Ethics- How should we live?

LECTURE 1

Three different branches of philosophical ethics/moral philosophy:

- ‘Applied ethics’: questions about the permissibility of various types of action, such
as abortion, euthanasia, prostitution, etc.
- ‘Moral Theory’: questions about the rightness of acts in general and attempts to say
what makes right actions right and wrong actions wrong.
- ‘Meta-ethics’: questions about the metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of
language related to ethics, e.g. ‘what are moral values and do they exist?’, ‘how do
we know moral facts?’, ‘what do moral utterances really mean?’

This module will focus on Moral Theory, and ignore questions relating to applied ethics and
meta-ethics- main general question is what is the right action to do- which act is our moral
duty to do- would be wrong if we didn’t do.

Three different approaches in moral theory:

- Consequentialism: what matters to an action’s being right or wrong is its
consequences – what will happen in the future if you do the action. Right actions are
those that lead to good consequences. (Note the difference between ‘right’ and
‘good’.)- all about the results- what happens after the action has passed- future is
the only thing that matters to the moral status of our action- util is most famous
example
- Deontology: actions can be right or wrong because of moral rules or principles, and
not just because of their consequences. It could be wrong to do some things even if
doing them would bring about good results- most famous kind of deontology is
Kantian ethics. Also divine command theory and NL
- Virtue-based approaches: instead of asking which acts are right, we should ask what
sort of people we should aspire to be. Focuses less on doing the right things and
more on being a good person- doesn’t start with the question which action is the
right action- asking what kind of person is a good person- not about individual
actions but the whole person and how they can be good.

Deontic status
An action has one of four: Supererogatory (‘above & beyond the call of
duty’)-more than what duty requires
Right (i.e. obligatory, morally required, a moral
duty)
Permissible (i.e. allowed, neither right nor wrong)
Impermissible (i.e. wrong, forbidden)

LECTURE 2- egoism vs altruism

 - Egoism is a potential opposition to moral theory- GABI NOTES
- If we are to behave ethically, we have to behave in a way which takes other
people’s needs/concerns as reasons for action- maybe its beneficial to others as
well as the agent. OR it could be despite the appearance of sacrifice even
apparently other benefitting actions are part of the flourishing of the moral agent
- If just talking about behaviour, there is no deep conflict between egoism and
altruism e.g. pollination in plants- bees does not know
- The problem emerges when rather than using the terms when talking about the
behaviour we use them to talk about motives e.g egoistic if shopkeeper giving right
change because it is good for business– Kant’s example- prudent shopkeeper
- Is altruism real? YES= private giving the charity HOWEVER still makes you feel
intrinsically good- not social reward but there is internal reward. YES= giving up
your life for someone- extreme self-sacrifice- e.g British soldier throwing
themselves on grenade HOWEVER- could get reward in afterlife therefore
underlining motivation is egoistic- HOWEVER if was atheist than could still be
altruistic. HOWEVER, when you die still lingering effects for your family

NOTE: intrinsically vs instrumentally good

- Some things are intrinsically good (good in themselves) e.g justice, love
- Other things are instrumentally good (good as a means to something else)- e.g
money in itself is useless but as a means to buying food and shelter etc. is
instrumental. E.g brushing your teeth- people don’t recreationally brush their teeth.
E.g injections

Egoism:
- An egoist is some who acts in pursuit of their own good
- The egoist always wants to know ‘What’s in it for me?’- the motivating thought
- Egoistic behaviour can be contrasted with altruism: behaviour that benefits others.
- An altruist asks themselves how they can benefit others. It’s commonly assumed
that some degree of altruism must be a component of ethical conduct: if we are to
live ethically, we must be altruists at least to some extent.
- If egoism (here the name of a theory about behaviour) is true, then there’s a threat
to all moral theory.
There are three main theories that involve egoism:
1) Psychological egoism
2) Rational egoism
3) Ethical egoism

Psychological egoism:
- Claims that it is part of our psychology that we always do act for the sake of our
own good- not something we choose to do but its part of our nature- GN
- Othecr types of egoist allow others to act in a non-egoistic way but just say its
irrational or immoral. However, PE says it is impossible to be moved by anything
other than your own good- there will always be a secret self-motivated motive.
 - It is the claim that all of us always, in every action we perform, act in pursuit of our
own benefit. The idea is that this is not something we can choose to do or not do:
it’s hard-wired into us that we are motivated in this way. Any apparent instances of
altruism (behaviour that benefits others rather than oneself) can always be truly
explained in terms which reveal the agent’s selfish desires.
- If PE is true, there is little or no point in ethical theory. Acting ethically, we think,
often requires acting altruistically. If altruism is impossible, that’s a problem,
especially when we consider the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
- We can distinguish:
a) The fact that an action brings about a certain effect (whether pleasure, pain, or
whatever else)
b) The action being done for the sake of achieving that effect.
- This distinction may help to undermine the case for PE.

