The Impact of the Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement on

Middle East Conflicts

On 10 March, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to restore diplomatic relations as part of
a Chinese-sponsored initiative that appears aimed at reducing tensions across the
Middle East. Crisis Group experts offer a 360-degree view of the implications for the
region’s many flashpoints.

On 10 March, representatives of Iran and Saudi Arabia, who had been meeting
secretly for five days in the Chinese capital Beijing, announced a Chinese-
sponsored agreement to restore diplomatic relations between the two
countries. Tensions between the regional rivals date back more than four
decades, persisting at lower levels through an earlier period of détente in the
1990s and then heightening in the past two decades. Riyadh formally severed
ties with Tehran seven years ago. The countries’ effort to mend fences was
public knowledge – Iraq and Oman had hosted previous rounds of talks
between Iranian and Saudi officials – but China’s role in midwifing the accord
was unforeseen, as was the speed with which the rapprochement has
proceeded. The degree to which the Joint Trilateral Statement issued by the
three countries augurs a geopolitical shift that will see China assume a larger
role in a region where the United States has long been dominant remains
uncertain.

An equally important question is whether and to what extent the Beijing

agreement will contribute to managing, or even resolving, conflicts elsewhere
in the Middle East. The competing regional agendas of Riyadh and Tehran
have compounded devastating wars in Yemen and Syria, and continue to fuel
instability in Lebanon and Iraq. Several Gulf Arab states have long been
concerned about direct threats from, or even attacks by, Iranian proxies, as
well as alleged Iranian support for dissident movements. Israel, meanwhile,
sees Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat. From its side, Tehran
accuses Israel of sabotaging its nuclear program, and Saudi Arabia of backing
ethnic opposition groups in Kordestan, Baluchistan and other troubled
provinces, along with hostile Iranian diaspora media.

While reducing the intensity of regional competition may help

redirect political energy to the core internal conflicts, the
prospect of swift solutions remains slim.

In this survey, Crisis Group analysts based in the Middle East present local
perspectives on the Saudi-Iranian agreement and its impact on the region’s
wars and crises. The bottom-line conclusion is that while reducing the
intensity of regional competition may help redirect political energy to the core
internal conflicts, the prospect of swift solutions remains slim. The Iranian-
Saudi rapprochement may lessen Gulf Arab states’ security concerns. But it
does not diminish the risk of a crisis triggered by Iran’s rapidly advancing
nuclear program and the threat it poses, in particular for Israel, but also for
some of Iran’s neighbours, including Saudi Arabia.

Gulf Arab States

The Saudi-Iranian agreement provides a roadmap for re-establishing

diplomatic ties within two months. If all goes well, it could reduce the intense
hostility that has existed between the two countries for the better part of a
decade. For now, the agreement’s rollout appears to be proceeding apace: King
Salman of Saudi Arabia invited Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi to Riyadh, and
the two countries’ foreign ministers met in Beijing on 6 April. A senior Saudi
official told Crisis Group that Riyadh “wants to build on the momentum
generated by the success of the Beijing talks”, while the Saudi finance
minister indicated that the country was prepared to start investing in Iran
“very quickly”. Both countries sent technical delegations in preparation for
reopening their respective embassies, suggesting that the two-month timeline
is on track.

Beyond improving bilateral relations, the agreement may also help lessen
tensions in the broader Gulf region. Officials in the United Arab Emirates,
Kuwait and Oman all lauded the deal as a move toward stability and
prosperity that will benefit all sides. A senior Qatari official told Crisis Group
that the accord was a “positive first step”, but that Saudi Arabia would need
time to regain a degree of trust in Iranian intentions after years of enmity.
Even Bahrain – notoriously wary of engaging Iran – issued
a statement welcoming the agreement and expressing hope for resolution of
conflicts through dialogue and diplomacy.

Relations between Gulf Arab countries and Iran had already improved
significantly over the last two years. The recent rupture between Iran and
these states can be traced to January 2016, when Iranian protesters stormed
the Saudi embassy in Tehran after Riyadh ordered the execution of Shiite
cleric Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent dissident in the kingdom. All the Gulf Arab
countries (except Oman) then downgraded or cut ties with Iran. In the
succeeding years, Oman, Qatar and sometimes also Kuwait continued to
engage with Tehran, even as tensions remained high. In contrast, Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain supported U.S.
President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, which included
over 1,500 new sanctions and belligerent rhetoric, all aimed at isolating and
weakening Iran. Today, all the Gulf Arab states, with the exception of Bahrain,
have restored or plan to restore full diplomatic relations with Iran. Even
Manama, which has long accused Tehran of fomenting unrest among
Bahrain’s Shiite majority population, reportedly held bilateral talks with Iran
in recent months. Soon after the announcement of the Saudi-Iranian deal,
Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary, Ali Shamkhani, met with
top security and economic officials in the UAE, suggesting an acceleration and
widening of UAE-Iran relations.

