Treadwell and the Department of Defence re: Doolan [2020]

DHAAT 3 (20 February 2020)

File Number 2018/039

Re Ms June Treadwell OAM on behalf of

Driver William Thomas Doolan
Applicant

And The Australian Army on behalf of

The Department of Defence
Respondent

Tribunal Ms Anne Trengove (Presiding Member)

Rear Admiral James Goldrick, AO, CSC, RAN, (Retd)
Mr David Ashley, AM

Hearing Date 13 August 2019

DECISION

On 20 February 2020, the Tribunal recommended to the Minister:

a. that the decision by the Chair of the Defence Historical Honours Review Board
of 18 April 2018 to refuse to recommend a gallantry award for Driver William
Doolan for his actions with 2/21st Battalion attached to the Gull Force of the 8th
Division during the Japanese invasion of Ambon Island on 1 February 1942 be
set aside;

b. the Minister recommend to the Governor-General that Driver William Doolan

be posthumously awarded the Medal for Gallantry for acts of gallantry in action
in hazardous circumstances as a volunteer on a reconnaissance patrol and then
further volunteering to fight off advancing Japanese forces, alone, with little
chance of survival on 1 February 1942 at Kudamati village, during the Japanese
invasion of Ambon Island; and

c. the Minister direct Army to review the eligibility of Major Mark William Horton
Newbury, the Officer Commanding Laha Aerodrome, Ambon, for a defence
honour.
CATCHWORDS

DEFENCE HONOUR – Gallantry Decorations - 2/21st Battalion - Driver - Second

World War - Gull Force - Confrontation during the Japanese invasion of Ambon Island,
Indonesia - historiography of the Ambon campaign, particularly on 1 February 1942
at or near the village of Kudamati, to the south of Ambon City - establishing evidence
of the action of that day from Australian, Japanese, Dutch and Indonesian records and
accounts - child eye-witness account - maps - myth and legend - Tribunal research -
Nomination process for Imperial Awards - lawfulness of 8th Division’s Administrative
Instruction of No 2/45 of 21 December 1945 - maladministration - previous
considerations for medallic recognition - gallantry assessment - hazardous
circumstances - death in action - posthumous honour for acts of gallantry - model
litigant obligations.

LEGISLATION

Defence Act 1903 – Sections 110V(1), 110VA, and 110VB(1)

Defence Regulation 2016 – Section 35
Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S25, Victoria Cross Regulations and
Gallantry Decorations Regulations dated 4 February 1991
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal Procedural Rules 2011
Legal Services Directions 2017

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 REASONS FOR DECISION
Background

1. On 26 May 2014, Ms June Treadwell OAM, (the Applicant), made application

to the Department of Defence for a posthumous ‘bravery award’ on behalf of her father,
the late Driver William Doolan. Driver Doolan was killed on 1 February 1942, during
the Japanese invasion of Ambon Island, in the Netherlands East Indies, now Indonesia.

2. After considerable delay, on 5 October 2017, Colonel Sue Kerr, Acting Director
General Personnel – Army, on behalf of the Department of Defence (the Respondent)
advised Ms Treadwell that her application would be referred to the Defence Historical
Honours Review Board (the Board). On 21 November 2017, the Board sat and decided
the application. On 18 April 2018, the Chair of the Board, Air Vice-Marshal Greg
Evans, DSC, AM advised Ms Treadwell that the Board decided it would not be taking
any further action to recognise her father’s actions.

3. On 14 August 2018, Ms Treadwell applied to the Tribunal for review of her

father’s eligibility for an ‘Award or Medal for Gallantry – VC, SOG, MOG, COG’.1

4. On 13 September 2018, the Tribunal sought a report from the Secretary of the
Department of Defence as to the decision to deny a gallantry award. The Tribunal asked
that the report provide all the evidence considered relevant to the decision to refuse to
recommend Driver Doolan for recognition. This included ‘the findings on material
questions of fact and the reasons for the decision’ and ‘reference to the evidence on
which the findings were based’.2

5. This request was answered by Air Vice-Marshal Evans in his letter of

16 November 2018, which provided the Board Minutes of 17 October 2017 and the
Report into Application for Retrospective Bravery Award - VX35406 Driver Doolan
(the Army research report). The Respondent had conducted its own research ab initio
principally by the Army Principal Research Officer, Major Philip Rutherford (who has
since retired). The resulting report was endorsed by Lieutenant Colonel E. O’Mahoney,
Staff Officer Personnel Policy in Army Headquarters in September 2017.

6. The letter of 16 November 2018 also set out that on 26 October 2018, the Chief
of Army, Lieutenant General Rick Burr, AO, DSC, MVO, agreed that no further action
be taken to recognise Driver Doolan, relying upon the recommendation of the Board.3

1
Application for Review of Decision, Ms June Treadwell OAM, 14 August 2018. The Tribunal
interpreted the abbreviations to mean Victoria Cross for Australia, Star of Gallantry, Medal for
Gallantry and Commendation for Gallantry.
2
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal Procedural Rules 2011, Rule 7
3
Letter, DH&A/OUT/201X/0092 (sic), 16 November 2018.

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7. The Board’s letter 16 November 2018 and the Army research report were sent
to Ms Treadwell on 17 December 2018. She responded with further comments on
17 December 2018.4

8. The decision and reasons are set out hereunder under the main headings as
follows:

Tribunal jurisdiction 4
Merits review 5
Driver Doolan’s service record 5
Prior considerations for medallic recognition 6
Decision under review 7
Evidence and Report of Secretary of Defence (Army research report) 8
Preparation for hearing 12
Summary of Tribunal hearing 14
Defence obligations as a model litigant 18
Tribunal proceedings - post hearing 20
Nomination process for medallic recognition 23
Administrative Instruction of No 2/45 of 21 December 1945 23
Maladministration 25
The historiography of the fighting on Ambon 31
Events directly relating to Driver Doolan 38
Tribunal findings as to the actions of Driver Doolan 53
Eligibility criteria for Gallantry Awards 54
Was Driver Doolan gallant? 56
Tribunal Decision 60

Annexes A – L 61

Tribunal Jurisdiction

9. Pursuant to Section 110VB(2) of the Defence Act 1903 (the Act) the Tribunal
has jurisdiction to review a reviewable decision if an application is properly made to
the Tribunal. The term reviewable decision is defined in section 110V(1) and includes
a decision made by a person within the Department of Defence to refuse to recommend
a person for an honour or award in response to an application. Section 35 of the Defence
Regulations 2016 lists the defence honours applicable to the Tribunal’s review
function. Included in the defence honours set out in section 35 are the gallantry awards
referred to in Ms Treadwell’s application, namely the Victoria Cross (VC), Star of
Gallantry (SG), Medal of Gallantry (MG) and the Commendation for Gallantry.
Therefore, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review decisions in relation to the honours
sought.

4
Letter, Ms June Treadwell OAM, received 17 December 2018.

Page | 4
10. As the Applicant, on behalf of her father, seeks a defence honour, the Tribunal
does not have the power to affirm or set aside the decision but may make
recommendations regarding the decision to the Minister, in accordance with
section 110VB(1) of the Act.

Merits review

11. General. Section 110VB of the Act requires the Tribunal to undertake a merits
review of all reviewable decisions. This requires an examination of the merits of the
matter in dispute rather than the lawfulness of the decision under review.

12. The facts, law and policy aspects of the decision are all considered afresh and a
new decision made.5 The Tribunal reviews the decision, and not the reasons for the
decision. In doing so, there is no legal onus of proof, and there is no presumption that
the decision was correct.6 The Tribunal is bound to make what it regards as the ‘correct
or preferable’ decision and must reach a decision that is legally and factually correct.7

13. Merits review revolves around the evidence and accordingly, the Tribunal
conducts an independent review, with values, expertise, methods and procedures of its
own, and not those of the decision-maker.

Driver Doolan’s Service Record

14. William Thomas Doolan VX35406 enlisted in the 2nd Australian Imperial
Force on 11 July 1940. After basic training, he was allotted to 2/7th Australian Infantry
Battalion.

15. Being a heavy vehicle driver prior to enlistment, Private Doolan was sent on
Army driving courses, graduating with the rank of Driver in February 1941. Rather than
following 2/7th Battalion to the Middle East, Driver Doolan was eventually posted to
2/21st Battalion in northern Australia. He departed with the Battalion for overseas duty
in Ambon as part of Gull Force, attached to the 8th Division, on 17 December 1941 as
an infantryman.

16. During fighting with the Japanese on 2 February 1942, Driver Doolan was listed
as ‘missing’. On 26 February 1942, he was reported as being ‘killed in action.’ This
date was later amended to 1 February 1942.8

5
Pearson, Linda, “Merit Review Tribunals”, in Creyke, Robin and McMillan, John, Administrative
Law – the Essentials, AIAL 2002, p. 68.
6
McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354.
7
Council of Australian Tribunals Practice Manual dated 7 April 2006 p.[Link].
8
Service Record, Doolan, William Thomas, NAA: B883, VX35406.

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17. At his death, he was 29 years of age. Driver Doolan was initially buried in
Kudamati, south of Ambon city, where his body had been found a few days after his
death. After the end of the war, his body was exhumed and transferred to the war graves
cemetery at Tantui Galala.

18. For his service in the Army, Driver Doolan was awarded the:

 1939-1945 Star
 Pacific Star
 Defence Medal
 War Medal 1939-1945
 Australia Service Medal 1939-1945

Prior considerations for medallic recognition

19. Previous representations have been made to Australian governments over the
years to recognise the actions of Driver Doolan. These representations and ensuing
investigations were largely in response to articles in the Australian media. The claim
was that Doolan had volunteered to remain behind to cover the withdrawal of a
reconnaissance patrol and that he had made a heroic stand against Japanese troops in
the village of Kudamati, causing many casualties, but was eventually overwhelmed and
killed.

20. Noting that an Australian newspaper article in 1947 referred to an assertion that
Driver Doolan had been posthumously awarded the “Dutch equivalent of the British
Victoria Cross”, the then Minister for the Army initiated certain enquiries with the
Royal Netherlands Legation. The resulting advice was that there was no known
bestowal of any Dutch honour or award on Driver Doolan.9

21. In 1949 a further representation by G.J. Bowden MC, MP was made and an
investigation was initiated by the then Minister for the Army.10 In a letter of 1 June
1949, the Minister for the Army advised that the evidence available did not reveal any
action on the part of Driver Doolan, other than that expected of a soldier in the ordinary
course of duty in operations. It was stated that as no recommendation had been
submitted for an award by Driver Doolan’s chain of command, further consideration
could not be given to his case.11

9
Secretary, Department of Defence, Memorandum 890 dated 20 May 1948 to Secretary, Department of
the Army, AWM119/222.
10
Military Secretary Letter dated 13 April 1949 to Lieutenant Colonel W.J.R. Scott, AWM119/222.
11
Minister for the Army Letter dated 1 July 1949 to G.J. Bowden Esq, MC, MP. AWM 119/222.

Page | 6
22. Further, in 1957 the Director of Public Relations in the Department of the Army
wrote to the Editor of the Australasian Post, concerning additional information
provided by Mr [Link] of the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Army). The letter stated
that this information did not alter the position and there was insufficient information to
give further reconsideration to medallic recognition for Driver Doolan.12

23. In 1984 Ms Treadwell submitted an earlier application to the then Minister of

Defence for an award for her father. This application was refused on 29 October 1984,
at a time when there was no avenue for review of such decisions.

24. While the Tribunal notes the previous unsuccessful considerations for medallic
recognition, it reiterates that it is obliged to determine the actions of Driver Doolan
against the statutory eligibility criteria set out at paragraphs 254-258 and the current
decision under review of 18 April 2018, and not any earlier considerations.

25. Helpfully, the prior applications and considerations contained evidentiary

material which was of assistance in determining the actions of Driver Doolan and how
the nomination process was applied by the 8th Division shortly after the war.

The Decision under review

26. The Tribunal makes the following observations concerning the decision under
review and makes further comments at paragraphs 83-94 below under the heading
‘obligations as a model litigant’.

27. Delay. At the outset, the Tribunal noted there was unexplained delay between
the decision under review of the Board of 17 October 2017 and the communication of
the decision to the Applicant some six months later on 18 April 2018. It should be
noted that this delay came on top of an extremely long delay to decide the application,
noting it was lodged on 26 May 2014.

28. Brief reasons. The Board’s decision letter of 18 April 2018 was brief in its
reasons for refusal. The decision referred to the Applicant’s submission and the Army
research, but did not do so in any detail. It did not enclose the research. The Board’s
reasons for refusal are set out as follows, that:

 the [Army] research did not locate substantiating evidence that

maladministration had occurred in relation to a nomination for recognition at
the time;

12
Director of Public Relations Army Letter D/4/3040 (G11) dated 29 November 1949 to Editor
Australasian Post, AWM119/222.

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  the [Army] research indicated that the survivors of the action for which
recognition was sought were capable of submitting formal recognition for
Driver Doolan at the time;
 there was no evidence available to suggest Driver Doolan was nominated or
recommended for such recognition; and
 there were no compelling reasons to alter the decisions taken at the time by the
chain of command where he was not recommended for an award, or to alter the
decisions taken when the matter of Driver Doolan’s actions in Ambon were
reconsidered in 1949.

29. The Tribunal further notes that the Board’s Minutes of 21 November 2017 made
brief reference to the ‘supporting evidence provided by the Army Historian for a
retrospective bravery award…’ and ‘noted the research did not indicate that
maladministration occurred.’13

30. Similarly, by letter dated 16 November 2018, the Chair of the Board reiterated
the same reasons for refusal as referred to in the letter of 21 November 2017. The letter
enclosed the Army research report as requested by the Tribunal. Whilst it stated the
Board ‘considered’ the Army research report, it did not refer to the research or how it
related to the Board’s refusal or reasons for the same.

The Evidence and the Report of the Secretary of Defence – ‘The Army research
report’

31. The Army research report utilised material from the Australian War Memorial
and the Australian National Archives, as well as a number of published works and
media reports. (The material was listed in Annex A to the Army research report).14

32. The historiography of the Ambon campaign is examined in detail later in these
reasons. Nevertheless, some points should be noted about the evidence and the analysis
and the findings of the Army research report. It was observed at the outset there are no
contemporaneous records relating to the actions of Driver Doolan. There are no official
Australian or Japanese after-action reports. There are no known Australian
eye-witnesses to the immediate action before Driver Doolan’s death. There seems to
have been no other actual eye-witnesses other than Job Lekatompessy, a local boy, 8
years old at the time. Job himself provided varying accounts to adults over the years.
As a result, it was an extremely difficult task to reconstruct events around Kudamati on
1 February 1942 and Driver Doolan’s role in the action prior to his death.

13
BK1201572 dated 10 October 2018, ‘Decision Brief for CA on the Defence Historical Honours
Review Board outstanding referrals for Army’.
14
R31038104 Dated September 2017 ‘ Report into Application for Retrospective Bravery Award –
VX35406 Driver William Thomas Doolan’, Annex A.

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33. From the Australian source material, namely from recollections from Lieutenant
D.W. Smith, Transport Platoon Commander, it could be determined that Driver Doolan
volunteered for a reconnaissance patrol to the village of Kudamati at sunrise on
1 February 1942. Driver Doolan then elected to stay behind, alone, and failed to return.
The details of any last stand are unknown from Australian accounts. His body was
found at Kudamati some days later.

34. The Australian material was largely sourced from an Australian Army report by
Major Ian Macrae. This report was originally written 10 months after the surrender and
then condensed into code and concealed, but afterwards destroyed to prevent discovery
by the Japanese. It was later recreated and edited by Lieutenant Smith after the end of
hostilities. The Tribunal refers to this document as the ‘Australian report’ throughout
these reasons. The report attached a sketch map Annex I produced by Lieutenant Smith
of Australian and Dutch troop positions. The Australian report referred to the following
single entry relating to Driver Doolan:

‘On Sunday 1 Feb a patrol of Tpt personnel under Sgt. J O’Brien reported enemy
tps in the town of Ambon. One of the patrol (Pte Doolan) failed to return
(K.I.A).’15

35. Some years after the war, Lieutenant Smith, set out his recollections which were
relayed to the Secretary of the Department of the Army on 5 June 1949 in a letter from
the Director of the Australian War Memorial.16 The excerpt below, which also appears
in a letter from Smith to the Military Secretary dated 16 May 1949 is the only direct
evidence from Australian sources of the action of Driver Doolan:

‘On Sunday Feb. 1, at 0400 hours, I sent a small reconnaissance Patrol under
Pl. Sgt. J. O’Brien towards the enemy lines. All patrols during this action were
composed of volunteers, and on this occasion Doolan was one of the volunteers.
It was essential that the patrol or some of its members return with the
information required.

O’Brien returned about 0700 [0730 +9] hours, gave me the information, and
advised that Doolan had elected to remain behind, to ensure the successful
withdrawl [sic] of the party. I could hear S.A.A & M.G. fire which ensued
during Doolan’s engagement of the enemy, but could not see anything. The
firing took place before O’Brien actually returned to my position.

15
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p.12. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
16
Based on Lieutenant Smith’s narrative as provided to the AWM. Director AWM Letter 74/8/39 to
Secretary Department of the Army dated 5 June 1949. Smith’s narrative, cited by the Director (but not,
significantly, by Smith himself) as ‘ a quotation from his personal diary’ as presented in this letter is
slightly more complete about the circumstances of Doolan’s burial than that given in Lieutenant D.W.
Smith Letter to Military Secretary dated 16 May 1949. AWM 119, 222.

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 Some days later, when the action was over, and the surrender took effect, I
observed Doolan’s body near a tree, at the side of the road in the village of
Koedamati. His body was riddled with bullets, and his head practically severed
by what appeared to be bursts of M.G. fire at short range.’ 17

36. To summarise, there is no account by Sergeant O’Brien, any member of the

reconnaissance patrol or anyone in Driver Doolan’s chain of command other than
Lieutenant Smith.

37. Thereafter, the story of Driver Doolan’s final action and death is based on the
recollections of Ambonese villagers (with the only actual eye witness being a then eight
year old boy Job Lekatompessy). Job knew Doolan as Doolan had come to his house at
intervals during the period immediately before the Japanese invasion.

