Guidance on Aircraft Reliability Programs
Guidance on Aircraft Reliability Programs
AC 42-03 v1.1
Reliability programs
Advisory circulars are intended to provide advice and guidance to illustrate a means, but not necessarily the only
means, of complying with the Regulations, or to explain certain regulatory requirements by providing informative,
interpretative and explanatory material.
Advisory circulars should always be read in conjunction with the relevant regulations.
Purpose
This Advisory Circular (AC) provides guidance on the practical application of the regulations
pertaining to reliability programs and provides examples of processes suitable for organisations
operating under subpart 42.L of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR 1998).
This AC is intended to be read in conjunction with Part 42 of CASR 1998 and its Manual of
Standards (MOS) and the associated Acceptable Means of Compliance/Guidance Material
document.
• CAMO – operator;
• CAME – maintenance control manual; and
• AMP – system of maintenance.
Unless specified otherwise, all subregulations, regulations, Divisions, Subparts and Parts
referenced in this AC are references to the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR).
Status
This version of the AC is approved by the Branch Manager, Airworthiness and Engineering.
Note: Changes made in the current version are not annotated. The document should be read in full.
Contents
1 Reference material 4
1.1 Acronyms 4
1.2 References 4
2 Background 6
3 Who is required to have a reliability program? 7
4 Personnel qualification 8
5 Reliability program document 9
6 Reports to CASA 10
1 Reference material
1.1 Acronyms
The acronyms and abbreviations used in this AC are listed in the table below.
Acronym Description
AC Advisory Circular
AMO Approved Maintenance Organisation
1.2 References
Legislation
Legislation is available on the Federal Register of Legislation website [Link]
Document Title
CAO 82.0
Part 42 of the CASR
Part 42 MOS
Part 145 of CASR
Document Title
Regulation 42L of CAR System of maintenance: matters to be included
Document Title
Annex 6 to the
Convention on
International Civil
Aviation
Other
Document Title
Chapter 11 of ATA Spec
2000
2 Background
2.1.1 This AC provides information and guidance material that can be used to design,
develop and manage reliability programs. The practices described are acceptable to
CASA in regard to AMP management that incorporate reliability methods.
2.1.2 The overall AMP development process has two distinct processes within it. The initial
AMP development (baseline) is the actual preparation of the aircraft maintenance
specifications.
2.1.3 The reliability analysis collects data associated with the aircraft operating on the
maintenance program. The results of the analysis can measure the effectiveness of
those maintenance tasks by providing alerts about the systems, components and
structures whose performance measures deviates from their expected levels.
2.1.4 A reliability program can be expected to enhance safety of flight operation and optimise
maintenance costs. The basic functions of a reliability program are to provide:
− a summary of aircraft fleet reliability and thus reflect the effectiveness of the way in
which maintenance is being done (by means of the statistical reliability element);
− significant and timely technical information by which improvement of reliability may
be achieved through changes to the program or to the practices for implementing it;
and
− variations to the AMP where standards and reliability data justify the change.
2.1.5 AMP variations actions resulting from a reliability program may be to escalate or de-
escalate, delete, vary or add maintenance tasks, as necessary. The aims of those
actions include elimination of redundant and ineffective maintenance practices, reduce
no-fault found occurrences, reduce fleet maintenance costs, reduce maintenance and
down time, increase aircraft availability and reduce the time from problem identification
to corrective action.
2.1.6 A CAMO may make changes to an AMP as provided by the CAME. All other
amendment to the reliability program will require approval by CASA.
4 Personnel qualification
4.1.1 In approving the operator's maintenance and reliability program, CASA expects that the
organisation which runs the program (it may be the operator, operators continuing
airworthiness management organisation (CAMO), or an approved maintenance
organisation (AMO) under contract) employs or contracts the services of sufficiently
qualified personnel with appropriate engineering experience and understanding of
reliability concepts. Trained and experienced personnel enable the interpretation of the
data analysis to be made correctly.
4.1.2 An approved reliability program can include full or partial utilisation of the services of
aircraft manufacturers. Such utilisation needs to be described with the reliability
program document.
4.1.3 Failure to provide appropriately qualified personnel for the reliability program may lead
CASA to reject the approval of the reliability program and therefore the aircraft
maintenance program.