Rational egoism:
- Only rational way to behave is in a way that benefits yourself- GN
- It is rational to be motivated- if we are thinking purely from the point of view of
what is rational to do- then egoistic behaviour is the only rational course of action-
doesn’t say altruism is impossible its just irrational. Perfectly possible for a good
person to do something good but this is stupid and irrational. They might defend
the action but the intention and motive was wrong- need to think about yourself
- It is the claim that the only rational thing to do in any given situation is to pursue
one’s own self-interest. In contrast to psychological egoists, rational egoists
acknowledge that people can act for other reasons, but they see actions of this kind
as irrational
- This assumes a certain understanding of rationality which might be disputed.
- Moral behaviour is difficult to defend as instrumentally good
- HOWEVER- not clear why we should have that concept of rationality- Singer
drowning child analogy

Ethical egoism:
- It is possible to act altruistically but we morally/ethically shouldn’t- ethics doesn’t
involve altruism but the most ethical thing to do is benefit yourself- GN
- It is the claim that what we ought to do if we are to act ethically is act for our own
self-interest. Sometimes it is argued for on the basis that everybody will benefit if
we act in this way, but this is not really an egoist argument at all.
- What you morally ought to do is look out for yourself and pursue your own good
rather than the good of others
- They argue that you ought to do what benefits you as in the long run that will
actually benefit everybody- if that’s the reason you should act for yourself the
underlying thing is altruism- concerned about others benefit

The paradox of Egoism: (or known as paradox of hedonism)

- Idea that there is an egoistic reason to stop being egoistic
- Suppose that I want to get the things in life that will bring me pleasure and be good
for me. I observe that people I know seem to get a lot of benefit from friendship, so
I set out to get this for myself. But I can’t, because my egoism prevents me from
 being a friend to anyone. So egoism is stopping me from achieving my egoistic goals,
so I have egoistic reasons to stop being an egoist.
- Suppose you are egoist- they want to benefit themselves- they look at others who
are having good lives- they would notice that they have friendship, family etc. The
egoist will try and make friends- suppose they pull it off are they actually friends?
- The sensible egoist is going to see things like this are true a) friendship is good b) in
order to be a friend have to care, but caring about them means not being an
egoist- being an egoist you want the good in your life but you cant be egoist
anymore if you care about others
(FROM GN- she says from online)
- P1- egoist says that you are always obligated to do what is in our best self interest
- P2- It is in everyone’s best interest to experience true friendship
- P3- true friendship required genuine altruism- caring about others interest for their
own sake
- C- ethical egoism is paradoxical- tells us both we should never behave
altruistically+ that we should have altruistically

LECTURE 3- Utilitarianism

Scarre Utilitarianism:
In his book Utilitarianism, Geoffrey Scarre identifies five features that characterise
utilitarianism: it is, he says, consequentialist, welfarist, universalist , aggregative and
maximising. If a moral theory has all of these features, it is a utilitarian theory.
1. Consequentialism. What matters morally is what your actions lead to: the
consequences. But which consequences? If want to see what deontic status an
action has we should look to its consequences, what happens as a result of the
action. The morality of an action is all about future. HOWEVER- what do we count
as a good result?
2. Welfarism- The consequences that we think of as good are ones that increase
welfare- Scarre changed word happiness for welfare- could be because we think
there is a gap between happiness and wellbeing. Good consequences = those that
produce or increase welfare. But whose welfare? And what is welfare, anyway?
There are rival theories of what welfare is, such as:
• Hedonism: welfare = pleasure. Hedonism is the theory that what is good for you is
pleasure. HOWEVER might not lead to long term happiness. Also cant predict
consequences.
• Desire/preference-satisfaction accounts: welfare is getting what you want. To have
more welfare is to have more of your desires satisfied. HOWEVER sometimes we
have desires where the satisfaction is not good for us
• OBJECTION= Robert Nozick- Can be plugged into VR machine that represents
reality. Most people would choose to not be plugged in. Some think this an
objection against hedonism
• Eudaimonia-based accounts: welfare is flourishing as a human being- as an empirical
fact you are doing well- flourishing is objective
3. Universalism: everybody’s welfare matters, and matters as much as everybody
else’s. No one matters more in themselves than anyone else. Who should be
included in the ‘everybody’, though? Everyone’s welfare matters equally- from
 moral point of view welfare is equal. 18 th century when first proposed was
revolutionary, that peasant and queen are equal in moral terms. HOWEVER who
do we include in everybody? All humans? All persons? Other species? Bentham-
the question is not can they reason or talk but can they suffer- all sentient beings
counts towards the moral code- their interests and welfare matters
4. (Quantification- Iain term) & Aggregation- Scarres term: welfare is something that
can be quantified and added up: if I choose A I will get x amount of welfare, but if I
choose B I will get y amount, which is more. Furthermore, we can compare how
much welfare different choices will create for groups of people, or whole
populations. HOWEVER- welfare might split into different things that cannot be
compared with each other. This is issue as Utils have to select which actions
produces most happiness/welfare
5. Maximisation. The right act (i.e. the one it is your moral duty to perform) is the one
which produces the most welfare. HOWEVER- have to produce the most welfare- it
squeezes permissible (from the deontic statuses) out of the picture. Either doing
moral duty (obligation), everything else is impermissible, so no room for
permissible action. Very demanding moral theory.
So the central claim made by utilitarians is: ‘The right act is the one out of all your options
which produces the most utility/welfare/wellbeing’.