38. Job gave varying accounts to a number of adults about what he had seen. These
hearsay accounts are set out at paragraphs 206-208 of these reasons. His accounts of
Driver Doolan’s action make claims to huge numbers of Japanese casualties. The
Tribunal notes that Job himself was not consistent in the figure he gave, nor in some of
the details of the fighting.18 Doolan was said to have given Job of photo of his family
before entering the fight. Job admitted in one interview that he ‘could not see much of
the fight’, but his story was that Driver Doolan had climbed a tree with a light machine
gun, that the tree was on a slope and that the Japanese, who had arrived in the area in
trucks, made repeated advances but were forced to fall back, while ‘the dead lay like
stones in a watercourse.’19

39. The Army research report largely encapsulated the above information and also
heavily relied upon the Japanese Unit Association history of the 228th Infantry
Regiment translated by Dr Steven Bullard. Major Rutherford described it as a Japanese
‘after action report’. However, the Tribunal refers to the Unit Association history
throughout these reasons as the ‘Japanese account’ as it is not an ‘after action report’
or a record of the action at the time, but a narrative compiled by veterans of the 228th
Infantry Regiment many years later.20

17
Lieutenant Smith’s recollections were then repeated in C.F. Coady, ‘“Gull” Force, Ambon: A
History of the 2/21st Battalion’ Reveille, July 1, 1962. pp. 5 & 34.
18
Job is cited as claiming 200 dead by Pat Burgess, ‘The Ballad of Driver Doolan. Day 2: Doolan stays
to fight!’
19
Job as quoted directly by Pat Burgess, ‘The Ballad of Driver Doolan. Day 2: Doolan stays to fight!’.
20
Hohei Dai 228 Rentai-shi Hensan Iinkai (228th Infantry Regimental History Compilation Committee)
Eds, Hohei Dai 228 Rentai shi (History of the 228th Infantry Regiment), Hohei Dai 228 Rentai-shi
Hensan Iinkai, Nagoya, 1st ed. 1973 (2nd ed. 1978). Translated by Dr Steven Bullard 2007. AWM
MSS1912.

Page | 10
40. The relevant sections of the Japanese account described an engagement between
Japanese troops of the 9th Company and a concealed enemy on 1 February 1942. The
account states that the 9th Company headed south down the coastal road from Ambon
when they suddenly came under enemy mortar and heavy arms fire. The firing was said
to be concentrated and from a Bren machine-gun by a concealed enemy at fairly close
range. But the enemy was nowhere to be seen. The unit was said to be pinned down
for several hours by the attack with significant casualties until a grenade-launcher squad
successfully silenced the ‘enemy camp’.21

41. The relevant passages of the Japanese account are set out below, (emphasis added
in bold)

1 February
Battalion commander Nishiyama advanced the front line to the coastal road,
and deployed the 9th Company as reinforcements along the road with the aim
of increasing gains in the area. However, the prepared enemy mortar and
heavy arms fire was accurate and pervasive. The commander of the 3rd
Platoon, 2nd Lt Muto achieved death in battle at the edge of the opening into
the coconut plantation. Casualties mounted and the advance was held.

The battalion commander judging that conditions for a daytime attack were
unfavourable, began to prepare for a night attack. All companies began a
simultaneous advance on the front line at 2000 hrs, engaging the enemy
covertly. 22
….

9th Co - 'Clearing operations of Ambon'

The 9th Company with Kawake’s 1st Platoon left in Ambon City in reserve,
headed south-west along the shoreline of the bay in the following order:
Koseki’s 2nd Platoon, Muto’s 3rd Platoon, then Shirai’s Command Squad.
During this time they found some enemy remaining troops.

In order to attack this enemy, the Company cut through the plantation to the
right of the road and reached a slightly elevated grassy area. With the
command squad deployed to the centre, the 3rd Platoon to the right and then 2nd
Platoon to the left, the unit advanced on the high ground. When they were 200
– 300 meters away, they suddenly came under concentrated fire from a Bren
machine-gun fired by a concealed enemy at fairly close range. At the head of
the unit, Platoon commander Muto and Lance Corporal Kondo were killed in
an instant, and the advance was halted. The enemy was nowhere to be seen, so
there was not even a faint movement to aim at. The unit was pinned down for
several hours in the open field, with absolutely no cover. It was not even possible
to get aid to the casualties.

Platoon leader Koseki on the left finally managed to move to the trees on the
left, then advanced quickly to the flanks of the enemy to try and destroy them

21
The relevant excerpts, translated by Bullard, are set out at Annex A.
22
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment.

Page | 11
 in one fell swoop. Just as the Kamya Squad were positioning in light machine
gun at the edge of the trees, they were subjected to heavy fire from the enemy
waiting for them, immediately killing rifleman Sugiyama Kyochi, and
superior privates Ando Hisayoshi, and Handa Goichi. The Platoon
Commander immediately ordered Isaji of the grenade-launcher squad to
attack. The enemy camp was finally silenced with the strength of this attack.

However, the sacrifices of the unit during the attack under the bright sun in this field
were in vain. As a result, the unit changed its attack to a night assault. 23

42. Major Rutherford formed the view that the actions of a concealed shooter
against the Japanese, as set out above, tallied so closely with the Ambonese narratives
that it could be inferred that the account described Driver Doolan’s actions immediately
prior to his death and Driver Doolan’s gallantry.24

43. Major Rutherford concluded that there appeared to be ‘significant evidence of

gallantry in choosing to remain behind to engage Japanese troops’ and that by ‘doing
so he [Doolan] was likely to lose his life’.25

44. The Army research report explicitly recommended that, ‘Doolan be submitted
to the Historical Honours and Review Board for consideration of an appropriate
medallic recognition.’26

Tribunal proceedings

45. Preparation for hearing. In preparation for hearing, it was difficult to

reconcile the conclusion expressed in the commissioned and endorsed Army research
report that there was ‘significant evidence of gallantry’ and the Board’s decision that
there were no compelling reasons to alter the decision not to recognise Driver Doolan
with a gallantry award.

46. The parties were advised on 30 May 2019 that the Tribunal sought oral expert
evidence at the hearing to assist with determining the actions of Driver Doolan. The
Tribunal indicated that it sought the expertise of Major Rutherford, who by this time
had retired from his role as the Army Principal Research Officer. The Tribunal also
invited Major Paul Rosenzweig (Retd), who wrote a thesis titled ‘Ziarah’ – The Gull
Force Association Pilgrimages to Ambon in 2000.

23
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment.
24
R31038104 Dated September 2017 ‘ Report into Application for Retrospective Bravery Award –
VX35406 Driver William Thomas Doolan’, p. 5.
25
R31038104 Dated September 2017 ‘ Report into Application for Retrospective Bravery Award –
VX35406 Driver William Thomas Doolan’, p. 6.
26
R31038104 Dated September 2017 ‘ Report into Application for Retrospective Bravery Award –
VX35406 Driver William Thomas Doolan’, p. 7.

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47. There was no objection by the parties to the Tribunal adopting this course or
their respective readiness for hearing set down for 13 August 2019.

48. Provision of late evidence by Respondent. Considerable material was

provided by Defence shortly before hearing.

49. On 7 August 2019, a week prior to the hearing, the Respondent disclosed
additional archival material relating to 1947 and 1949 concerning public interest in
Driver Doolan.27 The Tribunal provided the additional material to the Applicant and
the two expert witnesses on the same day.

50. On 9 August 2019, a further document, namely an 8th Division Administrative

Instruction of No 2/45 of 21 December 1945 (the Administrative Instruction), was
supplied by the Respondent to the Tribunal.28 Due to the timing of the disclosure, the
Applicant was not able to be provided this document until the hearing.

51. Although the Applicant had limited time to consider the new material, the
Tribunal considers there was ultimately no procedural unfairness to the Applicant as
both parties were given liberty to make further submissions after the hearing in relation
to any issues arising from the late evidence.

52. Hearing of 13 August 2019. The hearing was heard in public, in Canberra. It
was attended by the Applicant and her support person. There were a number of
representatives for the Respondent, namely Air Vice-Marshal Evans, Chair of the
Board, Brigadier Mark Holmes, AM, MVO (Retd) and Colonel Griffith Thomas on
behalf of Chief of Army and Ms Petrina Cole, Director Honours and Awards.

53. Major Rutherford gave evidence in person and Major Rosenzweig gave
evidence by way of telephone conference. Submissions were made by both the
Applicant and by Air Vice-Marshal Evans, Brigadier Holmes and Ms Petrina Cole for
the Respondent.

54. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal invited the parties to provide
further submissions concerning the late evidence provided, which included the
Administrative Instruction.

27
‘Foreign Award to Driver Doolan (Prisoner of War) Enquiries 1947-1957’, AWM 119/222.
28
Headquarters 8th Division Administrative Instruction 2/45 dated 21 December 1945,
AWM PR89/099.

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Summary of Tribunal hearing

55. Applicant’s Submissions. Ms Treadwell submitted that the actions of her father
should be further recognised. She relied upon the research of Major Rutherford and his
findings and conclusions in relation to her father’s actions and gallantry.

56. In her submissions, she elaborated upon her written application of 26 May 2014
which included numerous Ambonese and Australian newspaper reports, as well as
historical accounts, including extracts of Gull Force by Professor Joan Beaumont.29

57. Ms Treadwell explained to the Tribunal that she visited Ambon in the 1990s
during the various pilgrimages and was able to speak to Ambonese locals, including
Mr Paul Kastanja, formerly of the Dutch forces, who knew her father.

58. She included in her submission letters by Mr Kastanja, including one dated
11 August 1982, which states that her father and he were ‘good friends’. Mr Kastanja
also described that he and his friends had dug a grave for her father, three days after his
death, under a gandaria tree. This grave was said not to be far from where the Japanese
forces killed him at Kudamati.

59. Ms Treadwell submitted to the Tribunal that Mr Kastanja had related to her that
8 year old Job was apparently close by the action and saw fighting between her father
and the Japanese. She also related how Mr Kastanja returned from Mt Nona with his
friend Ebenezer Huwae to find Doolan’s body surrounded by Japanese bodies. She was
impressed by Mr Kastanja who she believed was relaying credible and reliable
information.

60. Ms Treadwell suggested that there was likely some bias at play in
acknowledging her father’s actions, namely that Australian and Dutch sourced accounts
were considered more reliable than local indigenous Ambonese sources, whose
accounts tended, in her view, to be discounted. Ms Treadwell made a short submission
as to the potential for maladministration which is referred to under the heading
‘maladministration’ at paragraphs 121-147 below.

61. Ms Treadwell concluded by proudly acknowledging that the ‘Story of Doolan’

incorporated in the ‘Song of Doolan’ had become something of legend at Ambon and
Australia. She finds it incongruous that her father’s bravery has not been recognised in
Australia by any kind of medallic recognition. She seeks appropriate medallic
recognition.

29
Joan Beaumont, Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941-1945, Allen & Unwin,
Sydney, 1988.

Page | 14
62. Testimony of Major Philip Rutherford (Retd). Major Rutherford at the outset
submitted that there may have been maladministration at play in Driver Doolan’s failure
to be recognised. His view is set out at paragraphs 125-130 under the heading
‘maladministration’.

63. Major Rutherford then gave evidence elaborating upon his analysis of the
sources and his conclusion in the Army research report. He explained that Driver
Doolan volunteered to go on a reconnaissance patrol to the village of Kudamati at
sunrise on 1 February 1942 and then elected to stay behind, alone. Major Rutherford
believed that Driver Doolan could have been armed with a Bren machine-gun as this is
what the Australian troops used. The Bren was capable of single shots as well as
machine-gun fire and being a weapon Driver Doolan would have been trained on as
part of basic field training.

64. Major Rutherford gave evidence with the assistance of the map at Annex B
which was attached to the Japanese account. He gave evidence of the Japanese 9th
Company advance and the location of the Australian troops in the area south of Ambon.
He concluded that the timing, and last known movements of Driver Doolan in that area,
combined with his proximate place of death in conjunction with the account of local
boy Job Lekatompessy, meant that it can be circumstantially inferred that the actions of
the enemy shooter in the Japanese account were in fact those of Driver Doolan and not
any other person.

65. In Major Rutherford’s assessment of the Japanese account, it is likely that it was
Driver Doolan’s action which inflicted heavy Japanese casualties and held up the
Japanese assault for at least 12 hours, and changed the Japanese attack from a day attack
to a night assault.

66. Some questions of clarification from Colonel Thomas for the Respondent were
put to Major Rutherford. These concerned the markings and information on the map
Annex B, specifically the location of named Japanese casualties and timings of their
death as identified. It was asserted by Colonel Thomas that the information on the map
was at odds with the known location and timing of Driver Doolan’s movements set out
in the Australian report and information subsequently provided by Lieutenant Smith.

67. While this line of questioning called somewhat into question the Japanese
account as being referable to actions of Driver Doolan, Major Rutherford’s testimony
was largely unchallenged by the Respondent. Major Rutherford’s assessment of Driver
Doolan’s gallantry was unchallenged.

Page | 15
68. Later in the hearing, whilst during the Respondent’s submissions, it became
clear that Major Rutherford’s assessment of the Japanese account as being referable to
the actions of Driver Doolan was not accepted. The Respondent submitted that there
were a number of additional inconsistencies (discussed at paragraph 70 below) between
the Japanese account which cast significant doubt over Major Rutherford’s conclusion.

69. Major Rutherford was then recalled and the Presiding Member required the
Respondent to put those asserted inconsistencies to Major Rutherford.

70. The additional inconsistencies included the type of weaponry used by “the
enemy” in the Japanese account, referred to as a Bren machine-gun and mortars. This
was at odds with Lieutenant Smith’s recollection which stated that Driver Doolan only
had a rifle and hand grenades. In addition, the Japanese account referred to the enemy
in the plurality, such as, ‘enemy flanks’ and ‘enemy camp’ and Driver Doolan was said
to have stayed behind alone. In short, it was put to Major Rutherford that the account
of the Japanese 9th Company could have been describing some other action with the
enemy that day and not an encounter with Driver Doolan.

71. In response, Major Rutherford reiterated that the three lines of Japanese advance
as marked on the map Annex B were consistent in his opinion with the last known area
of Australian defensive positions and where Driver Doolan was last seen. He said it
was also broadly consistent with timings shown on Annex B. Although Major
Rutherford conceded that the Bren machine-gun referred to in the Japanese account
could have been operated by Australian forces other than Driver Doolan, given the
potential for activity in the area, he maintained there were sufficient similarities
between the Japanese account and the last known movements of Driver Doolan derived
from the Australian report and Lieutenant Smith’s recollections and the accounts by
Job. Importantly, from the Australian sources, he did not believe there was any other
action in the area consistent with the last known location of Driver Doolan. He
maintained his conclusion as set out in the Army research report that the Japanese
account was referable to Driver Doolan’s actions.

72. Testimony of Major Paul Rosenzweig (Retd). Major Rosenzweig, historian,

gave evidence, elaborating on his thesis ‘Ziarah’ – The Gull Force Association
Pilgrimages to Ambon in 2000. A key element to his thesis addressed the basis for the
controversy regarding the ‘Doolan Memorial’ and Indonesian remembrance.

73. Major Rosenzweig stated that he had reviewed Major Rutherford’s Army
research report and agreed with his conclusion that the Japanese account seemed to
generally ‘fit’ with the narrative of Driver Doolan’s last stand. He stated at the outset
it was important to separate from hard evidence the hearsay accounts of Doolan’s
actions, many of which had been published and most of which, he opined, were grossly
exaggerated and embellished.

Page | 16
74. Major Rosenzweig stated that during his research and Gull Force pilgrimages,
he met Mr Kastanya, former Sergeant of the KNIL who described burying Doolan’s
mutilated body, as well as another local, Mr Pete Papilaya, who had been in the
Kudamati area at the relevant time. Mr Kastanya had had the benefit of hearing Job
Lekatompessy’s account. Major Rosenzweig also spoke with members of the Gaspersz
family, locals who knew Driver Doolan during the period before the invasion. The
abovementioned people had all impressed Major Rosenzweig as giving reliable and
credible information regarding Driver Doolan.

75. Major Rosenzweig further observed that Gull Force survivors interned as
prisoners of war at Tan Toey tended to resent the ‘legend of Doolan’ as opposed to
those interned at Hainan Island30. To Major Rosenzweig, this may have had a bearing
on Driver Doolan’s failure to be recognised to date.

76. Respondent’s submissions. Air Vice-Marshal Evans, Chair of the Board,

primarily made submissions on behalf of the Respondent. He acknowledged the service
of Driver Doolan and his sacrifice for his country.

77. Air Vice-Marshal Evans then sought to ‘clarify’ the Army research
commissioned by the Respondent. It was submitted that the Japanese account, contrary
to Major Rutherford’s conclusion, could not be considered as referring to Doolan’s last
actions. It was submitted there were too many inconsistencies.

78. As such, the Japanese account did not represent ‘compelling new evidence’ to
the Respondent.

79. To the Respondent, the reliable evidence of Driver Doolan’s actions are those
attributed to him by Lieutenant Smith as set out in the Australian report and in his
correspondence in 1949 at paragraph 114. The evidence concerning Driver Doolan’s
actions in volunteering for the reconnaissance patrol and further volunteering to remain
behind to fight, alone, was therefore not contested by the Respondent.

80. Upon questioning from the Tribunal, Air Vice-Marshal Evans stated that he did
not resile from the conclusion of Major Rutherford, as expressed in the Army research
report that there was ‘significant evidence of gallantry in [his] choosing to remain
behind to engage Japanese troops’ and that by ‘doing so [Driver Doolan] was likely to
lose his life’.31

30
Note Lieutenant Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Scott were POWs on Hainan Island.
31
Army report R31038104 Dated September 2017 ‘ Report into Application for Retrospective Bravery
Award – VX35406 Driver William Thomas Doolan’, p. 7. See transcript of hearing p. 61.

