in the case of annulment of revocation of donation. In the said
settlement, Josefina Gabriel (Gabriel) recognized Cebrero's absolute ownership of the subject
property and relinquished all her claims over the property in consideration of the payment of
the said P8,000,000.00.

Upon Cebrero's failure to pay the amount within the period of extension, Gabriel filed an
action for foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. In a Decision, the RTC ruled in Gabriel's
favor and ordered Cebrero to pay the P8,000,000.00 and interest, or the subject property
shall be sold at public auction in default of payment.

The sheriff initiated the necessary proceedings for the public auction sale when no appeal
was filed and the decision became final. Gabriel, being the sole bidder, purchased Cebrero's
undivided share plus her inheritance. The sheriff issued the Final Deed of Sale when
Cebrero failed to redeem the property.

However, Gabriel had not registered the Final Deed of Sale since she disputed the Bureau of
Internal Revenue's estate tax assessment on the subject property considering that she
claimed only a portion thereof.

Eduardo Cañiza (Cañiza), allegedly in behalf of Gabriel, instituted a Complaint for

declaration of nullity of sale.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that Gabriel has no legal capacity to sue as she was
bedridden and confined at the Makati Medical Center since 1993. The complaint should be
dismissed because Cañiza signed the verification and certification of. the complaint without
proper authority.

Gabriel died during the pendency of the case, thus her heirs substituted [Link] RTC ruled for the Heirs of
Gabriel, but the CA reversed.

75 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ISSUE/s: Whether or not the verification and certification of the complaint conforms with the
rules since Caniza, as Gabriel'sattorney-in-fact, signed it.
Whether or not the defect was cured when Caniza, being one of the heirs, substituted
Gabriel when she died duringthe pendency of the case before the trial court.

RULING

1st Issue:
NO. When an SPA was constituted precisely to authorize the agent to file and prosecute suits on behalf of
the principal, then it is such agent who has actual and personal knowledge whether he or she has initiated
similar actions or proceedings before various courts on the same issue on the principal's behalf, thus, satisfying
the requirements for a valid certification against forum shopping. The rationale behind the rule that it must be
the "petitioner or principal party himself who should sign such certification does not apply. Thus, the rule on
the certification against forum shopping has been properly complied with when it is the agent or attorney-in-
fact who initiated the action on the principal's behalf and who signed the certification against forum shopping.

However, there was no duly executed SPA appended to the complaint to prove Caniza's supposed
authority to file and prosecute suits on behalf of Gabriel. The Court cannot consider the mere mention
in the December 15, 1993 Decision that he was Gabriel's attorney-in-fact as evidence that he was indeed
authorized and empowered to initiate the instant action against respondents. There was also no evidence of
substantial compliance with the rules or even an attempt to submit an SPA after filing of the complaint.

2nd Issue
NO. Caniza's subsequent substitution as one of Gabriel's heirs did not cure the defect in the complaint, i.e.,
when he signed the verification and certification against forum shopping without apparent authority. To
reiterate, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the plaintiff upon the filing of the complaint. Besides, the
substitution merely ensured that Gabriel's interest would be properly represented and that her heirs were
brought to jurisdiction of the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari filed by herein petitioners Heirs of
Josefina Gabriel is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated October 20, 2015 and the
Resolution dated January 29, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102204 are
AFFIRMED. The complaint filed by Josefina Gabriel before the Regional Trial Court is
hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

76 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 8
Manner of Making Allegations in a Pleading

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, v. WESLEYAN

UNIVERSITY PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent
GR 207970 20 January 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Bersamin, J.

―The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party
when the defending party's answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the
parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for
judgment on the pleadings because the defending party's pleading in another case
supposedly tendered an issue of fact. x x x

The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party‘s pleadings
not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it omits to
deal with them at all.

The controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by specific denial.‖

FACTS:

From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing
with medical equipment and supplies, delivered to and installed medical equipment and
supplies at the respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid only
P67,357,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of
P54,654,195.54.

However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent entered into an
agreement whereby the former agreed to reduce its claim to only P50,400,000.00, and
allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.

In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new
administration had reviewed their contracts and had found the contracts defective and
rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to
recognize the February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of
Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose term of office had expired.

On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the
respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner filed its complaint for sum of money
in the RTC.

The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia;

77 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had
earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009
agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City; and that the resolution of that case would be
determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.

After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its
answer. On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed its Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint
and thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion
for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing that it had specifically denied the material
allegations in the complaint.

Judgment of the RTC

At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings considering that the allegations stated on the Motion are evidentiary in nature. The
Court, instead of acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with the
Answer and the Reply, issues have been joined.

Judgment of the CA

On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent
had admitted the contracts as well as the February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a
judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to the
petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its
complaint for rescission in the RTC in Cabanatuan City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent‘s denial may be considered ―specific denial‖
within the purview of the Rules of Civil Procedure

RULING:

NO. The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party‘s
pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it
omits to deal with them at all.

The controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by specific denial. Section 10,
Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes by which the denial in the answer
raises an issue of fact.

The first is by the defending party specifying each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, setting forth the
substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial.

The second applies to the defending party who desires to deny only a part of an
averment, and the denial is done by the defending party specifying so much of the

78 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and denying only the
remainder.

The third is done by the defending party who is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the
complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material averment in the complaint not so
specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the amount of unliquidated damages.

The respondent denied paragraph nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint ―for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the
alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of
defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines.‖ (Was the manner of denial effective as a specific denial?)

It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly known
to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been known by it are
insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials.

That the respondent qualified its admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special and
affirmative defenses of lack of jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis pendentia and
forum shopping was of no consequence because the affirmative defenses, by their nature,
involved matters extrinsic to the merits of the petitioner‘s claim, and thus did not negate
the material averments of the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
July 2, 2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its
proceedings in Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v. Wesleyan
University -Philippines, and to forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the
Pleadings by rendering the proper judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent
to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

The allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit, being undisputed, will not require
evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations of ultimate facts the answer
properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence.

Other Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in going outside of the respondent‘s
answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter‘s complaint
for rescission.
Ruling:

NO. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for
ascertaining whether the complaint’s material allegations were admitted or properly denied. —We
should emphasize that in order to resolve the petitioner‘s Motion for Judgment
Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only on the answer of the

79 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint‘s
material allegations were admitted or properly denied.

As such, the respondent‘s averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the

petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the resolution of
the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a
factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through
trial on the merits.

It should have openly wondered why the respondent‘s answer in Civil Case No. 09-
122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment
was true, if only to buttress the specific denial of its alleged liability. The omission
exposed the respondent‘s denial of liability as insincere.

80 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC. AND GEORGE C. GO, petitioners, v. BPI
FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC., SUBSTITUTED BY PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT
ONE [SPV-AMC], INC.,* respondent
G.R. No. 187487 29 June 2015
Petition for review on Certiorari
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

―A general denial does not become specific by the use of the word ―specifically.‖ Neither
does it become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of
law that the allegations contested are ―self-serving‖ or are intended ―to suit plaintiff‘s
purposes.‖

―..the admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party
whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by
another for him and with his authority; Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that
the defendant ―sets forth what he claims to be the facts,‖

FACTS:

Go Tong Electrical had applied for and was granted financial assistance by the then Bank of
South East Asia. Subsequently, DBS Bank of the Philippines, Inc. became the successor in
interest of BSA.

The application for financial assistance was renewed through a Credit Agreement. Go Tong
Electrical, represented by Go, obtained a loan from DBS for which Go Tong Electrical
executed Promissory Note for the same amount in favor of DBS.

As additional security, Go executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement covering any and all
obligations undertaken by Go Tong Electrical, including the aforesaid loan. Upon default of
petitioners, DBS – and later, its successor-in-interest, BPI Family Savings Bank demanded
payment from petitioners, but to no avail.

Hence respondent filed a complaint against petitioners for the payment of their loan
obligation in the aggregate amount of P87,086,398.71

In their Answer with Counterclaim (Answer), petitioners merely stated that they ―specifically
deny‖ the allegations under the complaint. Go Tong Electrical denied the execution of the
loan agreement, the PN, and the CSA "for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended
to suit purposes." By way of special and affirmative defenses, it argued that: (a) the real
party-in-interest should be DBS and not respondent; (b) no demand was made upon them;
and (c) Go cannot be held liable under the CSA since there was supposedly no solidarity of
debtors. It interposed counterclaims for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, as
well as litigation and attorney's fees.

RTC ruled in favor of respondent.

81 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
It found that respondent had amply demonstrated by competent evidence that it was
entitled to the reliefs it prayed for. Particularly, respondent‘s documentary evidence
— the authenticity of which the RTC observed to be undisputed — showed the
existence of petitioners‘ valid and demandable obligation. On the other hand,
petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that they had already paid the
same, even partially.

Further, the RTC debunked petitioners‘ denial of the demands made by respondent
since, ultimately, the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA clearly stated that no demand
was needed to render them in default.

Unconvinced, petitioners appealed to the CA.

CA sustained the RTC‘s ruling in toto

- the CA discredited petitioners‘ argument that respondent‘s sole witness, Suñio, was
incompetent to testify on the documentary evidence presented as he had no personal
knowledge of the loan documents‘ execution, given that petitioners, in their
Answer, did not deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the
PN and CSA and, hence, are deemed admitted under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules
of Court (Rules).

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in a Resolution

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC‘s ruling.

RULING:

The petition lacks merit.

The Court concurs with the CA Decision holding that the genuineness and due execution of
the loan documents in this case were deemed admitted by petitioners under the parameters
of Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules which provides:

SEC. 8. How to contest such documents.—When an action or defense is founded upon a

written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided
in the preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall
be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an
oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused.

A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution of
82 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
the Credit Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of the above quoted rule. The mere
statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they ―specifically deny‖ the pertinent
allegations of the Complaint ―for being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit
plaintiff‘s purposes,‖ does not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law.

A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a
general denial does not become specific by the use of the word ―specifically.‖ either does it
become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a broad conclusion of law that
the allegations contested are ―self-serving‖ or are intended ―to suit plaintiff‘s purposes.‖

In Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde (Permanent Savings & Loan Bank), citing the
earlier case of Songco v. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due
execution of an actionable document, viz.:

This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the
document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement
of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent
representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary
such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since
it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.

To add, Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the defendant ―sets forth what
he claims to be the facts,‖ which requirement, likewise, remains absent from the Answer in
this case.

Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the ―specific denial under oath‖ requirement
under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that
petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the documents
evidencing their loan obligation to respondent.

Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due
execution of the document, e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit, or of
different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 17, 2009 and the
Resolution dated April 13, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 86749 are
here by AFFIRMED with the above stated MODIFICATIONS.
SO ORDERED.

83 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, v. CA
and MONARK EQUIPMENT CORPORATION, respondents
GR 160242 17 May 2005
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Callejo, Sr., J.

―A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is
entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.‖

(NOTE: The 3rd party claim filed by ACDC failed to make the correct allegations against MEC to warrant the
admission of the 3rd party claim by the trial court, in relation to Rule 8 on the manner of making allegations in
pleadings. That was why the petition was denied.)

FACTS:

On March 13, 2001, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a complaint for sum of
money with damages against Asian Construction and Development Corporation (ACDC)
with the RTC of Quezon City.

MEC alleged that ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida floodlighting systems
from them for 4 months but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals for the equipment
for a total amount of P4.3 million pesos, and that from July to August 1998 various
equipment were again leased to ACDC and a balance on the rentals remained at )456,666.7,
and ACDC also purchased and took custody of various equipment parts from MEC for
P237,336.20 and despite demands, ACDC failed to pay.

MEC prayed that judgment be rendered in their favor for the payment of a total about P5M,
payment of legal interest of another P5M, attorney‘s fees at 15% of the total amount of the
claim (~1.5M), and the payment of the costs of litigation.

ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with 3rd party complaint against Becthel
Overseas (Becthel) where ACDC admitted its indebtedness to MEC in the amount of P5M
but alleged the following special and affirmative defenses. That ACDC incurred an
obligation with MEC but Betchel fails and refuses to pay its overdue obligation on the leased
equipment used by ACDC to comply with its contracted services and that the equipment
covered by the lease were all used in a construction project of Becthel in Mauban, Quezon
and Expo in Pampanga and that ACDC was not yet paid of its services which resulted to the
non-payment of rentals on the leased equipment.

By way of the 3rd party complaint against Becthel, ACDC alleged that Becthel was a foreign
corporation but may be served with summons in Quezon province; that with the contracted
work, ACDC rented the equipment from MEC; that ACDC with the rented equipment
complied with its contracted work with Becthel but BEcthel did not pay for the services
resulting to the nonpayment of rentals due to MEC; and that ACDC claims for payment of
attorney‘s fees from Becthel. ACDC prayed for judgment to be rendered in its favor.

84 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a 3rd party complaint against Becthel on the
ground that ACDC already admitted its principal obligation of P5M and that the transaction
between Becthel and ACDC were independent transactions and that the allowance of the 3 rd
party complaint would result to undue delays in the disposition of the case. Thus, MEC filed
for summary judgment alleging that there was no genuine issue and that that the only issue
for the trial court‘s resolution being the amount of attorney‘s fees and the costs of litigation.
ACDC opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground that it had a 3rd party
complaint against Becthel in connection with the reliefs sought against it which had to be
litigated. MEC in its reply alleged that the demand of ACDC in its special and affirmative
defenses partook of a nature of a negative pregnant, and that there was a need for a hearing
on its claim for damages.

The RTC denied the motion of ACDC for leave to file a 3rd party complaint and granted the
motion of MEC which the court considered as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The RTC ordered ACDC to pay MEC the P5M rentals that were due plus 12% interest.
ACDC appealed this resolution to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal and sustained the
RTC decision on the disallowance of the 3rd party complaint of ACDC against Becthel on
the ground that the transaction between the parties did not arise out of the same transaction
on which MEC‘s claim was based. CA denied ACDC‘s MR, hence this petition.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the 3rd party complaint filed alleged the facts in the pleadings
correctly
Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was proper

RULING:

1st Issue:
No. Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a defendant to assert an
independent claim against a third-party which he, otherwise, would assert in another action,
thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be
adjudicated in one proceeding. It is a rule of procedure and does not create a substantial
right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This
right to file a 3rd party complaint against a 3rd party rests in the discretion of the trial court. A
prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim
be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other
substantive right. Therefore there must be a causal connection between the claim of the
plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the
defendant against the 3rd party defendant.

The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be recovery
against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show possibility of
recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the
original complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party
complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant.

85 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In this case, the claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the petitioner as
defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such transactions are different
and separate from those between Becthel and the petitioner as third-party plaintiff for the
construction of the latter‘s project in Mauban, Quezon, where the equipment leased from
the respondent was used by the petitioner. The controversy between the respondent and the
petitioner, on one hand, and that between the petitioner and Becthel, on the other are
entirely distinct from each other. There is no showing in the proposed 3rd party
complaint that the respondent knew or approved the use of the leased equipment by
the petitioner for the said project in Quezon. The fact that the ACDC used the
equipment it leased from MEC in connection with its project with Becthel does not
provide a substantive basis for the filing of a 3rd party complaint against MEC.

(NOTE: In short, the 3rd party claim filed by ACDC failed to make the correct allegations against MEC
to warrant the admission of the 3rd party claim by the trial court, in relation to Rule 8 on the manner of
making allegations in pleadings. That was why the petition was denied.)

2nd Issue:
Yes. Considering that ACDC already admitted its liability for the principal claim of P5M of
MEC in its Answer with 3rd party complaint, the trial court was correct in rendering
judgment on the pleadings against it.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

86 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC. (Benguet), petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
SWITZERLAND GENERAL INSURANCE, CO., LTD. (Switzerland), and SEAWOOD
SHIPPING, INC. (Seawood), respondents
GR 117434 9 February 2001
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

―When the law makes use of the phrase ‗genuineness and due execution of the instrument‘
it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different
import on its face from the one executed. x x x

Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not
on the witness stand.

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent
can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.‖

FACTS:

Benguet entered into a contract with Seawood where the former chartered the latter‘s vessel
―Sangkulirang No. 3‖ for the delivery of copper concentrates to Japan to its buyer Brandeis
Intsel Co., Inc. The said transaction is insured by a marine policy insurance issued by
Switzerland.

By virtue of an alleged three hundred and fifty five (355) metric tons shortage out of the
supposed two thousand two hundred and fourty three (2,433) metric tons to be delivered,
Benguet filed two separate complaints for damages against Seawood and Switzerland in the
RTC. Later on, these cases were consolidated.

Switzerland filed a third-party complaint against Seawood for indemnification of any such
claims that might be adjudged in favor of Benguet.

In the RTC:

Benguet offered the testimonies of Rogelio Lumibao (Lumibao) and Ernesto

Cayabyab, its marking assistant and secretary of its manager, respectively, which
testified as follows:

Lumibao was not present at the loading or the unloading of the copper
concentrates, that the value of the copper was based solely on the Bill of
Lading relayed to him via a phone call, that he had no hand in the
preparation of the Bill of Lading.

Cayabyab on the other hand testified that he was present during the loading
and the preparation of the documents pertaining to the loading of the

87 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
copper, but had no hand in the loading of such, and that he cannot ascertain
if indeed there is any spillage which could have resulted in the shortage of the
weight of the copper.

On the other hand, Switzerland offered the testimony of three (3) witnesses, who
testified as follows:

That, the marine insurance policy contained a condition that the vessel
should have a ―centreline bulkhead‖ to prevent the shifting of the copper
and cause its reduction

That after clarifying with the captain, there is indeed no centreline bulkhead.

That the initial weight of the copper might have been bigger considering that
amount of rain prior to the voyage, and the subsequent lessening of weight is
due to the evaporation of such.

That the actual amount was contrary to Benguet‘s export declaration stating
2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons.

The RTC dismissed Benguet‘s complaint.

Aggrieved, Benguet filed an appeal to the CA, which likewise affirmed the RTC, and denied
the MR as well.

Thus, this petition, arguing that the testimonial and documentary evidence says otherwise,
that by the admissions of the genuineness and due execution of the documents, it had
effectively upheld the validity of the evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission as to the genuineness and due execution
sufficiently proves Benguet‘s case
Whether or not the testimony of Lumibao and Cayabyab sufficiently proved
Benguet‘s case

RULING:

1st Issue:
No, the admission as to the genuineness and due execution merely means that the same
document is what it purports to be, and not a spurious or false one.

However, this does not mean that it is conclusive considering that it merely establishes a
prima facie case, and may be the subject of rebuttal evidence.

In this case, Switzerland sufficiently disproved the pieces of evidence raised by Benguet.

In fact, Switzerland even went further by providing possibilities for the cause of the loss.

88 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
2nd Issue:
No, their testimonies cannot be given probative weight. As a rule, those which are not from
the personal knowledge of the witness shall be considered hearsay.

Hearsay evidence has no probative weight, even if not objected to.

In this case, both Lumibao and Cayabyab lacks personal knowledge as to the actual weight
delivered, considering that they did not have a hand in the preparation of the documents,
nor as to being in the actual loading of it.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

89 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 9
Effect of Failure to Plead

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. (formerly Equitable PCI Bank), petitioner, v. JOHN

TANSIPEK, respondent
GR 181235 22 July 2009
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Chico-Nazario, J.

―A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a
motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to
answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion
should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and
meritorious defenses.
The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious
defenses must concur.‖

FACTS:

J. O. Construction, Inc. (JOCI), a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business

in Cebu City, filed a complaint against Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) in
the RTC of Makati City. The Complaint alleges that JOCI entered into a contract with Duty
Free Free Shop in Mandaue City. As actual construction went on, progress billings were
made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein respondent John
Tansipek (Tansipek), its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent Tansipek
were initially remitted to JOCI.

 However, payment through PNB Check in the amount of ₱4,050,136.51 was not
turned over to JOCI. Instead, respondent Tansipek endorsed said check and
deposited the same to his account in PCIB.

PCIB filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that (1) an indispensable
party was not impleaded, and (2) therein plaintiff JOCI had no cause of action against PCIB.
The RTC denied PCIB‘s Motion to Dismiss.

PCIB filed its answer alleging as defenses that:

(1) JOCI had clothed Tansipek with authority to act as its agent, and was therefore estopped
from denying the same;
(2) JOCI had no cause of action against PCIB ;
(3) failure to implead Tansipek rendered the proceedings taken after the filing of the
complaint void;
90 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
(4) PCIB‘s act of accepting the deposit was fully justified by established bank practices;
(5) JOCI‘s claim was barred by laches; and
(6) the damages alleged by JOCI were hypothetical and speculative. PCIB incorporated in
said Answer its counterclaims for exemplary damages in the amount of ₱400,000.00, and
litigation expenses and attorney‘s fees in the amount of ₱400,000.00.

PCIB likewise moved for leave for the court to admit the former‘s third-party complaint
against respondent Tansipek. The third-party complaint alleged that respondent Tansipek
was a depositor at its Wilson Branch, San Juan, Metro Manila.

PCIB filed a Motion to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. The amendment

consisted in the correction of the caption, so that PCIB appeared as Third-Party
Plaintiff and Tansipek as Third-Party Defendant.

Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was granted time to file his Answer to the Third-Party
Complaint. He was, however, declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to
Reconsider the Default Order was denied.

Petitioner Banco de Oro-EPCI, Inc., as successor-in-interest to PCIB, filed the instant

Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the above Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals, and laying down a lone issue for this Court‘s consideration:

RTC promulgated decision in favor of the plaintiff. This was later appealed to the CA.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the
correct remedy

RULING:

NO. Respondent Tansipek‘s remedy against the Order of Default was erroneous from the
very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court: (b) Relief from order of default.—A party declared in default may at any time
after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default
may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of
justice.

A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in that the Motion
should be verified; and must show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses.
The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of meritorious defenses must
concur.

91 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
It is important to note that a party declared in default – respondent Tansipek in this case – is
not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or not he had
previously filed a

Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the result of the latter and the
appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on the Decision‘s being contrary to
law or the evidence already presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69130 dated 18
August 2006 and the Resolution of the same court dated 9 January 2008 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in
Civil Case No. 97- 508 dated 14 July 2000 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

92 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SPOUSES ROLANDO and HERMINIA SALVADOR, petitioners, v. SPOUSES ROGELIO
and ELIZABETH RABAJA and ROSARIO GONZALES, respondents
GR 199990 4 February 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

―Failure to attend the pretrial conference does not result in the default of an absent party.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default if he fails to
file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if a defendant fails to
attend the pretrial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence ex parte.

(NOTE: Under the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure under Sec. 3 of Rule 18, [new provision] non-
appearance at any of the foregoing settings (i.e. pre-trial conference, court annexed mediation and judicial dispute
resolution, if necessary) shall be deemed as non-appearance at the pre-trial and shall merit the same sanctions under
Section 5 hereof. Section 5 provides that when parties are duly notified, failure of the plaintiff and counsel to appear
without valid cause shall cause the dismissal of the action, with prejudice. Failure on the part of the defendant and
counsel on the other hand shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his or her evidence ex-parte within 10 calendar
days form the termination of the pre-trial, and the court to render judgment on the basis of the evidence offered.)

FACTS:

In July 1998, Spouses Rabaja learned that Sps Salvador were looking for a buyer of their
parcel of land situated in Mandaluyong which the Sps. Rabaja were leasing in an apartment
in the subject lot. Herminia Salvador introduced Rosario Gonzales to the Rabajas as the
administrator of the said property to whom the Salvador‘s even handed a duplicate
certificate of title over the property.

The Rabaja‘s made an initial payment of P48,000 to Rosario in the presence of Herminia.
Rosario then presented her SPA executed by Rolando Salvador. On the same day the parties
executed a Contact to Sell which stipulated that Sps Salvador transferred and conveyed the
subject lot to the Rabajas. The Rabaja‘s then made several payments through Gonzales
totaling P950,0000 as evidenced by check vouchers and the improvised receipts signed by
Herminia Salvador.

In June 1999, however, the Salvadors complained to the Rabajas that they did not receive
any payment from Gonzales. This prompted the Rabajas to suspend further payment of the
purchase price which triggered the notice to vacate the property as sent by the Salvadors due
to non-payment of rentals. After that, the Salvadors filed an action of ejectment against the
Rabajas. The Rabajas in turn filed an action for rescission of contract against the Salvadors
and Gonzales, which is now the subject matter of the present petition.

The MeTC of Mandaluyong, where the action for ejectment was filed, ruled in favor of
the Salvadors finding valid grounds for the ejectment and ruling that the Rabaja‘s should
pay back the rentals. The Salvadors were able to garnish P593,400 from the Rabaja‘s time
deposit account pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the MeTC. Appeal in the RTC
ruled in favor of the Rabajas since the RTC found no lease agreement between the

93 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
parties. On appeal at the CA, the decision of the MeTC was reinstated ejecting the
Rabajas. Finding no appeal. The decision of the CA (ejecting the Rabajas) became final and
executory.

On the rescission case filed by the Rabajas against the Salvadors and Gonzales, they
prayed that the P950,000 they previously paid be returned to them and to award damages
due to the contractual breach committed by the Salvadors. The Salvadors filed their answer
with counterclaim and cross claim contending that there was no meeting of the minds
between the parties and that the SPA made in favor of Gonzales was falsified (a case was
actually filedon this but was dismissed) and that they did not receive any payment made by
the Rabajas through Gonzales. In her defense, Gonzales stated that the SPA was not
falsified and that the payments made by the Rabaja;s were all delivered to the Salvadors. The
pretrial conference failed to settle case amicably, when it was reset the Salvadors and their
counsel failed to attend thus the Salvadors were declared in default and allowing the Rabajas
to present their evidence ex parte. The Salvadors filed an MR on the pretrial order which
was denied by the RTC due to the flimsy excuse provided by the parties.

The RTC then rendered a decision in favor of the Rabajas. The RTC ruled that the
contract was a contract of sale because the Salvadors, as vendors did not reserve their title to
the property until the vendees had fully paid the purchase and thus the contract entered into
was a reciprocal contract which could validly be rescinded by the Rabajas and thus recover
their 950,000 from the Salvadors and Gonzales. Further, the RTC ruled that the garnished
amount should be returned to the Rabajas‘ apart from the damages.

Gonzales filed a partial reconsideration but was denied. The Salvadors filed an appeal before
the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications making Gonzales not
solidarily liable with the Salvadors since she did not expressly bind herself or exceeded the
limit of her authority. The Salvadors filed an MR but was denied by the CA, hence, this
petition.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the order of default during the pretrial conference was proper
Whether or not the contract between the Salvador‘s and the Rabaja‘s were
valid
Whether or not the garnished amount has become final and executory in the
ejectment case
Whether the amount of damages was improper

RULING:

1st Issue:
No. The Court reiterated the rule that the failure to attend the pretrial conference does not
result in the default of an absent party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant
is only declared in default if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On
the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pretrial conference, the plaintiff can
present his evidence ex parte.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:

94 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Sec. 4. Appearance of parties.—

It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at
the pretrial. The nonappearance of a party may be excused only if
a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear
in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable
settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution,
and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of
documents.

Sec. 5. Effect of failure to appear.—

The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required
pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for
dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice,
unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the
part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff
to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render
judgment on the basis thereof.

The case of Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Joseph Enario discussed the
difference between the nonappearance of a defendant in a pretrial conference and the
declaration of a defendant in default in the present Rules of Civil Procedure. The decision
instructs: Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase ―as in default‖ was
initially included in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which read as follows: Sec. 2. A party who
fails to appear at a pretrial conference may be nonsuited or considered as in default. It was,
however, amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

Justice Regalado in his book explained that the failure of a party to appear at the pretrial has
indeed adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be
dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present
his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment based on the evidence presented.
Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the
defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. The
stringent application of the rules on pretrial is necessitated from the significant role of the
pretrial stage in the litigation process. Pretrial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy
disposition of cases.

The Salvador‘s were not able to attend allegedly since their counsel forgot to update his
calendar which the Court did not consider as a justifiable excuse thus as a result of their
inattentiveness, the Salvador‘s lost their chance at presenting their evidence. Sps Rabaja
were properly allowed by the RTC to present evidence ex parte. Gonzales, on the other
hand, as co-defendant, was able to attend the pretrial conference and was allowed to present
her evidence. The RTC could only render judgment based on evidence presented during
trial.

95 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
2nd Issue:
Yes, the contract between the parties were valid and so was the SPA with Gonzales.

The Court agrees with the lower courts in finding that the contract of sale between the
parties which could not be validly rescinded. As to the SPA presented by Gonzales, Article
1990 of the New Civil Code provides that an act is deemed to have been performed within
the scope of the agent‘s authority if such act is within the terms of the power of attorney, as
written. In the present case, the Spouses Rabaja did not recklessly enter into a contract to
sell with Gonzales. They required her presentation of the power of attorney before they
transacted with her principal. And when Gonzales presented the SPA to Spouses Rabaja, the
latter had no reason not to rely on it. The Court holds that, indeed, Gonzales acted within
the scope of her authority. The SPA precisely stated that she could administer the property,
negotiate the sale and collect any document and all payments related to the subject property.
As the agent acted within the scope of his authority, the principal must comply with all the
obligations. It is already too late in the day for Spouses Salvador to retract the
representation to unjustifiably escape their principal obligation.

3rd Issue:
Yes, the garnishment as a result of the decision of the ejectment case which has been final
and executory and an entry of judgment has been made.

Nothing is more settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court which rendered it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is
founded on consideration of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.

4th Issue:
Yes, the award of damages cannot be sustained by the court.

Article 2220 of the New Civil Code provides that to award moral damages in a breach of
contract, the defendant must act fraudulently or in bad faith. In this case, Spouses Rabaja
failed to sufficiently show that Spouses Salvador acted in a fraudulent manner or with bad
faith when it breached the contract of sale. Thus, the award of moral damages cannot be
warranted.

As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the New Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.54 The claimant must
first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In this
case, considering that Spouses Rabaja failed to prove moral or compensatory damages, then
there could be no award of exemplary damages.

96 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
With regard to attorney‘s fees, neither Spouses Rabaja nor Gonzales is entitled to the award.
The settled rule is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate and that not
every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of attorney‘s fees. The RTC reasoned
that Gonzales was forced to litigate due to the acts of Spouses Salvador. The Court does not
agree. Gonzales, as agent of Spouses Salvador, should have expected that she would be
called to litigation in connection with her fiduciary duties to the principal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The March 29, 2007 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. MC-03- 2175, is
MODIFIED to read as follows:

―WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment as follows:

a. Ordering the ―Contract to Sell‖ entered into by Spouses Rogelio and

Elizabeth Rabaja and Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador on July 24,
1998 as RESCINDED;

b. Ordering Spouses Rolando and Herminia Salvador to pay Spouses Rogelio

and Elizabeth Rabaja:

1. The amount of Nine Hundred Fifty Thousand (P950,000.00)

Pesos, representing the payments made by the latter for the purchase
of the subject property; and

2. The cost of suit; c. Dismissing the counterclaims of Spouses

Rolando and Herminia Salvador and Rosario Gonzales against
Spouses Rogelio and Elizabeth Rabaja. The amounts awarded are
subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum to be reckoned
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.‖

As aforestated, this is without prejudice to the invocation by either party of the Civil Code
provisions on legal compensation or setoff under Articles 1278, 1279 and 1290.
SO ORDERED.

97 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
FARIDA YAP BITTE and the HEIRS OF BENJAMIN D. BITTE, namely: JACOB YAP
BITTE, SHAIRA DAYANARA YAP BITTE, FATIMA YAP BITTE and ALLAN ROBERT
YAP BITTE, petitioners, v. SPOUSES FRED and ROSA ELSA SERRANO JONAS,
respondents
GR 212256 9 Dec 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

―The rule is that ―right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done
on grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that
prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or
that the decision is contrary to law.‖

If a party who has been declared in default has in his arsenal the remedy of appeal from the
judgment of default on the basis of the decision having been issued against the evidence or
the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in
the appellate court.

Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all
other remedies available to question not only the judgment of default but also the judgment
on appeal before this Court.

Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.‖

FACTS:

This controversy stemmed from a purported contract of sale involving a piece of property
situated in Davao City (subject property). It was initially under the name of Rosa Elsa Jonas
and presently under the name of Ganzon Yap, married to Haima Yap (Spouses Yap).

Before Rosa Elsa went to Australia, she had executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
authorizing her mother, Andrea C. Serrano (Andrea), to sell the property.

Sometime in May 1996, Cipriano Serrano (Cipriano),son of Andrea and brother of Rosa
Elsa, offered the property for sale to Spouses Bitte showing them the authority of Andrea.
He received Php 200, 000 then Php 400,000 in consideration thereof.

Spouses Bitte sought a meeting for final negotiation with Rosa Elsa. In 1996, shortly after
her arrival here in the Philippines, Rosa Elsa revoked the SPA, through an instrument of
even date, and handed a copy thereof to [Link] next day, the parties met at Farida
Bitte‘s office, but no final agreement was [Link], Rosa Elsa withdrew from the
transaction.

98 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In October 1996, Spouses Bitte filed before the RTC a Complaint for Specific Performance
with Damages seeking to compel Rosa Elsa, Andrea and Cipriano to transfer to their names
the title over the subject property.

The RTC:

Rendered judgment in favor of Bitte, demanding that they pay for the balance
remaining for the acquisition of property.

While in the CA:

Spouses Jonas appealed before CA. Judgment was reversed. After the denial of their
MR, Spouses Bitte filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In their
Comment, Spouses Jonas called the attention of the Court to the fact that Spouses
Bitte had been declared in default by the RTC. Spouses Jonas contended that, being
in default, Spouses already lost the legal personality to resort to this petition. They
also averred that the questions presented in this petition are one of facts and not of
law. Not being a trier of facts, this Court must deny the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Bitte may avail themselves of the right to appeal
despite being declared in default.

RULING:

The rule is that ―right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done on
grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that prayed
for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, or that the
decision is contrary to law.‖ If a party who has been declared in default has in his arsenal the
remedy of appeal from the judgment of default on the basis of the decision having been
issued against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy and
opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court. Despite being burdened by the
circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all other remedies available to question
not only the judgment of default but also the judgment on appeal before this Court. Those
remedies necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

99 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 10
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings

ADERITO Z. YUJUICO, petitioner, v. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET MANAGEMENT,

INC., ATTY. RICHARD J. NETHERCOTT and ATTY. HONORATO R. MATABAN,
respondents
GR 211113 29 June 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Perez, J.

―As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended
pleadings with liberality.

This is especially true when a motion for leave is filed during the early stages of proceedings
or, at least, before trial.

Our case law had long taught that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed in
the interest of justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real
facts and the multiplicity of suits thus be prevented.

Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave was made with bad faith or
with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of
an amended pleading.

Once a court grants leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.‖

FACTS:

In 2000, several stockholders of STRADEC executed Pledge Agreements whereby they

pledged a certain amount of their stocks in the said company in favor of the respondent
United Resources Asset Management, Inc. (URAMI). These pledges were meant to secure
the loan obligations of STRADEC to URAMI. One of the stockholders of STRADEC who
so pledged his shares in STRADEC was petitioner Aderito Z. Yujuico. Apparently,
STRADEC had not been able to comply with its payment obligations under the Loan
Agreement. STRADEC and its stockholders received a notice informing them about an
impending auction sale of the stocks pledged under the Pledge Agreements in order to
satisfy STRADEC‘s outstanding obligations under the Loan Agreement. The notice was sent
and signed by respondent Atty. Richard J. Nethercott (Atty. Nethercott), who claimed to be
the attorney-in-fact of URAMI. The notice stated that the public auction of the pledged
STRADEC stocks had been set at 8:30 in the morning of in front of the municipal building
of Bayambang, Pangasinan.

Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City an injunction complaint
seeking to enjoin the sale at public auction mentioned in Atty. Nethercott‘s notice. Petitioner
argued that the planned auction sale of the stocks pledged under the Pledge Agreements is

100 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
void as the same suffers from a multitude of fatal defects; one of which is the supposed lack
of authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate such a sale on behalf of URAMI.

RTC did not issue a temporary restraining order, the public auction of the pledged
STRADEC stocks pushed through, as scheduled. In that auction, URAMI emerged as the
winning bidder for all of the stocks pledged under the Pledge Agreements. However
subsequently, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which effectively prevented
URAMI from appropriating the stocks it had purchased during the auction sale.

In its answer, URAMI agreed with the petitioner that the auction sale was void; URAMI
admitted that it never authorized Atty. Nethercott to cause the sale of the stocks pledged
under the Pledge Agreements. URAMI, however, pointed out that, since it never sanctioned
the auction sale, it similarly cannot be held liable to the petitioner for any prejudice that may
be caused by the conduct of such auction sale. Hence, overall, URAMI prayed for the
dismissal of the injunction complaint against it. Petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for
summary Judgment.

URAMI changed its counsel and filed with the RTC an amended answer with compulsory
counterclaim (amended answer). In its amended answer, URAMI still vouched for the
dismissal of the injunction complaint but reneged from its previous admissions under the
original answer. This time, URAMI claimed that the auction sale was valid and that it duly
authorized Atty. Nethercott to initiate such sale on its behalf. Petitioner filed with the RTC a
motion to strike out URAMI‘s amended answer on the grounds that:

(1) it was not timely filed;

(2) it was filed without leave of court; and
(3) its admission would prejudice petitioner‘s rights.

In an order however, the RTC denied petitioner‘s motion and allowed admission of
URAMI‘s amended answer. Petitioner filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration of
the order allowing admission of URAMI‘s amended answer. The RTC issued an order
granting petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration and setting aside its earlier order allowing
admission of URAMI‘s amended answer because the amended answer could not be admitted
just yet as the same had been filed by URAMI without first securing leave of court. Thus,
URAMI filed with the RTC a motion for leave to file an amended answer (motion for leave).

RTC granted such leave, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Petitioner next challenged the Orders of the RTC through a certiorari petition
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision sustaining the
challenged orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment by URAMI with leave of court should be
allowed

RULING:

101 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
YES. THE AMENDMENT SHOULD BE ALLOWED. One of the key documents that
URAMI plans to present during trial, which it also attached in its amended answer as is
URAMI‘s Board Resolution that evinces Atty. Nethercott‘s authority to cause the
foreclosure on the pledged stocks on behalf of URAMI.

With the existence of such board resolution, the statement in URAMI‘s original answer
pertaining to the lack of authority of Atty. Nethercott to initiate the auction sale thus appears
mistaken, if not entirely baseless and unfounded. Hence, we find it only right and fair, that
URAMI should be given a chance to file its amended answer in order to rectify such
mistakes in its original answer.

The amended answer aims to correct certain allegations of fact in the original answer which,
needless to state, are crucial to a full and proper disposition of the case. It is, therefore, in
the best interest of justice and equity that URAMI should be allowed to file the amended
answer. We find absolutely no cause to overrule the grant of leave granted to URAMI to file
its amended answer.

The said grant is consistent with our time-honored judicial policy of affording liberal
treatment to amendments to pleadings, especially those made before the conduct of trial. We
should always remember that our rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their application should never be allowed to frustrate the truth and the
promotion of substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated 12 August 2013 and Resolution dated 29 January 2014 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 117431 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

102 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A.
SORIANO, petitioners, v. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK),** LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF
LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR., REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS
L. SARTE, respondents
GR 143264 23 April 2012
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―Amendments are generally favored In the present case, the trial proper had not yet even begun,
allowing the amendment would not have caused any delay and doing so would have served
the higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues among
all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally determined..‖

NOTE: Under the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure the amendments include the following, from the 2 nd
sentence of the paragraph: ―But such leave shall be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with
intent to delay or confer jurisdiction on the court, or the pleading stated no cause of action from the beginning which
could be amended.‖

FACTS:

In 1999, Lisam Enterprises Inc (LEI) filed a complaint against BDO (formerly PCIB) for
annulment of mortgage with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with damages with the RTC in Legaspi City.

Lolita Soriano alleged that she is a stockholder of LEI and a member of its board as
Corporate Secretary. She also alleged that sometime in 1993, LEI purchased a residential
land. That in 1996, the spouses Soriano (Lilian and Leandro) in their personal capacity
obtained a loan from BDO (PCIB) in the amount of P20M and that as security for the
payment of the said loan, the sps Soriano used a falsified board resolution to execute a real
estate mortgage over the property in favor of BDO (PCIB) and registered the same with the
Registry of Deeds, Legaspi City.

Lolita further alleged that the Sps Soriano falsified her signature as Corporate Secretary in
order to obtain a falsified board resolution to be used for obtaining the loan from BDO
(PCIB). That PCIB (BDO) was negligent in allowing the Sps Soriano to use the subject
property as a collateral for the P20M loan and under paragraph 13:

―13. That said irregular transactions of defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her
husband Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., on one hand, and defendant PCIB, on the
other, were discovered by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano sometime in April 1999.
That immediately upon discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on behalf and
for the benefit of plaintiff LEI, made demands upon defendants Lilian S.
Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., to free subject property of
plaintiff LEI from such mortgage lien, by paying in full their personal
indebtedness to defendant PCIB in the principal sum of P20 Million.

103 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
However, said defendants, for reason only known to them, continued and
still continue to ignore said demands, to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiffs;‖

After service of summons to all defendants, the RTC issued a TRO and after hearing issued
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PCIB from proceeding with the auction sale of the
subject property. Respondents Lilian Soriano and the Estate of Leandro Soriano filed an
answer stating that the spouses were duly authorized by LEI to mortgage the subject
property. PCIB filed an MTD on grounds of lack of legal capacity to sue, failure to state a
cause of action, and litis pendencia. LEI filed an opposition thereto, while PCIB‘s co
defendants (sps Soriano) filed a motion to suspend action. The RTC dismissed the
petitioner‘s complaint; LEI filed an MR however while waiting for the resolution of the MR,
LEI filed in January 2000, a motion to admit amended complaint, amending paragraph 13 of
the original complaint to read as:

―13. That said irregular transactions of defendant Lilian S. Soriano and her
husband Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., on one hand, and defendant PCIB, on the
other, were discovered by plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano sometime in April
1999. That immediately upon discovery, said plaintiff, for herself and on
behalf and for the benefit of plaintiff LEI, made demands upon defendant
Lilian S. Soriano and the Estate of Leandro A. Soriano, Jr., to free subject
property of plaintiff LEI from such mortgage lien, by paying in full their
personal indebtedness to defendant PCIB in the principal sum of P20
Million. However, said defendants, for reason only known to them,
continued and still continue to ignore said demands, to the damage and
prejudice of plaintiffs; that plaintiff Lolita A. Soriano likewise made
demands upon the Board of Directors of Lisam Enterprises, Inc., to make
legal steps to protect the interest of the corporation from said fraudulent
transaction, but unfortunately, until now, no such legal step was ever taken
by the Board, hence, this action for the benefit and in behalf of the
corporation‖

On May 2000, the RTC issued an order denying both the MR and the Motion to admit
amended complaint on the ground that no new argument had been raised by petitioners in
their MR to address the fact of plaintiffs‘ failure to allege in the complaint that Lolita made
demands upon the BOD of LEI to take steps to protect the interest of corporation against
fraudulent acts of the Sps. Soriano and PCIB. Further, the RTC ruled that the amended
complaint can no longer be admitted, because it absolutely changed petitioners‘
cause of action, hence, this petition.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the denial of the motion to admit amended complaint was
proper

RULING:

104 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
No. The Court overruled the trial court‘s denial of the motion to admit the amended
complaint and ordered the admission of the motion. Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provide
as follows:
―Sec. 2. Amendments as a matter of right;
A party may amend his pleadings once as a matter of right at any time before
a responsive pleading is served x x x.

Sec. 3. Amendments by leave of court;

Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments
may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it
appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. x x x‖

In the present case, it was noted that the respondents already filed their Answer to the
petitioner‘s complaint and the claims being asserted were made against the same parties.
Thus, a responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may only be
made by leave of court, following Sec 3 of Rule 10, and not as a matter of right. However,
in a case, the Court extensively discussed the importance of Sec 3, Rule 10:

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase ―or that the cause
of action or defense is substantially altered‖ was stricken-off and not
retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3,
Rule 10 is that under the new rules, ―the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or defense.‖ This should only be true,
however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of
action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a ―just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.‖

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly

addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is
broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not
substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or
that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as enunciated in
Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or
defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve
the higher interest of substantial justice, prevent delay, and secure a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to

avoid a multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the
case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality
is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case
where the amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby

105 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
giving the petitioners all the time allowed by law to answer and to
prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and

should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every
case, may so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and in
order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuitry of action
and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances
such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to
amend.‖

Thus, the Court ruled that amendments are generally favored and it would have been
more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality towards LEI by admitting the
amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing the original complaint
became final and executory. Since trial proper had not yet begun, allowing the
amendment would not have caused any delay and doing so would have served the
higher interest of justice as this would provide the best opportunity for the issues
among all parties to be thoroughly threshed out and the rights of all parties finally
determined.

The RTC was directed to admit the amended complaint and likewise directed to proceed
with dispatch in trying the civil case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of

Legaspi City, Branch 4, dated November 11, 1999, dismissing petitioners‘ complaint in Civil
Case No. 9729, and its Order dated May 15, 2000, denying herein petitioners‘ Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion to Admit Amended Complaint, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4, is hereby DIRECTED to
ADMIT the Amended Complaint.

Considering further, that this case has been pending for some time and, under R.A. No.
8799, it is now the regular courts which have jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes, the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 4 is hereby DIRECTED to PROCEED with
dispatch in trying Civil Case No. 9729.
SO ORDERED.

106 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
HENRY CHING TIU, CHRISTOPHER HALIN GO, and GEORGE
CO, petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondent
GR 151932 19 August 2009
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―Amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in

furtherance of justice in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of
action and unnecessary expense. x x x

Even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment
could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice;
prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and
proceedings.‖

FACTS:

Asian Water Resources, Inc. (AWRI), represented by herein petitioners, applied for a
real estate loan with the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM) to fund its
purified water distribution business. In support of the loan application, petitioners submitted
a Board Resolution dated June 7, 1993. The loan was guaranteed by collateral over the
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13020. The loan was eventually
approved.

In August 1996, AWRI applied for a bigger loan from PBCOM for additional
capitalization using the same Board Resolution, but without any additional real estate
collateral. Considering that the proposed additional loan was unsecured, PBCOM required
all the members of the Board of Directors of AWRI to become sureties.

PBCOM sent a letter to petitioners demanding full payment of its obligation to the bank. Its
demands having remained unheeded, PBCOM instructed its counsel to file a complaint for
collection against petitioners.

Petitioners filed their Answer and among other things, that they were not personally liable
on the promissory notes, because they signed the Surety Agreement in their capacities
as officers of AWRI. They claimed that the Surety Agreement attached to the complaint
were falsified, considering that when they signed the same, the words ―In his personal
capacity‖ did not yet appear in the document and were merely intercalated thereon without
their knowledge and consent.

Because of this development, PBCOM‘s counsel searched for and retrieved the file copy of
the Surety Agreement. The notarial copy showed that the words ―In his personal capacity‖
did not appear on page two of the Surety Agreement.

Petitioners‘ counsel then asked PBCOM to explain the alteration appearing on the
agreement. PBCOM subsequently discovered that the insertion was ordered by the

107 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
bank auditor. It alleged that when the Surety Agreement was inspected by the bank auditor,
he called the attention of the loans clerk, Kenneth Cabahug, as to why the words ―In his
personal capacity‖ were not indicated under the signature of each surety, in accordance with
bank standard operating procedures. The auditor then ordered Mr. Cabahug to type the
words ―In his personal capacity‖ below the second signatures of petitioners. However, the
notary public was never informed of the insertion. Mr. Cabahug subsequently executed an
affidavit attesting to the circumstances why the insertion was made.

PBCOM maintained that the insertion was not a falsification, but was made only to
speak the truth of the parties‘ intentions. PBCOM also contended that petitioners were
already primarily liable on the Surety Agreement whether or not the insertion was made,
having admitted in their pleadings that they voluntarily executed and signed the Surety
Agreement in the original form. PBCOM, invoking a liberal application of the Rules,
emphasized that the motion incorporated in the pleading can be treated as a motion for
leave of court to amend and admit the amended complaint pursuant to Section 3, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court.

The RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution of the altered document with the
original Surety Agreement. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

Aggrieved, petitioners sought recourse before the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. The CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for lack
of merit.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the substitution was proper

Whether or not PBCOM should be allowed to amend its complaint

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes. The substitution of the altered document was proper. The pertinent rule on actionable
documents is found in Section 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that when the
cause of action is anchored on a document, its substance must be set forth, and the original
or a copy thereof ―shall‖ be attached to the pleading as an exhibit and deemed a part thereof,
to wit:

Section 7. Action or defense based on document;

Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the
substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the
original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall
be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth
in the pleading.

2nd Issue:
Yes. PBCOM should be allowed to amend their complaint. Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
specifically allows amendment by leave of court.
108 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Section 3. Amendments by leave of court;

Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be made only
upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion
was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section
shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to the adverse party, and an
opportunity to be heard.

The Court, citing Valenzuela v. Court of Appeals said that:

The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, ―the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense‖. This should only be true,
however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent
delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a ―just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding‖.

The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations
that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory
of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action.

Nevertheless, as enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the

cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve
the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.

The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of

suits and in order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed
in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be determined on its
real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the circuity of action and
unnecessary expense.

That is, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse
party by surprise or the like, which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. Subject to the above

disquisitions, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57732, dated
September 28, 2001, and the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 21, in Civil Case No. 99-352, dated December 14, 1999 and January 11, 2000, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

109 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and BRITISH STEEL (ASIA), LTD., respondents.
GR 133657 29 May 2002
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Ynares-Santiago, J.

―This only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to
amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.

The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this
provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court
after an answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained
in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his
defense in the answer.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from breach of contract.
Impleaded as principal defendant therein was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro
Trading GMBH (Ferro) and respondent British Steel as alternative defendants. ISL and
respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that it failed to state a cause of action against them.

RTC denied the motions to dismiss, as well as the ensuing motion for reconsideration.

On the other hand, respondent British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
before the Court of Appeals.

ISL then filed its answer to the complaint. Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its
complaint by incorporating therein additional factual allegations constitutive of its cause of
action against respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
maintained that it can amend the complaint as a matter of right because respondent has not
yet filed a responsive pleading thereto.

ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint may still be amended as a matter of right before
an answer has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its
dismissal before the higher court

RULING:

Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that
prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint
whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.

110 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an
answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained in the
complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in
the answer.

In such an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected
by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. Considerable
leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior
to the filing of an answer by the defendant.

The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an
answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other
proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and
should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of justice in order to determine every case as
far as possible on its merits without regard to technicalities.

The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint does not
bar petitioner‘s right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed, where some
but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint once, as
a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-answering defendant,
but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44529 dated February 24, 1998 and April 28, 1998,
respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 22 is further ordered to ADMIT petitioner‘s Amended Complaint in Civil Case No.
96-79674 and to conduct further proceedings in said case.
SO ORDERED.

111 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 13
Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments, and Other Papers

GEORGE PHILIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DELA CRUZ, petitioners, v. PLANTERS

DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondent
GR 193650 8 October 2014
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

―Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the
Rules.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and/or sum of money and damages
with prayer for the issuance of writs of preliminary attachment and preliminary injunction
against Engr. Edgardo R. Torcende, Planters Development Bank (defendant Bank), Arturo
R. Delos Reyes, Benjamin N. Tria, Mao Tividad, and Emmanuel Tesalonia on 22 December
1998.

After summons together with the verified Complaint and its annexes were duly served upon
defendants, the latter answered. In the last pre-trial hearing dated 17 November 2000, only
plaintiffs and their counsel appeared, thus, the latter moved for the presentation of evidence
ex-parte, which was granted by the Court with the reservation of verifying the return card to
determine whether the order for the pre-trial was indeed received by defendants. Finally, at
the 21 November 2001 hearing, defendants again failed to appear and their failure to file pre-
trial brief was noted; thus plaintiffs were allowed to present evidence ex-parte before the
Clerk of Court.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, defendants were ordered to jointly and severally pay:
Actual Damages; George Philip Palileo - P2,605,972.92, Jose R. Dela Cruz - P1,529,508.80;
Moral Damages P500,000.00 each; Exemplary Damages P500,000.00 each; Attorney‘s
P500,000.00 each and to pay the costs.

On July 31, 2006, PDB filed by private courier service specifically LBC an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration and for New Trial. Petitioners‘ copy of the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and for New Trial was likewise sent on July 31, 2006 by courier service
through LBC, but in their address of record Tupi, South Cotabato there was no LBC service
at the time. On August 2, 2006, PDB filed with the RTC another copy of the Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial via registered mail; another copy thereof was
simultaneously sent to petitioners by registered mail as well.

Petitioners moved for the execution of the Decision pending appeal. In an August 30, 2006
Order, the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, while it

112 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
granted petitioners‘ motion for execution pending appeal, which it treated as a motion for
the execution of a final and executory judgment.

Records show that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial dated 28
July 2006 was initially filed via an LBC courier on 28 July 2006 and was actually received by
the Court on 31 July 2006, which was followed by filing of the same motion thru registered
mail on 2 August 2006. Said motion was set for hearing by the movant on 18 August 2006 or
16 days after its filing

RTC‘s Ruling:

RTC Held that Section 5 of Rule 15 mandatory, should have been complied with. Its
noncompliance renders it the motion defective to wit: The Rule is settled that a
motion in violation thereof is pro forma and a mere scrap of paper. It presents no
question which the court could decide upon. In fact, the court has NO reason to
consider it; neither does the clerk of court have the right to receive the same.
Palpably, the motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no judicial
cognizance. Hence, the motion deserves a short shrift and peremptory denial for
being procedurally defective.

CA‘s Ruling:

On May 31, 2007, the CA issued a Decision19 dismissing PDB‘s Petition for lack of
merit. It sustained the trial court‘s pronouncement, that by setting the hearing of the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial on August 18, 2006 — or
16 days after its filing on August 2, 2006 — PDB violated Section 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court which categorically requires that the notice of hearing shall specify
the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than 10 days after the filing
of the motion. Citing this Court‘s ruling in Bacelonia v. Court of Appeals, the CA
declared that the 10-day period prescribed in Section 5 is mandatory, and a motion
that fails to comply therewith is pro forma and presents no question which merits
the attention and consideration of the court.

PDB filed a Motion for Reconsideration,22 arguing that Rule 15, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court should be relaxed in view of the fact that judgment against it was
based on a technicality — and not on a trial on the merits; that there was no
deliberate intention on its part to delay the proceedings; that the court acted with
partiality in declaring that the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New
Trial was pro forma; that its notice of appeal was timely; and that the writs of
execution are null and void.

On July 28, 2009, the CA made a complete turnaround and issued the assailed
Amended Decision.

ISSUES: Was the CA correct in relaxing the Rules notwithstanding that PBD‘s late
filing and improper service of its omnibus motion for reconsideration?
Whether or not the RTC decision was become final for to file an appeal.
113 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULING:

1ST Issue:
YES. The proceedings in the instant case would have been greatly abbreviated if the court a
quo and the CA did not overlook the fact that PDB‘s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and for New Trial was filed one day too late. The bank received a copy of the trial court‘s
June 15, 2006 Decision on July 17, 2006; thus, it had 15 days — or up to August 1, 2006 —
within which to file a notice of appeal, motion for reconsideration, or a motion for new trial,
pursuant to the Rules of Court. Yet, it filed the omnibus motion for reconsideration and new
trial only on August 2, 2006.

Indeed, its filing or service of a copy thereof to petitioners by courier service cannot be
trivialized. Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the
Rules. This is not to mention that PDB sent a copy of its omnibus motion to an address or
area which was not covered by LBC courier service at the time. Realizing its mistake, PDB
refiled and resent the omnibus motion by registered mail, which is the proper mode of
service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-day period had expired.

PDB‘s Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy; it had only
up to August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly
in denying PDB‘s notice of appeal.

2nd Issue:
YES. Since PDB‘s Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial was filed late
and the 15-day period within which to appeal expired without PDB filing the requisite notice
of appeal, it follows that its right to appeal has been foreclosed; it may no longer question
the trial court‘s Decision in any other manner. ―Settled is the rule that a party is barred from
assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed from by him.‖ The ―presumption that a
party who did not interject an appeal is satisfied with the adjudication made by the lower
court‖ applies to it. There being no appeal taken by PDB from the adverse judgment of the
trial court, its Decision has become final and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed,
by this Court. ―Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the
reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the issues
actually determined and to every matter which the parties might have litigated and have x x x
decided as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, and
every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect to
matters of claim and of defense.

And ―[i]n this jurisdiction, the rule is that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is
the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment‖;
―execution will issue as a matter of right x x x (a) when the judgment has become final and
executory; (b) when the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; [or]
(c) when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed.

114 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed July 28, 2009 Amended
Decision and August 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
01317-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 37 is ORDERED to proceed with the execution of its June 15, 2006
Decision in Civil Case No. 6474.
SO ORDERED

115 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
HEIRS OF NUMERIANO MIRANDA, SR., namely: CIRILA (deceased), CORNELIO,
NUMERIANO, JR., ERLINDA, LOLITA, RUFINA, DANILO, ALEJANDRO,
FELIMON, TERESITA, ELIZABETH and ANALIZA, all surnamed MIRANDA,
petitioners, v. PABLO R. MIRANDA, respondent
GR 179638 08 July 2013
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

―Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In
the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.‖

(NOTE: In the 2019 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, new provisions under Sec 3, Rule 13 include sending
pleadings and other court submissions by accredited courier (para c) and transmitting the same by electronic mail and
other electronic means as may be authorized by the Court in places where the court is electronically equipped (para d),
and their corresponding dates of filing.)

FACTS:

In 1994, petitioners Cirila, Cornelio, Numeriano, Jr., Erlinda, Lolita, Rufina, Danilo,
Alejandro, Felimon, Teresita, Elizabeth and Analiza, all surnamed Miranda, representing
themselves as heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr., filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a
Complaint for Annulment of Titles and Specific Performance against the heirs of Pedro
Miranda namely: Pacita and Oscar Miranda, the heir of Tranquilino Miranda, Rogelio
Miranda, and the Sps Pablo Miranda and Aida Lorenzo.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in August 1999 ordering Pablo Miranda to
indemnify all other heirs of Numeriano Miranda and ordered the heirs to immediately vacate
the residential house and pay the Sps Pablo and Aida a P2,000 monthly rental from the date
of notice of the promulgation of judgment up to the time that they actually vacate the
property. The Heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr. did not file any appeal hence the decision of
the RTC became final and executory however, the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC in
December 2001 was not implemented.

In July 2005, Pablo Miranda filed an ex-parte motion praying that the RTC issue a ―break
open and demolition order‖ in order to compel the Heirs of Miranda to vacate his property.
However, since more than 5 years have elapsed from the time the Writ of Execution should
have been enforced, the RTC denied the Motion dated August 2005. This denial prompted
Pablo Miranda to file with the RTC a Petition for Revival of Judgment which the Heirs of
Miranda opposed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC granted the petition to
revive judgment in its decision rendered on June 20, 2006. On July 13, 2006, Heirs of
Miranda filed a Notice of Appeal (on the 1999 decision) via LBC, which was opposed by
Pablo Miranda on the ground that the decision in 1999 has long become final and executory.
The RTC denied the Notice of Appeal finding that the appeal is barred by prescription.
Aggrieved, the Heirs of Miranda filed a petition for mandamus with the CA praying that
their notice of appeal be given due course. The CA denied the petition for mandamus on

116 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time. MR was also denied, hence this
petition.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the appeal was perfected on time

Whether or not the action for revival of judgment was proper
Whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for revival of judgment

RULING:

1st Issue:
No, the Notice of Appeal was belatedly filed. It is basic and elementary that a Notice of
appeal should be filed within 15 days from notice or judgment or final order appealed from.
Under Section3, Rule 13 pleadings may be filed in court either personally or by registered
mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second case, the date of
mailing is the date of receipt.

In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a
private courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by
the Rules, we cannot consider the filing of petitioner‘s Notice of Appeal via LBC timely
filed. It is established jurisprudence that ―the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-
forwarding agency is not considered as the date of filing thereof in court‖ instead, the ―date
of actual receipt by the court is deemed the date of filing of that pleading‖. Records show
that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received by the court on the
16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the
Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.

2nd Issue:
No. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action. It is different and
distinct from the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced. As such, a party
aggrieved by a decision of a court in an action for revival of judgment may appeal the
decision, but only insofar as the merits of the action for revival is concerned. The original
judgment, which is already final and executory, may no longer be reversed, altered or
modified. In this case, the Heirs of Miranda assail the decision made in August 1999
which is the original judgment sought to be revived or enforced by respondent.
Considering that the said decision had already attained finality, the Heirs of Miranda
may no longer question its correctness. The Court reiterated that only the merits of the
action for revival may be appealed, not the merits of the original judgment sought to be
revived or enforced.

3rd Issue:
Yes. An action for revival of judgment may be filed either ―in the same court where said
judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any
other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in general.‖. In
this case, Pablo Miranda correctly filed the petition for revival of judgment in the same court
which rendered the decision made in August 1999.
117 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

―WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated June 14, 2007 and
the Resolution dated September 11, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97350
are hereby AFFIRMED.

118 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 14
Summons

LOURDES A. VALMONTE and ALFREDO D. VALMONTE, petitioners, v. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION and ROSITA DIMALANTA,
respondents
GR 108538 22 January 1996
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

―Service of summons upon a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines must be made
either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation; or (3)
in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.‖

FACTS:

Sps. Valmonte reside in Seattle, USA. Alfredo works as lawyer in Ermita, Manila and travels
between countries regularly.

Rosita Dimalanta (Dimalanta), private respondent & sister of Lourdes Valmonte filed a
complaint for partition of real property (situated in Manila) and accounting of rentals against
Sps. Valmonte. The complaint relied on a letter sent by Lourdes to the counsel of
Dimalanta. The letter instructed that correspondence between parties should be sent to the
law office of Lourdes‘ husband Alfredo in Ermita, Manila.

Service of summons was made upon Alfredo but refused to accept summons on behalf of
her wife on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. The
process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte.

Alfredo thereafter sent this answer with counterclaim. Lourdes did not file her Answer.
Hence, Dimalanta moved to declare Lourdes in default. Alfredo entered a special appearance
in behalf of his wife and opposed the Dimalanta‘s motion.

RTC denied Dimalanta‘s motion & MR. Such denial prompted Dimalanta to file a petition
for certiorari, prohibition & mandamus in the CA.

CA sided with Dimalanta and declared Lourdes in default. The CA heavily relied on the
Lourdes‘ letter because the statement ''all communications' ' includes summons. Moreover,
the close relationship of the Sps. Valmonte as co-defendants, spouses and attorney makes
the service of summons valid. Sps. Valmonte then appealed to the SC

ISSUE: Whether service of summons was properly made

RULING:

119 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
NO. Service of summons is different for non-residents and residents

Sps. Valmonte assail the CA decision, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in refusing
to apply the provisions of Rule 14, §17 of the ROC and applying instead Rule 14, §8 when
the fact is that Lourdes is a nonresident defendant; and (2) because even if Rule 14, §8 is the
applicable provision, there was no valid substituted service as there was no strict compliance
with the requirement by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with Alfredo.