LECTURE 4- UTLITARIANISM

This is John Stuart Mill’s ‘proof of utility’, from early in Chapter 4 of Utilitarianism:
“The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an
end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end. What ought to be required
of this doctrine- what conditions is it requisite that the doctrine should fulfil- to make good
its claim to be believed?
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it.
The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of
our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that
anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian
doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end,
nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the
general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be
attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the
proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a
good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness,
therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of
the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.”

Problems- there are obvious errors of reasoning in Mill’s ‘proof’:

- At the end says- “each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the general
happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons”- let suppose it’s true
that each individual wants to be happy can we then infer we all want each other to
be happy- colossal logical blunder (maybe don’t use that word)- like saying if I
want tickets for show and you want tickets for show, we as a pair want tickets for
 the show but might not be true- might be I want to get tickets but don’t want you
to get tickets- it’s a LOGICAL error, not moral error, just bad inference.
- “utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is desirable”- Mill is trying to make us believe
that we ought to be happy– by end of argument its descriptive but the conclusion
he was supposed to be going for was a normative and ethical conclusion. We can
think of things that people desire which do not merit/deserve desire e.g. lots of
people desire fame/ want to be influencers but I believe that it is an. unworthy
desire. Another example is smoking- the fact that people do desire things/is
desired does not mean it is worthy of being desired – if by desirable we mean
worthy of being desired. Mill was supposed to argue that happiness ought to be
desired but ended up being happiness is something people do desire- it’s a
LOGICAL ERROR
N.B DESCRIPTIVE VS NORMATIVE= descriptive about what is the claim just describing vs
normative- what ought to be the case or what ought to not be the case

Two strengths of Util:

1) We have moral intuitions and util explains and unifies these moral intuitions
- It coheres with and supports many of our moral intuitions (e.g. the intuitive response
that most people have to the ‘trolley problem’.
- Illustration: the ‘trolley problem’. If a runaway train carriage (aka ‘trolley’) is running
down a track heading for 5 people, and you can divert it onto a track with a single
person on it, it seems (at least to many people) that you ought to. Utilitarianism
supports this verdict and offers an explanation for why it’s the right verdict. 5 lives
more important than 1- opposite argument is act vs omission
- If we think that we can tell what the right moral theory is by trying to get the best
balance between our (carefully considered) intuitions and our theory, maybe
utilitarianism does pretty well.
- (This sort of methodology is called ‘Reflective Equilibrium’.)- start with intuitions we
are pretty sure of and look at what moral theory is suggested by that intuition.
Then take the theory and test other intuitions, look at other situation and look
whether they still line up with theory. Not looking at theory or intuitions as fixed-
keep revising both side until we get perfect consistency and perfect balance
between both sides- (shown through Smart- some of our moral intuitions should
be rejected- in reading)
- A lot of what morality seems to involve is explained in util- utilitarianism seems
too explain why benefitting others is good
2) Maybe utilitarianism can avoid problems other theories have. They need to appeal
to entities we can’t easily detect moral rules and suchlike. Utilitarianism just needs
to deal in everyday facts about what makes people happy or what benefits them.

Problems: how significant are these strengths? There are also many carefully
considered intuitions that utilitarianism conflicts with (or at least so it appears).
Examples: the Alabama sheriff and the innocent suspect; the transplant case. And
utilitarianism does have to make some claims that aren’t empirical: that certain states of
affairs are good, and that morality requires that we act in such a way as to bring about
that sort of consequence
LECTURE 5

Objections to utilitarianism:

1) Evil deed (Iains term)- think of an action that would be wrong to perform e.g.
murder- if you don’t perform that evil deed much worse consequences would
happen. Utils say its ur moral duty to do the bad thing. Actions which seem wrong
in themselves and yet which lead to the best consequences. Examples: The ‘fat man’
variant of the trolley case-. Transplant case. The Alabama sheriff, the innocent
suspect and the lynch-mob (in deep south of USA a few decades ago- a crime was
committed and a mob of people think an innocent person is the guilty party. The
sheriff knows for a fact this person is innocent but mob is getting so angry, if sheriff
doesn’t let mob get him than the sheriff station will get burnt down- shows there
are cases in which even though the best consequences come about if we do the
evil deed- certain things u just shouldn’t do even if results are beneficial
2) The ‘overdemanding’ nature of utilitarianism- asks us of too much- util says our
moral obligation is to do. Whatever option maximises welfare- f we aren’t we are
failing to do what morality requires of us. E.g. Peter Singer example of child
drowning- shallow pond and there is a small child that’s fallen over and is about to
drown. You have nicest shoes on as going to job interview- do you go into pond
and save child. Singer asks can we generalise the lessons- if we can save a life we
must even if it costs us a lot we all think its our obligation. But we could be saving
a lot of children that we are not. If we push Singers argument to it is logical
conclusion shows how util never stops asking more of us until we end up being as
worse off as the people we try to help
3) Psychological objections: objections that focus on the kind of thinking, mind or
character that the agent ought to have. E.g ‘one thought too many’ and sadistic
pleasure. Its about how U makes u think about what you should do e.g a loved one,
imagine in a situation where they are in trouble, e.g fallen in pond but so has a
stranger. Util forces you to have ‘one thought too many’ (Bernard Williams) even
when util gets answer right the way you arrived at answer did not speak well of
you as you have to ask whether morality permits you to save loved one, shouldn’t
have asked that. SADISTIC PLEASURE- in order to satisfy sadism, made expectations
that your nice, e.g. Iain having first years come to him when sad and he
psychologically tortures them for his own pleasure. If streaming it to other sadists-
their pleasure weighs out the crying of first year.