The litmus test for the deal’s success will be whether the
sides keep interfering in the domestic politics of countries
across the region.

The litmus test for the deal’s success will be whether the sides keep interfering
in the domestic politics of countries across the region. Riyadh has long
complained about Iranian support for militant groups across the region and
alleged Iranian attempts to stir up rebellion among Saudi Arabia’s minority
Shiite population. Likewise, Iran has accused the Gulf Arab states of
facilitating the presence of the U.S. and Israel on its doorstep. There are two
obvious first steps Iran and Saudi Arabia can undertake to demonstrate their
commitment to non-interference, both of which the two countries reportedly
agreed to as part of the deal itself. Saudi Arabia reportedly said it would curb
its support for media networks that have agitated against the Iranian regime,
while Iran reportedly said it would curtail arms shipments to Huthi rebels in
Yemen.

The deal could also help open the door to a security dialogue among the Gulf
Arab states, Iran and Iraq. Some of the smaller Gulf Arab states had previously
been reticent about expanding their engagement with Tehran if Riyadh did not
first mend ties, so in that sense the deal opens the door to wider discussions.
Such a dialogue could be a venue for states to discuss and develop ways to
address their primary security concerns, particularly in the Gulf itself. It might
have a salutary impact on the war in Yemen and potentially even, over time, in
other arenas. China has reportedly offered to host a meeting between the Gulf
states and Iran in Beijing sometime later in 2023. A senior Saudi official told
Crisis Group that such a meeting would be “logical”, but that nothing has been
agreed to as of yet.

Iraq
The Saudi-Iranian deal has the potential to lower tensions in Iraq. Baghdad
has for some time been trying to bring its two assertive neighbours closer
together. Iran is the bigger of the two – its border with Iraq is twice as long as
Saudi Arabia’s – and it enjoys close religious, economic and cultural ties with
many Iraqis. It has substantial political clout as well: Tehran exploited the
chaos following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to spread its influence,
especially among the majority Shiite population and the ruling Islamist parties
representing them. What is more, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
supports a number of armed groups that operate outside the Iraqi state’s full
control. These groups have periodically fired rockets at residual U.S. forces in
the country, and they may be responsible for attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2019
and 2021.

Iraqi Sunnis, by contrast, historically hold tribal, trade and religious ties with
Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has exercised the relatively little influence it wields in
Iraq mainly through Sunni tribes as well as political parties that have been
subordinate partners in post-2003 power-sharing governments. While Saudi
Arabia has not been party to the conflict that has pitted Iran-backed
paramilitaries against the U.S., it has found the overall security situation,
especially the presence of Iran-sponsored groups near its own 800km border
with Iraq, threatening to its interests.

A Saudi-Iranian détente may ... remove political obstacles that

have stood in the way of substantial Saudi investment in Iraq.

To lower the temperature, Baghdad has undertaken efforts to reposition Iraq

as an arena for regional dialogue rather than proxy confrontation. Various
Iraqi politicians have called for better relations between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. In particular, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, Iraq’s prime minister from 2020 to
2022, tapped the connections he acquired as former intelligence chief to bring
Iranian and Saudi representatives to Baghdad for five rounds of direct talks
during his tenure. Those negotiations were essential in clarifying both sides’
concerns and building a practice of regular dialogue that paved the way for the
Beijing meeting. Under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, Iraq has
tried to cement its ties with Saudi Arabia. In late February, interior ministry
officials from Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding
to strengthen security cooperation, and in January, Iraq’s southern city of
Basra hosted the 25th Arabian Gulf Cup football tournament, prompting an
influx of Gulf visitors that the country had not experienced in years. A Saudi-
Iranian détente may also remove political obstacles that have stood in the way
of substantial Saudi investment in Iraq.
Views from Iraq are mixed. Many Iraqis remain sceptical that Iran is prepared
to make significant changes to its longstanding policies in Iraq, much less end
its interference in domestic politics. In addition, while some new political
parties and independents welcome the Saudi-Iranian détente and its potential
to reduce harmful regional tensions, others caution that increased
coordination with and potential investment in Iraq by Saudi Arabia would
only benefit the ruling elite and strengthen their grip on power, further
fuelling already widespread popular anger at the political class. Others fear
that continued tension between Iran and the U.S., for instance over Iran’s
nuclear program and the continuing (though much reduced) U.S. military
presence in Iraq, may again lead to violence by paramilitary groups. The
Saudi-Iranian deal was in part motivated by Riyadh wanting to protect itself in
the event of escalating U.S.-Iran tensions, but such violence would still make it
difficult for Riyadh to continue to engage with Baghdad.