Page | 17
81. As to whether a gallantry award should be awarded for Driver Doolan’s actions,
it was submitted that Lieutenant Smith, having survived the war, was in a position to
put Driver Doolan forward for a Mention in Despatches (MID) if he believed his actions
warranted. He did not do so. The Respondent submitted there was no evidence of
malafides on Lieutenant Smith’s part nor anyone else in Driver Doolan’s chain of
command in not putting him forward

82. Air Vice-Marshal Evans concluded the undisputed actions of Driver Doolan
attributed to him by Lieutenant Smith could not be considered for the purposes of the
Australian Gallantry Decorations Regulations, noting the Chief of Army’s policy on
retrospective awards in the absence of maladministration or compelling new evidence.

Defence obligations as a model litigant

83. At this juncture, the Tribunal takes the opportunity to remind the Respondent,
that, as a Commonwealth Department, it has obligations as a model litigant, which
includes merits review proceedings before Tribunals.32 These obligations apply to
whether Government Departments are legally represented or not. Being a model
litigant requires the Government parties to litigation to act with complete propriety,
fairly and in accordance with the highest professional standards. The obligations are
particularly important where applicants, such as Ms Treadwell, are unrepresented.

84. Being a model litigant includes applying policy which is consistent with the
law. The Tribunal notes the Chief of Army’s policy on retrospective awards as applied
to this application and similar applications before the Tribunal. Government policy is
a relevant consideration in merits review and is usually applied in the absence of reasons
not to follow such policy. However, the Respondent’s policy in relation to retrospective
honours,33 as the Tribunal understands it, is at odds with the eligibility criteria for the
Australian Gallantry Decorations Regulations. It is also at odds with the Tribunal’s
obligations under section 110VB of the Act. The full Federal Court in the Minister for
Home Affairs v G [2019] FCAFC 79, discussed the effect of government policy with
respect to administrative decisions. It held that:

The boundary is clear: policy is to not become the rule of law. The statute is the
expression of the rule of law. Executive policy cannot, in form or more
importantly in substance, be perceived by decision-makers, as or operate, as a
rule…

32
Annex B ‘Model Litigant’ to the Legal Services Directions 2017, 29 March 2017,
[Link]
33
The Tribunal observes that the policy adopted and maintained by the Respondent had its origins in
the conclusions of the Tribunal that completed the Inquiry into unresolved recognition for past acts of
naval and military gallantry and valour (the Valour Tribunal). In reaching a conclusion that
retrospective awards should only be contemplated in ‘the most compelling of cases’, the Valour
Tribunal, in the view of this Tribunal, had adopted a cautious approach. The Valour Tribunal did not
contemplate how a decision-maker should examine a case to determine if it were ‘most compelling’.

Page | 18
85. It appeared that the Board did not turn its collective mind to consider whether
in performing undisputed actions, Driver Doolan had also performed an act or acts of
gallantry. Furthermore, there was no assessment of any gallantry against the statutory
eligibility criteria. Instead, the Board heavily relied on policy as formulated by the
Chief of Army to refuse the application, at odds with the law.

86. Being a model litigant requires the decision-maker to properly address the
merits of the application before it. It is incumbent upon decision-makers to identify
the law that must be applied, establish the relevant facts and apply the law to those facts.
This requires a merits consideration.

87. However, the Board’s Chair stated in the letter of 16 November 2018 that a
‘separate merits review’ did not take place.34 This is notwithstanding the Board was
said to be established to conduct ‘merits reviews of historical cases.’35 The Board’s
letter states there was only discussion at Board about the strategic environment and
operational context of the time, noting there was no evidence of maladministration or
compelling new evidence.36 However, it became apparent during the hearing that the
Board had closely considered the Army research report and its conclusion and to that
extent it did consider some of the merits of the application. Regrettably this
consideration and reasoning were not referred to in the refusal decision for the benefit
of the Applicant, nor in the Statement of Reasons provided to the Tribunal.

88. In summary, as opposed to a fresh merits consideration, to the Tribunal there

appeared to be undue focus by the Board on the issue of maladministration and upon
decisions made immediately post-war not to recommend Driver Doolan and during the
reconsideration of 1949. As a matter of procedural fairness, decision-makers are
obliged to make their own assessment of the merits of an application.

89. Being a model litigant also includes endeavouring to limit the scope of
litigation. It is good practice for Government agencies to clearly set out the evidence
it seeks to rely upon. This assists in narrowing the issues in dispute and helps an
Applicant prepare their case for hearing. It also assists the Tribunal in its preparation
for hearing and the conduct of the hearing itself.

90. Neither the decision under review of 18 April 2018, the accompanying Board
Minutes nor the Board’s letter of 16 November 2018 referred to the findings or
conclusion of Major Rutherford, as set out above or at all. Rule 7(4) of the Tribunal’s
Procedural Rules states that the Defence Report must set out findings on material
questions of fact and the reasons for the decision. The refusal decision did not qualify

34
HHRB Chair Letter DH&A/OUT/201X/0092 dated 16 November 2018. Also confirmed in the HHR
Board Minutes of the Meeting on 21 November 2017, p. 2.
35
‘Defence Historical Honours Review Board Terms of Reference and Guidelines’, AL16455488.
36
HHRB Chair Letter DH&A/OUT/201X/0092 dated 16 November 2018.

Page | 19
in any way the gallantry assessment in the Army research report. In particular, it did
not address Major Rutherford’s conclusion that relevant passages of the Japanese
account were referable to the actions of Driver Doolan. Taken at face value, the
Applicant and the Tribunal were entitled to assume that the Respondent accepted Major
Rutherford’s conclusion.

91. As previously stated, the Tribunal was taken by surprise by the Respondent’s
submission later in the hearing that it did not accept critical aspects of the research that
it had commissioned, endorsed and later provided (as, indeed it was required to do).

92. Failure to identify the critical aspects of the evidence did not assist focus on the
issues or limit the scope of the litigation.

92. Being a model litigant includes the obligation to deal with an application
promptly and without unnecessary delay. This obligation includes making an early
assessment as to the prospects of an application. While the Tribunal notes that Air
Vice-Marshal Evans acknowledged the regrettable delay in considering the application
at the commencement of the hearing and apologised for the delay within the decision
under review, the Tribunal viewed the four year delay by Defence in processing
Ms Treadwell’s application to be excessively long. Having finally decided the
application in October 2017, there was a further six month delay in communicating the
outcome to the applicant. The Tribunal considers unexplained delays of this magnitude
to be unacceptable.

93. Finally, being a model litigant also includes the obligation to abide by the
procedural rules. It includes the obligation to provide evidence in a timely manner
and abide by the timeframes as set down in the Tribunal’s Procedural Rules. Defence
evidence, in this case, was provided well outside the timeframes set and could only be
provided to the Applicant at hearing. 37

94. The above observations above are intended to assist the Respondent in better
decision-making with respect to honours and ensure compliance with its obligations as
a model litigant and its obligations before the Tribunal.

Tribunal proceedings - post hearing

95. Submissions sought from the Respondent. Noting the Respondent’s position
as to an absence of maladministration, the Respondent was asked to submit the
contended legal basis of the Administrative Instruction and what impact, if any, the

37
Procedural Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedural Rules also sets out that the Secretary of the
Department of Defence, on behalf of the Respondent must use his or her best endeavours to assist the
Tribunal in relation to the review.

Page | 20
Instruction might have on the nomination process in respect to deceased Australian
Army personnel, such as Driver Doolan.

96. On 9 September 2019, the Tribunal received a response from Ms Cole, the
Director of Honours and Awards,38 which was provided to the Applicant for any further
comment to which she declined.

97. Tribunal conducts research. Noting that the Respondent now clearly disputed
the Japanese account as being referable to the actions of Driver Doolan, the Tribunal
decided to undertake research of its own pursuant to Rule 6(1) of the Tribunal’s
Procedural Rules.39 This included systematically researching the events south of
Ambon, on 1 February 1942 from Australian, Dutch, Japanese and local sources before
focusing on Driver Doolan’s likely involvement within that action.

98. The Tribunal’s draft research essentially shed doubt over the Japanese account
as referring to the actions of Driver Doolan, as the research tended to indicate that the
account was referring to actions at a later time and in a different location on the relevant
day. On 15 October 2019, the Tribunal disclosed a draft narrative of its research and
the evidence relied upon in formulating the same, to the Applicant, the Respondent and
Major Rutherford for comment.

99. Response by Major Rutherford to the Tribunal’s research. On 31 October

2019, Major Rutherford provided his comments, which were to the effect that he
maintained that Driver Doolan’s actions were as he had originally concluded.40 He also
referred to and relied upon evidence, not previously set out in his Army Research
Report, namely a thesis by Dr David A. Evans The Ambon Forward Observation Line
Strategy: 1941 – 1942. A Lesson in Military Incompetence.41 Major Rutherford stated
that this work lent further support to his conclusion that Driver Doolan was the single
soldier who held up the 9th Company. He maintained there was significant correlation
between the map Annex B and the series of slides at Annex J provided by the Tribunal,
in terms of place and time. (Major Rutherford’s response was also provided to the
parties for comment).

100. Response by the Applicant to the Tribunal’s research. On 5 November 2019

Ms Treadwell provided her comments and essentially agreed the points raised in the
draft research of the Tribunal. She stated it was clear from the evidence that her father
volunteered for the patrol and later bravely volunteered to stay behind and fight alone,

38
Director of Honours and Awards Letter DH&A/OUT/2019/0039 dated 9 September 2019.
39
See also Subrule 22(3) The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform itself on
any matter in any way it considers appropriate.
40
Major Philip Rutherford Email dated 30 October 2019.
41
David A. Evans, The Ambon Forward Observation Line Strategy: 1941 – 1942. A lesson in Military
Incompetence, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, 2010,
[Link]

Page | 21
after giving Job Lekatompessy a photo of his family. From this, she submitted, it could
be inferred that her father expected he would likely die.42 She conceded that there were
unknowns about her father’s last stand, except to say that it was likely to have lasted
for two hours according to Job. It was not known how many Japanese soldiers Driver
Doolan killed, but because he was attacked with bayonets, revenge could be inferred,
she submitted. In Ms Treadwell’s view, the Tribunal’s draft research leant support to
her application that in the circumstances her father’s bravery ought to be recognised.

101. Response by the Respondent to the Tribunal’s research. On 13 November

2019, Ms Cole on behalf of the Directorate of Honours and Awards stated that the
Directorate did not dispute any aspects of the Tribunal’s draft research.

102. The thesis by Dr David Evans and relevant primary sources relied upon in that
thesis were provided to Ms Treadwell on 29 November 2019, and to the Respondent on
13 December 2019, for final comment by 29 January 2020. Ms Treadwell provided her
final response on 13 December 2019 and the Respondent provided its final response on
16 January 2020.

103. The Tribunal carefully considered the new evidence set out by Major Rutherford
and in particular the thesis by Dr Evans, together with all of the evidence, including
those of the experts and submissions by the parties provided prior, during and after the
hearing.

Tribunal Consideration

104. Respondent’s submission – the nomination process and absence of

maladministration. The Respondent submitted that the asserted absence of
maladministration and the fact that those in Driver Doolan’s chain of command who
survived the war were in a position to recommend him, was a basis to reject the
application.

105. However, to the Tribunal, assessing the merits of the application against the
statutory eligibility criteria, it was not necessary for the Respondent to establish whether
there was any maladministration in the failure or otherwise to process of an award
recommendation in the past.

106. Nonetheless, given the focus the Respondent placed on this argument both in
the refusal decision and submissions at hearing, the Tribunal considered it was obliged
to consider the contention. In doing so, the Tribunal emphasises that, as the Tribunal’s
has a statutory obligation to conduct merits reviews, any application for an honour or
award does not ‘rest or fall’ on whether there was a failure to follow due process or
whether there was maladministration.

42
Ms June Treadwell OAM Letter dated 5 November 2019.

Page | 22
107. The Nomination Process. During and after the Second World War, the granting
of honours and awards for gallantry and distinguished service was the prerogative and
under the authority of the Sovereign, King George VI and the Governor-General of
Australia.

108. The nomination process for honours and awards for Australian Defence
personnel, was set out in Cablegram 379 of 24 April 1942, from the Secretary of State
for Dominion Affairs to the Prime Minister of Australia, which relevantly specifies at
paragraph 10 in the case of posthumous recommendations:

Posthumous recommendations may be made only for the V.C.,G.C., Mentions

and Commendations. For all other awards the person must have been known to
be alive at the time the recommendation was initiated.43 [underlining in original]

109. Within a few years of the conclusion of hostilities, King George VI had ‘decided
there would be no further awards for service in the Second World War’.44

110. Nomination process as applied to deceased Australian Defence personnel

of the 8th Division. The Tribunal recognises that the situation immediately before and
after the surrender of Gull Force did not allow for formal recommendations for awards
to be generated and passed through the chain of command. The opportunity for this
came only after repatriation of the survivors to Australia during the period in late 1945
and early 1946. During this time, the command of the 8th Division caught up with the
events of the previous four years including recommendations for operational awards.

111. Administrative Instruction. The nomination process set out in Cablegram 379
above was later qualified by Administrative Instruction No 2/45 of 21 December 1945,
issued by Headquarters 8th Division under the authority of Colonel (later Sir) Wilfrid
Kent Hughes MVO, MC as Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General.

112. The Administrative Instruction called for recommendations for awards for the
End of Hostilities Honours List. It set out that all Brigade Commanders, COs, and OCs
were to submit recommendations for inclusion in the honours, awards and MIDs – end
of hostilities list. After stating that ‘Recommendations should be for services rendered
from the formation of the unit to demobilisation, including PW period’, the Instruction
then states explicitly, ‘No deceased personnel will be recommended.’45

43
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia, cablegram 379 of 24 April
1942, received 25 April 1942.
44
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, The Report of the Inquiry into unresolved
recognition for past acts of naval and military gallantry and valour, Commonwealth of Australia,
2013, pp. 62-63. The last Australian awards for the Second World War were only prevented from being
gazetted on 11 February 1949 by an administrative error (and were in fact backdated to that date when
finally promulgated on 6 October 1950).
45
Papers of LTCOL W.W. Leggatt, AWM: PR 89/099.

Page | 23
113. At the outset, the Tribunal noted that the Administrative Instruction was
inconsistent with the higher authority, Cablegram 379. Furthermore, it is clear that the
Administrative Instruction was in circulation at the time and relied upon by those in the
8th Division, to the potential detriment of deceased personnel who might have otherwise
been recommended.

114. Lieutenant Smith, Driver Doolan’s Transport Platoon Commander, confirmed

this in his letter of 16 May 1949 to the Military Secretary, writing that:

‘An Administrative Instruction was issued by this [8th Division] H.Q. which
distinctly stated that no deceased personnel were to be recommended. I do not
know what my C.O. had in mind about Doolan, but I knew he had intended to
recommend the late Major Horton Newbury, O.C. defence Laha Aerodrome,
Ambon, for a very high Honour. As a result this gallant officer received no
recognition whatever.’46

115. It is clear from Lieutenant Smith’s letter that he did not recommend Driver
Doolan for an honour or award and he reports that neither did his commanding officer
Lieutenant Colonel Scott. He did not believe that any others in Driver Doolan’s chain
of command had done so. Further, Major Macrae does not list Driver Doolan in the
Australian report, compiled in captivity 10 months after the surrender as a member he
intended to recommend.

116. Reconsiderations of Driver Doolan’s case over the years, and notably the one in
July 1949 when the Minister for the Army was asked whether Driver Doolan was
nominated or should have been nominated, make it clear that in all likelihood
Driver Doolan was never nominated for the MID or any other form of recognition,
including from the Netherlands government.

117. The Respondent advised that the following honours were awarded to Gull Force
personnel, gazetted between 1943 – 1947:

 Officer of the Order of the British Empire - 1

 Member of the Order of the British Empire – 3
 George Medal - 1
 British Empire Medals - 2
 Mention in Dispatches - 21

118. The Respondent confirmed that none of the above honours were awarded to
Driver Doolan.

46
Lieutenant D.W. Smith Letter to Military Secretary dated 16 May 1949. AWM119/222.

Page | 24
119. The Tribunal therefore finds there was no evidence available to suggest that
Driver Doolan was nominated or recommended for recognition.

120. Driver Doolan’s chain of command. His chain of command at the time of the
Ambon campaign, including those alive at the end of the war, were namely:

Officer Commanding 2/21st Battalion: Lieutenant Colonel W.J.R. Scott

2IC 2/21st Battalion: Major I.F. Macrae

OC B Echelon (until 31 January 1942) Captain P. Miskin (Battalion

QM)

OC B Echelon (after 31 January 1942) Captain J.M. Turner

OC Transport Platoon Lieutenant D.W. Smith

Platoon Sergeant (and Patrol leader) Sergeant J. O’Brien

Whether the failure to nominate Driver Doolan was due to maladministration?

121. Maladministration. The Tribunal notes that “maladministration” is a term

which has been described to include bias, neglect, delay, inattention, incompetence,
ineptitude, perversity and arbitrariness. Decisions made with a conflict of interest could
also amount to maladministration. Acts of maladministration may be with malice or be
of the non-intended kind. In the report of the its Inquiry into unresolved recognition for
past acts of naval and military gallantry and valour, the Tribunal considered that:

..maladministration could occur not only if a commander failed to follow the

required procedure, but also if a commander made a decision that could not be
justified on the available evidence, if a commander did not show due diligence,
or if a commander failed to make a decision when the evidence suggested that
they should have made a decision.47

122. The Tribunal also considers that decisions, acts or omissions based on information
that are factually in error or have been misinterpreted could also amount to
maladministration. This would include high level policy documents concerning
Defence Instructions made contrary to extant law, which were relied upon or could have
been relied upon.

123. Submission by the Applicant - maladministration. Whilst Ms Treadwell did

not make a formal case for maladministration, she referred to the dissension amongst
Gull Force survivors. Delight in her father’s fame was not shared by all. She believed

47
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, Report of the Inquiry into Unresolved Recognition
for Past Acts of Naval and Military Gallantry and Valour, 2013, p. 90.

