Arguments for and against Planning

Author(s): Richard E. Klosterman

Source: The Town Planning Review , Jan., 1985, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 5-20
Published by: Liverpool University Press

Stable URL: [Link]

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@[Link].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
[Link]

Liverpool University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to The Town Planning Review

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
TPR, 56(1) 1985

RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

Arguments for and against planning

Planning is increasingly under attack around the world in the political arena, the
popular press, and academic literature. Responding to these critiques, this article
examines four major types of argument which have been made for and against
planning in a modern democratic 'free market' society - economic arguments
based on the advantages and deficiencies of competitive markets, pluralist
arguments based on the benefits and limitations of pluralist group interactions,
the traditional arguments used by the early planning profession, and recent neo-
Marxist' arguments for and against planning. Together these perspectives suggest
that planning can be defended on theoretical grounds as performing four essential
social functions: promoting the collective interests of the community; considering
the external effects of individual and group action; improving the information base
for public and private decision-making; and protecting the interests of society's
most needy members. Ultimately, however, planning can only be judged on the
practical grounds of how well it performs these functions.

Formal governmental attempts to plan for and direct social change have always
been controversial. However, public and academic attention to planning peaked in
the 'great debate' of the 1930s and 1940s between proponents of government
planning such as Karl Mannheim, Rexford Tugwell, and Barbara Wootton and
defenders of 'free' markets and laissez faire such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von
Mises.1 By the 1950s the debate had apparently been resolved; the grand issues of
the desirability and feasibility of planning had been replaced by more concrete
questions concerning particular planning techniques and alternative institutional
structures for achieving society's objectives. Planning's status in modern society
seemed secure; the only remaining questions appeared to be 'who shall plan, for
what purposes, in what conditions, and by what devices?'2
Recent events in Great Britain, the United States, and other western societies
indicate that planning's status is again being questioned and that the 'great debate'
had never really ended. National planning efforts have been abandoned in Britain
and the United States and the public agenda in both countries now focuses on
deregulation, privatization, urban enterprise zones, and a host of other proposals
for severely restricting government's role in economic affairs. Planning is
increasingly attacked in the popular press, academic literature, and addresses to
Parliament and Congress.3 Graduate planning enrolments have declined dramati-
cally and government retrenchment around the world has severely reduced job
5

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
6 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

opportunities for professional planners at all levels

practitioners, students, and academics increasi
more than a way to make a living, ignoring its
filling one's professional life with transcending
In this environment it seems essential to return to fundamentals and examine
carefully the case for and against planning in a modern industrial context. This
article will critically examine four major types of argument which have been used
as two-edged rhetorical swords both to criticise and defend government planning
efforts and consider the implications which these arguments have for planning in
the 1980s and beyond. The analysis will consider only formal governmental efforts
at the local and regional level to achieve desired goals and solve novel problems
in complex contexts or what in Britain is called 'town and country planning' and in
America 'city and regional planning'.6 As a result, the arguments considered below
are not necessarily applicable to national economic planning or to the planning
done by private individuals and organisations. Also not considered are the legal
arguments for planning in particular constitutional or common law contexts or
arguments such as Mannheim's7 which have had little effect on the contemporary
political debate.

Economic arguments
Contemporary arguments for abandoning planning, reducing regulation, and
restricting the size of government are generally accompanied by calls for increased
reliance on private entrepreneurship and the competitive forces of the market.
That is, it is often argued, government regulation and planning are unnecessary
and often harmful because they stifle entrepreneurial initiative, impede innova-
tion, and impose unnecessary financial and administrative burdens on the
economy.
These arguments find their historical roots in the work of Adam Smith, lohn
Stuart Mill, and others of the classical liberal tradition.8 Emphasising individual
freedom, reliance on the 'impersonal' forces of the market, and the rule of law,
these authors called for minimal state interference in society's economic affairs to
protect individual liberty and promote freedom of choice and action. On
pragmatic grounds they argued that competitive markets could be relied upon to
coordinate the actions of individuals, provide incentives to individual action, and
supply those goods and services which society wants, in the quantities which it
desires, at the prices it is willing to pay9
Building on these foundations, contemporary 'neo-classical' economists have
demonstrated mathematically that competitive markets are capable in theory of
allocating society's resources in an 'efficient' manner. That is, given an initial
distribution of resources, a market-generated allocation of these resources cannot
be redistributed to make some individuals better off without simultaneously
making other individuals worse off.10 However, this Pareto efficient allocation will
occur only in perfectly competitive markets which satisfy the following conditions:
(i) a large number of buyers and sellers trade identical goods and services; (ii)
buyers and sellers possess sufficient information for rational market choice; (iii)

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLANNING 7

consumer selections are unaffected by the

pursue the solitary objective of maximising p
for production, labour, and consumption.11
The numerous obvious divergences betwe
economists' competitive market ideal justify
consistent with private property, individu
choice.12 The need to increase market c
consumer choice in a world of huge multi
helps justify restrictions on combinations in
misleading advertising. Indicative planning
and elsewhere are likewise justified as pro
rational market choice. The development o
the preparation of long-range economic
promoting informed market choice with resp
the relevant information is difficult to obtai
can be exceptionally costly.13
More importantly, both classical and neo
even perfectly competitive markets require g
failures' involving: (i) public or collective co
spill-over effects; (iii) prisoners' dilemm
issues.14