Israel

Israel’s political leadership across the board sees Iran, especially its nuclear
program, as the main strategic threat to the Jewish state, and has sought to
counter it through international sanctions and diplomatic isolation, as well as
a credible military threat. To this end, Israel prefers cooperation with the West
and Gulf Arab states, but it also projects determination to act alone if
required.

On the whole, Israelis view the deal with concern. Israeli officials fret that the
Saudi-Iranian deal may set back Israel’s efforts to build a regional anti-Iran
coalition, a main driver of the Abraham Accords, and Israel’s determination to
add Saudi Arabia to the countries with which it normalises ties. They find the
prospect of a significantly less prominent U.S. role in the region especially
concerning, particularly because China, which has thrown a political and
economic lifeline to Tehran over the past few years, may fill the ensuing
vacuum. Saudi Arabia’s recent move to become a “dialogue partner” of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, in which Iran has observer status, can
only add to Israel’s anxiety, as does the kingdom’s recent decision to host a
Hamas delegation, after years of friction. The Saudi-Iranian agreement comes
following rocket fire at Israel from Gaza, as well as from Lebanon and
Syria, which was reportedly coordinated by Iran, raising Israel’s concern that
the Beijing accord emboldened Iran and its non-state allies.

It is unclear how Israel will react. A growing sense of isolation could push
Israeli leaders to ratchet up their threats to act against Iran’s nuclear program.
Yet the promise of at least short-term regional quiet resulting from a Saudi-
Iranian rapprochement would make unilateral Israeli strikes harder for Israel
to justify. Moreover, Israel’s longstanding effort to confront Iran in general
and undermine the 2015 nuclear deal in particular arguably has backfired, as
it contributed, together with the U.S. withdrawal from the deal and Trump’s
“maximum pressure” strategy, to Iranian decisions to move even closer to
acquiring nuclear weapons capability. Add the fact that Israeli policymakers
are preoccupied with turmoil closer to home – demonstrations against the
government’s attempts to weaken the Israeli Supreme Court and incursions
into the West Bank to rein in Palestinian armed groups – and they may have
little time to formulate an effective response to the Saudi-Iranian deal.

Israel and the U.S. have both indicated that they do not see
the Iranian-Saudi détente as an impediment to improving
Israeli-Saudi ties.

That said, even if relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran improve, a core
foreign policy goal for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will continue to be
normalisation of relations with the kingdom. For Israel, it is not a zero-sum
game. Israel and the U.S. have both indicated that they do not see the Iranian-
Saudi détente as an impediment to improving Israeli-Saudi ties, even if such a
development seems far off for now. Indeed, if obstacles lie on that path, they
come not from Iran but from demands the Saudis have made of the U.S. in
exchange for normalisation with Israel and from the far-right Israeli
government’s anti-Palestinian actions and rhetoric. Riyadh’s price for
normalisation includes security guarantees and support from Washington in
developing a civilian nuclear program, but Israel’s treatment of Palestinians,
particularly incidents like the Israeli security forces’ recent attacks on Muslim
worshippers in the al-Asqa Mosque, still looms large, raising the political cost
of normalisation for Saudi leaders.

Lebanon

The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has been a major, though far from the only, hurdle
to forging a compromise in Lebanon that would allow the country’s political
elites to meaningfully address the devastating crisis that has ravaged its
economy since late 2019, when a broad protest movement erupted against the
entire political class.

Lebanon has stumbled into yet another era of state paralysis amid deep
polarisation between two political camps. One is led by Hizbollah (and
therefore representative of Iran’s regional influence), while Saudi Arabia at
least partially supports the other. These external actors, through their
alliances with major Lebanese players, have made it particularly difficult to
forge a compromise and create a functional government. For the past five
months, Lebanon has been without a president; its caretaker government
dominated by Hizbollah barely manages to meet; and parliament has stopped
legislating indefinitely.

Both sides of the divide have mixed feelings about the Saudi-Iranian deal.
Politicians and analysts from both camps appear cautiously optimistic that the
Beijing agreement could eventually facilitate a resolution to Lebanon’s
domestic crisis on terms favourable to them. At the same time, there is
consensus that, at least for now, neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia will devote
much attention to Lebanon compared with, for example, Yemen or Iraq.

[Hizbollah] express satisfaction with what they see as an end

to Iran’s international isolation and to Saudi Arabia’s
apparently unshakeable alignment with U.S. policies.