6 Reports to CASA
6.1.1 When approving a reliability program CASA will require that the program includes
procedures for providing reliability reports to CASA (to the CASA field office responsible
for the relevant CAMO).
6.1.2 The periodicity for report submission would normally be on a quarterly basis but other
arrangements may be agreed. For a low use aircraft (eg some corporate aircraft) the
report may be submitted on a yearly basis or as agreed with the CASA field office
responsible for the aircraft operator.
6.1.3 The report is required to be indicative of the fleet’s reliability and overall effectiveness of
the aircraft’s maintenance program. Reporting content detail can be seen within
Appendix 2.
to assist in achieving a safe forced landing after an engine failure, under all allowable operating
conditions:
a) two separate electrical generating systems, each one capable of supplying all probable
combinations of continuous in-flight electrical loads for instruments, equipment and systems
required at night and/or in IMC;
b) a radio altimeter;
c) an emergency electrical supply system of sufficient capacity and endurance, following loss of
all generated power, to as a minimum:
1) maintain the operation of all essential flight instruments, communication and navigation
systems during a descent from the maximum certificated altitude in a glide configuration to the
completion of a landing;
2) lower the flaps and landing gear, if applicable;
3) provide power to one pitot heater, which must serve an air speed indicator clearly visible to
the pilot;
4) provide for operation of the landing light specified in 2 j);
5) provide for one engine restart, if applicable; and
6) provide for the operation of the radio altimeter;
d) two attitude indicators, powered from independent sources;
e) a means to provide for at least one attempt at engine re-start;
f) airborne weather radar;
g) a certified area navigation system capable of being programmed with the positions of
aerodromes and safe forced landing areas, and providing instantly available track and distance
information to those locations;
h) for passenger operations, passenger seats and mounts which meet dynamically-tested
performance standards and which are fitted with a shoulder harness or a safety belt with a
diagonal shoulder strap for each passenger seat;
i) in pressurized aeroplanes, sufficient supplemental oxygen for all occupants for descent
following engine failure at the maximum glide performance from the maximum certificated
altitude to an altitude at which supplemental oxygen is no longer required;
j) a landing light that is independent of the landing gear and is capable of adequately illuminating
the touchdown area in a night forced landing; and
k) an engine fire warning system.
5. Event reporting
5.1 An operator approved for operations by single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes at night
and/or in IMC shall report all significant failures, malfunctions or defects to the State of the
Operator who in turn will notify the State of Design.
5.2 The State of the Operator shall review the safety data and monitor the reliability information
so as to be able to take any actions necessary to ensure that the intended safety level is
achieved. The State of the Operator will notify major events or trends of particular concern to the
appropriate Type Certificate Holder and the State of Design.
6. Operator planning
6.1 Operator route planning shall take account of all relevant information in the assessment of
intended routes or areas of operations, including the following:
a) the nature of the terrain to be overflown, including the potential for carrying out a safe forced
landing in the event of an engine failure or major malfunction;
b) weather information, including seasonal and other adverse meteorological influences that may
affect the flight; and
c) other criteria and limitations as specified by the State of the Operator.
6.2 An operator shall identify aerodromes or safe forced landing areas available for use in the
event of engine failure, and the position of these shall be programmed into the area navigation
system.
Note 1.— A ‘safe’ forced landing in this context means a landing in an area at which it can
reasonably be expected that it will not lead to serious injury or loss of life, even though the
aeroplane may incur extensive damage.
Note 2.— Operation over routes and in weather conditions that permit a safe forced landing in
the event of an engine failure, as specified in Chapter 5, 5.1.2, is not required by Appendix 3, 6.1
and 6.2 for aeroplanes approved in accordance with Chapter 5, 5.4. The availability of forced
landing areas at all points along a route is not specified for these aeroplanes because of the very
high engine reliability, additional systems and operational equipment, procedures and training
requirements specified in this Appendix.
being achieved. Any sustained adverse trend should result in an immediate evaluation by the
operator in consultation with the State and manufacturer with a view to determining actions to
restore the intended safety level. The operator should develop a parts control programme with
support from the manufacturer that ensures that the proper parts and configuration are
maintained for single-engine turbine-powered aeroplanes approved to conduct these operations.