Page | 25
those jealousies surrounding the ‘legend of Doolan’ after the war would have likely
been present during the occupation and immediately following the end of the war. She
contends that this would have counted against anyone in her father’s chain of command
putting him forward for medallic recognition. She also asserted that an officer she
named (of 2/21st Battalion) worked hard in later years to see that her father gained no
recognition and made defamatory remarks about him and others. She did not elaborate
on this contention and the Tribunal disregarded that part of her submission.48

124. In her written response provided on 5 November 2019 after the hearing,
Ms Treadwell believed it likely that Lieutenant Smith downplayed the actions of her
father in the Australian report, relying for the personal view of Major Rutherford as
expressed at the hearing, as set out below. She believed it conceivable that Lieutenant
Smith minimised the significance of the actions of Driver Doolan to cast himself and
his own actions in a better light, noting Driver Doolan was a ‘lowly Private who had
shown immense bravery when others had deserted or surrendered’.49

125. Evidence of Major Rutherford - maladministration. Major Rutherford in his

oral evidence to the Tribunal said that he remained troubled, noting the ‘legend of
Driver Doolan’ and the local respect for him, as to why his actions were never
mentioned in the official history nor any recommendation made for an award.

126. He suggested that an explanation may be because Lieutenant Smith re-wrote

‘his section’ of the Australian Report, originally written by Major Macrae in captivity
10 months after the surrender, which Lieutenant Smith claimed was damaged. In that
part of the report, Lieutenant Smith merely recorded that Driver Doolan ‘failed to return
from the reconnaissance patrol’. Major Rutherford raised the possibility that Lieutenant
Smith may have deliberately re-written that part of the report and in doing so,
downplayed the actions of Driver Doolan in an attempt to imply that it was Lieutenant
Smith’s troops who were responsible for disrupting the Japanese advance.

127. However, Major Rutherford also conceded in his evidence that it may have been
possible that neither Lieutenant Smith nor Major Macrae, in his immediate chain of
command, were sufficiently aware of Driver Doolan’s actions or the extent, to nominate
him for a VC or a MID at the time.

128. Submission by the Respondent - maladministration. It was submitted there

was no evidence suggesting any maladministration and it was the Defence position that
the research conducted did not locate any substantiating evidence that
maladministration had occurred prior to the cut-off date of awards for the Second World
War, or at all.50

48
Ms Treadwell Application for Review of Decision to DHAAT dated 14 August 2018, attached notes
p. 2,
49
Ms Treadwell Email to DHAAT dated 9 November 2019.
50
Chair HHRB Letter DH&[Link]/2018/0023 to Ms Treadwell dated 18 April 2018.

Page | 26
129. The aforementioned part of Major Rutherford’s evidence at hearing was
strongly refuted by Defence representatives at the hearing. Major Rutherford’s oral
opinion was not set out in the Army Research report and had clearly not been adopted
or endorsed by the Respondent.

130. It was submitted by the Respondent that there was simply no evidence capable
of supporting the said speculation by Major Rutherford that Lieutenant Smith
essentially re-wrote Driver Doolan out of history. Further, the Respondent claimed that
the Army research indicated that the survivors of the action, namely Lieutenant Colonel
Scott and Lieutenant Smith, in Driver Doolan’s relevant chain of command, were
capable of submitting formal recognition for him at the time, but they chose not to do
so. There was no evidence of mal-intent as to why they did not.

131. Tribunal finding – no evidence of malafides. Ms Treadwell did not put

forward any substantiated evidence of malice on the part of anyone in her father’s chain
of command. The Tribunal agreed with the Respondent’s submission that there was no
evidence on which to mount a case that Lieutenant Smith had deliberately or otherwise
downplayed Driver Doolan’s role. The Tribunal found that part of Major Rutherford’s
evidence to be speculative and did not provide a foundation for a case for any malafides
on the part of Lieutenant Smith. Further, there was no evidence to suggest that any
failure on behalf of Lieutenant Colonel Scott’s, (or Major Macrae’s) or anyone else to
nominate Driver Doolan after the conclusion of the Second World War was as a result
of any malafides.

132. Lawfulness of the Administrative Instruction. The Tribunal was, however,

concerned by the wording of the Administrative Instruction and the effect this
Instruction may have had on Driver Doolan’s failure to be nominated.

133. At hearing, the Tribunal inquired as to whether the Administrative Instruction

and addendum material provided shortly before hearing had altered the Defence view
as to whether there had been any potential for maladministration to nominate Driver
Doolan, even of an unintended kind. Air Vice-Marshal Evans responded that it could
be surmised from the Administrative Instruction that the ‘nomination process was
functioning in accordance with policy’. In his submission, administration of honours
and awards had been consistently applied across the 8th Division in this period.

134. The Tribunal disagreed with this submission and raised that the ‘policy’ was
seemingly contrary to the law of the Sovereign, King George VI, given the
Administrative Instruction stated that ‘no deceased personnel will be recommended’.

135. Post hearing the Tribunal sought further guidance from the Respondent as to the
Administrative Instruction and what impact, if any, it might have had on the nomination
process in respect to deceased personnel, such as, Driver Doolan. The Tribunal
formally requested that Defence respond to the following two questions:

Page | 27
 1) Whether the Administrative Instruction was a lawful instruction, in light
of the prerogative and authority of the Sovereign and the Governor-
General in respect of granting of honours for gallantry and distinguished
service during the Second World War; and

2) Paragraph 6-4 to 6-8 of the Report of the Tribunal’s Inquiry into

unresolved recognition for past acts of naval and military gallantry and
valour discusses the Second World War end of war list and the timing
of final awards for Second World War service. Does Defence agree with
this timeline, and does Defence have any further evidence regarding the
decision of King George VI to finalise awards for Second World War
service?
136. Respondent’s submission. On 9 September 2019, the Tribunal received a
response from the Director of Honours and Awards. In relation to question 1, the
response set out that a number of Instructions were made in relation to posthumous
recommendations by higher level authorities and further that a number of posthumous
awards were made for deceased Australian personnel of the various forces under the 8th
Division. In relation to question 2, Defence did not raise any concern about the content
of those aforementioned paragraphs of the Tribunal’s Valour Inquiry.

137. The Directorate assessed that:

the Headquarters 8th Division Administrative Instruction 2/45 was a lawful

instruction as the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, cablegram
379 of 24 April 1942 was the authority above it.51

138. The Tribunal maintains that there is a fundamental disparity between the 8th
Division Administrative Instruction and the cablegram concerned, in that the latter
specifies in paragraph 10:

Posthumous recommendations may be made only for the V.C.,G.C., Mentions

and Commendations. For all other awards the person must have been known to
be alive at the time the recommendation was initiated.52 [underlining in original]

139. The Respondent provided considerable additional material purportedly in

support of its position. The Tribunal found this material indicated otherwise. The
documents suggested that in other lists developed for the 8th Division, the policy set out
in the Cablegram was followed, rather than that of the 8th Division Administrative
Instruction, with posthumous awards being limited to those described above, rather than
being forbidden outright. The correct policy is in fact set out in detail (with Cablegram

51
Director of Honours and Awards Letter DH&A/OUT/2019/0039 dated 9 September 2019.
52
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Prime Minister of Australia, cablegram 379 of 24 April
1942, received 25 April 1942.

Page | 28
379 cited as its authority) and confirmed in the decision note for recommendations for
operational awards for service in Malaya, Timor, Ambon and Rabaul provided to the
Acting Minister for Defence and the Prime Minister in June 1946. The list included
explicitly refers to one of the Mentions in Despatches being posthumous.53

140. Tribunal finding: the Administrative Instruction was unlawful. Although the
Instruction was worded in such a way as to suggest that Headquarters 8th Division
would not endorse any recommendations for deceased personnel rather than actually
forbidding the submission of such recommendations, the intention was clearly to ensure
that subordinate commanders did not put the names of deceased personnel forward for
consideration. The Tribunal repeats that portion of Lieutenant Smith’s letter of 16 May
1949 which illustrates the point:

An Administrative Instruction was issued by this [8th Division] H.Q. which

distinctly stated that no deceased personnel were to be recommended. I do not
know what my C.O. had in mind about Doolan, but I knew he had intended to
recommend the late Major Horton Newbury, O.C. defence Laha Aerodrome,
Ambon, for a very high Honour. As a result this gallant officer received no
recognition whatever.54

141. The Tribunal is of the view that the restriction of recommendations to living
personnel exceeded the authority of 8th Division Headquarters and did not reflect the
procedures approved and expected by the Sovereign to be applied for deceased
personnel. Noting the letter of Lieutenant Smith, there may have been a failure in due
process in Major Newbury not to have been nominated or recommended for
recognition.

142. The Administrative Instruction had been considered by the Tribunal in its earlier
decision of Billett and the Department of Defence [2016]55. His case concerned
Lieutenant Billett, Sparrow Force, 8th Division. As he was alive at the end of the War,
the operation of the Administrative Instruction did not adversely affect him, per se.
However, the Tribunal observed in those reasons the case of Corporal Armstrong, who
by contrast did not survive the War and was initially recommended for a MID, but was
likely removed from the final list.56 The Tribunal noted that Corporal Armstrong was,
as a result, not recognised for his actions.57

53
Note for Acting Minister for Defence and Prime Minister ‘Recommendations for Periodical
Operational Awards for services in Malaya, Timor, Ambon and Rabaul’ dated 20 June 1946.
54
Lieutenant D.W. Smith Letter to Military Secretary dated 16 May 1949. AWM 119/222.
55
DHAAT 10 (24 March 2016).
56
DHAAT 10 (24 March 2016), paragraph 51.
57
The Tribunal in that case recommended to the Minister to direct Army to review his eligibility for an
honour.

Page | 29
143. Tribunal finding – maladministration. The Tribunal considers that Driver
Doolan should have thus been eligible for consideration in 1945-46 for the posthumous
award of a Victoria Cross or a Mention in Despatches, but was not so considered. This
timing proved critical. Soon afterwards, King George VI ‘decided there would be no
further awards for service in the Second World War.’58

144. Notably, in July 1949, when the Minister for the Army responded to the
representations made earlier that year about Driver Doolan’s actions, there was no
suggestion in any of the internal correspondence that a recommendation for an award
should be generated ab initio. In the response, the Minister not only claimed that, ‘the
evidence available does not reveal any action on the part of the late Driver Doolan other
than that expected of a soldier in the ordinary course of his duty in operations’, but also,
‘as no recommendation was submitted for an award [italics supplied], further
consideration cannot be given to the matter.’59 The door for war awards had clearly
already closed.

145. The Tribunal therefore firmly rejects the Respondent’s submission that there
was no evidence of a failure to follow ‘due process’ by those in Driver Doolan’s chain
of command and commanding officer, when that process itself, as it applied to deceased
personnel of the 8th Division, was unduly prescriptive and contrary to the intent of the
Sovereign.

146. There was potential for failure of due process in nominations as due process as
intended by the Sovereign could not be followed. There was a process failure in
administration, albeit likely non-intentional and a misinterpretation of Cablegram 379.
Any decision, act or omission based on information that is factually in error, or unlawful
will be maladministration.

147. In sum, although there is no evidence that a recommendation for an honour was
ever considered in the case of Driver Doolan, the Tribunal assesses that the 8th Division
Administrative Instruction’s effect was to prevent any chance of one being produced.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal is of the view that this could easily lead to
maladministration.

Determining the actions of Driver Doolan

148. Determining the action as to the involvement of Driver Doolan was the main
focus of the hearing and of the Tribunal’s research.

58
Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, The Report of the Inquiry into unresolved
recognition for past acts of naval and military gallantry and valour, Commonwealth of Australia,
2013, pp. 62-63.
59
Minister for the Army Letter dated 1 July 1949 to G.J. Bowden Esq, MC, MP. AWM 119/222.

Page | 30
149. The Tribunal notes that it was an extremely difficult task to reconstruct events
around Kudamati on 1 February 1942 and Driver Doolan’s role in the action prior to
his death. The narrative of events at Ambon between the Japanese landing and the final
surrender remains confused and, in parts, contradictory. Records of the fighting nations
are incomplete and leave out many details of what happened to the dispersed
formations, particularly in the last hours before the surrender.

150. The Tribunal refers to Annexes B to K, namely maps and illustrations and a
detailed timeline of 1 February 1942, included as Annex L, to assist in establishing the
action of the relevant day.

151. Introduction. The death in action of Driver Doolan on 1 February 1942 was
one incident during the short and ill-fated defence of the island of Ambon by Dutch and
Australian forces against superior Japanese forces between 31 January and 3 February
1942.

152. Approximately 1100 Australian troops, designated ‘Gull Force’ had been
despatched to Ambon after the outbreak of war with Japan to supplement the local
Netherlands East Indies (NEI) forces, some 2600 strong, largely made up of Ambonese
and other NEI soldiers led by Dutch officers.

153. Gull Force consisted of the 2/21st Battalion AIF, together with detachments of
anti-tank artillery, engineers and supporting arms. While this force and the Dutch units
lacked sufficient field artillery, mortars and anti-tank weapons, it was the absence of
naval and air support and a shortage of efficient anti-aircraft weapons that meant the
resistance of such an isolated outpost would be limited in duration and effect. This was
recognised by higher command. It did not have the resources to provide such
reinforcements and seems to have regarded the last-ditch defence of Ambon and the
remaining Allied held areas of the Netherlands East Indies as a means to buy time for
the defence of New Guinea and Australia.

The Historiography of the Fighting

Primary Sources

154. The Australian official history60 relies substantially on documents compiled

in secret in captivity by Gull Force officers. The first version, referred to in these
reasons as the ‘Australian Report’, was produced by the second in command, Major
Macrae, an account that had later to be broken up for concealment from the Japanese,
copied onto other material and then reassembled (partly from memory) and edited by

60
Lionel Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957. pp. 418-441.

Page | 31
Lieutenant Smith in late 1945.61 This record leaves out many details of what happened
to the dispersed formations, particularly in the last hours before the surrender.

155. Another account, found during the Tribunal’s research, also incomplete, was
made by Captain C.F. Newnham in captivity in 1942 and successfully hidden until his
return to Australia in 1945.62 A 1942 Court of Inquiry later made available to the
Australian official historian utilised the testimony of a number of personnel who
escaped shortly after the surrender (and whose recollections were thus relatively fresh),
but its analysis was also inevitably incomplete,63 as was an equivalent Dutch report of
1944.64

156. The Dutch official history, published in 1959, two years after the Australian
official history, is even more sketchy about the later events in the campaign.65

157. A short report of the Japanese operation was prepared in 1947 by Japanese
officers working for the Demobilization Bureau under the Allied occupation forces in
Japan. (This is a different document to what the Tribunal has described in these reasons
to the ‘Japanese account’ prepared much later). This short report was then translated
and edited by the Japanese Research Division of the American Headquarters Army
Forces Far East and issued by the US Army’s Chief of Military History in 1953. An
explanatory comment in this text about the state of the Japanese records is equally
applicable to those of the Allies:

‘The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally
essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or
destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of
compilation most difficult.’66

159. Accounts of the Japanese Army. Only recently have the official accounts of
the Japanese Army been translated into English,67 along with records compiled by the

61
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’ AWM54 573/6/1A
Part 3.
62
Gavin Long Personal Records: Captain C.F. Newnham, AWM67 3/285
63
Court of Inquiry with reference to landing of Japanese Forces in New Britain, Timor and Ambon,
Vol. III, Evidence re Timor and Ambon, dated 8 July 1942. AWM54, 229/1/7 Part 5.
64
Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, Battle for Ambon January/February 1942, report dated 23
May 1944. NAA MP729/7 35/421/67.
65
C. van Hoogenband & L. Schotborgh, Nederlands Indie contra Japan, Vol. VI, De Strijd op Ambon,
Timor en Sumatra, Staatsdrukkerij, S-Gravenhage, 1959, pp. 1-23. Summary in English pp. 157-158.
(The Tribunal made a translation of the key sections of the full Dutch text.)
66
Military History Section, Headquarters Army Forces Far East, Ambon and Timor Invasion
Operations, Japanese Monograph No. 16, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, Washington DC, 1953, p. v.
67
War History Office of the National Defense College of Japan, The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies,
War History Series, Vol. 3, Edited and translated by Willem Remmelink, The Corts Foundation,
Leiden University Press, Leiden, 2015. [Link]

Page | 32
veterans’ associations of some of the Japanese Army units involved, namely the Unit
Association history referred to in these reasons as the ‘Japanese account’ as relied upon
by Major Rutherford.68

160. In summary, aside from Dr David Evans’ work, the research conducted by the
Respondent for this application and the subsequent work of the Tribunal, no previous
Australian assessments have incorporated these Japanese accounts or fully attempted to
align their various narratives, apart from Japanese wartime propaganda, the results of
interrogations and some second and third-hand reports of interviews with Japanese
personnel immediately after the end of the war.69

161. The Japanese accounts help with understanding what happened, but do not
provide all the answers. Notably, in all the Australian, Dutch and Japanese records, it
is evident that some events and locations have been mixed up, while much activity went
unreported.

162. Even with the best endeavours of historians, Army researcher Major Rutherford
and the Tribunal, there remain discontinuities and uncertainties in the narrative of the
few days between the landing of the invasion forces and the final surrender of the
remaining elements of Gull Force. This problem extends to the maps used to record the
events of the time.

Secondary Sources

163. Australian works. Most published works in Australia are based on the
Australian official history, but also derive from a combination of the recollections of
the survivors many years later and statements by Ambonese soldiers and villagers,
collected informally just after the war or at a much later date. The Tribunal will refer to
a book Ambon, Island of Mist,70 written by Mr Courtney Harrison, a member of 2/21st
Battalion who worked alongside Driver Doolan in the days before the Japanese
surrender. Some Australian popular works which deal with the events at Ambon are
remarkable for their inaccuracies and exaggerations and cannot be relied upon, even as
background material.

164. Authoritative scholarship tends to deal with one of two issues. The first, such
as Professor Joan Beaumont’s Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941-
1945 has as its principal focus the harrowing experience of the Australian troops in

68
Hohei Dai 228 Rentai-shi Hensan Iinkai (228th Infantry Regimental History Compilation
Committee) Eds, Hohei Dai 228 Rentai shi (History of the 228th Infantry Regiment), Hohei Dai 228
Rentai-shi Hensan Iinkai, Nagoya, 1st ed. 1973 (2nd ed. 1978). Translated by Dr Steven Bullard 2007.
AWM MSS1912.
69
Narrative of Mr F.H. Waaldyk, as reported in Australasian POST, 21 November 1957, p. 17. #289.
70
Courtney T. Harrison, Ambon, Island of Mist: 2/21st Battalion AIF (Gull Force) Prisoners of War
1941-45, Privately Published, North Geelong, 1988.