Those on Hizbollah’s side express satisfaction with what they see as an end to
Iran’s international isolation and to Saudi Arabia’s apparently unshakeable
alignment with U.S. policies. In their reading, Riyadh’s interest in curbing
regional confrontation will also make its Lebanese allies – in particular
the Sunni community, which traditionally looks to Saudi Arabia for political
guidance, and the Lebanese Forces, a major Christian political party – more
amenable to compromise. Some even evince hope, though almost certainly
unrealistically, that Saudi support for rehabilitating Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad’s regime will partially restore Syria’s former role as a power broker in
Lebanon, with favourable results for Hizbollah and its allies.

For their part, those opposed to Hizbollah are hopeful that Iran and Saudi
Arabia’s mutual stated commitment to respecting the principles of state
sovereignty will translate into Iran scaling back its interference in Lebanese
political life. One opposition party official told Crisis Group that Tehran will
need to honour this pledge precisely because it relies so heavily on Beijing, the
agreement’s broker, as an economic and political lifeline. The argument
follows that Iran will be obliged to bow to Saudi concerns – eventually also in
Lebanon – to realise the gains offered to it under the accord.

For now, however, neither side appears to have budged on the question of who
should be Lebanon’s president. A Hizbollah-aligned analyst expected that,
under the Beijing agreement, Saudi Arabia and Iran would move toward
“controlled competition” rather than peaceful cooperation. In a speech on 14
April, Hizbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah projected confidence
that the regional balance of power has shifted in favour of Iran and its allies.
Such assessments make it unlikely that Hizbollah will countenance serious
political concessions, such as dropping its support for the presidential
aspirations of Suleiman Frangieh, the scion of a Christian political dynasty
who is a close friend of Assad. Other Lebanese party leaders oppose Frangieh
because they see him as Hizbollah’s puppet. Saudi Arabia, for its part,
reportedly renewed its categorical objection to Frangieh on 18 March, more
than a week after the agreement’s announcement, when it rebuffed a French-
led proposal to pair him with a “reformist” prime minister acceptable to
Riyadh and Hizbollah’s Lebanese opponents.

Even if a Saudi-Iranian détente were to pave the way to resolving Lebanon’s

presidential deadlock, a breakthrough in addressing the country’s economic
meltdown would remain unlikely. “The old model for Lebanon, under which
Saudi Arabia [injected] capital to bail [us] out, is finished”, a representative of
a party that emerged from the 2019 protest movement told Crisis
Group. “Would the mere election of a president help solve the economic crisis?
Of course not”.

Syria

The Iran-Saudi deal comes three years into the longest ceasefire in Syria’s civil
war. Front lines across the country have stabilised since March 2020, when a
deal brokered by Russia and Türkiye ended the regime’s offensive in the last
rebel bastion, Idlib province in the north west. The ceasefire left space for the
rebel faction Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (a former al-Qaeda affiliate that has cut
ties with the global movement but remains internationally designated as a
terrorist group) to consolidate its control over Idlib. Turkish-backed factions –
the remnants of the Syrian opposition that previously enjoyed Arab and
Western support – remain confined to a strip of land along the Turkish
border. Meanwhile the U.S.-backed, predominantly Kurdish Syrian
Democratic Forces in north-eastern Syria continue their anti-Islamic State
campaign while engaging in tit-for-tat skirmishes with Türkiye.

On the ground, people express different views about how the Iran-Saudi deal
might shape the conflict, particularly in terms of relations between Damascus,
which Iran backs, and Gulf Arab states, which for years supported rebel
factions. A Syrian politician in Damascus contacted by Crisis Group appeared
buoyant about the prospect that China would expand its role in the Middle
East to Washington’s detriment. He blamed the U.S. for years of acrimony
between Tehran and Riyadh, which he saw as exacerbating the conflict in
Syria. He particularly expressed appreciation of Saudi Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman as a modernising leader no longer willing to do
Washington’s bidding, as well as hope that the Saudi-Iranian agreement will
pave the way for full restoration of ties between Damascus and Gulf Arab
states that would lead to significant economic investment in Syria. By
contrast, an opposition figure questioned the regime’s ability to address issues
that are pressing for Gulf Arab countries, in particular Syria’s role as a hub for
the production and smuggling of the synthetic drug Captagon, since the drug
business is allegedly a major source of funds for powerful regime clients and
regime-aligned militias.

The Iranian-Saudi deal looks as though it may speed up

normalisation of relations between the Syrian regime and
some Arab governments.