Private respondent, upon the other hand, asserts that petitioners are invoking a technicality
and that strict adherence to the rules would only result in a useless ceremony.

The SC distinguished the nature of the action whether it is an action in personam, in rem or
quasi in rem. Since the rules of service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to
whether an action is one or the other of these actions.

In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he
cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, §§7-8 2 is essential
for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not
voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. If abroad, with leave of court then
publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be
personally served with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service
in accordance with Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in §§ 17 and 18 of the same
Rule. In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the
Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his
person is essential to make a binding decision.
While an action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not
essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be
served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, §17, which provides:

Sec. 17. Extraterritorial service;

When the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the
action affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which
is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court,
be effected out of the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as
the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order to the court
shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any
other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice,
within which the defendant must answer.

Rule 69 for partition is quasi-in rem. In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an
action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of
120 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached. Service
of summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with
jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that
property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected
to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if
he is so minded.

Lourdes is a non resident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her
must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient.

The first two were not complied with. The SC also negated the third manner as insufficient.
The service of summons to Alfredo was not made with prior leave of court nor any order
from the court. Also, the letter relied upon was for negotiations on the partition. Third mode
of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the
Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.

Lastly, no power of attorney was made by Lourdes authorizing her Alfredo to accept
summons hence no valid summons were served.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the orders dated July 3,
1992 and September 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48 are
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

121 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MILLENIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIALCORPORATION, petitioner, v. JACKSON
TAN, respondent
GR 131724 28 February 2000
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

―Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an
action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. If the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, Sec. 13 requires that service of
summons be made upon the corporation‘s president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or
any of its directors.

FACTS:

In December 1994, Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation executed a Deed of Real

Estate Mortgage over its real property in favor of Jackson Tan. The mortgage was executed
to secure payment of Millenium‘s debt to Tan for P2 million, without interest but which at
maturity date 6 months after or on June 10, 1995, was payable for P4 million. On
November 19995, Tan filed a against Millenium a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage
with the RTC in Cebu City. On November 21, 1995, summons and a copy of the complaint
were served upon Millenium through a certain Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriff‘s
return as ―a draftsman, a person of sufficient age and discretion, working therein, and is the
highest ranking officer or officer-in-charge of Millenium, to receive processes of the Court‖.

Millenium moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no valid
service of summons upon it resulting to a lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to try the case.

Millenium further invoked Rule 14, S13 and contended that service on Lynverd
Cinches was invalid as he is not one of the authorized persons on whom summons
may be served and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.

Millenium likewise sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it has
already paid its obligation with Tan when Tan opted to be paid in shares under a
stipulation in the mortgage contract.

The RTC denied the MTD based on the second ground that the petitioner had availed of
an affirmative defense on which the court has to hear and receive evidence which effectively
cures the defect on the summons because by submitting an affirmative defense, such
amounted to voluntary appearance and has cured the defect on summons. MR was also
denied.

Petition for certiorari was filed with the CA, which it dismissed on the ground that
although Millenium denies Cinches‘ authority to receive summons, the actual receipt of the
summons could be inferred from its filing of an MTD, hence the purpose for issuing
summons had been substantially achieved. Moreover, by including an affirmative defense,

122 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court (basically affirmed RTC
decision). Hence, this petition for review

ISSUE/s: Whether or not service of summons was proper

Whether or not in raising an affirmative defense of payment in an MTD the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner

RULING:

1st Issue:
No, the service of summons was not proper. Summons is the means by which the
defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby, the
court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is a
corporation, Rule 14, §13 requires that service of summons be made upon the corporation‘s
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The rationale of the rule
is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued as
to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he
should do with any legal papers received by him.

For the doctrine of substantial compliance to be upheld the following requisites must be
present: (a) there must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e.,
transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served;
(b) the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriffs return; and (c) there must be actual
receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on whom the summons was
actually served. The third requisite is the most important for it is through such receipt that
the purpose of the rule on service of summons is attained. In this case, there is no dispute
that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With respect to the third, the appellate
court held that petitioner‘s filing of a motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it
received the copy of the summons and the complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of
this or that Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the
corporation.

For there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation

through the person served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of
summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some person or means other
than the person actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is
particularly true in the present case where there is serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the
person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the
corporation. Except for the sheriff‘s return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches
was really a draftsman employed by the corporation. Receipt by petitioner of the summons
and complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed an MTD.

2nd Issue:
No. Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals settled this question. The
rule prior to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to dismiss, alleges grounds for
dismissing the action other than lack of jurisdiction, he would be deemed to have submitted
123 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This rule no longer holds true. Noting that the
doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La
Naval: Jurisdiction over the person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a
motion to dismiss or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary appearance shall be
deemed a waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not be
construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaint
against petitioner is DISMISSED.

124 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
E.B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD., petitioner, v. HON. HERMINIO I.
BENITO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 132, Makati City and
IMPERIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents
GR 136426 6 August 1999
Certiorari and Prohibition
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

―A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court
over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in
the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. . . . . The purpose is to render it reasonably
certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or
to insure that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation
that such person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office at
Davao City and with branch offices at Parañaque and Cagayan de Oro City.

Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development Agreement
wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at Cagayan de Oro
belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction of low cost housing
units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising therefrom,
the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati.

Private respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages
against petitioner, as defendant, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati allegedly for
failure of the latter to comply with its contractual obligation in that, other than a few
unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein.

Summons, together with the complaint, were served upon the defendant, through its Branch
Manager at Cagayan de Oro office.

Defendant filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that "summons
intended for defendant" was served upon Engr. Wendell Sabulbero, an employee of
defendant at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. Defendant contends that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in
its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom service of summons may be
made.

The RTC issued an Order denying defendant's Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs
Motion to Declare Defendant in Default. Defendant was given ten (10) days within which to
file a responsive pleading. The trial court stated that since the summons and copy of the

125 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its branch manager Wendell
Sabulbero, there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons and
consequently, it validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its discretion
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motions to dismiss and
for reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of petitioner because the summons intended for it was improperly served. Petitioner
invokes Section 11 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
petitioner upon service of summons on its Branch Manager

RULING:

NO. The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states ―general manager– instead
of only ―manager–; ―corporate secretary– instead of ―secretary–; and ―treasurer– instead of
―cashier.– The phrase ―agent, or any of its directors– is conspicuously deleted in the new
rule.

Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the

laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-
house counsel. (emphasis supplied).

The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise
the service is insufficient. The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation
will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons
be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know
what to do with the legal papers served on him.

The court rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its
branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office
at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the public
respondent trial court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132 is declared without jurisdiction to take cognizance of Civil
Case No. 98- 824, and all its orders and issuances in connection therewith are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

126 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner, v. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
respondent
GR 170943 23 September 2008
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Corona, J.

1. Where the defendant could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts
to locate his whereabouts, he may properly be served with summons by publication.—
Section 14, Rule 14

2. The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by

registered mail to the defendant‘s last known address; While the trial court ordinarily does
the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary
service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

FACTS:

Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the RTC of Pasig City. The complaint sought to collect the
amount from the petitioner‘s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent
when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal service of summons to
petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known address despite earnest
efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent‘s motion, the trial court allowed service of
summons by publication.

Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general

circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication
of the advertising manager of Remate and an affidavit of service of respondent‘s employee
to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner‘s last known
address.

When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved
that the case be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte in which the court granted
thereafter.

Petitioner sought reconsideration order, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by
respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not
executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not
notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondent‘s evidence ex parte be
stricken off the records and that his answer be admitted.

The RTC:

denied petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. It held that the rules did not require
the affidavit of complementary service by registered mail to be executed by the clerk
of court. It also ruled that due process was observed as a copy of the order was

127 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also denied the motion to
admit petitioner‘s answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary
period. Aggrieved, via a petition for certiorari.

The CA:

sustained the orders of the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied
reconsideration.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a service of summons was properly served to Santos despite
that his whereabouts is unknown;
Whether or not affidavit of service of a copy of the summons should have been
prepared by the clerk of court, not respondent‘s messenger.
RULING:

1st Issue:
YES. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:

―Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown;

In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like,
or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such times as the court may order.‖ (emphasis supplied)

Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to
locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect
service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.

Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and
claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is
wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was
silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable. Because of this silence, the
Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions only.

2nd Issue:
NO. Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the
newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is
complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the defendant‘s last known
address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit ―showing the deposit of
a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.‖

128 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed
by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders
and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on
the party who resorts to service by publication.

While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the
duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who
resorts to service by publication.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

129 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SPOUSES EFREN MASON and DIGNA MASON, petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and COLUMBUS PHILIPPINES BUS CORPORATION,
respondents
GR 144662 13 October 2003
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Quisumbing, J.

―Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
summons, we said, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.

Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11,
Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. x x x

We must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force
and effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule.

Hence, the cases cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial
compliance must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case. x x x‖

FACTS:

Spouses Mason owned two parcels along EDSA in Pasay City. Petitioners and private
respondent Columbus Philippines Bus Corporation entered into a lease contract, under which
Columbus undertook to construct a building worth ten million pesos (P10,000,000) at the end
of the third year of the lease. Private respondent failed to comply with this stipulation,
petitioners filed a complaint for rescission of contract with damages against private
respondent before the RTC of Pasay City. Summons was served upon private respondent
through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde
as a secretary to the corporate president, duly authorized to receive legal processes.

Private respondent failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading. The private
respondent was declared in default and the petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-
parte. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs. That decision became final
on May 12, 1999. The following day, private respondent filed a motion to lift order of default.
The trial court ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. However, without
waiting for the same, the trial court on May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default
since according to the court, the incidents can be resolved based on the records.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted, private
respondent filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution which was also
denied for being dilatory.

Private respondent appealed to the CA, which ruled in its favor.

Ruling of the CA:

130 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The CA held that private respondent was not properly served with summons, thus it
cannot be faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Consequently, the subsequent
proceedings, including the order of default, judgment by default and its execution,
were also invalid because the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over private
respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this
petition for review.

ISSUE/S: Whether there was valid service of summons on private respondent for the
trial court to acquire jurisdiction
Whether private respondent‘s motion to lift order of default was in order.

Petitioner Contention:
Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a private juridical
entity, said provision did not abandon or render inapplicable the substantial compliance rule.
Petitioners cite Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation v. Tan, and maintain that this Court,
by referring to E.B Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. v. Judge Benito, effectively ruled that said
provision is the statement of the general rule on service of summons upon corporation and
the substantial compliance rule is the exception.

Petitioners stress that even though the summons was received by a mere filing clerk in
private respondent‘s corporation, there was substantial compliance with Section 11, Rule 14
because the summons actually reached private respondent.

Respondent contention
Private respondent avers that what this Court discussed in the Millenium case was the rule on
service of summons under the old Rules of Court prior to the promulgation and effectivity
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Millenium case held that as a general rule, service
upon one who is not enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14 of the then Rules of Court is invalid,
according to private respondent. xxx Private respondent stresses that since the exception
referred to the old rule, it cannot be made to apply to the new rule, which clearly specifies
and limits the persons authorized to receive the summons in behalf of the corporation.

RULING:

1st Issue:
No. The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies
squarely to the instant case. (See xxx Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in
Millenium to support their position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We
must stress that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and
effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases cited by
petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance must be deemed
overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.

At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to be heard and
to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or
131 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due
process.

2nd Issue:
On the second issue, petitioners claim that private respondent‘s motion to lift order of
default was not in order for it was filed late, contrary to the provision in sub- paragraph (b),
Section 3,17 Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires filing of the motion
after notice but before judgment. Also, the motion was (a) not under oath; (b) did not show
the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect that caused private respondents‘ failure to
answer; and (c) did not show private respondent‘s meritorious defense.

Private respondent, in turn, argues that since service upon it was invalid, the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over it. Hence, all the subsequent proceedings in the trial court are
null and void, including the order of default. This renders the second issue now moot and
academic.

We find merit in private respondent‘s submissions. Since we have ruled that service of
summons upon private respondent through its filing clerk cannot be considered valid, it
necessarily follows therefore that the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City did not acquire
jurisdiction over private respondent. Consequently, all the subsequent.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The questioned decision, as well as the
resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54649 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

132 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Spouses PATRICK JOSE and RAFAELA JOSE, petitioners, v. Spouses HELEN BOYON
and ROMEO BOYON, respondents
GR 147369 23 October 2003
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Panganiban, J.

Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot
be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service
of summons must:

(a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;

(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business,
of the defendant.

FACTS:

Petitioner Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for specific performance against
[respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of
ownership of a parcel of land subject of a controverted sale before the RTC of Muntinlupa
which is presided by herein public respondent Judge N.C. Perello.

Respondent judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of Court, issued summons to the
respondents. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by the
process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the respondents
failed. In lieu of this, petitioners filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of
Court to Effect Summons by Publication in which the court granted. Further, the
respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring the respondents in
default for failure to file their respective answers.

Respondent Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United States of America, was
surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the resolution issued by the
respondent court. Hence, the respondents filed an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among
others, the validity of the service of summons effected by the court a quo. The public
respondent issued an Order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted
[respondents‘] supposed loss of standing in court. Thereafter, respondents filed before the
CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial
court (RTC).

CA: it held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution and
Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed
to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not
specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate them and the
impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by personal service. Second, the

133 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
subsequent summons by publication was equally infirm, because the Complaint was a suit
for specific performance and therefore an action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution
and the Orders were null and void, since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over
respondents. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on respondents.

RULING:

NO. There was no valid service of summons.

In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of
summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such
service may be done by personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:

―Service in person on defendant.;

Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof
to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him.d service of summons.‖

―Substituted service;
If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant‘s residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant‘s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.‖

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons is

preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the
process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a)
indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify the
efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of
the office or regular place of business, of the defendant.

It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the
proof of service or in the officer‘s return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully
with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

134 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MA. IMELDA M. MANOTOC, petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
AGAPITA TRAJANO on behalf of the Estate of ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, respondents
GR 130974 16 August 2006
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Velasco, Jr. J.

―Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of
Court can be broken down to the following requirements: (1) Impossibility of Prompt
Personal Service (2)Specific Details in the Return (3)A Person of Suitable Age and
Discretion (4)A Competent Person in Charge.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case entitled Agapita Trajano, et al.v. Imee Marcos-
Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos for Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign
Judgment. Respondent Trajano seeks the enforcement of a foreign court‘s judgment
rendered by the United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America,
for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by military intelligence
officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command, direction, authority, supervision,
tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.

Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons addressed to
petitioner at Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Pasig City. The
Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon (Mr.) Macky de la Cruz,
an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit in Pasig. When petitioner failed to
file her Answer, the trial court declared her in default. Petitioner, by special appearance of
counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
over her person due to an invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds to support
the motion were:

(1) the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint was not her dwelling,
residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court;
(2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a representative,
employee, nor a resident of the place;
(3) the procedure prescribed by the Rules on personal and substituted service of
summons was ignored;
(4) defendant was a resident of Singapore; and
(5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be ineffective and futile.

The RTC:

trial court rejected Manotoc‘s Motion to Dismiss on the strength of its findings that
her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was Alexandra Homes, Unit E-2104,
No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on the documentary evidence of

135 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the presumption that the sheriff‘s
substituted service was made in the regular performance of official duty, and such
presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The CA:

It adopted the findings of the trial court that petitioner‘s residence was at Alexandra
Homes, Unit E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, which was
also the residence of her husband, as shown by the testimony of Atty. Robert Swift
and the Returns of the registered mails sent to petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner through a substituted service of summons in accordance with
section 8, rule 14 of the revised rules of court.

RULING:

NO. Requirements for Substituted Service, Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of
Court which applies to this case can be broken down to the following requirements: (1)
Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service (2)Specific Details in the Return (3)A Person of
Suitable Age and Discretion (4)A Competent Person in Charge. A meticulous scrutiny of the
aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of material data on the serious efforts to
serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in
the Return why those efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal
service has become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of "on
many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally," "at
reasonable hours during the day," and "to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is
usually out of her place and/or residence or premises."

Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates from the ruling—in Domagas v.
Jensen and other related cases —that the pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts
exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the Return. It cannot be
determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the
attempts were made. Given the fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed,
as in the present case, by a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and
circumstances surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in
the Return or Certificate of Service.

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioner‘s address in the Complaint, it has not been
shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Cañelas, who served such summons, exerted
extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of the Complaint
only states that respondents were "informed, and so [they] allege" about the address and
whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a plaintiff must
demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more direct
means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioner‘s residence or house is
doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service
to have been pursued persistently.
136 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact terms would
encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to substituted service—for it
would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly,
considering that monies and properties worth millions may be lost by a defendant because of
an irregular or void substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriff‘s Return should
clearly and convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.

Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a "person of
suitable age and discretion" residing in defendant‘s house or residence. Thus, there are two
(2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age and
discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant. Both
requirements were not met.

In this case, the Sheriff‘s Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of Mr.
Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriff‘s general assertion that de la Cruz is the "resident
caretaker" of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and
telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with
petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit considering that a married woman of her
stature in society would unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling.

With the petitioner‘s allegation that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or
representative, it is necessary to have additional information in the Return of Summons.
Besides, Mr. Macky de la Cruz‘s refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong
indication that he did not have the necessary "relation of confidence" with petitioner. To
protect petitioner‘s right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against
her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.

It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized by the
rules.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and
the assailed March 17, 1997 Decision and October 8, 1997 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals and the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig City, Branch 163 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

137 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
YUK LING ONG, petitioner, v. BENJAMIN T. CO, respondent
GR 206653 25 February 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

In court proceedings, there is no right more cherished than the right of every litigant to be
given an opportunity to be heard. This right begins at the very moment that summons is
served on the defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost importance in ensuring that the
defendant personally grasps the weight of responsibility that will befall him. Thus, it is only
in exceptional circumstances that constructive notification, or substituted service of
summons, is allowed. If the server falls short of the rigorous requirements for substituted
service of summons, then the Court has no other option but to strike down a void judgment,
regardless of the consequences.

FACTS:

Yuk Ling Ong, a British-Hong Kong national, and Benjamin Co, a Filipino citizen, were
married. Co filed two petitions for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity on two different occasions. Co stated in the first petition that Ong‘s address was
600 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila. Co indicated in the second petition that Ong‘s address was
23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa Garden Homes, Quezon City. The RTC issued
summons. In the Server‘s Return, process server stated that, on August 1, 2002, substituted
service of summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile attempts to
serve the same personally on Ong. The said documents were received by a security officer.

On December 11, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision finding Co‘s marriage with Ong as
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
It stated that summons was served on Ong but she failed to file her responsive pleading
within the reglementary period.

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court before the CA on November 24, 2008, claiming that she was never notified
of the cases filed against her. She prayed that the RTC decision, dated December 11, 2002, in
Civil Case No. 02-0306, be nullified on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner alleged that first, respondent committed extrinsic fraud because, as seen in Civil
Case No. CV-01- 0177, he deliberately indicated a wrong address to prevent her from
participating in the trial; second, jurisdiction over her person was not acquired in Civil Case
No. 02-0306 because of an invalid substituted service of summons as no sufficient
explanation, showing impossibility of personal service, was stated before resorting to
substituted service of summons; third, the alleged substituted service was made on a security
guard of their townhouse and not on a member of her household; and fourth, she was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations.

Ruling of the CA

138 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The CA rendered decision finding the petition for annulment of judgment to be
devoid of merit. The CA further ruled that the substituted service of summons in
Civil Case No. 02-0306 was valid. It found that there was a customary practice in
petitioner‘s townhouse that the security guard would first entertain any visitors and
receive any communication in behalf of the homeowners. With this setup, it was
obviously impossible for the process server to personally serve the summons upon
petitioner. It also declared that the process server‘s return carries with it the
presumption of regularity in the discharge of a public officer‘s duties and functions.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA in its
Resolution,14 dated March 26, 2013.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the Trial Court in Civil Case No. 02- 0306 validly acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Whether or not the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic fraud
within the purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

1st Issue:
(See Manotoc v. CA for requirements of a substituted service of summons.)
In the case at bench, the summons in Civil Case No. 02- 030629 was issued on July 29, 2002.
In his server‘s return,30 the process server resorted to substituted service of summons on
August 1, 2002. Surprisingly, the process server immediately opted for substituted service of
summons after only two (2) days from the issuance of the summons. The server‘s return
stated the following:

―SERVER‘S RETURN

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT on August 1, 2002, substituted service of summons

with copy of petition, were effected to respondent, Yuk Ling H. Ong, at the Unit B-
2, No. 23 Sta. Rosa St., Manresa Garden Homes, Manresa Garden City, Quezon
City, after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The said
documents were received by Mr. Roly Espinosa of sufficient age and discretion, the
Security Officer thereat.

Therefore, respectfully returning to Court, original copy of summons, Duly Served,

this 2nd day of August, 2002. ―

The server‘s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process
server to personally serve the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general
statement that summons was effected after several futile attempts to serve the same
personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to perform the
personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made;
and the underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there
were inquiries made to locate the petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These

139 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though futile, must be specified in the
return to justify substituted service.

The server‘s return did not describe in detail the person who received the summons, on
behalf of petitioner. It simply stated that the summons was received "by Mr. Roly Espinosa
of sufficient age and discretion, the Security Officer thereat." It did not expound on the
competence of the security officer to receive the summons.

Also, aside from the server‘s return, respondent failed to indicate any portion of the records
which would describe the specific attempts to personally serve the summons. Co did not
even claim that Ong made any voluntary appearance and actively participated.

The case of Robinson v. Miralles, cited by the CA, is not applicable. In that case, the return
described in thorough detail how the security guard refused the sheriff‘s entry despite several
attempts. The defendant in the said case specifically instructed the guard to prevent anybody
to proceed to her residence. In the present case, the attempts made by the process server
were stated in a broad and ambiguous statement.

The presumption of regularity was never intended to be applied even in cases where there
are no showings of substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules of procedure.
Such presumption does not apply where it is patent that the sheriff's or server's return is
defective. As earlier explained, the server's return did not comply with the stringent
requirements of substituted service of summons.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the decision must be
declared null and void.

2nd Issue:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders
and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Annulment of judgment is an
equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a
judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from
the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with.

Petitioner raises two grounds to support her claim for annulment of judgment: (1) extrinsic
fraud and (2) lack of jurisdiction. Her contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud,
however, is too unsubstantial to warrant consideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March
26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 106271 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City is hereby declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.

140 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
FILOMENA DOMAGAS (Domagas), petitioner v. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN (Jensen),
respondent
GR 158407 17 January 2005
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Callejo, Sr., J.

…an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because
the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article
539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore
physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable
compensation for his use or occupation of the property. x x x

Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court
can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.

If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted

service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule.

If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted
to:

(1) substituted service set forth in Section 8;

(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
(4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

FACTS:

Domagas and Jensen, and the latter‘s brother, Oscar Layno (Oscar) were neighbors in
Calasiao, Pangasinan since their childhood. On 19 February 1999 Domagas filed a case for
forcible entry against Jensen, alleging that on 9 January 1999 she was deprived of sixty eight
(68) square metres of her land by Jensen‘s fencing of such.

At the time of the service of summons by the Sheriff, Oscar, while collecting rents from
Eduardo Gonzales (Gonzales) who leased the house owned by Jensen, told the Sheriff that
her sister is currently out of the country, specifically in Oslo, Norway, as she is living with
her husband therein.

As such, the Sheriff served the summons and the copy of the complaint upon Oscar.

The MTC:

Ruled in favor of Domagas, ordering Jensen to vacate and pay rentals concerning the
enchroached property.

141 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
As no appeal was made by Jensen, a writ of execution was issued on 27 September
1999.

Upon Jensen‘s return to the Philippines on 30 July 2000, and came to know of such case,
Jensen filed a complaint on 16 August 2000 in the RTC for annulment of the decision of
the MTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person, alleging that:

At the time the summons was served, she was NOT a resident of Calasiao
Pangasinan;

A Contract of Lease with Gonzales indicates that when the property was leased, she
was not a resident of Calasiao, Pangasinan but of Oslo, Norway.

She left the Philippines on 17 February 2017, as evidenced by her passport,

specifically two (2) days before Domagas filed her case;

Oscar was there merely for collection, but not a resident thereof and coincidentally
not authorized to receive such summons; and

Oscar never told her about the same

On the other hand, Domagas maintains that the service to Oscar is a valid one considering
that Oscar is a resident of Calasiao, Pangasinan as evidenced by the Voter‘s Registration
Records.

The RTC rules in favor of Jensen, holding that there was no proper service of summons.

Aggrieved, Domagas appealed to the CA, but the latter affirmed the MTC and held that the
case being quasi in rem, the proper service of summons should have been done to a resident
temporarily out of the country is by extraterritorial service and should be done with leave of
court.

Thus, this petition by Domagas, where parties contends the following:

Domagas alleges that the proceeding is in personam, and hence substituted service is
the proper mode of service considering the facts;

On the other hand, Jensen argues that the proceeding is quasi in rem, and thus no
substituted service can be had, and the proper mode is by extraterritorial service.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not a forcible entry case is an action in personam

Whether or not substituted service has been applied properly

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes, the forcible entry case is an action in personam.
142 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

An action in personam is directed towards the defendant‘s responsibility or liability. In such a

case, the defendant shall be answerable for the act complained of.

As this is a case for recovery of real property, Domagas prays that Jensen return the said
land to her, claiming that she is the rightful possessor of such.

It is not a proceeding quasi in rem considering that in such a case, what the plaintiff prays is to
subject the property answerable for the liabilities.

2nd Issue:
No, the substituted service is improper. While it is true, that substituted service is available in
case of actions in personam, Domagas failed to comply with the requirements of the law.

In this case, the summons were served upon Oscar, the brother of Jensen. Oscar was never a
resident of the subject lot, as it was at the time Gonzales, and Oscar is merely visiting the
premises for purposes of collecting rentals. As a visitor, Oscar is not among those who can
receive the summons in behalf of Jensen.

Furthermore, what the law intends when it said ―residence‖, is the residence at the time of
service of summons. Domagas‘ representations, together with affidavits of her witnesses that
Jensen was a resident of Calasiao, Pangasinan since childhood cannot control over the
Contract of Lease executed by Jensen and Gonzales, which stated that the former resides in
Oslo, Norway.

Thus, that the service is not proper, the service of summons is ineffective, and hence the
case against Jensen must be dismissed.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

143 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (TROPIFRESH DIVISION), petitioner, v. HON. REINATO
G. QUILALA in his capacity as pairing judge of Branch 150, RTC-Makati City, and ALL
SEASON FARM, CORP., respondents
GR 168723 9 July 2008
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Quisumbing, J.

―Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted,

limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio
alterius.

Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.‖

FACTS:

All Season Farm Corporation sought the recovery of a sum of money, accounting and
damages from petitioner Dole Philippines (Dole). According to Dole, an alias summons was
served upon it through a certain Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific
General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole.

Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint among other grounds is that the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to improper service of summons.

RTC denied said motion.

Dole filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals contending that the alias
summons was not properly served. The CA upheld the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the summons was validly served for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the corporation

RULING:

Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted,

limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est
exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant, received the alias summons. There was no
evidence that she was authorized to receive court processes in behalf of the
president. Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal assistant, not
employed by herein petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under Section
11, Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.

144 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action is equivalent to service of summons. petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with
Motion for Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of
the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by
acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file
responsive pleading. Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the
summons and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative
relief in its motion for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to
the jurisdiction of the RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated May 20,
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87723 and its Resolution dated June 28,
2005 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

145 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO SAYSON, JR., petitioners, v. NISSIN-
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION, respondent
GR 181517 6 July 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private
juridical entity must be strictly complied with.

Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.‖

FACTS:

A Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina Corporation (URC) owned figured in a
vehicular accident with petitioner Green Star Express, Inc.‘s (Green Star) passenger bus,
resulting in the death of the van‘s driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr.,
was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent Nissin- Universal Robina
Corporation (N-URC) for the repair of its passenger bus amounting to P567,070.68. N-URC
denied any liability therefor and argued that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate
liabilities of the parties.

Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice, due to insufficiency of
evidence. Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against N-URC before
the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of N-URC‘s employees, was the one who
received the summons.

N-URC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper service. RTC
issued a Resolution denying NURC‘s motion to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial
compliance because there was actual receipt of the summons by NURC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the summons was properly served on N-URC, vesting the trial
court with jurisdiction

RULING:

No. It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic
private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership;

If the defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a
partnership duly registered, service may be made on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.

146 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The rule now likewise states ―general manager‖ instead of ―manager‖; ―corporate secretary‖
instead of merely ―secretary‖; and ―treasurer‖ instead of ―cashier.‖ It has now become
restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in the aforementioned
provision, following the rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one
person excludes all others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius.

Service must, therefore, be made only on the persons expressly listed in the rules. If the
revision committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language. Since the service of summons was made on a cost
accountant, which is not one of the designated persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial
court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over NURC, 14 although the corporation may have
actually received the summons.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals‘ Decision dated

September 17, 2007 and Resolution dated January 22, 2008 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 86824 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

147 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, s ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent
GR 206147 13 January 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, the service of summons may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

FACTS:

Atty. Glenn Gacott (Gacott) from Palawan purchased two (2) brand new transreceivers from
Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) in Manila through its employee Rey Medestomas
(Medestomas).

The transreceivers were defective thus prompting Gacott to return the products to QSC.
Despite multiple unheeded demands, Gacott never received a replacement nor a refund.
Gacott filed a complaint for damages. Summons was served upon QSC and Medestomas,
after which they filed their Answer, verified by Medestomas himself and a certain Elton Ong
(Ong).

RTC ruled in favor of Gacott and the decision became final. During execution, Gacott
learned that QSC was not a corporation, but was in fact a general partnership registered with
the SEC. In the articles of partnership, Guy was appointed as General Manager of QSC.

The sheriff went to DOTC-LTO to verify if Guy, QSC and Medestomas had personal
properties. Upon knowledge that Guy owned a motor vehicle, Gacott instructed the sheriff
to attach the said motor vehicle to satisfy the claim. The sheriff by virtue of the Notice of
Attachment/Levy upon Personalty served upon the record custodian of the DOTC-LTO of
Mandaluyong City. A similar notice was served to Guy through his housemaid at his
residence. Guy filed his Motion to Lift Attachment Upon Personalty, arguing that he was
not a judgment debtor and, therefore, his vehicle could not be attached.

RTC denied Guy‘s motion by explained that considering QSC was not a corporation, but a
registered partnership, Guy should be treated as a general partner pursuant to Section 21 of
the Corporation Code, and he may be held jointly and severally liable with QSC and
Medestomas. Aggrieved.

Gacott appealed to the CA but the same was denied.

ISSUE: Whether Guy is solidarily liable with the partnership for damages arising from
the breach of the contract of sale.

RULING:

148 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
NO. Guy was not impleaded as a defendant

Guy contended that jurisdiction over the person of the partnership was not acquired because
the summons was never served upon it or through any of its authorized office. Guy argues
that he is not solidarily liable with the partnership because the solidary liability of the
partners under Articles 1822, 1823 and 1824 of the Civil Code only applies when it stemmed
from the act of a partner.

Gacott countered, among others, that because Guy was a general and managing partner of
QSC, he could not feign ignorance of the transactions undertaken by QSC. Gacott insisted
that notice to one partner must be considered as notice to the whole partnership, which
included the pendency of the civil suit against it.

SC held that service of summons was defective but was cured by voluntary
appearance. Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the ROC, when the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, the service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner,
general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is
replete with pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of
the persons authorized to receive summons for juridical entities. Service of summons
upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. Even
substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons.

1. Defect in the service of summons may be cured by the defendant‘s subsequent

voluntary submission to the court‘s jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such
as an answer.

A partner must be separately and distinctly impleaded before he can be bound by a

judgment. In the spirit of fair play, it is a better rule that a partner must first be
impleaded before he could be prejudiced by the judgment against the partnership

A decision rendered on a complaint in a civil action or proceeding does not bind or

prejudice a person not impleaded therein, for no person shall be adversely affected by the
outcome of a civil action or proceeding in which he is not a party. The principle that a
person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he has
not been made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

In Aguila, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the complainant had a cause of action against the
partnership. Nevertheless, it was the partners themselves that were impleaded in the
complaint. The Court dismissed the complaint and held that it was the partnership, not its
partners, officers or agents, which should be impleaded for a cause of action against the
partnership itself. The Court added that the partners could not be held liable for the
obligations of the partnership unless it was shown that the legal fiction of a different juridical
personality was being used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purposes.

Guy was never made a party to the case. He did not have any participation in the entire
proceeding until his vehicle was levied upon and he suddenly became QSC‘s ―codefendant
149 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
debtor‖ during the judgment execution stage. It is a basic principle of law that money
judgments are enforceable only against the property incontrovertibly belonging to the
judgment debtor. Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to
properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty
of the sheriff is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not that of a third person.

Further, Article 1821 of the Civil Code does not state that there is no need to implead a
partner in order to be bound by the partnership liability.

Notice to any partner of any matter relating to partnership affairs, and the knowledge of the
partner acting in the particular matter, acquired while a partner or then present to his mind,
and the knowledge of any other partner who reasonably could and should have
communicated it to the acting partner, operate as notice to or knowledge of the partnership,
except in the case of fraud on the partnership, committed by or with the consent of that
partner.

A careful reading of the provision shows that notice to any partner, under certain
circumstances, operates as notice to or knowledge to the partnership only. Evidently, it does
not provide for the reverse situation, or that notice to the partnership is notice to the
partners. Unless there is an unequivocal law which states that a partner is automatically
charged in a complaint against the partnership, the constitutional right to due process takes
precedence and a partner must first be impleaded before he can be considered as a judgment
debtor.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 25, 2012 Decision and the March 5,
2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. -G.R. CV No. 94816 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Puerto
Princesa City, is ORDERED TO RELEASE Michael C. Guy‘s Suzuki Grand Vitara
subject of the Notice of Levy/Attachment upon Personalty.
SO ORDERED.

150 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC., petitioner, v. TIARA COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION, respondent
GR 201378 18 October 2017
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Jardeleza, J.

In cases of improper service of summons, courts should not automatically dismiss the
complaint by reason of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The remedy is
to issue alias summons and ensure that it is properly served.

The enumeration under R14, S11 is exclusive -

When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of
the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.

The service of summons is not the only more through which a court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant. There is voluntary appearance when a party, without
directly assailing the court‘s lack of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court.

FACTS:

GV Florida purchased from TCC 50 brand new Michelin tires, four (4) of which were
installed into the bus that figured in the collision. It claimed that though Vizquera exerted all
efforts humanly possible to avoid the accident, the bus nevertheless swerved to the
oncoming south-bound lane and into the VLI bus.

The bus company Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) filed an action for damages against GV
Florida and its bus driver Arnold Vizquera (Vizquera) before the RTC. This action
arose out of a vehicle collision between the buses of VLI and GV Florida along Capirpiwan
Cordon Isabela on May 1, 2007. VLI claimed that Vizquera‘s negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision and GV Florida failed to exercise due diligence in supervising its
employee.

GV Florida instituted a third-party complaint against TCC. It alleged that the Michelin tires
of its bus had factory and mechanical defects, which caused a tire blowout.

GV Florida maintains that the ―proximate cause of the accident is the tire blowout
which was brought about by factory and mechanical defects in the Michelin tires
which third-party plaintiff GV Florida absolutely and totally had no control over.‖

The RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC.

 In the return of summons, it appears that the sheriff served the summons to a certain
Cherry Gino-gino (Gino-gino) who represented herself as an accounting manager
authorized by TCC to receive summons on its behalf.

151 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
TCC filed a Special Entry of Appearance with an Ex parte Motion for Extension of Time to
File Responsive Pleading and/or Motion to Dismiss. RTC granted TCC‘s prayer for
extension of time to file a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss.

TCC eventually filed a motion to dismiss GV Florida‘s third-party complaint.

 It argued, that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service
of summons. Under Section 11 of Rule 14, there is an exclusive list of the persons
upon whom service of summons on domestic juridical entities may be made. As
the summons in this case was not served on any of the persons listed in Section
11 of Rule 14, there was no proper service of summons on TCC that would vest
the RTC with jurisdiction over it.

RTC denied TCC‘s motion to dismiss and also denied TCC‘s subsequent motion for
reconsideration in an Order.

TCC filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65,
challenging the RTC‘s denial of its motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.

**In the meantime, TCC filed its Answer Ad Cautelam which repeated its arguments
pertaining to jurisdiction, the prescription of the implied warranty claim, the
impropriety of the third-party complaint and the venue of the action, and the failure
to implead Michelin. Upon order of the RTC, the case was set for pretrial and the parties
submitted their respective pretrial briefs. Notably, TCC filed its pretrial brief without any
reservations as to the issue of jurisdiction. Moreover, not only did it fail to include in its
identification of issues the question of the RTC‘s jurisdiction, TCC even reserved the option
to present additional evidence.

CA rendered its Decision granting TCC‘s petition and reversing the Orders of the
RTC.

 Emphasizing that the enumeration in Section 11 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court is

exclusive, the CA found that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over TCC because of
the improper service of summons upon a person not named in the enumeration.

It then proceeded to rule that GV Florida‘s third-party complaint against TCC is a claim for
implied warranty which, under Article 1571 of the Civil Code, must be filed within six
months from delivery.

 CA noted that the delivery receipt for the tires is not in the records of the case, it may be
assumed that the tires were delivered a few days after the purchase date of March 23,
2007. Since GV Florida only filed the third-party complaint on April 8, 2008, the action
has prescribed.

152 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
GV Florida thus filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the CA‘s Decision.

1. GV Florida argues that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over TCC.

a. GV Florida argues that service of summons is not the only means through which
a court acquires jurisdiction over a party. In this case, GV Florida claims that
TCC voluntarily appeared and submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it
filed motions and pleadings seeking affirmative relief from said court.

2. TCC reiterated its previous contentions.

a. It added however that the third-party complaint should be dismissed for failure
to implead an indispensable party — Michelin, the manufacturer of the tires
which GV Florida claims are defective.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over Tiara Commercial
Corporation

RULING:

Yes. SC ruled that summons were improperly served BUT COURTS SHOULD NOT
AUTOMATICALLY DISMISS THE COMPLAINT Moreover, TCC voluntarily appeared

a. Service of summons is the main mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant in a civil case. Through it, the defendant is informed of the
action against him or her and he or she is able to adequately prepare his or her course of
action.

b. Rules governing the proper service of summons are not mere matters of procedure.
They go into a defendant's right to due process.

c. Strict compliance with the rules on service of summons is mandatory.

d. Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for the issuance of
summons to a domestic private juridical entity. a. Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private
juridical entity. — When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be
made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.

e. This enumeration is exclusive. Section 11 of Rule 14 changed the old rules pertaining to
the service of summons on corporations.

f. While the former rule allowed service on an agent of a corporation, the current rule has
provided for a list of specific persons to whom service of summons must be made.

g. The purpose of this rule is "to [e]nsure that the summons be served on a representative
so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal
153 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
papers served on him." a. This rule requires strict compliance; the old doctrine that
substantial compliance is sufficient no longer applies.

h. Service of summons, however, is not the only mode through which a court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court states: a. Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. — The defendant's voluntary appearance
in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

i. There is voluntary appearance when a. a party, without directly assailing the court's lack
of jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court. b. a party appears before the court
without qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding
lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.

j. In contrast, Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that so long as a

defendant raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to include other
grounds of objection. In such case, there is no voluntary appearance.

k. Still, improper service of summons and lack of voluntary appearance do not

automatically warrant the dismissal of the complaint. a. A case should not be dismissed
simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. b. An alias summons can be
actually served on said defendant. i. [Note: An alias summons is a second summons
served when the first attempt at serving a summons is unsuccessful. OR the second
summons that has to be served because the original summons was defective or was
improperly served.]

l. In this case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While
she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, SC findsthat TCC has
voluntarily appeared before (and submitted itself to) the RTC a. it filed its pre-trial brief
without any reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it. b. At no point in its pre-trial
brief did TCC raise the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over it. c. it even asked the RTC
that it be allowed to reserve the presentation of additional evidence through documents
and witnesses.

m. TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the jurisdiction of the court when it
subsequently filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation and even prayed to be
allowed to present additional evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 13, 2011 and its Resolution dated March 26, 2012 are REVERSED. The Order
dated March 2, 2009 of Branch 129 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

154 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

OTHER RULINGS: GV FLORIDA‘s petition was timely filed

1. On motion of the party filed before the reglementary period, this Court may grant
extension for a period not exceeding thirty (30) days.

2. In a Resolution 30 dated July 16, 2012, SC granted Florida's motion for extension of
time. We thus find GV Florida's petition to be timely filed.

RTC not guilty of grave abuse of discretion

a. In remedial law, an order denying a motion to dismiss is classified as an interlocutory
order. This classification is vital because the kind of court order determines the
particular remedy that a losing party may pursue.

b. In the case of a final order — one that finally disposes of a case — the proper
remedy is an appeal. On the other hand, when an order is merely interlocutory —
one which refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit
which decides some point or matter but is not the final decision of the whole
controversy, — Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an appeal cannot be had.

c. In this instance, a party's recourse is to file an answer, with the option to include
grounds stated in the motion to dismiss, and proceed to trial. In the event that an
adverse judgment is rendered, the party can file an appeal and raise the interlocutory
order as an error. a. This general rule is subject to a narrow exception. A party may
question an interlocutory order without awaiting judgment after trial if its issuance is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

 TCC's petition for certiorari did not identify the RTC's specific acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Rather, it imputed errors in the RTC's proper interpretation of the
law.

 Further, the CA's Decision makes no finding of any grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the RTC.

 Not every error committed by a tribunal amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

o A misappreciation of the facts or a misapplication of the law does not, by itself,

warrant the filing of a special civil action for certiorari.
o There must be a clear abuse of the authority vested in a tribunal.
o This abuse must be so serious and so grave that it warrants the interference of
the court to nullify or modify the challenged action and to undo the damage
done.

GV FLORIDA‘s third party complaint has not prescribed.

 The Civil Code states that this claim must be made within six months from the time of
the delivery of the thing sold.

155 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

 This, in turn, requires the presentation of the delivery receipts as well as their
identification and authentication. Under the Rules of Court, a party presenting a
document as evidence must first establish its due execution and authenticity as a
preliminary requirement for its admissibility.

3. A finding of fact as to the date of delivery can only be made after hearing and reception of
evidence. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that GV Florida's thirdparty complaint should be
dismissed on the ground of prescription.

156 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Voluntary Appearance

SUNRISE GARDEN CORPORATION, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and FIRST

ALLIANCE REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT, INC., respondents
GR 158836 30 September 2015
Petitions for Review on Certiorari
Leonen, J.

Due process requires that a party be given the chance to be heard. The general rule is that
―no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a
case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court.‖ Corollarily, an ancillary writ of
remedy cannot affect nonparties to a case.

FACTS:

1998, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Antipolo City passed City Ordinance creating a
Technical Committee to do a study on a road construction feasibility.

1999, the Sangguniang Barangay of Cupang requested the Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Antipolo City to construct a city road to connect Barangay Cupang and Marcos Highway.
The Technical Committee created by City Ordinance posted notices to property owners that
would be affected by the construction of the city road.

Sunrise Garden Corporation (SGC) was an affected landowner. Its property was located
in Barangay Cupang, which SGC planned to develop into a memorial park. SGC, through
Cesar T. Guy, Chair of the Board of Directors, executed an Undertaking where SGC would
construct the city road at its own expense, subject to reimbursement through tax
credits.

SGC‘s contractor began to position its construction equipment. However, armed guards,
allegedly hired by Hardrock Aggregates, Inc., prevented SGC's contractor from
using an access road to move the construction equipment. SGC filed a Complaint for
damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction
against Hardrock Aggregates, Inc (HAI). HAI filed its Answer to the Complaint. HAI still
blocked the movement of the construction equipment. While the Complaint was pending,
informal settlers started to encroach on the area of the proposed city road.

SGC filed a Motion and Manifestation praying for the amendment of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction to include any and all persons or group of persons from
interfering, preventing or obstructing all of petitioner's contractors, equipment
personnel and representatives in proceeding with the construction of the city road as
authorized by Ordinance of Antipolo City.

The trial court granted SGC‘s motion.

157 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In compliance with the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the informal settlers
allowed the construction equipment passage to the city road project. The construction of the
city road then continued. Thereafter, armed guards of K-9 Security Agency, allegedly
hired by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., blocked Sunrise Garden
Corporation's contractor's employees and prevented them from proceeding with the
construction.

First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc., through its representative Mr. Boy Pineda,
requested to have a dialogue with Sunrise Garden Corporation. It was agreed that the
meeting would be between the representatives of First Alliance Real Estate Development,
Inc. and Sunrise Garden Corporation. On the day of the meeting, First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc.'s representative, however, did not arrive.

A Motion to cite K-9 Security Agency in contempt was filed by Sunrise Garden Corporation.
K-9 Security Agency, joined by First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and
represented by the same counsel, opposed the Motion to cite them in contempt,
raising the defense of lack of jurisdiction over their persons, since they were not
bound by the Amended Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the voluntary appearance of respondent First Alliance Real
Estate Development and K-9 Security Agency constitute a voluntary
appearance.
RULING:

NO. The appearance of respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. and
K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a voluntary appearance because it was
for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court. The records of this
case show that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised at the first instance and
repeatedly argued by K-9 Security Agency and respondent First Alliance Real Estate
Development, Inc. in their pleadings.

In this case, petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Sunrise Garden Corporation did not
refute that respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. was never a party to the
case.

Petitioner Sunrise Garden Corporation additionally argues that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction because respondent First Alliance Real Estate Development, Inc. voluntarily
appeared in court to argue why it should not be cited in contempt. While Rule 14, Section 20
of the Rules of Court provides that voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of
summons, the same rule also provides that ―[t]he inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed
a voluntary appearance.‖

158 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 158836 and 158967 are
DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 160726 and 160778 are DENIED, and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 75758 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

159 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJAN-MILITANTE, petitioner, v. ANA KARI CARMENCITA
NUSTAD, as represented by ATTY. MARGUERITE THERESE L. LUCILA, respondent
GR 209518 19 June 2017
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Tijam, J.

―A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons.
However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may
still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears
before it.‖

FACTS:

On June 2, 2011, respondent filed a petition before the RTC of Lucena City and prayed that
Ma. Hazelina A. Tujan-Militante be ordered to surrender to the Register of Deeds of Lucena
City the owner's duplicate copy of the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-435798, T-
436799, T- 387158 and T-387159, which were all issued in Nustad's name. She averred that
Tujan-Militante has been withholding the said titles.

RTC set the petition for a hearing.

Instead of filing an Answer, Tujan-Militante filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss

and Annul Proceedings.

She averred that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person as she
was not able to receive summons. Moreover, she argued that the Order
appeared to be a decision on the merits, as it already ruled with certainty that
she is in possession of the subject titles.

In an Order RTC denied Tujan-Militante's Motion and ruled that it has

jurisdiction over the case. RTC stated that it has not yet decided on the merits of
the case because it merely set the petition for a hearing.

Tujan-Militante filed a Motion for Reconsideration

alleged that the Power of Attorney executed by respondent in favor of Atty.

Lucila is void and non-existent.

Tujan-Militante likewise averred that Atty. Lucila is representing a

Norwegian, who is not allowed to own lands in the Philippines. Aside from
the dismissal of the case, petitioner prayed that the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Land Registration Authority be impleaded.

RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, she filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

160 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CA recognized the jurisdictional defect over the person of petitioner, but
nevertheless ruled that the flaw was cured by petitioner's filing of her Motion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was also denied by the CA.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over a person who was not able
to receive summons.

RULING:

Appeal is bereft of merit.

A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of summons.
However, it is equally significant that even without valid service of summons, a court may
still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the latter voluntarily appears
before it. Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Voluntary Appearance. - The defendant's voluntary appearance in the

action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds of relief aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to
have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. A party cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

In this case, while Tujan-Militante‘s motion to dismiss challenged the jurisdiction of the
court a quo on the ground of improper service of summons, the subsequent filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration which sought for affirmative relief is tantamount to voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of such court. Such affirmative relief is
inconsistent with the position that no voluntary appearance had been made, and to ask for
such relief, without the proper objection, necessitates submission to the [court]‘s jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated February
27, 2013 and Resolution dated October 2, 2013, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 124811 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

161 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 15:
Motions

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Republic), petitioner v. ALVIN C. DIMARUCOT

(Alvin) and NAILYN TAÑEDO-DIMARUCOT (Nailyn), respondents
GR 202069 7 March 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Caguioa, J.

―Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will
not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are
well-defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as:

[i] where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; x x x

The 3-day notice rule was established not for the benefit of movant but for the adverse party,
in order to avoid surprises and grant the latter sufficient time to study the motion and
enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein. x x x

Nevertheless, considering the nature of the case and the issues involved therein, the Court
finds that relaxation of the Rules was called for.‖

FACTS:

On 22 September 2009, Alvin filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of

Marriage in the RTC of her marriage with Nailyn, based on Art 36 of the New Civil Code, or
specifically, based on psychological incapacity of Nailyn, arguing that the latter is a loose
spender, overly materialistic, and fails to observe marital obligations.

On 2 July 2010, the RTC declared the marriage between Alvin and Nailyn null and void, for
successfully proving the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Nailyn‘s
psychological incapacity (RTC Decision).

On 27 July 2010, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on such order,
arguing that Alvin failed to prove such psychological incapacity, the RTC:

Denied the motion, for failure to observe the three (3) day notice rule, in that the
date set for hearing was ―6 July 2010‖, when the MR was filed on the 27th. (August
2010 Order)

On 1 September 2010, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, which
held:

Denying the Notice of Appeal, for failure of the previous MR to observe the
requirements under Rule 15 on Motions, the period to appeal was not tolled,
and hence the RTC Decision attained finality. (September 2010 Order)

162 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Aggrieved, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, arguing that both August
and September 2010 Orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the CA:

Dismissed the petition, for failure of the Republic to first file a MR against the
September 2010 Order, prior to the filing of its petition with the CA;

That the MR denied in the August 2010 Order is proper, considering that the failure
to observe the three (3) day notice rule made the Motion merely as pro forma.

The Republic filed its MR, arguing that the CA failed to consider that the RTC‘s
Clerk of Court, Atty. Amy Dimarucot (Atty. Amy), is Alvin‘s sibling and that the
September 2010 Order denying his Notice of Appeal is uncalled for, considering that
Appeal is the proper remedy. The CA:

Denied the MR

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition outright

Whether or not the CA erred in not taking consideration of Atty. Amy‘s

relation with Alvin

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes, the CA erred in dismissing the petition outright.

While as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is required before the CA may
recognize a petition for certiorari, it admits of exceptions, as in this case, when the order is a
patent nullity.

Strict adherence to Rule 15 should not take precedence over the sanctity of marriage.

Thus, the RTC should have set the hearing itself, and the CA should not have dismissed the
petition on the basis of such.

2nd Issue:
No, the CA did not err in not considering Atty. Amy and Alvin‘s relationship as siblings.

The issue cannot be raised first time on appeal in the CA, as the Republic should have made
in writing and sent to the judicial officer concerned before the trial court.

Furthermore, the Clerk on the other hand, may disqualify one‘s self if he or she came to
know of such instance.

163 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Nevertheless, such will not go unscathed, as sanctions must be made against Atty. Amy for
failure to observe ethical standards.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is

GRANTED. The Assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals Sixteenth Division dated July
29, 2011 and Assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals Former Sixteenth Division dated
May 24, 2012 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 116572 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 in Guimba, Nueva Ecija is DIRECTED to give due course
to the Republic‘s Notice of Appeal dated September 1, 2010 and to elevate the case records
to the Court of Appeals for review.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for its
information and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

The provision on setting of a hearing by the movant under the 1997 Rules of Court has been
deleted, to wit:

15.04; Hearing of motion;

Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of
the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

As explained by Atty. Tranquil Salvador, the deletion of the said provision passes on the
duty of setting the hearing to the courts. It is more expeditious, considering that the court
has the discretion to set the hearing, and if may immediately refer to its calendar of cases.

164 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ETHEL, EMMIE, ELVIE, EARLYN, EVELYN, all surnamed ACAMPADO, and
KATIPUNAN M. DE LOS REYES and THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KALIBO,
AKLAN, BRANCH 6, petitioners, v. SPOUSES LOURDES R. COSMILLA and FELIMON
COSMILLA, and LORELIE COSMILLA, for herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of LOURDES
R. COSMILLA, respondents
GR 198531 28 September 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Perez, J.

The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to comply with the
required notice and hearing and service to the adverse party as mandated by Sections 4 and
5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

In keeping with the principles of due process, therefore, a motion which does not afford the
adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply be disregarded. Failure to comply with
the required notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to respondents cause.

FACTS:

The present petition stems from the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of
Document filed by respondents against petitioners before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,
Branch 6.
 In their Amended Complaint respondents Spouses Cosmilla alleged that the sale of
their share on the subject property was effected thru a forged Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) and is therefore null and void.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint of the
respondents for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence that the signatures of the
respondents in the SPA were forged.

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking for the reversal of

the earlier RTC Decision.
 For failure of the respondents, however, to comply with the requirement of
notice of hearing as required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the court a quo denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and TRO
seeking to annul and set aside the RTC Order.

CA dismissed the petition filed by the respondents.

Respondents again filed for an MR.

 CA then reversed its earlier decision and allowed the relaxation of procedural in a
Resolution.

165 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners in a Resolution

Petitioners now before this Court via this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari praying
that the Court of Appeals‘ Resolution be reversed and set aside

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in its resolutions, which reconsidered its own
decision of dismissing the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

RULING:

Yes. The Court resolves to grant the petition.

The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to comply with the
required notice and hearing and service to the adverse party as mandated by the following
provisions of the Revised Rules of Court (Rule 15 Secs. 4, 5 and 6)

The foregoing requirements – that the notice shall be directed to the parties concerned, and
shall state the time and place for the hearing of the motion are mandatory, and if not
religiously complied with, the motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not comply
with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless
piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no
authority to act upon. The logic for such requirement is simple: a motion invariably contains
a prayer, which the movant makes to the court which is usually in the interest of the adverse
party to oppose.

Harsh as they may seem, these rules were introduced to avoid capricious change of mind in
order to provide due process to both parties and to ensure impartiality in the trial.

These doctrines refer exclusively to a motion, since a motion invariably contains a prayer,
which the movant makes to the court, which is to repeat usually in the interest of the adverse
party to oppose and in the observance of due process, the other party must be given the
opportunity to oppose the motion. In keeping with the principles of due process,
therefore, a motion which does not afford the adverse party the chance to oppose it
should simply be disregarded. Failure to comply with the required notice and
hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious to respondents cause.

New Japan Motors, Inc. v. Perucho:

―Under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, x x x a motion is required

to be accompanied by a notice of hearing which must be served by the applicant on
all parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof. Section 6 of
the same rule commands that ‗(n)o motion shall be acted upon by the Court, without
proof of service of the notice thereof x x x.‘ It is therefore patent that the motion
for reconsideration in question is fatally defective for it did not contain any
notice of hearing. We have already consistently held in a number of cases that
the requirements of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are
mandatory and that failure to comply with the same is fatal to movant‘s
166 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
cause.‖ (Emphasis supplied)

Nevertheless, the three-day requirement is not a hard and fast rule. Where a party has been
given an opportunity to be heard, the time to study the motion and oppose it, there is
compliance with the rule. The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well
as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the
grounds upon which it is based.

We here follow the rule and so pronounce that contrary to the findings of the appellate
court, petitioners were not given ample opportunity to vent their side on the issue since they
were not able to promptly receive a copy of the notice of hearing impinging the latter‘s right
to due process.

 no notice of hearing was appended to the Motion for Reconsideration of the

respondent.
o a motion for reconsideration is a litigated motion where the right of the
adverse party will be affected by its admission.
 The adverse party in this case had the right to resist the motion because it may
result to the reversal of a prior favorable decision. The proof of service was
therefore indispensable in order to avoid surprises on the opposite party.
The absence thereof is fatal to the motion.

It bears stressing that a motion without notice and hearing, is pro forma, a mere scrap
of paper that cannot be acted by the court. It presents no question that the court can
decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
Indisputably, any motion that does not contain proof of service and notice to the adverse
party is not entitled to judicial cognizance.

The running of the period towards the finality of the judgment was not stopped, the
RTC Decision became final and executory.
 Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory
and unappealable.
 For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is
the life of the law.
 To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate
all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice
that we should write finis to this litigation.

Consequently, we find no reversible error when the RTC denied respondents‘ motion for
reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint of the respondents and
167 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
its Order declaring their Motion for Reconsideration as pro forma are hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

168 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MARILOU S. LAUDE and MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, petitioners, v. HON. ROLINE M.
GINEZ -JABALDE, Presiding Judge, Branch 74, Regional Trial Court of the City of
Olongapo; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. ALBERT F.
DEL ROSARIO, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs; HON. GEN. GREGORIO
PIO P. CATAPANG, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; HON. EMILIE
FE DELOS SANTOS, Chief City Prose cutor of Olongapo City; and L/CPL JOSEPH
SCOTT PEMBERTON, respondents
GR 217456 24 November 2015
Certiorari
Leonen, J.

"While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule
15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted
upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor
violate his or her due process rights.

The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order to enable him or her to
prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant.

In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to
study petitioners‘ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.‖

FACTS:

Jeffrey ―Jennifer‖ Laude (Jennifer) was killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay
Drive in Olongapo City allegedly by 19-year-old US Marine L/CPL Joseph Scott Pemberton
(Pemberton). A Complaint for murder was filed by Jennifer‘s sibling, Marilou S. Laude,
against Pemberton before the Office of the City Prosecutor which Information was later
filed with the RTC in Olongapo City.

Pemberton surrendered personally to the RTC Judge and was later arraigned. On the same
day of Arraignment petitioner Laude filed an Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces
of the Philippines to Surrender the Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail and a
Motion to Allow Media Coverage. According to petitioners, they were only able to serve the
Motion on Pemberton‘s counsel through registered mail. In any case, they claim to have also
―furnished a copy of the Motion personally at the hearing of the Motion. The Urgent
Motion was denied, as well as its motion for reconsideration.

Petitioners argue that "[Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to an excess or absence of jurisdiction when she dismissed the Urgent Motion to Compel the
Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody o[f] Accused to the Olongapo City
Jail [based] on mere technicalities[.]" In particular, they argue that the three-day rule on
motions under Rule 15, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court is not absolute, and should be
liberally interpreted when a case is attended by exigent circumstances.

169 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Petitioners advance that the rationale behind the three-day notice rule is satisfied when there
is an opportunity to be heard, which was present in this case since Pemberton's counsel and
the Public Prosecutor were present in the hearing of the two Motions filed by
petitioners. Petitioners allege that the court noted their attendance, and were able to make
comments during the Motion hearing. They assert that the rights of Pemberton were not
compromised in any way.

Petitioners also aver that the three-day notice rule should be liberally applied due to the
timing of the arrest and arraignment. "The Urgent Motion was set for hearing on December
22, 2014[.]"31 This date preceded a series of legal holidays beginning on December 24, 2014,
where all the courts and government offices suspended their work. Petitioners point out that
a "murder trial is under a distinctly special circumstance in that Paragraph 6, Article V of the
Visiting Forces Agreement. . . provides for [a] one-year trial period[,] after which the United
States shall be relieved of any obligations under said paragraph[.]" Petitioners had to file and
set the Motion hearing at the earliest possible date.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 3-day notice rule should be should be liberally applied due
to the timing of the arrest and arraignment.

RULING:

No. Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the
adverse party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to
comply with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting
the adverse party‘s right to procedural due process.

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15
is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted upon
by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor violate his
or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the motion in order
to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of the movant. In this
case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given sufficient time to study
petitioners‘ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to procedural due process.

Petitioners admit that they personally furnished Pemberton a copy of the Urgent Motion to
Compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the
Olongapo City Jail only during the hearing. They attempt to elude the consequences of this
belated notice by arguing that they also served a copy of the Motion by registered mail on
Pemberton‘s counsel. They also attempt to underscore the urgency of the Motion by making
a reference to the Christmas season and the ―series of legal holidays‖ where courts would be
closed.

To compound their obfuscation, petitioners claim that the hearing held on December 22,
2014, attended by Pemberton‘s counsel sufficiently satisfied the rationale of the three-day
notice rule. These circumstances taken together do not cure the Motion‘s deficiencies.

170 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Even granting that Pemberton‘s counsel was able to comment on the motion orally during
the hearing, which incidentally was set for another incident, it cannot be said that Pemberton
was able to study and prepare for his counterarguments to the issues raised in the Motion.
Judge Ginez-J abalde was correct to deny the Urgent Motion to Compel the Armed Forces
of the Philippines to Surrender Custody of Accused to the Olongapo City Jail based on
noncompliance of procedural rules.

To rule otherwise would be to prejudice Pemberton‘s rights as an accused.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prayer for the
issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

171 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR. and AMPARO O. DE GUZMAN, petitioners,
v. CESAR OCHOA AND SYLVIA A. OCHOA, represented by ARACELI S. AZORES, as
their Attorney-in-Fact, respondents
GR 169292 13 April 2011
Petition for Review on Certiorari

―A motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections
available at the time of the filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all objections not
so included shall be deemed waived."

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa, through respondent Araceli Azores,
ostensibly acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced an action seeking the annulment of
contract of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages.

The petitioners, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground
that the complaint did not state a cause of action.

The respondent RTC Judge denied petitioners' motion to dismiss.

Then the petitioners filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that the
certification against forum shopping attached to the complaint was not
executed by the principal parties (plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the complaint fatally defective and thus
dismissible.

The respondent RTC Judge issued an order denying the second motion to
dismiss and thereafter denied the petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA via a petition for certiorari
contending that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it was
fatally defective.

They pointed out that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia
Ochoa but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the attorney-in-
fact of Cesar Ochoa only.

They invited the attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers delegated to
Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in court.

Thus, according to the petitioners, the denial by the RTC of their motion to dismiss
was capricious, whimsical and arbitrary, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and should be struck down as null and void.

172 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The CA denied the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defects of the complaint pointed out by the petitioners
were deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to
dismiss

RULING:

Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a motion attacking a
pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it
attacks a pleading, that is, the complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other
omnibus motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of
the motion because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived."

As inferred from the provision, only the following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are
excepted from its application:

[a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;

[b] there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause (litis
pendentia);
[c] the action is barred by prior judgment (res judicata); and
[d] the action is barred by the statute of limitations or prescription. In the case at
bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective verification and certification of
forum shopping only when they filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact
that this ground was existent and available to them at the time of the filing of their
first motion to dismiss.

Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the ground of defective
verification and certification of forum shopping was deemed waived and could no
longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to dismiss.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the requirement regarding verification of a

pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the
form of the pleading, and non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective.

Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the

pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.

In fact, the court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or
act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may thereby be served.

173 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Similarly, the rule requiring the submission of such certification of non-forum
shopping, although obligatory, is not jurisdictional.

The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not
be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.

As to whether the trial court should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio, the Court
rules in the negative. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is clear that failure to comply
with the requirements on the rule against forum shopping shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case "upon motion and after hearing."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

174 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 17
Dismissal of Actions

ALEX RAUL B. BLAY, petitioner, v. CYNTHIA B. BAÑA, respondent

GR 232189 7 March 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

―Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims
in the event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiff‘s instance, viz.:
Section 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff.—

Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff‘s instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and conditions as
the court deems proper.

If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the
plaintiff‘s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, seeking
that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on account of his psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Subsequently, respondent filed her
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated December 5, 2014.

However, petitioner later lost interest over the case, and thus, filed a Motion to Withdraw his
petition. In her comment/opposition thereto, respondent invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the
Rules of Court, and prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court's
independent adjudication. In turn, petitioner filed his reply, averring that respondent's
counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in the same action due to her failure to file a
manifestation therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Motion to Withdraw
which was, according to him, required by the Rules.

The RTC granted petitioner‘s Motion to Withdraw petition. Further, it declared respondent's
counterclaim "as remaining for independent adjudication" and as such, gave petitioner
fifteen (15) days to file his answer thereto. Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied.

Thus, he elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari. But the CA dismissed the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent‘s counterclaim may be maintained

RULING:

175 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
No. Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure relative to
counterclaims in the event that a complaint is dismissed by the court at the plaintiff‘s
instance.

As per the second sentence of the provision, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by the
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for the dismissal - as in this
case - the rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Commentaries on the
subject elucidate that "[i]nstead of an ‗action‘ shall not be dismissed, the present rule uses the
term ‗complaint‘. A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the
complaint. For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the
defendant inspite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same acton."

However, as stated in the third sentence of Section 2, Rule 17, if the defendant desires to
prosecute his counterclaim in the same action, he is required to file a manifestation within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim may be prosecuted
in a separate action. As explained by renowned remedial law expert, former Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in his treatise on the matter:

Under this revised section, where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of the
complaint to which a counterclaim has been interpose, the dismissal shall be limited
to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action or to have the
same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the first alternative, the court
should render the corresponding order granting and reserving his right to prosecute
his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his counterclaim
disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed, he must
manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's motion to dismiss. x xx

In this case, the CA confined the application of Section 2, Rule 17 to that portion of its
second sentence which states that the "dismissal shall be limited to the complaint."
Evidently, the CA ignored the same provision's third sentence, which provides for the
alternatives available to the defendant who interposes a counterclaim prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal. As may be clearly inferred therefrom,
should the defendant desire to prosecute his counterclaim, he is required to manifest his
preference therefor within fifteen (15) days from notice of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss.
Failing in which, the counterclaim may be prosecuted only in a separate action.

The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day
period triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the
conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the
same action. Thus, in order to obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file the
required manifestation within the aforesaid period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be
prosecuted only in a separate action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 23, 2017 and
the Resolution dated June 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 146138 are

176 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is ENTERED solely granting
petitioner Alex Raul B. Blay‘s Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in Civil Case No. R-PSY-14-17714-CV. The aforesaid dismissal is, among others,
without prejudice to the prosecution of respondent Cynthia B. Baña‘s counterclaim in a
separate action.
SO ORDERED.

177 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
LIM TECK CHUAN, petitioner v. SERAFIN UY (Uy) and LEOPOLDA CECILIO
(Leopolda), LIM SING CHAN @ HENRY LIM (Henry), respondents
GR 155701 11 March 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.

A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint.

For this reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant in
spite of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.

FACTS:

The subject land is a 33,610 square meter parcel of land located in Lapu Lapu City, Cebu,
owned by Antonio Lim Tanhu (Antonio), which is being claimed by the following:

1. Serafin, allegedly sold to him by Spouses Cabansag who allegedly acquired the same from
Antonio. As the Spouses Cabansag cannot process the documents being in abroad, they
sold the same to Serafin;
2. Leopolda, who allegedly acquired the same from an affidavit of self-adjudication which is
designated as ―Affidavit of Sole Adjudication/Settlement of the Estate of Antonio Lim
Tanhu with Deed of Sale‖ allegedly executed by Henry, the alleged sole heir of Antonio;
and
3. Lim Teck Chuan, as one of the six (6) legitimate descendants of Antonio.

Serafin sought the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title with the RTC, sitting as a
Cadastral Court, as the alleged title of the Cabansag‘s were said to be lost. The Cadastral
Court ordered the Registry of Deeds to issue such.

However, upon the opposition of Lim Teck Chuan, the Cadastral Court recalled its
order, alleging that the Original Certificate of Title has never been lost, as it is in his
possession.

On the other hand, Leopolda acquired her alleged title from Henry.

With such confusion, Serafin filed a Complaint for quieting of title, surrender of owner‘s
copy of certificate of title, declaration of nullity of affidavit of adjudication and sale,
annulment of tax declaration, and other reliefs with a prayer for preliminary injunction with
the RTC, impleading Lim Teck Chuan, Leopolda, and Henry as defendants.

Both Leopolda and Lim Teck Chuan filed their answers with counterclaim and cross
claim, alleging that the title of Sps. Cabansag were simulated and spurious.

On the other hand, Henry never appeared nor answered. Thus during pretrial, it was
agreed upon that Henry be declared as a fictitious person.

178 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Prior to the initial hearing, Leopolda and Serafin manifested that they are currently
negotiating for an amicable settlement.

Eventually, both Leopolda and Serafin filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss, that they had
reached an amicable settlement, and Serafin would case his title be cancelled an a
new one be issued in their common names.

On the other hand, Lim Teck Chuan filed an opposition thereto, claiming that there
is bad faith among both Leopolda and Serafin, and that he would like to prosecute
his counterclaim and cross claim in the same case.

The RTC dismissed the case, and likewise the counterclaim and cross claim of Lim
Teck Chuan. Thereupon, Lim Teck Chuan filed his MR, but was likewise denied

Lim Teck Chuan directly resorted to the Supreme Court (SC) by a petition for review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. To this, the respondents oppose on the ground that the
dismissal filed by a plaintiff, the same is a dismissal without prejudice and the proper
remedy would be to prosecute the case in a different action.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing the counterclaim and cross
claim

Whether or not Lim Teck Chuan erred in directly resorting to the SC

RULING:

1st Issue:
No, the RTC is incorrect in dismissing Lim Teck Chuan‘s counterclaim and cross claim.

As held in the case of Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago, a dismissal of action is different from a
dismissal of a complaint.

In case the complaint is dismissed, the counter claim or cross claim are not automatically
dismissed, considering that the defendant may opt to prosecute such in the same action.

Considering that it was Serafin, as the plaintiff in the RTC case, caused the dismissal of such,
and that Lim Teck Chuan manifested to the court that he wanted to prosecute the
counterclaim and cross claim in the same case, the latter should not have been dismissed.

2nd Issue:
No, Lim Teck Chuan did not err in directly resorting to the SC.

The SC may take cognizance of a petition under Rule 45 in cases that the question is solely a
question of law.

179 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In his petition, Lim Teck Chuan questions the propriety of the RTC‘s decision to dismiss his
counterclaim and cross claim.

As such, the petitioner properly invoked the SC‘s jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Orders dated April 25, 2002 and October 21, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu
City, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 4786-L are MODIFIED in that the counterclaim of Lim
Teck Chuanas defendant in Civil Case No. 4786-L is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to hear and decide Lim Teck Chuan‘s counterclaim with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

180 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RAMON CHING and PO WING PROPERTIES, INC., petitioners, v. JOSEPH CHENG,
JAIME CHENG, MERCEDES IGNE** and LUCINA SANTOS, respondents
GR 175507 8 October 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Leonen, J.

―Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the
plaintiff. Hence, the ―two-dismissal rule‖ under Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the instance of the defendant.‖

FACTS:

Antonio Ching owned several businesses among which was Po Wing Properties and his total
assets are alleged to have been worth P380 million. While Antonio is alleged to be
unmarried, he had children from two (2) women: his common law wife Lucina Santos to
whom Antonio has a child, Ramon Ching; and from his housemaid, Mercedes Igne, Joseph
Ching and Jaime Cheng which Ramon Ching disputes but both Mercedes and Lucina have
not.

In 1996, Lucina alleged that Antonio fell ill and that he entrusted her with the distribution of
his estate to his heirs and further alleged that she handed all property titles and business
documents to Ramon for safekeeping. When Antonio recovered, it was alleged that he
demanded Ramon to return all titles to the properties and business documents. However, in
July 1996, Antonio was murdered. Ramon allegedly induced Mercedes Igne and her children
Joseph and Jaime Cheng to sign an agreement and waiver to Antonio‘s estate in
consideration of P22.5 million, however the Cheng‘s allegedly did not receive any payment.

On October 1996, Ramon allegedly executed an affidavit of settlement of estate where he

named himself as the sole heir and adjudicating upon himself the entirety of Antonio‘s
estate. Ramon denied these allegations and insisted that when Antonio died, he was
summoned by the family association to execute an affidavit of settlement of estate declaring
him to be Antonio‘s sole heir. However, after a year of investigating Ramon was found to
be a primary suspect in the murder of Antonio thus an information was filed against him and
a warrant of arrest was issued.

On October 1998, the Chengs filed a complaint before the Branch 6 of the RTC of Manila
for declaration of nullity of titles against Ramon Ching. In 1999, the complaint was
amended, with leave of court, to implead additional defendants including Po Wing
Properties of which Ramon was a primary stockholder. The amended complaint was for
―Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and the Certificates
of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction.‖. Sometime after, Lucina filed a motion for intervention
and was allowed to intervene. After the responsive pleadings were filed, Po Wing filed an
MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter. The RTC granted the
MTD. No other pleadings was filed by the Chengs.

181 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In 2002, however, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint in Branch 20 of the RTC
of Manila for ―Annulment of Agreement, Waiver, Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate and
the Certificates of Title Issued by Virtue of Said Documents with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction‖ against Ramon and Po Wing
Properties. The case was later transferred to Branch 6 after Branch 20 was made aware of
the existence of the same case. On November 2002, the Chengs and Lucina Santos filed an
MTD in the second case praying it be dismissed without prejudice which was granted by
RTC Branch 6 on the basis that the summons had not yet been served on Ramon and Po
Wing Properties, the dismissal was made without prejudice.

On December 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties filed an MR on the dismissal
order arguing that the dismissal should have been with prejudice under the ―two-dismissal
rule‖ under Rule 17, Section1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in view of the previous
dismissal of the first case. During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, the
Chengs and Lucina Santos filed a complaint for ―Disinheritance and Declaration of Nullity
of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extrajudicial Agreement, Deed of Absolute Sale, and
Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction‖against Ramon Ching and Po Wing Properties (3rd case na tooooo anuba!!!!)
which was eventually raffled to Branch 6. On December 2002, Ramon Ching and Po Wing
filed their comment/opposition to the application for TRO in the 3rd case. They also filed
an MTD on the ground of res judicata, litis pendencia, forum shopping, and failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. A series of responsive pleadings were filed by both
parties.

On July 2004, Branch 6 issued an omnibus order resolving both the MR in the second case
and the MTD in the 3rd case. The trial court denied the MR and the MTD, holding that the
dismissal of the 2nd case was without prejudice and would not bar the filing of the 3rd case.
On October 2004, while the MR in the 3rd case was pending, Ramon Ching and Po Wing
filed a (first) petition for certiorari with the CA on the order of the RTC on Nov 2002 (yung
MTD without prejudice na grinant ng RTC) and the portion of the omnibus order (July
2004) which upheld the dismissal of the second case. On December 28, 2004, the trial court
issued an order denying the MR in the third case which prompted Ramon Ching and Po
Wing Properties to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or the issuance of a temporary restraining order (the second certiorari
case) with the CA.

The CA in March 2006 the first certiorari case saying that the petitioner‘s reliance on the
―two dismissal rule‖ was misplaced since the rule involves two motions for dismissals filed
by the plaintiff only. In this case, the CA found that the dismissal of the first case was upon
the motion of the defendants, while the dismissal of the 2nd case was at the instance of the
plaintiffs. MR in the CA was denied hence this petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing
of a third case, as per the two-dismissal rule

Whether respondents committed forum shopping when they filed the third
case while the MR of the second case was pending
182 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULING:

1st Issue:
No. RULE 17 DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS provides that:

SEC. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff.;

A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a notice of dismissal at any
time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon such
notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless
otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a
notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff
who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including
the same claim.

SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff.;

Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall not be dismissed at
the plaintiff‘s instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a
defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff‘s motion for dismissal, the
dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests his preference to
have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in
the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class
suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable cause, the

plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the
complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court‘s own motion, without prejudice to
the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate
action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise declared by the court.

The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal
of the case before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done
through notice by the plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without
prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.

The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been
pleaded by the defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff‘s motion to
dismiss. It requires leave of court, and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless
otherwise declared by the court.

183 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure
to prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu
propio. Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.

In all instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance of the plaintiff, not of the
defendant. Dismissals upon the instance of the defendant are generally governed by Rule 16,
which covers motions to dismiss.

As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it
is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a dismissal to
operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, the
following requisites must be present:

(1) There was a previous case that was dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the
defendant on the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former.

The purpose of the ―two-dismissal rule‖ is ―to avoid vexatious litigation.‖ When a
complaint is dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the
same claim.

Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults;
it does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since
there was already a dismissal prior to plaintiff‘s default, the trial court‘s instruction to file the
appropriate pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the plaintiff fails to file the appropriate
pleading, the trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the order dismissing the case still
stands. The dismissal of the first case was done at the instance of the defendant under Rule
16, Section 1(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Section 5 of the same rule,74 a party
may refile the same action or claim subject to certain exceptions. Thus, when respondents
filed the second case, they were merely re-filing the same claim that had been previously
dismissed on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. When they moved to dismiss the second case,
the motion to dismiss can be considered as the first dismissal at the plaintiff‘s instance.
Petitioners do not deny that the second dismissal was requested by respondents before the
service of any responsive pleadings. Accordingly, the dismissal at this instance is a matter of
right that is not subject to the trial court‘s discretion. For this reason, the trial court issued its
order dated November 22, 2002 dismissing the case, without prejudice.

When respondents filed the third case on substantially the same claim, there was already one
prior dismissal at the instance of the plaintiffs and one prior dismissal at the instance of the
defendants. While it is true that there were two previous dismissals on the same claim, it
does not necessarily follow that the re-filing of the claim was barred by Rule 17, Section 1 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The circumstances surrounding each dismissal must first be
examined to determine before the rule may apply, as in this case. In granting the dismissal
of the second case, the trial court specifically orders the dismissal to be without prejudice. It

184 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
is only when the trial court‘s order either is silent on the matter, or states otherwise, that the
dismissal will be considered an adjudication on the merits.

2nd Issue:
Yes. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court
would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a
favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. To
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important
factor to ask is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining
forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. When respondents filed the third case,
petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the second case was still pending.
Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final since it could still be overturned upon
reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court.

The second case, therefore, was still pending when the third case was filed. The prudent
thing that respondents could have done was to wait until the final disposition of the second
case before filing the third case. As it stands, the dismissal of the second case was without
prejudice to the re-filing of the same claim, in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In their haste to file the third case, however, they unfortunately transgressed certain
procedural safeguards, among which are the rules on litis pendentia and res judicata.

There is no question that there was an identity of parties, rights, and reliefs in the second and
third cases. While it may be true that the trial court already dismissed the second case when
the third case was filed, it failed to take into account that a motion for reconsideration was
filed in the second case and, thus, was still pending. Considering that the dismissal of the
second case was the subject of the first certiorari case and this present petition for review, it
can be reasonably concluded that the second case, to this day, remains pending. Hence,
when respondents filed the third case, they engaged in forum shopping. Any judgment by
this court on the propriety of the dismissal of the second case will inevitably affect the
disposition of the third case.

This, in fact, is the reason why there were two different petitions for certiorari before the
appellate court. The omnibus order dated July 30, 2004 denied two pending motions by
petitioners:

(1) the motion for reconsideration in the second case; and

(2) the motion to dismiss in the third case. Since petitioners are barred from filing a
second motion for reconsideration of the second case, the first certiorari case was filed
before the appellate court and is now the subject of this review.

The denial of petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration in the third case, however, could still
be the subject of a separate petition for certiorari. That petition would be based now on the
185 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
third case, and not on the second case. This multiplicity of suits is the very evil sought to be
avoided by the rule on forum shopping. The rule essentially penalizes the forum shopper by
dismissing all pending actions on the same claim filed in any court. Accordingly, the grant of
this petition would inevitably result in the summary dismissal of the third case. Any action,
therefore, which originates from the third case pending with any court would be barred by
res judicata.

The rule on forum shopping will not strictly apply when it can be shown that:

(1) the original case has been dismissed upon request of the plaintiff for valid
procedural reasons;
(2) the only pending matter is a motion for reconsideration; and
(3) there are valid procedural reasons that serve the goal of substantial justice for the
fresh new case to proceed.

The motion for reconsideration filed in the second case has since been dismissed and is now
the subject of a petition for certiorari. The third case filed apparently contains the better cause
of action for the plaintiffs and is now being prosecuted by a counsel they are more
comfortable with. Substantial justice will be better served if respondents do not fall victim to
the labyrinth in the procedures that their travails led them. Thus, petition is denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6 is
ordered to proceed with Civil Case No. 02-105251 with due and deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

186 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 19:
Intervention

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, v. MAXIMO D. SISON, respondent

GR 185954 16 February 2010
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Velasco, Jr., J.

Intervention; Requisites; To warrant intervention under Rule 19, two requisites must concur:
(1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim
of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding.

The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of
such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case—
it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.

FACTS:

The Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of
Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon.
Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the
Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous
transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the
Provincial Budget Officer.

The Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T. De Jesus, Jr., found basis to
proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded provincial officials of Samar. The
latter were then required to file their counter- affidavits and countervailing evidence against
the complaint.

In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in the letter-
complaint and claimed his innocence on the charges and asserted that his function is limited
to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the
corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds are available. He averred that he
never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet
of the bidding and that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached bore his
signature and that he was neither factually connected nor directly implicated in the
complaint.

The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local
officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from service.

187 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Aggrieved, Sison appealed to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43.

CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman against Sison.

Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached Motion for
Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA in its assailed resolution

Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene
and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA

RULING:

No. The appeal lacks merit.

Intervention Is Discretionary upon the Court

In its Decision, the CA did not allow the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene, because:

(1) the Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the
administrative case against petitioner;
(2) the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed after the CA... rendered its
Decision; and
(3) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the
impugned decision.

It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to

the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows the intention to
give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or... disallowing the intervention

―Section 1. Who may intervene;

A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor‘s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Section 2. Time to intervene;

The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties.‖ (Emphasis supplied.)‖

188 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the suit
but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect their
right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in... one action and by a single
judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons involved.

To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur:

(1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
(2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the parties, nor should the claim... of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must
involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment.

It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their
decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for such a doctrine is
the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the
issues without the judges' active participation.

Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

In this case, it cannot be denied that the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was belatedly
filed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA Resolution dated December 18, 2008
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96611 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

189 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, v. ERNESTO M. DE CHAVEZ,
ROLANDO L. LONTOC, SR., DR. PORFIRIO C. LIGAYA, ROLANDO L. LONTOC,
JR. AND GLORIA M. MENDOZA, respondents.
GR 172206 3 July 2013
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.:

The Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
directed against them.

Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability of public officers and
employees) is at stake. Hence, as a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the
right to seek redress on the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision.

FACTS:

The Batangas State University Board of Regents (BSU-BOR) BSU-BOR received an Order
from Deputy Ombudsman Victor Fernandez directing the former to enforce the
aforementioned Office of the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution.
Pursuant to said Order, the BSU-BOR issued Resolution No. 18, resolving to implement the
Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, herein respondents filed a petition for
injunction before the RTC of Batangas City that the BSU-BOR should be enjoined from
enforcing the Ombudsman's Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution because the same
are still on appeal and, therefore, are not yet final and executory.

The RTC ordered the dismissal of herein respondents' petition for injunction on the ground
of lack of cause of action. Respondents filed their notice of appeal and promptly filed a
Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction with the CA. The
CA issued a Resolution granting respondents' prayer for a temporary restraining order
enjoining the BSU-BOR from enforcing its Resolution No. 18, series of 2005.

Thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit
Attached Motion to Recall Temporary Restraining Order, with the Motion to Recall
Temporary Restraining Order.

CA denied the Motion for Intervention of the petitioner. It ruled that regular appeal
impugning the disposition of the trial court, the pivotal issue of which is only for the
appellants and the Board of Regents of BSU to settle and contest, and which may be
completely adjudicated upon without the active participation of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

Hence, this case.

190 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the legal personality to intervene in the
appealed case before the court of appeals

RULING:

YES. The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal
pending with the lower court. The wisdom of this course of action has been exhaustively
explained in Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego.6 In said case, the CA also issued a
Resolution denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion to intervene. In resolving the
issue of whether the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to intervene in the appeal
of its Decision, the Court expounded, thus:

x x x the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other

investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under
its jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations directed against them. Its function is critical because
public interest (in the accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake. x x
xx

The Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently alleged its legal interest in the subject matter of
litigation. Paragraph 2 of its motion for intervention and to admit the attached motion to
recall writ of preliminary injunction averred:

"2. As a competent disciplining body, the Ombudsman has the right to seek redress
on the apparently erroneous issuance by this Honorable Court of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction enjoining the implementation of the Ombudsman's Joint
Decision x x x."

In asserting that it was a "competent disciplining body," the Office of the Ombudsman
correctly summed up its legal interest in the matter in controversy. In support of its claim, it
invoked its role as a constitutionally mandated "protector of the people," a disciplinary
authority vested with quasi-judicial function to resolve administrative disciplinary cases
against public officials. To hold otherwise would have been tantamount to abdicating its
salutary functions as the guardian of public trust and accountability.

Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in the inquiry into
whether respondent committed acts constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable
under the Uniform Rules in Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with
its duty to act as a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that
petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its authority.

It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to
intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court after a consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. However, such discretion is not without limitations. One of the limits in the
exercise of such discretion is that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the
Constitution. The CA should have considered the nature of the Ombudsman's powers as
provided in the Constitution and RA 6770.
191 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
xxx
Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose
decision was in question. This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of
the power, duties and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the
Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when defending its
decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government personnel, the offense is
committed against the government and public interest. What further proof of a direct
constitutional and legal interest in the accountability of public officers is necessary?7

Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and Supplemental
Resolution is in danger of being impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear legal
interest in defending its right to have its judgment carried out. The CA patently erred in
denying the Office of the Ombudsman's motion for intervention.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals,

dated April 7, 2006, is SET ASIDE. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas
City, Branch 4, dated September 26, 2005 in Civil Case No. 7775, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

192 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS NERI,
petitioners, v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by
BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator, respondent
GR 178221 1 December 2010
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Perez, J.

―Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an
action or proceeding, to intervene therein

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel‘s
prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the
estate of Rodolfo.

Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement proceedings
cannot be justified.‖

FACTS:

Rodolfo Jalandoni died. His brother filed at the RTC a petition for issuance of Letters of
Administration for the property of Rodolfo. The petitioners intervened and said that their
mother, Sylvia, was the daughter of Isabel and John.

Isabel who, at the time of Rodolfo's death, was actually legally married to the deceased and is
therefore entitled to a share in the latter's property. The proof of which is based on a
marriage certificate between Isabel and Rodolfo. Both Sylvia and Isabel are dead at the time
of the manifestation.

The petitioners pray that they may be allowed to intervene on behalf of Isabel, Rodolfo's
brother opposed their intervention because the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel
and John were married.

Therefore, Isabel's marriage to Rodolfo was null and void. Petitioners argue however, that
such statement in the birth certificate was not enough evidence to prove a valid marriage
between Isabel and John Further, it was only done to save face and is customary.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner have legal standing to intervene on the proceedings

RULING:

No. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is
not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person‘s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.

193 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the competent evidence
of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As mentioned earlier, it contains the
following notable entries:

(a) that Isabel and John Desantis were "married" and

(b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child. In clear and categorical language, Sylvia‘s
birth certificate speaks of a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.

Pursuant to existing laws, the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie weight. They are
presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, they can, and
will, stand as proof of the facts attested. In the case at bench, the petitioners and their
siblings offered no such rebuttal.

The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvia‘s birth certificate as
untruthful statements made only in order to "save face." They urge this Court to take note of
a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and
make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.

The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other evidence, do
not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot, as the petitioners would
like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed folkway and conclude therefrom that
the usage was in fact followed. It certainly is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue
that the document on which they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful
statements in its vital entries.

Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings themselves which,
properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was, indeed, previously married to
John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of any proof that such marriage had been
dissolved by the time Isabel was married to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the
latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.

The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove that Isabel‘s
prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she has interest in the estate
of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners and their siblings in the settlement
proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated 31 May
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.

194 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
DEOGENES O. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
PHILIPPINE CHINESE CHARITABLE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondents
GR 184589 13 June 2013
Certiorari
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the
Court allowed exceptions in several cases, viz.: This rule, however, is not inflexible.
Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when
demanded by the higher interest of justice.

Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,
when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decision before
the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and
executory.

FACTS:

Purita Landicho filed before the CFI of Rizal an Application for Registration of a piece of
land located in San Mateo, Rizal. The CFI rendered a Decision evaluating the evidence
presented by the parties as follows:

It has been established that the parcel of land under consideration was formerly
several smaller parcels owned and possessed by the several people, all of whom in
January 1960, executed instruments of conditional sale of their respective parcels of
land in favor of [Landicho], x x x, and on July 20, 1965 all of them executed jointly a
final deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded the conditional sale. The applicant
is entitled to the benefits provided by Section 48, of C.A. No. 141, as amended.

CFI- confirmed the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho to the parcel of land under
consideration and orders the registration thereof in her name and personal circumstances
aforementioned. The opposition of the Director of Lands was dismissed.

Upon finality, a TCT was issued instead of an OCT. After several sales, respondent
Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), under TCT No. 482970, became
owner on July 15, 1975.

Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. (ADRDI) instituted Civil Case entitled A.
Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. CA, which was still pending before the RTC of Pasig City
as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over the subject property. While still pending in
court, ADRDI subsequently transferred the subject property to Amado Araneta (Araneta) to
whom TCT No. 70589 was issued.

195 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
On November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject
property in favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years later,
on June 1, 1998, Landicho died.

On May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus Motion alleging therein that the Decision
dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 which confirmed Landicho‘s title over the subject property has not been
executed alleging that no OCT had been ever issued by the ROD in Landicho‘s name. As
Landicho‘s successor-in-interest to the subject property, Rodriguez prayed that the Register
of Deeds for Marikina City issue OCT in his name.

Concerning the aforementioned Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No.
482970 of PCCAI but alleged that said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued
on November 3, 2006 a subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land
Reg. Case No. N-5098 and to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. SM-02-
0229; and to testify in connection therewith.

On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified Motion for Leave to
Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its intervention by arguing that it
was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial legal interest therein as the
registered owner of the subject property under TCT No. 482970. PCCAI likewise pointed
out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT No. 482970, only alleging that said
certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his
Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970 remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct
action or final court decree for its cancellation. Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion constituted a
collateral attack on the title of PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence.
Consequently, PCCAI asked the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N-
5098 so it could protect its vested rights and interests over the subject property; to note and
admit its Answer-in-Intervention; and to deny Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion for utter lack of
merit.

The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion in an Order dated April 10,
2007.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by PCCAI is proper even though
it was filed after rendition of judgment by the trial court.

RULING:

YES, intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, pertinent provisions of

which read:

Section 1. Who may intervene;

A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an
officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
196 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
intervenor‘s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

Section 2. Time to intervene;

The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties.

Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the
Court allowed exceptions in several cases, viz:

This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond
the period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not
been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the
trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted
for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has
already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention
filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave
injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the
parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.

We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to
make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.

The particular circumstances of this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of
procedure on intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject
property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in Land Reg. Case No.
N-5098 became final and executory. Second, as previously discussed herein, both PCCAI
and Rodriguez trace their titles back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could
not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho who prayed for the
execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to intervene in the
case only to oppose Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion on the ground that the subject property
is already registered in its name under TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landicho‘s
TCT No. 167681. And fourth, after learning of Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg.
Case No. N-5098 via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC, PCCAI was
reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was the most opportune and expedient
remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of
registration and OCT in Rodriguez‘s name.

For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the intervention of PCCAI.

197 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision dated May 26, 2008
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101789, reversing and setting aside the Orders
dated April 10, 2007 and November 22, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 75 of San
Mateo, Rizal in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
deleting the second sentence of the dispositive portion for being a superfluity.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

198 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A. HENSON and ANGEL S. ONG,
complainants, v. COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON M. BATO, JR.,
ISAIAS P. DICDICAN and EDUARDO B. PERALTA, JR., respondents
AM OCA IPI 12-201-CA-J 19 February 2013
Administrative Matter
Reyes, J.

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action.

Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary
writ, such as a preliminary injunction.

Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.

FACTS:

Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez, and Antonio Henson were elected to the board of
directors of NADECOR. In a regular stockholder's meeting where two groups were vying
for control over the company, Calalang, De Jesus, Romulo, Ayala, Lazatin. Femandez,
Nitorreda, Engle were Elected. Gatmaitan was also elected as Corporate Secretary.

Thereafter, Ricafort/s, claiming to be stockholders of record, sought to annul the said

meeting held. They filed a complaint before the RTC of PASIG Ricaforts alleged that they
were not given due notice of the said meeting thus they were not present and were not able
to exercise their right RTC agreed with the Ricaforts

Four separate Petitions for Certiorari were filed by the members of the board with the CA, all
with application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction. The CA denied such applications,
but on the same day nevertheless, the 11th division issued a TRO.

During the effectivity of the TRO the old Board of Directors assumed the functions of the
new one in order to prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the corporation All the CA
petitions were consolidated as well as the other cases.

On February 17, 2012 the respondents Ricafort filed their Comment Ad Cautelam to the
petition in CA-G.R. No. 122784, the petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3) Urgent
motions to resolve their application for writ of preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May
22 and again on June 6, 2012.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted by the CA 14th Division, which not for long
was questioned. Complainants filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition seeking to annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA's Special

199 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
14th Division Complainants also filed an Administrative case against the Justices of the 14th
Division of the CA.

Alleged in this administrative complaint that the respondent Justices are guilty of grave
misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law. gross
incompetence, and manifest partiality.

ISSUE: Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to assail the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CA 14th division

RULING:

No. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of
court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the
main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed, he
cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.

Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the
petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the
injurious writ. Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain
an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated
differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the
lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.

The complainants, who at various times served as elected members of the Board of
NADECOR, did not bother to intervene in the CA petitions, hence, they are not entitled to
the service of pleadings and motions therein. Complainant Fernandez was himself a
defendant in SEC Case No. 11-164 in the RTC, but he chose not to join any of the four CA
petitions.

In this Court‘s Resolution dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. No. 202218- 21, entitled "Jose G.
Ricafort, et al. v. Court of Appeals [Special 14th Division], et al.," involving a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by JG Ricafort, De Jesus, Paolo A. Villar, and Ma. Nalen
Rosero-Galang, also questioning the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Special 14th Division of the CA, we ruled that persons who are not parties to any of the
consolidated petitions have no personality to assail the said injunctive writ.

In another Resolution, also promulgated on July 18, 2012, in G.R. No. 202257-60, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein complainants to assail the validity of the writ of
preliminary injunction in the aforesaid consolidated CA petitions, we likewise dismissed the
petition due to lack of personality of the petitioners, since they were non-parties and
strangers to the consolidated CA petitions. We pointed out that they should first have
intervened below, and then filed a motion for reconsideration from the questioned CA
200 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
order. On September 19, 2012, we denied their motion for reconsideration from the
dismissal of their petition.

Having established that the herein complainants have no personality to assail the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the CA‘s former Special 14th Division, we cannot now
permit them to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the
issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be held
administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The settled rule
is that "a Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or administratively for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J is hereby

DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

201 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner, v. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, THE EX-
OFICIO SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MUNTINLUPA CITY and
BERNADINE D. VILLARIN, respondents
GR 153828 24 October 2003
Certiorari
Corona, J.

―Consequently, petitioner‘s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis.
Nothing in the said provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in
petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that:

(a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified,
and
(b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor‘s rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not.

Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second. x x x

As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25,
2002, way beyond the period set forth in the rules.

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner before the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation, PR Builders, Inc.
and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin, private respondent‘s/ Bernadine
Villarin‘s husband.

September 17 1999, the HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between
petitioner and PR Builders. Refund was ordered, amounting to 2,116,103.31, and damages as
well, amounting to 250,000. HLURB issued a writ of execution. Pursuant to that, the deputy
sheriff levied on a parcel of land in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna, registered in the names of
spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine Villarin. The property was
scheduled for public auction on March 20, 2002.

March 19, 2002, private respondent filed before the RTC of Paraaque City, a petition for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public
auction. Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the
execution sale; that the property regime between private respondent and her
husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in the
HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the
separate liability of her husband.

202 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Public respondent Judge Norma C. Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order
and set the case for raffle and conference on March 22, 2002. The case was eventually raffled
to RTC, Branch 276, presided by public respondent judge. A conference was then
conducted, after which public respondent judge issued the assailed resolution of March 22,
2002 granting private respondents petition for prohibition and declaring the subject property
exempt from execution. Hence, the scheduled auction sale did not materialize.

April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the
resolution of March 22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However,
public respondent judge denied the motion in her assailed order of May 10, 2002. The
order stated that the case has been long decided and that the intervention was too
late.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion to public respondent judge in: (a) declaring the subject property exempt from
execution and therefore could not be sold to satisfy the obligation of private respondent‘s
husband, and (b) denying petitioners motion for intervention on the ground that the same
was filed late.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not respondent judge erred in denying the motion for intervention

RULING:

To answer the first issue raised wherein petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it
is essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be
prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. The claim that he had the right
to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the codal provision requires the inclusion of a
private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow
intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to whether the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the
intervenors rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements must
concur as the first is not more important than the second.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor was adversely
affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal that there are
other pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants in the HLURB case that can
be levied upon.

UNDER THE CURRENT TOPIC IN THE SYLLABUS: As provided in the Rules of

Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set
forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private respondents petition for prohibition
and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6, 2002,
after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory.

203 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the trial
courts resolution is sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition.
Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed
before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

204 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ALBERTO G. PINLAC petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS respondents. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor. WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.
GR 91486. 10 September 2003
Petition-In-Intervention
Ynares-Santiago, J.

Intervention aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding

technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereon; Intervention is allowed even when the
petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the
Supreme Court, or even after the decision became final and executory.

The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of
the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive
adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.

FACTS:

The controversy stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title filed by petitioners over 3
vast parcels of land

The trial court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners and against the defendants
who were declared in default

The defaulted title owners of Vilma filed with the CA a Petition to Annul the Partial
Decision of the trial court, which was granted.

The appellate court ruled that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondents because of defective service of summons by publication.

Petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied; hence, they filed this
petition for certiorari. The SC affirmed the Judgment of the CA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and alleged that the CA should not have
annulled the disposition of the trial court with respect to Lot No. 3, because the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by the respondents concerned only Lot No. 2.

The SC issued a Resolution partially granting petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration by

reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dispositive portion of the trial court‘s Partial Decision
pertaining to Lot No. 3.

Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), thru the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-
Intervention

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic should be allowed to intervene

205 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULING:

Yes. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the
powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the
filing thereof. In exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the
rendition of judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even when
the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already submitted for decision in the
Supreme Court

The SC cited Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals where the motions for intervention were
filed when the case had already reached this Court, it was declared:

It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at
this stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on
appeal x x x the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition
for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted for decision by the
Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed
under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 19, Section 2 of the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure].

But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule
of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court
fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice.
Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that thing.
In other words, it is a means to an end.

The intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as

government properties located and projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional
mandate that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law can certainly be invoked by the Republic which is an indispensable party to the case at
bar. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a
protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the
Republic to protect its properties

After a thorough re-examination of the case, we find Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and
5 of the trial court‘s Partial Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3, overlooked certain aspects
which, if not corrected, will cause extreme and irreparable confusion and prejudice.

4) Declaring the area of [OCT] No. 333 in excess of its true and actual area of 4,574 Sq.
Meters, as well as the TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
covering the area in excess of said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-
defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio;

206 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
5) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs subsequently issued
based on OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception
of those titles belonging to the nondefaulted respondents;

We note that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which portions are in excess of the 4,574
square meter area of OCT No. 333 and which areas belong to the defaulted and non-
defaulted respondents. Neither did the body of the trial court‘s decision state the metes and
bounds that would serve as basis in implementing the dispositive portion thereof. Verily, this
flaw goes into the very identity of the disputed land. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null
and void for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that ―no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.‖

Hence, the November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial court‘s
Partial Decision should be modified.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Petition- In-Intervention of the Republic
of the Philippines is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution promulgated on
November 20, 2001 is MODIFIED as follows: The Decision dated March 21, 1988 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, in Civil Case No. Q-35762, is annulled
insofar as it concerns Lot No. 2, originally covered by OCT No. 614 and Lot No. 3
originally covered by OCT No. 333. The November 15, 1999 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 17596 is affirmed in all other respects.

As clarified above, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion of the decision of the court a quo
is void insofar as it declares petitioners as absolute owners in fee simple of Lot Nos. 2 and 3.

The Petition-in-Intervention filed by the World War II Veterans Legionaries of the

Philippines is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

207 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
NILO V. CHIPONGIAN, petitioner, v. VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GR 162692 26 August 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Bersamin, J.

―Intervention is ―a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the

proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right
or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.‖ If an intervention makes a third
party a litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should form part of the
main case.‖

FACTS:

Nilo Chipongian, petitioner, is the sister of Isabel Chipongian, the wife of the late Vicente
Benitez. Vicente died on November 13, 1989 while Isabel died on July 20, 1982. The couple
had no children. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and Nile had executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel whereby Nilo waived all his rights to
the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to Nilo, however, Vicente executed an
affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the
paraphernal properties of Isabel.

Upon the death of Vicente, respondent Victoria, sister of Vicente, and Feodor Aguilar,
nephew of Vicente, started proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente in the
RTC. The RTC later appointed Feodor as the administrator of Vicente‘s estate. Nilo
intervened in the special proceedings and sought the partial revocation of the order issued by
the court in order to exclude the paraphernal properties of Isabel from inclusion in the estate
of Vicente, citing the affidavit of Vicente in support of the partial revocation. Feodor
countered the intervention. On June 1994, Nilo specifically moved for the exclusion of the
paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicente‘s estate but withdrew the motion even before
the RTC could rule on it. Instead Nilo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit
Complaint in intervention, which the RTC granted and admitted the complaint in
intervention. Respondents opposed the complaint in intervention.

The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint in intervention and ordered the
costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner ruling that Nilo had actively participated in the
EJS of his sister‘s estate even agreeing to execute a quitclaim thereby waiving his rights to
the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. The court further emphasized that it took intervenor
12 years to assert the purported affidavit allegedly executed in his favor by Vicente. MR was
denied, thus a notice of appeal which was also denied by the RTC for being filed out of time.
The RTC later ordered that the notice of appeal was filed on time but still denied the MR on
this was also denied for non-payment of appellate court docket fees.

In 1999, Nilo instituted his petition for certiorari in the CA but was also denied affirming the
decision of the RTC; MR was also denied, hence, this petition.

208 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint in intervention was proper

RULING:

Yes. Intervention is ―a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right
or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.‖ If an intervention makes a third
party a litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in intervention should form part of the
main case. Accordingly, when the petitioner intervened in the special proceedings, once
admitted by the RTC, became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof
subject to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings including appeals under
Rule 109.

Rule 109 provides:

Appeals in Special Proceedings

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken;
An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment
rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the
distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the
estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of
the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or
guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or
guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of
the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the
substantial rights of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting
or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

In the present case, the dismissal of the petitioner‘s intervention constituted ―a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing‖, that is, his right in the
paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such it fell under paragraph (c) of Section 1,
supra, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as well
as under paragraph (e) of Section 1, supra, because it was a final determination in the trial
court of his intervention. Thus, with either or both paragraphs, the dismissal was the proper
subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely disposing of his
intervention.

209 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on October 30, 2002 subject to the foregoing clarification on the correct justification for the
dismissal of the appeal being upon the petitioner‘s failure to perfect his appeal in accordance
with Section 2(a) and Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and ORDERS the petitioner
to pay the costs of suit.‖

210 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 23:
Depositions pending Actions

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner v. MARIA CRISTINA SERGIO (Sergio) and

JULIUS LACANILAO (Lacanilao), respondent
GR 240053 9 October 2019
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Hernando, J.

"…the due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike
in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the
provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic
and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modem problem, and
their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the exigencies of an
undefined and expanding future.

The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward
this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer
to have the meaning of the due process clause 'gradually ascertained by the process of
inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise. x x x (Secretary
v. Lantion)

Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state how a
deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense by
final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness.‖

FACTS:

Mary Jane Veloso (Veloso), Sergio, and Lacanilao, were friends and neighbors in Talavera,
Nueva Ecija. By virtue of such friendship, Veloso trusted both Sergio and Lacanilao when
the latter offered a job in Malaysia.

Upon arrival in Malaysia, Sergio informed Veloso that the job is no longer available. To
―compensate‖ for the dismay, Sergio sent Veloso to a seven (7) day holiday in Indonesia,
with a promise that upon her return, a job will be waiting for her. For said trip, Sergio gave a
luggage to Veloso, which according to the latter was surprisingly heavy despite it being
empty. To this, Sergio just answered that it is new that‘s why it is heavy.

Upon arrival in Indonesia, police officers apprehended Veloso, for carrying 2.6 kilograms of
heroin inside of her luggage. She was eventually convicted with drug trafficking and
sentenced to execution originally on April 2015.

211 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
After knowing of such, family members confronted Sergio, and allegedly the latter stated not
to divulge the same to media and that she is part of an international drug syndicate who
would spend millions to get Veloso out of prison.

Meanwhile, the NBI arrested and charged Sergio and Lacanilao with qualified trafficking,
illegal recruitment, and estafa, to which the latter pleaded ―not guilty‖, filed in Branch 88 of
Regional Trial Court of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The PNP, DFA, PDEA, went to the
prison to interview Veloso and subsequently produced the ―Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Mary Jane
Fiesta Veloso‖, in which she narrated the events.

By virtue of the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty of
2004, President Joko Widodo granted an indefinite reprieve suspending the execution, by
virtue of Veloso being the sole witness of the prosecution against Sergio and Lacanilao. The
following conditions are imposed on the taking of Veloso‘s testimony:

1. Mary Jane shall remain in detention;

2. No cameras allowed;
3. No lawyers of the parties shall be present; and
4. Questions shall be in writing

Thereafter, due to such authority, the State filed a motion for leave of court to do such
deposition. They maintain that Rule 23 is suppletorily applicable in this case as it is not
prohibited by the Rules. On the other hand, Sergio and Lacanilao opposed the same as Rule
23 is inapplicable, rather Rule 119 must be applied. Furthermore, they assert that their right
to confront the witness will be impaired.

The RTC granted the State‘s motion, under the following conditions:

1. Accused, through counsel, is given ten (10) days to submit proposed questions on
the written interrogatories;
2. The court shall schedule the deposition, in the presence of the trial judge,
propounded by the Consul of the Philippines or his representative, answers to which
shall be in writing;
3. The written copy shall be given to the accused and counsel, which may opt to submit
cross interrogatory questions within ten (10) days;
4. The prosecution may the opt to object to the questions within ten (10) days;
5. In both cases, the judge will rule on the objections;
6. Unless the prosecution re-direct written interrogatories, the interrogatory shall be
terminated.

RTC denied Sergio and Lacanilao‘s MR, which prompted the latter to file a Petition for
Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA).

The CA reversed the RTC on the ground that it Rule 119 should be applicable, stating
that:

1. The State failed to establish compelling reasons to justify departure from Rule 119;
212 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
2. The circumstances amount to “limitation on mobility”;
3. Rule 23 applies only to civil cases; and
4. Allowing Rule 23 would violate the rights of the accused to confront his witness

ISSUE: Whether or not the remedy is correct

Whether or not the testimony may be acquired through written interrogatories,

considering that it is a criminal case

RULING:

1st Issue:
No, the remedy is incorrect. A petition for certiorari is limited and narrow in nature to the
extent that it can only assail jurisdictional issues or grave abuse of discretion.

It is to be noted that there are still other remedies available in the ordinary course of law (e.g.
appeal and petition for review under Rule 43)

In this case, what is being assailed is the decision of the trial court granting the written
interrogatories. It cannot be said that there is lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion, as the Court even highlighted the fact that the trial court made an effort to
explain the granting thereof, considering the extraordinary circumstances.

2nd Issue:
Yes, it may be acquired, as the Court repeatedly relaxed the rules in light of certain
circumstances

The pertinent provision anchored upon by the CA is as follows:

―Examination of witness for the prosecution;

When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm
to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending…‖
(Sec. 15, Rule 119)

The Court cannot agree that it is merely ―an immobility‖, and even went on to state that the
Rules did not comprehend any such situation as with is at bar.

This situation calls for a relaxation of the rules. Justice could be served only if both the
accused and the State were afforded protection of such, and if only one of them is given
protection, then there is no justice at all.

It likewise cannot be said that the accused will be deprived of their right to confront the
witness by reason of the written interrogatories, due to the following reasons and how they
are safeguarded:

213 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
1. Cross-examination; the judge allowed the submission of cross-interrogatories; and
2. Demeanor; the judge shall be present during the said interrogatory.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the instant petition. The December 13, 2017
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149002 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The August 16, 2016 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
that the deposition will be taken before our Consular Office and officials in Indonesia
pursuant to the Rules of Court and principles of jurisdiction.

The recommendation by the Office of the Solicitor General for this Court to promulgate a
set of rules for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar in transnational cases that may arise in
the future, where a prosecution's vital witness in a criminal proceeding is unavailable for
reasons other than those listed in Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
vis-a-vis the enforcement of the accused's constitutional right to confront witnesses face- to-
face is NOTED and REFERRED to this Court's Committee on Revision of the Rules for
its appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

The cases of Go v. People and Vda. De Manguera v. Risos, where strict adherence to
Rule 119 is ruled, is inapplicable to the case at bar:

In both cases, while both prosecution witnesses are sick or infirm to testify, they may
nevertheless voluntarily testify before the trial court.

On the other hand, Mary Jane cannot voluntarily do so, considering her
imprisonment.

Declaration of witness while in death row:

The SC has held in this case, that such testimony of a witness, may be considered as
a dying declaration

214 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner, v. HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD.,
respondents.
GR 108229 24 August 1993.
Petition for review on Certiorari
Narvasa, C.J.

―Depositions are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge
of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court.

Depositions are not generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court
of a party or witness.

A commission may be defined as ―an instrument issued by a court of justice, or other

competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by
authority of such court or tribunal.‖ Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined as
―an instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to another,
requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a cause pending
before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or court to whom
such letters are addressed.‖

FACTS:

American President Lines (APL) instituted an action against Dasma to recover the sum of
US $53,228.45 as well as an amount equivalent to twenty-five percent (25%) thereof as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses APL filed a motion during the hearing praying that it
intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and
prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the
consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei. Five (5)
days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has
no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an
office set up by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the
Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary — and it therefore prayed — "that
commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive
Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road,
Section 1, Taipei, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed
persons.

Dasma opposed the motion on the following grounds:

a) The motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek, that a foreign court examine a
person within its jurisdiction;"
b) Issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined
before the Philippine Court;" and
c) The Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken
orally in open court and not by deposition."

215 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Later on, ACP submitted the follwing to the RTC:

a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange
Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take
deposition upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being
"in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or
judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign Affairs;" and
xxx

RTC decision

The RTC ruled in favor of ACP and opined that "the Asian Exchange Center, Inc.
being the authorized Philippine representative in Taiwan, may take the testimonies of
plaintiff's witnesses residing there by deposition, but only upon written
interrogatories so as to give defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses by serving cross-examination."

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Asia Exchange Center, Inc. may properly be authorized to
take depositions

RULING:

Yes. Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in
some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery
(interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or inspection
of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are meant to enable
a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to him and his
witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter's own witnesses.
In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case to
learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof,
to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual
foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the
Court, without omission or suppression.

Depositions are principally made available by law to the parties as a means of informing
themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a
substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. The deponent
must as a rule be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing.
This is a requirement of the rules of evidence.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts therein set out during a trial or hearing, in
lieu of the actual oral testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed and
excluded on the ground that it is hearsay; the party against whom it is offered has no
216 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. It
matters not that that opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during the taking of
the deposition; for normally, the opportunity for cross-examination must be accorded a
party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the
trial or hearing.

However, depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness
stand by the proponent, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes. These
exceptional situations are governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. The
principle conceding admissibility to a deposition when the deponent is dead, out of the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to come to court to testify, is consistent with another rule
of evidence, found in Section 47, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding;

The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a
former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him.

It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may
be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his
deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24,
Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice
before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).

Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of
the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After
answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or
outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the
process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other
party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name
and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a
general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he
belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if
a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon
notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition taking, or impose conditions
therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with
no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16,
Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being
conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).

Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no
"secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
217 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.

A commission may be defined as "(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or other

competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by
authority of such court or tribunal". Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined
as "(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court to
another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a
cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge
or court to whom such letters are addressed". Section 12, Rule 24 just quoted states that
a commission is addressed to "officers . . . designated . . . either by name or descriptive title,"
while letters rogatory are addressed to some "appropriate judicial authority in the foreign
state." Noteworthy in this connection is the indication in the Rules that letters rogatory may
be applied for and issued only after a commission has been "returned unexecuted" XXX

In the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court has issued a commission to the "Asian Exchange
Center, Inc. thru Director Joaquin R. Roces" "to take the testimonies of . . . Kenneth H. Lee
and Yeong Fah Yeh, by deposition (upon written interrogatories) . . . ." It appears that said
Center may, "upon request and authority of the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign
Affairs, Republic of the Philippines" issue a "Certificate of Authentications" attesting to the
identity and authority of Notaries Public and other public officers of the Republic of China,
Taiwan (eg., the Section Chief, Department of Consular Affairs of the latter's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs) (Annex B of Annex N of the petition for review on certiorari) — a prima
facie showing not rebutted by petitioner.

What matters is that the deposition is taken before a Philippine official acting by
authority of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and in virtue of a
commission duly issued by the Philippine Court in which the action is pending, and
in accordance, moreover, with the provisions of the Philippine Rules of Court
pursuant to which opportunity for cross-examination of the deponent will be fully
accorded to the adverse party.

Dasma also contends that the "taking of deposition is a mode of pre-trial discovery to be
availed of before the action comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any
time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is
no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes
the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment
of a Regional Trial Court "to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further
proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and even during the process of
execution of a final and executory judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).

The Regional Trial Court saw fit to permit the taking of the depositions of the witnesses in
question only by written interrogatories, removing the proponent's option to take them by
oral examination, i.e., by going to Taipei and actually questioning the witnesses verbally with
the questions and answers and observations of the parties being recorded stenographically.
The imposition of such a limitation, and the determination of the cause thereof, are to be
218 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
sure within the Court's discretion. The ostensible reason given by the Trial Court for the
condition — that the deposition be taken "only upon written interrogatories" — is "so as to
give defendant (Dasma) the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses by serving cross-
interrogatories." The statement implies that opportunity to cross-examine will not be
accorded the defendant if the depositions were to be taken upon oral examination, which, of
course, is not true. For even if the depositions were to be taken on oral examination in
Taipei, the adverse party is still accorded full right to cross-examine the deponents by the
law, either by proceeding to Taipei and there conducting the cross-examination orally, or
opting to conduct said cross-examination merely by serving cross interrogatories.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for review on
certiorari. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

219 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB,
respondent
GR 132577 17 August 1999
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Ynares-Santiago, J.

―The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. The
deposition-taking can not be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion has to
be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.‖

FACTS:

Respondent Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for
Rape with Homicide entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, et al ."
presently pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, presided by
Judge Amelita G. Tolentino.

During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, respondent filed on May 2, 1997, a
Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the
testimonies of Steven Bucher, Deborah Farmer, Jaci Alston, Ami Smalley, John Pavlisin.

Before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Philippines in lieu of
presenting them as witnesses in court alleging that the said persons are all residents of the
United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to testify since the court had
no jurisdiction over them.

Respondent further alleged that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned
individuals whose testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his
innocence of the crime charged is sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 24.

In an Order dated June 11, 1997, the trial court denied the motion of respondent on the
ground that the same is not allowed by Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Court. Dissatisfied, respondent elevated his cause to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari.

In his Comment, private respondent Lauro Vizconde sought the dismissal of the petition
contending that:

1. The public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner [now herein respondent] Webb's motion to take testimony by oral
deposition dated 29 April 1997 as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration
dated 23 June 1997 for not being sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

a. The public respondent correctly held that Rule 23, Section 1 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure finds no application in criminal actions
such as the case at bar.

220 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

b. The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119, Section 4 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure only provides for conditional examination of
witnesses before trial but not during trial.

c. The public respondent correctly ruled that Rule 119 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure does not sanction the conditional examination of
witnesses for the accused/defense outside of Philippine jurisdiction.

2. The public respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner Webb's motion to take testimony by oral deposition considering that the
proposed deposition tends only to further establish the admissibility of documentary
exhibits already admitted in evide0-nce by the public respondent.

CA ruled against Hubert Webb stating ―In the final analysis, this Court rules that the denial
of the deposition -taking amount to the denial of the constitutional right to present his
evidence and for the production of evidence in his behalf. The denial is not justified by the
flimsy reason that Sec. 1 of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court is not applicable to the criminal
proceedings. To rule that petitioner cannot take the testimony of these witnesses by
deposition it to put [a] premium on technicality at the expense of the constitutional rights of
the accused,‖

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial judge gravely abused her discretion in denying the
motion to take testimony by oral depositions in the United States which
would be used in the criminal case before her

RULING:

No. The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
The deposition taking cannot be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons. Discretion
has to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.
There is no indication in this case that in denying the motion of respondent-accused, the trial
judge acted in a biased, arbitrary, capricious or oppressive manner.

Grave abuse of discretion ". . . implies such capricious, and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act all in contemplation of Law."

Whether or not the respondent-accused has been given ample opportunity to prove his
innocence and whether or not a further prolongation of proceedings would be dilatory is
addressed, in the first instance, to the sound discretion of the trial judge.

If there has been no grave abuse of discretion, only after conviction may this Court examine
such matters further. It is pointed out that the defense has already presented at least fifty-
seven (57) witnesses and four hundred sixty-four (464) documentary exhibits, many of them
221 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
of the exact nature as those to be produced or testified to by the proposed foreign
deponents.

Under the circumstances, we sustain the proposition that the trial judge commits no grave
abuse of discretion if she decide that the evidence on the matter sought to be proved in the
United States could not possibly add anything substantial to the defense evidence involved.
There is no showing or allegation that the American public officers and the bicycle store
owner can identify respondent Hubert Webb as the very person mentioned in the public and
private documents.

Neither is it shown in this petition that they know, of their own personal knowledge, a
person whom they can identify as the respondent-accused who was actually present in the
United States and not in the Philippines on the specified dates.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 6, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 45399 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City is
ordered to proceed posthaste in the trial of the main case and to render judgment therein
accordingly.
SO ORDERED.

222 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C.
CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19,
petitioners, v. RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY.
GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE, respondents
GR 152643 28 August 2008
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Nachura, J.

―It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil
procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says
that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases.

However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely
covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23
suppletorily or otherwise.‖

FACTS:

On November 4, 1999, respondents (Risos, et. al.) were charged with Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a
criminal information dated October 27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on
November 18, 1999.

The case arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed
by respondents where they made it appear that petitioner (Concepcion De Manguerra), the
owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to
the document. Concepcion who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila,
was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter‘s deposition due to her weak
physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.

The RTC of Cebu granted the motion and directed that Concepcions deposition be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. After several motions for change of venue of the
deposition-taking, Concepcion‘s deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her
residence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 23 of Rules of Court is applicable in the case of

Concepcion. Thus, her deposition in her residence is valid

RULING:

No. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus
required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is

223 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice.

As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same
manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 119 of the
present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any judge, or, if not
practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in the order,
or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an inferior court to be
designated therein, the examination of a witness for the prosecution under Section 15 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (December 1, 2000) may be done only before the court
where the case is pending.

This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.

It is thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where the case
is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner
of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
62551, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

224 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
JESUS P. DISINI, petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIP- PINES, as represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMIS-
SION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), respondents
GR 180564 22 June 2010
Certiorari
Abad, J.

There are two instances when the defendant can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule
23:

1. After the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject
of the action; and
[Link] an answer has been served.

Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant.

FACTS:

On July 23, 1987, the Republic through PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a civil
complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against
petitioner Herminio T. Disini (Disini), spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos and Rodolfo
B. Jacob. August 26, 1987, the Complaint was amended to include Rafael A. Sison as a party-
defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Disini acted in unlawful concert with his co-
defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth through the misappropriation of
public funds, plunder of the nation‘s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of
corruption.

SB issued summons based on the amended complaint. Marcos spouses was declared in
default, Sison and Jacob filed their respective answers, and Disini‘s remain unserved due to
the fact that the Roman family occupied the residence where the summons was to be served.
After the lapse of two years without any progress in the case, Jacob filed an Omnibus

Motion for the Sandiganbayan to either set the case for pre-trial or to dismiss the same with
respect to Jacob for failure to prosecute. He reasoned that, if summons could not be served
on his co-defendant Disini within a reasonable time, the prosecution should have moved to
exclude Disini from the complaint so that the case could be disposed of one way or another
instead of being left pending indefinitely. The Sandiganbayan denied Jacob‘s motion. It held
that the Republic had not lacked in efforts to ascertain Disini‘s whereabouts; hence, there is
no basis to rule that it failed to prosecute the case.

October 11, 1990, the Republic moved to drop Jacob as party-defendant considering that he
will testify as a witness for the Republic in its ill-gotten wealth cases both here and abroad.

225 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
August 4, 1994, the Sandiganbayan resolved to grant the dismissal of the complaint against
Jacob with prejudice and ordered him dropped as party-defendant.

March 14, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to Drop Rafael Sison as Party-Defendant after SB‘s warning regarding the absence
of the affidavit of Sison to which SB would assume that the government is not disposed to
prosecute this matter and will dismiss the case.

April 8, 1998, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Serve Summons by
Publication.29 It stated that resort to service by publication was needed because they could
not ascertain Disini‘s whereabouts despite diligent efforts to do so. While this motion was
awaiting resolution five months later, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for
Issuance of Alias Summons since it allegedly received information as to the whereabouts of
Disini. Receiving information that Disini was often seen at No. 35 Buchanan Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, the sheriff proceeded to the new address only to find
that it belonged to petitioner‘s cousin, Jesus Disini. Failing to serve summons personally on
Disini, the Republic filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion for Leave to Serve Summons
by Publication on October 3, 2001.

February 6, 2002, the Republic filed a Motion to Resolve (Ex Parte Motion for Leave to
Serve Summons by Publication).35 The same was granted36 and on April 23, 2002, the
summons and the Amended Complaint were published in People‘s Tonight, with a copy sent
by registered mail to Disini‘s last known address, No. 92 Kennedy Street, Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila.

By August 27, 2002, petitioner was declared in default for failure to file his responsive
pleading within 60 days from the publication of the summons.

December 7, 2006, petitioner Disini filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and for
Leave to File and Admit Attached Answer, together with an Answer to Amended
Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaims. He maintained that he was unaware of the
civil case pending against him because he never received summons or other processes from
the court, nor any pleadings from the parties of the case. His only fault, he averred, was that
he was ignorant of the proceedings in the case because of the absence of a proper notice.
Petitioner asked the respondent court to look at his meritorious defenses. He then invoked
the liberality of the courts in lifting default orders to give both parties every opportunity to
defend their cases, and pointed out that the proceedings, being in their pre-trial stage, would
not be delayed by petitioner‘s participation therein.

December 18, 2006, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny petitioner‘s Motion to Lift Default
Order.

December 19, 2006, Petitioner then filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
and an Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion. Aside from asking for reconsideration,
petitioner also prayed that the republic‘s ex parte presentation of evidence be held in
abeyance until the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.

226 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
December 20, 2006, The Republic‘s ex parte presentation of evidence held before the
Sandiganbayan Executive Clerk of Court began.

December 22, 2006, petitioner filed THIS Petition for Certiorari.

On January 2, 2007, he filed a Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition, protesting the continuation of the ex parte proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan as a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. He also filed
a Second Supplemental Petition on January 5, 2007

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE SB DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE INSTANT

PETITION FOR CERTIORATI AND PROHIBITION:

 On August 7, 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution67 denying petitioner‘s

Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

 The Republic presented 10 witnesses. It filed its Formal Offer of Evidence dated
October 17, 2008, which offer was admitted in the Resolution dated December 3, 2008.
On February 11, 2009, the Republic filed its Memorandum.

 On July 7, 2009, despite the pendency of his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
the Supreme Court, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Second Motion to Lift the
Order of Default dated August 27, 2002 – the very same Order which is now at the heart
of the present petition.

 On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Expunge or

Cross-Examine Plaintiff‘s Witnesses. On September 15, 2009, he also filed a Motion to
Expunge Evidence Presented Before the Clerk of Court.

 On September 23, 2009, petitioner filed with this Court a Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Memorandum, which was denied in a Resolution dated September 30,
2009.

 On October 15, 2009, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Expunge
Rolando Gapud‘s Deposition taken on October 18-20, 1995. On October 19, 2009, he
filed a Motion to Expunge or Cross-Examine Plaintiff‘s witnesses.

 On February 18, 2010, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a Supplement to the
Second Motion to Lift the Order of Default dated August 27, 2002 with Motion to Take
Judicial Notice.

 On March 4, 2010, he filed a Motion for Leave to Take Deposition.

ISSUE: Whether the validity of the summons was mooted by voluntary appearance by
means of seeking affirmative relief

227 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULING:

In his Petition, petitioner originally sought the nullification of the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan on the theory of lack of jurisdiction over his person, premised on the alleged
impropriety in the service of summons.

