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130 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (2014) 1 SLR
International Research Corp PLC
v
Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd and another
(2013] SGCA 55
Court of Appeal — Civil Appeal No 12 of 2013
Sundaresh Menon CJ, VK Rajah JA and Quentin Loh J
16 August; 18 October 2013
Arbitration — Agreement — Incorporation — Arbitration clause contained in first
agreement which supplemental agreements said to be “annexed to and made a part
of’ — Party to supplemental agreements not party to first agreement — Whether
arbitration clause validly incorporated by reference into supplemental agreements —
Whether arbitration clause binding on party to supplemental agreements — Whether
clear and express reference to arbitration clause required before arbitration clause
validly incorporated
Arbitration — Arbitral tribunal — Jurisdiction — Dispute resolution clauses
containing preconditions to arbitration — Whether preconditions enforceable —
Whether preconditions complied with — Whether substantial compliance sufficient
Arbitration — Arbitral tribunal — Jurisdiction — Whether preliminary ruling on
jurisdiction could be set aside — Section 10 International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A,
2002 Rev Ed) — Article 16(3) Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
in the First Schedule to International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed)
Facts
‘The first respondent, Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd (“the Respondent”),
and the second respondent, Datamat Public Company Ltd ("Datamat”), entered
into an agreement referred to as the “Cooperation Agreement for Applications
and Services Implementation” (“the Cooperation Agreement”) under which the
Respondent was to supply, deliver, and commission a new “maintenance, repair
and overhaul system”, This system was a component of the electronic data
protection system that Datamat had agreed to provide Thai Airways under
another agreement. The Cooperation Agreement contained a dispute resolution
mechanism which prescribed in cl 37.2 that any dispute shall first be resolved by
a specified mediation procedure, failing which, in cl 37.3, that the dispute shall
‘Owing to the financial difficulties of Datamat, the
Respondent threatened to cease work unless Datamat could secure another party
that would settle outstanding payments due to it as well as undertake to pay all
future invoices, The Respondent, Datamat and the appellant, International
Research Corporation PLC (“the Appellant”), entered into Supplemental
Agreement No 1 whereby Datamat undertook to transfer to the Appellant
moneys it received from Thai Airways, whereupon the Appellant would use
those moneys to pay the Respondent for works and services rendered by it under
the Cooperation Agreement. Supplemental Agreement No 2 was entered into by
the parties subsequently under which it was agreed that sums due to the
Respondent from Datamat under the Cooperation Agreement would be settled58 SINGAPORE LAW REPORTS (2014) 1 SLR
above (at [51]) can be overcome.
. We also
agreed with the Judge’s finding (see the Judgment at [100]) that the
pursuan' . Significantly, the arbitration claus. cl 37.3 refers
only to “disputes ... which cannot be settled by mediation pursuant to
Clause 37.2”.
a
5 Finally, we noted that there was no suggestion that the Appellant had
waived the preconditions for arbitration in cl 37.2.
Compliance
‘Actual compliance
2
6 When it came to deciding whether cl 37.2 had been satisfied on the
evidence before him, the Judge referred to a table produced in an affidavit
affirmed on 17 July 2012 by Oliver Marissal, who was the Respondent's
chief financial officer at the material time. This table (“the Table”), the
at [110]). The Judge concluded (likewise at [110] of the Judgment) that
given the many rounds of meetings between the parties, “the object of
137.2” [emphasis added] had been met.
q
7 We respectfully disagree with the Judge on this point. In our
judgment, from a perusal of the Table, it would have been apparent that
137.2 had not been satisfied. In our judgment, what was contemplated
under cl 37.2 was that any dispute would be escalated up the hierarchies of
the respective parties with representatives of increasing seniority to meet to
attempt resolution. The Table showed that a mix of various apparently
random meetings had been held.
58 Aside from this, it was not altogether clear just what had been
discussed at these meetings. The Judge did not think that this was
problematic because he “[had] not seen any evidence from [the Appellant]International Research Corp PLCV
(2014) 1 SLR Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd 159
that the [p]ayment (d]ispute was never discussed or sought to be resolved at
these meetings” (see the Judgment at [110]). With respect, there was no
basis for placing the burden of proof on this issue upon the Appellant. It
Substantial compliance
59 The Judge appeared to have been persuaded that the conditions
precedent in cl37.2 had been satisfied because its “object” (see the
Judgment at [110]) had been met. In this regard, the Judge applied the
English High Court decision of Halifax Financial Services Ltd v Intuitive
Systems Ltd [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 303 (“Halifax Financial”), which was
cited to him and also to us. Mr Dhillon submitted that Halifax Financial
stood for the proposition that it was sufficient for the Respondent to have
complied “in substance” with the procedure set out in cl 37.2. Therefore, it
was argued, despite some shortcomings in what in fact might have been
done, the conditions precedent to the commencement of arbitration should
be found to have been fulfilled because their object, namely, to attempt and
endeavour to address the dispute between the Appellant and the
Respondent at the respective parties’ senior management levels with the
aim of resolving such dispute, had been satisfied.