Responses by Utils:
1. Accept that the theory does imply these things and live with it. Stick with the theory
and change your intuitions.
2. Argue that the theory doesn’t have these implications at all – a strategy that may
work better for some objections than others.
3. Modify the theory so that different consequences count, either by adopting a
different view of welfare, or by including consequences for things other than welfare
(and thereby ceasing to be Utilitarian while remaining Consequentialist.)
4. Adopting an indirect approach. Think about the consequences of using various
different ways of deciding what to do. Choose the ‘decision procedure’ that
 produces the best consequences, and then use that. Don’t think about the
consequences of all your acts in normal life. Possible Examples: Professional Codes
of Practice; common-sense intuitions about morality. (Analogies: Trying to be more
spontaneous; trying to get to sleep; trying to have friends in order to benefit
yourself, the paradox of egoism.)

Act/omission principles:
- If utilitarianism isn’t correct, its mistake may lie in its refusal to see any morally
important distinction between consequences that come about as a result of what we
do and those that come about as a result of our not preventing them. Intuitively,
some sort of distinction of that sort seems to matter, e.g. killing people is morally
wrong and extremely blameworthy, but failing to act to prevent a death seems (at
least sometimes) much less blameworthy.

There are several possible distinctions that we might try out as ways of making this vague
intuition more precise, each of which is discussed by Philippa Foot in her paper:
1. Act/omission. This suggests that we are morally responsible only for what we do,
not for things that happen as a result of our failing to act. Counter-example= James
Rachaels- if we want to know whether the difference between act and omission
makes a difference we need to create a case where everything is the same- SMITH
AND JONES CASE (James Rachels): Smith deliberately lets his nephew drown in the
bath in order to inherit his money, and this seems as wrong as Jones’s action of
drowning his nephew in the bath for the same reason. If everything else in the two
situations is the same, it doesn’t seem to matter whether the outcome is reached via
an act or an omission. HOWEVER could suggest that an omission is an act- choosing
not to act is an act- leads to doing/allowing principle- by deliberately being inactive
you are acting
2. Doing/allowing. Not quite the same as an act/omission principle, but vulnerable to
the same kind of objection. This may suggest that it’s the agent’s intentions that
matter, leading us to:
3. The Principle (aka ‘doctrine’) of Double Effect. This says that while it is impermissible
to intend to bring about certain results, it may be permissible to bring about those
same outcomes so long as they are merely foreseen and not intended (if other
conditions are met: what you do produces some good outcome that isn’t
outweighed by the bad outcome, for example.) When one action has two
consequences, one good and one bad. If intention is to bring about good effect
then you can perform it but if your intention was bad then you cannot e.g. in
trolley problem if your intention was to save 5 lives then can do it- when trolley
come down hill and one person dodged train than should be pleased as was not
our intention to kill him- was just a by product. DIFFERENCE between INTENDED
and FORESEEN consequences
4. Positive and negative duties. Phillipa Foor used to be in favour of DODE but now
abandoned it- argues its not a difference between 2 consequences, instead there
are two different kinds of duties. Foot suggests that we can distinguish between a
duty to avoid causing injury (causing harm) and a duty to bring aid, and that
sometimes it is more morally important to avoid causing injury even if in doing so we
fail to bring aid to others. She argues for a quite limited conclusion, that ‘the size of
 the evil [need not] always be our guide’ (Foot, 2013, 541). E.g. (might be her
example not sure) if you’re a pilot and flying a plane and something has gone
wrong- plane is going to crash- best you can do is choose where to crash. Either
can crash in very populated area and have enough fuel to crash somewhere not so
populated- ur moral duty to go to less populated area. Duty to not hard always
come before duty to bring aid. Can pull lever but cant push fat man

LECTURE 6- deontology: Divine Command and Natural Law

Deontological moral theories are those that at least sometimes define right acts by reference to
something other than the consequences of those acts. Typically, they will say that an act is wrong
simply because of the kind of act it is, rather than because it produces bad results. Different theories
have different accounts of why various acts are right and wrong. The most influential form of
deontological moral theory is Kant’s, which we’ll get to next week, but there are other forms of
deontology.
- Deontologist theories are non-consequentialist
- When asking what is the right act, not looking at consequences- two answers to
the questions: consequentialism (util) and deontology
- Most people have deontological intuitions