PUBLIC GOODS

Public goods are defined by two technical characteristics: (i) 'jointed' or

rivalrous' consumption such that, once produced, they can be enjoyed s
taneously by more than one person; and (ii) 'non-excludability' or 'n
appropriability' such that it is difficult (in some cases impossible) to assig
defined property rights or restrict consumer access.15 Private goods su
apples, bread, and most 'normal' consumer goods exhibit neither characte
once produced they can be consumed by only one individual at a time. It i
easy to restrict access to these goods and charge a price for their enjoyme
the other hand, public goods such as open-air concerts, television broadcas
a healthy and pleasant environment simultaneously benefit more tha
individual because one person's enjoyment does not prohibit another's e
ment (except for any congestion effects). As a result, controlling access t
goods is either difficult, e.g. scramblers must be installed to restrict ac
television broadcasts, or impossible, e.g. clean air.
Competitive markets can effectively allocate private goods which can o
enjoyed if they are purchased; as a result, the prices individuals are willing to
for alternative goods accurately reflect their preferences for these goo
public goods the benefit individuals receive is dependent on the total sup
the good, not on their contribution toward its production. Thus, in ma
voluntary market contributions to pay for, say, environmental protect
individuals are free to understate their real preferences for environmental qu
in the hope that others will continue to pay for its protection - enabling the

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
8 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

be 'free riders', enjoying a pleasant environment

course if everyone did this, the money required
adequately would no longer be available. Individ
others' willingness to contribute and 'overpay', t
public goods and fewer private goods than they r
aggregated market preferences of individuals do n
or social preferences for alternative public and priva
fumbles.
Similar arguments can be made for public prov
such as education, public health programmes, tran
and fire protection which simultaneously benefi
provide shared, non-rationable benefits to society
goods can be used to justify over 96 per cent of
services and an almost open-ended range of gover

EXTERNALITIES

Closely related to the concept of public goods are externalities or spill-over effec
of production and consumption which are not taken into account in the process o
voluntary market exchange.17 The classical example is a polluting industrial pl
which imposes aesthetic and health costs on neighbouring firms and individu
which are not included in its costs of production. Similar spill-over effects a
revealed by land developers who can freely ignore the costs of congestion, no
and loss of privacy which high-intensity development imposes on neighbour
landowners. Positive external economies include the increased land values
associated with the construction of new transportation links and other large-scal
improvements which adjoining landowners can enjoy without compensation.
As is true for public goods, the divergence between public and private costs an
benefits associated with externalities causes even perfectly competitive mark
to misallocate society's goods and services. Profit-maximising firms concer
only with maximising revenues and controlling costs are encourged to incre
output even though the associated negative external costs vastly outweigh
increases in revenue because the external 'social' costs are not reflected in their
production costs. Neighbourhood beautification projects and similar goods with
positive external effects similarly tend to be under-produced because private
entrepreneurs cannot appropriate the full economic benefits of their actions. In
both situations the 'invisible hand' again fails to reflect accurately the needs and
desires of society's members.

PRISONERS' DILEMMA CONDITIONS

Similar difficulties are revealed in circumstances in which individuals' pursui

their own self interest does not lead to an optimal outcome for society or for th
individual involved. Consider, for example, the situation faced by landlords
declining neighbourhood who must decide whether to improve their re
property or invest their money elsewhere.18 If a landlord improves his prop
and the others do not, the neighbourhood will continue to decline, making

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLANNING 9

investment financially inadvisable. On the othe

property and the others improve theirs,
neighbourhood will allow him to raise rents
result, it is in each individual's self interest to
they all refuse to do so, the neighbourhood
worse for everyone. An identical inevitable l
over-utilise 'common pool' resources with a
as wilderness areas and a healthy environme
The fundamental problem here, as for public
interdependence between individual actions
between individual benefits and costs and s
solution in all three cases is government
external effects which are neglected in the pur
declining neighbourhoods include compulsor
and improvement of entire neighbourhoods
ments to neighbourhood exteriors which wil

DISTRIBUTIONAL QUESTIONS

As was pointed out above, economists have demonstrated that, given an in

distribution of resources, perfectly competitive markets will allocate thos
resources in such a way that no one can benefit without someone else bein
harmed. However, neither the initial nor the final distribution can be assumed t
be in any way 'optimal.' Both are determined largely by inherited wealth, in
talent, and blind luck and can range from states of perfect equality to extremes
tremendous wealth and abject poverty. Economic efficiency alone provides
criterion for judging one state superior in any way to another. As a result, given
societal consensus on the proper allocation of resources, e.g. that all ba
should receive adequate nutrition and that the elderly should be cared f
government tax collection and income transfer programmes are justified
achieve these objectives with minimal market interference.20

IMPLICATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS

The preceding discussion has identified a range of government functions f

consistent with consumer sovereignty, individual freedom in production
trade, and decentralised market choice. Each of these functions justifies a m
area of contemporary planning practice: first, providing the information ne
for informed market choice through indicative planning, the development of u
information systems, and the preparation of long-range population, econom
and land use projections; secondly, the provision of public goods thro
transportation, environmental, and economic development planning; thirdly
control of externalities and resolution of prisoner dilemma conditions thro
urban renewal, community development and natural resources planning and
use of traditional land regulatory devices; and lastly, health, housing, and o
forms of social planning to compensate for inequities in the distribution of
social goods and services. Specific government actions to reduce confl

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
10 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

between incompatible land uses, coordinate priv

infrastructure, preserve open space and historic bui
range impacts of current actions can similarly be j
market failures revealed in the physical development o
It must be recognised, however, that while necess
planning in a market society, these arguments are not
true, first, because those activities which are the
government in a market society need not be planning
decisions concerning the provision of public goods,
and so on can be made in a number of ways: by pro
or appointed public officials, by the proclamations
happenstance involving no deliberate decision pr
justifed by the economic arguments for governm
differentiate between government planning and gover
ernment' is reduced to an undifferentiated mass.
More fundamentally, the inability of existing markets to allocate society's
resources adequately does not necessarily imply that government provision,
regulation, or planning are necessary or even advisable. Suitably defined and
administered performance standards, building codes, and development require-
ments may more effectively guide the land development process than traditional
master planning and zoning techniques; effluent charges can often control
pollution discharges more efficiently than the direct enforcement of effluent
standards; and public facilities and services may be provided more equitably by
leasing and voucher systems than directly by government. Thus, in these and
other areas, the appropriate role for 'planning' may not be the preparation of
formal end-state plans but the establishment and maintenance of an appropriate
system of 'quasi-markets'.21
As a result, the case for planning in a market society cannot be based solely on
the theoretical limitations of markets outlined above. Popular dissatisfaction with
the free enterprise system is not based on an appreciation of the various theories
of market failure, but on its inability to provide stable economic growth and an
adequate standard of living for all of society's members. Conversely, the informed
critiques of planning are not made in ignorance of the theoretical limitations of
markets, but in the belief that, despite these limitations, markets are still more
effective than attempts at centralised coordination by government.22 As a result,
the case for planning in a modern market society cannot be made in the abstract,
but requires a careful evaluation of planning's effectiveness relative to alternative
institutional mechanisms for achieving society's objectives.

Pluralist arguments
Other arguments for and against planning emerged during the 1960s and 1970s to
complement the economic arguments considered above. Accepting the economic
arguments for government outlined above, Lindblom, Wildavsky, and other critics
of planning suggest that government actions should not be guided by long-range
planning or attempts at comprehensive coordination but by increased reliance on

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLANNING 1 1

existing political bargaining processes.23 Under

analogue to the economists' perfectly compe
between formal and informal groups pursu
interests is assumed to place all important is
that no group dominates the public arena
improve individuals' intellectual and deliberativ
has no independent role other than establish
game and ratifying the political adjustment
groups. Thus, it is assumed, political com
eliminates the need for independent governm
tion.24
Unfortunately, the pluralist model is subject to the same fundamental
limitations which face the economic model of perfect market competition. lust as
real-world markets are dominated by gigantic national and multinational
conglomerates, the political arena is dominated by individuals and groups who
use their access to government officials and other elites to protect their status,
privilege, and wealth and ensure that government acts in their interest.
Particularly privileged are corporate and business leaders whose cooperation is
essential for government's efforts to maintain full employment and secure stable
economic growth. As a result, government officials, particularly at the local level,
cannot treat business as only another special interest, but must provide
incentives to stimulate desired business activity such as tax rebates and low
interest-loans to attract new industry and downtown improvement projects to
encourage retail and commercial activity in the central business district. Further
supporting business's unique position in the group bargaining process is an
unrecognised acceptance of the needs and priorities of business which pervades
our political and governmental processes, media, and cultural and educational
institutions.25
Systematically excluded from the group bargaining process are minority and
low-income individuals and groups residing in decaying urban centres and rural
hinterlands. Lacking the time, training, resources, leadership, information, or
experience required to participate effectively in the political process, these groups
have no effective voice in determining the public policies which shape their world.
By thus tying individuals' political voice to underlying disparities in political
power and resources, existing political processes exacerbate existing inequalities
in income and wealth and fail to provide adequate information for fully informed
policy-making.26
Group bargaining also fails adequately to provide collective goods and services
which provide small benefits to a large number of individuals. In small groups,
each member receives a substantial proportion of the gain from a collective good;
as a result, it is clearly in their interest to ensure that the good be provided. For
large groups, individual benefits are so small and organisational costs are so large
that it is in no one's immediate interest to provide for the common good. The
result is an 'exploitation of the great by the small' in which small groups with
narrow, well-defined interests such as doctors and lawyers can organise more
effectively to achieve their objectives than larger groups such as consumers who