The programme includes verification that parts placed on an approved single-engine turbine-
powered aeroplane during parts borrowing or pooling arrangements, as well as those parts used
after repair or overhaul, maintain the necessary configuration of that aeroplane for operations
approved in accordance with Chapter 5, 5.4.
2.3 Power loss rate should be determined as a moving average over a specified period (e.g. a
12-month moving average if the sample is large). Power loss rate, rather than in-flight shut-down
rate, has been used as it is considered to be more appropriate for a single-engine aeroplane. If a
failure occurs on a multi-engine aeroplane that causes a major, but not total, loss of power on
one engine, it is likely that the engine will be shut down as positive engine-out performance is
still available, whereas on a single-engine aeroplane it may well be decided to make use of the
residual power to stretch the glide distance.
2.4 The actual period selected should reflect the global utilization and the relevance of the
experience included (e.g. early data may not be relevant due to subsequent mandatory
modifications which affected the power loss rate). After the introduction of a new engine variant
and whilst global utilization is relatively low, the total available experience may have to be used
to try to achieve a statistically meaningful average.
This appendix contains a copy of Chapter 3 of the Part 42 MOS Requirements for an approved
reliability program and is accompanied by guidance material. The copy is the unshaded text below
whilst the guidance material is the shaded portions of text.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 This chapter specifies for paragraph 42.020 (2) (k) of CASR 1998, the requirements for a
reliability program for an aircraft that requires a reliability program under regulation 42.155 of
CASR 1998.
3.2 General requirements
3.2.1 The reliability program must:
(a) be in writing; and
(b) define the meaning of any unique terms or acronyms used in the program; and
(c) contain the records of approval of:
(i) the program; and
(ii) any subsequent variations to the program.
Note Common terms used throughout the industry need not be defined as long as the same meaning is intended.
A reliability program, in practical terms, should ensure the continuous monitoring, recording and
analysing of the functioning and condition of aircraft components and systems. The results are
then measured or compared against established normal behaviour levels so that the need for
corrective action may be assessed and, where necessary, taken.
A reliability program should contain means for ensuring that the reliability which is forecast can
actually be achieved. A program, which is only general, may lack the details necessary to satisfy
the reliability requirement. It is not intended to imply that all of the following information should
be contained in one program. It is realised that operating philosophy and program management
practices, etc., for each operator are different; however, the requirements described in this
Appendix could be applied to the specific needs of either a simple or a complex program. All
associated procedures should be clearly defined.
The significant terms and definitions applicable to the program should be clearly identified.
Terms are already defined in MSG-3, CASR 1998, CAR 1988, Part 42 MOS and Civil Aviation
Orders. Other terms may be found in the ATA CSDD: 2010 – Common Support Data Dictionary
or in mathematical statistics literature and Chapter 11 of ATA Spec 2000. An operator’s
reliability program requires approval from CASA and its approval status is indicated by the
reliability program’s revision control.
3.3 Identification and applicability of the program
3.3.1 The reliability program must contain the following information:
(a) the type, model, serial number and registration mark of the aircraft controlled by the
program;
(b) the name and address of the registered operator of the aircraft controlled by the
program;
(c) the name and approval certificate reference number of the CAMO responsible for
the program.
The organisational structure and the departmental responsibilities for the administration of the
program should be stated. The responsibilities for individuals and departments (Engineering,
Production, Quality, Operations etc.) in respect of the program, together with the information and
functions of any program control committees (Reliability Group), should be defined.
Participation of CASA at periodic reliability meetings should be considered. This information
should be contained in the operator’s CAME.
3.8.5 The performance standards must be based on the operator’s own operating experience with
the exceptions mentioned in subsection 3.8.6. The period of experience will be dependent
on fleet size and utilisation.
3.8.6 If the operator’s operating experience of an aircraft type or model is non-existent or limited,
performance standards may be based on 1 or more of the following as applicable:
(a) the experience of other operators of the same or a similar aircraft type or model;
(b) the operator’s own experience of a similar aircraft type or model;
(c) the performance of a similar product or system on another aircraft type or model;
(d) the expected in-service reliability values used in the design of the aircraft.
Note For paragraph (d), the values are normally quoted in terms of mean time between unscheduled removals
or mean time between failure, for both individual product and complete systems.