Divine Command Theory:

- In its basic form Divine Command Theory says that an act is right if and only if it is
commanded by God, and because it is commanded by God.
- an Act A is right IF AND ONLY (double arrow symbol) IF action A is commanded by
God.
- Take the example F is true if and only God asserts F- God knows everything as he is
omniscient, omnibenevolent- knows F and is honest
- Therefore two ways the first statement could be true 1) the command comes first
and the fact that God commanded A is what makes A right 2) the act is right in
itself, his omniscience and benevolence means he can detect the facts about
rightness and therefore he commands inline with those facts.
- Divine Command Theory says god is in the role of creating the facts- just havinf the
by conditional by itself is not DCT. God’s commands creates the moral facts. God
saying its right or wrong to do various things creates the moral facts about
rightness/wrongness. E.g why is it wrong to murder as God forbids it.
- THOMAS A- ROBERT ADAMS (FROM RS DCT NOTES)

The Euthyphro dilemma (Plato):

Let’s suppose for the sake of argument that the right acts are those that God commands.
Are they right because God commands them, or does God command them because they are
right? If we take the first horn of the dilemma, which DCT does, we face these problems:

CRITIQUES OF DCT:
1. Reversal of values:
This means that if God had decided that, e.g. murder was right, it would be right, doesn’t it?
2. Arbitrariness: JAMES RACHEALS
Connectedly, it means that there was no reason for God to decree that murder is wrong. He
just picked arbitrarily.
3. Infantilism:
This seems to prevent us from ever being morally ‘grown up’. At best we’re just obeying
God’s commands, like a child who is told ‘because I said so!’
Makes us infantile- when older we learn insight into what is right and wrong- we don’t
have moral intuitions of our parents- if DCT is true says everybody doesn’t do things
because it is forbidden- no deeper reason
4. Praising God.
If being good is being approved of by God, what does it mean to praise God for His
goodness?
God lives up to his own standards but does not seem to satisfy the urge to praise God for
his goodness- omnibenevolence is one of the most important characteristics of God and
DCT goes against this

DCT IS A MINORITY VIEW EVEN AMONGST THEISTS TODAY

Natural Law Theory:

This involves determining the proper functions, ends or purposes of things. The end or
function of thing is called its ‘telos’, and this approach is called a ‘teleological’ ethical theory.
Right actions are those that are in keeping with such ends; wrong actions are those that are
not. Example: the Roman Catholic position on contraception.
- Often associated with belief in God but strictly speaking doesn’t have to- one idea
behind NL is that people were worried not everyone had received Gs commands-
as well as divine commands there is also natural law- means people who have not
heard of G can still be good- can be worked out through nature.
- NL involves looking at nature and identifying its telos (meaning
purpose/goal/end/function).
- NL says things ae wrong because they ae contrary to nature

Problems:
1. Are there real ‘ends’ to be found? Do we believe these things exist? Very old way of
thinking- we think in terms of merely efficient causes now-
2. Even if there are ends (even if we can identify functions), what moral significance
does that have? (e.g moral significance of thumbs are to grasp things-therefore
wrong to to texts as using thumbs to do something not intended to be used for- we
do things that are not their natural causes and doesn’t seem wrong- example of
Roman Catholic view on sex- might be able to get round this argument by saying
that other function of sex is that it provides pleasure- if function of sex is pleasure
not reproduction not wrong to use contraception- issue is how to identify what the
true function is, furthermore why should it matter to ethics?) David Hume puts the
problem like this: how do you justify the move from ‘is’ to ‘ought’?
- In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked,
that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs;
when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
 ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last
consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or
affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same
time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how
this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from
it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to
recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would
subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice
and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by
reason. (Hume’s Treatise, [Link]) Goes from what is the case to what ought to be-
is ought gap- naturalistic fallacy?- logical mistake- cant have conclusion about what
ought to be the case when all premises is about what is the case- TRADITIONAL
objection to NL theory

LECTURE 7- Deontology: Kantian ethics

Kantianism is named after Immanuel Kant. His most famous work on ethics is ‘The
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral’.
Most famous version of deontological ethics

Some of Kant’s key claims:

- Not unique to K but plays important role in his ethical thought. That ‘ought’ implies
‘can’. You can only be morally responsible for things that are in your power. If you
really cannot perform an action, then it cannot be morally required that you do it.
Morality cannot ask the impossible of you- if its true you ought to do something,
that implies you can do it- NOT THE OTHER WAY ROUND
- That your own feelings and desires are not under your direct control. Only your will
is yours to command. You can’t just turn off a desire for something; but you can
decide whether or not to act on that desire. K argues we have freedom of the will,
what we want we don’t have control of- can decide if we do something but cannot
decide what we want. WILL IS UNDER OUR CONTROL BUT OUR WANTS ARE NOT.
Morality cannot require of us that we want anything or have any desires as they
are not under our control. Need to differentiate between direct and indirect
control. If there was a moral duty to love, K would agree as Gods commands that
we love our self, however th command cannot be that we feel love for God as
flings and emotions blur decision making (chief agent of distortion), but rather that
w behave in loving ways- behaviour belongs to the will and is under our control.
SUMMARY= WILL IS UNDER OUR CONTROL, WANTS, FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS
ARE NOT (inclinations)
- That to do the right thing is to have a good will, and to have a good will is to do your
duty simply because it is your duty- Good will is the only good thing without
qualification, everything else is good as a means to an end. E.g money is good but if
used to fund evil purposes not good but if was good will would be intrinsically
good. Good will is an intention to do the right thing
- That if you act out of ‘inclination’ (because of feelings and emotions-K calls them
inclinations) then your act has no ‘moral worth’. This applies not just to selfish
 inclinations, but also to apparently altruistic desires to help other people. E.g on bus
that’s busy and someone comes on who is pregnant/elderly. Motives that are not
credible for getting up for the person= wanted to look good/impress someone-
doing the right thing, correct action but you are not deserving of moral credit.
OTHER MOTIIVE- see old person and feel moved to help- moved by sympathy- K
argues this has no moral worth as sympathy is not under our control but not
reliable moral motive, has to be something that you can reliable and consistently
act on as sympathy happens to you not something you do.
- K argues there is a distinction between acting from duty and acting in accordance
to your duty
- That hence our moral duties do not depend on our desires. They apply
‘categorically’, i.e. whether or not our desires are furthered by obeying them.

Some key Kantian Terms:

- Hypothetical imperatives: commands that prescribe what to do in order to achieve
some goal, e.g. ‘Come with me if you want to live’. Hypothetical because they are IF.
Imperative is another word for an ‘ought’ statement. MORAL IMPERATIVES AR
NOT HYPOTHETICAL IMPERATIVES ACCORDING TO KANT THEY ARE CATEGORICAL
- Categorical imperatives: commands that prescribe acts that are obligatory even if
they in no way further your goals, e.g. ‘Don’t steal’. Kant claims that moral duties
are expressed in categorical imperatives. They don’t come from desire or inclination
but from reason. Not difficult to understand what morality requires, even people
who are not smart know they shouldn’t steal for example.
- The Categorical Imperative: the fundamental principle of morality that grounds all
our particular duties. There are several formulations of the Categorical Imperative.
Ks famous foundation for all moral rules
- The ‘Universal Law' formulation of the CI: 'I ought never to act except in such a way
that I can also will that my maxim become a universal law'
- Maxim: the individual subjects reason for acting. the principle upon which I act, or
the reason I am acting on. If the maxim of your proposed action can be willed
(important: this is not the same as ‘wanted’ or ‘desired’) to be a universal law, then
the action is permissible. If not, it’s impermissible.

A maxim can fail to be universalizable in two ways.

1. Contradiction in conception: there can be some contradiction in the very idea of
everyone abiding by the maxim in question- is there something contradictory in a
world where everyone follows the idea that ‘give a false promise if it suits you’
2. Contradiction in the will: there is a contradiction between willing that the maxim be
one that everyone abide by and something else that you necessarily will as a rational
being. E.g we want to win lottery but don’t buy ticket- we can’t conceptualise a
world where everyone acts on the maxim e.g ‘no one helps anyone else’- if you will
that no one help anyone in need you are willing that no one helps you when your
in need- if you need help then you must logically will that you be helped- now
willing that you will be helped and not helped so contradiction
- ‘ I will that I be helped’- K says necessary part of any rational creature- it is a
fundamental principle of rationality. Also willing that I will not be helped-
contradictory
LECTURE 8- Deontology 8: Kantian ethics part 2

Kant distinguishes between two types of duty:

Perfect Duty: One that gives no scope for choice in how it should be performed, e.g. not
lying, not killing yourself.

Imperfect Duty: One that is no less binding, but which requires us to choose exactly how and
when to comply, e.g. helping others, developing your own talents.

Each type of duty can apply to you or to other people, resulting in four categories of duties:
perfect duties to oneself and to others, and imperfect duties to oneself and to others. The
most important imperfect duty we have towards others is to promote their happiness by
helping them get what they want. The most important imperfect duty we have towards
ourselves is to develop our talents.

Another formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the ‘formula of humanity’:

'Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
any other, never simply (key word) as a means but always at the same time as an end.’
What this means:
 We should respect other people – not treat them as though they were nothing but
tools we can use for our own purposes.
 We should respect ourselves in the same way.
 E.g of using people as means to an end- slavery- different between using someone
to buy something in shop and slavery is consent. Underpins moral significance of
slavery today.
 We should, to some extent, assist other people to achieve their goals – increasing
their happiness is a duty for Kant as well as for Utilitarians.
 To treat people as means in themselves means treating them as though they have
intrinsic worth and that their welfare and wishes are as important as our own.