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
12 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

share more broadly defined interests. By turning

most interested parties and excluding the public fro
implementation process, pluralist bargaining syste
spill-over effects of government actions and policies
individuals.27
The limitations of pluralist bargaining, like the lim
tion, provide the theoretical justification for a wi
Accepting the critiques of comprehensive planning b
authors propose that planning be limited to the 'adju
information, analysing alternative public policie
improved group interaction. The objective here,
improving existing decentralised decision processes b
needed for more informed decision-making.28
The pluralist model is incorporated directly in th
which rejects the preparation of value-neutral 'un
overall community interest for the explicit advocacy
all of the interests involved in the physical developm
the inequities of existing political processes, a
primarily as advocates for society's poor and mi
noteworthy here are the efforts of the Cleveland Pl
'a wider range of choices for those Cleveland res
choices'.30
Experience has demonstrated, however, that advo
the limitations of the pluralist model on which it is based: (i) urban
neighbourhoods are no more homogeneous and the neighbourhood interest no
more easy to identify than is true at the community level; (ii) group leaders are not
representative of the group's membership; (iii) it is easier to represent narrowly-
defined interests and preserve the status quo than to advocate diffuse and
widely-shared interests or propose new alternatives; and (iv) public officials still
lack the information required for adequate decision-making.31
As a result, there remains a fundamental need for public sector planners who
can represent the shared interests of the community, coordinate the actions of
individuals and groups, and consider the long range effects of current actions. This
does not imply that the shared interests of the community are superior to the
private interests of individuals and groups or that the external and long-term
effects of action are more important than their direct and immediate impacts. It
assumes only that these considerations are particularly important politically
because only government can ensure that they will be considered at all.32 It is on
these foundations that the traditional arguments for town and country planning
have been made.

Traditional arguments
The planning profession originated at the turn of the century with the widespread
dissatisfaction with the results of existing market and political processes reflected
in the physical squalour and political corruption of the emerging industrial city.

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLANNING 13

The profession's organisational roots in arch

were reflected in early views of planning
architecture does for the home' - improvin
amenity levels, increase efficiency in the perf
promote health, safety, and convenience.
progressive reform were reflected in argum
'fourth power' of government promoting th
narrow conflicting interests of individuals and
a mechanism for coordinating the impacts
adjoining property owners and considering
actions in isolation from day-to-day operatin
these arguments was the belief that the co
expertise, instrumental rationality, and scienti
promote economic growth and political sta
market and political competition.33
Implicit in these traditional arguments fo
formal justifications examined above. Th
independent function of government prom
obviously parallel the economic and pluralist ar
provide public or collective consumption
comprehensive coordination similarly recog
external effects of individual and group acti
which consider the long-range effects of curr
need for more informed public policy-makin
concern with the distributional effects of g
were largely ignored in planners' attemp
interest.34
By mid-century social scientists who had join
began severely to question each of these arg
planners' concern with the physical city wa
perceptions of the urban development proc
technical solutions found to reflect their prot
their attempts to promote a collective public
the needs of civic and business elites; and d
tion of public and private development p
politically impossible.35
Accompanying these critiques were new c
neutral, rational process of problem identi
implementation, and evaluation. In recent y
come under severe attack as well for fail
constraints on private and organisational decisi
and ethical nature of planning practice,
psychological realities of planning practice.
providing collective goods, dealing with ex
planning profession currently lacks a wide
defining planning problems or justifying plan

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
14 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

Marxist arguments
The recent emergence of Marxist theories of urba
dimension to the debate about the desirability and fe
the Marxist perspective, the role of planning in cont
understood by recognising the structure of modern
physical environment. That is, it is argued, the fu
institutions of capitalist society systematically prom
control society's productive capital over those of
formal organisation of the state is likewise assum
interests of capital by creating and maintaining
efficient accumulation of capital in the privat
conflicting short-run interests of the factions of cap
the capitalist class, and containing civil strife which
These actions are legitimised by a prevailing demo
the state as a neutral instrument serving the inte
Marxists argue that fundamental social improvemen
revolutionary activity of labour and the replacement
benefiting capital by new ones which serve the
Essential reforms include public ownership of th
centralised planning which would replace existing
processes by the comprehensive coordination
democratic procedures for formulating social priorit
actions which conflict with the long-term interests
Applying this perspective to urban planning, Marxi
critical of traditional planning practice and plann
and against planning examined above are dism
rationalisations which fail to recognise the materi
political forces which allowed planning to emerge
Accepting the limitations of market and politica
Marxists interpret planners' actions in each sphe
interests of capital at the expense of the rest of
provide collective goods and control externalities
of capital by helping manage the inevitable contra
in the physical and social development of the city
scientific techniques and professional expertise a
state action in the interest of capital by casting it in
neutral professionalism, and scientific rationalit
advance the interests of deprived groups are dism
groups, forestalling the structural reforms which ar
improvement to their positions in society.39
While extremely valuable in helping reveal the und
ary planning, the Marxist perspective has obv
planning practice.40 A strict Marxist analysis which
government actions as serving the interests of capit
reform other than a radical transformation of socie

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLANNING 15

the near future: If needed reforms can result

labour and all attempts to help the needy
changes, there is no significant role for ref
ambiguous class position between labour and
attempts to apply professional expertise and
making as merely legitimising and mainta
relations deprives professional planners of
dealing with other political actors - their cl
As a result, as was true for the arguments
earlier, the Marxist arguments cannot be e
examined critically in the light of present
while it may be desirable in the abstract to
decision processes, this is highly unlikely in
of a revolutionary role for planners in traditi
that they cannot work effectively for short-
professionals and community-based orga
planning may indeed serve the interests
interests alone and is clearly preferable to exc
flawed processes of market and political co