3.8.7 The program must contain procedures for monitoring and reviewing performance standards
at regular intervals to reflect the operating experience, product improvement and changes
in procedures.
3.8.8 The program must provide for the review of the performance standards set in accordance
with subsection 3.8.6, after the operator has gained sufficient operating experience.
complete systems. These initial predictions should be replaced when sufficient in-service
experience has been accumulated.
When an alert level is exceeded an assessment should be made to determine if corrective action
should be taken. It is important to realise that alert levels are not minimum acceptable
airworthiness levels. When alert levels are based on a representative period of safe operation
(during which failures may well have occurred) they may be considered as a form of protection
against erosion of the design aims of the aircraft in terms of system function availability. In the
case of a system designed to a multiple redundancy philosophy it should not be misunderstood
that, as redundancy exists, an increase in failure rate can always be tolerated without corrective
action being taken.
Alert levels can range from 0.00 failure rate per 1,000 hours both for important components,
where failures in service have been extremely rare, and to perhaps as many as 70 Pilot Reports
per 1,000 hours on a systems basis for ATA 100 Chapter 25 - Equipment/Furnishings, or for 20
removals of passenger entertainment units in a like period.
For structural or significant non-routine findings from major checks, a non-statistical review may
identify an alert condition.
Reliability Reports
Reliability reports typically display the following:
• Fleet reliability summary - This summary relates to all aircraft of the same type, and
should contain the following information for the defined reporting period:
Operation of aircraft with multiple Minimum Equipment List (MEL) items invoked. A periodic
reliability report should include trend reporting of dispatch of aircraft with multiple MEL items
invoked and shall present the information for a minimum period of 12 months. The report need
not repeat the occurrences in descriptive form.
Pilot Reports. Pilot Reports should be reported to CASA by ATA chapters in graphical and/or
tabular form as a count and rate for the defined reporting period, and comparison thereof with the
alert level. For certain types of aircraft pilot reported defects are not a valid reliability indicator
and in such situations reporting of Pilot Reports would not be required.
EDTO specific operations. In addition to non-EDTO reliability reporting requirements, the
following information should be provided for EDTO flights:
• number of EDTO flights during the defined reporting period;
• aircraft/engine type/combination involved in the program, e.g. B767/CF6-80C2;
• details of aircraft involved in the program during the reporting cycle;
• average fleet utilisation time and cycles during the reporting cycle;
• EDTO critical component failures or malfunctions, by ATA chapter; and
• EDTO critical system failure reporting.
The reports should explain changes, which have been made or are planned in the aircraft’s
maintenance program, including changes in maintenance and task intervals and changes from one
maintenance process to another. It should discuss continuing over-alert conditions carried
forward from previous reports and should report the progress of corrective action programs.
3.10 Analysis and interpretation of information
3.10.1 The reliability program must provide for the regular analysis and interpretation of
information generated by the program.
3.10.2 The method employed for analysing and interpreting the information must be explained in
the program.
3.10.3 The methods used must:
(a) enable the performance of the items controlled by the program to be measured; and
(b) facilitate recognition, diagnosis and recording of significant problems.
The procedures for data analysis should be such as to enable the performance of the items
controlled by the program to be measured. They should also facilitate recognition, diagnosis and
recording of significant problems. The whole process should be such as to enable a critical
assessment to be made of the effectiveness of the program as a total activity. Such a process may
involve:
• comparisons of operational reliability with established or allocated standards (in the initial
period these could be obtained from in-service experience of similar equipment of aircraft
types);
• analysis and interpretation of trends;
• the evaluation of repetitive defects;
• confidence testing of expected and achieved results;
• studies of life-bands and survival characteristics;
• reliability predictions; and
• other methods of assessment.
The range and depth of engineering analysis and interpretation should be related to the particular
program and to the facilities available. The following should be taken into account:
• staff training.
The procedures for effecting changes to the AMP should be described, and the associated
documentation should include a planned completion date for each corrective action, where
applicable.
3.12 Evaluation and review of the program
3.12.1 The reliability program must provide for continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the
program as a whole and identify each individual who is responsible for this monitoring.
3.12.2 The program must contain procedures for implementing changes to the program and
identify the individual responsible for proposing and preparing the changes.