In reality, the Iranian-Saudi deal looks as though it may speed up

normalisation of relations between the Syrian regime and some Arab
governments. These efforts, which Moscow has backed, had faltered on
Damascus’ refusal to compromise on key issues, such as safe return of
refugees, accommodation of parts of the opposition, and refusal to remove
Iranian and Hizbollah forces from Syria. But in the aftermath of the Chinese-
brokered Saudi-Iranian agreement, Riyadh has signalled readiness to
normalise relations with the Syrian regime unconditionally – a move that was
much rumoured beforehand but likely accelerated by the Beijing deal. On 1
April, news broke that Syria was also in advanced talks with Egypt to restore
diplomatic relations, as the two countries’ foreign ministers met in Cairo.

That said, several capitals, including Cairo, Doha, Rabat and Sanaa, are
holding out, making it unlikely for now that the Arab League will restore
Syria’s membership, which was suspended in 2011. At a 16 April meeting of
Arab foreign ministers in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, several countries’ ministers
appeared wary of Syria’s insistence on unconditional normalisation and
continued hosting of Iranian forces. The meeting ended without a clear
agreement among participants.

Little suggests that diplomatic normalisation between Damascus and some

Arab governments will initiate a dynamic toward resolution of the conflict.
Iran still views Syria as a key piece of its “axis of resistance” to Israel, using the
country to store, manufacture and transport missiles and high-tech military
equipment to Hizbollah and its Syrian proxies. A détente with Saudi Arabia is
therefore unlikely to affect Iran’s Syria activities, which will remain an issue
for Arab and Western countries alike. Saudi Arabia no longer wields any real
influence over any major actor in Syria, and there is no sign that Riyadh seeks
to marshal better relations with Tehran to nudge the regime into concessions
that could lead to a political solution for the conflict that, in turn, could pave
the way for the easing of Western sanctions. More broadly, no political
settlement for now appears to be plausible, given that it is almost impossible
to imagine the main protagonists – the regime, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham in the
north west and Kurdish forces in the north east – reaching an
accommodation.

Nor does rapprochement between Damascus and other Arab capitals seem
likely to trigger a significant financial engagement by wealthy Gulf Arab
countries that could restore Syria’s destroyed infrastructure and alleviate
extremely dire living conditions. As Crisis Group research in Aleppo has
shown, regime-aligned actors’ predatory behaviour, coupled with U.S.
sanctions and the Assad regime’s pariah status, make Syria a forbidding
environment for investors. The net effect is that the Syrian economy will
probably remain in its current abysmal state.

Yemen

The Saudi-Iranian deal coincided with the eighth anniversary of a Saudi-led

coalition’s military intervention in Yemen to dislodge the insurgent group
Ansar Allah, better known as the Huthis, which enjoys Iranian support. The
campaign turned out to be an expensive failure for Saudi Arabia. It achieved
neither of its declared goals – defeating the Huthis and restoring the
government of Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, the internationally recognised
president whom the Huthis had chased out of the capital Sanaa. It also led
Iran to scale up its cooperation with the Huthis, including military assistance,
diplomatic support and the hosting of a pro-Huthi media in a part of Beirut
controlled by Iran’s ally Hizbollah. Today, the Huthis maintain a tight grip on
the northern highlands, including Sanaa where most of the population resides,
while the coalition’s Yemeni allies are deeply divided over political and
military agendas.

Since early 2022, Saudi Arabia has actively pursued a negotiated end to the
war, or at least its involvement therein. That April, UN-facilitated mediation
led to a two-month truce, which was renewed twice before expiring in October
but continues to be largely respected by all sides. In January 2023, Oman-
facilitated back-channel contacts between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis
progressed to direct talks when a Saudi delegation visited Sanaa to discuss a
permanent ceasefire agreement. Riyadh hopes that the deal with Tehran will
help sustain momentum toward the exit from Yemen it seeks. Both Saudi
Arabia and Iran might see a compromise in Yemen as a first step toward a
regional security arrangement that would serve their interests.

Still, there is a long way to go to a comprehensive solution to the Yemeni war,

and precisely how much the China-brokered deal will help is unclear. Thus far,
Iran has not demonstrated it is ready to offer real concessions, in particular on
its alleged supply of advanced weapons to the Huthis. Even if Iran wants to
play ball, its influence over the Huthis and ability to persuade the group to
accept a political deal, either with the Saudis and Emiratis or, arguably even
more difficult, with the array of anti-Huthi forces in Yemen, are still in
question. As matters stand, a narrow Saudi deal with the Huthis, while
positive in itself, would not end the war, as it would exclude an array of
political and military actors aligned with what remains of Yemen’s
internationally recognised government. Any initial deal between Riyadh and
the Huthis would have to set the stage for intra-Yemeni talks.

Both Huthi and government sources presented the Saudi-

Iranian deal, at least initially, as a welcome boost to their own
positions.