Conclusions and implications

The preceding discussion has examined a v
planning in a modern industrial context. Unde
implicit consensus about the need for public s
social functions - promoting the common or
ity, considering the external effects of indivi
information base for public and private de
distributional effects of public and private ac
The first need is reflected in the economic a
resolve prisoners' dilemma conditions and p
tion goods such as a healthy and pleasant en
adequately by even perfectly competitive m
inability of markets to deal with social co
consumption which are not reflected in ma
reflected in the public and private need for
term effects of locational decisions necessa
market decisions. And the fourth results fr
alone is incapable in principle of resolving
acceptable manner.
From the pluralist perspective, planning
defined interests which are neglected in t
groups representing more narrow interests
external effects of political decisions on g
directly involved in the political bargaining p
short- and long-term consequences of alte

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
16 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

required to facilitate the group bargaining process.

serve as advocates for society's most needy memb
excluded from the group bargaining process.
The traditional arguments for planning reflect th
collective interests of the community in the calls fo
function of government charged with promoting the
considering the external effects of individual action is
of planning as comprehensive coordination. From
required to provide information on the physical dev
long-range implications of current actions. Distribu
fully largely ignored in traditional planning's effo
public interest.
While largely critical of contemporary planning prac
recognises each of the arguments for planning iden
tives. The need for representing the collective int
reflected in the Marxist prescriptions for replacing ex
by centralised planning in the interests of socie
considering externalities is reflected in calls for the
of investment decisions. From the Marxist perspe
planning information primarily serve the interest
fundamental social change planners are called upon
underlying realities of capitalist society. And the n
imbalances in power and wealth which shape contem
Marxist call for the radical reformation of society.
While all four perspectives propose that planning is r
these fundamental social requirements, they each reco
these theoretical arguments for planning are insuffici
ists argue that market competition, properly struc
more efficient and equitable than traditional forms of
regulation. Critics such as Lindblom have revealed p
centralised coordination to be impossible in a dece
And the social critics of the 1960s and 1970s and M
demonstrated convincingly that traditional plannin
terms of neutral technical competence and the pu
served the interests of society's most powerful and
An objective evaluation of sixty years' experience
planning in Great Britain and the United States mu
gap between planning's potential and its performa
several remarkable successes, much of contemporary p
preparation of 'boiler plate' plans, the avoidance of
routine administration of overly rigid and conservativ
open question whether planning, as currently pract
high levels of public support or whether other
institutional arrangements can better perform the vit
above. As a result, the arguments for planning outl
a defence of the status quo in planning, but must

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLANNING 17

profession to learn from its mistakes and b

of the public interest, information, and p
potential.42

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1 See, for example, Mannheim, Karl,individuals'

Man and actions are externally constrained by
Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Studiesthe actions of
in Modern others; the wider the sphere of
non-interference,
Social Structure. New York, Harcourt, Brace, and the greater an individual's
World, 1944, pp. 41-75; Tugwell, Rexford G., to increase the (negative) liberty of
liberty. Thus
individuals
Implementing the General Interest', Public Admi-by decreasing the external interfer-
ence32-49;
nistration Review, 1(1) Autumn 1940, pp. of the state, classical liberals call for a
sharply
Wootton, Barbara, Freedom Under Planning, reduced role for government in the
Chapel
domestic
Hill, University of North Carolina Press, and foreign economy. Contemporary'
1945;
liberals,
Hayek, Friedrich A.. The Road to Serfdom, on the other hand, view liberty largely in
Chicago,
the positive
University of Chicago Press, 1944; and von Mises, sense in which individuals are free
when no
Ludwig. Planning for Freedom and Other Essays, internal constraints such as a lack of
South
Holland, Illinois, Libertarian Press, 1952. knowledge, resources, of opportunities restrain
2 Examples here include Schonfield, their actions. From this perspective, increasing
Andrew,
the (positive) liberty of individuals, particularly
Modern Capitalism, New York, Oxford University
the most deprived, requires deliberate govern-
Press, 1965; and Dahl, Robert A. and Lindblom,
Charles E., Politics, Economics, andWelfare, ment action to promote social welfare and reduce
New York,
Harper and Row, 1953. The quotation is from the internal
Dahl constraints on individual action,
and Lindblom. p. 5. even though this may restrain the actions (and
3 For recent critiques of planning see negative
Fried-liberty) of some individuals. Compare
man. Milton and Friedman, Rose, Free toFriedman,
Choose. Milton,
A Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago.
Personal Statement, New York, Harcourt,University
Brace andof Chicago Press, 1962. pp. 5-6; and
Jovanovich, 1979; Simon, William E., AFiner,
TimeHerman.
for Road to Reaction, Boston, Little
Truth, New York. Reader's Digest Press,Brown
1978;and
andCo., 1945. pp. 221-228. Contemporary
examples of the classical liberal argument in-
Wildavsky. Aaron, 'If Planning is Everything,
Maybe It's Nothing,' Policy Sciences. 4(3) clude
luneHayek,
1973, op. cit., Friedman and Friedman, op.
pp. 277-295. cit., Friedman, op. cit. and Sorensen. Anthony D.
4 The dramatically declining enrolments and Day, inRichard A.. 'Libertarian Planning', Town
American planning schools are documented Planning and
Review, 52 (4) October 1981, pp. 390-402.
analysed by Krueckeberg. Donald A.. 'Planning9 Heilbroner, Robert L, The Worldly Philo-
and the New Depression in the Social sophers, New York. Simon and Schuster, 1969 (3rd
Sciences',
edn). pp.3 48-61
\ournal of Planning Education and Research, (2) ; Friedman and Friedman, op. cit.,
Winter 1984, pp. 78^86. pp. 9-27.
10 See, for example, Bator, Francis M., The
5 Friedmann, lohn, 'Planning as a Vocation',
Simpleand
Plan {Canada). 6 (2) April 1966. pp. 99-124 Analytics
7 of Welfare Maximization', Amer-
(3) luly 1966. pp. £-26. ican Economic Review, 47 ( 1 ) March 1957, pp. 22-59.
1 1 Seventeen more restrictive assumptions
6 A similar definition of planning is proposed
including
by Alexander, Ernest R., If Planning Isn't Every- perfectly divisible capital and consum-
er goods
thing, Maybe It's Something', Town Planning Review,and an absence of risk and uncertainty
52(2) April 1981, pp. 131-142. are identified by De. V. Graaff, I., Theoretical Welfare
7 Mannheim, op. cit. Economics, London, Cambridge University Press,
8 These writers are 'classical' liberals in that 1957.