60 — Halifax Financial concerned an interlocutory appeal where, in respect
of the claim brought by the claimant, the defendant sought a declaration
that the court did not have jurisdiction because there was alleged non-
compliance with a dispute resolution clause. There, the dispute resolution
clause (“cl 33.1”) read as follows (see Halifax Financial at 305)
33.1 In the event of any dispute arising between the Parties in connection
with this agreement, senior representatives of the Parties will, within
10 Business Days of a written notice from either Party to the other, meet in
good faith and attempt to resolve the dispute without recourse to legal
proceedings
Meetings were held between the representatives of the parties, but these
were not expressly labelled “cl 33.1 meetings”. McKinnon J held that cl 33.1
prescribed an optional contractual procedure, rather than a mandatory one
which had to be complied with before legal proceedings could be brought.
Clause 33.1 was thus found not to be a condition precedent to the
commencement of legal proceedings. Having decided the matter on this
basis, McKinnon J went on to express doubts over the enforceability of
<1 33.1, although he also opined that it had been satisfied on the facts.
McKinnon J thought that even though the meetings between the parties
had not been labelled “cl 33.1 meetings”, both parties had been represented
at those meetings by the appropriate “senior representatives” (see Halifax‘[Link] with K Williams, Damages in International Investment
repared in the course of research for
(BIICL, 2008)
Case summary
Sapphire International Petroleums Ltd.
v
National Iranian Oil Company
Year of the award: 1963
Forum: Ad hoc Tribunal
Applicable Law: General principles of law
Arbitrator
Pierre Cavin, Federal Judge,
Lausanne, Switzerland
Timeline of the dispute
28 September 1960 - request for arbitration
12 January 1961 - arbitrator appointed
15 March 1963 - arbitral award
Table of contents
2
2
LL Factual Background and Claims, 3
II Findings on Merits... 4
A. Applicable Law. 4
B. Breach of Contract, 5
IV. Findings on Damages...u.c:cucseueeeucusnecest 6
A. Law Applicable to the Determination of Damages. 6
B. Standard of Compensation... a6
B. Claims. . 6
C. Quantification of Damages. 7
1. Expenses incurred before the conclusion of the contra 1
2. Expenses incurred after the conclusion of the contract. 7
3. Loss of profit. 7
4, Refund of the inder 8
D_Interest, 8
E. Costs, &
V. Implications / Initial Analysis... 9drawn, specifically that the clause rejected the exclusive application of Iranian
law. (35 ILR 172)
= Article 38 of the contract expressed an intention to carry out the provisions of
the contract according to the principles of good faith and good will, and to
respect the spirit as well as the letter of the contract. It has been held in several
arbitral awards’ concerning similar legal relations that such a clause is scarcely
compatible with the strict application of the internal law of a particular country
and it much more often calls for an application of the general principles of law
‘based upon reason and upon the common practice of civilised countries, (35
ILR 172-3)
= Article 37 of the contract provided that force majeure as used in the contract
would be defined according to the principles of intemational law. If Article 37
is read with Article 38 then it could reasonably be held to have a wider
application and to extend to the entire contract. (35 ILR 173-4)
= The contract with Sapphire was the last of several contracts made by NIOC
which had the same object. In the contract of October 1954 with the
International Oil Consortium, Article 41 of that contract was identical to
Article 38 of the Sapphire Petroleum contract with the difference that the
contract with the Consortium pointed to the general principles of law as
applicable law. (35 ILR 174-5)
B. Breach of Contract
The validity of the contract was not contested; the dispute between the parties
concemed the interpretation and performance of the contract. The arbitrator was
satisfied that the plaintiff had fulfilled its obligations under the contract regarding the
prospecting works at Teast until February 1960. Hé also)found that the defendant
The arbitrator also observed that there was a general rule of private law that said the
failure of one party to a synallagmatic contract to perform its obligations releases the
other party from its obligations and gives rise to a right to pecuniary compensation in
the form of damages. He further noted that this rule could not be set aside even in the
case where the contract contained elements which had their origin in administrative
law, such as the present case which concemed a territorial concession:
Rules of public law, which might possibly differ from civil law, could only be
taken into consideration if the Iranian State had relied upon its sovereign rights
and had taken steps of a public law nature likely to endanger the performance
of the contract.(35 ILR 183)
Petroleum Developments Limited v Ruler of Abu Dhabi, ICLQ (1952), p.247; Ruler of Qatar v
International Marine Oil Company Limited, 18 ILR (1951), p.144141m72016 Cable & Wireless Plc vISM United Kingdom Ltd. [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm}@ttober 2002)
@
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IBM United Kingdom Ltd. [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm) October 2002)
URL:hap:/swww. bail. org/ew/eases/EWHC/Comm/2002/2059, html
Cite as: [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 1042003] BLR 892002] Masons CLR $8[2002] CLC 13192002] EWHC 2059 (Comm)
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Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWHC 2089 (Comm,
Case No: 2002 Folio 668
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEENS BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
11 October 2002
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE COLMAN
Between:
CABLES & tWIRELESSPLC (“C&W”) Claimant
-and-
IBM UNITED KINGDOM LTD (“IBM”) Defendant
Mr Timothy Dutton QC (instructed by Mayer Brwn Rowe and Maw) for the Claimaint
Mr Michael Crane QC (instructed by Feshfields Bruckhaus Deringer) for the Defendants
Hearing dates : 24 September 2002
HTML VERSION OF HANDED DOWN JUDGMENT.