Both Huthi and government sources presented the Saudi-Iranian deal, at least
initially, as a welcome boost to their own positions. Huthi
spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam professed the hope that it would put an
end to what he called the “destabilisation of the area wreaked by the Zionist-
American intervention”. For its part, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government
padded its cautious approval of the agreement with expectations that Tehran
would “change its destructive policies” in the country. Still, other Yemenis
caution that a deal between Riyadh and Tehran that does not involve the
parties on the ground will do little to change the calculus of Yemen’s many
actors. Local partners would have to be on board to make any agreement
sustainable.

The coming weeks will likely shed some light on prospects for political
progress in Yemen. An extension of the formal truce, which could then lead to
a permanent ceasefire, would be an important first step. In an encouraging
move, the Huthis and the government exchanged more than 800 prisoners
between 14 and 17 April. Earlier in April, Saudi Arabia invited members of the
Presidential Leadership Council, its main Yemeni partner, to discuss the
details of a roadmap Riyadh has been negotiating with the Huthis. According
to Crisis Group sources in Yemen, the roadmap will be divided into
phases, starting with a Huthi-Saudi deal that would fully open the country’s
ports and unblock roads. In principle, this move should open the door to
intra-Yemeni negotiations. It should also allow for payment of salaries to civil
servants and military personnel in Huthi-held areas, a main Huthi demand,
which the group’s rivals reject for now and which is complicated by the
unrecognised status of the de facto Huthi authorities. The plan then envisions
a two-year transitional period, to be dedicated to intra-Yemeni dialogue about
the country’s political future. For now, though, it remains unclear whether the
Huthis will actually sit down with their Yemeni rivals and, even if they are
prepared to, whether the various anti-Huthi forces can come to the table with
a single set of demands.

The Saudi-Iran détente and its regional implications

On March 10, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced an agreement to

restore bilateral relations. That’s good news.

The deal was conceived out of need and out of desire: The Saudi-
Iranian need to end a conflict that has proven costly and toxic to both
nations and disastrous to the Middle East, and the Chinese desire to
play matchmaker, to fill the strategic void left by the United States and
Russia, and to demonstrate its credentials as a trustworthy global
partner.

The fact that the agreement was signed after two years of difficult
negotiations holds promise. But do not expect the long archrivals to
turn archangels after normalising their diplomatic relations. There
remains a great deal of distrust and too many points of friction to
tackle and resolve.

With no love lost, the renewed Saudi-Iranian relationship may turn

into a marriage of convenience driven by national interest and shaped
by political and economic calculus. Or, it may become a marriage of
inconvenience – one that is eroded by divergent ideological and
regional agendas.

Riyadh and Tehran have agreed to reactivate the cooperation and

security agreements signed in 1998 and 2001, respectively, but a
return to the status quo ante of the 1990s is challenging if not
improbable after a dozen years of hostility.
Indeed, their proxy conflicts have been utterly devastating with their
sectarian overtones, undermining the two countries’ security, crippling
their economies and tearing their societies apart. The more they
interfered the more Yemenis, Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese and Bahrainis
suffered.

That’s why the way forward is not the way back for the two regional
powers. In light of the new and complicated regional order – or rather
disorder – they helped create, the two nations must chart a new and
sustainable path forward that serves their and their neighbours’
national interests.

This begins with refraining from intervening in each other’s affairs,

wasting fortunes on undermining other Middle Eastern societies, and
in the process, engaging in a costly arms race to the bottom.

Like other peoples, Iranians and Saudis would want their leaders to
focus their attention on domestic affairs, not foreign bravados,
pursuing democratic harmony at home instead of spreading anarchy
abroad.

A new way forward is an opportunity to lower tensions, mitigate the

damages, and compensate neighbours for the harm done to them. It is
indeed morally incumbent upon the two oil-rich nations to help
Syrians, Yemenis and other victims of proxy conflicts rebuild their
shattered lives. China and the West should also help.

Indeed, Riyadh and Tehran must now take a common, firm stand on
foreign interference, especially Western support for Israel’s
colonialism and apartheid – predictably the only country to openly
oppose the new Gulf détente, which it is, no doubt, determined to
sabotage.

They must also reject all attempts by global powers to intervene

directly or through proxies in the Middle East. That includes China.

Beijing, which mediated between Riyadh and Tehran and hosted the
final celebratory handshake, has emerged as the biggest winner of the
new deal. It will gain greater credibility and prestige as a responsible
global player, having helped resolve a complicated conflict in a tough
region considered part of the US area of influence.

Moreover, as the sponsor, China will probably want to stay involved in

order to see through the reconciliation and normalisation process,
which gives it greater access to the oil-rich region it needs to fuel its
economy and military in the long run. In other words, unlike other
regional mediations that came at a cost to their sponsors, this could
prove profitable to China, and at the expense of its global rival, the US.