However, petitioner subsequently filed several motions with the Sandiganbayan which
sought various affirmative reliefs from that court, sans any qualification of the nature of its
appearance and without reserving or reiterating its previous objection on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the person. One of the motions sought is:

(f) Motion for Leave to Take Deposition based on Section 1 of Rule 23 (Depositions Pending
Action or De Benne Esse)

In regard to the last-mentioned Motion for Leave to Take Deposition (which is the last
pleading on record), it is important to note that there are two instances when the defendant
can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23:

1. After the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject
of the action; and
2. After an answer has been served.

Both instances presuppose that the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant. By seeking the relief contained in this provision, petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, petitioner may
be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of jurisdiction over his person by
seeking affirmative relief through the said provision.

While petitioner bewailed the mode of service of summons on him and questioned the
Sandiganbayan‘s jurisdiction over his person, he has rendered his own arguments moot by
his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived
when the defendant files a motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the
dismissal of the case.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and ANNULS Resolution 2007-031
dated July 19, 2007 of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and the
Resolution dated August 16, 2007 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0013, Republic
of the Philippines v. Herminio T. Disini, et al.
SO ORDERED.

228 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO and JANE GO, petitioners, v. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
respondents
GR 185527 18 July 2012.
Petition for review on Certiorari
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to
preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It
cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a
prosecution witness' absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the
accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the
Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses.

FACTS:

Petitioners were charged with Other Deceits under Art 318 of RPC before MeTC Manila
and pleaded not guilty. Trial dates were postponed due to the unavailability of private
complainant Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia.

The Prosecution filed a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he
was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia
and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by
reason of ill health.

The MTC granted the motion. ON certiorari, the RTC reversed the MTC. Holding that
Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply
suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect
to the taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily
intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against
him face to face.

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC holding that no grave abuse of discretion can be
imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li
Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in
criminal cases and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-
examine the complaining witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral

229 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
deposition either through counsel or through the consular officer who would be taking the
deposition of the witness.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of deposition of private complainant would be a

violation of petitioner‘s right to a public trial and to congront the witness face
to face

RULING:

Yes. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution

Witness is covered under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This
is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his
right to a public trial and to meet the witnessess against him face to face. The
requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts" as it enables
the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and deportment while testifying.
It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the conditional
examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional

examination of witnesses – both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution.
The Court's ruling in the case of Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos explicitly states that:

"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different
modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are
adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of discovery.
In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses."

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in
civil cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary
public or person authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines;
or before any Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except
reasonable notice in writing to the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would foreseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the
case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no

other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the
230 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MeTC's orders granting the motion to take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the
Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the
very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his
right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe
the prosecution witness' deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially
intolerable when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the
accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de Manguerra where we further
declared that –

While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in
order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for
the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony
during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness
outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.

The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of

the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February
19, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos, Cambodia is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

231 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 25:
Interrogatories to Parties

PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION (PHIC), petitioner, v. OUR

LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL (OLLH), respondent
GR 193158 11 November 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties any
facts or matter that are not privileged and are material and relevant to the subject of the
pending action. x x x

On the other hand, the provision on production and inspection of documents is to enable
not only the parties but also the court (in this case, the PHIC Arbitration Department) to
discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the case pending before it.

If the Arbiter deemed it necessary, based on the required pleadings already submitted, a
formal hearing may be conducted wherein witnesses who testify may be subjected to
clarificatory questions.

In such hearing, the Arbiter has the power to issue subpoena ad testificandum and duces
tecum; he may issue subpoenas requiring attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of documents and other material/s necessary.

In effect, these serve the same purposes of the modes of discovery.

FACTS:

PHIC, a government corporation, filed a complaint with their Legal Sector-Prosecution

Department against OLLH, an accredited hospital of PHIC, for multiple claims concerning
the same patient, with the same diagnoses, and within the same period.

Subsequently, summons were served upon OLLH, as ordered by Senior Arbiter De Leon
(Leon) of PHIC‘s Arbitration Department (AD). In the AD:

OLLH filed its verified answer;

De Leon ordered for both PHIC and OLHH to file their Position Papers;

PHIC filed its Position Paper, while OLLH did not:

Instead, OLLH moved to defer the submission of such, until the President
and CEO answer their written interrogatories, and until certain documents
(e.g. Transmittal Letter and three (3) Validation Report) be produced and
inspected;

232 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

According to OLLH, these modes are needed to be complied in

order to enable them to file properly their Position Paper;

OLLH alleged further, that the information needed cannot be

obtained as PHIC ordered its employees not to entertain their
answers and requests.

If the documents and interrogatories are produced and complied

with, respectively, it claims that it can properly plead to its defense
that it is a mere inadvertence that it attached a second copy, causing
the multiple claims

De Leon denied the motion, and held that:

As an administrative body, its proceedings are summary in nature,

and thus no delay may be had. Furthermore, as such, it has authority
to prescribe its own Rules

The written interrogatories are unnecessary, considering that the

same allegations were asked in OLLH‘s Verified Answer. Likewise,
the interrogatories would be futile, as it is directed against the
President of PHIC, who has no personal knowledge thereof.

Finally, the document requested to be produced, are immaterial to

prove OLLH‘s case.

Likewise, De Leon denied OLLH‘s MR.

However, upon a petition for Certiorari in the CA, the appellate court reversed the AD‘s
Order.

ISSUE: Whether or not De Leon gravely abused his discretion

RULING:

No, De Leon did not gravely abuse his discretion.

While it is true that modes of discovery are necessary to enable the party to respond
intelligently, it would not strictly apply to administrative agencies, the proceedings in which
are summary in nature.

De Leon correctly held that the President‘s answer to the interrogatories, and the document
sought to be produced, are irrelevant to PHIC‘s case.

233 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Furthermore, the Arbiter may issue a subpoena testificandum or duces tecum, during the hearing of
the case if he deems it necessary. These in effect, have the same effect of the modes of
discovery

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The July 27, 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 110444, which reversed the August
11, 2009 Resolution and September 4, 2009 Order of the Arbitration Department of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation that denied Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital‘s resort
to modes of discovery, is ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

On the unauthorized signature placed on the Certification Against Forum Shopping

attached to the Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC;
The Court held, that while initially the Petition had an unauthorized signature, it was
subsequently cured by the submission of a resolution authorizing such person to sign the
same

Cases cited by OLLH are filed with regular courts;

In comparison, modes of discovery in regular courts should be complied with, and its failure
to do so shall be liable under Rule 29.

No evidence presented on allegation of PHIC Employees‘ being ordered to not

communicate;
Likewise, the allegation was not supported by any evidence

234 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 31:
Consolidation or Severance

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
REGION III, petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ORIBELLO, JR. and THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF OLONGAPO CITY, respondents.
GR 199501 06 March 2013
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Carpio, J.

Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its docket are
to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties.

FACTS:

Valentin Fernandez originally occupied a parcel of land in Olongapo which was once
classified as forest land. Upon his death, his son, Odillon Fernandez continued to occupy
the property together with Ruperto and Matilde Apog. In 1969, Odillon sold the property to
Mrs Balcita who sold it to Oribello. In 1987, the property was declared open to disposition
under the Public Land Act thus Oribello filed another Miscellaneous Sales Application in
1987 but was only approved on March 1990. OCT was issued to Oribello.

Apog and Aliseo San Juan claimed to be the actual occupants of the property protested the
issuance of the sales patent and OCT in favor of Oribello on the ground of fraud. After
investigation, the DENR found substantial evidence as to the fraud and misrepresentation
warranting a reversion suit.

In 1992, the OSG representing RP instituted a complaint for reversion and cancellation in
the RTC, Olongapo and was consolidated with a complaint for recovery of possession filed
by Oribello against Apog and San Juan. However, in several occasions that the cases were
set for trial, the OSG failed to appear leading the court to declare the RP deemed to have
abandoned the case for the government. Thus, the trial of the consolidated cases continued
and the reception of evidence of the private parties proceeded. However, in feb 2005, the
trial court dismissed the consolidated cases without prejudice for non substitution of parties
due to the death of Oribello.

The RP moved for reconsideration and prayed that it be allowed to present its evidence,
which was allowed by the court. Aggrieved, Oribello‘s heirs filed a manifestation and
motion to bring to the court‘s attention the order declaring RP to have abandoned the case.
In the court‘s resolution in July 2006, the case was once again dismissed after finding merit
in Oribello‘s motion and manifestation. RP then appealed to the CA which denied the
appeal; MR likewise denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not interlocutory order are not subject of appeal;

235 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Whether or not the consolidated cases, without any order of severance, cannot
be subject of multiple appeals;
Whether there can be no private ownership over an unclassified public forest

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes. A final order is defined as ―one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce
by execution what has been determined by the court.‖

Conversely, an interlocutory order ―does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be decided upon‖ by the court. Its effects are merely provisional in character
and substantial proceedings have to be further conducted by the court in order to finally
resolve the issue or controversy.

2nd Issue:
No. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court provides:

―SECTION 1. Consolidation.―When actions involving a common question of law

or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated, and it
may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid
unnecessary costs or delay.

Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the court in deciding how cases in its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched
expeditiously and with economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote
this end, the rule allows the consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the
court‘s docket, or the consolidation of issues within those cases. The Court
explained, thus:

In the context of legal procedure, the term ―consolidation‖ is used in three different
senses:

(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in
which case the judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is
not actually consolidation but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)

(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity,
and become a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is
illustrated by a situation where several actions are pending between the same
parties stating claims which might have been set out originally in one
complaint. (actual consolidation)

236 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its
separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of
consolidation does not merge the suits into a single action or cause the
parties to one action to be parties to the other. (consolidation for trial)

In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by RP was consolidated with the
complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello. While these two cases involve
common questions of law and fact, each action retains its separate and distinct
character. The reversion suit settles whether the subject land will be reverted to the
State, while the recovery of possession case determines which private party has the
better right of possession over the subject property. These cases, involving different
issues and seeking different remedies, require the rendition and entry of separate
judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial of the cases. Notably, the
complaint for recovery of possession proceeded independently of the reversion case and was
disposed of accordingly by the trial court.

Since each action does not lose its distinct character, severance of one action from
the other is not necessary to appeal a judgment already rendered in one action. There
is no rule or law prohibiting the appeal of a judgment or part of a judgment in one case
which is consolidated with other cases. Further, severance is within the sound discretion of
the court for convenience or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the Rules of
Court that the court sever one case from the other cases before a party can appeal an
adverse ruling on such case.

3rd Issue:
ISSUE REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Fraud is a question of fact. Whether there was fraud and
misrepresentation in the issuance of the sales patent in favor of Oribello calls for a thorough
evaluation of the parties‘ evidence. Thus, this Court will have to remand the reversion case
to the trial court for further proceedings in order to resolve this issue and accordingly
dispose of the case based on the parties‘ evidence on record.

―WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition IN PART and SETS ASIDE the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The reversion case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court is ordered to resolve the
reversion case with utmost dispatch.

237 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SPOUSES JUVY MARAÑO and MARIA LUISA G. MARAÑO, petitioners, v. PRYCE
GASES, INCORPORATED, respondent
GR 196592 6 April 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Brion, J.

Consolidation is proper when two or more actions pending, not necessarily, before the same
court, involve a common question of law or fact.

FACTS:

August 1, 1998, spouses Juvy and Maria Marano filed a free patent application for a
9,074sqm parcel of land in Damulaan, Albuera, Leyte, denominated as Lot No. 4299. The
free patent application was subsequently granted. December 17, 1998, Original Certificate of
Title No. P-43553 was issued to the petitioners over the subject lot.

December 29, 1998, the petitioners filed an ejectment complaint against Pryce Gases,
Incorporated (respondent) alleging that the latter illegally entered the subject lot and
constructed a building thereon sometime in March 1998.

MTC of Albuera, Leyte granted the complaint, but RTC reversed the decision upon
appeal. The CA, on January 11, 2002, remanded the case to the MTC for trial as a
reivindicatory action.

 Prior the CA ruling, the respondent, on April 17, 1999, filed a protest on the free patent
application filed by the petitioners in August 1998. December 29, 2000, the DENR
rendered a decision recommending the filing of reversion proceedings against the
petitioners, which decision became final and executory. However, no reversion
proceedings were instituted against the petitioners.

October 28, 2002, the petitioners filed an action to quiet title against the respondent with the
RTC, 8th Judicial Region, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte. A month later, the respondent
filed a complaint for reconveyance against the petitioners before the same RTC. The
petitioners moved to dismiss the respondent's complaint, but the RTC denied their motion.

Respondent later moved to amend its complaint from reconveyance to the cancellation of
the petitioners' certificate of title. The petitioners again moved to dismiss the
respondent's amended complaint on the ground of litis pendentia in view of the then
pending reivindicatory action with the MTC. The RTC dismissed the petitioners‘ motion
on March 6, 2006. MR also denied. The petitioners questioned the RTC resolution in a
petition for certiorari with the CA.

In the reivindicatory action at the MTC, the latter court rendered a decision on June 18,
2010 ruling in the respondent's favor; it declared the respondent as the owner of the subject
lot and, thus, entitled to the possession thereof. The petitioners appealed the MTC's decision
to the RTC.

238 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners before the CA, the appellate court
rendered a decision dated December 14, 2010 affirming the RTC's resolution that dismissed
the petitioners' motion to dismiss. The CA held that no litis pendentia exists between the
reivindicatory action (then pending before the MTC) and the amended complaint for
cancellation of certificate of title filed by the respondent with the RTC. MR was filed before
the CA, but denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for cancellation of title of the respondent should
be dismissed on the ground that the question of validity of the certificate of
title issued in their names over the subject lot is being litigated in the
reivindicatory action case that is pending appeal before the RTC.

RULING:

Yes. The petitioners correctly point out that the MTC in the subject reivindicatory case
already conducted a full-blown trial on the issue of validity of their claim of ownership and
had, in fact, ruled that their certificate of title is inoperative and has no binding effect. They
argue that for the RTC to conduct another full-blown trial in the cancellation of title case on
the same issue would, in effect, nullify the MTC's decision in the reivindicatory case.

Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent's complaint for cancellation of certificate
of title, we find that the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the cancellation of
certificate of title case to be the appropriate remedy in the present situation. Consolidation
is proper when two or more actions pending, not necessarily, before the same court
involve a common question of law or fact. In such cases, the court may: order a joint
hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, order all the actions
consolidated, and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein for the purpose of
avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.

Considering that the validity of the petitioners' certificate of title is the crucial issue
in both the reivindicatory action pending appeal before the RTC and the cancellation
of certificate of title case filed by the respondent, these two cases should be
consolidated in order to avoid the possibility of rendering conflicting decisions and
for the orderly administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the

Decision dated December 14, 2010 and resolution dated March 18, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB S.P. No. 02025.

In the interest of orderly dispensation of justice, we order that the action for the cancellation
of the petitioners‘ certificate of title in Civil Case No. B-2002-11-32 be CONSOLIDATED
with the reivindicatory action in Civil Case No. 158.
SO ORDERED.

239 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, as successor-in-interest of ASIAN
BANK CORPORATION, petitioner, v. HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, HON.
FRANCISCO H. VILLARUZ, JR. and HON. RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA (in their
capacities as Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Second Division of
SANDIGANBAYAN) and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
GR 169677 18 February 2013
Ceretiorari
Bersamin, J.

A Colorado District Court found three factors to weigh in determining whether to order
separate trials for separate defendants. These are:

1) whether separate trials would further the convenience of the parties;

2) whether separate trials would promote judicial economy; and
3) whether separate whether separate trials would avoid substantial prejudice to the parties.

FACTS:

On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages in the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was obviously to recover
allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the
properties subject of the action were two parcels of commercial land located in Tandang
Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City, registered in the names of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr.
and Ludivina L. Genito.

On February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the complaint in order to
implead Asian Bank as an additional defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It
appears that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of land as the registered
owner. Asian Bank was also in possession of the properties by virtue of the writ of
possession issued by the RTC in Quezon City. When the Republic was about to terminate its
presentation of evidence against the original defendants, it moved to hold a separate trial
against Asian Bank.

Commenting on the motion, Asian Bank sought the deferment of any action on the motion
until it was first given the opportunity to test and assail the testimonial and documentary
evidence the Republic had already presented against the original defendants, and contended
that it would be deprived of its day in court if a separate trial were to be held against it
without having been sufficiently apprised about the evidence the Republic had adduced
before it was brought in as an additional defendant.

In its reply to Asian Bank‘s comment, the Republic maintained that a separate trial for Asian
Bank was proper because its cause of action against Asian Bank was entirely distinct and
independent from its cause of action against the original defendants; and that the issue with
respect to Asian Bank was whether Asian Bank had actual or constructive knowledge at the
time of the issuance of the TCTs for the properties in its name that such properties were the

240 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
subject of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0004, while the issue as to the original defendants
was whether they had "committed the acts complained of as constituting illegal or unlawful
accumulation of wealth which would, as a consequence, justify forfeiture of the said
properties or the satisfaction from said properties of the judgement that may be rendered in
favor of the Republic."

Asian Bank‘s rejoinder to the Republic‘s reply asserted that the issue concerning its supposed
actual or constructive knowledge of the properties being the subject of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 0004 was intimately related to the issue delving on the character of the properties
as the ill-gotten wealth of the original defendants; that it thus had of the original defendants;
that it thus had a right to confront the evidence presented by the Republic as to the
character of the properties; and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction to decide Asian
Bank‘s ownership of the properties because the Sandiganbayan, being a special court with
limited jurisdiction, could only determine the issue of issue of whether or not the not the
properties were illegally acquired by the original defendants.

SANDIGANBAYAN:

On June 25, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution granting the
Republic‘s motion for separate trial, giving its reasons that the comment filed by
defendant Asian Bank to plaintiff‘s request for a separate trial would readily reveal
that defendant is not actually opposing the conduct of a separate trial insofar as the
said bank is concerned. What it seeks is the opportunity to confront the witnesses
and whatever documentary exhibits that may have been earlier presented by plaintiff
in the case before the Court grants a separate trial. Asian Bank moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution, but the Sandiganbayan denied its motion through
the second assailed resolution issued on July 13, 2005.

Hence, Metrobank commenced this special civil action for certiorari as the successor-in-
interest of Asian Bank and transferee of the properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in

ruling that:

1. The Republic was entitled to a separate trial against Asian Bank;

2. Whether there was evidence that Asian Bank acquired the properties in
bad faith; and
3. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the issue of Asian Bank‘s
alleged bad faith in acquiring the properties.
RULING:

The petition for certiorari is partly meritorious.

The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the Republic‘s motion for
separate trial, but was correct in upholding its jurisdiction over the Republic‘s claim against
Asian Bank (Metrobank).

241 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
On the first and second issue, the separate trials are improper. The rule on separate trials in
civil actions is found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court , which reads:

―Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid

prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-
party complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.‖

The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to determine if a separate trial of
any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues should
be held, provided that the exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice to any party.

x x x A Colorado District Court found three factors to weigh in determining whether to

order separate trials for separate defendants. These are:

1) whether separate trials would further the convenience of the parties;

2) whether separate trials would promote judicial economy; and
3) whether separate whether separate trials would avoid substantial prejudice to the
parties.

Bearing in mind the foregoing principles and parameters defined by the relevant US case law,
the SC conclude that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse discretion in ordering a
separate trial as to Asian Bank (Metrobank) on the ground that the issue against Asian Bank
was distinct and separate from that against the original defendants. Thereby, the
Sandiganbayan veered away from the general rule of having all the issues in every he issues in
every case tried at one time, unreason case tried at one time, unreasonably shunting aside the
dictum in Corrigan, supra, that a "single trial will generally lessen the delay, expense, and
inconvenience to the parties and the courts."

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for
conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials
of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further
convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate
trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must apply.

As we see it, however, the justification the Sandiganbayan for allowing the separate trial did
not constitute a special or compelling reason like any of the exceptions. To begin with, the
issue relevant to Asian Bank was not complicated. In that context the separate trial would
not be in furtherance of convenience. And, secondly, the cause of action against Asian Bank
was necessarily connected with the cause of action against the original defendants original
defendants. Should the Sandiganbayan resolve the issue against Spouses Genito in a separate
trial on the basis of the evidence adduced against the original defendants, the properties
would be thereby adjudged as ill-gotten and liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic
without Metrobank being given the opportunity to rebut or explain its side. The outcome
would surely be prejudicial towards Metrobank.
242 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The representation by the Republic in its comment to the petition of the petition of
Metrobank, that the latter "merely seeks to be afforded the opportunity to confront the
witnesses and documentary exhibits," and that it will "still be granted said right during the
conduct of the separate trial, if proper grounds are presented therefor, unfairly dismisses the
objective possibility of leaving the opportunity to confront the witnesses and documentary
exhibits to be given to Metrobank in the separate trial as already too late.

The properties, though already registered in the name of Asian Bank, would be meanwhile
declared liable to forfeiture in favor of the Republic, causing Metrobank to suffer the
deprivation of its properties without due process of law. Only a joint trial with the original
defendants could afford afford to Metrobank the equal and efficient opportunity to confront
and to contest all the evidence bearing on its ownership of the properties.

Hence, the disadvantages that a separate trial separate trial would cause to Metrobank far
outweigh any good or benefit that the Republic would seemingly stand to gain from the
separation of trials.

We must safeguard Metrobank‘s right to be heard in the defense of its registered ownership
properties, for that is what our Constitution requires us to do. Hence, the grant by the
Sandiganbayan of the Republic‘s motion for separate trial, not being in furtherance of
convenience or would not avoid prejudice to a party, and being even contrary the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, was arbitrary, and, therefore, a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

On the Third Issue, Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the matter
involving Metrobank.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for certiorari.

Let the writ of certiorari issue:

(a) ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the Resolution dated June 25, 2004
and the Resolution dated July 13, 2005 issued by the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case
No. 0004 granting the motion for separate trial of the Republic of the Philippines as
to Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company; and

(b), DIRECTING the Sandiganbayan to hear Civil Case No. 0004 against
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the same trial conducted against the
original defendants in Civil Case No. 0004.

The Court DECLARES that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over the
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0004 as against Asian Bank Corporation/Metro
politan Bank and Trust Company. No pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

243 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 33:
Demurrer to Evidence

PAZ T. BERNARDO, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. OSCAR L. LEVISTE

and FLORLITA RONQUILLO- CONCEPCION, respondents.
GR 119010 5 September 1997
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Bellosillo, J.:

Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Chairman of the Committee, suggested that— x x x there
may be instances where it is very plain that the evidence is insufficient, but there are also
instances where the court is in doubt x x x it is the court that will now determine whether a
demurrer should be filed or not after getting the opinion of both sides x x x

(a) The court on its initiative can dismiss the case after giving prior notice to the
prosecution;
(b) The accused can file a demurrer only if he is granted prior leave of court;
(c) If the motion for leave or the demurrer is denied, the accused can present his evidence,
and there is no waiver; and
(d) If the accused files a demurrer without leave, his right to present evidence is waived.

―… under the new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer
to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of
court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied.

However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied,
he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the
accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.‖

FACTS:

Paz T. Bernardo was originally charged with four (4) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93- 46792-
95. Subsequently, private complainant, respondent Florlita Ronquillo-Concepcion, executed
an Affidavit of Desistance which led to the dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46794 and
Q-93-46795, thus leaving Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-93-46793 to be disposed of
by the trial court.

After the prosecution in the criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 rested its case, the
defense asked orally for leave of court to file a written demurrer to evidence on the ground
that the prosecution failed to elicit the fact that the checks were issued and where they were
dishonored.

244 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Trial court judge ruled to deny the demurrer, further stating - that if the defense would
insist to file a written demurrer, they waive their right to present evidence, otherwise it will
be dilatory; and if the defense will not present their evidence in that same day, their right to
present evidence is deemed waived.

The defense persisted on filing a motion for demurer of evidence, and the Court considered
it as a waiver of their right to present their evidence.

Petitioner assailed the Order of the respondent judge to the CA by way of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
on considering her to have waived here right to present evidence after the denial of her
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.

Petitioner submits that when her counsel moved for leave to file a demurrer to evidence on
this meant that she intended to make a written demurrer after extensive research and with
proper authorities to support the same; that when the trial court denied her motion, it was in
effect a denial only of the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence and not the
demurrer to evidence itself and, therefore, the order of respondent appellate court allowing
petitioner to present her evidence was premature. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to present evidence to

support its demurrer to evidence after her motion for leave to admit such
demurrer was denied

RULING:

NO. The new rule on demurrer to evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer to
evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of
court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied.
However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied,
he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the
accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.

In the case at bar, petitioner admits that in the hearing of 20 May 1994 the trial court denied
her motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner
has under Sec. 15, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court after having been denied leave to submit a
demurrer is to adduce evidence in her defense. However, even without express leave of the
trial court, nay, after her motion for leave was denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer
instead of presenting evidence in her defense.

Judicial action to grant prior leave to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial
court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior leave to file
demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his
demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the
245 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the
basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. And, unless there is grave abuse thereof
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial
court‘s denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be
disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the
accused to the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition to allow petitioner to file a demurrer to evidence is

DENIED. The ruling of respondent Court of Appeals directing the trial court to hear the
evidence of the accused is SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is
directed to decide the remaining Crim. Cases Nos. Q-93-46792 and Q-93-46793 on the basis
of the evidence already presented by the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.

246 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, petitioner, v. Spouses VICENTE and MA.
SUMILANG DEL ROSARIO, respondents
GR 138739 6 July 2000
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Panganiban, J.

―The rationale behind the rule and doctrine is simple and logical. The defendant is
permitted, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event that his motion is not
granted, to move for a dismissal (i.e., demur to the plaintiff‘s evidence) on the ground that
upon the facts as thus established and the applicable law, the plaintiff has shown no right to
relief.

If the trial court denies the dismissal motion, i.e., finds that plaintiff‘s evidence is sufficient
for an award of judgment in the absence of contrary evidence, the case still remains before
the trial court which should then proceed to hear and receive the defendant‘s evidence so
that all the facts and evidence of the contending parties may be properly placed before it for
adjudication as well as before the appellate courts, in case of appeal. Nothing is lost.

The doctrine is but in line with the established procedural precepts in the conduct of trials
that the trial court liberally receive all proffered evidence at the trial to enable it to render its
decision with all possibly relevant proofs in the record, thus assuring that the appellate
courts upon appeal have all the material before them necessary to make a correct judgment,
and avoiding the need of remanding the case for retrial or reception of improperly excluded
evidence, with the possibility thereafter of still another appeal, with all the concomitant
delays.

The rule, however, imposes the condition by the same token that if his demurrer is granted
by the trial court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant losses his
right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to
stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff‘s case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court
which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the
basis of plaintiff‘s evidence.‖

FACTS:

On March 2, 1991 the Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del Rosario jointly and severally
executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory
Note for P138,948 without need of notice or demand, in instalments of P11,579.00 payable
for 12 consecutive months leaving the period for the instalments blank. Upon default, the
late payment, 2.5% penalty charge per month shall be added to each unpaid installment from
due date thereof until fully paid.

On June 7, 1993, the Radiowealth filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and
collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence the Spouses‘ check payments, the
demand letter dated July 12, 1991, Spouses‘ customer‘s ledger card, another demand letter

247 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that he did not have personal
knowledge of the transaction or the execution of any of these pieces of documentary
evidence, which had merely been endorsed to him.

On July 29, 1994, the Spouses filed a Demurrer to Evidence for alleged lack of cause of
action

RTC:

The lower court dismissed for Radiowealth‘s failure to substantiate the claims, the
evidence it had presented being merely hearsay

CA:

It Reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings

o During the pretrial, through judicial admissions or the spouses admitted the
genuineness of the Promissory Note and demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Their
only defense was the absence of an agreement on when the installment payments
were to begin

ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses can still present evidence after the appellate
court‘s reversal of the dismissal on demurer of evidence

RULING:

No. As mentioned in Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—

After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move
for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right
to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion
is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.

Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff‘s evidence retain the right to present
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them,
but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal
order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence

The appellate court shall resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a
demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is MODIFIED in

that the remand is SET ASIDE and respondents are ordered TO PAY P138,948, plus 2.5
percent penalty charge per month beginning April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of
the amount due as attorney‘s fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

248 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ANTONIO CABADOR, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
GR 186001 2 October 2009
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Abad, J.

―This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 283 SCRA 229 (1997), that, to
determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the
Court must consider:

(1) the allegations in it made in good faith;

(2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and
(3) the primary objective of the party filing it. x x x

A demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case; Where the
accused filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution‘s formal offer,
before the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it
could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to
evidence.‖

FACTS:

On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the RTC
of Quezon City of murder. On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses over
five years of intermittent trial, the RTC required the prosecution to make a written or formal
offer of its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor
asked for three extensions of time. Still, the prosecution did not make the required written
offer.

On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a
turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his
right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could not
consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out
that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime
charged.

On August 31, 2006, the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador‘s motion to
dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave of court, the
RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. The trial court
deemed the case submitted for decision. Cabador questioned the RTCs actions before the
CA. The latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower courts actions. Petitioner seek the
help of Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cabadors motion to dismiss before the trial court
was in fact a demurrer to evidence.

RULING:

249 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Supreme Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. In criminal cases, a motion
to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused‘s right to speedy trial. This
denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the
accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.

It can be said that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out how trial in the case had
painfully dragged on for years. The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often
postponed because of the prosecutors absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said,
by the prosecutions repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its
failure to file it within such time. Cabador then invoked his right to speedy trial. But the
RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated
Cabadors motion as a demurrer to evidence.

The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer
and the prosecution was not yet deemed to have rested its case on that date. He did not state
what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what respects such
evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called demurrer did not
touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit.
Thus, the petitioner‘s motion to dismiss cannot be treated as a demurrer to evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the August 4, 2008 Decision and the October
28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100431 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 81 is NULLIFIED. The latter court is DIRECTED to resolve petitioner Antonio
Cabador‘s motion to dismiss based on the circumstances surrounding the trial in the case.

250 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MAMERTA LOPEZ CLAUDIO, EDUARDO L. CLAUDIO, ASUNCION CLAUDIO-
CONTEGINO, ANA CLAUDIO ISULAT, DOLORES CLAUDIO-MABINI, and
FERMIN L. CLAUDIO, petitioners, v. SPOUSES FEDERICO and NORMA SARAZA,
respondents
GR 213286 26 August 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence

and is filed after the plaintiff rests his case.

FACTS:

The case traces its roots to a case for annulment of sale, power of attorney and mortgage
with prayer for damages filed before the RTC on September 28, 2004 by petitioners
Mamerta Lopez Claudio (Mamerta) Eduardo L. Claudio, Asuncion Claudio-Contegino
(Asuncion), Ana Claudio-Isulat, Dolores Claudio-Mabini, and Fermin L. Claudio (Fermin)
against respondents Florentino Claudio (Florentino) and Spouses Federico and Norma
Saraza (Spouses Saraza).

The complaint alleged that Porfirio Claudio and his wife Mamerta, during their marriage,
acquired 10 parcels of land in Pasay City including a property which Florentino Claudio
made to appear to have been sold to him by his parents Porfirio and Mamerta for P500,000
thru a deed of absolute sale in October 2003; that the DAS was void because the signatures
of the vendors were forged and there was no consideration for the sale; that the signatures
of Fermin and Asuncion Claudio appearing in the same DAS was also forged; and that
subsequently, Florentino sought the registration of the same property under his name with
the RD of Pasay City.

It was also alleged that Florentino executed a deed of real estate mortgage over the subject
lot with SPA to sell the mortgaged property without judicial proceedings in favor of the sps
Saraza to secure the payment of a loan in the amount of P1M; that sps Saraza were
mortgagees in bad faith because they knew fully well that Florentino could not have acquired
the property because Porfirio had long been dead and Mamerta was in the US at the time of
the alleged sale, among others; and that it was only in 2004 that the original TCT was
cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of Florentino and that for the failure of
Florentino to redeem the property, it was consolidated in the name of sps Saraza.

Saraza moved for the dismissal of the complaint contending whether the Claudio‘s had the
legal right to proceed against them could be resolved even without trial; RTC denied MTD.
In their answer, sps Saraza interposed the defense that the lot now covered by the new title
used as collateral in the real estate mortgage contract, was valid and the mortgage was
enforceable. After the presentation of Claudio‘s evidence in chief, sps Saraza moved for
leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The
RTC granted the demurrer to evidence, complaint against the sps were demised. The

251 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Claudio‘s filed an MR but was denied. In the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in
toto, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in granting Sps Saraza‘s demurrer to evidence.

RULING:

NO. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of

evidence and is filed after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties
in an action to the effect that the evidence, which his adversary produced, is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. In the case at
bench, the petitioners‘ evidence, together with such inferences and conclusions as may be
reasonably drawn therefrom, amply supports the allegations in their complaint necessary to
their claim against Spouses Saraza. The evidence-in-chief of the petitioner clearly made out a
very strong case against them which would warrant recovery from them. All told, the Court
holds that the petitioners‘ evidence, standing alone and in the absence of controverting
evidence, would afford sufficient basis for a judgment in their favor and against Spouses
Saraza. Despite the fact that Spouses Saraza are deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence before the RTC pursuant to Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court, still this
disposition is without prejudice to the judgment on the merits to be handed down by the
RTC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 24, 2013 Decision and the July
1, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A. -G.R. CV No. 96051 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 04- 0661- CFM is ordered RE IN STATED as against
Spouses Federico and Norma Saraza. Let the case be REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, for further proceedings.

252 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
FREDERICK F. FELIPE, petitioners, v. MGM MOTOR TRADING CORPORATION,
doing business under the name and style NISSAN GALLERY-ORTIGAS, and AYALA
GENERAL INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
GR 191849 23 September 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Perez, J.

―A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence

and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case.‖

FACTS:

Petitioner Frederick Felipe claimed that he purchased on installment basis a Nissan Terrano
Wagon through MGM Motors' authorized representative Jane Sarmiento (Sarmiento).
Petitioner allegedly gave a P200,000.00 downpayment and P5,000.00 reservation fee to
Sarmiento.

He further issued seven (7) Allied Bank checks payable to MGM Motors. Consequently,
MGM Motors delivered the subject vehicle to petitioner. He then insured the vehicle with
Ayala Insurance under Policy and paid a premium. The subject vehicle, while parked along
Adriatico Street in Manila, was reportedly lost. He tried to claim from Ayala Insurance but
the latter refused to pay its liability causing damages to petitioner.

On the other hand, MGM Motors refused to produce, despite repeated demands, the
document of sale by installment covering the vehicle. Petitioner allegedly paid additional
P200,000.00 as partial payment for the vehicle. The refusal of MGM Motors to produce the
document and its renouncement of the existence of the installment sale; and the subsequent
unlawful insistence on a cash transaction agreement, had caused damages to petitioner.4 In
its Answer, MGM Motors denied receiving the down payment of P200,000.00 and P5,000.00
reservation fee paid through Sarmiento.

Ayala Insurance, for its part, contended that petitioner had no valid cause of action against it.
Ayala Insurance asserted that petitioner had no insurable interest because he is not the
owner of the vehicle that he had insured with it. Ayala Insurance also counterclaimed for...
damages.

The trial proceeded with petitioner and his father Alberto Felipe (Alberto) testifying on the
behalf of the former. Petitioner's testimony was however stricken off the record because he
failed to return, despite numerous opportunities, to the witness stand for cross-examination.

Only two pieces of evidence were admitted by the trial court: (1) the Official Receipt dated 7
May 1998 issued by MGM Motors wherein it acknowledged receipt of P200,000.00 from
petitioner; and (2) the testimony of his father Alberto that he was present when petitioner
paid P200,000.00 to MGM Motors.

253 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
MGM Motors and Ayala Insurance filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on demurrer to
evidence.

RTC:
Dismissed the case. The trial court reasoned that the evidence admitted by the trial
court do not prove the material allegations of petitioner's complaint, as well as the
alleged liability of Ayala Insurance.

CA:

Gave weight to the factual findings of the trial court and found no reason to reverse
its ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly granted the demurrer to evidence and
subsequently dismissed the complaint.

RULING:

Yes, the trial court is correct.

A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence

and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of the parties in an
action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of
law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.

Well-established is the rule that the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the
allegations. There is no dispute that the only pieces of evidence admitted in court are the
testimony of Alberto and the receipt showing MGM Motors receiving P200,000.00 from
petitioner as partial payment of the subject car. The allegation that the purchase of the
vehicle was on an installment basis was not supported by any evidence. The receipt of a
partial payment does not suffice to prove that the purchase was made on an installment
basis. Petitioner did not present any document to prove said allegation while MGM Motors
produced a sales invoice wherein it was stated that the mode of payment is "COD" or cash
on delivery.

Further, petitioner failed to substantiate his allegation against Ayala Insurance. Petitioner has
the burden of proof to show that a loss occurred and said loss was covered by his insurance
policy. Considering that the trial court only admitted two pieces of evidence in petitioner's
favor and none of those tend to prove loss of the subject car and coverage thereof under the
insurance policy, petitioner is not entitled to the reliefs he had prayed for.

BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED. The 14 January 2010

Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 16 March 2010 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
89665 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

254 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. FE ROA GIMENEZ and IGNACIO
B. GIMENEZ, respondents
GR 174673 11 January 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Leonen, J.

―Dismissal on the basis of a very strict interpretation of procedural rules without a clear
demonstration of the injury to a substantive right of the defendant weighed against years
and years of litigation actively participated in by both parties should not be encouraged, and
to erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer documentary
evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.‖

FACTS:

The Republic, through the PCGG, instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion,
Accounting, Restitution and Damages against the Gimenez Spouses before the
Sandiganbayan. The Gimenez spouses acquired the ill-gotten wealth as dummies, agents, or
nominees of then-president Marcos and Imelda Marcos.

During trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to the positions held,
business interests, income, and pertinent transactions of the Gimenez Spouses. The Republic
presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the Sequestered Assets
Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director of the Research and
Development Department of PCGG. Witnesses testified on the bank accounts and
businesses owned or controlled by the Gimenez Spouses.

The Republic eventually manifested that it was ―no longer presenting further evidence‖.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gave the Republic 30 days or until March 29, 2006 ―to file
its formal offer of evidence.‖

March 29, 2006, the Republic moved ―for an extension of thirty (30) days or until April 28,
2006, within which to file its formal offer of evidence.‖ This Motion was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in a Resolution of the same date.

April 27, 2006, the Republic moved for an additional 15 days or until May 13, 2006 within
which to file its Formal Offer of Evidence. This Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan
in a Resolution dated May 8, 2006. Following this, no additional Motion for extension was
filed by the Republic.

In the first assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2006, the Sandiganbayan noted that the
Republic failed to file its Formal Offer of Evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and
the lapse of 75 days from the date it terminated its presentation of evidence. Thus, it
declared that the Republic waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence.

 The first resolution provides that: It appearing that the plaintiff has long terminated the
presentation of its evidence on February 27, 2006, and it appearing further that it failed or

255 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
otherwise neglected to file its written formal offer of evidence for an
unreasonable period of time consisting of 75 days (i.e., 30 days original period plus
two extension periods totaling 45 days), the filing of said written formal offer of evidence is hereby
deemed WAIVED. WHEREFORE, the reception of the defendants’ evidence shall proceed on
June 22 and 23, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock [sic] in the morning as previously scheduled.

May 30, 2006, Ignacio Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence.
He argued that the Republic showed no right to relief as there was no evidence to support its
cause of action.

June 13, 2006, Fe Roa Gimenez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to
prosecute. Through her own Motion to Dismiss, she joined Ignacio Gimenez‘s demurrer to
evidence.

June 15, 2006, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration [of the first assailed
Resolution] and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence. The pertinent portions of the
Republic‘s offer of documentary exhibits attached to the Motion: EXHIBITS A TO G
(Income Tax Returns, Certificate of Income Tax Withheld on Compensation, Statement of Tax Withheld
at Source, Schedule of Interest Income, Royalties and Withholding Tax, Statement of Assets, Liabilities &
Net Worth of Ignacio B. Gimenez from 1980-1986 proving his legitimate income during said period).

The second assailed Resolution dated September 13, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied
the Republic‘s Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Gimenez Spouses‘ Motion to
Dismiss.

 According to the Sandiganbayan: While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities
and that the higher ends of substantial justice militate against dismissal of cases purely on technical
grounds, the circumstances of this case show that the ends of justice will not be served if this Court
allows the wanton disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Court’s orders. Rules of procedure are
designed for the proper and prompt disposition of cases.

 The court also noted that the documentary evidence presented by the Republic
consisted mostly of certified true copies. However, the persons who certified the
documents as copies of the original were not presented. Hence, the evidence lacked
probative value.

Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration and admit its Formal Offer of Evidence, the
plaintiff‘s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence is
DENIED.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in denying petitioner‘s

Motion to Admit Formal Offer of Evidence on the basis of mere
technicalities, depriving petitioner of its right to due process;
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in making a sweeping
pronouncement that petitioner‘s evidence does not bear any probative value,
and thus granting the demurrer to evidence

256 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes. Petitioner argues that substantial justice requires doing away with the procedural
technicalities. Loss of vital documentary proof warranted extensions to file the Formal Offer
of Evidence. Honest efforts to locate several missing documents resulted in petitioner‘s
inability to file the pleading within the period granted by the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner was granted several extensions of time by the Sandiganbayan totaling 75 days from
the date petitioner terminated its presentation of evidence. Notably, this 75-day period
included the original 30-day period. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer of Evidence, and the Formal Offer of
Evidence.

In resolving petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Formal Offer
of Evidence, the Sandiganbayan found the carelessness of petitioner‘s counsel unacceptable.
According to the Sandiganbayan, it could not countenance the non-observance of the court‘s
orders.

But this court has long acknowledged the policy of the government to recover the assets and
properties illegally acquired or misappropriated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
his wife Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates,
dummies, agents or nominees. Hence, this court has adopted a liberal approach regarding
technical rules of procedure in cases involving recovery of ill-gotten wealth:

In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan.

To be clear, petitioner was able to file its Formal Offer of Evidence, albeit, belatedly.
Petitioner hurdled 19 years of trial before the Sandiganbayan to present its evidence as
shown in its extensive Formal Offer of Evidence. As petitioner argues:

Undeniable from the records of the case is that petitioner was vigorous in prosecuting the case. The
most tedious and crucial stage of the litigation and presentation of evidence has been accomplished.
Petitioner completed its presentation of evidence proving the ill-gotten nature and character of the
funds and assets sought to be recovered in the present case. It presented vital testimonial and
documentary evidence consisting of voluminous record proving the gross disparity of the subject funds
to spouses Gimenezes’ combined declared income which must be reconveyed to the Republic for being
acquired in blatant violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft statutes.

This court is not unmindful of the difficulty in gathering voluminous documentary

evidence in cases of forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth acquired throughout the years. It is
never easy to prosecute corruption and take back what rightfully belongs to the
government and the people of the Republic.

257 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Weighing the amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays
petitioner incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state‘s policy on
recovering ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be
relaxed and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence. The
Sandiganbayan‘s Resolutions should be reversed.

2nd Issue:
Yes. Respondent Ignacio Gimenez argues that petitioner‘s documents are not official
issuances of the Philippine government. They are mostly notarized private documents.
Petitioner‘s evidence has no probative value; hence, a dismissal on demurrer to evidence is
only proper.

It is important that we look at the Best Evidence Rule, which states that:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions — When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except
in the following cases:

a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

In case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be presented133 as

provided for under Sections 5 to 7 of the same Rule:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.— When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.

SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record — When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Emphasizing the importance of the correct classification of documents, this court

pronounced:
258 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents
may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official
or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a notary
public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the
formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.

Notably, the Sandiganbayan‘s evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was

hasty. Its main reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence
was that there was no evidence to consider due to petitioner‘s failure to file its
Formal Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner
built its case. Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this
court finds it clear from the second assailed Resolution that the Sandiganbayan did not even
consider other evidence presented by petitioner during the 19 years of trial. The
Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner‘s testimonial evidence without any basis or
justification. Numerous exhibits were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner‘s
witnesses.

Furthermore, a liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state‘s policy to recover ill-
gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion to
dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a
judgment on the merits. This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for
the expeditious termination of an action," it specifically "pertains to the merits of the
case."

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated May 25, 2006
and September 13, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division in Civil Case No. 0007
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further
proceedings with due and deliberate dispatch in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

Admissibility of evidence;
refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance or evidence is to be considered at all. On the other
hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. Thus,
a letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends upon the observance
of the rules on evidence.

259 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
the SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondents; and BENIGNO B. AGUAS,
petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent
GR 220598 and 220953 19 July 2016
Certiorari
Bersamin, J.

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory
order issued by the trial court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that ―the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall
not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.‖

It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that
in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as
among the errors to be reviewed.

Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not
be limited, because to do so — x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and
usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not wanting to show that
certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus.

In the exercise of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all
the circumstances of each particular case ‗as the ends of justice may require.‘ So it is that
the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial
justice.

FACTS:

On 10 July 2012, the Ombudsman filed a an Information in the Sandiganbayan (SB) for a
plunder case for the amount of three hundred sixty-five million nine hundred ninety- seven
thousand nine hundred fifteen pesos (Php365,997,915.00) committed during the years of
2008-2010 against the following ten (10) persons:

1. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA):

2. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office‘s (PCSO) Officers:
a. Benigno Aguas (Aguas), Budget and Accounts Officer;
b. Rosario Uriarte (Uriarte), General Manager and Vice Chairman;
c. Sergio Valencia, Chairman;
d. Board Members:
i. Manuel Morato;
ii. Jose Taruc V;

260 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
iii. Raymundo Roquero; and
iv. Ma. Fatima Valdes;
3. Commission on Audit‘s (COA) Officers:
a. Reynaldo Villar, Chairman; and
b. Nilda Plaras Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit

In proving the plunder case, the State offered the testimony of its main witness Atty. Aleta
Tolentino (Atty. Tolentino), a member of the Board of Directors of PCSO, and appointed as
the Chairman of the Audit Committee. Included in her testimony, among others, are as
follows:

1. Commingling or the placing into one main account, which is in violation of the PCSO
Charter and generally accepted accounting principles, of the following funds:
a. Charity;
b. Prize; and
c. Operating
2. Excessive disbursement, considering that what can be requested is only if it is within
the allotment, which is in violation of PCSO Charter, for:
a. Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF); and
b. Advertising expenses;
3. Merged internal audit with budget and accounting department, which is in violation
of internal audit rules;
4. The process pertaining to the release of CIF funds, which includes:
a. There must be a budget and savings thereto;
i. As disbursement pertains to release of budget, NOT allocation
b. Detailed specific project proposals and specifications accompanying the
request;
c. Authorized officer to sign vouchers and checks;
d. Designation of the disbursing officer:
i. Which should NOT at the same time be the authorized officer to
sign vouchers and checks; and
ii. A fidelity bond must be posted;
e. That (at the time, prior to President Benigno (Noynoy) Aquino removing the
requirement) signature of the Department of Health’s Supervising and
Controlling Secretary of the Secretary of Health; and
f. Approval of the President;
5. That in some instances:
a. There is no budget; or
b. There is no disbursing officer designated; or
c. Even if there is one designated:
i. Is at the same time the authorized person to sign vouchers and
checks, as in the case of Uriarte; or
ii. Was not authorized to be such, as in the case of Valencia; or
iii. No fidelity bond was posted;
d. That direct dealing (Uriarte) to the President was made, instead of acquiring
first the signature of the Controlling Secretary of the Secretary of Health
6. That Credit Notices issued by the COA had no specification that it had been audited
261 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Worthy of note is the letter-requests in the span of two (2) years from Uriarte, annotated by
GMA‘s ―OK‖, pertaining to additional CIF funds for purposes of protection of image or
integrity, or to address urgent issues.

In sum, the Prosecution holds, that GMA, Uriarte, and Aguas conspired, and that GMA
violated the following:

1. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional CIFs to be

accompanied with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and

2. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of
additional CIFs only if there was an existing budget to cover the request

After presentation of other evidence, the State rested its case, seven (7) out of the ten (10),
accused separately filed their demurrers to evidence (Uriarte and Valdes are at large, while
Plaras secured a TRO from the SC).

The SB granted the demurrers, except those of GMA, Aguas, and Valencia:

As to those who were granted thereof, the SB held that the Board Members were not
shown to have divested funds, or that the acts complained of were tainted with any
criminal design, and that the mere signature without any showing of conspiracy
cannot amount to being a conspirator;

On the other hand, as to those who had been denied thereof, the SB held sufficient
evidence showing that they had conspired to commit plunder.

Likewise, the Motions for Reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were denied

Thus, this Petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the order denial of a demurrer to evidence may be subject to a
petition for Certiorari

RULING:

Yes, in proper cases, a Special Civil Action for Certiorari may be a proper remedy to an order
denying a demurrer to [Link] Court is not precluded to take cognizance of a case
wherein the order in question is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, considering that the
Constitution itself vested it with such authority (expanded jurisdiction).

There is grave abuse of discretion considering the following factors, that:

1. The information:
a. Failed to state a ―main plunderer‖, as required by the laws of plunder;

262 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
b. Despite failure to indicate among any one of the accused, the SB nevertheless
assumed that GMA was the mastermind despite no such indication;
2. That there is no ―main plunderer‖, the value of ill-gotten wealth exceeding Php50M
cannot be had considering that the amount of Php365,997,915.00 would be divided
into ten (10) aliquot portions, thus only to Php36,599,791.50 each, which is below
the threshold amount in plunder;
3. The mere annotation of ―OK‖ could not amount to a criminal design related to a
conspiracy, considering that it is an act in the regular and ordinary business of the
President;
4. The requests were complete in itself, as to its nature and necessity;
5. The commingling of funds:
a. Was not per se illegal, as per COA, and is merely frowned upon; and
b. As such, it is legal, it made the disbursement of funds possible as it is within
a common fund, the additional funds is still sustainable, considering that
there is still budget within the commingled fund;
6. The doctrine of command responsibility (that PCSO as a subordinate of GMA, the
acts of the former can be imputed to the latter) is not tenable, considering that it
applies only to the following cases:
a. Actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
and
b. Human Rights issues;
7. The lack of elements of plunder:
a. Amassment, accumulation, or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, considering
that Atty. Tolentino herself conceded to any knowledge of such diversion of
the funds to the accused; and
b. Personal benefit, considering that no benefit has been proved.

Thus, while the general rule as to the proper remedy in case of the denial of a demurrer is
to go to trial, and in case of an adverse decision, appeal therefrom and to raise the issue
pertaining to the denial therein, the exception must be applied in this case, for the SB has
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrers to evidence.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS
ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan
on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners‘ respective demurrers to
evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM- 0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA
MACAPAGAL - ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence;
ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no
pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

Voting;
The SC voted 11-4, with the following Justices dissenting:
1. C.J. Sereno;

263 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
2. J. Carpio;
3. J. Leonen; and
4. J. Caguioa

While J. Perlas-Bernabe dissented as to the ruling on Aguas, she nevertheless concurred with
the ruling on GMA.

Dissenting opinions;
In sum, the dissenting opinion focuses on the following:

1. As to the propriety of Certiorari;

a. Certiorari is NOT a proper recourse under the Rules, and is categorical,
absent any grave abuse of discretion. The SB did not commit grave abuse
of discretion;
b. The SB is within its expertise of determining plunder cases, as a trier of
facts. The SC is not, on the other hand, an expert and a trier of facts;
c. A testimonial evidence is presented before a trial court, which in this
case, is the SB. Thus the SB is placed in a better standing to observe the
demeanor of the witness and to determine the probative weight of the
testimony; and
d. If Certiorari is a prohibited remedy, then it does not follow that
annulment of the denial of demurrer is proper;
2. Criminal law:
a. The words in the information pertaining to conspiracy and the basic facts
pertaining thereto are sufficient to indicate such relationship, in line with
the ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan;
b. The pieces of evidence presented strongly proved the conspiracy
between and among the accused;
c. The actual amassment, accumulation, or acquisition, need not be proved,
as personal benefit is not required as the mere taking itself constitutes the
crime. If it were so, there be a virtual impossibility to convict someone as
the perpetrators would just hide the ill-gotten wealth;
d. The law on plunder does not require a ―main plunderer‖, considering the
acts are concerted and thus the act of one is the act of all;
3. Commingling of funds:
a. While the commingling is not illegal per se, it should have been looked
into as a means to commit the crime, considering that the COA in fact
advised the PCSO to stop such practice but nevertheless continued to do
such. It is thus a ―red flag of financial fraud‖;
4. Approvals of GMA:
a. The words ―OK‖ is not equivocal, but rather pertains to an assent to the
act to be done
b. The repeated approvals of GMA should have been seen as an irregular
course of business, considering that her signature is required to commit
the crime; and
c. It cannot be grasped that GMA has been blindly assenting to these
requests, considering her position as then President;
264 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULES 34 and 35:

Judgment on the Pleadings
Summary Judgment

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BUREAU OF

CUSTOMS, petitioner, v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION,
respondent.
GR 209324 9 December 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Villarama, Jr., J.

―When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when
the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying
the law to the material facts.‖

FACTS:

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), a domestic corporation registered with the
Board of Investments (BOI), is engaged in the importation, refining and sale of petroleum
products in the country. For its importations, PSPC was assessed and required to pay
customs duties and internal revenue taxes.

Under Deed of Assignment , Filipino Way Industries (FWI) assigned the following Tax
Credit Certificates5 (TCCs) to PSPC with a total amount of P10,088,912.00..On the belief
that the TCCs were actually good and valid, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) accepted and
allowed PSPC to use the above TCCs to pay the customs duties and taxes due on its oil
importations.

The One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center ("center")
undertakes the processing of TCCs and approval of their transfers. The Center, informed
BIR Commissioner Rualo that pursuant to EXCOM Resolution No. 03-05-99, it has
cancelled various Tax Debit Memos (TDMs) issued to PSPC and Petron Corporation against
their TCCs which were found to have been fraudulently issued and transferred. These
include the subject TCCs sold by FWI to PSPC. The Center thus advised that it will be
demanding from the said oil companies payment corresponding to the amount of the TCCs
as evidenced by the TDMs, and accordingly directed the BIR to collect the amount utilized
on the TCCs, including the related penalties, surcharges and interests.8 A similar letter was
sent to Customs Commissioner Nelson Tan regarding the cancellation of TDMs issued to
PSPC based on the Center's finding that the TCCs utilized by PSPC have been fraudulently
issued and transferred.

In lieu of this, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the BOC filed the present
collection suit in the RTC for the payment of P10,088,912.00 still owed by PSPC after the
invalidation of the subject TCCs. Meanwhile, PSPC filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a
petition for review questioning the factual and legal bases of BOC's collection efforts.

265 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Further, PSPC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there is no basis for the
Republic's claims considering that the subject TCCs were already fully utilized for the
payment of PSPC's customs duties and taxes, and that EXCOM Resolution No. 03-05-99,
the basis of the cancellation of the TCCs, was declared void and invalid in Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation v. CIR,16 where this Court likewise ruled that the subject TCCs cannot be
cancelled on the basis of post-audit since a post-audit is not allowed and not a suspensive
condition.

BOC:
argued that rendition of summary judgment is inappropriate in this case in view of
disputed facts that necessitate a full-blown trial where both parties can present
evidence on their respective claims. BOC pointed out that PSPC cannot rely on the
Deed of Assignment as proof that it had no participation in the issuance of the
TCCs. PSPC should prove at the trial that there was a valid transfer in good faith and
for value of the subject TCCs. As to the rulings in the case of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. CIR,17 these are inapplicable here because first, what is involved
therein are taxes owed to the BIR and there was no finding of fraud against PSPC
whereas in the present case the BOC can readily prove during trial that PSPC
committed fraud.

RTC:

denied the motion for summary judgment. Specifically, it stated that presentation of
evidence is necessary to determine if PSPC is a mere transferee in good faith and for
value of the subject TCCs and that there was a valid transfer/assignment between
PSPC and FWI.

However, on motion for reconsideration by PSPC, the RTC reversed its earlier
ruling and granted the motion for summary judgment under its Order19 dated
April 28, 2010. The RTC cited Pilipinas Shell Corporation v. Republic20 which supposedly
settled factual and legal issues raised by BOC in its pleadings and arguments,
specifically PSPC's not having committed fraud. As there are no more disputed
matters, the RTC held that there is no more need for a trial to prove that the subject
TCCs have been fully utilized by PSPC and that they were cancelled due to an invalid
post-audit under the authority of EXCOM Resolution No. 03-05-99.

CA:

denied the appeal and affirmed the questioned orders of the RTC. BOC's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment is proper.

RULING:

NO, it was not proper.

266 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of
damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed:

―Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant;

A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been
served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine
issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of
summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide
the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts. Even if on their face the
pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that
such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue
as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment,
is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.

For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has
the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue
posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. Genuine issue means an issue
of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious or contrived.

Petitioner's complaint is premised mainly on the alleged fraudulent issuance and transfer of
the subject TCCs. As stated in the pre-trial order, petitioner submitted for trial the issue of
whether or not PSPC is a transferee in good faith.

In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR, we ruled that "[t]he transferee in good faith and
for value may not be unjustly prejudiced by the fraud committed by the claimant or
transferor in the procurement or issuance of the TCC from the Center."

A transferee in good faith and for value of a TCC who has relied on the Center's
representation of the genuineness and validity of the TCC transferred to it may not be legally
required to pay again the tax covered by the TCC which has been belatedly declared null and
void, that is, after the TCCs have been fully utilized through settlement of internal revenue
tax liabilities. Conversely, when the transferee is party to the fraud as when it did not obtain
the TCC for value or was a party to or has knowledge of its fraudulent issuance, said
transferee is liable for the taxes and for the fraud committed as provided for by law.

The RTC found no genuine factual issue as far as PSPC's status as innocent purchaser in
good faith and for value, relying on the following underlined portion of this Court's decision
in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Republic (March 6, 2008):

267 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
THE FILING OF THE COLLECTION CASE WAS A PROPER REMEDY

Assessments inform taxpayers of their tax liabilities. Under the TCCP, the
assessment is in the form of a liquidation made on the face of the import entry
return and approved by the Collector of Customs. Liquidation is the final
computation and ascertainment by the Collector of Customs of the duties due
on imported merchandise based on official reports as to the quantity, character
and value thereof, and the Collector of Customs' own finding as to the applicable
rate of duty. A liquidation is considered to have been made when the entry is
officially stamped "liquidated."

Petitioner claims that it paid the duties due on its importations. Section 1603 of the old
TCCP stated:

Section 1603. Finality of Liquidation. When articles have been entered and passed free
of duty or final adjustments of duties made, with subsequent delivery, such entry and
passage free of duty or settlement of duties will, after the expiration of one year from
the date of the final payment of duties, in the absence of fraud or protest, be final
and conclusive upon all parties, unless the liquidation of the import entry was merely
tentative.

An assessment or liquidation by the BoC attains finality and conclusiveness one year from
the date of the final payment of duties except when:

(a) there was fraud;

(b) there is a pending protest or
(c) the liquidation of import entry was merely tentative.

None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. There was no fraud as petitioner
claimed (and was presumed) to be in good faith. Respondent does not, dispute this.
Moreover, records show that petitioner paid those duties without protest using its TCCs.
Finally, the liquidation was not a tentative one as the assessment had long become final and
incontestable. Consequently, pursuant to Yabes and because of the cancellation of the TCCs,
respondent had the right to file a collection case. (Underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2013 and
Resolution dated June 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 95436 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 49 for the conduct of trial proceed ings in Civil Case No. 02-
103191 with utmost DELIBERATE DISPATCH. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

268 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS, petitioner, v. SANTOS CAR CHECK
CENTER CORPORATION, respondent.
GR 202989 25 March 2015.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.

A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the FACTS as pleaded, and is based

exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion
for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case
after the answer is filed.

FACTS:

Santos Car Check Center Corporation leased out its showroom space to Comglasco
Corporation for a period of five years at a monthly rental of P60,000.00 for the first year,
P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00 on the third through fifth years. Thereafter,
Comglasco advised Santos Car Check Center Corporation through a letter that it was pre-
terminating their lease contract. Santos Check Center Corporation refused to accede to the
pre-termination, reminding Comglasco that their contract was for five years. Comglasco
vacated the leased premises and stopped paying any further rentals. Santos Check Center
Corporation sent several demand letters, which Comglasco completely ignored. Santos
Check Center Corporation sent its final demand letter, which Comglasco again ignored.

On 2003, Santos filed suit for breach of contract. Summons and a copy of the complaint,
along with the annexes, were served on Comglasco in 2004. On June 28, 2004, Comglasco
filed its Answer. Santos Car Check Center Corporation moved for a judgment on the
pleadings, which the RTC granted. On August 18, 2004, the trial court rendered its
judgment, in favor of Santos Check Center Corporation and against Comglasco. Comglasco
appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Comglasco filed a petition
for review with the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not judgment on the pleadings was properly invoked by the trial
court as basis for rendering its decision.

RULING:

Yes. As found by the CA, Comglasco‘s answer admitted the material allegations in the
complaint, to wit: a) that Santos holds absolute title to a showroom space; b) that Comglasco
leased the said showroom from Santos; c) that after a little over a year, Comglasco
preterminated the lease; d) that, disregarding Santos‘ rejection of the pre-termination of their
lease, Comglasco vacated the leased premises on January 15, 2002; e) that Comglasco never
denied the existence and validity of the parties‘ lease contract.

Specifically, the CA noted that Paragraph 2 of the Answer admitted the allegations in
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the complaint that the lease was for five years, starting on August

269 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
16, 2000 and to expire on August 15, 2005, at a monthly rental of P60,000.00 on the first
year, P66,000.00 on the second year, and P72,600.00 on the third up to the fifth year.

The RTC acted correctly in resorting to Section 1 of Rule 34, on Judgment on the Pleadings,
to cut short a needless trial. The SC agrees with the CA that Comglasco cannot cite Article
1267 of the Civil Code, and that it must be deemed to have admitted the material allegations
in the complaint. Section 1, Rule 34 reads:

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party‘s pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the
material FACTS alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the FACTS as pleaded, and is based

exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a motion
for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter in the case
after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. Under Rule 35, on
Summary Judgments, Comglasco had recourse to move for summary judgment, wherein it
could have adduced supporting evidence to justify its action on the parties‘ lease, but it did
not do so. Section 2 of Rule 35 provides:

Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

Summary judgment may be allowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is, as
shown by affidavits and like evidentiary documents, no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Philippine Coconut Producers
Federation, Inc. [COCOFED] vs. Republic, 663 SCRA 514 [2012])

Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party‘s pleading; An answer fails to
tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in
Sections 8 and 10, Rule 8 of the Rules, resulting in the admission of the material allegations
of the adverse party‘s pleadings. (Government Service Insurance System vs. Prudential Guarantee and
Assurance, Inc., 710 SCRA 337 [2013])

270 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE C. GO and
ELVY T. GO, respondents.
GR 175514 14 February 2011.
Petition for review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of
damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed.

Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham

claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of
time involved in a trial.

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact
which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the
pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that
such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue
as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment,
is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.

The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.