One important implication of this is that it’s crucial to have the consent of the people
affected by your actions. This looks like a straightforward principle, but it’s more complex
than it appears:

Not every act of (not) consenting carries the same moral weight. Under what conditions
does consent matter morally? What needs to be true of the person giving their consent?
Must they have full information? Do they need to be competent to make decisions for
themselves?
Problems and objections

1. Kantian ethics is empty and tells us nothing- perhaps because it is formalistic. It

seems you can get any result you like from the first formulation of the CI. Just
describe the proposed action carefully, and it’ll be universalisable. Take some action
and we are able to come up with different descriptions of actions all which are
correct but make it sound different. E.g describing an action as flicking the switch
or completing a circuit or allowing the current to flow or electrocuting the person
to whom the current was attached- all are true descriptions- empty formalism
argues we are going to get different answers to the categorical imperative
depending on what description- can say yes and no to same action when
differently described and so it means nothing.
Reply: but it’s not the universalisability of any old description that’s the issue. It’s whether
the maxim is universalisable, i.e. the reason you actually had. Also the second formulation
seems to avoid this problem. Not about any old true description its about your maxim

2. Kant’s moral law is too inflexible and absolute. It doesn’t take account of the
important details of cases. K argues even white lies e.g are wrong. K believes you
can get rules like ‘never lie’- people think this is too strict and inflexible- may be
cases where lying is the right thing to do. E.G 1943 hiding Jew and Nazis asking if
you are harbouring any Jewish person- K would say don’t lie to them but K ethics
says could universalise lying to protect human life
(N.B CRITIQUE 1 AND 2 CANT BOTH BE TRUE- CANT BE EMPTY AND TOO STRICT)
Reply: This may be true of what Kant actually thought himself (e.g. the case of the enquiring
murderer) but is it true of the theory? - might have to distinguish between Kant’s ethics
and Kantian ethics

3. People who both do what they should and feel as they should are better people than
those who have to control themselves to do their duty. But for Kant this is not true –
the most charitable interpretation of his view is that the former are as good as the
latter, not better. Some feelings of love can be good so long as they are
underpinned by duty
Reply: If we take into account facts about how we might try to influence our feelings
indirectly, is it so clear that Kant’s position is out of step with our moral intuitions?

LECTURE 9- Virtue Ethics part 1

- Kantianism can be seen as a sorting device- possible actions can be sorted into
being permissible and impermissible (from first lecture deontic status)- K says act
only on maxim which can will to be universible law- these are permissible. Can also
add in category of obligatory- this is a negation of the impermissible. Util does
same thing- different mechanism but performing same sorting function- perhaps
 util leaves out permissible as it is about maximising happiness. Still sorting actions
into having deontic status.
- All the theories we have looked at have features e.g the thing being evaluated is an
action (they are act-focused) The answer they give is expressed in deontic terms
e.g right, wrong, obligatory, permissible, impermissible.
- Virtue theorists say we don’t have to think of ethics in these terms- evaluate ethics
in other terms than acts- can evaluate peoples characters or particular character
traits- we need to focus on being the right kind of person and then will do right
kind of action- not about deontic terms instead we use terms which Iain calls
aretaic terms (coms from Greek word excellence) Aretaic terms would be terms
such as good, bad, wise, cowardly, cruel
- Permissible field is too broad- there are credible actions such as giving proportion
of income to charity which is not obligatory
- Virtue Ethicists think we should stop focusing all our attention on what the right
thing to do is, and ask ourselves what sort of people we ought to be. This is because
by focusing on right action, moral theories seem to go astray.
- Examples: the friendly hospital visit, the guest who outstays his welcome.

Deontic theories (like utilitarianism and Kantianism: those that focus on right action) seem
to ignore the importance of feelings, motives and desires to ethics, and force us to use
crude categorisations like permissible/impermissible.

We could in principle stop using deontic terms but just evaluate actions in aretaic terms-
we are still encouraging/ praising- evaluating their actions not just their characters. Would
be weird to evaluate character traits in deontic terms- is it obligatory to be kind? Maybe
to act kindly but not to be a kind person.

What is a virtue?:

A virtue = a good character trait = a disposition that it is good or admirable to have.

Disposition = reliable tendency to act in way X in circumstances C. A certain type of
property that people have- not always objects- can be an inanimate object- a property
which is only manifested in certain conditions. E.g courageous person would behave in a
run towards danger rather than running away kind of way in many circumstances.
Particular actions are not enough to make us courageous for example- disposition is about
behaving in a certain way more than one occasion.
Take example of vase being fragile- when falls would break- if never falls it will never
break- nevertheless still true that its fragile. A brave person could never manifest its
bravery and still be a brave person.
Some virtue ethicists will go so far as to give an account of right action that is derived from
their account of the virtuous person: the right thing to do is whatever act a virtuous person
would do in the situation.