The Biden administration has welcomed the de-escalation in the Gulf,

which it says could also help put an end to the war in Yemen, but it is
unable to hide its anger and disappointment. This is especially so since
Beijing succeeded in championing a diplomatic breakthrough in the
Middle East after Washington tried to block its mediation between
Russia and Ukraine.

The US’s grinning mouth fails to hide its teeth-grinding, as China

undermines US plans to expand the so-called Abraham Accords to
include Saudi Arabia, or to impose a new nuclear deal on Iran through
sanctions and regional pressure. Although it is too early to tell, the
Chinese-sponsored agreement may well scuttle the American-Israeli
scheme of polarising the region in favour of a pro-Israel and anti-Iran
bloc.

But then again, Saudi Arabia is not about to turn its back on the US or
switch alliances. It is far too dependent on Washington in military and
economic affairs. But like other regional actors, large and small,
Riyadh is also going hybrid, merely adding one more relationship to its
diplomatic mix, aimed at securing its own interests first and foremost.

So will Iran, which has already developed relations with Russia and
China. It may well add the US to the mix, if or when the latter agrees
to lift the sanctions and strike a fair nuclear deal.

In other words, the Saudi-Iran deal is an indication of a changing

region and shifting geopolitics.
Welcome to the new Middle East, where states are acting more
independently of global powers, shaping and balancing relationships
and alliances, instead of being shaped by them.

Iran-Saudi Arabia Reconciliation-

An Opportunity for Pakistan
As Iran’s neighbor, Saudi Arabia’s partner, and
China’s key ally, Pakistan will see major benefits
from the recent diplomatic breakthrough.
The normalization of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia presents implications and
opportunities for Pakistan, as Iran’s neighbor, Saudi Arabia’s partner, and China’s key
ally. The animosity between Tehran and Riyadh has had serious implications for
Pakistan, which claimed neutrality but in practice titled toward Saudi Arabia, mainly
due to economic dependence and religious affiliation. However, Pakistan has made
efforts to bring the two states to the table, with then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of
Pakistan calling mediation between the two countries a “sacred mission” in 2016.

In 2019, Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Iran and Saudi Arabia
and displayed the intent of acting as a mediator. In May 2021, Pakistan’s foreign
minister visited Iraq, which was playing an active role in seeking rapprochement
between Saudi Arabia and Iran, to contribute to the process. Although no significant
breakthrough was made at the time, this rapprochement positively impacted Saudi-
Iran reconciliation.

With diplomatic ties being restored, Pakistan can now maintain balanced diplomatic
ties with both states, which is a much-cherished moment.
The restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a significant
development for Pakistan, which has welcomed the agreement as a positive step
toward regional peace and stability. Pakistan has a vested interest in maintaining
friendly relations with both Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the past, these relationships
have been impacted by cross-border crime and terrorism, and a balanced approach
toward both countries is crucial for addressing such issues.

Moreover, the normalization of ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia presents massive
opportunities for trade and energy ties. Pakistan can benefit from increased economic
cooperation with both states. Neighboring Iran has always been an important trading
partner of Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia is a significant economic ally, with a large
Pakistani diaspora working in the Kingdom, which is a significant source of
remittances.

Pakistan has been plagued by sectarian violence for decades, with Sunni-Shia tensions
being exploited by extremist groups to fuel conflict and create instability. This
situation has been exacerbated by the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran,
as both countries have sought to exert influence in Pakistan and use sectarianism as a
tool to further their geopolitical interests. Therefore, the normalization of ties between
Iran and Saudi Arabia could have a positive impact on Pakistan, as it may help to
defuse sectarian tensions and reduce the influence of extremist groups. Improved
relations between these two regional powers could also lead to a more stable and
peaceful Middle East, which would be beneficial for Pakistan as well as the broader
international community.

Moreover, Pakistan has a significant Shia population, which has historically faced
discrimination and marginalization. Improved ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia
could help to alleviate the suffering of this community and promote greater religious
tolerance and coexistence in Pakistan. The normalization of ties between Iran and
Saudi Arabia has the potential to bring about positive change in Pakistan by reducing
sectarian tensions and promoting religious tolerance.

Moreover, it would provide Pakistan with an opportunity to pursue a neutral foreign

policy, which could help to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties with both
countries. Pakistan’s friendly relations with Saudi Arabia could result in economic
and political support, particularly on issues such as Kashmir. Additionally,
strengthening ties with the GCC could offer Pakistan new opportunities for economic
cooperation. Meanwhile, closer ties with Iran would be essential for improving
regional security; while close ties between China, Iran, and Pakistan would be crucial
for the success of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the larger Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI).