FACTS:

On September 30, 1999, respondent Jose C. Go obtained two loans from PBCom,
evidenced by two promissory notes, embodying his commitment to pay P17,982,222.22 for
the first loan, and P80 million for the second loan, within a ten-year period from September
30, 1999 to September 30, 2009.

To secure the two loans, Go executed two (2) pledge agreements, both dated
Septembers 29, 1999, covering shares of stock in Ever Gotesco Resources and
Holdings, Inc. The first pledge, valued at P27,827,122.22, was to secure payment of
the first loan, while the second pledge, valued at P70,155,100.00, was to secure the
second loan.

Two years later, however, the market value of the said shares of stock plunged to less than
P0.04 per share. Thus, PBCom, as pledgee, notified Go in writing on June 15, 2001, that it
was renouncing the pledge agreements.

Later, PBCom filed before the RTC a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment against Go and his wife, Elvy T. Go. PBCom alleged that Spouses
Go defaulted on the two (2) promissory notes, having paid only three (3) installments on
interest payments covering the months of September, November and December 1999.

271 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Consequently, the entire balance of the obligations of Go became immediately due and
demandable.

PBCom made repeated demands upon Spouses Go for the payment of said
obligations, but the couple imposed conditions on the payment, such as the lifting of
garnishment effected by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on Go‘s accounts
Spouses Go filed their Answer with Counterclaim denying the material allegations in
the complaint and stating, among other matters, that:

8. The promissory note referred to in the complaint expressly state that the
loan obligation is payable within the period of ten (10) years. Thus, from the
execution date of September 30, 1999, its due date falls on September 30,
2009 (and not 2001 as erroneously stated in the complaint). Thus, prior to
September 30, 2009, the loan obligations cannot be deemed due and
demandable. xxx

9. Contrary to the plaintiffs proferrence, defendant Jose C. Go had made

substantial payments in terms of his monthly payments. There is, therefore, a
need to do some accounting works (sic) to reconcile the records of both
parties.

10. While demand is a necessary requirement to consider the defendant to be

in delay/default, such has not been complied with by the plaintiff since the
former is not aware of any demand made to him by the latter for the
settlement of the whole obligation.

11. Undeniably, at the time the pledge of the shares of stock were executed,
their total value is more than the amount of the loan or at the very least,
equal to it. Thus, plaintiff was fully secured insofar as its exposure is
concerned.

12. And even assuming without conceding, that the present value of said
shares x x x went down, it cannot be considered as something permanent
since the prices of stocks in the market either increases (sic) or decreases (sic)
depending on the market forces. Thus, it is highly speculative for the plaintiff
to consider said shares to have suffered tremendous decrease in its value.
More so, it is unfair for the plaintiff to renounce or abandon the pledge
agreements.

PBCom filed a verified motion for summary judgment stating that the Answer
interposed no specific denials on the material averments in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the
complaint such as the fact of default, the entire amount being already due and
demandable because of default, and the fact that the bank had made repeated
demands for the payment of the obligations. Spouses Go opposed the motion for
summary judgment arguing that they had tendered genuine factual issues calling for
the presentation of evidence.

272 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The RTC granted PBCom‘s motion in its judgment. The Spouses Go moved for
reconsideration but was denied.

The CA in its decision reversed and set aside the judgment of the RTC and ordered
the remand of the records to the court of origin for trial on the merits. The CA
disagreed with the conclusion of the RTC that the Spouses Go admitted several
paragraphs of the complaint. It found the supposed admissions insufficient to justify
a rendition of summary judgment in the case for sum of money, since there were
other allegations and defenses put up by Spouses Go in their Answer which raised
genuine issues on the material FACTS in the action.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that there exists a genuine issue as to
material FACTS in the action

RULING:

No. The CA correctly ruled that there exist genuine issues as to three material FACTS,
which have to be addressed during trial: the fact of default; the amount of the outstanding
obligation, and the existence of prior demand.

Under the Rules, following the filing of pleadings, if, on motion of a party and after hearing,
the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that, except as
to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be
rendered. This rule was expounded in Asian Construction and Development Corporation v.
Philippine Commercial International Bank, where it was written:

Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount
of damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed.
Summary or accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense
and loss of time involved in a trial.

Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues
of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on
their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor,
therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact.

A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as

distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the FACTS as
pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or
question as to the FACTS, and summary judgment is called for. The party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence
273 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have
limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the FACTS as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take
the place of trial.

Spouses Go are not disclaiming knowledge of the transaction or the execution of the
promissory notes or the pledge agreements sued upon. The matters in contention are, as the
CA stated, whether or not respondents were in default, whether there was prior demand, and
the amount of the outstanding loan. These are the matters that the parties disagree on and by
which reason they set forth vastly different allegations in their pleadings which each will have
to prove by presenting relevant and admissible evidence during trial. Furthermore, in stark
contrast to the cited cases where one of the parties disclaimed knowledge of something so
patently within his knowledge, in this case, respondents Spouses Go categorically stated in
the Answer that there was no prior demand, that they were not in default, and that the
amount of the outstanding loan would have to be ascertained based on official records.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

274 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, petitioner, v. FE T. ADOLFO, respondent.
GR 201427 18 March 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper ―where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party‘s pleading.‖

Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted ―if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

FACTS:

CIVIL CASE MAN-4821

Teofilo Adolfo filed a petition for judicial separation of property against his wife, Fe,
alleging that they bought with conjugal funds because they have been separated in
fact and reunion is now an impossibility due to irreconcilable differences.

In her answer, Fe alleged that the property is not conjugal, but paraphernal property
belonging to her.

CIVIL CASE MAN-2683

Fe‘s sister Florencia and her husband Juanito (Gingoyons) filed a civil case for
partition with damages, alleging that in 1988, Fe sold a300-square meter lot portion
of the lot to the spouses Gingoyon, but that the former refused to subdivide it. This
time, Fe alleged that the property was conjugal, and the sale was made without the
signature of Teofilo, hence it was null and void. The RTC ruled in favour of Fe and
declared it conjugal property, hence, the Gingoyons appealed to the CA.

Civil Case No. MAN-4821

Teofilo filed a Request for Admission of (among others) respondent‘s declaration in

said Answer that the subject property constituted conjugal property of the marriage;
and the trial court‘s pronouncement in said case that the subject property forms part
of the conjugal estate.

Fe failed to answer the Request for Admission, hence, Teoflio filed a motion to
render judgment on the pleadings, alleging that since Fe failed to answer the request
for admission, the matters included in the request are deemed admitted pursuant to
Rule 26, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, he is now entitled to judgment on the
pleading based on Rule 34.

275 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Fe opposed the motion, arguing that the decision, was the subject of an appeal, had
not yet become final.

The RTC granted the motion by Teofilo, treating it as a motion for summary
judgment. It ruled that judicial separation was proper, taking judicial notice of its
decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683 that the property is conjugal property. With
Fe‘s failure to provide a verified answer or denial under oath to the request for
admission of the documents, she is deemed to have admitted the genuineness of the
same.

Civil Case No. MAN-2683

The Gingoyon‘s appeal to the CA, was resolved in their favour, the CA ruling that
the property is paraphernal property as established by the records and the evidence.

It became final and executory.

Civil Case MAN-4821

Fe appealed to the CA saying that the Trial Court was wrong in treating his motion
for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary judgment. She also asks the
court to submit to the findings of the CA in Civil Case 2683 finding the property to
be paraphernal.

Her appeal was favorably acted upon by the CA. The CA held that the trial court
cannot treat Adolfo‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings as one for summary
judgment.

It stated that in a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there are no ostensible
issues at all on account of the defending party‘s failure to raise an issue in his answer,
while in a proper case for summary judgment, such issues exist, although they are
sham, fictitious, or not genuine as shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions. In
other words, a judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded,
while a summary judgment is a judgment on the facts as summarily proved by
affidavits, depositions, or admissions. It added that Fe‘s Answer appeared on its face
to tender an issue; it disputed petitioner‘s claim that the subject property is their
conjugal property.

The next thing to be determined is whether this issue is fictitious or sham as to

justify a summary judgment.

The CA added that although respondent was bound by the resulting admission
prompted by her failure to reply to petitioner‘s request for admission, her claims and
documentary exhibits clearly contradict what petitioner sought to be admitted in his
request; that the trial court disregarded the fact that the issue of whether the subject
property is conjugal was still unresolved as CA-G.R. CV No. 78971 was still pending;
and that finally, the trial court should have been guided by the principles that trial
276 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
courts have but limited authority to render summary judgments and that summary
judgments should not be rendered hastily.

Teofilo assailed the CA decision to the Supreme Court via petition

ISSUE: Whether or not summary judgment is proper in the case, considering the
failure of Fe to answer or deny under oath the Request for Admission in Civil
Case No. MAN-4821.

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition.

Judgment on the pleadings is proper ―where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party‘s pleading.‖

Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted ―if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.‖

An answer would ―fail to tender an issue‖ if it ―does not deny the material allegations
in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party‘s pleadings
by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.

Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint
and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the
material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or
bar recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.

On the other hand, ―whether x x x the issues raised by the Answer are genuine is not the
crux of inquiry in a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only in a motion for
summary judgment. In a case for judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that no
issue is raised at all. The essential question in such a case is whether there are issues
generated by the pleadings.‖

―A ‗genuine issue‘ is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as

distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as to
the facts, and summary judgment is called for.

In rendering summary judgment, the trial court relied on respondent‘s failure to reply to
petitioner‘s request for admission, her admission in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, as well as its
May 15, 2002 Decision declaring that the subject property is a conjugal asset.

277 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Even if respondent is deemed to have admitted the matters contained in petitioner‘s request
for admission by her failure to reply thereto, the trial court should have considered the
pending appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 78971. It cannot take judicial notice solely of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, and ignore the appeal in C.A.- G.R. CV No.
78971. After all, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 78971 is merely a continuation of Civil Case No. MAN-
2683; an appeal is deemed a continuation of the same case commenced in the lower court

On the part of petitioner, it must be said that he could not have validly resorted to a motion
for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. While it may appear that under Rules
34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion for judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment as a result of the consequent admission by respondent that the subject
property is conjugal, this is not actually the case. Quite the contrary, by invoking the
proceedings and decision in Civil Case No. MAN-2683, petitioner is precluded from
obtaining judgment while the appeal in said case is pending, because the result thereof
determines whether the subject property is indeed conjugal or paraphernal. He may not
preempt the appeal in C.A.- G.R. CV No. 78971.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2009 Decision and March 2,
2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01783 are AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION in that Civil Case No. MAN-4821 is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; A genuine issue, as opposed to
a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires the presentation of evidence.
(Ong vs. Roban Lending Corporation, 557 SCRA 516 [2008])

In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of
the failure of the defending party‘s answer to raise an issue. (First Leverage and Services Group,
Inc. vs. Solid Builders, Inc., 675 SCRA 407 [2012])

278 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 36:
Judgments, Final Orders, and Entry Thereof

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

(FASAP), petitioner v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., PATRIA CHIONG and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents; IN RE: LETTERS OF ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA RE: G.R. NO. 178083 - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (FASAP) vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
ET AL.
GR 178083 13 March 2018
Bersamin, J.

The requirement for the Court to state the legal and factual basis for its decisions is found in
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

The constitutional provision clearly indicates that it contemplates only a decision, which is
the judgment or order that adjudicates on the merits of a case. This is clear from the text
and tenor of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, the rule that implements the
constitutional provision, to wit:

Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order

determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by
him, and filed with the clerk of court.

FACTS:

The Third Division thereby differed from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
had pronounced in its appealed decision promulgated on August 23, 2006 that the remaining
issue between the parties concerned the manner by which PAL had carried out the
retrenchment program. Instead, the Third Division disbelieved the veracity of PAL‘s claim
of severe financial losses, and concluded that PAL had not established its severe financial
losses because of its non-presentation of audited financial statements. It further concluded
that PAL had implemented the retrenchment program in bad faith, and had not used fair
and reasonable criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched.

Upon conclusion of the oral arguments, the Court directed the parties to explore a possible
settlement and to submit their respective memoranda. Unfortunately, the parties did not
reach any settlement; hence, the Court, through the Special Third Division, resolved the
issues on the merits through the resolution of October 2, 2009 denying PAL‘s motion for
reconsideration.

279 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The Special Third Division was unconvinced by PAL‘s change of theory in urging the June
1998 Association of Airline Pilots of the Philippines (ALP AP) pilots' strike as the reason
behind the immediate retrenchment; and observed that the strike was a temporary
occurrence that did not require the immediate and sweeping retrenchment of around 1,400
cabin crew.

Not satisfied, PAL filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of October 2, 2009 and
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008.

On October 5, 2009, the writer of the resolution of October 2, 2009, Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, compulsorily retired from the Judiciary. Pursuant to A.M. No. 99-8-09-
SC, G.R. No. 178083 was then raffled to Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., a Member of the
newly-constituted regular Third Division. Upon the Court's subsequent reorganization, G.R.
No. 178083 was transferred to the First Division where Justice Velasco, Jr. was meanwhile
re-assigned. Justice Velasco, Jr. subsequently inhibited himself from the case due to personal
reasons. Pursuant to SC Administrative Circular No. 84-2007, G.R. No. 178083 was again
re-raffled to Justice Arturo D. Brion, whose membership in the Second Division resulted in
the transfer of G.R. No. 178083 to said Division.

On September 7, 2011, the Second Division denied with finality PAL‘s Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008.

Thereafter, PAL, through Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, its collaborating counsel, sent a series
of letters inquiring into the propriety of the successive transfers of G.R. No. 178083. His
letters were docketed as A.M. No. 11- 10-1-SC.

On October 4, 2011, the Court En Banc issued a resolution:

(a) assuming jurisdiction over G.R. No. 178083;

(b) recalling the September 7, 2011 resolution of the Second Division; and
(c) ordering the re-raffle of G.R. No. 178083 to a new Member-in-Charge.

Resolving the issues raised by Atty. Mendoza in behalf of PAL, as well as the issues raised
against the recall of the resolution of September 7, 2011, the Court En Banc promulgated its
resolution in A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC.

PAL contends that the October 2, 2009 resolution focused on an entirely new basis - that of
PAL‘s supposed change in theory. It denies having changed its theory, however, and
maintains that the reduction of its workforce had resulted from a confluence of several
events, like the flight expansion; the 1997 Asian financial crisis; and the ALP AP pilots‘
strike. PAL explains that when the pilots struck in June 1998, it had to decide quickly as it
was then facing closure in 18 days due to serious financial hemorrhage; hence, the strike
came as the final blow.

PAL posits that its business decision to downsize was far from being a hasty, knee-jerk
reaction; that the reduction of cabin crew personnel was an integral part of its corporate
rehabilitation, and, such being a management decision, the Court could not supplant the
280 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
decision with its own judgment‘ and that the inaccurate depiction of the strike as a
temporary disturbance was lamentable in light of its imminent financial collapse due to the
concerted action.

PAL submits that the Court‘s declaration that PAL failed to prove its financial losses and to
explore less drastic cost-cutting measures did not at all jibe with the totality of the
circumstances and evidence presented; that the consistent findings of the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC, the CA and even the SEC, acknowledging its serious financial difficulties could not
be ignored or disregarded; and that the challenged rulings of the Court conflicted with the
pronouncements made in Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. 40 and related cases41 that
acknowledged PAL‘s grave financial distress.

In its comment, FASAP counters that a second motion for reconsideration was a prohibited
pleading; that PAL failed to prove that it had complied with the requirements for a valid
retrenchment by not submitting its audited financial statements; that PAL had immediately
terminated the employees without prior resort to less drastic measures; and that PAL did not
observe any criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched.

FASAP stresses that the October 4, 2011 resolution recalling the September 7, 2011 decision
was void for failure to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; that
the participation of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona who later on inhibited from G.R. No.
178083 had further voided the proceedings; that the 1987 Constitution did not require that a
case should be raffled to the Members of the Division who had previously decided it; and
that there was no error in raffling the case to Justice Brion, or, even granting that there was
error, such error was merely procedural.

ISSUE: Whether resolution promulgated in A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC for not citing any
legal basis in recalling the September 7, 2011 resolution of the Second
Division.

RULING:

The requirement for the Court to state the legal and factual basis for its decisions is found in
Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.

The constitutional provision clearly indicates that it contemplates only a decision, which is
the judgment or order that adjudicates on the merits of a case. This is clear from the text and
tenor of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, the rule that implements the constitutional
provision, to wit:

Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order

determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
281 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

The October 4, 2011 resolution did not adjudicate on the merits of G.R. No. 178083. We
explicitly stated so in the resolution of March 13, 2012. What we thereby did was instead to
exercise the Court's inherent power to recall orders and resolutions before they attain
finality. In so doing, the Court only exercised prudence in order to ensure that the Second
Division was vested with the appropriate legal competence in accordance with and under the
Court's prevailing internal rules to review and resolve the pending motion for
reconsideration. We rationalized the exercise thusly:

As the narration in this Resolution shows, the Court acted on its own pursuant to
its power to recall its own orders and resolutions before their finality. The
October 4, 2011 Resolution was issued to determine the propriety of the
September 7, 2011 Resolution given the facts that came to light after the ruling
Division's examination of the records. To point out the obvious, the recall
was not a ruling on the merits and did not constitute the reversal of the
substantive issues already decided upon by the Court in the FASAP case in its
previously issued Decision (of July 22, 2008) and Resolution (of October 2,
2009). In short, the October 4, 2011 Resolution was not meant and was never
intended to favor either party, but to simply remove any doubt about the validity of
the ruling Division's action on the case. The case, in the ruling Division's view, could
be brought to the Court en banc since it is one of "sufficient importance"; at the very
least, it involves the interpretation of conflicting provisions of the IRSC with
potential jurisdictional implications.

At the time the Members of the ruling Division went to the Chief Justice to
recommend a recall, there was no clear indication of how they would definitively
settle the unresolved legal questions among themselves. The only matter legally
certain was the looming finality of the September 7, 2011 Resolution if it would not
be immediately recalled by the Court en banc by October 4, 2011. No unanimity
among the Members of the ruling Division could be gathered on the unresolved legal
questions; thus, they concluded that the matter is best determined by the Court en
banc as it potentially involved questions of jurisdiction and interpretation of
conflicting provisions of the IRSC. To the extent of the recommended recall, the
ruling Division was unanimous and the Members communicated this intent to the
Chief Justice in clear and unequivocal terms. (Bold underscoring for emphasis)

It should further be clear from the same March 13, 2012 resolution that the factual
considerations for issuing the recall order were intentionally omitted therefrom in obeisance
to the prohibition against public disclosure of the internal deliberations of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court:

(a) GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of October 2, 2009
and Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008 filed by the
respondents Philippine Airlines, Inc. and Patria Chiong;

282 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

(b) DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration (Re: The Honorable Court's
Resolution dated March 13, 2012) filed by the petitioner Flight Attendants and
Stewards Association of the Philippines;

(c) SETS ASIDE the decision dated July 22, 2008 and resolution dated October 2,
2009; and

(d) AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 23, 2006.

No pronouncement on costs of still.

SO ORDERED.

283 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 37:
New Trial or Reconsideration

MARIO J. MENDEZONA and TERESITA [Link], LUIS J. MENDEZONA

and MARICAR [Link] and TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE MENDEZONA,
petitioners v. JULIO H. OZAMIZ, ROBERTO J. MONTALVAN, JOSE MA. OZAMIZ,
CARMEN H. OZAMIZ, PAZ O. MONTALVAN, [Link] O.F. ZARRAGA, CARLOS
O. FORTICH, JOSELUIS O. ROS, PAULITA O. RODRIGUEZ, and LOURDES O. LON,
respondents
GR 143370 6 February 2002
Petition for Review on Certiorari
De Leon, Jr., J.

A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted
only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely:

(a) the evidence had been discovered after trial;

(b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is
of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must
characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.

FACTS:

On 25 September 1991, Sps. Mario and Teresita Mendezona as plaintiffs, filed a suit for
quieting of title, and later filed an amended complaint in October 7, 1991, joining Luis J.
Mendezona, Maricar L. Mendezona and Teresita Abad Vda. De Mendezona as plaintiffs.

In their complaint, the petitioners alleged that they own a parcel of land each in Banilad
Estate, Lahug, Cebu City with almost 3,462 sq. m. for sps Mario and Teresa Mendezona
covered by TCT No. 116834; 3,466 sq.m. for Luis and Maricar Mendezona under TCT
116835, and 3,468 sq.m. for Teresita Abad Vda. De Mendezona under TCT no. 116836, all
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City. These titles of ownership were ultimately
traced to a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 28 April 1989 executed in their favor by
Carmen Ozamiz for and in consideration of P1,040,000.00.

The suit was initiated to remove a cloud on the petitioners‘ said respective titles caused by
the inscription thereon of a notice of lis pendens which came about as a result of a special
proceeding in the RTC of Oroquieta City for guardianship over the person and properties of
Carmen Ozamiz initiated by respondents herein.

It appears that on January 15 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship
with the RTC of Oroquieta City alleging that 86 year old Carmen Ozamiz after an illness in
July 1987, had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friedns nor take care

284 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
of her health or manage her properties. Mario and Luis Mendezona, nephews of Carmen,
and Pilar Mendezona, a sister of Carmen, filed an opposition to the guardianship petition.

In the course of the proceeding, the petitioners and oppositors (herein respondents and
petitioners) agreed that Carmen needed a guardian over her person and her properties, and
thus respondent Paz O. Montalvan was designated as guardian over the person of Carmen
while petitioner Mario Mendezona, respondents Roberto MOntalvan and Julio Ozamiz were
designated as joint guardians over the properties of Carmen. As guardians, Roberto and
Julio filed on August 6 1991 their ―inventories and accounts‖ which included the 10,396
sq.m. property covered by the April 28, 1989 DAS executed by Carmen in favor of
petitioners. Roberto and Julio caused the inscription on the titles of petitioners a notice of
lis pendens which gave rise to the suit for quieting of title.

In their Answer, the respondents opposed the petitioner‘s claim of ownership of the Lahug
property and alleged that the titles issued in the petitioner‘s names are defective and illegal,
and the ownership of the said property was acquired in bad faith and without value
inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable.
Respondents further alleged that at the time of the sale on April 1989, Carmen was already
ailing and was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners.

The RTC, rendered a decision in favor of petitioners finding that the property in
question was sold, with reservation of usufructuary rights by Carmen Ozamiz to petitioners
under a valid contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered into while she was of sound mind,
for good consideration and without fraud and that the notice of lis pendens should be
eliminated from the record and the RD and the ordered to expunge the same.

On appeal to the CA, the appellate court reversed the RTC decision finding that the DAS
dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove that the
consideration was actually paid and that at the time of the execution of the contract, the
mental faculties of Carmen were already seriously impaired. Thus, the CA declared the
DAS of April 28, 1989 to be null and void. The CA further ordered the cancellation of
the certificates of title issued in the petitioners name and directed the issuance of
new certificates of title in favor of Carmen Ozamiz or her estate.

Petitioners filed an MR with the CA but later, subsequently filed a motion for new
trial and/or reception of evidence. They contended, among other things, that the
appellate court totally ignored the testimony of Judge DUrias regarding the mental condition
of Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the DAS in question. The said
testimony was taken in the guardianship proceeding in the RTC, Oroquieta City. However,
Judge Durias was not presented as a witness in the guardianship proceeding. Petitioners
allege that Judge Durias‘ testimony is a newly discovered evidence which could not have
been discovered prior to the trial. The CA denied both motions, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Judge Durias was newly discovered evidence.

RULING:

285 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
NO. A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence is properly
granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence
had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that
if admitted, would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the
evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial.

We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As
early as the pre-trial of the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a
possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondents chose not to
present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is
free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias‘ testimony in another
case be considered as newly-discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge
Durias which were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the
petitioners at the trial.

The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by
questioning. It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly-discovered
evidence was necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred
to the party in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort was made to secure it;
there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts in question,
especially where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek
evidence available through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is
within the control of the complaining party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in
other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures. Thus, the
testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly-discovered evidence to warrant a
new trial.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated September 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6, in
Civil Case No. CEB-10766 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

286 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, v. LI KA KIM alias ED, appellant
GR 148586 25 May 2004.
Automatic Review
Vitug, J.

The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that:

(a) the evidence is discovered after trial;

(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of
such weight that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.

FACTS:

The Regional Intelligence Investigation Division (RIID) of the PNP received a report from
an informer named Boy that a certain alias Ed, known to be a drug dealer who was operating
in the southern part of Metro Manila, was looking for a buyer of shabu. The RIID
conducted a buy bust operation that led to the arrest of appellant Li Ka Kim alias Ed. The
appellant put forth the defense of denial. He claimed that he is a Chinese citizen who came
to the Philippines on a tourist visa. According to him, he was with Tan Eng Hong until the
date when the buy bust operation was conducted. They then went to a mall where he was
arrested. Later on, he was brought to the police station where the policemen allegedly
demanded of him P1M for his release. The trial court debunked appellant‘s defense of
denial.

The court found it hard to believe that appellant would be singled out by the police officers
from scores of people at the mall where he was arrested and later indicted for selling shabu.
Strangely, the court observed that appellant‘s friend, a certain Tan Eng Hong, did not appear
in court to corroborate his testimony. The court likewise noted that the car, as well as the
license plate, used by appellant had been stolen, and that appellant was an undocumented
alien as so shown from the Commissioner on Immigration. Finding the prosecution‘s
evidence far more credible than that of the defense and to have overwhelmingly established
the elements of the crime charged, the trial court convicted appellant and decreed the
penalty of death. In arriving at that penalty, the trial court considered the use of a motor
vehicle to be an aggravating circumstance.

Appellant contends that the (1) the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged; and (2) assuming arguendo that accused-appellant is guilty of
the crime charged, nonetheless, the trial court erred in imposing upon him the supreme
penalty of death. In this appeal, appellant filed a motion to remand the case for new trial. In
his motion, appellant would attempt to overturn his conviction or, at the very least, to be
given a chance for a new trial, citing Section 14, Rule 121, of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, because of newly discovered evidence, i.e., his passport which would establish his
true identity as Huang Xiao Wei, a Chinese National, and as having entered the Philippines

287 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
as a tourist. Invoking his constitutional right to an effective counsel, appellant chides his
former counsel for having failed to secure and present his travel documents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant‘s motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence (i.e. his passport should be granted)

RULING:

NO. The requisites of newly discovered evidence in order to justify a new trial are that - (a)
the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if
admitted, would likely change the judgment.

Not one of the requisites mentioned is attendant. Appellant‘s passport could have easily
been presented and produced during the trial. Then, too, the presentation of appellant‘s
passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. Most
importantly, appellant even identified himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang
Xiao Wei, which bolsters the conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true
identity in the nefarious enterprise.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction against appellant Li Ka Kim, a.k.a. ―Ed,‖ is

AFFIRMED with modification in that the penalty of DEATH imposed by the trial court is
hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA. In other respects, the judgment of the
court a quo is sustained. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

288 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA, petitioner, v. EDWARD RUMBAUA, respondent
GR 166738 14 August 2009
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Brion, J.

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial.

If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an
end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.

This will put a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with
a view to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the
instant case.

FACTS:

The present petition traces its roots to the Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua's (petitioner) complaint
for the declaration of nullity of marriage against Edward Rumbaua (respondent) before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by
the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under
one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for
his mother‘s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to
be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches,
Quezon City.

During the trial, aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true
copy of their marriage contract; and the testimony, curriculum vitae, and psychological
report of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).

RTC:

The court nullified the parties‘ marriage. Moreover, the trial court saw merit in the
testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag.

The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. In the CA:

The Appellate Court reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and denied the
nullification of the parties‘ marriage.

In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag‘s psychiatric report did not mention the
cause of the respondent‘s socalled ―narcissistic personality disorder;‖ it did not
discuss the respondent‘s childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight into
the respondent‘s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she

289 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
came to the conclusion that the respondent‘s incapacity was ―deep-seated‖ and
―incurable.‖

The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should remand the case to the RTC for the
petitioner to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony.

RULING:

NO. The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts‘ decisions and the remand of
the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally permissible. She
argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of her former
counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow
her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of
counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of
justice.

The Court did not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial
that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved
party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to
grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial
may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by
reason of which the aggrieved party‘s rights have probably been impaired; or (2)
newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could
not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the
result if presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her
former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the
RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner‘s
counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner‘s
counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable,
i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence
that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel
Corporation where we explained:

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the
ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial.
If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an
end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a
premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.
290 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25, 2004 and January 18, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
SO ORDERED.

291 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ROBERT CHUA, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
GR 196853 13 July 2015
Del Castillo, J.

The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e.,
when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have
been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance.

We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as
newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the
evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge
of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had
nonetheless failed to secure it.

FACTS:

Chua and private complainant Philip See (See) were long-time friends and neighbors. On
different dates from 1992 until 1993, Chua issued several postdated PSBank checks of
varying amounts to See pursuant to their rediscounting arrangement at a 3% rate.

However, See claimed that when he deposited the checks, they were dishonored either due
to insufficient funds or closed account. Despite demands, Chua failed to make good the
checks. Hence, See filed a Complaint2 for violations of BP 22 before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. In a Resolution, the prosecutor found probable cause and
recommended the filing of charges against Chua.

During the course of the trial, the prosecution formally offered as its evidence a demand
letter, however, objected to its admissibility on the grounds that it is a mere photocopy and
that it does not bear any proof that he actually received it. In view of these, Chua filed a
Motion to Submit Demurrer to Evidence. Per Chua‘s allegation, however, the MeTC failed
to act on his motion since the judge of said court vacated his post.

Several years later, the prosecution filed a Motion to Re-Open Presentation of Prosecution‘s
Evidence and Motion to Allow Prosecution to Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence
dated March 28, 2003. It averred that while See was still trying to locate a demand letter
dated November 30, 1993 (which it alleged to have been personally served upon Chua), the
prosecution nevertheless decided to rest its case on February 24, 1999 so as not to further
delay the proceedings. Again, the records of the case bear no copy of an MeTC Order or
Resolution granting the aforesaid motion of the prosecution. Nevertheless, extant on records
is a Formal Offer of Evidence filed by the private prosecutor submitting the demand letter
dated November 30, 1993 as additional evidence. In an Order dated November 18, 2005, the
MeTC refused to take cognizance of the supplemental formal offer on the ground that the
same was filed by the private prosecutor without the conformity of the public prosecutor. Be
that as it may, the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 eventually found its way into the
records of this case as Exhibit ―SSS.‖

292 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Later, the defense, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. It again pointed out
that the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 attached to See‘s affidavit-complaint is a
mere photocopy and not accompanied with a Post Office Registry Receipt and Registry
Return Receipt. Most importantly, it does not contain Chua‘s signature that would serve as
proof of his actual receipt thereof. In view of these, the defense surmised that the
prosecution fabricated the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 to remedy the lack of a
proper notice of dishonor upon Chua. At any rate, it argued that while the November 30,
1993 demand letter contains Chua‘s signature, the same should not be given any probative
value since it does not contain the date when he allegedly received the same. Hence, there is
simply no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period that the law affords an issuer to make
good the check from the date of his notice of its dishonor. In an Order dated January 12,
2007, the MeTC denied the defense‘s Demurrer to Evidence. In a Consolidated Decision,
the MeTC convicted Chua of 54 counts of violation of BP 22 after it found all the elements
of the offense obtaining in the case.

Before the CA:

Chua argued against the probative value of the demand letter dated November 30,
1993 by pointing out that:

(1) for more than 10 years from the time the case was filed, the prosecution
never adverted to its existence. He thus surmised that this was because the
document was not really missing but in fact inexistent – a mere afterthought
as to make it appear that the second element of the offense is obtaining in
the case;

(2) the subject demand letter is not a newly discovered evidence as it could
have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence; and,

(3) his counsel‘s admission of the physical existence of the subject demand
letter and Chua‘s signature thereon does not carry with it the admission of its
contents and his receipt of the same.

And just like the MeTC and the RTC, the CA concluded that the prosecution clearly
established all the elements of the offense of violation of BP 22.

ISSUE: Whether or not the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not qualify
as a newly discovered evidence within the purview of the law.

RULING:

NO. At any rate, the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 deserves no weight and
credence not only because it does not qualify as a newly discovered evidence within the
purview of the law but also because of its doubtful character.

293 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
As may be recalled, the prosecution had already long rested its case when it filed a Motion to
Re-Open Presentation of Prosecution‘s Evidence and Motion To Allow Prosecution To
Submit Additional Formal Offer of Evidence dated March 28, 2003. Intending to introduce
the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 as a newly discovered evidence, See attached to
the said motion an affidavit of even date where he stated the circumstances surrounding the
fact of his location of the same, viz.:

(2) When we initially presented our evidence in support of these criminal complaints,
I was already looking for a copy of the demand letter personally served by the affiant
(See) and duly received by [Chua];

(3) That despite diligent efforts to locate the demand letter x x x dated November 30,
1993, the same was not located until sometime in February 2002 when I was having
our old house/office located at C-5 Christian Street, Grace Village, Quezon City,
cleaned and ready to be rented out;

(4) x x x [upon] showing the same to the new handling public prosecutor, he advised
the affiant to have it presented in Court.

In Ybiernas v. Tanco-Gabaldon, the Court held that: The question of whether evidence is
newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered,
and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter
that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. We have held that in order that a
particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new
trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into
existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it;
what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has
exercised due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case.
Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is often equated with ―reasonable
promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant.‖ In other words, the concept of due
diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant for a new
trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he
must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the defendant
acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the facts known to him.

―Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly discovered evidence are:

(a) the evidence was discovered after trial;

(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and
(c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such
weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.‖

294 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In this case, the Court holds that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 does not
qualify as a newly discovered evidence within the purview of the law. Per See‘s statements in
his affidavit, the said evidence was already known to him at the time he filed his complaint
against Chua. It was also apparently available considering that it was just kept in his house.
Undeniably, had See exercised reasonable diligence, he could have promptly located the said
demand letter and presented it during trial. However, the circumstances suggest otherwise.

Curiously, while See claims that the demand letter dated November 30, 1993 was already
existing at the time he filed the complaint, the same was not mentioned therein. Only the
demand letter dated December 10, 1993 was referred to in the complaint, which per See‘s
own allegations, was also not actually received by Chua. In addition, the prosecution failed to
present the original copy of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 during trial. Clearly
on the basis of the demand letter dated December 10, 1993 alone, the prosecution cannot
possibly establish the existence of the second element of the offense. Indeed, the
surrounding circumstances and the doubtful character of the demand letter dated November
30, 1993 make it susceptible to the conclusion that its introduction was a mere afterthought
– a belated attempt to fill in a missing component necessary for the existence of the second
element of BP 22.

All told, the Court cannot convict Chua for violation of BP 22 with moral certainty.

295 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
NAPOLEON D. SENIT, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
GR 192914. 11 January 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.:

A new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was available during trial but was
not presented due to its negligence.

―A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met:

(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;

(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to
locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.‖

FACTS:

Private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the
direction of Valencia onboard his Toyota pickup with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-
year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left and
was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by petitioner
and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big
truck from the right side.

Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the
road and applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision
with the pickup. The bus crashed into the right side of private complainant‘s pickup at
a right angle.

Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to

Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property in an Amended Information
which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay City.

Upon arraignment, Senit pleaded not guilty.

Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he
resigned from his employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became
unknown so he was not presented as a witness by his new counsel

RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the crime charged

The RTC issued a Promulgation, which included an order for the arrest of the petitioner.

296 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Senit then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the ground that:

- errors of law or irregularities have been committed during trial that are allegedly
prejudicial to his substantial rights;
- he was not able to present evidence during trial because he was not notified of the
schedule;
- he mistakenly believed that the case against him has been dismissed as private
complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr.

Public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial filed by the petitioner.

The motion for new trial was denied by the lower court pronouncing that notices have been
duly served the parties and that the reason given by the petitioner was self-serving.

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of by registered mail to the
CA, on both questions of facts and laws.

CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed

In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows:

First, the evidence presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the
culprit.

Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as
baseless

Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods that is — imprisonment for three (3)
months

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, in its
Resolution

The petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court, praying that the applicable law
on the matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation of facts committed by the court a
quo and by the CA be given a second look.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in denying the motion for new trial
or to reopen the same in order to allow the petitioner to present evidence on
his behalf

RULING:

No. RTC and CA did not err in denying the petitioner‘s motion for new trial or to reopen
the same.

297 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the petitioner, have been committed during trial.

The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The Court shall grant a new trial on any of the
following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of

the accused have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if
introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

First, no substantial right of the accused was prejudice during trial.

Trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Second, there is no legal basis for the grant of the motion for new trial.

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met:

(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;

(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admit ted, it would probably change
the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure
it.

However, a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was available during
trial but was not presented due to its negligence.

The Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the motion for
new trial of the petitioner.

Senit was not in any way deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process
as he had previous notice of the criminal case filed against him. SC noted that the petitioner
had been arraigned already, thus the court had acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there
was already initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his whereabouts became
unknown.
298 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
He was given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner he was duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense, but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at
the scheduled hearings. He wasted his opportunity to be heard by not being diligent enough
to ask about the status of the criminal case against him and inform his counsel of his
whereabouts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 20,
2009 and the Resolution dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
00390-MIN are AFFIRMED

299 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 40:
Appeal from the Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court

WILFREDO DE VERA, et al., petitioners, v. SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO, SR., et

al., respondents
GR 179457 22 June 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction;
If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on
the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of
affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the
case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings.

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section,
without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.‖

In Serrano v. Spouses Gutierrez,16 the Court explained that the first paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued without trial of the case
on the merits, while the second paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal
but the case was tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for
dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction.

Verily, the second paragraph refutes respondents‘ contention that Section 8, Rule 40 refers
solely to cases where the MTC dismissed a case filed therein without a trial on the merits
and an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of dismissal. Therefore, the RTC
correctly proceeded to decide the case on the merits despite the MTC‘s lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.

FACTS:

On 24 January 2000, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession

with damages against the respondents with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, over a subdivided land allegedly possessed in an open, continuous and exclusive
manner, free from any third person since 1967. However, despite such possession, a free
patent has been issued by the Bureau of Lands under respondents‘ names which they claim
should not be, considering that the thirty (30) year occupation should ipso facto convert the
land to private land, and hence outside the powers of the Bureau of Lands to be issued a
patent thereon.

300 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Respondents answered, and filed a counterclaim, alleging that they are the actual owners of
said land as evidenced by a Deed of Sale entered with the Registry of Deeds (RD) in 1996,
tax declaration, and that the case should be dismissed on the ground that the assessed value
of the land is Php54,370.00, thus the MTC has no jurisdiction over it, but rather the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Further, they raised that since the title was entered with the RD
on 1996, and this complaint was filed only in the year 2000, the title is indefeasible
considering that more than one (1) year has elapsed from the entry with RD.

The MTC:

Ruled in favour of respondents, and dismissed the complaint, further ruling that
the land should be under their ownership as the ones having a better right

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal with the RTC:

Reversing the MTC decision, holding that the petitioners has a better right

Not be outdone, respondents filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA):

Sets aside both the decisions of the MTC and RTC, for lack of jurisdiction by the
former, the latter cannot take cognizance over such. Further, the CA stated that even
assuming that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case, it cannot declare the nullity of
the patent, considering the indefeasibility of title.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has no appellate jurisdiction over a decision of the
MTC issued despite having no jurisdiction thereto

RULING:

Yes, the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the case. In arriving at the conclusion, the Court
cited the following provision under Rule 40 on Appeals from the MTC to the RTC:

―Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction;
If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a
trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may
be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the
case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the
case shall be remanded for further proceedings.

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.‖
301 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The above provision both contemplates lack of jurisdiction, but differs on the action taken
by the lower court. In this case, what would be applicable is the 2 nd paragraph, considering
that the trial on the merits was done despite the MTC having no jurisdiction from the
beginning.

The RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the MTC, regardless of the amount
involved, considering the former‘s jurisdiction as an appellate court over decisions made by
the first level court.

Thus, the RTC aside from having exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case having an assessed value greater than Php50,000, it unquestionably also as
jurisdiction over the MTC decisions. It necessarily follows that the CA erred in declaring that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case, as the MTC had no jurisdiction in the first place
and thus nothing to appeal in the RTC. The correct interpretation is that under Rule 40, and
BP 129, the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions, regardless of the latter‘s
jurisdiction or absence thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

The Court of Appeals‘ Decision dated May 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated August 22,
2007 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 79769 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for the prompt resolution of the factual issues
raised in the respondents‘ petition for review of the Decision dated June 14, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 64. This Decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

Remand to the CA;

That the Court determined that the RTC has indeed jurisdiction over the case, it follows
then that the CA should have resolved the issues as the procedure followed complies with
the Rules and BP 129.

302 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 41:
Appeal from the Regional Trial Court

HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA I, (In substitution of HEIRS OF MELECIO BUENO),

petitioners, v. MUNICIPALITY OF IBA, ZAMBALES, respondent
GR 162217 22 July 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Bersamin, J.

―The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter of right, but the appeal by petition
for review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion.

An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a superior
court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In
contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered
by a court in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the
superior court in its discretion. Verily, the CA has the discretion whether to due course to
the petition for review or not.

The procedure taken after the perfection of an appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs
from that taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the clerk of court of the RTC is
burdened to immediately undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the
correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the transmittal to the CA must be
made within 30 days from the perfection of the appeal. This requirement of transmittal of
the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon order of the CA when deemed
necessary.‖

FACTS:

The late Melecio Bueno was the tenant-farmer beneficiary of an agricultural land located in
Poblacion, Iba, Zambales.

October 18, 1999, he brought an ejectment suit in the MTC of Iba against the Municipality
of Iba, Province of Zambales, claiming that in 1983, the Municipality of Iba had
constructed the public market on a substantial portion of his land without his
consent; and that his repeated demands for the Municipality of Iba to vacate the
property had remained unheeded. MTC ruled on favor of Bueno.

Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due course to the
notice of appeal.

Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba,
Zambales to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to
Branch 69 which ultimately granted the petition for certiorari.

303 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The petitioners, who substituted Bueno upon his death, moved for the
reconsideration of the judgment granting the petition for certiorari, but the RTC
denied their motion for reconsideration.

Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA by petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Rules of Court.

The CA ―dismissed‖ the petitioners‘ petition for review on October 28, 2003 for not being
the proper mode of appeal, observing that the assailed orders had been issued by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. The motion for reconsideration of the
petitioners was ultimately denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in denying due course to the petition.

HELD:

No, the CA is correct.

The petitioners should have filed a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days
from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within the same period should have paid
to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.

The petitioners plead for liberality, insisting that their petition for review, even if it was the
wrong mode, was a substantial compliance with the proper mode of appeal. The plea for
liberality is unworthy of any sympathy from the Court. We have always looked at appeal as
not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege. As the parties invoking the privilege, the
petitioners should have faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

R41
 Matter of Right
 From RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to CA
 Taken from a judgement or final order that completely disposes of the case, or a particular
matter therein when declared by the rules to be applicable.

R42
 Matter of Discretion
 From RTC in its appellate jurisdiction to CA
 Taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its
primary appellate jurisdiction

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the Court of Appeals

promulgated on October 28, 2003 and February 10, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 78706; and
ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

304 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 42:
Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals

TEDDY MARAVILLA, petitioner v. JOSEPH RIOS, respondent

GR 196875 19 August 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for
review shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same
rule states that failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements regarding the
contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof.

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 695 SCRA 10 (2013), this Court held that there are three guideposts
in determining the necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under
Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only
those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said
document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the
court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be
appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document
already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are
summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment
is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given
due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted
the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be
decided on the merits.

The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect
that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is whether the
accompanying documents support the allegations of the petition.

FACTS:

In 2003, respondent Joseph Rios filed a criminal case against Teddy Maravilla for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries before the MTCC if Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental. Rios accused Maravilla of recklessly driving his jeep which caused it to
collide with the motorcycle that Rios was then driving, causing him to be injured and

305 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
incapacitated to work for more than 90 days. The MTCC acquitted Maravilla of the
criminal charges but found preponderance of evidence to hold him liable for
damages for the injuries incurred by Rios and as such was ordered to pay P20,000 as
temperate damages. Other claims for damages was dismissed for lack of basis.
Rios appealed the decision at the RTC where the decision of the MTCC was modified
by: (1) deleting the temperate damages of P20,000; (2) payment of actual and
compensatory damages of P256,386.25; and (3) no award for moral damages and
attorney‘s fees and no costs.

Maravilla then filed a petition for review with the CA but was dismissed, for being
defective. An MR was filed, but was still dismissed for being defective, hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for review under
Rule 42 due to technicalities.

RULING:

YES. Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition
for review shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and other
material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. Section 3 of
the same rule states that failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the requirements
regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that there are three guideposts in determining
the necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42
and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the
petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of
relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in
the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse
of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be
appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another
document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a
position paper are summarized in a questioned, it will suffice that only a certified
copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be
given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner
later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of
justice that the case be decided on the merits.

306 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under
Rule 42, reflect that the significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached
documents is whether the accompanying documents support the allegations of the
petition.

Petitioner‘s failure to attach relevant portions of the evidence and transcript of stenographic
notes — to his Petition, initially, and Motion for Reconsideration, subsequently — which
were not tackled in the decisions of the courts below, but which are material to his claim that
respondent failed to testify as to and prove actual damages, is fatal to his Petition for Review
before the CA. In short, none of the three guideposts spelled out in Galvez were observed in
petitioner‘s case.

Further, when petitioner argued that it is the Court which should get all the records from the
court a quo if it wants to be more informed of the issues, was not well taken by the CA. The
annexes mentioned in Section 2(d) of Rule 42 are required to be appended to the petition in
order to enable this Court to determine even without consulting the record if the petition is
patently without merit or the issues raised therein are too insubstantial to require
consideration, in which case the petition should be dismissed outright, or whether there is a
need to require the respondent to comment on the petition. Section 3 of Rule 42 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that if petitioner fails to comply with the submission of
―documents which should accompany the petition,‖ it ―shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.‖ In this case, the insufficiency of the supporting documents coupled
with the unjustified refusal of the petitioner to even attempt to substantially comply
with the attachment requirement justified the dismissal of his petition. Thus, even
though petitioner exercises the initiative to select what will be attached to his
Petition for Review, it is the CA that ultimately determines the sufficiency of these
attachments.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The July 25, 2008 and April 4, 2011
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. CEB No. 03594 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

307 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 43:
Appeal from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals

ALICIA C. GALINDEZ, petitioner, v. SALVACION FIRMALAN; THE HON. OFFICE

OF THE PRESIDENT THROUGH THE HON. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; and THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION IV,
respondents
GR 187186 6 June 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Leonen, J.

―In Solid Homes v. Payawal, this Court explained that administrative agencies are
considered specialists in the fields assigned to them; hence, they can resolve problems in
their respective fields ―with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice.‖

Thus, this Court has consistently accorded respect and even finality to the findings of fact of
administrative bodies, in recognition of their expertise and technical knowledge over
matters falling within their jurisdiction.

Moreover, Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that findings of fact
of a quasi-judicial agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the
Court of Appeals. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding the findings
of fact of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and of the Office of the
President.‖

FACTS:

On 1949, Salvacion Firmalan (Firmalan) filed an Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) with
the Bureau of Lands (Bureau) over a parcel of land in Romblon under the Public Land Act
(PLA). While the Bureau made favourable recommendations in Firmalan‘s behalf, records
are bereft of any action taken thereafter. Thus, in 1967, Firmalan again filed an application,
with the addition of a certain portion pertaining to the said land.

Alicia Galindez (Galindez) filed a protest thereto, contending that she and her family were in
possession since 1951, and even constructed a building therein. Further, she said that she
also filed an application on 1964.

Bureau‘s officers observed the following:

1. Initially, it was stated the land was occupied in equal portions by Firmalan and a
certain Felipe Gaa, Sr. (Gaa), thus the portion pertaining to the latter should be
excluded from the application;
2. However, the above was corrected by the same Inspector, saying that instead, it was
the son Galindez who occupied the same and not Firmalan; and

308 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
3. Recommending that Firmalan be given a better right, considering that Galindez,
through trickery, entered the premises subject of the MSA

The report was elevated to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources‘
(DENR) Regional Executive Director (RED), and has decided that by virtue of Firmalan‘s
earlier application, she has a better right over Galindez, and that the latter‘s possession
through trickery could never ripen to ownership, considering that there is a prior application
making the land in question not capable of possession, and that it can only be acquired by
complying with the requirements of the PLA, which, obviously, Galindez did not follow.
Likewise, the RED denied the Motion for Reconsideration (MR)

The appeals to the DENR Secretary, Office of the President, and Court of Appeals (CA),
upheld the findings of the RED.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Galindez has a better right over the lands in question

RULING:

No, it is Firmalan who has a better right over the lands in question.

Findings of fact made by quasi-judicial agencies are afforded great weight, when supported
by substantial evidence. In such cases, the CA, as the appellate court over decisions made by
the quasi-judicial agency, shall give utmost respect to findings of the latter, as it is within the
bounds of their expertise.

In this case, decades worth of ocular inspections and hearing repeatedly upheld the better
right of Firmalan, and thus, serves as the basis for the findings of the Bureau, DENR RED,
DENR Secretary, and the Office of the President.

It is undisputed, that because of the earlier application by Firmalan, the quasi-judicial

agencies time and time again held that a better right must be afforded to Firmalan, and
Galindez‘ cannot anchor her claim on the possession as early as 1951, considering that the
first application was made in 1949, and heavily favoured.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals‘

November 27, 2008 Decision and March 13, 2009 Resolution in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 95114
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

309 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 44:
Ordinary Appealed Cases

TERESITA DE LOS SANTOS and SPOUSES RAPHAEL LOPEZ and ANALYN DE LOS
SANTOS-LOPEZ, petitioners v. JOEL LUCENIO AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
CLAIMING RIGHTS AND AUTHORITY UNDER HIM, respondents
GR 215659 19 March 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

―Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may
include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the
court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties. This provision embodies
the settled principle that, on appeal, the parties are not allowed to change their ―theory of
the case‖‖

FACTS:

Petitioners Teresita de los Santos and Spouses Analyn de los Santos-Lopez and Raphael
Lopez filed before the MTC of Biñan, Laguna, a Complaint for Ejectment/Unlawful
Detainer with Damages, against respondents Joel Lucenio and all persons claiming rights
and authority under him. Petitioners alleged that in 2010, a Deed of Conditional Sale was
executed by the GSIS over the subject property in favor of Teresita; that despite demand by
petitioners, respondent Joel refused to vacate the subject property; and that petitioners filed
a complaint against respondent Joel before the Barangay LupongTagapamayapa but the
same was unavailing as the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.

In his Answer, respondent Joel raised as a defense lack of cause of action. He alleged that in
1995, his sister obtained a housing loan from the GSIS to purchase the subject property, and
subsequently acquired ownership over it; that he then availed of the condonation or amnesty
program offered by the GSIS for the unpaid amortizations of his sister; that he was deprived
of due process as the GSIS executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of petitioners
without first acting on his offer to purchase the property;

MTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners, finding that the latter had a better right
over the subject property as they acquired an inchoate right of ownership by virtue of the
Deed of Conditional Sale executed by GSIS.

Joel appealed the MTC Decision to the RTC, which affirmed the findings of the MTC. Joel
moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same. Thereafter, the RTC issued Orders
granting petitioners' Motion for Immediate Execution and Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Break Open Order.

Unfazed, Joel elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. For the first time, Joel raised, as an issue the alleged failure of the GSIS to
comply with the provisions under RA No. 6552, otherwise known as the Maceda Law. He

310 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
alleged that his sister's contract had not been cancelled and that she had not received the
cash surrender value of the payments made on the subject property.

CA reversed the ruling of the RTC for failure of the GSIS to issue a notarized notice of
cancellation and to refund the cash surrender value of the payments made on the subject
property. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that the CA erred in allowing
respondent Joel to change his theory on appeal. In any case, petitioners attached a copy of
the notarized cancellation of the contract from the GSIS to dispute the allegation of
respondent Joel. CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners‘ Motion for Reconsideration for
lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA was correct to allow respondent Joel to change his theory
for the first time in his petition for review.

RULING:

No. Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court provides:

Questions that may be raised an appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has filed a
motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors
any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues framed by the parties.

This provision embodies the settled principle that, on appeal, the parties are not allowed to
change their "theory of the case," which is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as:

A comprehensive and orderly menial arrangement of principle and facts, conceived

and constructed for the purpose of securing a judgment or decree of a court in favor
of a litigant; the particular line of reasoning of either party to a suit, the purpose
being to bring together certain facts of the case in a logical sequence and to correlate
them in a way that produces in the decision maker's mind a definite result or
conclusion favored by the advocate.

In other words, an issue not alleged in the complaint nor raised before the trial court cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal as this goes against the basic rules of fair play, justice,
and due process. In the same way, a defense not pleaded in the answer cannot also be raised
for the first time on appeal.

From respondent Joel‘s Answer, Pre-Trial Brief, and assignment of errors in his Appellant‘s
Brief, it is apparent that the issue of whether the GSIS complied with the Maceda Law or
not was never brought to the attention of the MTC and the RTC. Respondents‘ contention
that the MTC and the RTC should have taken judicial notice of the Maceda Law is untenable
as the issue of compliance with the Maceda Law is a factual matter, which should have been
alleged or raised as a defense in the Answer. And since respondent Joel failed to allege such
matters in his Answer, there was no reason for the MTC, as well as the RTC, to resolve the
issue and apply the Maceda Law.

311 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 29, 2014
Decision and the December 1, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 130384 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 4, 2013 Judgment
and the May 20, 2013 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 25, in
Civil Case No. B-8784, affirming the March 20, 2012 Decision of the Municipal Trial Court
of Biñan, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 4086, are hereby REINSTATED.

In addition, the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the subject property
shall incur a legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from May 16, 2010 up to the finality of
this decision. Thereafter, an interest of 6% per annum shall be imposed on the total amount
due until full payment is made.
SO ORDERED.

312 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 45:
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

LOLITA ESPIRITU SANTO MENDOZA and SPS. ALEXANDER and ELIZABETH

GUTIERREZ, petitioners, v. SPS. RAMON, SR. and NATIVIDAD PALUGOD,
respondents
GR 220517 20 June 2018.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Caguioa, J.

As a rule, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are final and conclusive,
and they cannot be reviewed by the Court which has jurisdiction to rule only on questions of
law in Rule 45 petitions to review.

There are, however, recognized exceptions where the Court may review questions of fact.
These are:

1) when the factual conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and
conjectures;

2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3) when there is abuse of discretion;

4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

6) when the CA went beyond the issues of the case in making its findings, which are further
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

7) when the CA‘s findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

8) when the conclusions do not cite the specific evidence on which they are based;

9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents;

10) when the CA‘s findings of fact, supposedly premised on the absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; or

11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

FACTS:

313 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Petitioner Lolita Espiritu Santo Mendoza and Jasminia Palugod were close friends. In 1991,
Lolita and Jasminia bought the subject lot on installment for one year until they decided to
pay the balance in full. In 1995, Jasminia became afflicted with breast cancer. Sometime in
1996, Lolita and Jasminia constructed a residential house on the subject lot. Although Lolita
has no receipts, she shared in the cost of the construction of the house from her income in
the catering business and selling of various products.

On May 11, 2004, Jasminia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Lolita, who
eventually mortgaged the subject property to Elizabeth Gutierrez as a security for a loan in
the amount of Php800,000.00. On the other hand, respondent spouses Palugod alleged that
their daughter, the late Jasminia, acquired the property located in Sagana Homes, Habay,
Bacoor, Cavite. Prior to and after the said acquisition of the subject property, Jasminia was
living with Lolita, a lesbian. Unfortunately, Jasminia was afflicted with Stage IV breast
cancer. When she was nearing her death, she told her mother, respondent Natividad
Palugod, that her house and lot shall go to her brother Ramonito Palugod, but petitioner
shall be allowed to stay therein Meanwhile, Lolita, taking advantage of her relationship with
Jasminia, caused the latter to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor. Upon learning from
the Office of the Registry of Deeds that Jasminia's certificate of title has been cancelled,
respondents executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim of their right and interest over the
property as the only compulsory and legitimate heirs of Jasminia. However, Lolita, knowing
fully well of the impending suit, made it appear that she mortgaged the property to Spouses
Gutierrez as a security for a loan amounting to Php800,000.00.

The RTC‘s Ruling

On March 14, 2013, the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch 19, rendered the assailed
Decision in favor of respondents. The RTC declared that there can be no contract
unless the following concur: (1) consent; (2) object certain; and (3) cause of the
obligation. Respondents were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the
Deed of Sale involved no actual monetary consideration.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC, in the

assailed Order dated May 8, 2014, denied the same for lack of merit. Aggrieved,
petitioners interposed an appeal before the CA.

The CA‘s Ruling

The CA found no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the RTC that the
deed of sale is null and void for being absolutely simulated since it did not involve
any actual monetary consideration.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the decision of the RTC that the
Deed of Absolute Sale is void for lack of consideration.

RULING:
314 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
YES. As a rule, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the RTC are final and
conclusive, and they cannot be reviewed by the Court which has jurisdiction to rule only on
questions of law in Rule 45 petitions to review.

The Court in Pascual v. Burgos, 778 SCRA 189 (2016), reiterated that:

A question of fact requires this Court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations of the parties. This review includes assessment of the ―probative value of
the evidence presented.‖ There is also a question of fact when the issue presented
before this Court is the correctness of the lower courts‘ appreciation of the evidence
presented by the parties.

There are, however, recognized exceptions where the Court may review questions of fact.
These are:

1) when the factual conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises

and conjectures;
2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3) when there is abuse of discretion;
4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
6) when the CA went beyond the issues of the case in making its findings, which are
further contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7) when the CA‘s findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8) when the conclusions do not cite the specific evidence on which they are based;
9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner‘s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
10) when the CA‘s findings of fact, supposedly premised on the absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; or
11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

As will be demonstrated below, the Court‘s review of the factual findings of the courts
below is justified by the fourth, tenth and eleventh exceptions the assailed judgments of the
CA and the RTC are based on a misapprehension of facts; the findings of fact of the CA and
the RTC, supposedly premised on the absence of evidence, are contradicted by the evidence
on record; and the CA as well as the RTC manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

Both the RTC and the CA declared the DAS void on the ground that it was fictitious or
simulated on account of lack of consideration. As correctly pointed out by petitioner Lolita,
the DAS is itself the proof that the sale of the property is supported by sufficient
consideration. This is anchored on the disputable presumption of consideration inherent in
every contract. Thus, Article 1354 of the Civil Code provides: ―Although the cause is not
stated in the contract, it is presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the
contrary.‖ This disputable presumption is reiterated in the Rules of Court, Section 3, Rule
131.
315 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
With the presumption in favor of petitioner Lolita who is the vendee, it became incumbent
upon respondents to present preponderant evidence to prove lack of consideration.
Respondents‘ mere assertion that the DAS has no consideration is inadequate.

In addition, the lower courts misapprehended the admission by petitioner Lolita that she did
not pay the consideration before the Notary Public. They excised from their judgment‘s
petitioner Lolita‘s sworn testimony as to how the consideration was paid by her. The portion
of petitioner Lolita‘s testimony that the lower courts quoted in their respective Decisions
does not even indubitably show that no consideration had been paid. What petitioner Lolita
admitted was that the consideration was not paid ―before the Notary Public,‖ and, as
correctly pointed out by her, there is no legal requirement that the consideration of a sale be
paid in the very presence of the Notary Public before whom the deed of sale is
acknowledged.

Given the foregoing, contrary to the findings of the CA and the RTC, which evidently arose
from their misapprehension and non-consideration of relevant facts, respondents have not
discharged their burden of proof to rebut either the presumption of sufficient consideration
of the DAS or the evidence of petitioner Lolita. In fine, respondents failed to establish their
cause of action by preponderance of evidence.

Consequently, the DAS executed by Jasminia in favor of petitioner Lolita over the subject
property is valid, the presumption that it has sufficient consideration not having been
rebutted. The same holds true regarding the Real Estate Mortgage between petitioner Lolita
and petitioners‘ spouses Alexander and Elizabeth Gutierrez.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 29, 2015 and its Resolution dated September 10, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
102904 as well as the Decision dated March 14, 2013 and Order dated May 8, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. BCV 2004-217 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed in Civil Case No. BCV 2004-217
is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.
SO ORDERED.

316 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
KENSONIC, INC., petitioner, v. UNI-LINE MULTI-RESOURCES, INC., (PHIL.), respondent.
GR 211820-21 6 June 2018

UNI-LINE MULTI-RESOURCES, INC., petitioner, v. KENSONIC, INC., respondent

GR 211834-35 6 June 2018
Bersamin, J.

Court cannot act on a factual matter in this appeal by petition for review on certiorari, which
is limited to the consideration of questions of law.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is well defined. According
to Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escaño, Jr.:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of
the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one
of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case,
it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

FACTS:

Under consideration are the consolidated appeals urging the review and reversal of the
decision on July 30, 2013, and the amended decision on March 19, 2014, whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision rendered by the Director General of the Intellectual
Property Office (IPO) upholding the cancellation of the application of Uni-Line for the
registration of the SAKURA mark for goods falling under Class 09 of the Nice International
Classification of Goods (Nice Classification), and allowing the registration of Uni-Line's
SAKURA mark registration for goods falling under Class 07 and Class 11 of the Nice
Classification.

On June 15, 1999, Uni-Line filed an application for the registration of the mark "SAKURA"
for amplifier, speaker, cassette, cassette disk, video cassette disk, car stereo, television, digital
video disk, mini component, tape deck, compact disk charger, VHS, and tape rewinder
falling under Class 9 of the Nice International Classification of Goods. Kensonic opposed
Uni-Line's application which was docketed as IPC No. 14-2004-00160 (IPC 1). The Director
of the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) rendered Decision No. 2005-01 dated November 29,
2005 finding that Kensonic was the first to adopt and use the mark SAKURA since 1994
and thus rejecting Uni-Line's application. On January 19, 2006, said Decision became final
and executory.

While IPC Case 1 was pending, Uni-Line filed an application and was issued a certificate of
registration for the mark "SAKURA & FLOWER DESIGN" for use on recordable compact
317 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
disk (CD-R) computer, computer parts and accessories falling under Class 9. On September
7, 2006, Kensonic filed a petition for cancellation docketed as IPC No. 14-2006-00183 (IPC
2) of Uni-Line's registration. In Decision No. 08-113 dated August 7, 2008, the BLA
Director held that Uni-Line's goods are related to Kensonic's goods and that the latter was
the first user of the mark SAKURA used on products under Class 9. The BLA Director thus
cancelled Uni-Line's certificate of registration. Uni-Line moved for reconsideration of the
BLA Director's Decision which is pending resolution to date.