Page | 33
captivity rather than the invasion itself, although it includes a very useful summary of
the campaign.71 The second, reflected in Professor Michael Evans’ study, Developing
Australia’s Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon Disaster of 1942
analyses the military strategy behind the despatch and eventual loss of Gull Force.72

165. The only study so far produced which, although focused on strategic command,
includes a detailed assessment of events at the tactical level is Dr David A. Evans’
unpublished 2010 PhD Thesis ‘The Ambon Forward Observation Line Strategy 1941-
1942 A Lesson in Military Incompetence’ from Murdoch University.73

166. Maps. Both Allied and Japanese battle maps are sketchy or, in the case of the
Japanese unit histories, not always to scale or accurate in their identification of
geographical features, and only careful comparison of this material with contemporary
survey charts, as well as 2019 sources, gives a reasonable idea of the times and distances
involved.

167. The best battle map, at least from the Japanese perspective, is that included in
the 1947 study, although it is inaccurate in relation to the actual Australian positions in
the Laitimore Peninsula. This is attached at Annex C. US Army 1:50,000 topographical
maps, based on a 1925 Dutch chart, proved particularly useful to the Tribunal, as did
the 1943 study of Ambon produced by the Southwest Pacific Area Command’s Allied
Geographical Section.74 The US Army maps are attached at Annexes D and E and the
Allied Geographical Section map is at Annex F.

168. The human geography of Ambon in 2019 is much changed from 1942, but
contemporary sources give some insights into the geography of 1942 for the Tribunal’s
purposes. The satellite map of Ambon in 2019 attached as Annex G has much more
extensive built up areas around Ambon city than existed in 1942, but nevertheless
shows jungle area in the south around Gunung Nona (Mount Nona or Peak 514 or Iron
Hat Peak) that is unlikely to have changed much,75 while the main roads (most notably
the coastal road now known as Jalaan Nona Saar Sopacua) are in their original
positions. The location of the memorial termed locally as ‘Tugu Dolan’ (the Doolan
Monument) is also known.

71
Joan Beaumont, Gull Force: Survival and Leadership in Captivity 1941-1945, Allen & Unwin,
Sydney, 1988.
72
Michael Evans, Developing Australia’s Maritime Concept of Strategy: Lessons from the Ambon
Disaster of 1942, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Study Paper No. 303, Duntroon, 2000.
73
[Link] It should be noted that the
Tribunal has formed a different view to Dr Evans of some of the events on 1 February, although it
found Dr Evans’ tactical narrative extremely helpful.
74
Allied Geographical Section Southwest Pacific Area, Area Study of Ambon Island, Terrain Study No.
45, 13 January 1943.
75
[Link]
See also: [Link]
3.7302777,128.1545785,15z/data=!3m1!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x2d6cc2bb7c42cf4f:0x67f6da45cea68597!8
m2!3d-3.7302778!4d128.1633333

Page | 34
170. Time Zones. Ambon in early 1942 was on Moluccan Time (GMT + 8½). It is
believed that this is the time zone employed by the Dutch and Australian forces. The
Japanese were operating on Japan Standard Time (GMT +9) (to which Ambon and most
other parts of the Dutch East Indies were transferred shortly after the occupation).
Times in this narrative have been adjusted to Time Zone GMT +9.

171. The Japanese invasion. This analysis will not examine in detail the complete
Ambon campaign, but focus on the events in the southern areas of the Laitimore
peninsula, where Driver Doolan was stationed, between 31 January 1942 and
1 February 1942.

172. The Japanese surprised the Allies by their choice of landing places. Critically,
the ‘Eastern Detachment’, formed from the Imperial Japanese Army’s 228th Infantry
Regiment, went ashore in the early hours of 31 January 1942 in the vicinity of Hutumori
and Rutung on the south-east coast of the Laitimore Peninsula. This meant that the
Dutch and Australian preparations to meet a landing on the western coast of the
peninsula in Ambon Bay itself were not only wasted, but the defences on the peninsula
were also facing the wrong way. The Dutch forces which had been positioned to protect
Paso from a landing in Baguala Bay on the north-east coast of the peninsula found
themselves similarly discomfited, with the additional threat of troops advancing from a
landing at Hitu-Lama on the northern coast of the main island.

173. The Eastern Detachment troops were divided into a northern ‘right attack unit’,
the 2nd Battalion of the 228th Infantry Regiment, tasked with capturing Paso, linking up
with the force from the north and cutting Allied communications between the Laitimore
Peninsula and the remainder of the island, and a southern ‘left attack unit’ which had
as its first goal the city of Ambon. The latter was further divided into a northern
component, the 3rd Battalion, and a southern, the 1st Battalion.

174. What had been intended as the Australian administrative and support areas south
of Ambon City became the front line, forcing hasty improvisation of defences, while
the speed with which the Eastern Detachment moved westward through what had been
assessed as difficult, if not impenetrable jungle also took both Dutch and Australians
by surprise. There was a rapid and successful junction of the ‘right attack unit’ with
the troops of the 1st Kure Special Naval Landing Force who had landed at Hitu-Lama.
Their capturing the town of Paso cut off the Australian troops on the northern shore of
Ambon Bay defending the Laha Aerodrome from those on Laitimore Peninsula. It also
brought the surrender of the Dutch forces in the northern areas of the peninsula by the
early hours of 1 February 1942. This included the Dutch Lieutenant Colonel J.L.R.
Kapitz who had been in overall command of the Allied forces on Ambon.

174. A key requirement for the remaining Allied forces south of Ambon city was
now to protect the northern and eastern approaches to Mount Nona (Peak 514), the
plateau of which dominated the south-western areas of the peninsula and most of the

Page | 35
existing Allied defensive positions. Four 15cm coastal defence guns on the coast south
of Ambon, known by the Dutch as the Nona Battery, were located in two batteries low
on its western slopes. These positions were known to the Australians as the Benteng
battery, although, as shown on the Dutch battle map (see Annex H), two of the guns
seem to have been installed further south than Benteng itself.76

175. The administrative and stores dumps established south of Ambon in the
Kudamati area now became the front line. The potential need for a strong point in the
heights to the south of Kudamati had been foreseen, although only limited preparations
had been made. With the news of the Japanese landing, the transport and engineer
detachments at Kudamati were deployed into these positions, the transport troops under
Lieutenant D.W. Smith holding the western and southern fronts and the engineers under
Lieutenant C. Campbell the north. In overall command was Captain J. Turner.77 The
latter had relieved the Quartermaster, Captain P. Miskin.78 The formations south of
Kudamati were designated ‘B Echelon’.

176. There is a discrepancy between this summary and the sketch map produced by
Lieutenant Smith supporting what the Tribunal refers to as the Australian report
produced in 1945 that is attached at Annex I. While the map records that Dutch troops
were positioned south of the Australians, other evidence suggests that the 2nd Company
of NEI soldiers equipped with machine guns and under Dutch leadership was placed to
the east, probably as far east as Peak 317. The 2nd Company, made up of troops from
‘different lands’ in the Netherlands East Indies,79 had just been redeployed from Eri in
the south-west and was in position only from 1630 on 31 January 1942, according to
the Australian report. The Dutch history records that a reassignment to Ambon city was
ordered at 1100, but explains that the 2nd Company was redeployed on Australian
instructions not to Ambon city but ‘on the heights of Koedemati (sic).’80 The Dutch
official history explicitly states that the NEI troops were stationed ‘to prevent an enemy
advance from [Mount] Urimesing in the direction of the Nona battery’81 and thus would
have been stationed and would have looked east. The Australian report (in the section
actually composed by Lieutenant Smith, rather than being a re-created version of Major
Macrae’s original report) confirms that the NEI troops were deployed on ‘the east

76
De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, Kaart No.1: Ambon.
77
Based on Lieutenant Smith’s narrative as provided to the AWM. Director AWM Letter 74/8/39 to
Secretary Department of the Army dated 5 June 1949. Smith’s narrative, cited by the Director (but not,
significantly, by Smith himself) as ‘ a quotation from his personal diary’ as presented in this letter is
slightly more complete than that given in Lieutenant D.W. Smith Letter to Military Secretary dated 16
May 1949. AWM 119, 222.
78
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p. 10. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
79
De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, p. 3.
80
De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, p. 19. Given as 1030 (Moluccan Time) in the original. The
romanized rendering of Indonesian place names was not consistent in this period and generally differs
from current practice.
81
De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, p. 19.

Page | 36
front.’82 This positioning most closely accords with the way that events unfolded on
1 February 1942.

177. At the same time, the Australian lines constructed between Amahasu town and
the cliffs to the west of Mount Nona were turned around to face the threat from the
north. Additional positions were established on the northern and eastern slopes of
Mount Nona.

178. Situation on the morning of 1 February 1942. The Japanese ‘right attack
unit’ had secured Paso and the isthmus connecting the Laitimore Peninsula with the
main island by the end of 31 January 1942. The northern elements of the ‘left attack
unit’ (the 3rd Battalion) had occupied Ambon city and the southern elements (the
1st Battalion) were assaulting positions around Mount Sirimau in the highlands to the
east-south-east of Ambon City. The latter fell around 1900 on 31 January 1942.

179. The effect of these successes was to complete the separation of the Allied forces
south of Ambon city from those on the main island. The Eastern Detachment’s
commander, Major General Ito Takeo,83 assessed that he could over-run the Allied
southern positions on the peninsula by the end of Sunday 1 February 1942. He therefore
ordered the ‘left attack unit’ to resume its advance that morning. The day started early
and well for the Japanese with the capture of the Dutch camp at Sojadaitas west of
Sirimau.84 Following this, elements of the 1st Battalion appear to have entered the
south-east corner of Ambon city at 090085 and turned south to resume their advance,
which was ordered for 1100.86

180. The 3rd Battalion, which had spent the night of 31 January/1 February 1942 in
Ambon City, began an advance in the morning. This was described by Lieutenant
W.A.M. Chapman, Assistant Intelligence Officer of 2/21st Battalion in his testimony to
the 1942 Court of Inquiry after his escape from Ambon as:

On 1st February an attack was made, in the morning, by Japanese, on B Echelon,

and down the line of the road on D Company in the AMAHOESE Line.
Communication with B Echelon was severed during the morning.87

82
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p.12. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
83
This narrative respects the Japanese custom of giving the equivalent of the surname first and the
individual’s given name second.
84
Ambon and Timor Invasion Operations, Map No. 2, p. 9.
85
Ambon and Timor Invasion Operations, Map No. 2, p. 9.
86
The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, p. 370.
87
VX45199 Lieutenant W.A.M. Chapman: Testimony to Court of Inquiry with reference to landing of
Japanese Forces in New Britain, Timor and Ambon, Vol. III, Evidence re Timor and Ambon, dated 26
May 1942. AWM54, 229/1/7 Part 5.

Page | 37
181. The attack ‘down the line of the road’, which started at 1000,88 was led by the
4th Company of the 3rd Battalion and supported by the 11th Company of the 3rd Battalion,
with the 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion in reserve. This was directed along the coast
with the idea of first isolating the Dutch 15cm coastal batteries from the defenders
further inland and then capturing them. The coastal batteries, despite being under
increasing fire from Japanese artillery and mortars, were creating a serious problem for
the Japanese attempts to sweep Ambon Bay for mines and provide naval gunfire support
to the forces ashore.

182. However, the thrust was preceded by one led by the 4th Company of the 3rd
Battalion that appears to have been aimed south at the B Echelon positions occupied by
the Australian transport troops and the NEI company south of Kudamati. This advance
probably began after 0830 but it is likely that the Japanese troops entered the Kudamati
village area before this in order to prepare for the attack on the positions on the heights
to the south.

183. It is in this period and against the 4th Company of the 3rd Battalion that Driver
Doolan’s stand is most likely to have occurred.

184. Slides displaying the Japanese lines of advance on 1 February 1942 are attached
at Annex J.

Events directly relating to Driver Doolan

Reconnaissance patrol led by Sergeant O’Brien

185. At 0430 on Sunday 1 February 1942, Lieutenant Smith despatched ‘a small

reconnaissance patrol’ under Platoon Sergeant O’Brien ‘towards the enemy lines’89
from the Australian position south of Kudamati. The relevant passage in Lieutenant
Smith’s recollections as recorded in the Director of the AWM’s letter of 5 June 1949 to
the Secretary of the Army is:

‘On Sunday Feb. 1st at 0400 hours, I sent a small reconnaissance Patrol under
P1. Sgt. J. O’Brien towards the enemy lines. All patrols during this action were
composed of volunteers, and on this occasion Doolan was one of the volunteers.
It was essential that the patrol or some of its members return with the
information required.’90

88
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment, p. 6.
89
Director AWM Letter 74/8/39 to Secretary Department of the Army dated 5 June 1949.
AWM 119, 222.
90
Director AWM Letter 74/8/39 to Secretary Department of the Army dated 5 June 1949.
AWM 119, 222.

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186. The sortie appears to have been intended to find out whether the Japanese had
fully occupied the town of Ambon and what were their dispositions. Lieutenant Smith
confirmed on a number of occasions that ‘all patrols during this action were composed
of volunteers, and on this occasion Driver Doolan was one of the volunteers.’91

187. The most direct road route from the Kudamati area to the central Merdeka Field
in Ambon where the Dutch colonial government’s administrative offices were located
is less than 3 kilometres. Thus, a reconnaissance by vehicle would have taken relatively
little time, even if it encompassed the northern boundaries of the then built-up area of
Ambon. In Time Zone GMT + 9, morning civil twilight began in Ambon on 1 February
1942 at 0612 and sunrise occurred at 0633.92 Given its use of the truck and the need to
avoid itself being surprised in the dark, the patrol would have needed reasonable light
to achieve its aim. It is therefore likely that the reconnaissance party left Australian
lines no earlier than just before 0600 and possibly as late as 0620.

188. Although there are no official Australian after-action reports, it was later
claimed by Gull Force survivors that the patrol encountered Japanese army units. This
could have involved any of the 4th, 9th or 11th Companies of the 3rd Battalion. These
would have been preparing to resume their advance, but had yet to start.

189. There are some later stories of the patrol attacking93 and even entering buildings
being used as headquarters by the Japanese, but other more credible accounts claim that
the Australians attacked enemy troops and their vehicles with light weapons and
grenades without disembarking from their truck – and almost certainly without
stopping. Such an engagement is much more likely to have taken place in the south of
Ambon city than in the north and was therefore probably no more than 2 kilometres
from Kudamati – and in all likelihood less than that.

190. The Tribunal formed the view that the encounter most likely took place north
of the hospital, in the southern limits of the main township but, as Japanese troops had
been spotted in the hospital area late the previous afternoon, an encounter could well
have been further south and in the hospital grounds.

191. The patrol under Sergeant O’Brien took advantage of the resulting confusion to
withdraw along the road it had come. Perhaps significantly, the Japanese accounts make
no mention of any encounter with a patrol, suggesting that the contact was much more
fleeting and less effective than the patrol’s survivors thought. It is also not mentioned

91
Director AWM Letter 74/8/39 to Secretary Department of the Army dated 5 June 1949.
AWM 119, 222.
92
Based on the tables for 1943 set out in Area Study of Ambon Island. The 2019 figures are 0610 for
MCT and 0631 for sunrise.
93
Shaun McIlraith, ‘Bill Doolan – Who Died Game’ People, 6 April 1955, p. 6. See also: Alec
Hepburn, True Australian War Tales, Rigby, Adelaide, 1983, p. 127.

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in the Australian report prepared by Major Macrae and edited by Lieutenant Smith,
which includes Lieutenant Smith’s personal recollections of the Kudamati actions.
Smith recorded only that Sergeant ‘O’Brien reported enemy troops in the town of
Ambon’.94 The Tribunal accepts Lieutenant Smith’s account.

192. The Tribunal acknowledged it is also possible that some of the events described
above, based as they were on the post-war recollections of Gull Force survivors, relate
to a different reconnaissance patrol, one despatched from the Amahasu lines later in the
morning on 1 February 1942 under the command of Warrant Officer Class One L.C.
Warren, the Regimental Sergeant Major of 2/21st Battalion. One of the early escapers
from Ambon, Regimental Sergeant Major Warren testified at the Court of Inquiry
conducted into the campaign in May 1942. From his evidence, this patrol appears to
have been undertaken at a time when B Echelon was under attack, but before the
Benteng batteries were abandoned – probably around 0900. Before returning to
Amahasu lines, Warren claimed that his patrol saw the Japanese using requisitioned
civilian trucks, as well as bicycles in the vicinity of Ambon city. He went on to say:

‘We cut back through the town, having several skirmishes with the Japanese,
and by BENTENG barracks we picked up two of the original men from
B Echelon who were being pursued by about 40 Japanese.’ 95

Driver Doolan elects to stay behind and fight, alone

193. Earlier in the morning, after breaking contact and returning to the village area
of Kudamati, Sergeant O’Brien’s patrol had abandoned their truck and started out on
foot to return to Australian lines. This is likely to have been no later than 0645. The
likely route of Sergeant O’Brien’s patrol, the position of its interaction with the
Japanese and Driver Doolan’s location in Kudamati are shown on the sequence of slides
prepared by the Tribunal at Annex K.

194. At this point, according to Lieutenant Smith, Driver Doolan ‘elected to remain
behind, to ensure the successful withdrawl [sic] of the party.’ Smith based this statement
on the report made to him shortly after by Sergeant O’Brien. The relevant passage in
the letter of 16 May 1949 setting out Lieutenant Smith’s recollections is:

‘O’Brien returned about 0700 [0730 +9] hrs. Gave me the information, and
advised that Doolan had elected to remain behind, to ensure the successful
withdrawl [sic] of the party. I could hear the S.A.A. & M.G. fire which ensued

94
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’ p. 12. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
95
W39687 WO1 L.C. Warren: Testimony to Court of Inquiry with reference to landing of Japanese
Forces in New Britain, Timor and Ambon, Vol. III, Evidence re Timor and Ambon, dated 28 May
1942. AWM54, 229/1/7 Part 5.

