SCALED COMPOSITES, LLC
June 17, 2009
Scaled Composites Safety Guidelines for N2O
Background:
Scaled Composites shares this information in order to help facilitate the industry’s use of N2O as
a rocket motor oxidizer in as safe a manner as practical. Scaled bases this set of guidelines on our
experience using N2O and research into other organization’s usage and testing. Do not consider
this an exhaustive or complete list.
Although generally available from public documents, Scaled Composites does not believe this
information has been previously collected into a single source and hopes that others may find it
useful.
Scaled’s Requirements for N2O Systems:
1. Ignition Sources:
Review any and all movable parts (valves, regulators, etc.) in the N2O oxidizer flow path for
potential sources of energy release into the oxidizer. Numerous potential sources of ignition
exist, including, but not restricted to:
a) Friction (metal on metal, plastic on metal, plastic on plastic, etc.)
b) Static discharge/sparking
c) Impact
Design all components and assemblies so that they are incapable of releasing any substantial
amount of energy into the oxidizer. No component or assembly should be capable of producing
a temperature, for any length of time, on any surface, above 573 deg K (571 deg F).
Put substantial effort into reviewing what will occur if, for any reason, any component of the
N2O oxidizer flow path ever does reach this temperature threshold.
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2. Adiabatic Compression:
Designs should attempt to minimize adiabatic compression in the system during flow of the
N2O oxidizer. This implies controlling the rates of valve openings (similar to LOX system
design), and minimizing dead volumes down stream of valves. Adiabatic compression alone
has low effectivity in starting a decomposition reaction; however, the presence of
contaminants or incompatible materials that can act as fuels may reduce the ignition
threshold of N2O to the point where adiabatic compression in an otherwise adequate system
can begin a reaction.
3. Compatibility Testing:
No significant body of materials compatibility test data for N2O in aerospace applications
exists, so the design process should plan for ensuring compatibility of all materials exposed
to the N2O oxidizer.
For compatibility testing of materials you may consider for a N2O flow path, standard LOX
impact sensitivity tests such as those described by ASTM G36 or NASA STD-6001 Method
13 are useful. However, the test method should be modified to include soaking the materials
in N2O before test.
Experience has shown that some materials such as silicone (which is generally considered
N2O compatible) absorb N2O. The N2O saturated silicone exhibits impact sensitivity,
whereas the raw material does not.
Also, some materials may outgas a combustible product when exposed to N2O. This out
gassing may be facilitated by the fact that liquid N2O is a very good solvent and is even more
capable of dissolving organic compounds than liquid CO2, which is well known for its
solvent properties.
We have shown with hot wire fixed volume ruggedized “bomb” vessel ignition testing that
the presence of these gases can significantly reduce the ignition threshold (by a factor of 5),
and increase the yield and rate of the resulting decomposition reaction. Therefore,
compatibility testing may need to include ignition testing.
Compatibility testing should include, but should not be restricted to, elastomers, plastics,
metals and lubricants. This is not an exhaustive list, but is only indicative of the wide range
of materials that must be considered for compatibility.
4. Incompatible Material Removal:
As a corollary to #3, remove all incompatible materials from the N2O oxidizer flow path
and/or storage.
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5. Corrosion-Prone Metals:
Related to items #3 and #4, remove all corrosion prone metals (non-stainless steels, etc.)
from the N2O oxidizer flow path and/or storage, due to risk of catalytic reaction.
6. Decomposition in Liquid:
N2O is extremely resistant to decomposition in pure liquid form. However,
combustion/decomposition in the liquid form can occur if sufficient fuel exists to propagate
the reaction. Organic materials such as epoxy composites combust more readily than metals
such as stainless steels. Therefore, using metallic materials in the oxidizer flow system will
increase the tolerance of the system to fuel contaminated liquid combustion/decomposition
and reduce potential for fuel contamination.
Also, the system pressure significantly affects the ignition sensitivity of liquid N2O. For
example, N2O flowing at 130 psi in an epoxy composite pipe would not react even with a
2500 J ignition energy input. However, at 600 psi, the required ignition energy was only 6 J.
7. Decomposition in Gas:
N2O is less stable as a gas in comparison with its liquid form and so consideration should be
given to minimizing the potential for decomposition of the gas.
Previous testing such as discussed in the Air Force Weapons Lab report AFWL-TR-75-231
showed that Helium diluent can reduce the possibility of decomposition of N2O when used in
sufficient quantity. Additional testing confirms that a diluent gas (such as He or N2) can
increase the required ignition energy and reduce the yield of any decomposition reaction. It
may be possible to eliminate decomposition progression in N2O gas with enough diluent
concentration, and this should be evaluated for the system being studied.
Minimizing the quantity of gaseous N2O and/or two phase flow in the oxidizer flow path via
a pressurant/diluent system should be considered.
8. Oxidizer Flow Path Design:
Ensure that the N2O flow path does not have eddies or stagnation zones due to sudden
changes in flow path cross section. These can act as "flame holders" and prevent the flow
from displacing any decomposition reaction downstream.
Testing of the oxidizer flow path in combination with an ignition event should be performed
to ensure that decomposition cannot persist anywhere in the flow path.
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9. Pressure Vessel Design:
In the event that ignition prevention measures and deflagration wave mitigations fail,
pressure vessel designs should allow for a controlled failure upon overpressure. In large
oxidizer systems operated at high pressures, the energy released during a tank rupture for
what ever reason (structural, overpressure, feedback, decomposition) is very high. This
failure mode should be designed for with burst disk or other similar safety precautions that
can safely reduce the PV energy in the vessel without catastrophic failure.
10. Cleaning Procedures:
Since there is such a small body of data available on materials compatibility with N2O and
the definition of "significant" contamination levels, industry-standard procedures for
handling aerospace oxidizers such as LOX should be considered with respect to all materials
that come in contact with the oxidizer.
11. Test Safety:
Test safety procedures should always consider worst-case scenarios when planning safe
distances for participants during development testing. For example, the NASA Glenn
Research Center Safety manual has methods for setting safe distances during pneumatic tests.
The distances are calculated such that the overpressure due to rupture does not exceed 0.5 psi
at the personnel location. Take additional precautions for the debris field that this sort of
energy release may create, which may exceed the distance required for overpressure alone.
Additional References:
1. “Nitrous Oxide Explosive Hazards”, Claude Merrill, AFRL, May 2008, unlimited distribution
2. “Summary of Nitrous Oxide Investigations”, AFWL, July 1976, unlimited distribution
3. “Storage and Use of Nitrous Oxide - The Nitrous Oxide Decomposition Reaction”,
L. Martin Tupman, Puritan-Bennet Corporation, 1994 CGA Seminar
4. “Explosion Limit Studies of Nitrous Oxide and Nitrous Oxide-Nitrogen- Air Mixtures to 200
ATM. and 1800 deg R”, Juris O. Krisjansons et. al., OSU & ARL Office of Aerospace
Research, September 1962
5. “Investigation of Decomposition Characteristics of Gaseous and Liquid Nitrous
Oxide”, Captain G. W. Rhodes, AFWL, July 1974, unclassified
6. “Modeling of N2O Decomposition Events”, M.A. Karabeyoglu, J. Dyer, J. Stevens and B.
Cantwell, AIAA-2008-4933, AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference and
Exhibit, Hartford, CT, July 21-23,2008