On June 6, 2002, Uni-Line filed an application for the registration of the trademark
SAKURA for use on the following:

Class 07
Washing machines, high pressure washers, vacuum cleaners, floor polishers, blender,
electric mixer, electrical juicer

Class 09
Television sets, stereo components, DVD/VCD players, voltage regulators, portable
generators, switch breakers, fuse

Class 11
Refrigerators, air conditioners, oven toaster, turbo broiler, rice cooker, microwave
oven, coffee maker, sandwich/waffle maker, electric stove, electric fan, hot & cold
water dispenser, airpot, electric griller and electric hot pot

Kensonic opposed Uni-Line's application on the ground that the latter had prior use and
registration of the SAKURA mark since October 1994.

Decision of the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA)

The BLA Director cancelled Uni-Line's certificate of registration. It observed that

the marks were confusingly similar with each other; that the goods sought to be
covered by the SAKURA registration of Uni-Line were related to the goods of
Kensonic under Class 09 goods (namely: amplifiers, speakers, cassette disks, video
cassette disks, car stereos, televisions, digital video disks, mini components, tape
decks, compact disk chargers, VHS and tape rewinders). Hence, appeal
to the Director General, IPO.

Decision of the Director General, IPO

Director General of the IPO ruled in favor of Uni-Line's registration of the

SAKURA mark as to goods classified as Class 07 and Class 11, but denied its
registration under class 09. The registration of products of Uni-Line falling under
Class 07 and Class 11 should not be cancelled because the products were different
from the goods registered under Class 09 in the name of Kensonic.

Hence, appeal to CA by both parties.

318 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Judgment of the CA

The CA upheld Kensonic's ownership of the SAKURA mark based on its showing
of its use of the mark since 1994, but ruled that despite the identical marks of
Kensonic and Uni-Line, Kensonic's goods under Class 09 were different from or
unrelated to Uni-Line's goods under Class 07 and Class 11. It observed that the
protection of the law regarding the SAKURA mark could only extend to television
sets, stereo components, DVD and VCD players but not to Uni-Line's voltage
regulators, portable generators, switch breakers and fuses due to such goods being
unrelated to Kensonic's goods; that Kensonic's registration only covered electronic
audio-video products, not electrical home appliances; and that the similarity of the
marks would not confuse the public because the products were different and
unrelated.

Hence, Kensonic appeal to SC

ISSUE: Whether or not petition the for certiorari should be granted

RULING:

The appeal of Kensonic in G.R. Nos. 211820-21 is dismissed but the petition in G.R. Nos.
211834-35 is partially granted.

Kensonic's prior use of the mark since 1994 made it the owner of the mark, and its
ownership cannot anymore be challenged at this stage of the proceedings. Seeking the review
of Kensonic's ownership would entail the examination of facts already settled by the lower
tribunals.

Uni-Line's challenge to the ownership of the SAKURA mark should stop here
because the Court cannot act on a factual matter in this appeal by petition for review
on certiorari, which is limited to the consideration of questions of law.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court specifically so provides:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal

by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies
by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding lat any time during its
pendency.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is well defined. According
to Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escaño, Jr.:

319 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of
whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.

It is timely to remind, too, that the Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, the factual findings of
the quasi-judicial body like the IPO, especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the
Court. Jurisprudence has laid down certain exceptions to the rule of bindingness, but, alas,
Uni-Line did not discharge its burden to show how its urging for a review of the factual
findings came within any of the exceptions.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
211820-21; PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No.
211834-35; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the amended decision promulgated on March
19, 2014; PARTIALLY REINSTATES the decision promulgated on July 30, 2013 insofar
as it allowed the registration by Uni-Line Multi-Resources, Inc. under the SAKURA mark of
its voltage regulators, portable generators, switch breakers and fuses;
and ORDERS Kensonic, Inc. to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

320 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 50:
Dismissal of Appeal

LOURDES VALDERAMA, petitioner, v. SONIA ARGUELLES and LORNA

ARGUELLES, respondents
GR 223660 2 April 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Tijam, J.

Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals;

An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising
only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court.

Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate
judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.

FACTS:

On Sonia Arguelles and Lorna Arguelles (respondents) filed a petition to cancel adverse
claim involving a parcel of land before the RTC, Branch 4, Manila.

In their petition, respondents alleged that Conchita Amongo Francia (Conchita), who was
the registered owner of a parcel of land, freely and voluntarily executed an absolute deed of
sale of the subject property in favor of respondents.

Conchita filed an affidavit of adverse claim, however Conchita died. As registered owners of
the subject property, respondents prayed for the cancellation of the adverse claim in the
petition subject of this controversy.

Petitioner and Tarcila Lopez (Tarcila), as full blooded sisters of Conchita, filed an
opposition to the petition. They claimed that upon Conchita's death, the latter's claims and
rights against the subject property were transmitted to her heirs by operation of law. They
also argued that the sale of the subject property to the respondents was simulated as
evidenced by the following, among others:

(1) Conchita had continuous physical and legal possession over the subject property;
(2) Conchita was the one paying for the real estate taxes for the subject property; and
(3) Conchita had in her possession, up to the time of her death, the Owner's
Duplicate Copy of the TCT.

Meanwhile, while the petition to cancel adverse claim was pending before the RTC,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and physical possession of a piece

321 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
of realty and its improvements with damages and with prayer for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner and Tarcila, among
others.

In light of the respondent's filing of the complaint, petitioner and Tarcila filed a notice of lis
pendens with respect to the subject property.

Respondents filed a manifestation and motion praying for the outright cancellation of the
adverse claim annotated on the subject property on the ground that petitioner's subsequent
filing of notice of lis pendens rendered the issue moot and academic.

After an exchange of several pleadings between the parties, the RTC issued a Resolution
ordering the cancellation of the adverse claim.

Petitioner and Tarcila filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in
a Resolution.

The CA rendered a decision dismissing petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The CA held
that the issue on cancellation of adverse claim is a question of law since its resolution would
not involve an examination of the evidence but only an application of the law on a particular
set of facts. Having raised a sole question of law, the petition was dismissed by the CA
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner's appeal before the CA raised purely questions of law
thereby warranting its outright dismissal.

RULING:

Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, viz:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. -

(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with the Rule 45.

Moreover, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules provide that an appeal to the CA raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed outright, thus:

Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. - An appeal under Rule 41
taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions
of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court.
Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the
appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred

to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. (Emphasis Ours)
322 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Applying the foregoing rules, there is no question that an appeal from the RTC to the CA
raising only questions of law is an improper appeal which shall be dismissed outright. Thus,
We now delve into the issue on whether petitioner's appeal before the CA raised purely
questions of law thereby warranting its outright dismissal.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, its resolution must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, but must rely solely on what the
law provides on the given set of facts. If the facts are disputed or if the issues require an
examination of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact. The test, therefore, is not the
appellation given to a question by the party raising it, but whether the appellate court can
resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question
of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.

As correctly observed by the CA, a careful perusal of the records reveals that the essential
facts of the case are not disputed by the parties before the CA. Contrary to the petitioner's
claim, the question of whether this Court's ruling in the case of Villaflor is applicable to the
present case is not a question of fact. Given an undisputed set of facts, an appellate court
may resolve the issue on what law or ruling is applicable without examining the probative
value of the evidence before it.

Moreover, no other than the petitioner raised the issue on the cancellation of the adverse
claim as the sole issue in her appeal before the CA. As such, the CA correctly concluded that
the said issue involved a pure question of law as its resolution would not involve an
examination of the evidence but only an application of the law on a particular set of facts. At
any rate, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both
questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All doubts as to the correctness
of the conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it
commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The CA, therefore, did not err in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner for being an
improper appeal. The proper mode of appeal is an appeal by certiorari before this Court in
accordance with Rule 45. Section 2 of the said Rule provides that appellant has a period of
15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from within which to perfect her
appeal. In this case, petitioner filed the present petition before Us well beyond the said
reglementary period.

Failure to perfect an appeal within the period provided by law renders the appealed
judgment or order final and immutable. However, this rule is not without exceptions. In
some cases, this Court opted to relax the rules and take cognizance of a petition for review
on certiorari after an improper appeal to the CA "in the interest of justice and in order to
write finis to [the] controversy"31 and "considering the important questions involved in a [the]
case." As such, We proceed to decide the merits of the case considering the confusion
brought by conflicting jurisprudence on the issue posed before Us.

323 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated

April 11, 2014 and July 31, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Case No. P- 09-499
LRC REC. No. 2400, ordering the cancellation of the Notice of Adverse Claim made as
Entry No. 8957/Vol. 132/T-266311, Registry of Deeds of Manila are hereby SET ASIDE
and respondents Sonia Arguelles and Lorna Arguelles‘s petition for cancellation
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

324 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS;
AUDIT GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, respondents.
GR 213525 21 November 2017
Bersamin, J.

The Fresh Period Rule applies only to appeals in civil and criminal cases, and in special
proceedings filed under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45, and Rule 122.

FACTS:

The Court issued a resolution on January 27, 2015 denying the petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration on the following grounds, namely: (a) failure to comply with the rule on proof
of service; (b) late filing; (c) failure to file a verified declaration under the Efficient Use of Paper
Rule; and (d) failure to prove grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission on Audit (COA).

In the same resolution, however, the Court required the petitioner and its counsel, Atty.
Eduardo S. Fortaleza, to show cause why they should not be punished for indirect contempt
of court for using in the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated October 1, 2014 harsh
and disrespectful language towards the Court; and further required Atty. Fortaleza to explain
why he should not be disbarred

In the Joint Explanation dated March 9, 2015, the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza, both now
represented by former Senate President Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., have apologized for the
statements made in the Motion for Reconsideration, but have stated nonetheless that they had
been constrained to attach cut print-outs of registry receipt numbers because the Makati City
Central Post Office (MCPO) stopped issuing registry receipts and had adopted an electronic
system instead;6 that they thought that the Court, in mentioning proof of service, had been
referring to the non-submission of the affidavit of service;7 that Atty. Fortaleza had been
only lacking in finesse in the formulation of his submissions; that the petitioner honestly
believed that it had faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court on the
service of pleadings; and that because of time constraints Atty. Fortaleza had not been able
to sufficiently go over the Motion for Reconsideration.

Atty. Fortaleza has prayed that he be spared from disbarment, stressing his not being some
wayward member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), but had in fact served the
IBP by handling pro bono cases in his home province of Antique.

Additionally, the petitioner has filed its so-called Manifestation with Motion for Leave to file Second
Motion for Reconsideration, attaching therewith its Second Motion for Reconsideration. It has
contended in the Second Motion for Reconsideration that the final order referred to in Neypes v.
Court of Appeals11 applied to the 30-day period mentioned in Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court as to make such period be reckoned from notice of the denial by the COA of its Motion
for Reconsideration; and that the reckoning of the 30-day period ought to be from July 14, 2014,

325 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
the date when it received the denial by the COA of its Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this
case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Fresh Period Rule under Neypes apply to the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

NO. The petitioner‘s noncompliance with the rule on proof of service and the petitioner‘s
unjustified reliance on the Fresh Period Rule as the basis to extend the period for filing of
the special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court were already
enough ground to dismiss the petition for certiorari. We need not remind that the Fresh
Period Rule applies only to appeals in civil and criminal cases, and in special proceedings
filed under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45,37 and Rule 122. Hence, liberality
could not be extended to the petitioner.

According to Ginete v. Court of Appeals, only matters of life, liberty, honor or property may
warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character. That is not the
situation of the petitioner herein. It is also true that other justifications may be considered,
like: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; and (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. But, again, the
petitioner has not shown the attendance of any of such justifications for excepting its
petition for certiorari from the stricture of timeliness of filing.

As earlier pointed out, the petition for certiorari was dismissed upon reasonable but still
formidable grounds, namely: (a) noncompliance with the rule on proof of service; (b)
noncompliance with the Efficient Use of Paper Rule; and (c) failure to establish the grave
abuse of discretion committed by the COA. The plea for liberality was really unworthy of
favorable consideration.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court:

(1) FINDS and PRONOUNCES the petitioner and its counsel, Atty. Eduardo S.
Fortaleza, GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT, and,
accordingly, SENTENCES them to pay, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, a fine
of P15,000.00; and

(2) DENIES the Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration and
the Second Motion for Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

326 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

REMEDIES AGAINST EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS

RULE 38:
Relief from Judgment, Orders, or Other Proceedings

SPOUSES MICHAELANGELO and GRACE MESINA, petitioners, v. HUMBERTO D.

MEER, respondent
GR 146845 2 July 2002
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Puno, J.

―Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present.
Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial
or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. x x x

As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear
the petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order
of municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional trial court.‖

FACTS:

Respondent Meer is a registered owner of a parcel of land located at Pandacan, Manila,

evidenced by TCT No. 158886. He applied for a loan to construct thereon. However, he
discovered that his certificate of title has been cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 166074
was issued in the name of the Spouses Bunquin. The latter acquired said property by virtue
of deed of sale purportedly executed by respondent Meer in their favor.

On January 12, 1994, respondent sought the cancellation of the TCT in the name of the
Spouses Bunquin with the MTC of Manila. On the same day, a notice of lis pendens was
annotated at the back of TCT No. 166074.

While the case was pending, TCT No. 166074 was cancelled and replaced by another TCT
No. 216518 issued in the name of Spouses Mesina. It appears that the property has been
conveyed to petitioners on Spetember 28,1993 which is prior to the annotation of lis
pendens. The absolute deed of sale was also notarized on the same day, including the
payment of taxes. However, the transfer of the title from Spouses Bunquin to Petitioners
was effected on June 15, 1994 because of some requirements impose by NHA.

Thus, Meer impleaded Petitioners as additional party defendants. Spouses Bunquin never
appeared at the hearing so they were declared in default. Petitioners participatred actively in
defense of their position.

MeTC:

327 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The lower court ruled that the alleged sale between Meer and Bunquin was
fraudulent. However, Petitioners were adjudged buyers in good faith and thus
entitled to possession of the property and damages.

Respondent Meer filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the lower court denied it.
He then filed an appeal with the RTC.

RTC:

The RTC reversed and ruled that Petitioners were not purchasers in good faith,
reasoning that it is the registration of the Deed of Sale, and not the date of its
consummation that will confer title to the property. Since the Deed of Sale was
registered subsequent to the annotation of the lis pendens, Petitioners were bound
by the outcome of the case.

CA:

Petitioners appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC in a resolution dated May
10, 2000.

On July 17, 2000 and after the reglementary period for appeal has lapsed, petitioners
filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment and prayed that the CA set aside its
Resolution dated May 10, 2000 for the following reasons:
a. Extrinsic fraud was committed whoch prevented petitiners from presenting his
case to the court and/or was used to procure the judgment without fair
submission of the controversy;
b. Mistake and excusable negligence has prevented the petitioner from taking an
appeal with the prescribed period; and
c. Petitioner has good and substantial defense in his action.

With respect to the first ground, petitioners argued that there has been collusion
between respondent and the Bunquins during trial of the case at the MeTC. Had the
Bunquins testified in court as to validity of the Deed of Sale as well as the
authenticity of the respondent‘s signature, petitioners argued that the result would
have been in their favor.

Anent to the second ground, petitioners averred that their failure to file the requisite
appeal on time was largely due to the delay of counsel of record to produce the
requested documents of the case.

The Court of Appeals denied the petition reasoning that:

―As aptly pointed out by the respondent, the first ground raised by the petitioner spouses
should have been filed before the court of origin, the Metropolitan Court of Manila,
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 38 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as amended.
As to the second ground, the petitioner spouses who were the prevailing party before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, did not mention the alleged extrinsic fraud when the
328 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
case was on appeal before the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners cannot now challenge the
decision of this Court for the fraud allegedly perpetrated in the court of origin.

Besides, it is extremely doubtful that the remedy of a petition for relief under Rule 38 may
be availed of from a judgment of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.‖

Their MR was denied also. Hence, Petition for review under Rule 45 raising as the
issue of availability of Petition for Relief under Rule 38, as a remedy against the
judgment of the CA promulgated in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for relief under Rule 38 is a proper remedy against
the judgment of the CA promulgated in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.

RULING:

No. Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where
the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or
appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.

Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to
be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may [Link] importantly, it should be filed
with the same court which rendered the decision.

―Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings.-

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a
party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in
such court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.‖

As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided the case or issued the order to hear the
petition for relief. Under the old rule, petition for relief from the judgment or final order of
municipal trial courts should be filed with the regional trial court

The old rule provides:

"Section 1. Petition to Court of First Instance for Relief from Judgment of

inferior court.- When a judgment is rendered by an inferior court on a case, and a party thereto
by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been unjustly deprived of a hearing therein,
or has been prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in the Court of First Instance of
the province in which the original judgment was rendered, praying that such judgment be set aside
and the case tried upon its merits.
329 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Section 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from the judgment or
other proceeding thereof.- When a judgment order is entered, or any other proceeding is
taken against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment,
order or proceeding be set aside."

Petitioners argue that apart from this change, the present Rule extends the remedy of relief
to include judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals since the Rule uses the phrase "any
court". The SC disagree.

Petitioners beg this Court, on equitable grounds, not to strictly construe the Rules, arguing
that their "only earthly possession" is at stake.

The court answer: Indeed, in certain occasions, this Court has, in the interest of substantial
justice and in exercise of its equity jurisdiction, construed the Rules of Court with liberality.
Nevertheless, the circumstances obtaining in the present case do not convince this Court to
take exception.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the petitioners' allegation of extrinsic
fraud should have been brought at issue in the Metropolitan Trial Court. If they truly believe
that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudiced their rights, they should have questioned
this from the beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings and actively
presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the Metropolitan Trial Court
ruled in their favor.

When the respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court, they never raised this
issue. Even after the Regional Trial Court reversed the finding of the MeTC, and the Court
of Appeals sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for
consideration. This Court will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their
own negligence.

The same is true with regard to the defenses forwarded by the petitioners in support of their
petition. These contentions should have been raised in the MeTC, as they have been
available to them since the beginning.

Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own
negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of
inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by [Link],
however, place the blame on their counsel and invoke honest mistake of law. They contend
that they lack legal education, hence, were not aware of the required period for filing an
appeal.

In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross
negligence, this Court affords a party a second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this
opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioners have squandered the
330 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
various opportunities available to them at the different stages of this case. Public interest
demands an end to every litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already
attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the administration of justice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

331 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA, petitioner, v. HILARIO M.
MARCO, respondent
GR 202331 23 April 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Leonen, J.

The remedy of a petition for relief from judgment is not among those provided under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

This means that the remedy is not allowed under civil service rules.

Even assuming that a petition for relief may be filed before the Civil Service Commission,
the party must show that the assailed judgment became final through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence.

FACTS:

June 25, 2004, or five days before the end of Governor Ong‘s term, Marco was permanently
appointed as Cooperative Development Specialist II.

June 28, 2004, Marco's appointment, together with 25 other appointments, was submitted to
the Civil Service Commission Field Office-Aurora.

June 30, 2004, newly elected Governor Bellaflor Angara-Castillo assumed office. The next
day, she called to an executive meeting all the department heads of the Province. During
the executive meeting, Provincial Budget Officer Clemente allegedly manifested that
the Province had no funds available to pay for the salaries of Governor Ong's 26
appointees. Provincial Budget Officer Clemente's Letter was submitted to the Province's
Human Resource Management-Office. It was then forwarded to the Field Office. Due to the
recall of the certification, the CSC Field Office disapproved Marco's appointment in the
Letter dated July 5, 2004.

The Province, through Human Resource Management Officer Liwayway G. Victorio, served
Marco a copy of the Letter dated July 5, 2004. Marco was, thus, advised to refrain from
reporting for work beginning July 8, 2004, the day he received notice of the disapproval of
his appointment.

Marco wrote to the CSC Regional Office No. IV, moving for reconsideration of the
disapproval. This was denied on April 6, 2005. On May 17, 2005, Marco appealed before the
CSC. The Province, through its Human Resource Management Office, received a copy of
Marco's Letter on May 23, 2005. However, it failed to comment on the appeal within 10
days from receipt as required by Section 73 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.

April 14, 2008, the Civil Service Commission granted Marco's appeal and set aside the
Regional Office's Decision dated April 6, 2005. It ruled that Marco's appointment was

332 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
valid since it was accompanied by a certification of availability of funds. As to the
Letter withdrawing the certification, the Civil Service Commission ruled that it did
not affect the validity of Marco's appointment because the Province "failed to submit
documentary evidence to support its claim [that it had no funds to pay for the
services of Governor Ong's appointees].‖ The CSC further stated that the withdrawal of
the certification was unfair to Marco ―It is unfair to Marco who applied for the said position
believing in good faith that funds were available, passed the screening conducted by the
Personnel Selection Board […] and was later told to stop reporting for work as his
appointment was disapproved by CSC Field Office Aurora simply because the provincial
government under the new governor realized that it has no funds to pay for his services.‖
The Province received a copy of this Resolution on May 21, 2008.

CSC then ordered the Regional Office to investigate whether Provincial Budget Officer
Clemente and Provincial Accountant Saturno were administratively liable for certifying that
funds were available to cover the positions filled by Governor Ong's appointees but
subsequently withdrawing this certification.

July 22, 2008, Provincial Administrator Alex N. Ocampo (Provincial Administrator

Ocampo), on behalf of the Province, filed before the CSC a Petition for Relief on the
ground of extrinsic fraud. According to him, the Civil Service Commission deprived the
Province of an opportunity to be heard when it failed to implead the Province as an
indispensable party. He reiterated that Marco's appointment was void since the Province had
no funds to pay for Marco's salaries.

November 4, 2009, CSC denied the petition. It ruled that Provincial Administrator Ocampo
had no legal personality to file the Petition for Relief absent an authorization from the
Provincial Governor. Moreover, a petition for relief was not allowed under the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. A motion for reconsideration was also
filed, but was then denied on September 8, 2009. CSC ruled that its April 14, 2008
Resolution had become final and executory considering that the Province did not file a
motion for reconsideration of this Resolution within the reglementary period.

Marco requested the CSC to implement the April 14, 2008 Resolution. Through the
Resolution dated July 6, 2010, the Commission granted Marco's request. Provincial
Administrator Ocampo filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash
"Execution," arguing that the April 14, 2008 Resolution had already been implemented. As
the Civil Service Commission had ordered, the Province reflected the April 14, 2008
Resolution in Marco's appointment papers and in his Service Record.

In the Resolution dated January 24, 2011, the Civil Service Commission denied the Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion to Quash "Execution." It noted that the Province still
refused to reinstate Marco despite the April 14, 2008 Resolution and thus clarified that this
Resolution necessarily resulted in the approval of Marco's appointment and his
reinstatement as Cooperative Development Specialist II.

A Petition for Review under Rule 43 with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order was filed before the Court of Appeals. For the first time, the
333 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Province argued that Marco was a midnight appointee since Governor Ong
appointed him during the last five (5) days of her tenure. Therefore, Marco's
appointment was void. March 2, 2012, the Court of Appeals denied the Petition for
Review and affirmed the implementation of the Civil Service Commission's April 14, 2008
Resolution. MR was also denied by the CA.

The Province filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court.

ISSUE: Whether the CSC properly denied the Province‘s petition for relief? (In
relation to the topic)

RULING:

Yes. the remedy of a petition for relief from judgment is not among those provided under
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. This means that the remedy
is not allowed under civil service rules. Even assuming that a petition for relief may be
filed before the Civil Service Commission, the party must show that the assailed
judgment became final through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.

Furthermore, the Province failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the April 14, 2008
Resolution within the 15-day reglementary period. The Province, through its Human
Resource Management Office, received a copy of the Civil Service Commission's
April 14, 2008 Resolution on May 21, 2008. Thus, the Province had until June 5, 2008
to file a motion for reconsideration.

With no motion for reconsideration seasonably filed, the April 14, 2008 Resolution-became
final and executory on June 6, 2008.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals‘
Decision dated March 2, 2012 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

334 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
THOMASITES CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (TCIS), petitioner, v.
RUTH N. RODRIGUEZ, IRENE P. PADRIGON and ARLYN B. RILLERA, respondents.
GR 203642 27 January 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.

As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for relief
from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods:

first, the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order
or other proceeding to be set aside; and
second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other
proceeding.

Strict compliance with these periods is required because a petition for relief from judgment
is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode
any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some
definite time, attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.

FACTS:

On July 29, 2004, Rodriguez, 34, Rillera, 36, and Padrigon, 30, all graduates of the University
of the Philippines and holders of teaching licenses from the Professional Regulation
Commission, were hired by Dr. Jae Won Park and Dr. Cheol Je Cho (Dr. Cho), Korean
nationals and President and Academic Dean, respectively, of TCIS. The parties executed no
written contracts but the respondents were promised a monthly salary of P25,000.00 plus
shares of stock.

As soon after classes opened on December 20, 2004 at the Crown Peak Hotel in Subic Bay,
disagreements arose between the respondents and the American teachers on the question of
salaries. At the meeting called by Dr. Cho on January 7, 2005, the American teachers
threatened to resign unless the respondents were terminated. That same afternoon, the
respondents were served with letters of termination 6 effective January 8, 2005, signed by
Dr. Cho, citing as reason the restructuring of the company and consequent evaluation of its
staffing requirements.

On January 24, 2005, Rodriguez and Rillera filed NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01-8376-05,
while Padrigon filed NLRC Case No. RAB-III-01-8401-05, both for illegal dismissal and
money claims, against TCIS and Dr. Cho.

On May 8, 2006, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision finding that the respondents
were illegally dismissed, and directed TCIS and Dr. Cho to reinstate them with full
backwages in the total amount of P1,125,000.00, plus 10% as attorney's fees. Dr. Cho
received a copy of the decision on June 21, 2006.

On August 11, 2006, the complainants moved for issuance of a writ of execution.

335 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
At the September 22, 2006 pre-execution conference, Atty. Joy P. Bayona (Atty. Bayona)
entered her appearance as counsel for TCIS and Dr. Cho. Conferences were held on
October 2, 2006, October 23, 2006, November 24, 2006 and December 15, 2006. But at the
hearing held on December 18, 2006, the law firm of Andres Marcelo Pedernal Guerrero and
Paras entered its appearance as counsel for TCIS and filed a petition for relief from
judgment. On January 30, 2007, the LA directed the issuance of a writ of execution, which
was served on TCIS's counsel on February 8, 2007; the LA merely noted the petition for
relief due to wrong venue and lack of jurisdiction and because it was a prohibited pleading.

On February 19, 2007, TCIS re-filed its petition for relief, with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, before the NLRC. It claimed that
the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over it since the summons and notices were addressed to
Dr. Cho, who did not represent TCIS; that the entry of appearance of Atty. Bayona at the
pre-execution conference was signed only by Dr. Cho in his capacity as therein respondent
and academic dean of TCIS; that TCIS did not receive any notice of the proceedings; and,
that although the NLRC is not bound by technical rules of procedure, TCIS's right to due
process was violated since it was deprived of the right to file its position paper. TCIS further
argued it faced a shut-down and would suffer irreparable damage unless the execution was
enjoined, although it also expressed willingness to post a bond to guarantee payment of
whatever damages may be awarded by the NLRC.

On September 30, 2011, the NLRC denied TCIS's petition on the ground that it had other
adequate remedies such as a motion for new trial or an appeal; that it failed to show that due
to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence it was prevented from availing thereof;
that it could not avail of the equitable remedy of petition for relief for the purpose of
reviving its appeal which it lost through its negligence.

On petition for certiorari, the CA dismissed on May 24, 2012 the TCIS's petition outright.
The CA also denied its motion for reconsideration on September 26, 2012 for lack of
meritorious grounds.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Relief is tenable

RULING:

No. In Philippine Amanah Bank (now Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the
Philippines, also known as Islamic Bank) v. Contreras, the Court stated:

Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom a
decision or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence. It is a remedy, equitable in character, that is allowed only in exceptional
cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another
remedy available to him, which may either be a motion for new trial or appeal from
an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,

336 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
mistake, or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he
cannot avail of the remedy of petition for relief. (Citation omitted)

Otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to the mistake in the mode
of procedure by counsel.

In Tuason v. CA, the Court explained the nature of a petition for relief from judgment, thus:

A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in

exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party
has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or
appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted
to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can
be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
(Citations omitted)

As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a party filing a petition for relief
from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: first, the petition
must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other
proceeding to be set aside; and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of
such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is required
because a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State,
which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a
judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order to put an
end to litigation.

The NLRC pointed out that TCIS's petition for relief was filed beyond the period provided
under Rule 38. 30 The earliest that it could have learned of the LA's judgment was on June
21, 2006 when Dr. Cho received a copy thereof, and the latest was during the pre-execution
conference held on September 22, 2006, when Atty. Bayona formally entered her appearance
as counsel for TCIS and Dr. Cho. TCIS's petition for relief was filed only on February 13,
2007, well beyond the 60-day period allowed.

Moreover, the Court agrees with the CA that no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence prevented TCIS from filing an appeal from the decision of the LA, even as the
NLRC also noted that the petition also lacked the requisite affidavit showing the fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the facts constituting its good and substantial
cause of action.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

337 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 47:
Annulment of Judgments or Final Orders and Resolutions

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, petitioner,

v. ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and
ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR., respondents
GR 173559 7 January 2013
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.

FACTS:

Respondents obtained a loan from petitioner, payable by a Real Estate Mortgage. When the
debt became due and upon failure of respondents to pay, the petitioner filed a complaint.

RTC:

The lower court granted the complaint but awarded 5% per month interest.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely
appeal despite receipt by their former counsel of the RTC‘s Decision. Before it could be
resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment, claiming that not all
of them were duly served with summons. According to the other respondents, they had no
knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it.
They prayed that the RTC‘s Decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted.

RTC issued a Writ of Execution. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner
moved for the public auction of the property which the RTC likewise granted. The auction
sale was conducted with the petitioner as the only bidder.

Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution
Sale dated, claiming that the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that
petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in her Complaint. Surprisingly, the
RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum). RTC granted respondents‘ motion
and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5% monthly to 12% per annum.

Displeased with the RTC‘s Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

CA:

338 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision declaring that the RTC exceeded its
jurisdiction in awarding the 5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate of
interest to 12% per annum. It ruled that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction.
However, the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to declare that
portion as a nullity. Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. No legal rights
can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.

From the foregoing, the remedy of the respondents is to have the Court declare the portion
of the judgment providing for a higher interest than that prayed for as null and void for want
of or in excess of jurisdiction. A void judgment never acquire[s] finality and any action to
declare its nullity does not prescribe.

SC:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in G.R. SP No. 85541 which granted the Petition
for Annulment of Judgment filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that portion
of the October 17, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75,
Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5% monthly interest rate for the principal
amount of the loan respondent obtained from her.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed grave and serious error of law when it
granted the petition for annulment of judgment as a substitute or alternative
remedy of a lost appeal

RULING:

No. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy
granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has
failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies.

Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost
due to the party‘s own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to
an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or
cause involved therein should be laid to rest."

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence
recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set
aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued
without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
339 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the
Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of
what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining
the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that
judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in
court. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order

which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which
affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed
relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint
must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a
defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who participated in trial.
For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is
allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not feasible when the defendant
is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court comes into
play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed
for in the Complaint.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24,
2005 and June 26, 2006 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

340 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, respondent.
GR 187061 8 October 2014.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Leonen, J.

The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic
fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.

The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This
court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523 (1999):

For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is
intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where
the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral
when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real
contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of
Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her
presumptively dead.

July 27, 2007, Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared Celerina Santos presumptively
dead after her husband, Ricardo Santos, filed a petition for declaration of absence of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo Santos married
on September 17, 2008. Ricardo Santos alleged in the petition that Celerina Santos and him
rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila and a year later moved to Tarlac
City.

Ricardo Santos claimed that their business did not prosper therefore Celerina Santos
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong. Celerina Santos
allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila and left Tarlac City and was
never heard from again her. Ricardo Santos alleged that he exerted efforts to locate the
whereabouts of Celerina Santos but to no avail Celerina‘s parents, relatives and friends gave
him no any information. November 17, 2008, Celerina Santos filed a petition for annulment
of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.

She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo Santos, despite his
knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of
Tarlac City. According to Celerina Santos her true residence is in Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City. Celerina Santos claimed that she never resided in Tarlac and she never left and

341 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
worked as a domestic helper abroad. She also claimed that it was not true that she had been
absent for 12 years. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with
another woman. Court of Appeals issued the resolution dismissing Celerina‘s petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. The proper remedy was to file a
sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with
Article 42 of the Family Code. Celerina Santos filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court of Appeals‘ resolution. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina‘s petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a fraudulently obtained
judgment declaring presumptive death.

RULING:

YES. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court‘s judgment,
order, resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Celerina Santos filed her petition for annulment of judgment on November 17, 2008. This
was less than two years from July 27, 2007 decision declaring her presumptively dead and
about a month from her discovery of the decision in October 2008. The petition was,
therefore, filed within the four-year period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and
before the action is barred by laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of
jurisdiction.

There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina Santos at the time of her
discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her. If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith
when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the
subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the element of
―well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is essential for the
exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to apply‖. Celerina does not admit to have
been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also
the nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy
because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and subsequent marriage.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage,
mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina‘s choice to file an
action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination of

the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the
merits of the petition.
SO ORDERED.

342 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
YUK LING ONG, petitioner, v. BENJAMIN T. CO, respondent.
GR 206653 25 February 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Mendoza, J.

Annulment of Judgment; Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governs
actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof
explicitly provides only two (2) grounds for annulment of judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

FACTS:

Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and respondent Benjamin
Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married on October 3, 1982

November 2008, petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her permanent
residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings. Reportedly, her marriage
with respondent was nullified by the court.

April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0177.
There was no showing of its status, whether pending, withdrawn or terminated.

July 19, 2002, respondent filed another petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 02- 0306. the address
stated in the summons however was not the petitioner‘s real address – even if there is a
security guard who was able to receive the said summons.

RTC rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 finding respondent‘s marriage with
petitioner as void ab initio.

- That summons was served on petitioner, but she failed to file her responsive pleading
within the reglementary period.

- RTC concluded that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.

- Fraud: Extrinsic fraud since the respondent deliberately indicated a wrong address
to prevent her from being notified.

343 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
- Lack of jurisdiction: No jurisdiction was acquired over her due to invalid service of
summons.

Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
before the CA claiming that she was never notified of the cases filed against her. She prayed
that the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306, be nullified on the grounds of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

CA rendered the assailed decision finding the petition for annulment of judgment to be
devoid of merit.

- there was no sufficient proof to establish that respondent employed fraud to insure
petitioner‘s nonparticipation in the trial of Civil Case No. CV-01-0177.

- that the substituted service of summons in Civil Case No. 02-0306 was valid It found
that there was a customary practice in petitioner‘s townhouse that the security guard
would first entertain any visitors and receive any communication in behalf of the
homeowners.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment is meritorious

RULING:

Yes. The Court finds merit in the petition. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate
remedy.

The SC finds that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner – following the
rigorous requirements enshrined in the case of Manotoc vs CA, to wit:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

(2) Specific Details in the Return
(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

The CA likewise erred in ruling that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty could be applied. This presumption of regularity, however, was never intended
to be applied even in cases where there are no showing of substantial compliance with the
requirements of the rules of procedure. Such presumption does not apply where it is patent
that the sheriff‘s or server‘s return is defective, he server‘s return did not comply with the
stringent requirements of substituted service of summons.

Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the Court is not inclined to
uphold the CA‘s denial of the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service of summons.
Accordingly, the decision in Civil Case No. 02-0306 must be declared null and void.
344 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The stricter rule in substituted service of summons was meant to address ―[t]he numerous
claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned the filing of a great number
of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and appeals to higher courts, resulting in
prolonged litigation and wasteful legal expenses

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 27, 2012 Decision and the March
26, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. S.P. No. 106271 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 260, Paranaque City is hereby declared VOID.
SO ORDERED.

345 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ALBERTO T. LASALA, previously doing business under the style PSF SECURITY
AGENCY, petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY, respondent.
GR 171582 19 August 2015
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Brion, J.

Annulment of judgment may only be resorted to if the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies, are no longer available without the
petitioner‘s fault.

Thus, the petitioner must be able to provide a plausible explanation for not resorting first to
the more common remedies enumerated under the Rules. As annulment is an equitable
remedy, it cannot be used to compensate litigants who lost their case because of their
negligence or because they slept on their rights. This safeguard has been put in place to
address the concern that defeated litigants would use and abuse Rule 47 to avoid or delay an
already final and executory judgment.

FACTS:

Lasala, through his company PSF Security Agency, used to provide security guard services to
the NFA. Sometime in 1994, Lasala's employees who were deployed to the NFA filed with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for underpayment of wages
and nonpayment of other monetary benefits. The NLRC ruled for the employees and held
Lasala and the NFA solidarily liable for the employees' adjudged monetary award.
Consequently, the sheriff garnished the NFA's P383,572.90 worth of bank deposits with the
Development Bank of the Philippines.

Believing that it had no liability to Lasala's employees, the NFA filed with the RTC, Branch
220, Quezon City, a complaint for sum of money with damages and an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Lasala.

In response, Lasala filed an answer with counterclaim and opposition to the prayer for
preliminary attachment. In his counterclaim, Lasala prayed for the payment of moral
damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary damages of P500,000.00; attorney's fees of
P300,000.00, compensatory damages of P250,000.00; and unpaid wage differential of
P1,500,000.00, for a total amount of P3,550,000.00.

Initially, the trial court granted the NFA's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment. However, this writ was eventually nullified when Lasala questioned it with the
CA.

Meanwhile, on May 2, 1997, the trial court dismissed the NFA's complaint for failure of the
lawyer deputized by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), Atty.
Rogelio B. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), to present the NFA's evidence-in-chief, due to his
repeated hearing absences.

346 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The NFA replaced Atty. Mendoza and administratively charged him with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interests of the service, and gross neglect
of duty. It subsequently employed Atty. Ernesto D. Cahucom (Atty. Cahucom) as its new
counsel.

Although the NFA's complaint was dismissed, Lasala's counterclaim remained, and he
presented evidence to support it. Interestingly, Atty. Cahucom, the NFA's new counsel, did
not submit any evidence to controvert Lasala's counterclaim evidence. When asked during
trial, Atty. Cahucom simply waived his right to cross-examine Lasala and did not exert any
effort to counter his testimony.

Thus, in its September 2, 2002 decision, the trial court granted Lasala's counterclaim in the
total amount of P52,788,970.50.

Notably, this amount is substantially higher than the amount of P3,550,000.00, Lasala
originally prayed for.

Despite the huge award to Lasala, the NFA failed to appeal its case to the CA. Atty.
Cahucom did not inform the NFA's management about the trial court's adverse ruling.
When asked to explain, he reasoned out that he only discovered the decision after the lapse
of the period for appeal.

Having lost its chance to appeal, the NFA filed with the trial court a petition for relief from
judgment (petition for relief) grounded on excusable negligence. In its petition, the NFA
through Atty. Cahucom, attributed its failure to appeal to one of the NFA's employees.
Allegedly, this employee received the copy of the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision but
did not inform Atty. Cahucom about it. It was only after the lapse of the period for the filing
of a motion for reconsideration and an appeal that the NFA learned about the adverse
ruling.

The trial court did not accept the NFA's reasoning; thus, it denied the petition for relief for
insufficiency in substance.

Thus, on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the NFA, through the
OGCC, filed with the CA a petition and an amended petition for annulment of judgment
(petition for annulment) of the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision which had granted a
substantially higher award than what Lasala originally prayed for in his counterclaim.

The CA granted the petition and annulled the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision.

ISSUE: Whether the filing of a petition for relief barred the filing of a petition for
annulment of judgment;

Whether the CA correctly annulled the trial court's September 2, 2002 decision
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:
347 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
1st Issue:
No. The prior filing of a petition for relief he said order does not per se bar the filing of a
petition for annulment of judgment.

Annulment of judgment may only be resorted to if the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies, are no longer available without the
petitioner's fault.

Thus, the petitioner must be able to provide a plausible explanation for not resorting first to
the more common remedies enumerated under the Rules. As annulment is an equitable
remedy, it cannot be used to compensate litigants who lost their case because of their
negligence or because they slept on their rights. This safeguard has been put in place to
address the concern that defeated litigants would use and abuse Rule 47 to avoid or delay an
already final and executory judgment.

In the present case, the NFA actually availed of the remedy of petition for relief at the trial
court level.

2nd Issue
No. The CA committed an error; it violated the restrictive application of a petition for
annulment; only extrinsic fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction may annul a final judgment.

In a petition for annulment based on lack of jurisdiction, the petitioner cannot rely on
jurisdictional defect due to grave abuse of discretion, but on absolute lack of jurisdiction. As
we have already held, the concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment
does not embrace grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In
Republic v. G Holdings, we explained:

Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from

the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not
the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the
subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an
exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject
of an appeal. (emphasis supplied)

In other words, the lack of jurisdiction envisioned under Rule 47 is the total absence of
jurisdiction over the person of a party or over the subject matter. When the court has validly
acquired its jurisdiction, annulment through lack of jurisdiction is not available when the
court's subsequent grave abuse of discretion operated to oust it of its jurisdiction.

Despite this erroneous ruling of the CA, we hold that annulment of the trial court's
September 2, 2002 decision is still proper as the NFA validly raised and substantiated the
allowed grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

348 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit, and
AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the June 14, 2005 Decision and February 15, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 73235 (which annulled and set
aside the September 2, 2002 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
220).

Let a copy of this Decision and the records of this case be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever action it may deem appropriate against Attys. Rogelio B.
Mendoza and Ernesto D. Cahucom under the circumstances defined in this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision and the records of this case also be sent to the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its administrative investigation of
Attys. Rogelio B. Mendoza and Ernesto D. Cahucom, based on the given facts of this
Decision, in the interest of determining whether these members of the Bar still have the
requisite competence and integrity to maintain their membership in the roll of lawyers of this
country.
SO ORDERED.

349 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ABNER MANGUBAT, petitioner, v. BELEN MORGASEVA, respondent.
GR 202611 23 November 2015.
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

The remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under exceptional circumstances as

this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final judgments. Hence, it is allowed only
on two grounds, i.e. extrinsice fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In a petition for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of
jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction.

It was held that ―[a]n action for revival of judgment may be filed either ‗in the same court
where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the plaintiff or defendant resides,
or in any other place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of actions in
general.‘‖

FACTS:

In 1974, Gaudencio Mangubat filed with RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages against respondent Belen Morga-Seva and two other
defendants.

The RTC ruled in favor of the Mangubat. Since Belen and her co-defendants' appeal to the
CA and later to this Court were both unsuccessful, the RTC Decision became final and
executory.

In 1988, Gaudencio and his children as heirs of the deceased Aurelia filed with the same
court a Complaint for Revival of the Decision. They averred that the writ of execution could
not be implemented because Belen and her co-defendants evaded service thereof. And since
five years had already lapsed from the date of its entry, Gaudencio and the heirs prayed for
the revival of the RTC Decision.

Gaudencio, assisted by Atty. Reynaldo L. Herrera (Atty. Herrera) and Belen by Atty. Junnel
M. Relativo, entered into a Compromise Agreement.

The RTC approved the agreement. Upon its finality, the Writ of Execution was ordered
issued by the said court. Subsequently in behalf of all the heirs, Abner filed a Motion to
Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void.

It was alleged therein that Gaudencio acted only on his own behalf when he entered into the
compromise agreement with Belen, hence, the same is null and void for want of consent and
participation of the heirs who were indispensable parties.

The RTC ruled on the Motion to Declare the Amicable Settlement Null and Void, it said
that Abner Mangubat is not a real party in interest, because he was disinherited in a final
judgment in intestate proceeding. In addition the RTC ruled that the inaction of Abner

350 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Mangubat or [the] other heirs of Gaudencio Mangubat and Aurelia Mangubat for a period of
almost four (4) years after becoming aware of the compromise agreement and of the
judgment thereon, amounts to a ratification on their part of said agreement.

On September 21, 2010, Abner filed a Petition for Annulment of Final Order36 with the
CA. One of the argument of Abner, that since the February 23, 2001 RTC Decision
approving the Compromise Agreement had long become final and executory, the RTC had
already lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the September 25, 2006 Order. The
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petition for Annulment of Final Order can be granted.

RULING:

NO. It must be stressed that the remedy of annulment of judgment is only available under
certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final
judgments. Hence, it is allowed only on two grounds, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Abner anchors his Petition for Annulment of Final Order on lack of
jurisdiction. He posits that the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the case when its 2001
Decision became final, hence, any issuance subsequent thereto is made without any
jurisdiction. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner
must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction.

Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have
taken cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by
law." The RTC's jurisdiction over petitions for revival of judgment had already been upheld
by the Court. It was held that "[a]n action for revival of judgment may be filed either
'in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the place where the
plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other place designated by the statutes which
treat of the venue of actions in general.'" Here, the Complaint for revival of judgment
was filed in the same court which rendered the Decision. Undoubtedly, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action. There is therefore no valid ground for the Petition for
Annulment of Final Order that Abner filed with the CA.

Even assuming that the claim of lack of jurisdiction is well-grounded, Abner‘s Petition for
Annulment of Final Order is barred by laches. An action for annulment of judgment or final
order if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by laches. ―The
principle of laches or ‗stale demands‘ ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier —negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.‖ In this case, it was only after almost four years from the finality of the September
25, 2006 Order that Abner brought an action to annul the same. He did not even care to
provide in his petition any justification for his inaction for such a long period of time.

351 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In any event, Abner's Petition for Annulment of Final Order was not the proper remedy to
nullify the September 25, 2006 Order which is an interlocutory order. "An interlocutory
order refers to a ruling respecting some point or matter between the commencement and
end of the suit, but is not a final adjudication of the claims and liabilities of the parties that
are in dispute in that suit. The 2006 Order merely dealt with the incidental matter of causing
the transfer of the title to the property covered by TCT under the name of Belen in
accordance with the final and executory 2001 RTC Decision after Abner refused to comply
with the directive to deliver the owner's copy thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2011 and June 13, 2012 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

352 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CAMILO SIBAL, petitioner, v. PEDRO BUQUEL, SANTIAGO BUQUEL, JR.,
ROSALINDA BUQUEL, represented by FRANCISCO BUQUEL, respondents
GR 197825 11 January 2016
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the
adverse party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its
clay in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own
counsel.

FACTS:

Respondents Buquel inherited from their parents a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-725. Sometime in January 1999, petitioner Camilo Sibal and Tobi
Mangoba took possession of a portion of the property which belonged to Santiago Buquel,
Sr. Thereafter, the Buquels made several demands against Sibal and Mangoba for them to
vacate and turn over the property, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, they filed a
complaint before the Tuguegarao RTC for recovery 0f possession and damages.

RTC-

ruled in favor of the Buquels and its Decision became final and executory; hence, the
trial court issued a writ of execution.

CA-

Sibal filed a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision before the CA, where he
raised lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud as grounds. However, the CA dismissed
Sibal' s petition.

Sibal maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the Buquels
were guilty of extrinsic fraud. Hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Buquels were guilty of extrinsic fraud

RULING:

YES. As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the
adverse party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its
clay in court. The fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own
counsel.

The case at bar is closely similar to, if not the same with the case of Pinausukan Seafood House
v. FEBTC. In this case, the Court noticed that the petition's own language mentioned
mistake and gross negligence on the part of petitioner's own counsel. The petition even

353 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
suggested that the negligence of its counsel may constitute professional misconduct. The
Court then ruled that such neglect of counsel, even if it were true, was not tantamount to
extrinsic fraud because it did not emanate from any act of FEBTC as the prevailing party,
and did not occur outside the trial of the case. What is certain, for purposes of application of
Rule 47, is that mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to the extrinsic fraud under
Rule 47. By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in
character, i.e., it relates to any fraudulent act 9f the prevailing party in litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been prevented from
presenting fully his side of the cause, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. And even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless the fraud is
committed by the adverse party, not by one's own lawyer. In the latter case, the remedy of
the client is to proceed against his own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where judgment
had been rendered.

Sibal asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense during the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 6429 resulted in violation of his right to due process. He
claims that his counsel's inexcusable negligence denied him of his clay in court. However, he
admitted that he attended only one stage of the proceedings below, which was the
preliminary conference. He was not aware of the subsequent proceedings as he was totally
dependent on his former counsel and would merely wait for the latter to notify him if his
attendance would be required. There was likewise no indication that his counsel was in fact
in cahoots with the Buquels to obtain the assailed judgment. Sibal must therefore bear the
unfortunate consequences of his actions. As a litigant, he should not have entirely left the
case in his counsel's hands, for he had the continuing duty to keep himself abreast of the
developments, if only to protect his own interest in the litigation. He could have discharged
said duty by keeping in regular touch with his counsel, but he failed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
March 16, 2011 and its Resolution dated July 7, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 104774 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

354 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 39:
Execution, Satisfaction, and Effects of Judgment
Kinds of Execution

AIDA P. BANEZ, petitioner, v. GABRIEL B. BANEZ, respondent

GR 133628 23 January 2002.
Petitions for Review on Certiorari
Quisumbing, J.

As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is
allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result
from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the
writ may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.

FACTS:

These two petitions stem from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, in Civil Case No.
CEB-16765.

The first seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals‘ decision setting aside the orders dated
October 1 and November 22, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court.

The second prays for the reversal of the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
CV-56265, denying the motion to dismiss.

The RTC of Cebu decreed legal separation between Aida and Respondent Gabriel on the ground of
Sexual Infidelity. Dissolution of conjugal property and division of net conjugal assets forfeiture of
Gabriel‘s half share in the net assets in favor of common children; payment of 100,000 as attorney‘s
fees and surrender of a Mazda car and small residential house to petitioner and common children 15
days from receipt of decision was also decreed by the same court. Respondent appealed.

Aida filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The RTC gave due course to execution pending
appeal and issued a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to order the respondent to vacate the
house and surrender the Mazda car. It also ordered the petitioner to post bond to answer for all
damages that respondents may suffer.

The CA set aside the judgment.

Upon motion, Aida prayed that she and her children be allowed to occupy the house for she did not
have the chance to occupy it and besides, she posted a bond for damages that respondent may suffer.
Respondent on the other hand argued that Aida chose not to live in the house for she owned two
houses in the United States where she resides.

ISSUE: Whether or not the execution pending appeal is justified.

RULING:

No. As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal is
allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from

355 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ
may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.

In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no superior
or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if he were ordered
to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondent‘s allegations that she did not
intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses in the United States where she is a
permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to
justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule
rather than the exception.

Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioner‘s counsel was
properly granted. We see no justification to preempt the judgment by the Court of Appeals
concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial court‘s judgment was already on appeal.

Execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the
damages that may result from issuance of writ. Otherwise, the writ may become a tool of oppression
and inequity. In this case, considering the reason cited of Aida, there is no superior or urgent
circumstances that outweigh the damages which the respondent would suffer if he were ordered to
vacate the house. She did not refute the respondent‘s allegations that she did not intend to use the
house for she owned two houses in the US where she resides. Merely, putting up a bond is not
sufficient to justify her plea for execution pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42663 and CA-G.R. No. CV- 56265, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED, so that the Order dated October 1, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
authorizing the release of P100,000 to petitioner‘s counsel; the Omnibus Order dated November 22,
1996 granting the motion pending appeal; the writ of execution dated December 2, 1996; and the
Order dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the
house and vehicle are SET ASIDE. Further, the Administrator of the conjugal partnership is
ORDERED to cause the reimbursement by petitioner‘s counsel of the released amount of
P100,000. The Court of Appeals is hereby DIRECTED to give due course to respondent‘s appeal,
and the Division Clerk of Court of this Court is likewise DIRECTED to promptly remand the
record of these cases to the Court of Appeals.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

356 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
EDGAR Y. SANTOS, petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION)
and PEDRO Q. PANULAYA, respondents
GR 155618 26 March 2003
Certiorari
Ynares-Santiago, J.

Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the elections and
the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the court‘s decision that
should prevail.

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal
was that the immediate execution should be based ―upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order.‖ The rationale why such execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in
Gahol v. Riodique, ―to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge‘s decision as
that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.‖

FACTS:

Edgar Santos and Pedro Panulaya were candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of
Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the 2001 elections. Panulaya was proclaimed the winner.
Santos, filed an election protest before RTC where it ruled in favor of Santos ―trial court
found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while respondent received only 2,105‖.

Santos, filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Panulaya then appealed to the
COMELEC before RTC could have acted on Santos‘ motion. COMELEC, issued a writ of
Preliminary Injunction against the RTC‘s decision, then dismissed Panulaya‘s appeal and
lifted the earlier Writ Preliminary Injunction. Santos, posted bond then RTC, issued a writ of
execution ―thereby installing petitioner as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental
―. Santos then took his oath and assumed duties. Panulaya then filed an Motion for
Reconsideration before the COMELEC, and pending resolution of his MR and
supplemental petition, he filed another petition before the COMELEC, which contained the
same prayers.

COMELEC then issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante and
enjoining Santos from assuming the functions of Mayor, Santos filed an MR before
COMELEC 1st Division. COMELEC 1st Division did not refer the MR to the COMELEC
En Banc. Santos filed a Rule 65 before the SC and filed an Omnibus Motion before the
COMELEC.

ISSUE: Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of RTC?

RULING:

NO. The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the
trial court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must
first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should show not merely a

357 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
reversible error committed by the trial court, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. ―Grave abuse of discretion‖ implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.

We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. In its order
granting execution pending appeal, it held:

It is of judicial notice that for the public official elected last May 14, 2001 elections
only a short period is left. Relative to this Court‘s jurisdiction over the instant case,
the settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of appeal does not divest the trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case and to resolve pending incidents, i.e., motion
for execution pending appeal (Asmala vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be
overemphasized.

However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone
is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal. We disagree.

While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond
are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that:

The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on
April 2, 2002, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots.
It found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed
the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the
Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by
the trial court in the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The
Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even
while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially
determined to have been chosen by the people.

Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the
elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the
court‘s decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the case of Ramas
v. COMELEC in this wise:

All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending
appeal was that the immediate execution should be based ―upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order.‖ The rationale why such execution is allowed in election
cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, ―to give as much recognition to the worth of
a trial judge‘s decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the
proclamation by the board of canvassers.‖ Thus:

358 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to
assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of
a court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers is composed of
persons who are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots,
apart from their being more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the board
must act summarily, practically racing against time, while, on the other hand, the judge has
benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical preparation
and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study and
mature deliberation before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of
allowing the immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees,
notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in
the sound discretion of the court, good reasons therefor.

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in the
words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the ―grab-the-proclamation-
prolong the protest‖ techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in
their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This would, as a consequence, lay
to waste the will of the electorate.

Thus, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of
dismissing outright, the petition in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that
respondent was guilty of forum-shopping; and in setting aside the trial court‘s order granting
execution pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Order
dated September 3, 2002 and the Resolution dated October 14, 2002 of the Commission on
Elections in SPR No. 37-2002 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the said case is
ordered DISMISSED on the ground of forum-shopping. The Order dated August 20, 2002
of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 26, granting the execution pending
appeal of its decision in Election Protest No. 1- M(2001), and the Writ of Execution dated
August 21, 2002, are REINSTATED. The full enforcement of the said Writ must forthwith
be made. The court of origin shall transmit immediately to the Commission on Elections the
records of SPL Election Case No. 1-M(2001), and the Commission on Elections shall
dispose of the appeal in EAC No. A-12-2002 with deliberate dispatch.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

359 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS), petitioner, v. TOMAS TOH, SR., AND REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MANDALUYONG CITY, BRANCH 214, respondents.
GR 144018 23 June 2003
Quisumbing, J.

Discretionary execution is permissible only when "good reasons" exist for immediately
executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of
the time to appeal. "Good reasons" are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of
time, become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may
apparently have no case except to delay.

FACTS:

Tomas Toh, Sr., private respondent herein, filed Civil Case against petitioner Far East Bank
& Trust Co. (FEBTCO now merged in Bank of the Philippine Islands), seeking recovery of
his bank deposits with petitioner plus damages. In his complaint, Toh claimed that petitioner
had debited, without Toh‘s knowledge and consent, said amount from his savings and
current accounts with petitioner bank and then applied the money as payment for the Letters
of Credit availed of by Catmon Sales International Corporation (CASICO) from petitioner.
Thus, when Toh issued two checks to Anton Construction Supply, Inc., they were
dishonored by FEBTCO allegedly for having been drawn against insufficient funds,
although Toh alleged as of February 4, 1999, he had an outstanding withdrawable balance of
₱2,560,644.68.

It appears that private respondent Tomas Toh, Sr., together with his sons, Tomas and
Antonio, had executed a Comprehensive Security Agreement in favor of petitioner, wherein
the Tohs jointly and severally bound themselves as sureties for the ₱22 million credit
facilities, denominated as Omnibus Line and Bills Purchased Line, earlier granted by
petitioner to CASICO. Said credit line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed the
same for another year, subject to the following amendments: (1) a reduction in the credit line
from ₱22 million to ₱7.5 million; and (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as one of the sureties of
CASICO.

In its answer to private respondent‘s complaint, petitioner bank averred that the debiting of
Toh‘s bank accounts was justified due to his surety undertaking in the event of the default of
CASICO in its payments. Petitioner further claimed that the reduction of credit line does not
relieve Toh, Sr. from his continuing surety obligation, citing the absence of a new surety
undertaking or any provisions in the renewal agreement releasing Toh, Sr., from his personal
obligation. It pointed out that CASICO‘s default in its obligations became inevitable after
CASICO filed a Petition for Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

Private respondent filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which petitioner opposed.
Thereafter, Toh Sr., filed a Motion for Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2, 5 Rule
360 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
39 of the Revised Rules of Court. He prayed that execution pending appeal be granted on
the ground of old age and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy his money
deposited in petitioner‘s bank. Petitioner duly opposed said motion.

While private respondent‘s motion was pending before the RTC, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal of the trial court‘s order.

RTC-

issued its order granting private respondent‘s Motion for Discretionary Execution. In
granting Toh‘s motion, the trial court held that discretionary execution may be issued
upon good reasons by virtue of Section 2(a),7 Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Citing De Leon v. Soriano,8 where we held that the approach of the end of one‘s life
span is a compelling cause for discretionary execution pending appeal,9 the trial court
used the circumstance of Toh‘s advanced age as a "good reason" to allow execution
pending appeal.

Petitioner decided to forego filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial court‘s order of.
Instead, it brought the matter to the Court of Appeals in a special civil action for certiorari.

CA:

petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals pointed out that
petitioner filed its petition for certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court‘s Order
granting execution pending appeal on the ground of advanced age of private
respondent Tomas Toh, Sr.
RULING:

NO. Discretionary execution is permissible only when "good reasons" exist for immediately
executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the
time to appeal. "Good reasons" are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate
execution lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time,
become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently
have no case except to delay.15

The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of "good reasons" to justify
execution. The determination of what is a good reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ of execution must
necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge in accordance with his own
conscience and by a sense of justice and equity, free from the control of another‘s judgment
or conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard and fast rule.16

In this case, the trial court granted private respondent‘s motion for discretionary execution
due to his advanced age, citing our ruling in De Leon v. Soriano.17 It concluded that old age is a
"good reason" to allow execution pending appeal as any delay in the final disposition of the
361 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
present case may deny private respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he has with
defendant bank.18 The Court of Appeals found said ruling in conformity with sound logical
precepts, inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of time would render the ultimate
judgment ineffective. It further stressed that the trial court was in the vantage position to
determine whether private respondent‘s advanced age and state of health would merit the
execution private respondent prayed for.

In De Leon, we upheld immediate execution of judgment in favor of a 75-year-old woman.

We ruled that her need of and right to immediate execution of the decision in her favor
amply satisfied the requirement of a paramount and compelling reason of urgency and
justice, outweighing the security offered by the supersedeas bond.19 In the subsequent case of
Borja v. Court of Appeals,20 we likewise allowed execution pending appeal in favor of a 76 year-
old man on the ground that the appeal will take years to decide with finality, and he might
very well be facing a different judgment from a Court higher than any earthly tribunal and
the decision on his complaint, even if it be in his favor, would have become meaningless as
far as he himself was concerned.21

In the present case, private respondent Toh is already 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch
of imagination, be denied that he is already of advanced age. Not a few might be fortunate to
live beyond 79 years. But no one could claim with certainty that his tribe would be always
blessed with long life.

Private respondent obtained a favorable judgment in the trial court. But that judgment in
Civil Case No. MC-99-643 is still on appeal before the Court of Appeals. It might even reach
this Court before the controversy is finally resolved with finality. As well said in Borja,
"while we may not agree that a man of his years is practically moribund, the Court can
appreciate his apprehension that he will not be long for this world and may not enjoy the
fruit of the judgment before he finally passes away."22

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59234 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

362 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, v. HONORABLE
NEMESIO S. FELIX, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 56, Regional Trial
Court, Makati City, RICHARD C. JAMORA, Branch Clerk of Court, and EMERITA
GARON, respondents
GR 148090 28 November 2006
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Carpio, J.

Execution pending appeal is an exception to the general rule. The Court explained the
nature of execution pending appeal as follows:

Execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, being more of the exception rather
than the rule. This rule is strictly construed against the movant because courts look with
disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquired finality.

Such execution affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal.

The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the following:

(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; (c) the good reasons must be
stated in the special order.

FACTS:

Emerita Garon (private respondent) filed an action for sum of money against Project
Movers Realty and Development Corporation (Project Movers) and Stronghold Insurance
Company, Inc. (Stronghold Insurance).

RTC:

The RTC of Makati granted Garon‘s motion for summary judgment on September
19, 2000 and ruled in her favor.

On October 6, 2000, Garon filed a motion for execution pending appeal. On October 10,
2000, Stronghold Insurance moved for the reconsideration of the September 19 Order. The
court denied Stronghold Insurance‘s motion for lack of merit. On February 8, 2001, the trial
court granted Garons motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court ordered Garon
to post a bond of P20 million to answer for any damage that Project Movers and Stronghold
Insurance may sustain by reason of the execution pending appeal. The clerk of court issued a
writ of execution pending appeal on February 14, 2001.

Stronghold Insurance filed a notice of appeal on February 16, 2001. It also filed for certiorari
before the CA on the Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ
of execution pending appeal.

363 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CA:
The CA issued a TRO (temporary restraining order) to enjoin the trial court, Garon,
and the clerk of court from enforcing the February 8 Order. However, notices of
garnishment were already served on Stronghold Insure before the CA issued the
TRO. Stronghold Insurance filed for a motion to recall the notices of garnishment,
which the trial court denied.

The CA sustained the trial court in issuing the writ of execution pending appeal on
the ground of illness of Garon‘s husband. The CA held that while it was not Garon
who was ill, she needed the money to support her husband‘s medical expenses and
to support her family.

Stronghold Insurance alleged that its liability is limited only to P12,755,139.85 in accordance
with its surety bond with Project Movers, plus attorneys fees of P200,000 as awarded by the
trial court. However, the amount in the writ of execution pending appeal and notices of
garnishment is P56 million. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that Stronghold
Insurance failed to show that more than P12,755,139.85 had been garnished.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

ISSUE: Whether there are good reasons to justify execution pending appeal.