their views of government and liberty are fun- 12 For analyses of the many empirical limita-
damentally different from those associated withtions of real markets see Lindblom, Charles E.,
contemporary liberalism. Classical liberals de-Politics and Markets. The World's Politics-Economic
fine liberty in the negative sense in which Systems, New York, Basic Books, 1977, pp. 76-89
freedom is determined by the extent to whichand 144-157; and Heilbroner, Robert L. and

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
18 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

can be used
Thurow, Lester C. The Economic to justify government
Problem, Engle- provision of
wood Cliffs, Prentice [Link], 1978 (5thdams, and otherpp.
edn), 'decreasing cost'
201-219 goods with large initial costs and decreasing
marginal costs; see Bator, op. cit., pp. 93-95
13 Cohen, Stephen, Modern Capitalist Planning.
17 The relevant literature here is extensive as
The French Model, Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1969; Foster, Christopher, Planning well.
and For excellent reviews see Mishan, E. |., The
the Market', in Cowan. Peter led.). The Future of Literature on Externalities: An Interpre-
Postwar
Planning. A Study Sponsored by the Centre for
tive Review', \ournal of Economic Literature, 9(1)
Environmental Studies, London, Heinemann, March
1973, 1971, pp. 1-28, and Head, op. cit, pp. 184-
pp. 135-140; Meyerson, Martin, Building
2 1the
3. In the planning literature see Lee, Douglas B.
Middle-range Bridge for Comprehensive |r,
Plan-
Land Use Planning as a Response to Market
Failure'
ning', \ournal of the American Institute of Planners, 22 indeNeufville, Judith I., (ed. ), The Land \Jse
( 1 ) 1956. pp 58-64; and Skjei, Stephen S., Urban
Planning Debate in the United States, New York.
Problems and the Theoretical Justification of Pleneum Press. 1981. pp. 153-154.
Urban Planning', Urban Affairs Quarterly, 1 1 (3) 18 This example is adapted from Davis, Otto
March 1976, pp. 323-344 A., and Whinston, Andrew B., The Economics of
14 Thus, for example, Adam Smith recognised Urban Renewal', Law and Contemporary Problems, 26
that government must be responsible for: (i) (2) Winter 1961, pp. 106-117.
'protecting the society from the violence and 19 See the classic article by Garret Hardin.
invasion of other independent societies'; (ii) The Tragedy of the Commons', Science, 162, 13
'establishing an exact administration of justice'; December 1968, pp. 242-248. For more general
and (iii) 'erecting and maintaining those publicdiscussions see Luce. Duncan and Raiffa. Ho-
institutions and those public works, which ... areward, Games and Decision. Introduction and Critical
... of such a nature that the profit could neverSurvey, New York. John Wiley, 1 957, pp. 88-1 54. In
repay the expense of an individual or small the planning literature see Moore, op. cit.
number of individuals', Smith, Adam, An Enquiry 20 Bator, op. cit., pp. 87-89; Musgrave. Richard
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of NationsS., The Theory of Public Finance. A Study in Public
(edited by Edwin Cannon). New York, Modern Economy. New York. McGraw Hill, pp. 1 7-22. These
Library, 1937, pp. 653, 669, and 681; his thirdpoints do not, of course, exhaust the economic
category of justified state functions is discussedarguments for and against planning. Thus while
in pages 681-740. Other government functionsFriedman, op. cit., pp. 7-21, and Hayek, op. cit.,
recommended by the classical economists in- pp. 43-118, defend unrestricted markets as
clude: the regulation of public utilities, the necessary to protect individual liberty, Barbara
establishment of social insurance systems, theWootton, op. cit., argues that government plan-
enactment of protective labour legislation, andning is fully compatible with the whole range of
compensatory fiscal and monetary policy. See cultural, civil, political, and economic freedoms.
Robbins, Lionel, The Theory of Economic Policy in For other economic arguments for planning see
English Classical Political Economy, London. Macmil-Webber, Melvin, 'Planning in an Environment of
lan, 1952. esp. pp. 55-61. Change, Part Two: Permissive Planning', Town
1 5 The literature on public goods is extensive. Planning Review. 39 (4) January 1969, pp. 282-284;
For excellent reviews see Burkhead, lesse and Oxley, op. cit.; and Lee, op. cit. More fundamental
Marxist' critiques of reliance on competitive
Miner, lerry, Public Expenditure. Chicago, Aldine,
1971; and Head, lohn G.. Public Goods and Public markets are considered below.
Welfare. Durham, North Carolina, Duke University 21 See Webber, op. cit., pp. 284-295; Lee, op
Press. 1974. pp. 68-92 and 164-183. In the cit., pp. 158-164; Friedman, op. cit.. pp. 84-107;
planning literature see Moore. Terry. Why Allow Moore, op. cit.. pp. 393-396; and Foster, op cit.,
Planners to do What They Do? A Justification pp. 153-165.
From Economic Theory', \ournal of the American 22 See. for example, Becker, Gary S., Competi-
Institute of Planners. 44 (4) October 1978, pp. 387-
tion and Democracy', \ournal of Law and Economics.
398. The discussion below generally follows that 1, October 1958, pp. 105-109. and Wolf. Charles
in Bator, Francis M., The Question of Government Jr.'ATheoryof Nonmarket Failure: Framework for
Implementation Analysis', \ournal of Law and
Spending: Public Needs and Private Wants, New York.
Collier Books. 1960. pp 80-102. Economics. 22 (1) April 1979, pp. 107-140.
16 Bator, op. cit . p 104; Friedman and 23 See, for example, Lindblom, Charles E ,
Friedman, op. cit.. pp. 27-37. Similar arguments
The Science of Muddling Through', Public Admin-