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 during Doolan’s engagement of the enemy, but could not see anything. The
firing took place before O’Brien actually returned to my position.’ 96

195. Sergeant O’Brien reported back to Lieutenant Smith at 0730. Lieutenant Smith
had heard small arms and machine gun fire from the direction of the village ‘before
Sergeant O’Brien actually returned to my position’.97 This is the only direct evidence
from Australian sources of the action in which Driver Doolan was involved.

196. Although as a driver, Doolan would have had only a rifle as his personal
weapon, the Tribunal determines that it is possible that at this point he was given a Bren
machine-gun and magazines as used by Australian troops and as considered by Major
Rutherford. This would also accord with the Japanese account which stated a Bren
machine-gun was in use and the recollection of Job Lekatompessy who claimed to have
witnessed Driver Doolan with a Bren machine-gun.

197. The Tribunal believes that the 4th Company of the 3rd Battalion most likely came
into contact with Driver Doolan in his defensive position before it began its main attack
on the B Echelon positions. This probably occurred between 0715 and 0830 because,
with an attack primarily aimed at the Benteng batteries scheduled for 1000, the troops
needed to secure their flank at Kudamati before they began their advance further west
and south.

198. Another aim of the Japanese Army is likely to have been to cut the Australian
positions south of Kudamati off from the Benteng batteries, something which they seem
to have achieved relatively quickly, partly because some of the troops in B Echelon’s
western entrenchments abandoned their positions.98 The three companies earmarked for
the advance along the coastal road to Benteng had no other compelling reason to enter
the area concerned. In this regard, Lieutenant Chapman’s statement that the attack was
‘down the line of the road’ is particularly significant.99 It is likely, (supported by
Regimental Sergeant Major Warren’s evidence), that these troops moved into Kudamati
in captured and commandeered trucks, although this is not certain.

199. The location of Driver Doolan’s body. Where the body was found and the
position in which he is claimed to have made a last stand are associated with the
memorial to Gull Force in Kudamati which has come to be known as ‘Tugu Dolan’ (the
‘Doolan Monument’). This is in the area known as Batu Gantung approximately 500

96
Director AWM Letter 74/8/39 to Secretary Department of the Army dated 5 June 1949.
97
Director AWM Letter 74/8/39 to Secretary Department of the Army dated 5 June 1949.
AWM 119, 222.
98
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’ p. 12. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
99
VX45199 Lieutenant W.A.M. Chapman: Testimony to Court of Inquiry with reference to landing of
Japanese Forces in New Britain, Timor and Ambon, Vol. III, Evidence re Timor and Ambon, dated 26
May 1942. AWM54, 229/1/7 Part 5.

Page | 41
metres north east of the Australian B Echelon positions which had been set up to protect
the approaches to Mount Nona in the south.

200. Although there is clearly some uncertainty about the exact spot, such
uncertainty does appear to be contained within a radius of no more than 150 metres –
the difference being the belief of some of the local people that the location of Driver
Doolan’s defensive stand was on a knoll further to the south and that ‘Tugu Dolan’ is
the spot where Driver Doolan was buried a few days later.100

201. Lieutenant Smith set out his recollections in his letter to the Military Secretary
on 16 May 1949:

‘Some days later, when the action was over, and the surrender took effect, I
observed Doolan’s body near a tree, at the side of the road in the village of
Koedamati. His body was riddled with bullets, and his head practically severed
by what appeared to be bursts of M.G. fire at short range.’101

202. The general location is consistent with the likely point at which the truck would
have been abandoned by the patrol, with the time that would have been taken by
Sergeant O’Brien to find Lieutenant Smith and the fact that the latter was in earshot of
the firing which is believed to be associated with Driver Doolan’s action (vide
Annex K).

203. Heroic narratives. There can be no doubt that there was a strong collective
view which quickly developed amongst the local people that Driver Doolan staged a
heroic last stand against the Japanese, that it was in Kudamati and that his gallantry
deserved special recognition. Captain John Turner recorded in 1949 that he had been
told by an Ambonese man during the Japanese occupation ‘of Driver Doolan’s exploit,
although he did not mention his name but referred to him as an “Australian soldier”’.102

204. The Allied occupation forces in 1945 appear to have been struck by the strength
of the locals’ recognition of Doolan’s action.103 Major Paul Rosenzweig’s thesis on the
post-war ‘pilgrimages’ of Gull Force survivors to Ambon provides a good summary of
the heroic narratives which ‘grew up’ around the incident.104

205. An authoritative reconstruction of events around Kudamati for the remainder of

1 February 1942 is, however, extremely difficult.

100
P.A. Rosenzweig, ZIARAH: The Gull Force Association Pilgrimages to Ambon, MA Thesis,
Northern Territory University, 2000, pp. 110-111.
101
Lieutenant D.W. Smith Letter to Military Secretary dated 16 May 1949. AWM 119, 222.
102
Captain John M. Turner letter to Military Secretary dated 5 May 1949. AWM 119, 222.
103
ZIARAH: The Gull Force Association Pilgrimages to Ambon, pp.112-113.
104
ZIARAH: The Gull Force Association Pilgrimages to Ambon, pp.109-118.

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206. Local accounts. Eye-witness Job Lekatompessy. The only known
eye-witness to Driver Doolan’s actions, Job Lekatompessy, was an eight year old boy
at the time. Job already knew Driver Doolan ‘because he would come to my house with
one of his friends and drink coffee.’ On 1 February 1942, Doolan,

‘came that day with a bottle of soft drink and from my house he borrowed an
opener. That day he had two other soldiers with him, two Australians…It was
about noon when Doolan and the other two came. Later, we saw the Japanese
coming. They were coming in long lines and in trucks. Doolan said to the other
two. “You go!” And they left him and went up the hill…There was no one there
at all then except us, and the Japanese spreading out and coming up the slope.’105

207. Job admitted in one interview that he ‘could not see much of the fight’, but his
story was that Driver Doolan had climbed a tree with a light machine gun, that the tree
was on a slope and that the Japanese, who had arrived in the area in trucks, made
repeated advances but were forced to fall back, while ‘the dead lay like stones in a
watercourse.’106 The accounts of Driver Doolan’s stand which exist make claims of
Japanese casualties ranging from 80 to 200 and Job himself was not consistent in the
figure he gave, nor in some of the details of the fighting.107 Furthermore, it is not likely
that a tree would support the weight of an adult male while providing stability for
accurate firing of a Bren machine-gun or the launching of grenades or magazine
reloading. It is possible that Driver Doolan used the tree concerned as cover while firing
from the ground. The reality was summed up by one local, ‘…how many Japanese he
[Doolan] has killed, nobody knows.’108

208. Job stated that, after the engagement, Doolan ‘came out of his tree and walked
to a place in the village where there was a field telephone.’ According to Job, Driver
Doolan was trying to make contact with the Australian lines when he was attacked and
killed by Japanese troops. Job reported that:

‘He was wounded about five times. He fell down. But from where I watched
none of his wounds seemed to be very bad. The Japanese pushed him over so
he lay face down. Then they killed him by pushing a bayonet through the temple
from side to side.’109

209. There are no other eye-witness accounts, although the Tribunal notes that one
local (Mr Bill Gazperz) believed that there was another eyewitness, Sergeant Major
F.H. Waaldyk of the NEI Army (later the caretaker of the Ambon war cemetery).110

105
Job as quoted directly by Pat Burgess, ‘The Ballad of Driver Doolan. Day 2: Doolan stays to fight!’
106
Job as quoted directly by Pat Burgess, ‘The Ballad of Driver Doolan. Day 2: Doolan stays to fight!’
107
Job is cited as claiming 200 dead by Pat Burgess, ‘The Ballad of Driver Doolan. Day 2: Doolan
stays to fight!’,
108
ZIARAH: The Gull Force Association Pilgrimages to Ambon, p. 100.
109
Pat Burgess, ‘The Ballad of Driver Doolan. Day 2: Doolan stays to fight!’.
110
ZIARAH: The Gull Force Association Pilgrimages to Ambon, p. 111.

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However, this was not the case, as Waaldyk made no claim to this. Rather, as explained
in his 1957 letter to Australasian Post, Sergeant Major Waaldyk claimed to have spoken
after the war to a Japanese officer who was held prisoner for war crimes and who
claimed to have been an eyewitness:

‘He told me that Doolan killed in the fight 120 Japs. The Nips, however, went
around him; killed him, and, already killed, stabbed him with their bayonets.’111

Tribunal’s observations of Job’s accounts and Harrison’s account

210. It should be noted that the Japanese official history states that the total Japanese
casualties in the Ambon campaign from 30 January to 3 February were 55 dead and 135
wounded.112 Although Japanese records are not always reliable on this subject, these
figures are consistent with the accounts of the Japanese unit association, which focus
on both individual and group experiences – often listing dead personnel by name - and
which, written by veterans for veterans and their families, had no interest in minimising
their losses. They are also realistic given the scale and effectiveness of the Allied
defence as a whole. By comparison, the best estimate of Australian deaths in action
during the campaign is 54.113 Thus, if Driver Doolan did inflict any casualties on the
Japanese, they could not have been on anything like the numbers claimed by many of
the sources, including Job.

211. Job’s account of Doolan’s body as he found it accords with Lieutenant Smith’s
recollection that Driver Doolan’s body when discovered a few days later had multiple
bullet wounds and that his head was nearly severed.114 However, this does not prevent
the possibility that Driver Doolan was neutralised by a grenade and killed close range
with light weapons either in action or attempting to surrender. It also does not prevent
the possibility that, in the immediate aftermath of the action, Driver Doolan’s body was
subjected to further attacks by soldiers resentful of their losses.

212. Another version by Job, as retold by Captain Philip Miskin in 1955, specifically
follows the comment that:

‘Some say he killed and wounded 80 Japanese’ with the statement that an
‘Ambonese wash-boy [who is believed to be Job Lekatompessy] told a different
story…He [Doolan] turned on his pursuers and with rifle, bayonet and grenade

111
‘Don’t Forget Doolan of Ambon’, Australasian POST, 21 November 1957, p. 17.
112
The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, p. 372.
113
Courtney T. Harrison, Ambon, Island of Mist: 2/21st Battalion AIF (Gull Force) Prisoners of War
1941-45, Privately Published, North Geelong, 1988, p. 260. This figure does not include the massacres
at or near Laha after the Australian surrender in that area.
114
Lieutenant D.W. Smith Letter to Military Secretary dated 16 May 1949. AWM119/222.

Page | 44
 strewed the earth around him with two rings of Japanese dead, before falling
dead himself.’

213. Miskin’s story of Doolan also stated that he was ‘perched in a tree.’115

214. The 1945 Allied Occupation Forces’ newspaper Ambon News, in giving the
background to the ‘Song of Doolan’ that was circulating amongst the Ambonese, stated
that the ‘story the Ambonese tell of him’ was:

‘He was alone when he made his last stand. High in a Gandaria tree near the
Batoegantoeng River, he built a machine gun nest and waited in it with his gun
aimed on the bend of the road.

Three trucks full of Japanese soldiers came roaring up the narrow track, and as
they passed, Doolan poured the devastating fire at point blank range. The
Japanese casualties were staggering. Doolan stayed where he was, waiting.
Then some hours later, Japanese snipers who were sent out to pick him off,
found his hiding place and he was shot through the back of the neck, crashing
through the branches on to the ground, dead.’116

215. Mr Courtney T. Harrison, another member of 2/21st Battalion who worked

alongside Driver Doolan in the days before the Japanese invasion, told a somewhat
different story in his 1988 book, Ambon Island of Mist:

‘Doolan was stationed at a large food dump with ‘B’ Echelon at Kudamati on
the outskirts of Ambon town…On receiving the order to move to action stations
and learning that the change in command from Roach to Scott had thrown the
Australian defence system into confusion and now placed ‘B’ Echelon in the
forward position of the defence lines at Amahasu and Eri, Doolan refused to
move with his mates and was heard to say,

‘Give me a yard of bike chain and I’ll do the bastards over myself’.

In fact two days previously he had been given a service revolver by [Captain
W.] Aitken [a medical officer]. As the enemy approached Ambon, Doolan,
armed with six hand grenades, his rifle and revolver, positioned himself in the
thick undergrowth at the bottom of the native house yard, and is believed to
have made his lone attack on the truckloads of Japanese troops as they left the
main road and went towards where he lay waiting.’117

115
Shaun McIlraith, ‘Bill Doolan – Who Died Game’ People, 6 April 1955, p. 6.
116
‘Song of Doolan’, Ambon News, Wednesday 7 November 1945.
117
Ambon, Island of Mist, p. 50.

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216. Mr Harrison claimed that he found Doolan’s body a week after the capitulation
during a visit to the Kudamati locality to recover medical stores. Permission was given
by the Japanese for a party to bury Doolan the following day, at a time when
Mr Harrison claimed that,

‘The natives who had fled to the hills before the fighting had still not returned,
and any Japanese bodies had been removed, consequently the result of Bill
Doolan’s lone attack was known only to the Japanese.’118

217. Mr Harrison repeated in an interview in 1993 that he had seen Doolan’s body.119

218. There are conflicting accounts of who buried Driver Doolan. Both Lieutenant
Smith and Mr Harrison stated that the burial party was made up of AIF personnel. The
Ambonese locals insisted that they themselves had ‘buried him under the gandaria tree
at Kudamati’. This claim was repeatedly made by both Mr Pete Papilaya and Mr Paul
Kastanja.120 The Tribunal does not determine it necessary for its purposes to resolve the
inconsistencies as to who found and buried Driver Doolan’s body.

The Japanese advance south from Ambon – forenoon of 1 February 1942

219. Before the Tribunal makes its final assessment, Driver Doolan’s action needs to
be considered in relation to the other events in the area that day.

220. While the Japanese accounts are not easy to follow, it is clear is the Japanese
forces moved forward later than 0730 – as noted above. The Japanese records give
1100 for the easternmost attack towards Peak 317 and 1000 for the south-western attack
on Benteng. The southern attack on B Echelon preceded that of Benteng and the
Tribunal assesses that it was initiated around 0830, while the Japanese charts, both in
the official history and the unit history, although not completely consistent, suggest that
a renewed attack on B Echelon was taken up after the 3rd Battalion’s earlier efforts by
elements of the 1st Battalion.121 (Vide Annex J). However, any 1st Battalion attack on

118
Ambon, Island of Mist, pp. 50-51.
119
[Link]
120
ZIARAH: The Gull Force Association Pilgrimages to Ambon, pp. 111-112. See also: Paul Kastanja
letter to Wendy dated 11 August 1982.
121
Illustration No. 36, War History Office of the National Defense College of Japan, The Invasion of
the Dutch East Indies, War History Series, Vol. 3, p. 372; Edited and translated by Willem Remmelink,
The Corts Foundation, Leiden University Press, Leiden, 2015; History of the 228th Infantry Regiment,.
The chart ‘3rd Battalion Battles’ suggests that the 4th Company of the 3rd Battalion staged an attack on B
Echelon before heading for the Bentang batteries, but the following chart and in the official history
suggest that the attack was conducted by elements of the 1st Battalion. The map ‘3rd Battalion Battles’
is extremely distorted and not to scale, to the point of being misleading, particularly in relation to the
Amahasu positions. It also misidentifies Peak 317 as ‘Iron Hat Peak’, increasing the confusion about
the location of this Peak reflected in the text. The translator, Dr Steven Bullard, confirmed that the
English text copy of the map was an exact translation – with known errors in identification retained –

Page | 46
B Echelon would have been later in the forenoon and thus later than Driver Doolan’s
likely engagement.

221. The eastern advance south. As to the eastern wing: supported by the
remainder of its companies which had moved directly west from Mount Sirimau, the 1st
Battalion headed south from Ambon city and over-ran the defences around Peak 317.
The NEI troops, tired by their repeated redeployments and short of food and water, had
already suffered significant desertions. Although they held the Japanese off until about
1230, the survivors seem to have abandoned their positions after this. While the
Ambonese in the 2nd Company would have made for their home villages, others
(probably the majority) headed south-west to Amahasu,122 which is confirmed by the
Dutch history123 and in the Australian report.124

222. The Japanese then continued south in attempt to envelop the defences around
Peak 514 (Mount Nona). This proved more difficult than expected, and they ‘had made
little progress by the time night fell’.125 Given the timings and the fact that their
movements were up to a kilometre east of Driver Doolan’s locality (Lieutenant Smith
in the Australian account records seeing ‘300…moving up the east slopes of Nona’
from the Kudamati position126), it does not appear likely for these elements of the 1st
Battalion to have been engaged in any action involving Driver Doolan.

223. The southern advance from Kudamati. The Tribunal acknowledges that
Lieutenant Smith’s narrative does not align with the Japanese accounts in its estimate
of the time of the first morning assault on B Echelon. This has obvious significance in
relation to Driver Doolan’s actions. Lieutenant Smith recorded that:

‘At about 0700 hrs (0730 +9) an enemy body were (sic) observed advancing
toward the SW. The tps were hotly engaged by Tpt personnel (Lt. D.W. Smith)
and casualties inflicted, the enemy facing a prepared position were unable to
make any progress and withdrew.’127

of the original Japanese map and provided the Tribunal with a copy of the latter as confirmation. Dr
Steven Bullard Email dated 7 September 2019.
122
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p. 12. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
123
De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, p. 19.
124
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p. 16. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
125
The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies, p. 370.
126
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p. 13. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
127
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’ AWM54 573/6/1A
Part 3.