RULING:

No, the Court held that Garon failed to prove that she had provided proof of good reasons
to justify execution pending appeal. The Court held that an execution pending appeal is an
exception to the general rule. Execution pending appeal is provided under Sec. 2 of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 2. Discretionary execution;

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the
filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order
even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the
appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due
hearing.

As to its nature, an execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, which is strictly

construed against the movant because the courts do not favor any attempt to execute a
judgement which has not acquired finality. It affects the rights of parties which are yet to be
ascertained on appeal.

364 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the
following:

(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party;
(b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal;
(c) the good reasons must be stated in the special order.

As a discretionary execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good

reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or
even before the expiration of the period to appeal.

The Court defined ‗good reasons‘ as special, important, pressing reasons which exist to
justify the execution pending appeal. They must consist of exceptional circumstances of
such urgency that outweighs the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer
should the appealed decision be reversed later.

In the instant case, the posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good reasons
required under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow execution pending
appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is not a good reason to justify
execution pending appeal as a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration
which impels the grant of immediate execution.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 4 May 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 63334. We also SET ASIDE the 8 February 2001 Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 56 and the writ of execution pending appeal issued on 14
February 2001. We make permanent the temporary restraining order we issued on 8 August
2001.
SO ORDERED.

365 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CECILIO ABENION, et al., petitioners v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, respondent
GR 200749 6 February 2017

CECILIO ABENION, et al., petitioners v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION and BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, respondents
GR 208725 6 February 2017
Petitions for Review on Certioari
Reyes, J.

―…the Court restates the rule that the trial court‘s discretion in allowing execution pending
appeal must be strictly construed. Its grant must be firmly grounded on the existence of
―good reasons,‖ which consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate
execution lest the judgment becomes illusory.

―The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might result
should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would make of
execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of
oppression and inequity.‖

The sufficiency of ―good reasons‖ depends upon the circumstances of the case and the
parties thereto. Conditions that are personal to one party, for example, may be insufficient
to justify an execution pending appeal that would affect all parties to the case and the
property that is the subject thereof.‖

FACTS:

1,843 plaintiffs, which includes the petitioners herein, filed a complaint for damages in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo City, Davao, against Shell Oil Company (Shell) and
other foreign corporations.

Plaintiffs, whom are banana plantation workers, argue that the Shell and the other
corporations sold nematocides against the parasite nematode which are abundant in
banana plantations, and it contains a chemical known as dibromochloropropane
(DBCP).

Due to the exposure to DBCP, plaintiffs claim that it caused sterility and other
serious and permanent health injuries.

During the pendency of the case, a compromise agreement was entered, and subsequently
the case against shall was dismissed.

In the said compromise agreement, ―Clause 28‖ states that the agreement is binding
to Shell‘s affiliates and successors

366 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
As there is an alleged failure on the part of Shell to comply with the agreement, the plaintiffs
filed a Motion for Execution, for the enforcement of the judgment based on the
compromise agreement, with the RTC of Davao City.

The RTC of Davao ordered in favor of the plaintiffs, and ordered the enforcement
of the judgment.

By virtue of Clause 28, plaintiffs moved to bring in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum

Corporation (PTPC) as a party despite not being a party to the case, which was
granted.

Thus, an alias writ of execution was issued, citing PSPC as one of the parties against
whom the writ of execution may be implemented.

The sheriff sought to implement the said writ against PSPC, and issued a notice of
garnishment to cover the latter's account with Banco De Oro (BDO)

Aggrieved, PSPC instituted two (2) actions in the RTC of Makati:

First, a Petition for Prohibition against the Sheriff and the plaintiffs, to prevent the
enforcement of the writ

Second, a Complaint for Injunction against BDO and John Does, the former to
prevent its release of funds, and the latter to prevent their intervention claiming to be
among those who should receive therefrom.

In the Petition for Prohibition:

The 1st Judge handling the case granted the application for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO);

An injunction bond of Php20M was posted by PSPC, issued by

Malayan Insurance Company (Malayan)

The 2nd Judge, after the 1st Judge inhibited himself, a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was issued (WPI), and thus barred the garnishment of PSPC‘s
funds in BDO until further orders;

Likewise, an additional bond of Php20M was posted by PSPC, again

as issued by Malayan.

Thus, the total of the bonds is Php40M

The 3rd Judge, after the 2nd Judge‘s inhibiting herself, dismissed the Petition, on the
ground that PSPC has another remedy available, specifically being stranger to the
attachment under Rule 39, and thus prohibition cannot be had, considering that it is
only allowed if there is no appeal or other remedies in the ordinary course of law
367 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Thus, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Call on the Bond, for damages incurred by
virtue of the injunctive writs issued against them.

PSPC opposed the same, claiming that no compensable damage can be had
due to such issuance, and further claimed that the Court of Appeals (CA) of
Mindanao issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of execution orders in
relation to this case

Nevertheless, RTC of Makati granted the motion, and ordered the Php40M
worth of bond answerable for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs

PSPC filed a Notice of Appeal, while Malayan filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR). Due to the appeal, plaintiffs amended their Motion for Execution, into an
execution pending appeal, which was granted.

In the Complaint for Injunction:

John Does were nevertheless included in the suit by allowing their intervention
despite opposition of PSPC

Aggrieved, PSPC filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, and by virtue of such appeal, the
plaintiffs amended the Motion for Execution:

In the Prohibition case:

Reversed the RTC decision, considering that there is still an MR from

Malayan which made the case yet to be resolved, and thus the period to
appeal has yet to commence, and therefore no execution pending appeal can
be had.

In the Injunction case:

Annulled and set aside the order of the RTC allowing for the intervention

Thus, this petition

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the motion for execution
despite the filing of the Notice of Appeal; and
Whether or not the execution pending appeal raised by petitioners contained
a good cause;

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes, the RTC still has jurisdiction.

368 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal and the
expiration of the period to appeal.

In this case, the RTC of Makati properly exercised jurisdiction over the motion for execution
considering that the period to appeal has yet to expire.

Specifically, by virtue of Malayan‘s MR, the case being unresolved, no appeal can be filed at
that moment

2nd Issue:
No, good reasons pertain to:

―…which consist of compelling circumstances that justify immediate execution lest

the judgment becomes illusory.

―The circumstances must be superior, outweighing the injury or damages that might
result should the losing party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would
make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice,
a tool of oppression and inequity.‖‖

In this case, the RTC relied on the representation of the plaintiffs that twenty three (23) of
them have already died, or are suffering from old age, or are seriously injured.

The fact that the number of the raised ground is minimal to the totality of the plaintiffs, it
cannot be said that it is a good reason to which the execution pending appeal may be
allowed.

While it is true that the determination of good cause is discretionary, it must be scrutinized
strictly on the basis of the yardstick determining such:

―The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of
exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that
the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later.

Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule,
the existence of good reasons is essential.‖

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 200749 and
G.R. No. 208725 are DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

The intervention, was likewise denied, considering its discretionary nature and that legal
interest in the suit was not proven by the intervenors

369 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT
ARESTO (SELDA), represented by DIONITO CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M.
FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY, and DANILO M.
DELA FUENTE,** petitioners, vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (in his
capacity as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of the
Philippines), The Grave Services Unit (Philippine Army), and GENERAL RICARDO R.
VISAYA (in his capacity as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines), DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, and HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
represented by his surviving spouse IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., and RENE A.C. SAGUISAG
III, intervenors
GR 225973 8 August 2017
Motions for Reconsideration of a Decision of the Supreme Court; Urgent Motion Or Petition for
exhumation of Marcos‘ remains at the LNMB; and Petitions to cite respondents in contempt
Peralta, J.

Judgments in actions for injunction are immediately executory; it shall be enforceable after
their rendition stud shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise
ordered by the court.

FACTS:

November 8, 2016, the Court dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of the
mortal remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos), former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). Marcos was finally laid to rest at the
LNMB around noontime of November 18, 2016, which was ten days after the promulgation
of the judgment and prior to the filing of petitioners' separate motions for reconsideration.

Now filed before the SC are the following matters for resolution:

1. Motions for Reconsideration (MRs) filed by Ocampo et al., Lagman et al., Rosales et al.,
Latiph, and De Lima;
2. Urgent Motion or Petition for the exhumation of Marcos' remains at the LNMB filed by
Lagman et al.; and
3. Petitions to Cite respondents in Contempt of court filed by Ocampo et al. and Rosales et al.,
which were consolidated with the case and docketed as G.R. No. 228186 and G.R. No.
228245, respectively.

ISSUE: The related topic or issue is the contention of Lagman et al. that he right of a
party to file a MR is impaired and that due process is derailed if a decision that is
not yet final and executory is implemented.

RULING:

370 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
While the Court concedes that execution takes place only when decisions become final and
executory, there are cases that may be executed pending appeal or are immediately executory
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules and the statutes as well as by court order. Yet, the
fact that a decision is immediately executory does not prevent a party from questioning the
decision before a court of law.

By nature, a Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) is similar to the provisional remedies of TRO
and WPI. Thus, when the Court dismissed the petitions in the earlier Decisions, the SQAO,
in effect, became functus officio or without authority anymore; it could not stand
independent of the main proceeding.

Finally, based on the title, allegations, and relief being sought, this consolidated case is one
for prohibition; hence, essentially in the nature of petitions for injunction. Under Section 4,
Rule 39 of the Rules, judgments in actions for injunction are immediately executory; it shall
be enforceable after their rendition stud shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom,
unless otherwise ordered by the court.

With the dismissal of the petitions and the lifting of the SQAO, nothing stood to hinder
respondents from acting on and proceeding with Marcos' burial at the LNMB prior to the
expiration of the period to file a MR and before its resolution.

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration, as well as the motion/petition to exhume

Marcos‘ remains at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, are DENIED WITH FINALITY.

The petitions for indirect contempt in G.R. No. 228186 and G.R. No. 228245 are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

371 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Modes of Execution

DANIEL A. VILLAREAL, JR. (ON BEHALF OF ORLANDO A. VILLAREAL),

petitioner, v. METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM,
respondent
GR 232202 28 February 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Tijam, J.

A final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years or by action
for revival of judgment within ten years reckoned from the date of entry of judgment. The
date of entry, in turn, is the same as the date of finality of judgment. By jurisprudence, for
execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the accomplishment of
two acts within the five-year prescriptive period, as follows:

(a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and
(b) the court's actual issuance of the writ.

FACTS:

The MeTC of Quezon City dismissed Civil Case No. 21293 for Unlawful Detainer, entitled
"Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Orlando A. Villareal and other persons
claiming Rights Under Him," for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action.

RTC:

On appeal by respondent Metropolitan Waterworks Sewerage System (MWSS), the

RTC Branch 96, rendered a Decision on September 27, 2002, reversing the MeTC's
judgment, and ordered that Orlando and all persons claiming rights under him to
vacate the premises and surrender peacefully the possession thereof to MWSS; and
to pay the amount of P2,500.00 as reasonable compensation from November 7, 1997
until the possession is restored to MWSS.

On December 15, 2002, the RTC Clerk of Court issued an Entry of Judgment/Order,
stating that the RTC Decision has become final and executory. Within a period of two years
or on May 17, 2004, MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the
MeTC.

Orlando Villareal (Orlando) filed his Comment/Opposition, praying that the motion be held
in abeyance pending compliance by MWSS with the provision of Section 23 of Republic Act
No. 7279, also known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.

More than 10 years from the filing of MWSS' motion for execution or on July 28, 2014, the
MeTC issued an Order, granting the motion for issuance of writ of execution. The MeTC
ruled that R.A. No. 7279 does not find application, since Orlando failed to prove that he

372 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
falls under the category of "underprivileged and homeless citizens," who are the beneficiaries
of the said Act.

On October 26, 2015, the MeTC issued a Writ of Execution, for the satisfaction of the RTC
Decision dated September 27, 2002. Pursuant to the writ of execution, on April 19, 2016, the
MeTC Sheriff III sent a Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay to Orlando.

SC:

Daniel Villareal, Jr. (on behalf of Orlando), filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 with the RTC Branch 215, challenging the Writ of Execution dated October 26,
2015 and the Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay. He argued that the five-year period
under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules was violated since the execution was done
more than 10 years from the finality of the RTC decision.

MWSS countered that the five-year period under the Rules within which to enforce a
judgment by mere motion run only against the judgment obligee and not the court
that will resolve/decide it. MWSS likewise alleged that Orlando's filing of
Comment/Opposition caused the delay in the execution of judgment.

ISSUE: Whether the writ of execution issued by the MeTC on October 26, 2015 is null
and void for violating the five-year period under Section 6, Rule 39.

RULING:

Yes. Execution may be either through motion or an independent action. The two modes of
execution under the Rules are available, depending on the timing when the prevailing party
invoked his right to enforce the court's judgment.

Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. This is a matter of right. On the other hand,
execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for
execution by motion had already elapsed. The said judgment is reduced to a right of action
which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular court. The action must
be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten
(10) years from the finality of the judgment.

Corollary, a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years or by
action for revival of judgment within ten years reckoned from the date of entry of judgment.
The date of entry, in turn, is the same as the date of finality of judgment.

By jurisprudence, for execution by motion to be valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the
accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive period, as follows: (a) the filing
of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and (b) the court's actual issuance of
the writ.

373 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Here, the RTC Branch 96 Decision dated September 27, 2002 became final and executory
on December 15, 2002. By operation of law, December 15, 2002 is likewise the date of entry
of judgment. Consequently, the five-year prescriptive period for the execution of the RTC
decision by mere motion must be reckoned from December 15, 2002.

MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution of the RTC Decision on May 17,
2004. This is within five years from December 15, 2002 - the date when the decision became
final and executory. Thus, the first act was accomplished. There is, however, non-compliance
with the second act.

The five-year prescriptive period reckoned from the entry of judgment mentioned in Section
6, Rule 39 of the Rules, should be observed both by the winning party who filed the motion,
i.e., judgment obligee/creditor, andthe court that will resolve the same. Simply put, the
winning party may file the motion for execution within the five-year period; and the court
should issue the actual writ of execution pursuant to the motion within the same period.
After the lapse of the five-year period, any writ issued by the court is already null and void,
since the court no longer has jurisdiction over the issuance of the writ.

Records show that the MeTC issued an Order granting the said motion only on July 28,
2014. More than a year after the grant, or on October 26, 2015, the MeTC issued the Writ of
Execution. Reckoned from the entry of judgment on December 15, 2002, more than 12
years have elapsed after the actual writ of execution was finally issued by the MeTC. This is
clearly beyond the fiveyear prescriptive period within which the court may issue the writ of
execution. By then, the MeTC was already stripped of its jurisdiction. Thus, the writ of
execution it issued on October 26, 2015 is null and void.

We cannot subscribe to MWSS' insistence that Orlando's filing of his Comment/Opposition

to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, caused the delay in the execution of
judgment.

There are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of
five years upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, i.e.,
the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for
his benefit or advantage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated February 9, 2017 and the Order
dated May 17, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, in Case No. R-
QZN-16-03654-CV, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

374 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, v. FEDERICO A.
SERRA, respondent
GR 203241 10 July 2013
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Carpio, J.

The Rules of Court provide that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion
within five years from the date of its entry or by an action after the lapse of five years and
before prescription sets in.

This Court, however, allows exceptions when execution may be made by motion even after
the lapse of five years.

These exceptions have one common denominator: the delay is caused or occasioned by
actions of the judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.

FACTS:

Federico Serra (Serra) entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), whereby the former shall lease his land in
Masbate to the latter for twenty five (25) years, and with an option for the latter to buy the
same within ten (10) years.

On the 9th year of the contract, RCBC manifested its intention to buy the same. However,
Serra said that he is no longer interested. Thus, RCBC filed a complaint for Specific
Performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

Initially, the Complaint was dismissed, but eventually the RTC itself reversed and
ordered the execution and delivery of the deed of sale to Serra.

Serra appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA)

During the pendency, Serra donated the said parcel to his mother, while the
latter sold the same to a certain Liok

The CA, and likewise the Supreme Court (SC) affirmed the decision of RTC Makati,
and became final and executory on 15 April 1994 upon entry of judgment

Having knowledge of the sale made by Serra‘s mother, RCBC filed an annulment case with
the RTC of Masbate to nullify the deed of donation, sale, and for reconveyance against three
(3) parties involved.

RTC ruled in favor of RCBC, declaring the donation and sale null and void, and
likewise affirmed by the SC and became final and executory on 27 August 2008 and
2 March 2009, as filed by Liok, and Serra with his mother, respectively.

375 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved to execute of the decision in the Specific Performance
case with the RTC of Makati

Serra opposed the same, on the ground that the period to execute by motion, which
is from 1994 to 1999, has already passed

RTC denied the RCBC‘s motion, on the ground raised by Serra.

Thus, this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the period to execute has already passed

RULING:

No, the execution is still within the period.

While as a rule, execution must be done via a motion within five (5) years from entry, or
after the lapse of five (5) years via an action, it admits of exceptions, with a common
denominator that, the delay to execute was caused by the judgment obligor (debtor).

In this case, Serra did acts to delay the execution of the RTC Order, such as the donation to
his mother. Such acts prevented RCBS to execute the same, as it is impossible to transfer it
to its name considering the title named to Liok. Thus, the annulment case, which effectively
delayed the execution

Hence, the acts in question suspended the period to execute, and therefore that the order of
the SC became final and executory in 2009, and the execution was made in 2011, it is well
within the five (5) year period to move for execution.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July 2012. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 3 December 2012 is made permanent.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City is DIRECTED to issue the writ of execution in
Civil Case No. 10054 for the enforcement of the decision therein. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

376 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SPOUSES LARRY and FLORA DAVIS, petitioners, v. SPOUSES FLORENCIO and
LUCRESIA DAVIS, respondents
GR 233489 7 March 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Velasco, Jr. J.

Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within five (5)
years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action."

Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many instances where it allowed execution
by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon meritorious grounds. These exceptions
have one common denominator, and that is: the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of
the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.

FACTS:

On January 29, 1991, the petitioners, as vendees, and the herein respondents Spouses
Florencio and Lucresia Davis, as vendors, entered into a Contract to Sell over a 500-square
meter lot in Banga, Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-226201 (M) (subject property) for a consideration of P500,000. As agreed upon, the
petitioners gave the respondents the sum of P200,000 as down payment while the remaining
balance of P300,000 was made payable in 12 equal monthly installments. The respondents
agreed to execute the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale upon full payment of the
purchase price. After full payment thereof and despite repeated demands, however, the
respondents failed and refused to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale to the petitioners. This
prompted the latter to initiate a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against
the former before Branch 78 (Br. 78) of the RTC Malolos. A notice of lis pendens was then
annotated at the back.

On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the aforesaid ruling in its Decision dated August 31,
2004, which became final and executory on October 2, 2004.

Accordingly, on May 11, 2005, the petitioners moved for the execution of the February 13,
1998 Decision of the RTC Malolos (Br. 78), which was granted. A writ of execution was
subsequently issued. Unfortunately, this writ was not implemented primarily because the
respondents already sold the subject property and new TCT No. 421671 (M) was issued. But
the notice of lis pendens was still carried over to the new title. The petitioners were, thus,
compelled to file an action for annulment of title and document against the new registered
owners of the subject property before Br. 15, RTC Malolos, it ruled in favor of the
petitioners and declared TCT No. 421671 (M) as null and void and restored TCT No. T-
226201 (M). This Decision became final and executory.

With this in view, the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion on July
13, 2016for the implementation of the February 13, 1998 Decision of the RTC Malolos (Br.

377 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
78) by issuing a writ of execution to direct the respondents to execute a Deed of Absolute
Sale in their favor pursuant to Section 10 (a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In their
Comment, the respondents opposed arguing that the said Decision cannot be enforced by a
mere motion or by an action for revival of judgment since 10 years had already lapsed from
the time it became final. In their Reply, the petitioners insisted that the period within which
to move for the execution of the aforesaid Decision was deemed suspended with their filing
of an action for annulment of title and document involving the subject property before the
RTC Malolos (Br. 15) to enable a complete and effective relief in their favor.

RTC Malolos (Br. 78) denied the petitioners' Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion
explaining that the consequent filing of annulment of title involving the subject property
before Br. 15 does not toll the running of the period.

ISSUE: Whether a writ of execution in favor of petitioners to execute and implement

the Decision dated February 13, 1998 should be issued.

RULING:

Yes. Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a "judgment may be executed within
five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory.
After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action." Nonetheless, this Court held that there had been many
instances where it allowed execution by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon
meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one common denominator, and that is: the
delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his
benefit or advantage.

Here, the decision sought to be enforced became final and executory on October 2, 2004.
Upon the petitioners' motion, a writ of execution was issued in 2005, which was well within
the said five-year period. The writ, however, was repeatedly returned unserved and
unimplemented. The petitioners later discovered the reason therefor. The respondents had
sold the subject property to other parties. Worse, a new title has already been issued to the
latter. As such, the petitioners were compelled to file an action for annulment of title and
document against these new registered owners. Fortunately, the court ruled in petitioners'
favor, which ruling became final and executory on July 23, 2012. Petitioners consequently
moved for its execution resulting in the cancellation of the title in the names of the new
registered owners and the restoration of the title in the names of the respondents.
Chronologically speaking, the motion for execution filed on July 13, 2016 was almost 12
years after the decision became final and executory. Petitioners, however, maintain that the
period during which it was compelled to file another action involving the subject property
just to enable a complete and effective relief in their favor should not be taken into account
in the computation of the five-year period.

This Court sustains the petitioners' position. Considering that the delay was not due to the
fault of the petitioners but of the respondents, who deliberately sold the subject property to
another to avoid the outcome of the case filed against them, and which delay incurred to
their benefit/advantage, it is only logical, just, and equitable that the period during which an
378 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
action for annulment of title and document was being litigated upon shall be deemed to have
interrupted or tolled the running of the five-year period for enforcement of a judgment by
mere motion. Otherwise, the respondents were rewarded for escaping the fulfilment of their
obligation. Therefore, in computing the time limited for suing out an execution, the time
during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any
delay occasioned by the debtor.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The CA Resolutions dated May 22,
2017 and August 10, 2017 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 150626 and the Order dated February 7,
2017 of the RTC Malolos, Branch 78 in Civil Case No. 581- M-95 are, thus, REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Urgent Ex Parte Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioners on
July 13, 2016 in said civil case is hereby GRANTED. The RTC Malolos, Branch 78 is
ordered to immediately issue a writ of execution in favor of petitioners — spouses Larry and
Flora Davis to execute and implement the Decision dated February 13, 1998, the fallo of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court resolves the instant case in
favor of plaintiffs Larry and Flora Davis and against defendants Florencio and
Lucresia Davis ordering the aforesaid defendants to: 1. Execute the Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of herein plaintiffs covering the 500-square-meter land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-226201, and cause the necessary
registration thereof to the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan; 2. Pay, jointly and
severally, the plaintiffs the following amounts, to wit: d. P50,000.00 as moral
damages; e. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and f. P40,000.00 as attorney‘s fees
and litigation expenses; 3. Pay, jointly and severally, the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

379 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ROGELIO (ROGER) PANOTES (thru ARACELI BUMATAY, as successor-in-interest),
petitioner, v. CITY TOWNHOUSE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
GR 154739 23 January 2007
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Writs of Execution; Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action
and not against one who did not have his day in court.

FACTS:

In April 1979, Rogelio Panotes, then president of the Provident Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. filed a complaint in the National Housing Authority, against Provident
Securities Corporation (PORSECOR), owner-developer of the Provident Village in Marikina
City. The complaint alleged that PROSECOR violated Sections 19, 20, 21, 39 and 39 of PD
No. 957. One of the violations complained of was the failure of PROSECOR to provide an
open space in the said subdivision.

During the proceedings before the NFA, an ocular inspection showed that the subdivision
has no open space but NHA found that Block 40 could be utilized as an open space. Thus
in its resolution, the NHA directed PROSECOR to provide the Provident Village an open
space to be located in Block 40. PROSECOR was served copies of the NHA Resolution
and the letter from NHA in August 1980. PROSECOR did not appeal from the NHA
Resolution, the Resolution became final and executory. When Panotes filed a motion for
execution of the NHA resolution, it was ―mysteriously missing‖, hence his motion was
―provisionally dismissed‖ without prejudice.

Meanwhile, PROSECOR sold to City Townhouse Development Corporation (CTDC),

herein respondent, several lots in the subdivision including Block 40. CTDC was unaware
of the NHA Resolution ordering PROSECOR to utilize Block 40 as open space.

Eventually, Panotes was succeeded by Araceli Bumatay as president of the PVHAI. In July
1990, she filed with the HLURB a complaint for revival of the NHA Resolution (issued in
Aug 1980). She impleaded CTDC as defendant as successor-in-interest of PROSECOR. In
its Answer, CTDC averred that Bumatay has no legal personality to file the action for revival
of judgment, and that there is a pending litigation between CTDC and PROSECOR
involving Block 40 and other entities also have existing liens over Block 40.

On October 1991, HLURB rendered a decision in favor of Bumatay which effectively

revived the NHA Resolution and declaring Block 40 of the Provident Village as open
space for the subdivision. On appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the
decision of the Arbiter in the revival case was affirmed with modification in that CTDC
now has a right to recover from PROSECOR what it had lost. CTDC‘s MR was denied
hence it made an appeal with the Office of the President (OP). The OP affirmed in
toto the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. MR was again denied, thus
an appeal to the CA under Rule 43 was filed by CTDC. The CA dismissed CTDC‘s

380 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
petition for failure to attach thereto a certification against forum shopping; CTDC filed an
MR which was opposed by Bumatay. CTDC submitted a certification of non-forum
shopping as well as the pleadings mentioned in the CA‘s Resolution to which the CA
granted the MR filed by CTDC and reinstated its petition. The CA eventually
reversed the decision of the OP and dismissed the complaint for revival of
judgement. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA Resolution made in August 1980 may be enforced
against CTDC.

RULING:

NO. The Court in this case ruled that the original judgment or the NHA Resolution sought
to be revived was between Rogelio Panotes and PROSECOR and not between petitioner
Araceli Bumatay and respondent CTDC. CTDC purchased Block 40 in the said village not
as an owner-developer like PROSECOR but as an ordinary buyer of lots. Even after the
sale, CTDC did not become an owner-developer. The Deed of Sale executed between
CTDC and PROSECOR did not include the transfer of rights of PROSECOR as owner
developer of the said subdivision thus, there clearly is no basis to conclude that CTDC is the
successor-in-interest.

The Court also stressed that when CTDC bought Block 40, there was no annotation on
PROSECOR‘s title showing that the property is encumbered. In fact here was no
Annotation of the NHA Resolution in the title of PROSECOR. Thus, there is no basis to
conclude that CTDC was the successor-in-interest of PROSECOR, hence the NHA
Resolution may not be enforced against CTDC.

An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the
execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years
without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open
any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor‘s case not the propriety or correctness
of the first judgment.

Since CTDC was not a successor-in-interest of PROSECOR, the obligation to provide an

open space within the subdivision remains with PROSECOR, the owner-developer and the
real party in interest in the case for the revival of judgment. CTDC is simply on the same
footing as any lot buyer-member of the PVHIA. Thusly, strangers to a case. Like CTDC,
are not bound by the judgment rendered by a court. The Court will not divest the rights of a
party who has not and never been a party to a litigation. Execution of a judgment can
only be issued against a party to the action and not against one who did not have his
day in court. CA decision affirmed.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52621. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

381 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Properties exempt from Execution

D‘ ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioner, v.

ARNULFO ORPIA, et al., respondents.
GR 151325 27 June 2005
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

Writs of Execution; It is apparent that the rule on properties exempt from execution pertains
only to natural persons and not to juridical entities. Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on
Execution of Judgment provides: x x x The Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt from execution. It is
apparent that the exemption pertains only to natural persons and not to juridical entities.
The CA, on this point was correct in ruling that petitioner, being a corporate entity, does not
fall within the exemption.

It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and earnings are
indispensable for his own and that of his family‘s support are exempted under Section 13 (i)
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner security
agency is not covered by the exemption.

FACTS:

On February 1995, Arnulfo Orpia, et. al, herein respondents, who were employed as security
guards of D‘Armoured Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., herein petitioner, and
assigned to Fortune Tobacco Inc filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
dismissal and various monetary claims against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco. On
June 1998, the LA rendered a decision which held D‘Armoured and Fortune Tobacco
liable to pay Arnulfo Orpia et. al a total sum of P1,077,124.29 for underpayment, overtime
pay, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, illegal deduction and
refund of firearms bond.

From the said Decision, Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the NLRC.
D‘Armoured did not file an appeal. The NLRC, on March 1999, rendered a decision
affirming with modification the LA decision in the sense that the complaint against Fortune
Tobacco was dismissed. This decision of the NLRC became final and executory, thus the
award specified in the LA decision became the sole liability of D‘Armoured. The records
were then remanded to the LA for execution. Upon the motion for execution filed by Orpia
[Link]., the LA issued a writ of execution. Eventually, the sheriff served a writ of garnishment
upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom D‘Armoured
has an existing services agreement. Thus, D’Armoured’s receivables with Foremost were garnished.

D‘armoured then filed with NLRC a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and
Garnishment which was opposed by Orpia, [Link]. On March 2000, the LA denied the
motion and directed the sheriff to release the garnished sum of money to respondents pro
rata. D‘Armoured‘s MR was denied; hence it filed an appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC in its
Resolution issued in July 2000, dismissed the appeal for failure to post a bond within the

382 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
reglementary period; MR was also denied. Thus petitioner filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On
December 2001, the CA dismissed the petition, hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in holding that D‘Armoured‘s monthly
receivables from Foremost Farms Inc (garnishee) are not exempt from
execution.

RULING:

YES. The Court has ruled that an order for execution of a final and executory judgment, as
in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. On this ground
alone, the instant petition is dismissible.

Assuming that an appeal is proper, still the Court would have to deny the instant petition.
Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment enumerates what
properties are exempt from execution. It is apparent from the enumeration that the
exemption pertains only to natural persons and not to juridical entities. On this point, the
CA correctly ruled that petitioner, being a corporate entity, does not fall within the
exemption.

Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties are
exempt from execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:

‗SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution.—Except as otherwise expressly

provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from
execution:

xxx xxx xxx

(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal
services within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his
family.’

The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the
Civil Code, the substantive law which proscribes the execution of employee‘s wages,
thus:

‗ART. 1708. The laborer‘s wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment,
except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.‘

Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New
Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons
belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day‘s labor for immediate or present
support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa vs. Court
of Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985)].
383 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons and not
to juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning
from the ‗personal services‘ rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires
that such earnings be intended for the support of the judgment debtor‘s family.
Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the exemption.
If at all, the exemption refers to petitioner‘s individual employees and not to petitioner as a
corporation.

It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and earnings are
indispensable for his own and that of his family‘s support are exempted under
Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Undeniably, a corporate entity such as
petitioner security agency is not covered by the exemption. Petition is DISMISSED.
CA decision affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 18, 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61799 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

384 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Third Party Claim

POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

(PSALM), petitioner, v. MAUNLAD HOMES, INC., respondent
GR 215933 8 February 2017
Petition for review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

The power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and
not against one who did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff is to levy the property
of the judgment debtor not that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one man‘s goods shall
not be sold for another man‘s debts. Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a writ of execution
is claimed by a third person who is not the judgment obligor, Section 16 of Rule 39 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the remedy of such third party claimant.

The third party claimant may execute an affidavit of his title or right to the possession of the
property levied, and serve the same to the officer making the levy and a copy thereof to the
judgment creditor. This remedy is known as terceria.

FACTS:

National Power Corporation (NPC) set a public bidding for the security package in NPC
MinGen. Among the participating bidders was San Miguel Protective Security Agency (SMPSA),
represented by Labao. However, NPC's Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) disqualified SMPSA
for its alleged failure to meet the equipage requirements. The disqualification prompted Labao,
as the general manager of SMPSA, to bring a petition for certiorari against NPC and its officials
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Lanao del Norte.

RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) directing NPC and its officials to desist from
awarding the security package, as well as from declaring a failure of bidding.

Then the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining NPC and its officials
from committing said acts. And on August 17, 2009, the RTC, ruling in favor of
SMPSA, made the injunction permanent, and granted other reliefs to SMPSA.

NPC appealed to the CA.

In the meantime, NPC and Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM) entered into an operation and maintenance agreement (OMA) whereby the latter, as
the owner of all assets of NPC by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), had the obligation to provide for the
security of all the plants, assets and other facilities.

PSALM received the TRO issued by the CA on April 5, 2010. It is noted that Labao did not
furnish PSALM a copy of SMPSA's Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or
Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction.

385 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CA issued the assailed resolution granting the TRO in order to maintain the status quo, and
expressly included PSALM as subject of the writ, notwithstanding the fact that PSALM was not
a party in the case brought by Labao against NPC, and the fact that PSALM was not furnished a
copy of Labao 's Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary Prohibitory
Injunction.

Hence, PSALM has come to the Court by petition for certiorari, insisting that the CA thereby
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by subjecting its company to the injunctive writ issued to NPC.

ISSUE: Whether or not a non-party to a suit may be subjected to the injunctive writ
issued against one of the parties.

RULING:

No. A non-party to a suit cannot be subjected to the injunctive writ issued against one of the
parties. We cannot uphold the resolutions of the CA. First of all, Section 49 of Republic Act No.
9136, or EPIRA, expressly created PSALM as a corporate entity separate and distinct from NPC,
to wit:

Section 49. Creation of Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management

Corporation;
There is hereby created a government owned and controlled corporation to be known as
the "Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation", hereinafter referred
to as the "PSALM Corp.", which shall take ownership of all existing NPC generation
assets, liabilities, IPP contracts, real estate and all other disposable assets. All outstanding
obligations of the National Power Corporation arising from loans, issuances of bonds,
securities and other instruments of indebtedness shall be transferred to and assumed by
the PSALM Corp. within ninety (90) days from the approval of this Act.

Accordingly, the CA blatantly erred in holding that PSALM, without being made a party itself,
was subject of the writ of injunction issued against NPC. PSALM and NPC, despite being
unquestionably invested by Jaw with distinct and separate personalities, were intolerably
confused with each other. Lastly, Labao was quite aware that under EPIRA, PSALM became the
owner as early as in mid-2001 of all of NPC's existing generation assets, liabilities, IPP contracts,
real estate and all other disposable assets, as well as all facilities of NPC. NPC MinGen was
among the assets or properties coming under the ownership of PSALM. As such owner, PSALM
was an indispensible party without whom no final determination could be had if it was not
joined. An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in its absence without injuring or affecting that
interest. As such, Labao should have impleaded PSALM in the proceedings in the RTC, or the
RTC should have itself seen to PSALM 's inclusion as an indispensable party.

In fine, the CA unquestionably exceeded its jurisdiction in including PSALM within the coverage
of the TRO and the writ of injunction issued against NPC. There is no question that as a
provisional remedy to prevent irreparable injury pending the final determination of the action,
injunction can bind only the parties in the action, or their privies or successors in interest. No
person who has not been impleaded and duly served with the summons should be adversely
affected by the outcome of the action. The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a
386 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which it has not been made a party conforms to
the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 30, 2012 and the
Resolution dated December 10, 2014 issued by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
118302 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

387 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Effect of Judgment

CITY OF CEBU, petitioner, v. APOLONIO M. DEDAMO, JR., respondent

GR 172852 30 January 2013
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Reyes, J.

Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question

already settled in a previous case.

FACTS:

This is an off-shoot of Civil Case No. CEB-14632 for eminent domain over two (2) parcels
of land owned by spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo (Spouses Dedamo), filed by the
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, on September 17,
1993. The petitioner immediately took possession of the lots after depositing P51,156.00
with the Philippine National Bank pursuant to Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160.

December 14, 1994, the petitioner and Spouses Dedamo entered into a Compromise
Agreement whereby the latter agreed to part with the ownership of the parcels of land in
favor of the former in consideration of P1,786,400.00 as provisional payment and just
compensation in an amount to be determined by a panel of commissioners.

Thereafter, the panel was constituted and a report was submitted to the RTC recommending
the sum of P20,826,339.50 as just compensation. The report was adopted and approved by
the RTC in its Order dated December 27, 1996. The RTC order was affirmed by the CA,
then by the SC under G.R. No. 142971.

September 20, 2002, the case was remanded for execution to the RTC, before which, a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by Spouses Dedamo on April 4,
2003. On May 16, 2003, the RTC granted the motion and ordered the issuance of the writ.

December 23, 2003, the petitioner paid the respondent the sum of P19,039,939.50 which is
the difference between the just compensation due and the provisional payment already
made.

March 24, 2004, the respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC to order
the petitioner to pay interest on the just compensation computed from the time of actual
taking of the lands.

April 30, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and ruled that it can no longer amend a final and
executory judgment that did not specifically direct the payment of legal interest. The
respondent sought recourse before the CA asserting that the petitioner is liable to pay:

388 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

 12% legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just compensation computed from
the time of actual taking of the property up to the date of payment of just
compensation; and
 12% legal interest from the time the decision awarding just compensation
became final and executory on September 20, 2002 until its satisfaction on
December 23, 2003.

November 30, 2005, CA rejected the first claim, but found merit on the second. Both
parties elevated the CA judgment to the Court. The respondents petition was docketed
as G.R. No. 172942 where he sought, in the main, that the 12% interest rate be reckoned
from the date of taking of the property and not from the date of finality of the Decision
dated May 7, 2002 in G.R. No. 142971. The Court denied his petition on August 22, 2006
for failure to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error in the questioned
judgment. The respondents‘ motion for reconsideration of the said decision was
denied with finality on November 27, 2006.

At bar is the recourse interposed by the petitioner wherein he seeks the setting aside of the
same CA Decision dated November 30, 2005. In the case at bar, the petitioner prays for the
annulment of the award of 12% legal interest made by the CA in view of the termination of
the eminent domain case upon payment of the just compensation in satisfaction of the writ
of execution. The petitioner further asserts that the final judgment in Civil Case No. CEB-
14632 which did not explicitly pronounce the payment of interest can no longer be modified
lest the basic principles of remedial law be defiled.

ISSUE: Whether this Court can try the case notwithstanding the issues similarly
raised and already resolved in G.R. No. 172942.

RULING:

The petition is denied on the ground of res judicata in the mode of conclusiveness of
judgment. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed,
should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.

The adjudication in G.R. No. 172942 has become binding and conclusive on the petitioner
who can no longer question the respondents‘ entitlement to the 12% legal interest awarded
by the CA. The Courts determination in G.R. No. 172942 on the reckoning point of the
12% legal interest is likewise binding on the petitioner who cannot re-litigate the said matter
anew through the present recourse.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

389 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Effect of Foreign Judgment

MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI

MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents
GR 196049 26 June 2013
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Carpio, J.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a ―presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title‖. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court
states that ―the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.‖

Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits,
i.e. ―want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law
or fact.‖

FACTS:

Minoru Fujiki, petitioner, is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
respondent, in the Philippines on January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with Fujiki‘s
parents thus he could not bring Marinay to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara whom Marinay married on May
2008 in QC and without having the first marriage being dissolved. Maekara brought Marinay
to Japan however Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara so she left
Maekara to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish
their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay to obtain a judgment from a Japanese
family court to declare the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.

In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled ― Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage) where Fujiki prayed that (1) the
judgment of the Japanese Court be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of QC to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the NSO.

390 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The RTC immediately issued an order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case
from its active civil docket on the ground that under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (AM No. 02-11-10-SC),
only the husband may file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage (Sec
2) and that the petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least 6 months prior to the date of
filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines,
at the election of the petitioner (Sec 4). The RTC ruled that the petition was in gross
violation of the above provision and based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of AM No 02-11-10-
SC which provides that ―failure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition‖. Apparently the RTC took the view that
only ―the husband or the wife‖ in this case Maekara or Marinay can file the petition
to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki filed an MR on the RTC order arguing that AM No. 12-11-10-SC does not apply as
the Rule only contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of
marriage whereas he filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment. He further argued
that a petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding which seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact and is not a civil action. Fujiki further argued
that AM No.02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Art 26 of the FC on the
ground of psychological incapacity since applying Sec2(a) of the AM in bigamy would be
absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue where in truth, the material
interest and personality to nullify a bigamous marriage would lie with the husband in the
prior, pre-existing marriage. He further argued that Rule 108 is also applicable being a
―procedural implementation‖ of the Civil Register Law (CRL) in relation to Art 413 of the
Civil Code. The CRL imposes a duty on the ―successful petition for divorce or annulment
of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized‖.

The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. On March 2011,
the RTC denied the MR stating that AM No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable and considered
Fujiki as a third person in the proceeding because he is not the husband in the decree of
divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.
Further the RTC justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v The
Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental where it was ruled that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rile 108, the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages. Braza also emphasized that the validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and
filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and
not through a collateral attack such a petition for correction of entry. The RTC
considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.

On May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review. The Local Civil Registrar of QC and the NSO participated through the Office of the
Solicitor General. The SolGEn filed a Manifestation and Motion instead of a comment. The
SolGEn agreed with the petition and prayed that the RTC‘s pronouncement that the
391 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
petitioner failed to comply with AM No. 02-11-10-SC be set aside and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. The SolGen argued that Fujiki as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void citing the case of Juliano-Llave v Republic
which held that Section 2(a) of AM No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy as it
would not be expected that the parties in the bigamous marriage would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus it would be the injured spouse or the spouse in a
subsisting previous marriage who should be given a legal remedy. The subsequent marriage
will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior
marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.

The SolGen contended that the petition to recognize the judgment of the Japanese Family
Court may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding as the object of special proceedings is precisely
to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. The judgment of the Japanese
Family Court directly bears on the civil statues of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be
proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding. Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to
the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment. Maekara wrote that Marinay
concealed from him the fact that Marinay was previously married to Fujiki and also denied
that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. Marinay, on the other hand, wrote that
she had no reason to oppose the petition and would like to maintain her silence as this may
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari directly to the SC from the RTC of QC.

ISSUE/S: Whether or the AM No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable; [NO]

Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy; [YES]
Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. [YES]

RULING:

1st Issue:
NO. The Court ruled that the AM No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Also, as held in the case of Juliano-Llave v Republic, AM No.
02-11-10-SC does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

2nd Issue:
YES. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs
to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49
Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication
392 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office. The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. As explained in a previous case, if every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.

However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic; Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws and Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact
according to rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order
against a person creates a ―presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title‖. Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court
states that ―the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact.‖ Thus,
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and
proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e.
―want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or
fact.‖

Further, while divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, the recognition of a foreign
decree does not involve the extended procedure under AM No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
obtained a divorce decree abroad. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy since it is consistent with Philippine public policy, as
bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Art 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is also a crime under Art 349 of the RPC. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

3rd Issue:
YES. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify
facts of a person‘s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or
Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which
the State has an interest in recording. However, to be sure, a petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
393 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
procedural safeguards of a marriage under the Family Code, AM No. 02-11-10-SC and other
related laws. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. However, this does not
apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry based on the recognition
of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country.

A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for

Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a
case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Thus, Philippine courts are
limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already ―presumptive evidence of a right between the parties‖. Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that reestablishes a new
status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be
an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
public records in the Philippines. This is without prejudice to the prosecution for bigamy
under Art 349 of the RPC.

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address
the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
SO ORDERED.

394 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION, petitioner,
v. EDGARDO V. GUEVARRA, respondent.
GR 167052 11 March 2015
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain conditions that
vary in different countries.34 In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a foreign tribunal cannot
be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or order merely creates a right of action, and its
non-satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be brought upon for its enforcement.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order requires only proof of fact of the
said judgment or final order. In an action in personam, as in the case at bar, the foreign judgment or
final order enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is the party attacking the foreign
judgment or final order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.38 A
foreign judgment or final order may only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, particularly,
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

FACTS:

In the 1980s, Ayala Corporation was the majority stockholder of Ayala Investment and
Development Corporation (AIDC). AIDC, in turn, wholly owned Philsec Investment
Corporation (PHILSEC), a domestic stock brokerage firm, which was subsequently bought
by petitioner; and Ayala International Finance Limited (AIFL), a Hong Kong deposit-taking
corporation, which eventually became BPI International Finance Limited (BPI-IFL).
PHILSEC was a member of the Makati Stock Exchange and the rules of the said
organization required that a stockbroker maintain an amount of security equal to at least
50% of a client's outstanding debt.

Respondent was hired by Ayala Corporation in 1958. Respondent later became the Head of
the Legal Department of Ayala Corporation and then the President of PHILSEC from
September 1, 1980 to December 31, 1983. Thereafter, respondent served as Vice-President
of Ayala Corporation until his retirement on August 31, 1997.

While PHILSEC President, one of respondent's obligations was to resolve the outstanding
loans of Ventura O. Ducat (Ducat), which the latter obtained separately from PHILSEC and
AIFL. Ducat proposed to settle his debts by an exchange of assets. Ducat owned several
pieces of real estate in Houston, Texas, in partnership with Drago Daic (Daic), President of
1488, Inc., a U.S.-based corporation.

Respondent relayed Ducat's proposal to Enrique Zobel (Zobel), the Chief Executive Officer
of Ayala Corporation. Zobel was amenable to Ducat's proposal but advised respondent to
send Thomas Gomez (Gomez), an AIFL employee who traveled often to the U.S., to
evaluate Ducat's properties.

In December of 1982, Gomez examined several parcels of real estate that were being offered
by Ducat and 1488, Inc. for the exchange. Gomez, in a telex to respondent, recommended

395 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
the acceptance of a parcel of land in Harris County, Texas (Harris County property), which
was believed to be worth around US$2.9 million. Gomez further opined that the "swap
would be fair and reasonable" and that it would be better to take this opportunity rather than
pursue a prolonged legal battle with Ducat.

William Craig (Craig), a former owner of the Harris County property, conducted the
appraisal of the market value of the said property. In his January 1983 appraisal, Craig
estimated the fair market value of the Harris County property at US$3,365,000.

Negotiations finally culminated in an Agreement,6 executed on January 27, 1983 in Makati

City, Philippines. The series of transactions per the Agreement was eventually executed.
However, after acquiring the Harris County property, ATHONA (company represented by
respondent) had difficulty selling the same. Despite repeated demands by 1488, Inc.,
ATHONA failed to pay its promissory note for the balance of the purchase price for the
Harris County property, and PHILSEC and AIFL refused to release the remainder of
Ducat's stock portfolio, claiming that they were defrauded into believing that the said
property had a fair market value higher than it actually had.

Civil Action No. H-86-440 before the U.S. District Court of Southern District of
Texas, Houston Division

Inc. instituted a suit against PHILSEC, AIFL, and ATHONA for (a) misrepresenting
that an active market existed for two shares of stock included in Ducat's portfolio
when, in fact, said shares were to be withdrawn from the trading list; (b) conversion
of the stock portfolio; (c) fraud, as ATHONA had never intended to abide by the
provisions of its promissory note when they signed it; and (d) acting in concert as a
common enterprise or in the alternative, that ATHONA was the alter ego of
PHILSEC and AIFL. The suit was docketed as Civil Action No. H-86-440 before
the U.S. District Court.

In its Order dated March 13, 1990, the U.S. District Court stated after trial, the
jury returned a verdict for 1488, Inc. In the same Order, the U.S. District Court
ruled favorably on respondent's pending motion for sanction.

Petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA appealed the jury verdict, as well as the
aforementioned order of the U.S. District Court for them to pay respondent
US$49,450.00; while 1488, Inc. appealed a post-judgment decision of the U.S.
District Court to amend the amount of attorney's fees awarded. The appeals were
docketed as Case No. 90-2370 before the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

The U.S. Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on September 3, 1991 affirming the
verdict in favor of 1488, Inc.

Civil Case No. 92-1445 before Branch 57 of the RTC of Makati City

In his Complaint for the enforcement of the Order of the U.S. District Court in Civil
Action No. H-86-440, respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay.
396 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

The RTC:
rendered a decision in favor of respondent Edgardo V. Guevara ordering petitioner
BPI Securities Corporation to pay respondent.

CA:

affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, petitioner seeks recourse from this Court

Petitioner:

contends that it was not accorded by the Court of Appeals the right to refute the
foreign judgment pursuant to Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court because the
appellate court gave the effect of res judicata to the said foreign judgment. The Court
of Appeals copied wholesale or verbatim the respondent's brief without addressing
the body of evidence adduced by petitioner showing that it had reasonable grounds
to implead respondent in Civil Action No. H-86-440.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in giving effect of res judicata to the foreign
judgment

RULING:

NO. In Mijares v. Rañada,33 the Court extensively discussed the underlying principles for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in Philippine jurisdiction:

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the
enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation in
international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the
combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that
the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.

It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of

competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain
conditions that vary in different countries.34 In the Philippines, a judgment or final order of a
foreign tribunal cannot be enforced simply by execution. Such judgment or order merely
creates a right of action, and its non-satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit can be
brought upon for its enforcement. An action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment or
final order in this jurisdiction is governed by Rule 39, Section 48 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

397 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders;
The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment
or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a

want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.

The Court expounded in Mijares on the application of the aforequoted provision:

It is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign

judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in
rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment, and in order for the court to properly
determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment
has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.

In a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages

from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same
manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but
from the foreign judgment itself.

Actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the

foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of
fact or law. The limitations on review [are] in consonance with a strong and
pervasive policy in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues. Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by
never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and – in a larger sense – to
promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer‘s Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of
all law: ―rest and quietness.‖ If every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation.

As the foregoing jurisprudence had established, recognition and enforcement of a foreign

judgment or final order requires only proof of fact of the said judgment or final order. In an
action in personam, as in the case at bar, the foreign judgment or final order enjoys the
disputable presumption of validity. It is the party attacking the foreign judgment or final
398 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.38 A foreign
judgment or final order may only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, particularly,
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

Recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or final order requires only proof of
fact of the said judgment or final order. In an action in personam, as in the case at bar, the
foreign judgment or final order enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is the party
attacking the foreign judgment or final order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming
its presumptive validity.38 A foreign judgment or final order may only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, particularly, want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

The fact of a foreign final order in this case is not disputed. It was duly established by
evidence submitted to the RTC that the U.S. District Court issued an Order on March 13,
1990 in Civil Action No. H-86-440 ordering petitioner, AIFL, and ATHONA, to pay
respondent the sum of US$49,450.00 as sanction for filing a frivolous suit against
respondent, in violation of Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The said
Order became final when its reinstatement in the Order dated December 31, 1991 of the
U.S. District Court was no longer appealed by petitioner, AIFL, and/or ATHONA.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated December 19, 2003 and Resolution dated February 9, 2005 of the Court Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69348, affirming the Decision dated September 11, 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 57 in Civil Case No. 92-1445, is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that petitioner BPI Securities Corporation is ordered to pay
respondent Edgardo V. Guevara the sum of US$49,450.00 or its equivalent in Philippine
Peso, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the filing of the case before the trial
court on May 28, 1992 until fully paid.43
SO ORDERED.

399 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

ON JURISDICTION

SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA (De Lima), petitioner v. HON. JUANITA GUERRERO

(Guerrero), et al., respondents
GR 229781 10 October 2017
Special Civil Actions; Certiorari and Prohibition
Velasco, Jr. J.

―Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed by high-ranking public officers in
relation to their office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the
Sandiganbayan‘s jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers.

In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as
drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the
public officials‘ office.

The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive
jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the
technical aspect of drug-related cases. x x x

Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and
technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances.‖

FACTS:

By virtue of investigations done by the Senate and the House of Representatives regarding
dangerous drug syndicates in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), four complaints were filed with
the Department of Justice (DOJ) against De Lima for unlawfully trafficking and trading
dangerous drugs inside it.

Eventually the DOJ Panel prepared Informations which were filed in the RTC of
Muntinlupa, under Presiding Judge Guerrero.

Despite De Lima‘s Motion to Quash the Information, Guerrero still issued a Warrant of
Arrest, which was effected against De Lima which led her being placed under the Philippine
National Police‘s (PNP‘s) custody.

Hence, a direct resort to the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC over her case,
considering that she is a public officer, and thus the proper jurisdiction should be with the
SB in that the acts complained of are committed in relation to her office.

400 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ISSUE/s: Whether or not the SB has jurisdiction over drug cases involving public
officers

RULING:

No, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165.

Drug cases are vested upon the jurisdiction of the RTC designated as a drug court.
Obviously, drug cases involve a technical matter, to the extent that Judges of said drug court
are given sufficient training in the Philippine Judges Academy. Corollary thereto, it has never
been shown that Justices of the SB has been trained to do such.

While it is true that the SB has jurisdiction over public officers, the RTC designated as a drug
court has been vested by RA 9165 with the EXCLUSIVE authority to hear violations of
such law.

Thus, drug cases are exceptions to the jurisdiction of the SB, even if the offender be a public
officer. In line with this, PD 1606 is the general law on the jurisdiction of the SB, while RA
9165 is a special law excluding from its jurisdiction cases involving drugs. Special law prevails
over a general law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 204 is ordered to proceed
with dispatch with Criminal Case No. 17-165.
SO ORDERED

NOTE:

Other procedural aspects involved in this case are as follows:

1. Defect in the verification and certification against forum shopping, where the SC held that
the defect, specifically on the certification, should have caused the dismissal of this petition;
and
2. Doctrine of hierarchy of courts, where the SC rejected De Lima’s claim of sensational case
and her status of being a Senator amounts to a disregard of the hierarchy.
a. If the Court would allow such, then it would lead to a situation where politicians
might directly file to the Court

401 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
DANILO A. DUNCANO (Duncano), petitioner v. HON. SB (2nd DIVISION) and HON.
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR (OSP), respondents
GR 191893 15 July 2015
Special Civil Action; Certiorari
Peralta, J.:

―As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over
the cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified
as Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the
offense. The jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain
with the Sandiganbayan‖

FACTS:

The OSP filed a criminal case in the Ombudsman for violation of RA 6713 against
Duncano, then Regional Director (RD) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary
Grade 26 (SG 26), for failure to disclose assets in the ―Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SALN)‖, which includes, among others:

c) Financial/business interests (registered owner) in:

a. Documail Provides Corporation; and
b. Don Plus Trading;
d) Nissan Patrol

As such, prior to arraignment, Duncano filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prayer to Defer
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest in the SB, claiming that he is an RD with SG26 and
hence NOT subject to the jurisdiction of the SB.

The OSP opposed, on the ground that:

c) The SG27 requirement is applicable only to other executive officers, as the

conjunction used was “and” (RD and higher”), thus separating the RD from other
officers, and thus RD does NOT require SG27 to be within the jurisdiction of the SB;
and
d) The filing of the motion to dismiss is premature, considering that the SB has yet to
acquire jurisdiction over Duncano’s person.

The SB denied the motion, and likewise the MR was denied.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a RD, regardless of SG, is within the jurisdiction of the SB

RULING:

402 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
No, RD must be of SG27 to be deemed within the jurisdiction of the SB. The equivalent of
―regional director of higher‖ is meant by the committee as ―SG27 or higher‖, as evidenced
by the Sponsorship Speech of then Sec. Raul Roco.

The purpose of the law is to concentrate on the ―larger fish‖ rather than the ―small fry‖ in
order to declog the dockets of the court.

In this case, Duncano correctly cited, and is all fours, with the case of Cuyco v. SB where it
was held that the SB has no jurisdiction, as in the latter case, at the time of the commission
of the crime in 1992, the RD was classified as a Director II with a SG of 26, which in the
present case is evidenced by a certification from the BIR:

―…although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as

Director II with Salary Grade 26.‖

Thus, the application of the SG 27 or lower would not apply to Duncano, considering that a
―Regional Director‖ is not among those enumerated which may be subjected to the
jurisdiction of the SB regardless of the SG grade, as in the cases of RD, they MUST BE of
SG 27.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is

GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the
Sandiganbayan Second Division, which denied petitioner‘s Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

NOTE:

The following officers had been held as within the jurisdiction of the SB:

e) Member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod (People v. SB);

f) Department manager of Philhealth (Geduspan v. People);
g) Student regent of UP (Serana v. SB);
h) Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefit System’s (AFP-RSBS):
a. Head of the Legal Department (Vice President); and
b. Chief of Documentation (Assistant Vice President) (Alzaga v. Sandiganbayan)

403 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 110: PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Sec. 6: Sufficiency of Complaint or Information

MIGUEL v. SANDIGANBAYAN

The test of the information‘s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible
terms and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly
informed of the offense charged.

FACTS:

Vice Mayor and other local officials of Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging the petitioner, Fernando
Miguel, of violations of R.A. 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with
the consultancy services for the proposed Koronadal Public Market.

The Ombudsman directed the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit. After moving for
an extension, the petitioner filed his counter-affidavit. Thereafter, the Ombudsman found
probable cause against the petitioner and some other private individuals for violation of RA
3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification of Public Documents under Art. 171
par. 4 of the RPC.

The Ombudsman filed the corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a
reinvestigation.

The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner 10 days to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner asked for another 3-day extension and
afterwhich another 20-day extension.

Despite the given extensions, the petitioner still failed to file his counter-affidavit prompting
prosecutor Norberto B. Ruiz to declare the petitioner to have waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence. Ombudsman approved the resolution.

After several extensions sought and granted, the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner‘s
motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation this, despite the OSPs earlier
termination of the reinvestigation for the petitioner‘s continuous failure to submit his
counteraffidavit.

After the arraignment, the OSP file a Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite. The petitioner filed
his Vigorous Opposition based on the obvious and fatal defect in the information.

The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendent
lite.

404 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded pre-
suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this
certiorari petition to challenge the validity of the suspension order.

ISSUE: Whether the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner.

RULING:

No. In Bedruz vs Sandiganbayan, the court considered the opposition of the accused
(Motion to Suspend Pendente Lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the
prosecution‘s motion for hearing.

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity
of the information/suspension, the court believed that the pleadings filed for and against
them achieved the goal of the procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not by just oral
arguments but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties‘ pleadings,
memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused

public official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against a
mandatory suspension under RA 3019, then an accused would have no reason to complain
that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean
oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of
procedural due process exists.

405 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 111: PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS

Sec.1: Civil Liability Arising from the Offense is Deemed Instituted

SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE

1. Civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.

2. The civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the
criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.

FACTS:

Two days after his birth, Gerald Gercayo, who was born with an imperforate anus,
underwent colostomy, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side
of his body.

In 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-
through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by
Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists
included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and Dr. Fernando Solidum.

During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer
see, hear or move. Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) then lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor‘s Office of Manila. Upon a
finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor‘s Office filed an information solely against
Dr. Solidum

Dr. Solidum were pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA).

He then filed an appeal to the SC. The SC acquitted Dr. Solidum because circumstances,
taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly
imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Dr. Solidum, through his acquittal, is exempt from civil
liability

Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila should be adjudged jointly and severally

liable with the accused

RULING:

1st Issue:
YES. The circumstances that have been established do not present the factual and legal
bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There

406 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That
meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not
necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.

2nd Issue:
NO. In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged.
Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum.
The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment
against Ospital ng Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.

For one, Ospital ng Maynila was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental
right to be heard was not respected from the outset. The RTC and the CA should have been
alert to this fundamental defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in
an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would
be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the
subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to
Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any
kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However,
Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit
but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila
was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital
ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he
definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming
that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen
here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.

407 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 112: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Definition/Description

ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ,

petitioners, v. BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., respondent
GR 172829 18 July 2012
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

―Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean ―actual and positive
cause‖ nor does it import absolute certainty.

It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without
resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense.

What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief

that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should
be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.

FACTS:

Vergara filed a case for Falsification of Public Documents with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila (OCP) against Fenequito, Hernandez, and Rodriguez (Petitioners), for
the latter‘s alleged falsification of a Deed of Sale.

In determining probable cause, the OCP relied on the PNP Crime Laboratory Questioned
Document Report No. 048-03 (Document) comparing the signatures in the Deed of Sale
versus the sample signatures, and was concluded that it:

―…reveal divergences in the manner of execution and stroke structure [which is] an
indication that they WERE NOT WRITTEN BY ONE AND THE SAME
PERSON‖

408 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
On the basis of such, the OCP filed an Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC). In the MeTC:

The Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for Absence of Probable Cause, alleging
that the Document does not merit probable cause against them.

MeTC granted the Motion to Dismiss

Aggrieved, the OCP filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC:

Reversed the MeTC decision, and ordered for the continuation of the proceedings in
the MeTC

Thus, the Petitioners filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals (CA), which held:

Affirming the RTC decision, and further ruled that that the appeal to the CA is
improper considering that the RTC decision is not a final order but rather merely an
interlocutory order

ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause against the Petitioners

RULING:

Yes, there is probable cause.

Probable cause does not require absolute certainty, but rather pertains only to such facts
which may engender a belief that:

1. A crime is committed; and

2. Suspects are probably guilty thereof

The allegation that the Document does not amount to probable cause as it said that it were
not written by one and the same person cannot prosper, considering that the nature of the
crime itself is falsification, does the above fact alone amounts to probable cause.

Even assuming that the evidence is not enough to warrant a conviction, but for purposes of
preliminary investigation itself, does not require the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather
merely of probability.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of

Appeals, dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29648, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

409 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
On the question of propriety of appeal made by the OCP instead of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG);
The appeal made by the OCP is proper in this case, for the following reasons:

1. The OSG is designated as the counsel for the State in case of cases in the CA and the
Supreme Court (SC);
2. The OCP on the other hand, represents the State in the trial courts; and
3. Thus, that the appeal was made with the RTC, the OSP properly filed the appeal

On the absence of the City Prosecutor‘s signature of approval to file the appeal;
The signature of the City Prosecutor, or the Chief State Prosecutor in cases of those filed by
the State Prosecutor, is required only in the following cases:

1. Filing of information; and

2. Dismissing a case

Thus, that this is an appeal, it does not require the authority from the City Prosecutor or
Chief State Prosecutor, as the case may be. Of course, this is subject to an order from the
City Prosecutor or Chief State Prosecutor directing otherwise

On the propriety of appeal as the remedy;

An order directing the case to be tried is merely an interlocutory order, as it leaves
something to be done, which in this case refers to the trial in the MeTC.

410 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, v. JOSEFA ―JING‖ C. REYES and
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, respondents
GR 181021 10 December 2012
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a
preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of a case.

Its purpose is to determine whether:

(a) a crime has been committed; and

(b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.

FACTS:

Josefa Reyes (Reyes) became the real estate agent of Burgundy Realty Corporation
(Burgundy) after the former‘s representation that she has ten (10) clients willing to buy
properties in Laguna, and thus the latter released funds amounting to Php20M to secure
such lands.

However, as time went by Reyes was not able to meet the proposed timeline and a demand
for the return whole amount was made by Burgundy, but was never made.

Instead, Reyes claims that her sub-broker Mateo Elejorde (Elejorde) deposited the amount
to his own personal account and despite demands by Reyes, failed to return the same.

In line with the allegation, a case was filed by Reyes for estafa against Elejorde, upon
which the trial court found Elejorde guilty of the crime charged.