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PLANNING 19

istration Review, 19 (I)Criterion',

January 1959,
]ournal of the pp. Associa-
American Planning 79-88
and Wildavsky. op. cit. tion, 46 (3) July 1980, p. 330; Barry. Brian, Political
24 Conolly. William E. Argument.
(ed), New The York, Bias
Humanities
of Press, 1965. pp.
Plural-
ism, New York, Atherton,234-235. 1969. pp 3-13.
25 Lindblom, op. cit., 33 pp.
For examples
170-233;
of each argument
Elkin, see: (i)
Stephen L, 'Market and Politics in Liberal Robinson, Charles Mulford, City Planning. New
Democracy', Ethics. 92 (4) July 1982, pp. 720-732;York, G. P. Putnams, 1916. pp. 291-303 (the
Miliband, Ralph, The State in Capitalist Society, New quotation is from p. 291 ); (ii) Howard, John T., In
York. Basic Books, 1969. Defense of Planning Commissions', \ournal of the
26 Garrison, William A., 'Stable Underrepre-American Institute of Planners, 17(1) Spring 1951. pp.
sentation in American Society', American Behavioral89-93, and Tugwell, op. cit.; and (iii) Bettman,
Scientist, 12 (1) November/December 1968, [Link], City and Regional Planning Papers (edited by
15-21; Skjei, Stephen S., Urban Systems Advoca-Arthur C. Comey), Cambridge. Mass, Harvard
cy', \ournal of the American Institute of Planners, 38 ( 1 )University Press, pp. 5-30. and Dunham, Allison.
January 1972, pp. 1 1- 24; also see Dye, Thomas R. A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning',
and Zeigler, L. Harmon, The Irony of Democracy. An Columbia Law Review, 58, 1958, pp. 650-671.
Uncommon Introduction to American Politics, North 34 The earliest example of this concern in the
Scituate, Mass.. Duxbury Press, 1975 (3rd edn),planning literature known to the author is
pp. 225-284. Webber, Melvin M., 'Comprehensive Planning
27 Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective [Link] Social Responsibility: Toward an AIP Con-
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge,sensus on the Profession's Role and Purposes'.
Harvard University Press, 1965; Lowi, Theodore J.,\ournal of the American Institute of Planners, 29 (4)
The Public Philosophy: Interest-group Liberal-November 1963. pp. 232-241.
35 For examples of these now-familiar criti-
ism', American Political Science Review, 61(1) March
1967, pp. 5-24. For an extensive discussion of ques see Gans, Herbert |., City Planning in
other forms of 'non-market failure' see Wolf, op. America: A Sociological Analysis' in Gans, Her-
cit. bert J., People and Plans. Essays on Urban Problems and
28 See, for example, Rondinelli, Dennis A., Solutions. New York. Basic Books. 1963; Altshuler.
'Adjunctive Planning and Urban Policy Develop- Alan A., 'The Goals of Comprehensive Planning'.
ment', Urban Affairs Quarterly, 6(1) September \ournal of the American Institute of Planners, 31 (5)
1971, pp. 13-39; and Skjei, Stephen S., Urban August 1965, pp. 186-195; Bolan, Richard S,
Problems and the Theoretical Justification of 'Emerging Views of Planning', \ournal of the
Planning', Urban Affairs Quarterly. II (3) MarchAmerican Institute of Planners. 33 (4) July 1967, pp
1976, pp. 323-344. 233- 246; and Kravitz. Alan S., Mandaranism:
29 Davidoff, Paul. Advocacy and Pluralism inPlanning as Handmaiden to Conservative Poli-
Planning', \ournal of the American Institute of Planners. tics'
in Beyle Thad L., and Lathrop George T .
31 (6) November 1965. pp. 331-338. (eds), Planning and. Politics: Uneasy Partnership, New
30 Krumholz, Norman, Cogger, Janice andYork, Odyssey Press, 1970.
Linner, John, The Cleveland Policy Planning 36 Critiques of the rational' planning model
Report', \ournal of the American Institute of Planners. 41have dominated the planning theory literature for
(3) September 1975, pp. 298-304; Krumholz, the last decade. For reviews of this literature and
Norman. 'A Retrospective View of Equity Plan-their implications for contemporary planning
ning: Cleveland. 1969-1979', \ournal of the American practice see DiMento, loseph F , The Consistency
Planning Association. 48 (2) Spring 1982, pp. 163-Doctrine and the Limits of Planning. Cambridge,
174. Mass., Oelgesch lager, Gunn, and Hain, 1980, pp
31 Peattie, Lisa R . 'Reflections on Advocacy44-1 1 7; and Alexander, Ernest R . After Rational-
Planning', \ournal of the American Institute of Planners, ity, What? A Review of Responses to Paradigm
34 (2) March 1968, pp. 80-88; Skjei, Stephen S.,Breakdown', ]ournal of the American Planning Associa-
'Urban Systems Advocacy', \ournal of the Americantion. 50 ( 1 ) Winter 1984. pp 62-69
Institute of Planners, 38(1) January 1972, pp. 11-24; 37 Examples here include Castells, Manuel.
Mazziotti, Donald F., The Underlying Assump-The Urban Question. A Marxist Approach. Cambridge.
tions of Advocacy Planning. Pluralism and Mass.. The MIT Press, 1977; Harvey. David. Social
Reform', \ournal of the American Institute of Planners, Justice and the City, Baltimore, lohns Hopkins
40 ( 1 ) January 1974. pp. 38. 40-47. University Press, 1973, pp 195-238; Paris, Chris
32 Klosterman, Richard E , 'A Public Interest (ed), Critical Readings in Planning Theory. Oxford.