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224. Mr Harrison recorded in 1988 that:

‘Early on Sunday 1 February Japanese troops advanced along the road from
Ambon towards Kudamati village in rough marching order, four abreast, only
to receive severe punishment from machine guns, rifles and grenades, forcing
them to withdraw rapidly.’128

225. The Tribunal notes that Lieutenant Smith’s estimate of time was made nearly
four years after the event, and Mr Harrison’s, many years later, while there is no
confirmation that the narrative quoted above was based on Mr Harrison’s own
eyewitness evidence (which is unlikely). Given that Lieutenant Smith recorded in other
documents that Sergeant O’Brien reported to him at the same time (0730) but did not
mention being simultaneously engaged with the enemy, the Tribunal believes
Lieutenant Smith’s estimate is slightly flawed and that the action took place a little later
in the forenoon (around 0830). This was after any encounter involving Driver Doolan,
notwithstanding Mr Harrison’s recollection that the Japanese approach was ‘Early on
Sunday’. The Tribunal does not, however, believe that Job’s recollection that Driver
Doolan appeared ‘about noon’ is accurate. Notably, Lieutenant Smith reported in his
1945 record, following the entry about Sergeant O’Brien’s report:

‘Japanese Army vehicles were seen moving up the road to the Sanatorium. With
these were 2 Aust Ambulances. Combatant troops were debussed from all these
vehicles. The C.C.S [Casualty Clearing Station], had been captured with all
personnel early in the morning and these were marched up to the Sanatorium as
prisoners. We continued to engage this position but again poor results.’129

226. Further confirmation that B Echelon’s engagements continued later in the

forenoon than Lieutenant Smith’s recollection comes from the evidence of several of
the witnesses at the 1942 Court of Inquiry.130 While not specific about the time in ‘the
morning’ that the attack on B Echelon was mounted, the context suggests that the 3rd
Battalion attack was early in the forenoon, but did not continue for long. Given the rapid
abandonment of the positions in the west of B Echelon as a result of Sergeant Major
Ryan’s orders, the Kudamati position would no longer have presented an obstacle to
the advance on the Dutch coastal batteries which were the 3rd Battalion’s primary
objectives.

128
Ambon, Island of Mist, p. 51.
129
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p. 13. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
130
See evidence of VX45199 Lieutenant W.A.M. Chapman, dated 26 May 1942; VX 44818
Lieutenant W.T. Jinkins, dated 26 May 1942: VX 44785 Lieutenant A.G. Jack, dated 27 May 1942;
VX 39687 Warrant Officer Class One L.C. Warren, dated 28 May 1942. Testimony to Court of
Inquiry with reference to landing of Japanese Forces in New Britain, Timor and Ambon, Vol. III,
Evidence re Timor and Ambon AWM54, 229/1/7 Part 5.

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227. The circumstantial evidence therefore suggests that there was an early forenoon
encounter on 1 February 1942 between B Echelon of Gull Force and elements of the
Japanese 3rd Battalion, probably spearheaded by the 4th Company, followed by
engagements further to the east between the Allied troops in the position south of
Kudamati and elements of the Japanese 1st Battalion as the forenoon progressed. During
their southern advance, these elements of the 1st Battalion engaged both the Australian
troops in the heights above Kudamati and the elements of the NEI company stationed
nearby. The latter seem to have largely abandoned their positions by early afternoon.

228. The Tribunal assesses that there was a window of up to two hours for an
engagement involving Doolan to have taken place within Kudamati village itself,
although it remains of the view that the most likely time for such an encounter was
between 0715 and 0830, with the first attack on B Echelon by the 4th Company 3rd
Battalion following shortly after.

229. The NEI Army desertions and the capture of the Benteng/ Nona coastal batteries
meant the Australian troops on the ridge above Kudamati, despite the ‘hot’ defence they
had mounted, were soon cut off from the positions further south. Lieutenant Smith
recorded that the Australians attempted to engage Japanese troops to the south-west and
later to the east (the elements of the 1st Battalion who were advancing south to Mount
Nona), but that the range was too great for effective results, while ‘there was no means
of advising Bn HQ’.131 It had also proved impossible to provide any support to the
coastal batteries because of a combination of the NEI Army desertions with the
disappearance of some key Australian personnel.

230. The lack of further reference to the Australian position south of Kudamati in the
Japanese accounts suggests that the latter recognised that it could be left alone while
operations were mounted against Nona to the south and Amahasu to the south-west.
This is consistent with the Japanese account of their later operations and with that
provided eight years later, by Captain Turner, who reported:

‘My only other definite recollection which might assist is that for one day heavy
firing proceeded from a point on an inside road running down from the town of
Amboina (sic), towards + past the hill at KOEDIMATI (sic). Large parties of
Japanese troops apparently detoured from this position and climbed behind our
position out of range to attack Australian positions at NONA and
AMAHOESOE.’132

131
‘Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’, p. 13. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
132
Captain John M. Turner letter to Military Secretary dated 5 May 1949. AWM119/222.

Page | 49
231. It is also consistent with Captain Miskin’s 1963 recollection of what followed
the successful repulse of the initial assault on Kudamati:

‘Miskin and his men, practically all of whom had been wounded by shellfire,
remained in triumphant possession of their mountain. They were still there and
unconquered five (sic) days after the invasion began.’133

232. The south-western advance along the coast road & the 9th Company of the
3rd Battalion action. The Tribunal carefully considered the assessment made by Major
Rutherford in the Army research report and repeated during his evidence before the
Tribunal that the Japanese account in the 228th Infantry Regiment’s Unit Association
history of the 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion’s encounter on 1 February 1942 was
credible evidence in determining Driver Doolan’s actions and his fate.134

233. As previously stated, it is important to note, although Major Rutherford

described the account as an ‘after action report’ by a Japanese officer, it is in fact one
narrative in what is a pastiche constructed many years later by the authors of the Unit
Association history. It is not certain how much of the text is directly derived from
contemporary or near-contemporary material and how much from the collective
recollections of the survivors of the 228th Infantry Regiment in later years. The
explanatory comment about the lack of surviving Japanese battle records made in the
1947 history and quoted above (Paragraph 157) is relevant.

234. The description of the action suggests that the Japanese were advancing across
a ‘slightly elevated grassy area’ when ‘they suddenly came under concentrated fire from
a Bren machine-gun fired by a concealed enemy at fairly close range’. A platoon
commander, Second Lieutenant Muto and a junior NCO were killed. The defender was
invisible to the Japanese, suggesting effective concealment in heavier growth outside
the plantation, and succeeded in keeping the Japanese troops pinned down for several
hours. An attempt to outflank the enemy position resulted in three more dead before the
grenade squad successfully eliminated the threat.

Analysis of the Japanese account

235. Although the numbers of the defenders are never specified in the Japanese
account, the events detailed strongly suggest that they were facing only small numbers
of personnel and possibly an individual. Notably, it was a single Japanese ‘grenade
squad’ which achieved final success, without itself apparently sustaining any casualties.
However, it is not certain from the account whether their adversaries were killed or
successfully withdrew from the scene.

133
‘The Heroic Stand on Ambon’, June-July 1963, p. 43.
134
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment, pp. 18-19.

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236. Furthermore, the loss by the Japanese of two dead in the first phase of the action
and three in the second represents a much more realistic kill ratio for an individual or a
small patrol than a larger formation. It should also be noted that this casualty total (with
the likely addition of two or three times the number of wounded – the Japanese account
admits to casualties in addition to the dead) is a much more realistic figure than the
numbers suggested after the war or by Job Lekatompessy who claimed to be an
eyewitness to Driver Doolan’s actions.

237. The Japanese account also makes it clear that the defender or defenders
concerned remained in position for an extended and resisted a follow-up attack. Given
the defence’s success in the first phase, particularly in remaining concealed and the
extent to which the Japanese were pinned down, this suggests that at least one
opportunity to make a clean break and retreat to Australian lines was foregone by the
soldier or soldiers concerned, even if a successful withdrawal may have ultimately been
made.

238. It is true that there are elements of the Japanese account which accord with
fragments of the recollections of Job concerning Driver Doolan’s final action. This
includes Job’s report that, ‘The fight lasted two hours’ and ‘Then…the Japanese fell
back down the hill’.135 However, the Tribunal does not consider that the episode, which
was part of the advance south along the coast road, can be associated with Driver
Doolan.

239. The key problem of correlation is that the Japanese account specifically states
that ‘The 9th Company, with Kawake’s 1st Platoon left in Ambon City in reserve, headed
south-west along the shoreline of the bay…’136 This movement would have been along
the coastal road and in a direction away from Kudamati. (See Annex J).

240. Although there are examples of confusion in the location of key positions
elsewhere in the Japanese account (notably the siting of the Dutch 15cm coastal defence
guns which were in the Benteng/ Nona batteries, not Peak 317),137 this description is
specific and in context. The 9th Company was the reserve for the assault on the Benteng/
Nona batteries, which seem to have fallen soon after the Dutch gunners destroyed their
weapons (around 0930) and the Japanese began their attack. The 1947 Japanese analysis
shows a time of 1040.138 The Dutch official history claims that the batteries fell ‘on the
evening of 1 February’,139 but the Tribunal considers the Japanese and Australian
estimates of time are more credible, although it is possible that the capture of the
southern position was considerably later than that of the northern battery.

135
Pat Burgess, ‘The Ballad of Driver Doolan. Day 2: Doolan stays to fight!’,
136
Unit Account, translated by Dr Steven Bullard, p. 18.
137
Unit Account, translated by Dr Steven Bullard, p. 6.
138
Ambon and Timor Invasion Operations, p. 9.
139
De Strijd op Ambon, Timor en Sumatra, p. 19.

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241. Notably, the 1944 Dutch report on the campaign gives 1100 as the time at which
‘it was decided to demolish the battery and withdraw to Amahoese’.140 Captain
Newnham, however, recorded in 1942 that ‘a Dutch officer and 41 OR’s from
“Benteng” Arty’ retreated south to the Amahasu lines at this time,141 suggesting that
the spiking of the guns had occurred earlier than 1100. The Japanese account indicates
that the 9th Company’s action was after the capture of the coastal batteries and occurred
further south along the road to Amahasu and Eri, the Company having been ‘deployed
as reinforcements along the road with the aim of increasing gains in the area.’142 The
1947 Japanese map shows a time of 1235 for initiating this renewed advance.143

242. Finally, the encounter with the concealed enemy required them to ‘cut through
the plantation to the right of the road’ [i.e. to the north or west]. Even if the Japanese
then turned back to the east to deal with the threat, this places the action at least two
kilometres west-south-west of where Driver Doolan’s body was found. This assessment
approximately accords with the location of Second Lieutenant Muto’s death as shown
in the distorted Japanese sketch map entitled ‘3rd Battalion Battles’.144 (See Annex B)

243. There is one possible association with a reported Australian action. This
concerns a patrol sent north along the coastal road from Amahasu during the afternoon
of 1 February 1942 in an attempt to re-establish contact with Kudamati:

‘…as it set out its forward elements contacted those of the Japanese who had
moved on after Benteng Battery had been taken. Several casualties were
sustained and as progress along the defile appeared impossible the platoon fell
back and took up its position on the left facing Ambon.’145

244. Further details of the action were recorded by Captain Newnham in his 1942
report.146 What is clear is that it was sustained and that the Japanese were held back for
some hours.

245. Notably, this incident aligns with the Japanese account in time. It also aligns in
place, as far as can be determined from the Japanese unit association history’s battle
map. While this is not to scale and is significantly distorted, particularly in locating the
Amahusu lines further north than they actually were, it shows Lieutenant Muto’s death

140
Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service, Battle for Ambon January/February 1942, report dated 23
May 1944, p. 10. NAA MP729/7 35/421/67. The original cites 1030 (+8½).
141
Gavin Long Personal Records: Captain C.F. Newnham, ‘Report by Capt. C.F. Newnham re
Amahoesoe and Erie’, p. 5. AWM67 3/285. The original cites 1030 (+8½).
142
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment , p. 6.
143
Ambon and Timor Invasion Operations, p. 9.
144
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment , p. 18.
145
Action of the Gull Force on AMBOINA December 1941 – 3 February 1942’ p. 15. AWM54
573/6/1A Part 3.
146
Gavin Long Personal Records: Captain C.F. Newnham, ‘Report by Capt. C.F. Newnham re
Amahoesoe and Erie’, p. 5. AWM67 3/285.

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as having occurred close to the coastal road as it ran towards Amahasu and well away
from the Australian positions south of Kudamati.

246. The Tribunal was unable to find records of any other incident on 1 February
1942 which could be ascribed to Driver Doolan.

Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence

247. The Tribunal gives limited weight only to Job Lekatompessy, whose eyewitness
recollections, recorded second-hand, partially align with the other evidence and whose
conviction of the truth of his story seems to have been compelling to those who heard
it. However, ultimately the Tribunal had difficulty relying upon those hearsay accounts
noting his young age at the time, particularly given that the accounts differed and the
number of Japanese casualties was grossly exaggerated.

248. While other second and even third hand reports of Driver Doolan’s actions
recorded in the immediate aftermath of war are confused, sometimes contradictory and
verge on hagiography, if not outright myth, it is clear that there was a belief in many
quarters – according to one source, even amongst the Japanese – that Driver Doolan
had made a stand against the invaders. This view was current amongst the Kudamati
villagers from the outset of the Japanese occupation. The Tribunal considers in total
that this is evidence, even if circumstantial, of Driver Doolan’s conduct. The Tribunal,
however, emphasises that there seem to have been no other actual eye-witnesses to
Driver Doolan’s actions than Job Lekatompessy. (The accounts of Ambonese adults
were all hearsay.)

249. The Tribunal gave careful consideration to the Japanese account of the extended
encounter of Japan’s 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion with a concealed individual
defender or small group. The Tribunal believes that the Japanese account is credible
and accurately describes an action in which an effective defence was mounted from a
concealed position. However, the timing as well as the distance of this action from
where Driver Doolan’s body was found and where he was most likely to have made a
stand indicate that the concealed defender (or defenders) could not have been Driver
Doolan. It is more likely to have been a reconnaissance patrol sent north in the early
afternoon from Amahusu as set out at paragraph 192.

Tribunal Finding as to the actions of Driver Doolan

250. Reconnaissance patrol. The Tribunal is satisfied that Driver William Thomas
Doolan VX35406, already a volunteer for a reconnaissance patrol in Ambon on 1
February 1942, further volunteered to remain behind in Kudamati to cover the retreat
of troops from the expected advancing enemy. This finding is based on Lieutenant
Smith’s evidence, repeated in two separate documents in recollections as set out in the

Page | 53
letters of 1949 and publicly in Reveille in 1962,147 all of which is derived from the report
made to him at the time by Sergeant O’Brien.

251. Electing to stay and fight, alone. The circumstantial evidence from Australian
sources, namely Lieutenant Smith’s hearing of small arms and machine gun fire shortly
before O’Brien’s arrival and his later observation of Driver Doolan’s body with its
multiple bullet wounds and mutilation, strongly suggests that Driver Doolan conducted
at least one engagement with the enemy. The Tribunal believes that the forces which
he engaged were likely elements of the 4th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 228th
Infantry Regiment of the Imperial Japanese Army. This force advanced from Kudamati
to attack the Allied positions in B Echelon to the south of the village shortly after on
the same morning before proceeding west and south to capture the Dutch coastal
batteries at Benteng.

252. The Tribunal is, however, unable to confirm with any confidence the precise
details of Doolan’s last stand, the number of casualties – if any – he inflicted on the
Japanese, or the exact circumstances of his death, other than it was violent.

Whether Driver Doolan performed an act or acts of gallantry

253. Having determined the actions of Driver Doolan to its reasonable satisfaction,
the Tribunal then turned to consider whether or not he had performed an act, or acts, of
gallantry. If this was determined to be the case, the Tribunal would then proceed to
consider Driver Doolan’s actions against, and in relation to, the eligibility criteria for
the available gallantry awards.

Eligibility Criteria for Gallantry Awards

254. Contemporary Gallantry Awards. Australian service personnel received

honours and awards under the Imperial system until February 1975 when the
Government introduced the Australian system. The two systems – the Imperial and the
Australian; then operated in parallel until October 1992 when the Government
announced that Australia would no longer make recommendations for Imperial
awards.148 This means that an Imperial award cannot be awarded for this action and
only contemporary decorations may be considered. The eligibility criteria for gallantry
awards in the Australian system are governed by Gallantry Decorations Regulations. 149

147
C.F. Coady, ‘“Gull” Force, Ambon: A History of the 2/21st Battalion’ Reveille, July 1, 1962. pp. 5 &
34.
148
Prime Minister of Australia Media Release 111/92 dated 5 October 1992.
149
Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S25 – Gallantry Decorations Regulations - dated
4 February 1991.

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255. The Victoria Cross for Australia. The VC was established by Letters Patent
on 15 January 1991 to be:

‘The highest decoration for affording recognition to persons who, in the

presence of the enemy, perform acts of the most conspicuous gallantry, or daring
or pre-eminent acts of valour or self-sacrifice or display extreme devotion to
duty’.150

256. The honour is governed by Regulations set out in the Schedule:

Conditions for the award of the decoration

3. The decoration shall only be awarded for the most conspicuous gallantry, or
daring or pre-eminent act of valour or self-sacrifice or extreme devotion to duty
in the presence of the enemy.

257. Gallantry Decorations. The Star of Gallantry, the Medal for Gallantry and the
Commendation for Gallantry were established as Gallantry Decorations by Letters
Patent on 15 January 1991 for the purpose of:

‘according recognition to members of the Defence Force and certain other

persons who perform acts of gallantry in action.’
258. The honours are governed by Regulations set out in the Schedule, as amended
in 1996:
…
Conditions for award of the decorations
3. (1) The Star of Gallantry shall be awarded only for acts of great heroism or
conspicuous gallantry in action in circumstances of great peril.
(2) The Medal for Gallantry shall be awarded only for acts of gallantry in
action in hazardous circumstances.
(3) The Commendation for Gallantry may be awarded for other acts of
gallantry in action which are considered worthy of recognition.
3A. A decoration referred to in regulation 3 may be awarded for an act of a kind
mentioned in relation to the particular decoration, although the act did not
occur in action, if it occurred in circumstances similar to armed combat or
actual operations and those concerned were deployed under military command.
…

150
Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S25 – Victoria Cross – dated 4 February 1991.

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 Making of awards
7. Awards of a decoration shall be made by the Governor-General on the
recommendation of the Minister. 151
259. What is Gallantry? The Tribunal noted that all the gallantry decorations
accord recognition for individuals ‘who perform acts of gallantry in action’. Whilst ‘in
action is a relatively straightforward concept, ‘gallantry’ is an abstract term, which is
not defined in the Regulations. Various dictionary definitions such as ‘dashing courage;
heroic bravery’,152 and ‘courageous behaviour, especially in battle’,153 are largely
circuitous and unhelpful. Some countries have attempted to differentiate between
‘bravery’ and ‘gallantry’; defining the later as recognition of military personnel who
carry out acts which put their lives at risk while involved in operational service; whilst
‘bravery’ is defined as saving or attempting to save the life of another person in the
course of which they place their own life at risk.154 Again this is largely unhelpful in
defining gallantry in the context of the Australian Honours and Awards system.