Note There may be more than 1 responsible individual.
Each program should describe the procedures and individual responsibilities in respect of
continuous monitoring of the effectiveness of the program as a whole. The time periods and the
procedures for both routine and non-routine reviews of maintenance control should be detailed
(progressive, monthly, quarterly, or annual reviews, procedures following reliability “standards”
or “alert levels” being exceeded).
Each program should contain procedures for monitoring and, as necessary, revising the reliability
“standards” or “alert levels”. The organisational responsibilities for monitoring and revising the
“standards” should be specified together with associated time scales.
Although not exhaustive, the following list gives guidance on the criteria to be taken into account
during the review:
• utilisation (high/low/seasonal);
• fleet commonality;
• alert level adjustment criteria;
• adequacy of data;
• reliability procedure audit;
• staff training; and
• operational and maintenance procedures.
The program areas requiring Authority’s approval may include changes to the program that
involve:
• any procedural and organisational changes concerning program administration;
• adding or deleting aircraft types;
• adding or deleting components/systems;
• procedures relating to performance standards;
• data collection system;
• data analysis methods and application to the total maintenance program; and
• procedures for AMP amendment.
3.13 Pooling of data
3.13.1 For a reliability program for a small fleet of aircraft, it is permitted to “pool” data, that is,
to collate data from a number of operators of the same type of aircraft.
3.13.2 For this section, a small fleet of aircraft is a fleet of less than 6 aircraft of the same type.
3.13.3 For the analysis to be valid, the following things for the aircraft from which data is pooled
must be substantially the same:
(a) aircraft configuration;
(b) aircraft age and utilisation rate;
(c) type of operation and operating environment;
(d) AMP and maintenance procedures.
3.13.4 The program must describe the pooling arrangement and the types and extent of data to be
pooled.
In some cases, it may be desirable to “pool” data (i.e. collate data from a number of operators of
the same type of aircraft) for adequate analysis. For the analysis to be valid, the aircraft
concerned, mode of operation, and maintenance procedures applied must be substantially the
same. Variations in utilisation between two operators may fundamentally corrupt the analysis.
Although not exhaustive the following list gives guidance on the primary factors, which need to
be taken into account:
• certification factors, such as aircraft type certificate data sheet (TCDS) compliance
(variant)/modification status, including SB compliance;
• operational factors, such as operational environment/utilisation,
e.g. low/high/seasonal/respective fleet size operating rules applicable
(e.g. EDTO/RVSM/All Weather operations etc.)/operating procedures/MEL and MEL
utilisation;
• maintenance factors, such as aircraft age, maintenance procedures; maintenance
standards, applicable lubrication/servicing procedures, MPD revision or escalation applied
or AMP applicable.
Although it may not be necessary for all of the foregoing to be completely common, it is
necessary for a substantial amount of commonality to prevail. CASA makes its approval
decisions on a case-by-case basis.
In case of a short-term lease agreement (less than 6 month) CASA may grant more flexibility
against the above criteria to allow the operator to operate the aircraft under the same program
during the lease agreement.
Where an operator wishes to pool data in this way, the approval of CASA will need to be sought
prior to any formal agreement being signed between operators. CASA approval of data pooling
will be described within the program.
Whereas this paragraph is intended to address the pooling of data directly between operators, it is
acceptable that the operator participates in a reliability program managed by the aircraft
manufacturer, when CASA is satisfied that the manufacturer manages a reliability program that
complies with the intent of this AC.
While regulations require that the CAMO manage and present the AMP which includes the
associated reliability program to CASA, it is understood that the CAMO may delegate certain
functions to an AMO under contract, provided this organisation proves to have the appropriate
expertise.
The functions that may be delegated to an AMO are:
• developing the aircraft maintenance and reliability programs;
• performing the collection and analysis of the reliability data;
• providing reliability reports; and
• proposing corrective actions to the CAMO.
Despite the above, the decision to implement a corrective action (or the decision to request from
CASA the approval to implement a corrective action) remains the CAMO’s prerogative and
responsibility. A decision not to implement a corrective action should be justified and
documented.
The arrangement between the CAMO and the AMO should be specified in the maintenance
contract and the relevant MCM and procedures manual of the AMO.