Pakistan has a history of playing a constructive role in the Middle East and has
consistently supported and coordinated efforts to bridge gaps between countries in the
region. In light of the recent restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, it is important for Pakistan to continue this role and help maintain the positive
momentum and contribute to a more stable and peaceful Middle East, while also
strengthening its own position as a regional player. This will require a nuanced
approach that takes into account the interests and concerns of all parties involved, but
the potential benefits for Pakistan and the wider region are significant.

one could argue that if the deal holds, China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia will be better off. Resultantly,

Pakistan, a country that has cordial, religious, and enduring relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well

as a strategic bonhomie with China, will certainly be affected by this China-brokered deal. Therefore, it is

reasonable to argue that given its relations with the said countries, there will be far-reaching

implications of this diplomatic deal on Pakistan. Three among them, however, merit closer attention.

First, if Saudi Arabia and Iran remain committed to making incremental improvements in their relations,

Pakistan will no longer be pushed to walk a tightrope in the Middle East. Over the years, Pakistan has

tried its best to strike a balance between its relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. For example, arguing

that taking sides is not in its interests, Pakistan abstained from sending its troops to Yemen. Pakistan’s

Middle East policy was and is rightly guided by both economic and religious concerns, and therefore, at

times, it has found it hard to remain fully neutral. The Saudi-Iran animosity has, on many occasions,

stifled Pakistan’s bid to advance its diplomatic and economic interests in the Middle East and the

Muslim world. This is partly evidenced by Pakistan’s decision to not partake in the Kuala Lumpur Summit
in 2019. Therefore, if Tehran and Riyadh mend fences, Islamabad will be in a better position to not only

strengthen bilateral relations with both these Muslim countries but also engage more positively with

important actors like Qatar, Turkiye, and Malaysia. This is extremely important for Pakistan, not least

because it needs new economic partners with whom it can establish win-win development partnerships.

Hence, Pakistan not being expected to choose between Saudi Arabia and Iran will augur well for the

country. Second, China’s inroads in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other parts of the Middle East will provide

more geoeconomic cushion to Pakistan, not least because of its location and economic relations with

Beijing. Through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Pakistan gives China the easiest route to

the Indian Ocean and West Asia. Therefore, Pakistan stands to benefit from the centrality of CPEC in

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Further, with Iran and Saudi Arabia willing to start their relations

afresh, China’s strategic deal with the former, as well as the synergy between the BRI and the latter’s

Vision 2030, will create new economic opportunities for Pakistan. It could, for instance, help Iran and

Pakistan take advantage of the proximity between the Gwadar and Chabahar ports. After all, both are

separated only by 72 kilometres. It could also translate Saudi Arabia’s promised investments in Gwadar

into actual ones. China, for its part, could steer and push these economic moves for mutual gains. If

anything, it has the potential to become a veritable catalyst of stability given its economic and

diplomatic heft. Third, as an oil-importing, energy-deficient country, Pakistan can ill-afford instability in

the Persian Gulf. The country’s proximity to the ever so vital Strait of Hormuz means that it cannot

remain unfazed by any conflict that involves Iran and Saudi Arabia. That most of Pakistan’s oil and

liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait is indicative of its importance. Therefore, any

blockade or closure of the Strait will be disastrous for Pakistan. With the country economically in tatters,

it should welcome any development that reduces the prospect of a major conflict between Iran and

Saudi Arabia. Additionally, millions of Pakistani expatriates work in the Gulf; the remittances they send

back home are the country’s biggest source of foreign exchange. Hence, an improved security and

economic milieu in the Middle East, not least its Gulf part, is good news for Pakistan. These interests, it

must be stressed, had driven Pakistan’s mediatory initiatives in the past. Here, it is important to also

note that any escalation between Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially at a time when Pakistan is grappling

with its biggest economic crisis, will wade the country into a deeper quagmire. So, a more stable and
peaceful Persian Gulf is a boon for Pakistan. Overall, it is befitting to say that Pakistan can gain

tremendously from better ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran. A semblance of normalcy between the

two poles of the Muslim world will mean that Pakistan may not have to make hard choices between the

two, something which would open up avenues that are hitherto closed. Moreover, China’s pronounced

mediatory role in the Saudi-Iran deal has elevated its position and stakes in the region. Therefore,

Pakistan, as one of the leading partners in China’s BRI, should position itself to take advantage of the

economic engagements that may happen after this deal. That said, while the rapprochement is a

positive development, it does not guarantee peace and stability in the Middle East. A lot has to still be

done from all sides, to make this deal a real success. Pakistan must carefully monitor how things shape

up going forward.