Two central questions for Virtue Ethics:

1. What are the Virtues? Which traits?

2. How can we acquire Virtue? How to develop them?
- One account goes back to an act-focus theory
- K says in metaphysics of morals there are certain dispositions which are aids to
doing out duty- if you are a benevolent person, it is easier to do regarding duties
such as helping other people, yet for K, virtue stuff comes after the act-focused

What sorts the good dispositions from the bad? Different ways to answer this:

1. Good dispositions are those that lead to right action.

Problem: This makes Virtue ethics dependent on a working deontic moral theory not
based on virtues, such as Kantianism or Utilitarianism. It seems no different from the
more sophisticated versions of those theories. Is there a way to avoid this?
- If we want true virtue based theory- one that is character based, we need an
answer other than sayng it leads to right action.

2. Aristotle’s first attempt: The ‘Doctrine of the Mean’

 Each virtue is a mean between two vices, e.g. courage is the mean between cowardice
and foolhardiness. Problem with this approach: counterexamples – virtues that don’t
seem to be a ‘mean’ between vices.
- Called the happy medium- he says that virtue is taking the right action at the right
time.

LECTURE 10- virtue ethics part 2

3. Aristotle’s second attempt: Functions

- Each virtue is identifiable as a trait that enables its possessor to perform its function
well.
- E.g looking for a ‘good’ pen would first ask what function will the pen serve- is it
whiteboard pen etc. All pens have different functions- non whiteboard pen would
not work well for normal paper. Or if looking for knife need to ask what you using
it for- is it carving knife or throwing knife (need to have different properties e.g
being balanced in a perfect way)
- Once you understand what it is for the thing to function well you then look at the
properties and this is the virtues.
- E.g., sharpness is a virtue in a vegetable knife; patience is a virtue in a teacher; etc.
- Problem with this approach: identifying the functions of persons (biologically
speaking primary function could be to reproduce- but this does not seem to ground
ethics). (It’s similar to the problems Natural Law theorists have in identifying the
proper ends of various things). Not going to tell us what the virtues for human
beings in general are- might be helpful in applying virtues in professional ethics-
has become very popular in professional ethics recently- for professional ethics
function argument could work but for humans in general doesn’t.

4. Aristotle’s third attempt to say what makes a disposition a virtue:

- Virtues are those dispositions that give their possessor a good, happy or flourishing
life (Aristotle: ‘eudaimonia’- a condition of having a good life (good in a non-moral
 sense).) A believes the life that is good for the person living it is also the virtuous
life- therefore eudaimonia is virtue- virtue is part of flourishing.
- A admits there are part of human flourishing that’s not under our control- we are
all victims of chance- this is called external goods- not virtues- have some control
but not full- A believes virtues are all under our control.
- Stoics thought that happiness was a virtue believed we didn’t need external goods-
the truly virtuous person was happy no matter what happened ot them- radical
outlook which A disagrees with as he claims we need external goods.
- This is the view defended by many advocates of virtue ethics today, such as Rosalind
Hursthouse. The idea isn’t that having virtues leads to being happy later; it’s that
being virtuous is part of what it is to be happy.
Problems with this approach:
- Finding a criterion for flourishing/happiness (c.f. disagreements over what welfare is
in utilitarianism). Are there many different sorts of life that we might think exhibit
flourishing in different ways? Do the people living those lives have the same virtues?
- Defending the view that the dispositions I should have from an ethical point of view
are the ones that will benefit me.

Becoming good
- Supposing we had some grasp of which dispositions are the virtuous ones, how can
we acquire them?
- Aristotle’s answer: practise acting in the way a virtuous person would, and
eventually you’ll acquire the virtue- repeated iterations of it will develop a habit-
you identity the thing, do the thing, practice, then you repeat and then process of
habit forms and for A good habit is a virtue and bad habit is a vice- they become so
ingrained they become what A called your second nature
Problems:
 Will this work?
 Will we be able to tell what a virtuous person would do, if we lack the virtue? Isn’t it
part of being virtuous that you see what to do in a way that non-virtuous people
don’t?
  Good lives are too multi-faceted- so we cannot identify certain virtues that leads to
human flourishing

Contrast Aristotle’s answer with the one that a Kantian or Utilitarian could give: do the right
thing even if you don’t feel like it, and eventually you’ll do the right thing without it being a
struggle. Once again it seems useful to have a criterion of right action to underpin the idea
of virtue.

Possible advantages of virtue ethics:

- It allows us to articulate facts about ethics that can’t be articulated by sorting actions
into deontic categories. If we can’t capture truths about people’s character in the
terms used by deontic moral theories, maybe we need virtue ethics to do so.

- It could be very useful for professional ethics, using Aristotle’s function argument. It
can help us to identify the traits of a good teacher/doctor/engineer/etc. Compare
the virtue-based language of many professional codes of conduct.

- It reminds us that ethics isn’t just about making choices at moments of crisis. If
you’re a good person this makes a difference to everyday life: to how you interact
with others on a day-to-day basis concerning small things (do you do your fair share
of housework?) as well as life-and-death decisions. It integrates morality into
ordinary life.

A possible defect of virtue ethics:

- If Virtue Ethics doesn’t set out to answer the question ‘what should I do?’ is it
sufficiently ‘action guiding’? Does it deliver what we want/need from a moral
theory, by way of helping us to resolve difficult moral decisions?