Rejectionists

Scholars who dismiss the utility of globalization as an analytical concept typically advance
their arguments from within a larger criticism of similarly vague words employed in academic
discourse. Besides globalization, another often-cited example for such analytically
impoverished concepts is the complex and ambiguous phenomenon of nationalism. Craig
Calhoun (1993), for example, argues that nationalism and its corollary terms ‘have proved
notoriously hard concepts to define’ because ‘nationalisms are extremely varied phenomena’,
and ‘any definition will legitimate some claims and delegitimate others’. Writing in the same critical vein,
Susan Strange (1996) considers globalization a prime example of such a vacuous
term, suggesting that it has been used in academic discourse to refer to ‘anything from the
Internet to a hamburger’. See also Clark (1999: 34–40). Similarly, Linda Weiss (1998) objects
to the term as ‘a big idea resting on slim foundations’.
Scholarly suggestions for improvement point in two different directions. The first is to
challenge the academic community to provide additional examples of how the term
‘globalization’ obscures more than it enlightens. Such empirically based accounts would serve
as a warning to extreme globalization proponents. Ultimately, the task of more careful
researchers should be to break the concept of globalization into smaller, more manageable
parts that contain a higher analytical value because they can be more easily associated with
empirical processes. This rationale underlies Robert Holton's (1998) suggestion to abandon
all general theoretical analyses in favour of middle-range approaches that seek to provide
specific explanations of particulars.
The second avenue for improvement involves my own suggestion to complement the social-
scientific enterprise of exploring globalization as an objective process with more interpretive
studies of the ideological project of globalism. Following this argument, the central task for
scholars working in the emerging field of globalization studies would be to identify and
evaluate the ideological manoeuvres of prominent proponents and opponents who have filled
the term with values and meanings that bolster their respective political agendas.

Sceptics
The second group emphasizes the limited nature of current globalizing processes. This
perspective is perhaps best reflected in the writings of Wade (1996); and Hirst, Thompson and
Bromley (2009). See also Rugman (2001). In their detailed historical analysis of economic
globalization, Hirst and Thompson (2009) claim that the world economy is not a truly global
phenomenon, but one centred on Europe, eastern Asia, and North America. The authors
emphasize that the majority of economic activity around the world still remains primarily
national in origin and scope. Presenting recent data on trade, foreign direct investment, and
financial flows, the authors warn against drawing global conclusions from increased levels of
economic interaction in advanced industrial countries. Hirst and Thompson advance an
argument against the existence of economic globalization based on empirical data in order to
attack the general misuse of the concept. Without a truly global economic system, they insist,
there can be no such thing as globalization: ‘[A]s we proceeded [with our economic research]
our skepticism deepened until we became convinced that globalization, as conceived by the
more extreme globalizers, is largely a myth.’ Doremus et al. (1998) and Zysman (1996)
reached a similar conclusion.
Buried under an avalanche of relevant data, one can nonetheless detect a critical-normative
message in the Hirst–Thompson thesis: it is to show that exaggerated accounts of an ‘iron
logic of economic globalization’ tend to produce disempowering political effects. For example,
the authors convincingly demonstrate that certain political forces have used the thesis of
economic globalization to propose national economic deregulation and the reduction of
welfare programmes. The implementation of such policies stands to benefit neo-liberal
interests.
But there also remain a number of problems with the Hirst–Thompson thesis. For example, as
several critics have pointed out, the authors set overly high standards for the economy in
order to be counted as ‘fully globalized’. See, for example, Held et al. (1999) and McGrew and Held
(2007). Moreover, their efforts to construct an abstract model of a perfectly globalized
economy unnecessarily polarize the topic by pressuring the reader to either completely
embrace or entirely reject the concept of globalization. Perhaps the most serious shortcoming
of the Hirst–Thompson thesis lies in its attempt to counteract neo-liberal economic
determinism with a good dose of Marxist economic determinism. Their argument implicitly
assumes that globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon. As a result, they portray all
other dimensions of globalization – culture, politics, and ideology – as reflections of deeper
economic processes. While paying lip service to the multidimensional character of
globalization, their own analysis ignores the logical implications of this assertion. After all, if
globalization is truly a complex, multilevel phenomenon, then economic relations constitute
only one among many globalizing tendencies. It would therefore be entirely possible to argue
for the significance of globalization even if it can be shown that increased transnational
economic activity appears to be limited to advanced industrial countries.