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Colman :
There are two applications before the courthe claimants’ application is under CPR Rule 8 for a declarati«
as to the meaning of one provision (paragraph 5.3 of schedule 10) of a Global Framework Agreement (“t
tp wana [Link] ?doc=/ewlcases/EWHC/Comn/2002/[Link]&query=(cable}¥AND+(wireless) so141m72016 Cable & Wireless Plc vISM United Kingdom Ltd. [2002] EWHC 2059 (Comm}@ttober 2002)
precious horses are killed on a railway line, but which an apology from a very senior police
officer is all that the claimant is really seeking and the money side of the matter fall8 away
Further CPR 1.4 provides as follows:
“(1) The court must further the overriding objective by actively managing cases.
(2) Active ease management includes ... (e) encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute
resolution procedure if the court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of such
procedure.”
Indeed, the practice in this court of making non-mandatory ADR orders substantially in the words now s
in Appendix 7 to the Commercial Court Guide precedes the coming into force of the CIR. making of
such orders in appropriate cases is now commonplace, even where one party objects to such an order bei
made. Occasionallythe circumstances of a dispute may appear to the court so strongly to demand a refere
to ADR that, even in the face of objections from both parties, such orders have been made and have led t
settlements much to the surprise of the parties concerned
For the courts now to decline to enforce contractual references to ADR on the grounds of intrinsic uncert
would be to fly in the face of public policy as expressed in the CPR and as reflected in the judgment of th
Court of Appeal isDunnett vRailtrack supra,
Accordinglyin the present case I conclude that clause 41.2 includes afgaiéntly defined mutual obligation
upon the parties both to go through the process of initiating a mediation, selecting a mediator and at least
presenting that mediator with its case and its documents and attending upon'Biinre can be no serious
difficulty in determining whether a party has complied with such requirements
Reliance by C&W on the dictum of Steyn [Link] Smith VH&S Internationalsupra, at page 131L is, in my
judgment, unhelpfuEhe passage in question was in these words:
“The plaintif rightly conceded that the provisions that the parties shall strive to settle the matter
amicablyand that a dispute shall, in the first place, be submitted for conciliation, do not create
enforceable legal obligations.”
Investigation of the clause entitled Settlement of Disputes in that case shows it to have been in terms whi
although providing that the parties should first “strive to settle the (dispute) amicably” and, upon their fa
do so, that it should be “adjudicated upon under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the Internat
Chamber of Commerce,” contained nothing amounting to a reference to conciliation as distinct from
[Link] ICC arbitration rules appear under the above title and have always included in addition to
arbitration procedure a facility for conciliation, but the clause in that case by its use of the words “adjudi
upon” could not conceivably be treated as a reference to the ICC conciliation faciligordinglythe
concession by counsel on behalf of the plaifiifthat case was, in so far as it related to conciliation, entirel:
irrelevant to any matter in issue and the dictum of the judge was both obiter and irrelevant.
Before leaving this point of construction I would wish to add that contractual references to ADR which é
include provision for an identifiable procedure would not necessarily fail to be enforceable by reason of
uncertainty An important consideration would be whether the obligation to mediate was expressed in
unqualified and mandatory terms or whethas is the case with the standard form of ADR orders in this
court, the duty to mediate was expressed in qualified terms ~ “shall take such serious steps as they may b
advised" The wording of each reference will have to be examined with these considerations in mind,
principle, howeverwhere there is an unqualified reference to ADR, afseiéntly certain and definable
minimum duty of participation should not be hard to find.
tp wana [Link] ?doc=/ewlcases/EWHC/Comn/2002/[Link]&query=(cable}¥AND+(wireless) a0