As there is a failure to return, Burgundy filed a case against Reyes for the crime of estafa with
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP):

After preliminary investigation, the OCP found probable cause against Reyes, and
thus an Information was filed with Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati

Aggrieved, Reyes filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ):

Initially, it was dismissed

However, upon a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), the order of dismissal was
reversed, and hence found that no probable cause existed against Reyes. Thus,
ordered for the withdrawal of the Information.

411 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In finding so, they anchored on the alleged absence of the element of
misappropriation, considering the defense raised by Reyes regarding
Elejorde.

Burgundy‘s MR was denied

Burgundy filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for Certiorari:

CA however, affirmed the DOJ

Thus, this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ is correct in ruling that no probable cause exists
against Reyes

RULING:

No, misappropriation can be determined from the failure to heed to the demand of return of
the money, as it creates a presumption that indeed the money has been misappropriated.

In line with the presumption, probable cause was properly found by the OCP, considering
that absolute certainty is not required in the determination of such, but mere probability that
a crime is committed and the suspect is probably guilty thereof.

To rebut the presumption is a matter of trial, as evidence would be required to overthrow

the presumption.

That it is a matter of trial, it need not be considered during the determination of probable
cause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED and,

accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 14, 2007
and December 20, 2007, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati City, where the Information was
filed against private respondent Josefa ―Jing‖ C. Reyes, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed
with her arraignment.
SO ORDERED.

412 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Who may conduct Preliminary Investigation

HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA v. OBIAS

The justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the
investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court; The
justice secretary‘s subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the
case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case.

FACTS:

On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 o‘clock in the morning at the Pili Airport in Camarines
Sur, Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Region V and concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd Engineering District of
Camarines Sur, was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was
brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape.
Subsequently, the incident was investigated by the NBI.

On July 31, 1998, NBI Regional Director Alejandro R. Tenerife, Chairman of Task Force
Tria, recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur the indictment of
Roberto Aclan, Juanito, Ona and Atty. Epifania "Fanny" Gonzales-Obias, for the murder of
Engr. Tria. On the basis of statements given by 26 individuals, autopsy and ballistic
examination reports, and relevant documents gathered the NBI found that: ACLAN and
ONA had been conducting an almost daily stakeout, for about two weeks prior to the
incident, at Dir. Tria‘s office. They would observe Tria‘s arrival and departure from office
and would even ask the security guard on duty if TRIA has already arrive or left the office.

Around 8:00 o‘clock in the morning of May 22, 1998, ACLAN and ONA were spotted in
their usual places at the DPWH Office. Shortly after, Administrative Officer JOSE
PECUNDO announced to those who had some documents for signature of Director Tria to
proceed to Pili Airport where Tria would sign them before leaving for Manila. Upon hearing
this, ACLAN and ONA left hurriedly on board a red motorcycle. Shortly after 10:00 a.m. on
that day, Director Tria arrived at the Airport. After signing some documents at the parking
lot he proceeded towards the pre-departure area on the second floor of the airport building.
ONA, who was waiting on the stairway, immediately followed Tria as the latter was going up
the stairs. As Tria was approaching the pre-departure area he was met by Atty. EPIFANIA
OBIAS who shook his hands and started conversing with him. It was at this juncture that a
gunshot rang out and Tria dropped like a log on the floor, bleeding profusely from a
gunshot wound at the back of his head. Atty. EPIFANIA OBIAS, on the other hand,
admitted that she was with ACLAN in the early morning of May 22, 1998; that at about 7:00
a.m. on that day she went to the residence of Director Tria at Liboton, Naga City, had a brief
talk with the latter and left immediately after agreeing to meet at the airport later on. She also
volunteered the information that ROBERTO ACLAN was not the gunman who had fired
the fatal shot at Director Tria. She was also the last person seen talking with Director TRIA
when the latter was gunned down. A practicing lawyer,

413 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Atty. Obias also engages herself in real estate business on the side.

In 1997 she had brokered a sale of real estate between and among spouses Jeremia, as
Vendors, and Spouses Nestor and Pura Tria, as Vendees, over a land in Balatas, Naga City. It
was Atty. Obias who received, for and in behalf of the vendors, the full payment of P2.8
Million of the sale but the latter deliberately avoided the Tria family and, despite verbal and
written demands, she failed and refused, as she still fails and refuses, to fulfill her legal
obligation to the Tria family.

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying that she was in anyway involved with the
killing of Engr. Tria and denied most of the allegations made by the NBI.

On July 2, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur issued a
resolution directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan and Ona but
dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence as against herein respondent, Atty. Epifania
Obias. This was, however, modified on January 25, 2000 by then Justice Secretary Serafin
Cuevas directing the Provincial Prosecutor to include respondent in the information for
murder filed against Aclan and Ona.

Respondent along with Aclan and Ona filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ‘s
January 25, 2000 resolution. In the meantime, the information charging Aclan and Ona has
already been filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur. Upon request
however, the venue was transferred to the RTC Quezon City by resolution of this Court in
A.M. No. 00-3145-RTC.16 After so much petition and appeal, the DOJ eventually directed
the Provincial Prosecutor to forward the records of the case to the Office of the President in
compliance.

In his Order dated March 24, 2004, Presidential Assistant Manuel C. Domingo granted
respondent‘s motion for reconsideration and reversed the DOJ resolutions. The OP
concluded there was no interlocking circumstantial evidence of respondent‘s acts before,
during and after the killing of Engr. Tria that would establish conspiracy among Aclan, Ona
and respondent to commit the crime.

Accordingly, the case against respondent was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Petitioners filed a series of motions, which reached the CA, who denied their petition.
Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S: Whether non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of the appeal or motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondent had deprived them of the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine the witnesses on those affidavits belatedly
submitted by the respondent. –-- No.

Whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP‘s reversal of
the ruling of the Secretary of Justice.–-- Yes.

414 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULING:

Under the procedure for preliminary investigation provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, in case the investigating prosecutor
conducts a hearing where there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party or witness,
"[t]he parties can be present at the hearing but without the right to examine or cross-
examine. They may, however, submit to the investigating officer questions which may be
asked to the party or witness concerned." Hence, the non-referral by the OP to the DOJ of
the motion for reconsideration of respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not violate
petitioners‘ right to due process. The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence
or non-existence of probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ.

Indeed, the Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the resolution of the prosecutor, after
which he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information
without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of
the complaint or information with notice to the parties. In reversing the DOJ‘s finding of
probable cause, the OP found merit in the argument of the respondent that the DOJ‘s
finding that she was with Aclan when she went to the residence of Engr. Tria early in the
morning of May 22, 1998, was not sufficiently established. The OP gave more weight to the
affidavit of Calayag stating that Aclan was not around when they and respondent, among
other visitors, were at Engr. Tria‘s house at that time -- than that account given by SA
Eduarte, which was uncorroborated.

As to the double sale allegedly committed by the respondent from which the latter‘s strong
motive to liquidate Engr. Tria was inferred, the OP found this as a mere expression of
opinion by the investigators considering that Engr. Tria‘s widow, Mrs. Pura Tria,
categorically admitted her knowledge of the said transaction. Neither was the OP persuaded
by the NBI‘s "kiss of death" theory since it is but a customary way of greeting a friend to
shake hands and hence it cannot imply that respondent utilized this as a signal or
identification for the gunman to shoot Engr. Tria. Respondent‘s alleged indifference
immediately after Engr. Tria was gunned down while conversing with her, was also negated
by the affidavit of an employee of Philippine Air Lines based at the Pili Airport, stating that
right after the incident took place he saw respondent in the radio room in shock and was
being given water by another person.

Considering the totality of evidence, the OP was convinced there was nothing suspicious or
abnormal in respondent‘s behavior before, during and after the fatal shooting of Engr. Tria
as to engender a well-founded belief of her complicity with the killing of Engr. Tria.
Petitioners, however, maintain that the records are replete with abundant proof of
respondent‘s complicity in the murder of Engr. Tria.

Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence
to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
415 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It
is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause merely binds
over the suspect to stand trial; it is not a pronouncement of guilt. On the other hand,
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be shown through circumstantial evidence,
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest.

We reverse the OP‘s ruling that the totality of evidence failed to establish a prima facie case
against the respondent as a conspirator in the killing of Engr. Tria. To begin with, whether
or not respondent actually conspired with Aclan and Ona need not be fully resolved during
the preliminary investigation. The absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters. The same is better left ventilated before the trial court during
trial, where the parties can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial

function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of
ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Prosecutors control and direct the
prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject
to review by the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to
determine whether the executive determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to
review unless made with grave abuse.

After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence on record, we find no such grave abuse
when the Secretary of Justice found probable cause to charge the respondent with murder in
conspiracy with Aclan and Ona.

The following facts and circumstances established during preliminary investigation were
sufficient basis to incite reasonable belief in respondent‘s guilt: (a) Motive - respondent had
credible reason to have Engr. Tria killed because of the impending criminal prosecution for
estafa from her double sale of his lot prior to his death, judging from the strong interest of
Engr. Tria‘s family to run after said property and/or proceeds of the second sale to a third
party; (b) Access - respondent was close to Engr. Tria‘s family and familiar with his work
schedule, daily routine and other transactions which could facilitate in the commission of the
crime eventually carried out by a hired gunmen, one of whom (Aclan) she and her father
categorically admitted being in her company while she visited Engr. Tria hours before the
latter was fatally shot at the airport; (c) Suspicious Behavior -- respondent while declaring
such close personal relationship with Engr. Tria and even his family, failed to give any
satisfactory explanation why she reacted indifferently to the violent killing of her friend while
they conversed and shook hands at the airport.

Indeed, a relative or a friend would not just stand by and walk away from the place as if
nothing happened, as what she did, nor refuse to volunteer information that would help the
authorities investigating the crime, considering that she is a vital eyewitness. Not even a call
416 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
for help to the people to bring her friend quickly to the hospital. She would not even dare go
near Engr. Tria‘s body to check if the latter was still alive. All the foregoing circumstances, in
our mind, and from the point of view of an ordinary person, lead to a reasonable inference
of respondent‘s probable participation in the well-planned assassination of Engr. Tria.

417 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 114: BAIL

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPEC. ADM. REGION v. OLALIA

The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. If bail can be granted in deportation
cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition
cases—clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights.

FACTS:

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the
private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the
same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high ―flight risk‖. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the
following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of
the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own
motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his
undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the
corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail

RULING:

418 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
YES. A potential extraditee is entitled to bail. Petitioner alleged that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting
private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to
criminal proceedings.

On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the
Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one‘s liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America
v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, and Mario Batacan Crespo, that the constitutional provision
on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

1. the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

2. the higher value now being given to human rights;
3. the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and
4. the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our
fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling
in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

419 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

Primary objective of bail –

The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity
for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

Bail is a right and a matter of discretion –

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit: ―No person charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution.‖

FACTS:

On June 5, 2014, Petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of his purported involvement in the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) Scam. Initially, Enrile in an Omnibus Motion requested to post
bail, which the Sandiganbayan denied. On July 3, 2014, a warrant for Enrile's arrest was
issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.

Petitioner again asked the Sandiganbayan in a Motion to Fix Bail which was heard by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the
evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary
surrender, the penalty would only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not
a flight risk due to his age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed
resolution. Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied on the grounds that:

1. The Petitioner is charged with a capital offense;

2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the prosecution
have not yet presented its evidence.

Petitioner then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime
charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is
strong.

a. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that if ever petitioner

would be convicted, he will be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
b. Whether or not prosecution failed to show that petitioner's guilt is
strong.

Whether or not petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk.

420 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
RULING:

1st Issue:
YES.

Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.

Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.

Bail as a matter of discretion

Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:

Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. —
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.

Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of guilt
is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to the
discretion of the court.

Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:

Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting
the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
421 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.

Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion

perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held: ―[S]uch
discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of
the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional liberty.‖ Bail
hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing should primarily
determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.

The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:

a) In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor
of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);

b) Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show
that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)

c) Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution;

d) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

2nd Issue:
YES. Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail

The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international
community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We
422 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the SC
emphasized:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: ―The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.‖ The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the
detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine
authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention
such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.

Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion. They arbitrarily ignored the objective of
bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded
the clear showing of the fragile health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted
whimsically and capriciously and was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty [to allow petitioner to post bail].

423 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 115: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Right to Counsel

PEOPLE v. LARA

The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation
begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of
custodial investigation.

FACTS:

On June 14, 2001, an Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with
the RTC.

Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued. The prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses: Enrique Sumulong (Sumulong), SPO1 Bernard Cruz (SPO1 Cruz) and PO3 Efren
Calix (PO3 Calix).

Sumulong testified that:

(a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. (San Sebastian);
(b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the morning, he withdrew the amount of
P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of
the employees of San Sebastian;
(c) in going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio
Manacob (Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista);
(d) he placed the amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank;
(e) at around 10:30 in the morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes
and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side
of the pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag,
nasaan?";
(f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, "Wag mong ibigay";
(g) heeding Bautista's advice, he threw the bag in Bautista's direction;
(h) after getting hold of the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran;
(i) seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while firing his gun;
(j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up, he ran towards Mercedes Plaza
and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay the incident;
(k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion
of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground;
(l) he was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken
away from him;
(m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other
companions were brought to the police station for investigation;
(n) on June 7, 2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara
walking along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City;
(o) he alerted the police and Lara was thereafter arrested; and

424 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
(p) at the police station, he, Atie and Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot
and robbed them of San Sebastian's money.

SPO1 Cruz testified that:

(a) he was assigned at the Follow-Up Unit of the Pasig City Police Station;
(b) at around 7:55 in the evening of June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police
station and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street;
(c) four (4) police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they saw
Lara, who Sumulong identified;
(d) they then approached Lara and invited him for questioning;
(e) at the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was positively
identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and
(f) after being identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.

PO3 Calix testified that:

(a) he was a member of the Criminal Investigation Unit of the Pasig City Police
Station;
(b) on May 31, 2001, he was informed of a robbery that took place at the corner of
Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City;
(c) he, together with three (3) other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene;
(d) upon arriving thereat, one of the police officers who were able to respond ahead
of them, handed to him eleven (11) pieces of empty shells and six (6) deformed slugs
of a 9mm pistol;
(e) as part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob at the police
station; and
(f) before Bautista died, he was able to interview Bautista at the hospital where the
latter was brought after the incident.

RTC:

On October 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide. On appeal,
Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended his conviction. First, that he
was arrested without a warrant under circumstances that do not justify a warrantless
arrest rendered void all proceedings including those that led to his conviction.
Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line-up to be
identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in violation of Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution. The police line-up is part of custodial investigation and his right
to counsel had already attached. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness
who actually saw him commit the alleged acts.

CA:

The CA affirmed Lara's conviction. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a
warrant may not serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings leading to his
425 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
conviction considering its belated invocation. Any objections to the legality of the
warrantless arrest should have been raised in a motion to quash duly filed before the
accused enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived. Further, that the accused was
illegally arrested is not a ground to set aside conviction duly arrived at and based on
evidence that sufficiently establishes culpability.

SC:

The Supreme Court accepted the appeal as the penalty imposed was reclusion
perpetua and the parties were afforded an opportunity to file their supplemental
briefs. Both parties waived their right to do so, stating that they would adopt the
allegations in their respective briefs that they filed with the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the
police line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood therein without the
assistance of counsel.

RULING:

No. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a police line-up since the
latter is not part of custodial investigation and this does not constitute a violation of his right
to counsel.

The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation
begins and being made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of
custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while
he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This
was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People
vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial
investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police
line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is because
during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and
who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.

426 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and cannot be
claimed by the accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of the
custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line-up, the process has not
yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

An exception to this rule is when the accused had been the focus of police attention at the
start of the investigation. In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by
prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the purpose. However, there
was no proof that appellant was interrogated at all or that a statement or confession was
extracted from him. During the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet
commenced.

Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights during custodial
investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction. Here, appellant
was convicted based on the testimony of a prosecution witness and not on his alleged
uncounseled confession or admission.

427 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 116: ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, petitioner, v. THE HON. SADIGABAYAN (Fourth

Division), respondent
GR 163972-77 28 March 2008
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Austria-Martinez, J.

Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea
bargaining may be made:

that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor; and t
hat the plea of guilt should be to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. x x x

FACTS:

Daan is a foreman/timekeeper detailed in the Municipality of Bato, Leyte. His duties include
routinely affixing his signature on documents pertaining to release of funds to construction
workers engaged in the building of government projects. However, it does not include nor
permit possession of local government funds.

A case for Falsification of Public Document by a Public Officer or Employee and

Malversation of Public Funds was filed in the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Daan and alleged
principal accused Benedikto Kuizon (Kuizon), the mayor of Bato, Leyte, for the amount of
Php18,860.

During the pre-trial of the case, Daan offered to plea bargain, as follows:

As to the falsification case, to withdraw his plea of ―not guilty‖ to ―guilty‖:

If the mitigating circumstances of confession, plea of guilt, and voluntary

surrender will be appreciated in his favor; or

In the alternative, a plea of guilty to the lesser crime of Falsification of Public

Document by a Private Individual

On the other hand, as to the Malversation, Daan bargained to substitute a plea of

guilty to the lesser offense of Failure of an Accountable Officer to Render Accounts.

The prosecution recommended to the court to allow the plea bargain, as it is favourable
considering the following circumstances:

It would strengthen the case against principal accused Kuizon; and

428 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
It appears from the records that Daan restituted the amount of Php18,860, therefor
damage to the government is no longer apparent. Further, it would be difficult to
prove malversation against him, considering that the element of conversion would be
difficult to prove.
However, the SB denied the plea bargaining, stating that it would:

―…only serve to trivialize the seriousness of the charges against them and send the
wrong signal to potential grafters in public office that the penalties they are likely to
face would be lighter than what their criminal acts would have merited or that the
economic benefits they are likely to derive from their criminal activities far outweigh
the risks they face in committing them; thus, setting to naught the deterrent value of
the laws intended to curb graft and corruption in government.‖

As Daan‘s MR was denied, this petition was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the SB‘s denial of the plea bargaining is proper

RULING:

No. While the Court submits that the SB presented sound reasons to deny the plea bargain,
the Court however, presented the yardstick in People v. Estrada:

―…in its Resolution dated March 14, 2007, approved the Plea Bargaining Agreement
entered into by the prosecution and one of the accused, Charlie Atong Ang.

The agreement provided that the accused undertakes to assist in the prosecution of
the case and promises to return the amount of P25,000,000.

In approving the Plea Bargaining Agreement, the took into consideration the
timeliness of the plea bargaining and whether the agreement complied with the
requirements of Section , Rule 11 of the Rules of Court.

The Sandiganbayan noted that the accused had already withdrawn his earlier plea of
not guilty; and that the prosecution consented to the plea of guilt to a lesser offense;
and the lesser offense, which is Corruption of Public Officials in relation to Indirect
Bribery, is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is Plunder.‖

While it is true that the court is given the discretion to allow or deny plea bargaining, such
exercise must not be whimsical or capricious.

It is therefore, hard to conceive, that Daan‘s plea bargaining considering the surrounding
facts, which thus called for this Court‘s equity jurisdiction, to wit:

1. That the amount has already been restituted;

2. That Daan’s duty does not include accounting; and
3. That the offenses pleaded are necessarily included in the offense charged against
him.
429 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

In comparison to People v. Estrada, the amount in question is much smaller. Thus, that the
plea bargaining complied with the elements under Sec. 2, and the surrounding fact of
payment, the SB should have allowed the plea bargaining.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and
May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant
petitioner‘s Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to the for
further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

On the proper time to bargain:

While it is true that ordinarily it should be done during pre-trial, or after pre-trial but prior to
trial, plea bargaining may also be allowed during the trial stage or even after the prosecution
rested its case, thus:

―But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has
finished presenting its evidence and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is
immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pre- trial stage or that it was
made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.‖

430 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. KHADDAFY JANJALANI,
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, GAPAL
BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu Solaiman, ROHMAT
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES, accused
GR 188314 10 January 2011
Appeal
Sereno, J.

When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
shall require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. x x x

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of rearraignment.

In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused appellant‘s original plea as not
guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his
plea to guilty. x x x

The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in
which it as the defense counsel who explained the consequences of a guilty plea to the
accused, as it appears in this case. x x x

Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole
basis of the judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict
the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on
the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.

FACTS:

Related to the Valentine‘s Day Bombing, crimes of multiple murder and multiple frustrated
murder were charged against Abu Sayyaf members, including, among others, Baharan,
Trinidad, and Asali. While Asali pleaded guilty to both of the crimes, Baharan and Trinidad
pleaded guilty only to the multiple murder, while pleading not guilty in the frustrated
multiple murder.

During the pre-trial of the case, the judge of the trial court asked the defense counsel to
explain to Baharan and Trinidad the apparent inconsistencies in their pleas.

Thus, as a result, Baharan and Trinidad changed their plea to ―guilty‖ and thus re-arraigned.
After such, the pre-trial is terminated

The trial court found them guilty of the crime charged.

They now raise the issue of the absence of a searching inquiry required in a change of plea in
crimes with capital punishment, and thus an improvident plea which conviction based on
such must be set aside

431 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction should be set aside considering that it is an
improvident plea

RULING:

No, the conviction cannot be set aside. While it is true that as a general rule, improvident
pleas cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction and must be set aside, it admits of
exceptions.

It is true, that if the conviction is based on the improvident plea alone, it must be set aside.
However, if it is not the sole basis of the conviction, as to when pieces of evidence presented
amounts to proof beyond reasonable doubt, then the conviction shall remain.

In this case, the prosecution presented the following evidence, among others:

1. Extrajudicial confessions of the accused and others, which were repeated in court;
2. Positive identification by the bus conductor against Baharan and Trinidad; and
3. Narration by the state witness of facts pertaining to the acts committed

Thus, despite the absence of searching inquiry required in changing to a plea of guilty, the
conviction remains valid, considering that evidence in relation to the acts were presented,
and the improvident plea resulting from the change of plea without searching inquiry was
never the sole basis of the judgment of conviction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

On who conducts the searching inquiry:

It should be the judge, who would look into the decision of the accused to change his plea to
guilty, to explain the possible consequence and understanding of such act of doing so, and to
explain to him that it may result to inevitable conviction. Likewise, the judge must see to it
that such change was not brought about by force, intimidation, duress, etc.

Can it be done by the defense lawyer?

No, it must be done by the judge himself

Rule as to judgments based on improvident pleas

GR: Must be set aside

ER: Cannot be set aside, if there is basis other than the improvident plea

432 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 17: MOTION TO QUASH

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v. BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO

DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON, accused-appellants
GR 197546 23 March 2015
Appeal
Perez, J.

Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present:

(1) a valid complaint or information;

(2) a court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy:

(1) a valid Information for robbery with homicide was filed;

(2) the Information was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction;
(3) the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge; and
(4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence, which
amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.

FACTS:

Bayani, Antonio, Danilo, and Yoyong, all surnamed De Leon (De Leons), are siblings who
are being charged with Robbery with Homicide, for the alleged killing and taking of the
money/wallet of one Emilio Prasmo (Prasmo).

As a defense, the De Leons raise the defense that it was they were the ones who were
attacked by Prasmo and his son, to which self-defense, specifically by Antonio was raised, as
it resulted in the ―accidental‖ firing of the sumpak owned by Emilio as they grappled for its
possession.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that the De Leons guilty for the crime of Murder,
instead of Robbery with Homicide, as the element of taking was never proven.

The Court of Appeals (CA), on the other hand, affirmed the RTC decision but with
modifications, to the extent that Danilo is guilty of the crime of Robbery as a separate crime.
Thus Danilo was held to be guilty for the crimes of Murder and Robbery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly modified the acquittal to a conviction as to

the Robbery

RULING:
433 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

No, as doing so would violate the Constitutionally enshrined protection against double
jeopardy, or to put a person twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
In this case, the RTC, as a competent court with jurisdiction, has already ruled on the guilt of
the De Leons regarding the crime of Robbery, which held that they should be acquitted.

Thus, the CA cannot be allowed to modify such ruling, as it would put Danilo twice in
jeopardy for the same offense, considering that the RTC has ruled upon it already.

As a rule, an order of acquittal is immediately final and cannot be the subject of an appeal,
even if there is a misappreciation of evidence. as, again, it would be double jeopardy against
the accused.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATIONS. Accused- Appellants BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE
LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON are hereby declared guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellants are ordered to pay Emilio Prasmo‘s heirs the
following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for Emilio Prasmo‘s death, P75,000.00 as
moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

434 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 119: TRIAL

NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., petitioners, v. MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL., respondents

GR 160067 17 November 2010
Petitions for Review on Certiorari
Perez, J.

Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution

suspended over him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the administration of
justice, said right is considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. x x x

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition
of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered:

(a) length of delay;

(b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant‘s assertion of his right; and
(d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x

In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

FACTS:

Due to a vehicular accident between a Isuzu ten-wheeler truck owned by petitioner, Fuso
six-wheeler truck, and a KIA Besta Van, which resulted in eight (8) deaths and other injuries,
three cases were filed, one of which is a criminal case against petitioner. The other two cases
are for damages impleading each party to the case, alleging that it is not his fault but of the
other, and vise versa.

The proceedings in the criminal case were delayed due to the following reasons:

1. Three (3) to four (4) changes in public prosecutors;

2. Parties failure to agree on the facts of the case or prosecutor’s absence in pre-trial
hence pre-trial, coupled with the change in prosecutors which led to the new prosecutor
needing time to study the case; and
3. Numerous petitions against interlocutory orders in the present case and the civil cases;

Eventually, petitioner claims that his right to a speedy trial has been violated, and thus the
criminal case should be dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner‘s right to a speedy trial has been violated

RULING:
435 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

No, the right to speedy trial can only be said to be so violated if it is characterized by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. It must be determined on the facts of the case.

In relation to the facts, what can be gleaned is the act of petitioner filing extraordinary writs
against interlocutory orders. In line with this, the Court stated that:

Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates

commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order and the
continuous con duct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1),
Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which trial must
commence.

Thus, the extraordinary remedies should be excluded from the count. And considering,
again, that it is by petitioner‘s filing of said remedies that it caused delay, more so should it
be excluded.

Further, the change in the prosecutors of the case is justified, as the reasons stated, such as
assignment to another government agency, is a valid reason for another prosecutor to be
assigned. With the change in prosecutor, of course, time is needed to once again study the
case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410 are
both DENIED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 171622, the petition is GRANTED and the
17 February 2006 decision in CA-G.R. No. 87906 is, accordingly, REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered NULLIFYING the Parañaque RTC‘s 16 August
2004 order and directing said court to: (a) order petitioners Francisco and Imperial to pay
the filing and other docket fees for their third-party complaint; (b) order the issuance of
summons to respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta with respect to said third-
party complaint; and, thereafter,

436 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
VDA. DE MANGUERRA v. RISOS

FACTS:

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA
Decision setting aside the RTC Orders granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerras
motion to take deposition, and Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of
respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.

Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before
the RTC as Criminal Case that arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner
of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the
document.

Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in Manila, was
unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding;
and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters deposition. He explained the
need to perpetuate Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age,
which limited her freedom of mobility.

The motion was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, respondent filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA. At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the
respondent‘s petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable
party. This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring
that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section
15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to
the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions deposition should have been
taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending and not before the Clerk of
Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly committed
grave abuse of discretion.

The CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the
same court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The
appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the
situation was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 23 of Civil Procedure applies to the deposition of the
petitioner.

RULING:

437 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to
the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule
119 thus comes into play, and it provides:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. - When it satisfactorily

appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial
as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence
after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be
conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the
accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The
statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

The procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the
conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also
necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his
right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules
mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is,
through question and answer.

To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking
his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no
necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition
is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention.
More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the
witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially true
when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecution‘s case.

438 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PEOPLE v. DOMINGUEZ

FACTS:

On January 13, 2011, Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted in Cubao, Quezon
City by a group of men later pinpointed as the respondents herein. Evangelista's charred
remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.

In connection with the incident, Alfred Mendiola (Mendiola) and Ferdinand Parulan
(Parulan) voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP) and executed
extrajudicial confessions identifying respondents Roger and Raymond Dominguez
(Dominguez Brothers) as the masterminds behind the killing. This led to the filing before
the Quezon City RTC of an Information against Mendiola and the respondents for
Carnapping with Homicide under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539,[3] otherwise known
as the Anti-Carnapping Act.

However respondents Rolando Taiban (Taiban) and Joel Jacinto (Jacinto) remained at large.
Only the Dominguez brothers and Miranda were apprehended. And during arraignment on
April 11, 2011, the three arrested respondents pleaded not guilty to the offense.

On June 27, 2011, a hearing was conducted on the prosecution's motion that Mendiola be
discharged as an accused to become a state witness. On the said date, Mendiola gave his
testimony and was cross examined by the counsel for the defense. Nevertheless, the defense
manifested that the cross-examination was limited only to the incident of discharge, and that
their party reserved the right to a more lengthy cross examination during the prosecution's
presentation of the evidence in chief.

On September 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 215, before which Criminal Case No. Q-11-
168431 is pending, issued an Order granting the motion to discharge Mendiola as an accused
to become a state witness.

Thereafter, by a surprise turn of events, Mendiola was found dead on May 6, 2012. The RTC
then required the parties to submit their respective position papers on whether or not
Mendiola's testimony during the discharge proceeding should be admitted as part of the
prosecution's evidence in chief despite his failure to testify during the trial proper prior to his
death.

RTC:

On January 10, 2014, the RTC issued the assailed Order directing that the testimony
of Mendiola be stricken off the records of Criminal Case No.Q-11-168431.

According to the trial court, Mendiola's testimony on June 27, 2011 was offered only
for the purpose of substantiating the motion for him to be discharged as a state
witness, and does not yet constitute evidence in chief. Thus, the defense counsel
limited his questions during cross-examination to only those matters relating to

439 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
Mendiola's qualifications to become a state witness and expressly reserved the right
to continue the cross-examination during trial proper.

The trial court likewise cited Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, noting that
there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a regular witness during
trial proper to secure his acquittal. Noncompliance with this requirement, according
to the RTC, amounted to the deprivation of respondents of their constitutional right
to due process, and of their right to confront the witnesses against them.

CA:

The issue was elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule
65, but the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court. Moreover, The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration therefrom
through its January 18, 2017 Resolution. Hence, the instant recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the state witness prior to trial proper will
automatically render his testimony during the discharge proceeding
inadmissible.

RULING:

No. The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding
will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state
witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had already concluded and the motion for
discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already automatically
deemed part of the records of Criminal Case and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule.

Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete, contrary to how Miranda paints it to be. The
contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to establish his possession of all
the necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, under Section 17, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court to be eligible as a state witness. The argument of incompleteness even
contradicts respondent Miranda's own position since he does not contest here the RTC's
Order granting Mendiola's motion to be a state witness, only the admissibility of his
testimony following his demise.

Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it mandatory that
the state witness be presented during trial proper and that, otherwise, his failure to do so
would render his testimony inadmissible. On this point, Miranda, the RTC and the CA are
mistaken in their interpretation of the rule.

While respondent Miranda is correct that the motion hearing is different from the
presentation of evidence in chief, it is precisely because of this distinction and separability
that the validity of the discharge proceeding should remain untouched despite the non-
presentation of Mendiola during trial on the merits. True, the provision requires the accused
to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness. However, non-
compliance therewith would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an
440 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
acquittal; it does not speak of any penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the
state witness during the discharge proceeding inadmissible. On the contrary, the testimonies
and admissions of a state witness during the discharge proceedings may be admitted as
evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse to testify in
accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge, militating
against the claim of inadmissibility.

To recall, one of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 is to establish that the
erstwhile respondent does not appear to be the most guilty among him and his cohorts.
Thus, it is quite understandable that, during the discharge proceeding, Mendiola narrated in
graphic detail his entire knowledge of the crime and the extent of the participation of each of
the accused.

We cannot subscribe to Miranda's postulation that the above narration is extraneous to the
purpose of qualifying Mendiola as a state witness. On the contrary, they were essential in
establishing that he is not the main perpetrator of the murder of Venson Evangelista,
rendering him eligible as a state witness under Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, even assuming arguendo that the foregoing details are not germane to the
purpose for which the testimony of Mendiola was offered, it was nevertheless incumbent
upon respondents to have timely objected against the line of questioning for irrelevance.

Noteworthy is that Miranda never raised in his Comment that he and his co-respondents
have timely raised an objection when Mendiola delved into the particulars of the crime in his
testimony. They are, thus, precluded from belatedly questioning the relevance of the said
details.

441 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
CABADOR v. PEOPLE

One can avail of a demurrer to evidence only after the plaintiff or the prosecution has rested
its case. Resting one‘s case requires a formal offer of evidence which has been commented
on or has been opposed and the court has already ruled on the formal offer of evidence
together with the opposition or comment thereto.

FACTS:

The public prosecutor accused Cabador of murdering, in conspiracy with others, Atty.
Valerio. After 5 years of trial and 5 witnesses, RTC ended the prosecution's presentation of
witnesses and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary
evidence within 15 days from notice. The public prosecutor asked for 3 extensions of time
but was still not able to make the offer.

Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, invoking his right to a speedy trial. Moreover, he
claimed that the trial court could not consider any evidence against him that had not been
formally offered. 4 days before such filing, without the knowledge of Cabador, another
extension was asked for, and an offer was made on the day Cabador filed his MTD.

RTC issued an order treating Cabador's MTD as a demurrer to evidence. And since he filed
his motion without leave of court, he waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
RTC submitted the case for decision. Cabador filed a MR which the RTC denied. CA
likewise denied his petition and affirmed RTC.

CA denied his MR.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion filed by Cabador was demurrer to evidence or a
motion to dismiss.

RULING:

The SC ruled that Cabador filed a motion to dismiss, not a demurrer to evidence. He did not
waive his right to present evidence. There are 2 stages in the trial proper of a criminal case:
(1) prosecution's presentation of evidence against the accused; and (2) accused's presentation
of evidence in his defense. If after the first stage, the evidence appears insufficient to
support a conviction, the trial court may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused
dispense with the second stage, and dismiss the criminal action. There is no point for the
trial court to hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal amounts to an
acquittal.

But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the proceedings in
the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused files a demurrer without leave

442 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence and the case shall
be considered submitted for judgment.

To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the
Court must consider the following: the allegations in it were made in good faith; the stage of
the proceeding at which it is filed; the primary objective of the party filing it.

Cabador in his MTD pointed out how the trial dragged on for years; the gaps between
hearings were long, with hearings often postponed due to the absence of the prosecutor.
And it was compounded by the repeated motions for extension by the prosecutor to make
the formal offer, and its failure to make such offer. He invoked his right to speedy trial.

In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused's
right to speedy trail. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and oppressive
delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that unreasonably
prolonged the trial. This was the main thrust of Cabador‘s motion to dismiss and he had the
right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.

Cabador did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in
what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime, something that is
fundamental in ay demurrer. It did not touch on any particular testimony or documentary
exhibit. He could not do so because he did not know that the prosecution finally made its
offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his MTD.

A demurrer assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case. In this case, after the
prosecution filed its formal offer, the trial court still needed to give Cabador an opportunity
to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And
only after such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. The MTD
was filed before he could object to the offer, before the trial court could rule on the offer,
and before the prosecution could rest its case. It cannot be said that he intended his MTD to
serve as a demurrer. He cannot be declared to have waived his right to present evidence in
his defense.

443 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 120: JUDGMENT

FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO, respondents
GR 174654 17 August 2011
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Del Castillo, J.

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state

whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. x x x

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is
really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused
to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether
or not the same be punishable by law. x x x

Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly
liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage
to the spouses

FACTS:

Abellana extended a loan in favor of Sps. Alonto, which is secured by a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over a parcels of land located in Cebu City.

Two (2) years thereafter, due to failure to Sps. Alonto‘s failure to comply with their
obligation, Abellana prepared a Deed of Sale (Deed) transferring the said lots in his favor.
Sps. Alonto signed the Deed in Manila, but the document was notarized by Abellana in Cebu
City, without the former‘s presence. Eventually, Abellana sold the lot to a third person.

Sps. Alonto caused the filing of an information for Estafa by Falsification of a Public
Document against Abellana, claiming that their signatures were forged.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held as follows:

Found Abellana guilty for Falsification of a Public Document by a Private Individual,

instead of the crime charged in the information.

444 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
It ruled so considering that by the records of the case, it was admitted that
indeed the Sps. Alonto affixed their own signature in the Deed as a result of
the non-payment of the loan.

Thus, the intent to defraud is not apparent, and what merely is apparent is
the act of Abellana causing the notarization of the Deed in Cebu without the
presence of Sps. Alonto.

Likewise, civil liability is awarded

Aggrieved, Abellana raised the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA), which held:

Reversed the RTC decision, considering that it is a crime different, and is not
necessarily included, in the crime ruled to be committed by Abellana.

In holding so, the CA stated that it is in violation of Abellana‘s Constitutional

right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against
him.

However, as to civil liability, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in upholding civil liability

RULING:

No. First and foremost, a distinction must be made on the nature of the acquittal, that is,
one based on absolute failure to prove guilt, and the other on failure to prove beyond
reasonable doubt.

If it is in the former, then no act was committed to cause the damage, and thus no civil
liability may arise. On the other hand, if it is in the latter, an act exists but there is a failure to
prove it to the required quantum of evidence, thus there is an uncertainty, but indeed there is
an act which gives rise to damages.

In this case, it is admittedly said by Sps. Alonto that they affixed their signature in the deed,
and that it is due to their non-payment. Thus, the subsequent transfer to Abellana, and to the
third person eventually, did not cause any damage to Sps. Alonto, considering that it is the
consequence of the Loan secured by the REM.

Further, despite the defective notarization, the veracity of its contents are presumed to be
valid unless contradicted by evidence, which is, in this case, wanting.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED
insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of falsification of
public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the

445 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of P1,103,000.00
representing the value of the property, and the payment of nominal and exemplary damages,
attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses, is deleted for lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.

446 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
BASILONIA VS. VILLARUZ

FACTS:

On June 19, 1987, a Decision was promulgated against petitioners finding the (accused) Rodolfo
Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John "Jojo" Basilonia, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, as principals for the murder of Atty. Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas City,
Philippines and to pay and [indemnify], jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani
Roblete the sum of 32,100.00 representing funeral expenses, tomb, burial, and expenses for wake;
the sum of 130,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Atty. Isagani Roblete; the amount of lost
income cannot be determined as the net income of the deceased cannot be ascertained; and to pay
the costs of suit. [Accused] Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence.

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1987, which the trial court granted on August 3,
1987.

On January 23, 1989, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to file
their brief despite extensions of time given. The Resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgment on September 18, 1989. Thereafter, the entire case records were remanded to the trial
court on October 4, 1989.

Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon
C. Roblete, claiming to be the son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for
Execution of Judgment.

He alleged, among others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for
execution, the judgment has not been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his
request. Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an
Omnibus Motion for Execution of Judgment and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.

On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Relief of Judgment praying to set
aside the June 19, 1987 trial court Decision and the January 23, 1989 CA Resolution. Further, on
September 1, 2009, they filed before the trial court a Manifestation and Supplemental Opposition to
private respondent Roblete's motion.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not a decision in a criminal case may be enforced through a writ of execution
after twenty years from the date it was entered in the book of entry of judgments.
2. Whether or not the civil liability is extinguished.

RULING:

1st Issue:
Yes. With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) governs. Articles 92 and 93 of which provide:

447 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final
sentence prescribe as follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of
arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.

ARTICLE 93. Computation of the Prescription of Penalties. - The period of

prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant
should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which
this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before
the expiration of the period of prescription.

As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental, the Court already
opined that evasion of service of sentence is an essential element of prescription of penalties.
Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al. expounded on the rule that the culprit should escape
during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by final
sentence to commence to run.

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:

(1) the offender is a convict by final judgment;

(2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and
(3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This
must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his
sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment."

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final
sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.

Following Tanega, Del Castillo v. Hon. Torrecampo held that one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. We agree with the position
of the Solicitor General that "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and
157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.

Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners.
For the longest time, they were never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite
being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of
imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution and
in eventually granting the same.

448 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
2nd Issue:
YES. The treatment of petitioners' civil liability arising from the offense committed is
different. Elementary is the rule that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.

Under Article 112 of the RPC, civil liability established in Articles 100,25 101,26 102,27 and
103 of the Code shall be extinguished in the same manner as other obligations, in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law. Since the Civil Code is the governing law,
the provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 6, Rule 39
thereof, is applicable.

There are two (2) modes of enforcing a final and executory judgment or order: through
motion or by independent action.

These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the judgment
creditor invoked its right to enforce the court's judgment. Execution by motion is only
available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from the date
of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-
year prescriptive period for execution by motion had already elapsed. However, for
execution by independent action to prosper - the Rules impose another limitation - the
action must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil
Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the judgment.

In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for
execution within the five-year period or an action to revive the judgment within the ten-year
period. Worse, other than the bare allegation that the judgment has not been enforced
because the public prosecutor has not acted on the request to file a motion for execution, no
persuasive and compelling reason was presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity
jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent Roblete, the instant case does not fall
within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was
entirely beyond their control or that petitioners have any hand in causing the same.

As regards the civil aspect of a criminal case is concerned, it is apt to point that —Litigants
represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and
await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel,
for at stake is their interest in the case. While lawyers are expected to exercise a reasonable
degree of diligence and competence in handling cases for their clients, the realities of law
practice as well as certain fortuitous events sometimes make it almost physically impossible
for lawyers to be immediately updated on a particular client's case.

Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs and incidental expenses of the
suit are part of the judgment and it is incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor
they are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of court. Manifestly, the
heirs of Atty. Roblete failed to do so. Their indifference, if not negligence, is indicative of
lack of interest in executing the decision rendered in their favor. To remind, the purpose of
the law in prescribing time limitations for executing judgments or orders is to prevent
obligors from sleeping on their rights.46 Indeed, inaction may be construed as a waiver.
449 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 121: NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

PAYUMO v. SANDIGANBAYAN

New and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial;
requisites.

FACTS:

The petitions stem from the facts of Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident
that occurred on February 26, 1980 at around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon in Sitio Aluag,
Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC)
and Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly
killing one and wounding several others.

SANDIGANBAYAN:

The accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted
Murder before the Sandiganbayan. After four (4) years of trial, the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision dated October 5, 1984, penned by
Justice Romeo M. Escareal, convicting the accused as co principals in the crime of
Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder. On January 11, 1985, the
accused filed their Motion for New Trial, which was denied.

The accused elevated the case to the Supreme Court, which set aside the October 5, 1984
Decision of the Sandiganbayan and remanding the case for a new trial. Thus, Criminal Case
No. 4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was raffled to the First Division.
Accordingly, the First Division received anew all the evidence of the parties, both
testimonial and documentary. Later, with the creation of the Fourth and Fifth divisions,
Criminal Case No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth Division. On February 23, 1999, the
Fifth Division promulgated judgment, penned by Justice Godofredo T. Legaspi, convicting
the accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their
Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial. Since the Fifth Division could
not reach unanimity in resolving the aforesaid omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was
constituted pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan.

On September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-2, issued the subject Resolution
promulgated on October 24, 2001, setting aside the November 27, 1998 Decision and
granting a second new trial of the case. The Special Fifth Division pronounced among others
that a second new trial would enable it to allow the accused to adduce pertinent evidence
including the records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to shed light on the "serious allegations"

450 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
granted a new trial of Criminal Case No. 4219.

RULING:

On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in
Criminal Case No. 4219, the Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis.
Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that: new and
material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial.

The records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the criteria
for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met:

(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;

(b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment.

It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.

In this case, however, such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could
have been presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the
JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that
prevented the accused from using these records during the trial to substantiate their position
that the shooting incident was a result of a military operation. The Court finds and so rules
that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it
nullified the November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No.
4219. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent court, being clothed with the
power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. Accordingly, the
assailed Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside.

451 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 122-125: APPEALS

IRENORIO B. BALABA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

GR 169519 17 July 2009
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Carpio, J.

An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the
correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day
period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate
court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals.

Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply.
The second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: ―An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court
but shall be dismissed outright.‖

FACTS:

Upon investigation by State Auditors, they found a shortage amounting to Php114,186.34 in

the funds of Guindulman, Bohol. Thus, they demanded an explanation from Assistant
Municipal Treasurer Balaba.

Unsatisfied with Balaba‘s explanation, it was recommended that a case for Malversation of
Public Funds be instituted, to which the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC).

The RTC found Balaba as guilty on 9 December 2002.

Balaba filed a notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. However, on 15 December 2004, the
Court of Appeals (CA) declared that it lacks jurisdiction over the case, and holds that it
should have been filed with the Sandiganbayan instead.

Trying to correct the mistake, Balaba attempted to file it instead with the Sandiganbayan on
27 January 2005.

Nevertheless, the CA dismissed the appeal due to the error.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed the appeal

RULING:

Yes, the CA correctly dismissed the appeal. While it is true that such an error may be
rectified, it must be done within the fifteen (15) day period to appeal.

452 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
That Balaba attempted to correct the mistake only a year after, it is way beyond the period to
correct the error.

Thus, in such a case, the CA may dismiss it as per Sec. 2 of Rule 50, to wit:
―An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.‖

The error to rectify within the period to appeal, is fatal, as the CA may dismiss it if not acted
upon as soon as possible.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 15 December 2004 Decision

and 24 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27178.
SO ORDERED

453 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
PEOPLE v. OLIVO

FACTS:

On November 21, 2000, around 6:30 o‘clock in the ebening, Maricel Permejo (Permejo) was
tending the store of the victim, Mariano Constantino (Constantino) in Bagong Silangan,
Quezon City. Suddenly, three (3) aremed men entered the store and demanded money.
When Permejo did not accede to the demand, one of the armed men later identified as
appellant Nelson Danda (Danda) kicked her in the leg while his other companion, appellant
Joey Zafra got money from the cash register. When the store owner, Constantino, went
inside the store and shouted, the third appellant Charmen Olivo (Olivo) poked a gun at him.
Mariano ran towards the back of the house but appellant Olivo nevertheless chased him.
Tehreafter, Danda and Zafra going out of the store while the bloodied body of Mariano was
lying at the stairway of the house. The victim was taken to the hospital where he died upon
arrival.

Two days after the incident SPO2 Joseph Dino received an Information from the Batasan
Police Station that they have three (3) suspects from drug violation and illegal possession of
firearms. He borrowed the suspects for identification by Permejo. When presented to her,
she identified them as the men who staged a hold up and shot the deceased.

On August 24, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of the
crime of robbery with homicide.

Accused-appellants Olivo and Danda applealed to the CA.

In a Decision dated November 30, 2006, the CA affiremed in toto the RTC‘s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not an accused who has not perfected an appeal should be
included in a decision of acquittal on appeal by the other co-accused.

RULING:

Yes. Trial courts are mandated not only to look at the direct examination of witnesses but to
the totality of evidence before them. In every case, the court should review, assess and weigh
the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. It should not confine itself to oral
testimony during the trial.

We cannot convict appellants for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide when
the evidence relied upon by the trial court is plainly erroneous and inadequate to prove
appellants‘ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.

In view of the foregoing, acquittal of the accused-appellants is in order.

One final note. The other accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other
appellants and who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have
454 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
perfected an appeal from the trial court‘s judgment. The record does not show the reason
therefor.

Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our pronouncements here with respect to the
insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are
definitely favorable and applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated
as the odd man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under
similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-accused who failed
to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we subsequently reversed.

455 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
TIU v. PEOPLE

Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings
before this Court and the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

The instant controversy stemmed from a criminal charge for slight physical injuries filed by
respondent Edgardo Postanes (Postanes) against Remigio Pasion (Pasion). On the other
hand, petitioner David Tiu (Tiu) filed a criminal charge for grave threats against Postanes.
Consequently, an Information for Slight Physical Injuries, and an Information for Grave
Threats, , were filed with the MeTC of Pasay City. Upon motion of Pasion the 2 criminal
cases were consolidated before the MeTC Br. 44 of Pasay City.

The MeTC dismissed the criminal cases for slight physical injuries against Pasion and the
Tiu‘s counter-charge of grave threats against Postanes. Tiu filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied, so he filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC.

The RTC rendered the decision of the MeTC void against the acquittal of Postanes.
Postanes filed a motion for reconsideration, but was subsequently denied. Postanes went up
to the CA challenging the Order of the RTC.

Meanwhile, Tiu filed a motion with the MeTC to enforce the RTC‘s decision. He also filed
before the CA a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping.

The CA affirmed the decision of the MeTC in the dismissal of the criminal cases. Further, it
also denied the motion to dismiss by Tiu.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion to dismiss by Tiu before the CA has merit;

RULING:

NO. At the outset, the Court finds that the petition is defective since it was not filed by the
Solicitor General. Instead, it was filed by Tiu, the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
96-413, through his counsel. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or
defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State
in criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court of Appeals.20 Tiu, the offended
party in Criminal Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to appeal the decision of the
Court of Appeals before this Court. Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the People in this appeal before this Court. On this ground alone, the petition
must fail.

456 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
ARNEL COLINARES, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
GR 182748 13 December 2011
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Abad, J.

In a real sense, the Court‘s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only
of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him
guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation. x x x

…it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals ―from the judgment of
conviction‖ is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. x x x

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused.
Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation
Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in
many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it
is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

FACTS:

Colinares is being charged with the frustrated homicide of Rufino, as the former struck the
latter‘s head using a stone at least fifteen (15) inches in size. However, as he was rushed to
the hospital, Rufino lived.

Colinares claims self-defense, that Rufino, together with two (2) other persons, initially
boxed him as they were drunk.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held Colinares guilty of frustrated homicide. No probation
can be applied for considering that the maximum allowable penalty in order for such
application may be filed is six (6) years, and the conviction against Colinares has the
maximum of six (6) years and one (1) day as maximum.

Thus, Colinares appealed to the Court of Appeals, again invoking self-defense or, in the
alternative, he be convicted for attempted homicide instead. However, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC.

Upon petition to the Supreme Court (SC), the SC determined that the proper conviction
should be for attempted homicide, considering that the records in the RTC shows that there

457 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
is no showing that the wound caused to the head was fatal. In line with jurisprudence, if the
wound is not fatal, it can never be said to be frustrated.

As it goes, what is left is the determination of propriety of an application for probation,

considering that an appeal was previously perfected which bars the filing of such application.

ISSUE: Whether or not an application for probation is warranted

RULING:

Yes, an application for probation may be had. While it is true that an accused cannot apply
for probation if he already perfected an appeal, the facts of this case are exceptional.

The SC set aside the conviction for frustrated homicide, considering that they wrongly
interpreted the facts of the case, specifically as to the mortality of the wound inflicted. Thus,
a new judgment, different from the one rendered by the RTC, was given.

In reality, it is a separate judgment, to which Colinares may apply probation for. Further, it is
impossible for Colinares to apply then, considering that the imposable penalty bars him from
doing so.

Thus, under the spirit of the Probation Law, it cannot be the intent of the framers to
disallow an accused who could have applied then, but by virtue of an erroneous judgment
was not able to. It would be prejudicial considering that the error was not his fault.

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the

Decision dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS
petitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and
SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay
Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to
petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has
been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.

NOTE:

Rule as to availability of application for probation;

GR: Can only be availed exclusively of appeal, once appeal made, no application
may be had

ER: If upon appeal, the appellate court found that the imposable penalty be lower
or of a different stage of consummation, application can be had, considering
that it is a new judgment, separate from the trial court‘s decision.

458 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

RULE 126: SEARCH AND SEIZURE

MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondent
GR 200370 7 June 2017
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Leonen, J.

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In
any given situation, ―[w]hat constitutes a reasonable . . . search . . . is purely a judicial
question,‖ the resolution of which depends upon the unique and distinct factual
circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into ―the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured. x x x

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a
search is made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; ―the process
cannot be reversed. x x x

In this case, petitioner‘s arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the
checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in
the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless
arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is
insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be
arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about
to be committed.

FACTS:

Acting upon a tip given by an informant, police officers of Laguna set up a checkpoint to
catch Veridiano, who allegedly went to San Pablo, Laguna, to obtain drugs, specifically
marijuana.

At around 10AM in the morning, a passenger jeepney wherein Veridiano is riding was
flagged down. All the passengers were let off the jeepney while Veridiano was frisked. As
Veridiano stayed silent and never objected to the search upon him, police officers were able
to find in his pocket a sachet containing marijuana.

As a defense, Veridiano said that after passing from the said checkpoint, three (3)
motorcycles rode by men in civilian uniforms tailgated the passenger jeep wherein he was
riding on. After a while, the men overtaken the jeep and signalled the jeep to stop. Without
any reason, it was only he who was subjected to a search and to his surprise, marijuana was
―found‖ in his pocket.

459 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held Veridiano guilty of illegal possession of drugs. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), Veridiano argued that as his arrest was illegal, no
conviction can be had against him. As opposed by the State, they argued that by entering his
plea, Veridiano effectively waived his right to question the legality of the arrest.
Nevertheless, the CA upheld the validity of the arrest and thus affirmed the RTC decision.

This petition is filed by Veridiano questioning the validity of the arrest and the subsequent
search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure is valid

RULING:

No. In order for a seizure to be valid, it must be preceded by a lawful arrest. Lawful arrest
may be by virtue of a search warrant or via a warrantless arrest.

Obviously, the arrest was made without a warrant, and thus ruling out the possibility of an
arrest by virtue of a warrant. On the warrantless arrest, it has been argued by the State to be
such considering the tip given to them.

However, it was ruled by the Court that a hearsay tip alone cannot amount to a probable
cause as to permit a warrantless arrest. A tip by itself could not suffice, as it must be coupled
with an overt act or circumstances that would arouse a suspicion that a crime has been
committed by the person.

In this case, no such circumstances appear as to permit the warrantless arrest. Veridiano,
from the facts of both the prosecution and defense, is said to be sitted without doing
anything suspicious.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal
Case No. 16976-SP and the Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated
January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.- G.R. CR No. 33588
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is hereby
ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is
being held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

On Veridiano‘s supposed waiver by silence;

Waivers to search a person must be express, and can never be implied by acts of the accused.
This is due to circumstances that might prevent the person from speaking his opposition
thereto considering the fear he might be experiencing being in the presence of authorities

On the acts being in flagrante delicto and hot pursuit;

460 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
In both cases, it cannot be said to be as such. As a common denominator, overt acts must be
present. If there is no such suspicion arousing the arresting officer, no arrest, and
subsequently seizure, may be made.

Thus, in a case where the police officers received a tip that a certain person went to a drug
den, and upon seeing the person with red eyes and ran away from them, the warrantless
arrest and seizure was held to be valid.

In comparison to the case at bar, no such suspicious act is present.

Limitations of ―stop-and-frisk‖ and ―search of a moving vehicle‖;

In a ―stop-and-frisk‖, it is limited to the outer layer of the clothes, as to check any weapons
in order to preserve the safety of the public.

On the other hand, in ―search of a moving vehicle‖, it should be limited to visual checking,
unless, of course, the car in question is a subject of a crime which in this case could properly
be subjected to an extensive search.

Extensive searches in airports or other ports of travel;

Searches in this case can be more extensive, considering the nature of security measures to
be taken to prevent the State from being entered by illegal contrabands or any other
dangerous articles. This is due to the fact that by being in a port, the traveller has a
―reasonable reduced expectation of privacy‖.

461 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
JAYLORD DIMAL and ALLAN CASTILLO, petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent
GR 216922 18 April 2018
Petition for Review on Certiorari
Peralta, J.

For the ―plain view doctrine‖ to apply, it is required that the following requisites are
present:

(a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
(b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. x x x

The ―immediately apparent‖ test does not require an unduly high degree of certainty as to
the incriminating character of the evidence, but only that the seizure be presumptively
reasonable, assuming that there is a probable cause to associate the property with a criminal
activity.

FACTS:

Jaylord Dimal (Dimal) together with Allan Castillo (Castillo) and others are being charged
for the crime of Kidnapping with Murder, for the loss and death of Lucio and Rosamarie
Pua, and Gemma Eugenio (Victims).

The victims went to Dimal‘s compound, as palay sellers, to negotiate the sale of sacks of
palay. However, they never returned, which alarmed Lucio‘s nepher, Edison, and thus went
to Dimal‘s compound.

Dimal, in his defense, said that they have left an hour before Edison came. However, upon
statement of a certain Sapipi, as implicated by Castillo, told the crime was committed by
Dimal and they were ordered to throw the bodies to the river.

An employee further stated that, on the day of the killing, Dimal called upon him to help
him transfer the dead bodies. However, said employee refused to as he cannot do so. At the
time, he saw Dimal holding a 9mm caliber pistol.

Thus, Dimal was arrested. To bolster its case against Dimal and company, police officers
applied for a search warrant, supported by statements of various witness, and probed to by
the Judge.

In the returns of the search warrant, the following items were said to be seized in ―plain
view‖:

1) Extracted suspected Bloodstain (Marked as E-24 with JAM markings);

462 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial
2) Extracted suspected Bloodstain (Marked as E-25 with JAM markings)
3) One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Marked as E-14 with JAM markings)
4) One (1) cell phone spare part (Marked as E-16 with JAM markings)
5) One (1) cell phone spare part (Marked as E-17 with JAM markings)
6) Palay husk with suspected bloodstain (Marked as E-28 with JAM markings)
7) Suspected bloodstain (Marked as E-25-A with JAM markings)
8) One (1) pc. torn cloth (Marked as E-1 with JAM markings)
9) One (1) pc. torn cloth (Marked as E-2 with JAM markings)
10) One (1) pc. torn cloth (Marked as E-3 with JAM markings)
11) One (1) pc. spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-4 with JAM markings)
12) One (1) bag pack color black (Marked as E-5 with JAM markings)
13) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-6 with JAM markings)
14) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-7 with JAM markings)
15) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-8 with JAM markings)
16) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-9 with JAM markings)
17) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-10 with JAM markings)
18) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-11 with JAM markings)
19) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-12 with JAM markings)
20) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-13 with JAM markings)
21) Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1)
BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua (Marked as E-15 with JAM markings)
22) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-18 with JAM markings)
23) One (1) piece gold-plated earring (Marked as E-19 with JAM markings)
24) Suspected human hair (Marked as E-20 with JAM markings)
25) A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (Marked as E-22 with JAM markings)
26) Three (3) burned Tire wires (Marked as E-23 with JAM markings)
27) One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (Marked as E-27 with JAM markings)
28) One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (Marked as E-29 with JAM markings)
29) One (1) color white T-shirt (Marked as E-30 with JAM markings)

Dimal questioned the admissibility of the above items, considering that they were not stated
in the search warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the items seized in plain view are admissible

RULING:

No. In order for plain view to apply, the following requisites should concur:

1) The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
2) The discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
3) It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

While it is conceded that indeed the police officers had authority based on the search
warrant, the second and third requisite are wanting.
463 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

As to the inadvertence, there was no showing in the returns that indeed they were found by
accident or without any deliberate intent to go into a ―fishing expedition‖.

As to its being immediately apparent, while it does not demand definite certainty, it must be
reasonable to show that indeed the items seized were in connection of the crime. As an
example, the 22-caliber shells cannot be related to the offense charged, considering that what
was used in the killing was a 9mm caliber pistol.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY

GRANTED. The Court of Appeals‘ Decision dated August 27, 2014 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
128355 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to declare that the following properties
seized under Search Warrant No. 10-11 are inadmissible in evidence for neither having been
particularly described in the search warrant nor seized under the ―plain view doctrine‖:

1) Extracted suspected Bloodstain (Marked as E-24 with JAM markings);

2) Extracted suspected Bloodstain (Marked as E-25 with JAM markings)
3) One (1) Bra color brown (tiger) (Marked as E-14 with JAM markings)
4) One (1) cell phone spare part (Marked as E-16 with JAM markings)
5) One (1) cell phone spare part (Marked as E-17 with JAM markings)
6) Palay husk with suspected bloodstain (Marked as E-28 with JAM markings)
7) Suspected bloodstain (Marked as E-25-A with JAM markings)
8) One (1) pc. torn cloth (Marked as E-1 with JAM markings)
9) One (1) pc. torn cloth (Marked as E-2 with JAM markings)
10) One (1) pc. torn cloth (Marked as E-3 with JAM markings)
11) One (1) pc. spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-4 with JAM markings)
12) One (1) bag pack color black (Marked as E-5 with JAM markings)
13) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-6 with JAM markings)
14) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-7 with JAM markings)
15) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-8 with JAM markings)
16) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-9 with JAM markings)
17) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-10 with JAM markings)
18) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-11 with JAM markings)
19) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-12 with JAM markings)
20) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-13 with JAM markings)
21) Two (2) Alien Certificate of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua, and One (1)
BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua (Marked as E-15 with JAM markings)
22) One spent shell of caliber 22 (Marked as E-18 with JAM markings)
23) One (1) piece gold-plated earring (Marked as E-19 with JAM markings)
24) Suspected human hair (Marked as E-20 with JAM markings)
25) A piece of embroider[ed] cloth (Marked as E-22 with JAM markings)
26) Three (3) burned Tire wires (Marked as E-23 with JAM markings)
27) One (1) empty plastic bottle of Gleam muriatic acid (Marked as E-27 with JAM markings)
28) One (1) live ammo of caliber 22 (Marked as E-29 with JAM markings)
29) One (1) color white T-shirt (Marked as E-30 with JAM markings)

464 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Moreover, the two (2) Alien Certificates of Registration of Lucio Pua and Rosemarie Pua,
and One (1) BDO Passbook in the name of Lucio Pua are directed to be returned to the
respective heirs of said victims, while the live ammo of caliber 0.22 (marked as E-29 with
JAM markings) shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal case that
may be filed against petitioner Jaylord Dimal.
SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

On the sufficiency of the probing questions by the Judge;

Based on the records, the Judge indeed questioned the witnesses and the applicant to the
search warrant.

Without any showing that the Judge had exercised his power with grave abuse of discretion,
the Court cannot look upon it considering that the Judge has a wide range of discretion in
determining probable cause

On the propriety of the search warrant considering that it must be directed towards a
single crime, and not a single warrant for two (2) separate crimes;
The search warrant is proper, as Kidnapping and Murder in this case is to be treated as a
Special Complex Crime, designated as Kidnapping with Murder

On the particularity of the place as stated in the search warrant;

It is sufficient that the police officers can easily identify and go to the place stated in the
search warrant, to the exclusion of other places. Thus, that the compound was named with
particularity, it is sufficient.

On the particularity of the other seized items;

The other items in the search warrant have not been defined with particularity.

As a remedy, the applicant could have attached by reference the affidavits of the witnesses
pertaining to the items lacking in particularity in order to uphold its sufficiency. However,
the police officers failed to do so in this case. Thus, those described lacking in particularity
should be inadmissible

465 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for
REM REV 1 DIGESTS, 1st Sem, A.Y. 2020-2021
Atty. Henedino Brondial

Cases are
numerous, but
friendship is
limitless.

466 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Atty. Brondial pass all of us (with flying colors) in this subject; and
2. Other reliefs, just and equitable, are likewise prayed for