Transformation of Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan

Author(s): Saba Noor

Source: Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses , Vol. 4, No. 6 (June 2012), pp. 10-14
Published by: International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
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 10

Transformation of Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan

By Saba Noor
This article discusses the recent transformation of sectarian terrorism in Pakistani society and chal-
lenges it can pose in the near future.

Even as the Pakistani security forces launched cases of sectarian violence respectively, whereas
operations against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in the first four months of 2012, as many as 41
(TTP) in various parts of the Federally Adminis- incidents have been reported.
trative Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber
Pakhtunkhawa province (KP), a new threat has This recent wave of sectarian violence in Paki-
appeared in the ever evolving militant landscape stan is qualitatively different from the traditional
of the country. While the Taliban-led terrorism is sectarian discourse in terms of broader ideology,
on the decline, sectarian terrorism is expanding trends and theaters. This indicates the transform-
not just in terms of its spread but its lethality. In ing trends of sectarianism in the Pakistani soci-
addition to inter-sect rivalry and violence involv- ety.
ing Shias and Sunnis, there are now intra-sect
Historical Background
confrontations involving Deobandi-Barelvi and
Deobandi-Salafi within the Sunni sect itself.
The trends of sectarianism in Pakistan can be
traced back to post-partition changes which af-
The Pakistani security forces have been success-
fected various aspects of social, political and eco-
ful in controlling the frequency of suicide attacks
nomic life. The polarization of the two communi-
and incidents of terrorism in the urban areas.
ties was aggravated with the Islamic revolution in
However, they have failed to counter the menace
Iran in 1979. Zia-ul-Haq, fourth Chief Martial Law
of sectarian killings in various parts of the coun-
Administrator and sixth President of Pakistan, int-
try. In 2010 and 2011, there were 57 and 30

Protesters gathered in various cities across Pakistan to protest the multiple attacks on the Eid Milad-un-Nabi pro-
cessions on 5 February 2012. Photo Credit: Human Rights Advocacy and Media Watch http://
[Link]/2012/02/06/who-are-these-people-attacking-eid-milad-un-nabi-processions-in-
pakistan/

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 6, 2012

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 Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan 11

roduced the state’s “Islamization” agenda that sponded to this by forming Sipah-e-Muhammad
revived the existing sectarian (Shiite and Sunni Pakistan (SMP) translated as “Soldiers of the
Muslim) divide in the country. Zia attempted to Muhammad”. SMP is a violent Shiite sectarian
Islamize Pakistani society through legislative group which aims to protect the interests of Shi-
changes and the propagation of Islamic ideology ite community and to counter the Sunni militant
(through the Sunni interpretation of Islam) to groups in Pakistan. Between 1980s and 1990s,
prolong his regime. This led to irreparable dam- both groups engaged in the destruction of each
age to the social fabric of Pakistani society. other’s businesses, burning down valuable prop-
erties and assassinated religious, political and
Zia’s promulgation of the Zakat and Ushar Ordi- business leaders in various parts of Jhang dis-
nance 1980 (a religious tax that applies only to trict, Karachi and Gilgit-Baltistan. The decade of
Muslim citizens in Pakistan), to the regulation of the 1990s witnessed a frightening upsurge in
the assessment, collection and disbursement of sectarian terrorism in the country, which is cur-
Zakat and Ushar became a major incident to rently at its highest level. The creation of Lash-
isolate Shiite community from the rest of the kar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in 1996, a breakaway group
population. As a reaction to the Ordinance, of SSP, led to further sectarian violence.
50,000 Shiite from all over the country gathered
under the banner of Wifaq-e-Ulema-e-Shiite Transformation of Sectarian Violence
Pakistan in Islamabad and demanded that Shiite
should be treated in accordance with their reli- The transformation of sectarian violence started
gious laws. Although Zia amended the law after in the end of the 1990s when Musharraf’s gov-
strong protests by local Shiite community, the ernment initiated a strong crackdown to break
incident widened the gap between the Sunni the organizational structure of sectarian groups
and Shiite communities. like LeJ and SSP. In the short-term, targeted
security operations proved to be successful in
Many other domestic and regional factors also reducing the frequency of sectarian incidents in
played an important role to aggravate sectarian the country. However, in the long-term it helped
differences in the Pakistani society. At the do- sectarian militants integrate their ideologies into
mestic level, the Shias established the political other extremist organizations like TTP and Al
party, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafria (TNFJ), Qaeda. This integration not only boosted the
now known as Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP), resources of the Sunni sect groups but also pro-
to protect the interests of the Shiite community. vided a broader agenda far beyond the tradi-
While the impact of the Iranian Revolution tional Sunni-Shiite differences. The influence of
strengthened the cause of the Shiite movement, TTP ideology within LeJ can be seen in their
the moral and financial support provided by actions. For the first time, LeJ specifically tar-
Saudi Arabia had similar effect on Sunni groups. geted and kidnapped high-profile Westerners in
Pakistan.
In 1985, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a Sunni cleric of
Deobandi school of thought from Jhang, estab- The most important aspect of the recent sectar-
lished Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), trans- ian discourse is that it is not only confined to the
lated as “The Army of Mohammad’s Compan- traditional Shiite-Sunni differences, however, it
ions”. The main objectives of SSP were to trans- has also spread into the sub-divisions of the
form Pakistan into a purely Sunni Muslim state, Sunni sect particularly Deobandi-Barelvi and
to protect the Sunnis in Pakistan, to uphold the Deobandi-Salafi/Takfiri. Deobandi and Barelvi
Sharia law and to attack Shiites because they are the two major Sunni groups of Muslims in
are considered “non-Muslims”. Shiites re- Pakistan. Barelvis subscribe to many Sufi prac-

Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, Vol. 4, Iss. 6, 2012

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 Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan 12

tices, whereas, Deobandis believe in the literal Salafi/Takfiri concepts are harsher than the Deo-
interpretation of the holy text and are opposed to bandi ideology and hence gives its followers the
additions to original Islamic practices. right to declare other Muslims apostate and wor-
thy of death. An example of the emerging differ-
The attacks on Sufi shrines demonstrate the ences among different political religious parties
divide amongst Deobandis and Barelvi in Paki- are portrayed by orthodox Deobandi groups
stan. The first attack on a Sufi shrine was in Jhal such as Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F), Jammat-
Magsi, Balochistan on 20 March 2005. Since e-Islami (JI) factions and ultra-orthodox Wahabi
then, as many as 24 attacks have occurred, re- groups who are influenced by Al Qaeda ideol-
sulting in the death of 200 persons while 542 ogy. Ideologically, the difference between pro Al
others were injured. Initially, the attacks were Qaeda Salafi groups and the orthodox Deo-
confined to the conflict-prone areas like Jhang, bandis also become visible in the radical litera-
Gilgit-Baltistan, and Balochistan. However, by ture produced by the former. Furthermore, the
the beginning of 2010, all important shrines in tactical differences between the factions are
mainland Pakistan such as Data Sahib in La- evident in their choice of targets and tactics
hore, Abdullah Shah Ghazi in Karachi, Baba when they undertake jihadi activities. Orthodox
Farid in Pakpatan and Sakhi Sarwar in Dera Deobandi groups are against the use of suicide
Ghazi Khan were targeted. The attacks on Sufi terrorism, killing of non-combatants, and Paki-
shrines are an attempt to disrupt the intra-sect stani security forces, whereas, ultra-orthodox
harmony in the country and also an influence of Salafi groups are more prone to use such violent
Al Qaeda’s Takfiri ideology within the ranks of tactics.
LeJ.
Along with sub-sect differences, Sunni-Shia ri-
The sectarian transformations are further evi- valry is becoming increasingly more lethal and
dent by the attacks on Sufi shrines in early 2011 ruthless. Another clear example of this disturb-
that led to clashes between SSP and Sunni Te- ing violent trend is the series of executions of
hrik (ST), a militant group of Sunni-Barelvi sect, Hazara Shias in different areas of Gilgit/Baltistan
established to counter the growing influence of and Balochistan. Furthermore, attacks on the
Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith schools of thoughts Muharram mourning processions have become
in Karachi. Groups within the same sects began commonplace. The sectarian groups have
fighting over monetary donations and property, adopted more lethal tactics to target Shia com-
for example by forcibly occupying mosques. munity such as the use of suicide attacks and
Also, in 2011 when LeJ and Lashkar-e-Toiba indiscriminate killings of Shias in public. In Octo-
(LeT) targeted Eid Milad-un-Nabi processions ber 2011, LeJ distributed an open letter in
(processions organized by Barelvi sect to cele- Quetta declaring an all out war on the Hazara
brate the birthday of Prophet Muhammad) in Shia community.
Dera Ismail Khan and Faisalabad. Similar at-
tacks occurred on 5 February 2012 in various Significantly, in the last few years the sectarian
cities including Mansehra, Gujranwala, Gojar rift has escalated throughout the country and not
Khan, Mirpur, Khairpur and Karachi. confined to any specific area or province like its
early phase of 1990s. This can be an outcome
Parallel to the Deobandi-Barelvi sectarian rift, of LeJ’s strategic change in 2010 when the
another unfolding sectarian trend in the country group reorganized into at least eight small cells
is Deobandi-Salafi/Takfiri divisions. Although to better coordinate its activities across Pakistan
these divisions are nascent, it has an impact on (from the southern port city of Karachi to Wa-
the religiously complex society of Pakistan. The

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 Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan 13

ziristan in the restive tribal belt bordering Af- conducting operations. So unlike military tactics
ghanistan). used against the Taliban terrorists, smart polic-
ing with well-informed intelligence input is im-
Challenges and Future Implications perative to fight these entities in urban centers
of the country.
Contrary to the Taliban-led militancy which peo-
ple disowned, sectarianism pre-dates Afghan Conclusion
jihad and has its deep roots in Pakistani society.
So current transformations will not be confined The current wave of sectarian violence in Paki-
to any particular area or ethnicity. It will also di- stan points towards the rising influence of sec-
rectly polarize the Pakistani society along sec- tarian groups in Pakistani society. Further, it
tarian lines further. The ideological nexus indicates that traditional discourse of sectarian-
among the Sunni sectarian outfits, Taliban and ism is changing. Currently this discourse is not
Al Qaeda has blurred the differences in agendas limited to Shiite and Sunni conflicts. On the
of these terrorist organizations. For such a fluid other hand, the scope has significantly in-
threat, designing a counter-ideology strategy will creased to other sects within the Sunni Muslims.
not be an easy task. The Pakistan military used
heavy fire power and weaponry to quash and This rise is due mostly to alliances with groups
quell militant groups. The counter strategies to like LeJ, Al Qaeda and TTP. These groups
fight the new formation would be different and whose ideologies are anti-Shiite and anti-
more difficult to implement. Since sectarian western not only pose a threat to Pakistan, they
groups operate in small cells in urban centers, can also cause a serious threat to the peace
they can easily hide amongst the people after and stability of the entire region. The Pakistani

Two Taliban suicide bombers targeted Sufi shrine in Dera Ghazi Khan, 3 April 2011. Photo Credit: Sheikh Asif
Raza. [Link]

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 Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan 14

government should take serious measures

against this growing threat of sectarian terrorism EDITORIAL STAFF
before this turns into a full blown crisis.
Editor
Dr. Arabinda Acharya

Associate Editors
Uday Ravi
Nadisha Sirisena

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