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]
20 RICHARD E. KLOSTERMAN

Pergamon, 1982; and the articles the Rational cited

City. The in foot-
Myth of City Planning, Cam-
note 39 below. bridge, Mass . The MIT Press, 1983.
38 Harrington, Michael, Socialism, New York. 40 The discussion here draws heavily on that
Saturday Review Press, 1972, pp. 270-307; Baran, in Fainstein and Fainstein, op. cit.
Paul A., The Longer View. Essays Toward a Critique of 41 Also see Branch, Melville C, Delusions and
Political Economy, New York, Monthly Review Press, Defusions of City Planning in the United States',
1969, pp. 144-149; Huberman, Leo and Sweezy, Management Science, 16 (12) August 1970, pp. 714-
732, and Branch, Melville C, 'Sins of City
Paul M., Introduction to Socialism, New York, Month-
ly Review Press, 1968, pp. 60-65. Planners', Public Administration Review. 42 (I)
39 See, for example, Fainstein, Norman I. and lanuary/February 1982, pp. 1-5.
Fainstein, Susan S., 'New Debates in Urban 42 See Alexander, op. cit., pp. 138-140; Klos-
Planning: The Impact of Marxist Theory Within terman, op. cit.; Forester, lohn, Critical Theory
the United States', International \ournal of Urban and
and Planning Practice', \ournal of the American
Regional Research, 3 (3) September 1979, pp. 381- Planning Association, 46 (3) July 1980, pp. 275-286;
403; Beauregard, Robert A., Planning in an Clavel, Pierre, Forester, lohn and Goldsmith,
Advanced Capitalist State' in Burchell, RobertWilliam
W. W. (eds), Urban and Regional Planning in an
and Sternlieb, George (eds), Planning Theory in Age
the of Austerity, New York, Pergamon, 1980: and
Dyckman, lohn W., Reflections on Planning
1980s: A Search for New Directions, New Brunswick,
N|, Center for Urban Policy Research, 1978; Practice in an Age of Reaction', \ournal of Planning
Harvey, David, 'On Planning the Ideology Education
of and Research, 3(1) Summer 1983, pp. 5-
12.
Planning' in ibid.; Boyer, M. Christine, Dreaming

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable comments

received from Robert A. Beauregard of Rutgers University, lay M.
Stein of the Georgia Institute of Technology, and the
anonymous reviewers of this journal.

This content downloaded from

[Link] on Sat, 22 Oct 2022 11:04:09 UTC
All use subject to [Link]