260. The Tribunal considered that there is an expectation that soldiers in battle
conducting themselves in accordance with their training, will be acting bravely. The
Tribunal considered that gallantry requires a higher standard of conduct than bravery
and usually a special and additional element of courage, fearlessness, daring or heroism
will have been demonstrated. What amounts to an ‘act of gallantry’ necessarily varies
according to the individual circumstances of each action, and depending on many
factors, including the level of threat, the person’s training, role and responsibility, the
risk to the individual and/or the group, and the consequences of undertaking, or not
undertaking, the particular act.

261. The Tribunal considered that the concept of gallantry is greater than collective
or individual acts of bravery and above and beyond what was expected of an individual
or group who were bravely doing what they were trained to do or expected to do as part
of a role, rank or responsibility.

Was Driver Doolan gallant?

262. As stated, the Tribunal has made findings concerning the actions of Driver
Doolan on 1 February 1942 based on Lieutenant Smith’s recollections, which the
Tribunal accepts as being accurate. On the basis of these findings, as well as the
Tribunal’s research concerning the events around Kudamati on 1 February 1942, the
Tribunal went on to consider whether Driver Doolan was gallant on this day. The
Tribunal considered that in volunteering to accept additional risk on two occasions:

151
Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No. S420 – Amendment of the Gallantry Decorations
Regulations - dated 6 November 1996.
152
The Macquarie Dictionary on-line accessed 20 October 2017.
153
The Oxford Dictionary on-line accessed 20 October 2017.
154
[Link]

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being a volunteer member of the morning reconnaissance patrol and in later staying
behind, alone, to cover the retreat from the expected enemy advance, Driver Doolan
demonstrated an additional element of courage and daring over and above other
Australian soldiers with him.

263. First act. The Tribunal considered it relevant that Lieutenant Smith, Transport
Platoon Commander made a point that the members of the reconnaissance patrol were
all ‘volunteers’. To the Tribunal, this indicated that Command thought volunteering for
such a dangerous activity was significant. To volunteer in this context meant to offer
one’s services for the benefit of the formation. Driver Doolan and the others were
clearly not ordered to patrol. In accepting to go on the patrol, Driver Doolan and the
others put themselves into a position of increased risk, compared to their fellow troops.

264. The Tribunal inferred from its research that it would have become plain to
Driver Doolan and those in the reconnaissance mission that the enemy were in location
at Kudamati and the surrounds. It would have been clear that the enemy probably
outnumbered the Australian troops in the area. Driver Doolan was a volunteer member
of the reconnaissance patrol, whose purpose was gather information and intelligence.
Noting the small numbers in the group, it can be inferred that Driver Doolan was privy
to the information gathering by the group, as well as his own observations.

265. Second act. In further volunteering to stay behind and alone, Driver Doolan
consciously agreed to face additional danger. This danger was a far greater risk to him
than members of his platoon generally and those members of the reconnaissance patrol.
No members of the earlier patrol elected to stay behind and fight with Driver Doolan,
or alone. Only Driver Doolan elected to remain behind and cover the retreat from an
advancing Japanese force.

266. The Tribunal determined that Driver Doolan in electing to remain behind
sacrificed his own safety to successfully cover the withdrawal of members of the patrol
so the intelligence could be conveyed.

267. When he remained behind, Driver Doolan was on foot somewhere outside the
rural village of Kudamati. He did not have the advantage of the cover of darkness. He
was likely armed with a weapon of some kind that he could personally manage.
Although the evidence is unclear as to the length of time Driver Doolan was alone or
for how long he was exposed to fire or the precise danger he faced, the Tribunal
determined that by placing himself alone in this situation, he was in a position of grave
risk and almost certain death with an outnumbered enemy.

268. The Tribunal considered that it had sufficient reliable evidence at its disposal to
determine these two acts, undisputed by the Respondent, were performed by Driver
Doolan. The Tribunal determines that the cumulative effect of the two acts of
volunteering and particularly the second act when he volunteered to fight alone,

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demonstrated an additional element of courage and daring. In volunteering on both
occasions, he consciously assumed that additional risk. Noting the concept of gallantry
as determined by the Tribunal above and taking into account of the circumstances as
found by the Tribunal, the Tribunal finds Driver Doolan was gallant on the morning of
1 February 1942.

Was Driver Doolan ‘in action’?

269. A criterion for each of the Gallantry Awards requires the person under
consideration to be ‘in action’. It was not refuted by the Respondent that Driver Doolan
was ‘in action’ on 1 February 1942 and, noting the findings set out above, the Tribunal,
determined that Driver Doolan was indeed ‘in action’ on 1 February 1942 whist
engaged with the enemy.

270. With these criteria established, the Tribunal decided to assess the actions of
Driver Doolan against each gallantry award, in ascending order.

The Commendation for Gallantry may be awarded for other acts of gallantry
considered worthy of recognition.

271. The Tribunal concluded that this criterion could have been met by Driver
Doolan’s participation, as a volunteer, for the reconnaissance patrol early on the
morning of 1 February 1942. The Tribunal again notes that the Respondent did not
dispute Driver Doolan’s participation, as a volunteer, in this dangerous patrol.
Importantly, Driver Doolan later also volunteered to remain behind, alone, in Kudamati
to cover the retreat from the expected enemy advance. The Tribunal therefore
considered that the award of the Commendation for Gallantry would not appropriately
recognise Driver Doolan’s actions. The Tribunal considered that this award was
insufficient because not only did he volunteer for the patrol but in addition he later
volunteered to remain behind, alone, to fight the enemy.

The Medal for Gallantry shall be awarded only for acts of gallantry in action in
hazardous circumstances

272. The Tribunal was satisfied that Driver Doolan volunteered to remain behind in
Kudamati to cover the retreat from the expected advance from the enemy. This fact
was also not disputed by the Respondent. To the Tribunal, this was then the second act
of gallantry displayed by Driver Doolan. As stated the Tribunal considered that a safer
alternative was available to him, namely remaining with the other members of the patrol
and returning to the Australian lines. Further, Driver Doolan would have likely been
aware of the additional risk he was bringing upon himself by volunteering to remain
behind, especially alone.

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273. Hazardous circumstances are not defined in the gallantry regulations. The
Tribunal in P and the Department of Defence155 concluded that the term ‘hazardous
circumstances’ was intended to take into account the particular circumstances of a
soldier in action and requires that the hazardous circumstances be relevant to a combat
situation. The Tribunal agrees with this interpretation. The Tribunal determines that
this requires an objective view of the facts as opposed to the subjective perception of
the individual in the circumstances.

274. It is clear that Driver Doolan in accepting to volunteer on the two occasions
placed himself in hazardous circumstances, in action, noting that he placed himself at
greater risk than other members of his platoon especially considering the enemy’s
numbers and likely advance.

275. Having been a member of the early reconnaissance patrol, which was sent out
to gather information about the Japanese troops in the area, to the Tribunal it was very
probable that Driver Doolan knew of the Japanese troops in the area and that he would
be grossly outnumbered by the enemy. Given the Japanese had assembled at Kudamati
in large numbers, the circumstances were hazardous for any Australian or Dutch troops
in the area, particularly any who happened to be alone.

276. The Tribunal determines that there is sufficient evidence in support of gallantry
as evidenced by Driver Doolan’s decision to choose to remain behind to engage
Japanese troops and that by doing so he was likely to be outnumbered and lose his life.
It was further accepted by the Respondent that in choosing to remain behind in these
circumstances Driver Doolan acted gallantly. For these reasons, the Tribunal concluded
that Driver Doolan meets the criteria to be eligible for the award of the Medal for
Gallantry.

The Star of Gallantry shall be awarded only for acts of great heroism or
conspicuous gallantry in action in circumstances of great peril

277. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal could not further establish what
happened to Driver Doolan and did not assess that the Japanese account of an extended
engagement with a concealed shooter referred to him. The Tribunal could only place
very limited weight on the evidence of Job Lekatompessy to the extent it was supported
by the evidence of Lieutenant Smith. As such the Tribunal was not reasonably satisfied
on the evidence before it that Driver Doolan performed acts of great heroism or
conspicuous gallantry in action in circumstances of great peril. The Tribunal notes the
heroic ‘legend of Doolan’, however, the Tribunal must be reasonably satisfied on
evidence before it and not rely upon heroic myth and legend as a basis for any award.

155
P and the Department of Defence [2014] DHAAT 27, 4 July 2014.

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278. Therefore, the Tribunal assessed that Driver Doolan did not meet the criteria to
be eligible for the award of the Star of Gallantry.

279. As the Tribunal concluded Driver Doolan was not eligible for the Star of
Gallantry, it decided it was not necessary to consider the higher criteria for the Victoria
Cross for Australia.

Conclusion

280. The Tribunal determined that the actions of Driver William Doolan at
Kudamati, Ambon, on 1 February 1942 meet the criteria for the award of a posthumous
Medal for Gallantry.

TRIBUNAL DECISION

281. The Tribunal decided to recommend to the Minister that:

a. that the decision by the Chair of the Historical Honours Review Board of 18
April 2018 to refuse to recommend a gallantry award for Driver William Doolan
for his actions with 2/21st Battalion attached to the Gull Force during the
Japanese invasion of Ambon Island on 1 February 1942 be set aside;

b. the Minister recommend to the Governor-General that Driver William Doolan

be posthumously awarded the Medal for Gallantry for acts of gallantry in action
in hazardous circumstances as a volunteer on a reconnaissance patrol and then
further volunteering to fight off advancing Japanese forces, alone, with little
chance of survival on 1 February 1942 at Kudamati village, during the Japanese
invasion of Ambon Island; and

c. the Minister direct Army to review the eligibility of Major Mark William Horton
Newbury, the Officer Commanding Laha Aerodrome, Ambon, for a defence
honour.

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 List of Annexes

Annex A - Excerpts from the translated Japanese Unit Association History account of
the 9th Company action on 1 February 1942

Annex B – Map from the translated Japanese Unit Association History account of
operations in Ambon.

Annex C - ‘Progress of Japanese Operations on Ambon – Map no 2’, Japanese Account

prepared in 1947 and issued by Military History Section, Headquarters Army Forces
Far East, Ambon and Timor Invasion Operations, Japanese Monograph No. 16, Office
of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1953 (Time
Zone Japan - +9)

Annex D - US Army 1:50,000 topographical map ‘Amboina Archipelago’ – Sheet No.

3, based on a 1925 Dutch chart

Annex E – US Army 1:50,000 topographical map ‘Amboina Archipelago’ – Sheet No.

4, based on a 1925 Dutch chart

Annex F - 1943 map of Ambon City produced by the Southwest Pacific Area
Command’s Allied Geographical Section

Annex G – Contemporary Satellite photograph map of Ambon and southern environs

Annex H - Dutch battle map of Ambon Campaign - Dutch Official History

Annex I - Sketch map produced by Lieutenant Smith in support of the Australian

account 1945, titled ‘Dispositions on Ambon Island 17 December 1941 – 31 January
1942, Scale: 1:100,000 (Time Zone Molucca - +8½ )

Annex J – Slides prepared by Tribunal showing Japanese advances from Ambon City
and action involving death of IJA Lieutenant Muto

Annex K – slides prepared by Tribunal displaying likely route of Sergeant O’Brien’s

patrol, the position of its interaction with the Japanese and Driver Doolan’s location in
Kudamati

Annex L – Timeline of events of 1 February 1942 prepared by the Tribunal

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ANNEX A – Relevant excerpts from the Japanese Unit Association Account of the
9th Company on 1 February 1942 translated by Dr Steven Bullard (emphasis
added in bold)

1 February156
Battalion commander Nishiyama advanced the front line to the coastal road,
and deployed the 9th Company as reinforcements along the road with the aim
of increasing gains in the area. However, the prepared enemy mortar and
heavy arms fire was accurate and pervasive. The commander of the 3rd
Platoon, 2nd Lt Muto achieved death in battle at the edge of the opening into
the coconut plantation. Casualties mounted and the advance was held.

The battalion commander, judging that conditions for a daytime attack were
unfavourable, began to prepare for a night attack. All companies began a
simultaneous advance on the front line at 2000 hrs, engaging the enemy
covertly…..

9th Co - 'Clearing operations of Ambon'157

The 9th Company with Kawake’s 1st Platoon left in Ambon City in reserve,
headed south-west along the shoreline of the bay in the following order:
Koseki’s 2nd Platoon, Muto’s 3rd Platoon, then Shirai’s Command Squad.
During this time they found some remaining enemy troops.

In order to attack this enemy, the Company cut through the plantation to the
right of the road and reached a slightly elevated grassy area. With the
command squad deployed to the centre, the 3rd Platoon to the right, and the 2nd
Platoon to the left, the unit advanced on the high ground. When they were 200
– 300 meters away, they suddenly came under concentrated fire from a Bren
machine-gun fired by a concealed enemy at fairly close range. At the head of
the unit, Platoon commander Muto and Lance Corporal Kondo were killed in
an instant, and the advance was halted. The enemy was nowhere to be seen, so
there was not even a faint movement to aim at. The unit was pinned down for
several hours in the open field, with absolutely no cover. It was not even possible
to get aid to the casualties.

Platoon leader Koseki on the left finally managed to move to the trees on the
left, then advanced quickly to the flanks of the enemy to try and destroy them
in one fell swoop. Just as the Kamiya Squad were positioning a light machine
gun at the edge of the trees, they were subjected to heavy fire from the enemy
waiting for them, immediately killing rifleman Sugiyama Kyoichi, and
superior privates Ando Hisayoshi, and Handa Goichi. The platoon
commander immediately ordered Isaji of the grenade-launcher squad to
attack. The enemy camp was finally silenced with the strength of this attack.

However, the sacrifices of the unit during the attack under the bright sun in this
field were in vain. As a result, the unit changed its attack to a night assault

156
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment, p. 6.
157
History of the 228th Infantry Regiment, pp. 18-19.
ANNEX B - Map from the translated Japanese Unit Association History account of operations in Ambon.
ANNEX C - ‘Progress of Japanese Operations on Ambon – Map no 2’, Japanese Account prepared in 1947 and issued by Military History Section,
Headquarters Army Forces Far East, Ambon and Timor Invasion Operations, Japanese Monograph No. 16, Office of the Chief of Military History,
Department of the Army, Washington DC, 1953 (Time Zone Japan - +9)
ANNEX D - US Army 1:50,000 topographical map ‘Amboina Archipelago’ – Sheet
No. 3, based on a 1925 Dutch chart
ANNEX E – US Army 1:50,000 topographical map ‘Amboina Archipelago’ – Sheet
No. 4, based on a 1925 Dutch chart
ANNEX F - 1943 map of Ambon City produced by the Southwest Pacific Area Command’s Allied Geographical Section
Annex G – Contemporary satellite photograph map of Ambon and southern environs
Annex H - Dutch battle maps of Ambon Campaign - Dutch Official History
Page | 70
 Annex I - Sketch map produced by Lieutenant Smith in support of the Australian
account 1945, titled ‘Dispositions on Ambon Island 17 December 1941 – 31 January
1942, Scale: 1:100,000 (Time Zone Molucca - +8½ ) *

*Please note that this map is aligned with North towards the bottom of the page
Annex J – Slides prepared by Tribunal showing Japanese advances from Ambon City
and action involving death of IJA Lieutenant Muto
Page | 73
Page | 74
Annex K – slides prepared by Tribunal displaying likely route of Sergeant O’Brien’s patrol, the
position of its interaction with the Japanese and Driver Doolan’s location in Kudamati
Page | 76
Page | 77
 ANNEX L

TIMELINE: EVENTS OF 1 FEBRUARY 1942

(All times adjusted to GMT +9)

0430 Lieutenant Smith orders formation and despatch of a reconnaissance

patrol into Ambon City led by Sergeant O’Brien. Volunteers for the
patrol include Driver Doolan
0612 Local time of morning civil twilight
0600-0620 Probable time of departure of Sergeant O’Brien’s patrol
0633 Local time of sunrise
0630-0640 Probable time of Sergeant O’Brien’s patrol’s encounters with Japanese
troops and withdrawal to Kudamati area
0645 Truck abandoned. Driver Doolan volunteers to remain behind
0715-0830 Probable period in which Driver Doolan engaged 4th Company 3rd
Battalion Japanese troops and was killed
0730 Sergeant O’Brien reports to Lieutenant Smith. This officer recalled
hearing machine gun fire from the vicinity of Kudamati village shortly
before Sergeant O’Brien’s report
0830 Japanese 3rd Battalion begins advance on Australian positions
0830-0900 Probable period in which 4th Company 3rd Battalion engaged Kudamati
position and achieved its isolation from Benteng coastal batteries and
their defences
0830-0900 Likely time of abandonment of western B Echelon entrenchments by
detachments under Sergeant Major Ryan
0900 Leading elements of Japanese 1st Battalion enter Ambon City
0900 RSM Warren’s patrol reconnoitres from Amahasu to south of Ambon
City and observes Kudamati positions under attack
0930-1000 Dutch artillery troops disable Benteng coastal battery guns
1000 4th Company 3rd Battalion launches main attack on Benteng
1047 Benteng batteries captured
1100 1st Battalion begins advance south from Ambon City
1200 Engagements between 1st Battalion and Kudamati positions – Japanese
forces eventually leave the Kudamati area and move further south to
Mount Nona
1230 Effective abandonment of eastern Kudamati positions by NEI 2nd
Company troops
1235 9th Company 3rd Battalion begins southward advance from Benteng
along coastal road
1300 Earliest time for start of 9th Company encounter with concealed
shooter(s)
1300-1900 Period within which 9th Company were pinned down
1846 Local time of sunset

Page | 78
1907 Local time of evening civil twilight
2000 Japanese night assault on Amahasu lines
2300 Japanese penetrate Amahasu lines.
Australian troops withdraw to Eri

Page | 79