Modifiers
The third and final group of globalization critics disputes the novelty of the process, implying
that the label ‘globalization’ has often been applied in a historically imprecise manner. Robert
Gilpin (2000), for example, confirms the existence of globalizing tendencies, but he also
insists that many important aspects of globalization are not novel developments. Citing
relevant data collected by the prominent American economist Paul Krugman, Gilpin notes that
the world economy in the late 1990s appeared to be even less integrated in a number of
important respects than it was prior to the outbreak of World War I. Even if one were to accept
the most optimistic assessment of the actual volume of transnational economic activity, the
most one could say is that the post-war international economy has simply restored
globalization to approximately the same level that existed in 1913. Gilpin also points to two
additional factors that seem to support his position: the globalization of labour was actually
much greater prior to World War I, and international migration declined considerably after
1918. Hence, Gilpin warns his readers against accepting the arguments of ‘hyper-globalizers’.
For a similar assessment, see Burtless et al. (1998) and Rodrik (1997).
Similar criticisms come from the proponents of world-system theory. Pioneered by neo-Marxist
scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein (1979) and Andre Gunder Frank (1998), world-system
theorists argue that the modern capitalist economy in which we live today has been global
since its inception five centuries ago. See also Chase-Dunn (1998). For a Gramscian neo-
Marxist perspective, see Rupert and Smith (2002). World-system theorists reject, therefore,
the use of the term ‘globalization’ as referring exclusively to relatively recent phenomena.
Instead, they emphasize that globalizing tendencies have been proceeding along the
continuum of modernization for a long time.
The greatest virtue of the world-system critique of globalization lies in its historical sensitivity.
Any general discussion of globalization should include the caution that cross-regional
transfers of resources, technology, and culture did not start only in the last few decades.
Indeed, the origins of globalizing tendencies can be traced back to the political and cultural
interactions that sustained the ancient empires of Persia, China, and Rome. On the downside,
however, a world-system approach to globalization suffers from the same weaknesses as the
Marxist economicdeterminist view pointed out above in my discussion of the Hirst–Thompson
thesis. Wallerstein (1990) leaves little doubt that he considers global integration to be a
process driven largely by economic forces whose essence can be captured by economistic
analytical models. Accordingly, he assigns to culture and ideology merely a subordinate role
as ‘idea systems’ dependent on the ‘real’ movements of the capitalist world economy However, more
recent studies produced by world-system scholars (Amin, 1996; Carroll et al.,
1996; Robinson, 2004) acknowledge that the pace of globalization has significantly quickened
in the last few decades of the twentieth century. Ash Amin (1997), for example, has suggested
that much of the criticism of globalization as a new phenomenon has been based on
quantitative analyses of trade and output that neglect the qualitative shift in social and
political relations. This qualitative difference in the globalizing process, he argues, has
resulted in the world-capitalist system's new configuration as a complex network of
international corporations, banks, and financial flows. Hence, these global developments may
indeed warrant a new label. In their efforts to gauge the nature of this qualitative difference,
world-system theorists like Barry K. Gills (2002) have begun to focus more closely on the
interaction between dominant-class interests and cultural transnational practices. In so doing,
they have begun to raise important normative questions, suggesting that the elements of the
‘ideological superstructure’ – politics, ideas, values, and beliefs – may, at times, neutralize or
supersede economic forces. Leslie Sklair (2002), for example, highlights the importance of
what he calls ‘the ‘culture-ideology of global consumerism’.
Overall, then, all three groups of globalization critics make an important contribution to
academic approaches on the subject. Their insistence on a more careful and precise usage of
the term forces the participants in the debate to hone their analytical skills. Moreover, their
intervention serves as an important reminder that some aspects of globalization may neither
constitute new developments nor reach to all corners of the earth. However, by focusing too
narrowly on abstract issues of terminology, the globalization critics tend to dismiss too easily
the significance and extent of today's globalizing tendencies. Finally, the representatives of
these three groups show a clear inclination to conceptualize globalization mostly along
economic lines, thereby often losing sight of its multidimensional character.