Who is a Judge (Estoya vs.

Singson, 237 SCRA 1) Achilles

ATTY. ERNESTO B. ESTOYA, ET AL., complainants, vs. JUDGE MARVIE R. ABRAHAM SINGSON, Presiding
Judge, Branch 10, Regional Trial Court of Antique, respondent.

Facts:
A complaint signed by 47 employees and officers of several branches of the RTC Antique was
filed with the SC. The signatories allege that Judge Singson "treats her staff in a dictatorial and terroristic
manner without regard to the basic dignity and self-respect of the individual," making the "working
atmosphere… entirely dependent on her moods on the particular day which most often fluctuates
with the moonãe!" The signatories allege that they could not understand the judge’s bizarre
actuations and that sometimes she is excessively generous but in most occasions she is "oppressive,
dictatorial, despotic, and unbearable, if not hysterical."
The judge was further accused of gross and culpable incompetence for having delegated her
authority to the Clerk of Court by requiring the latter to make orders or resolve or decide cases for her.
Several persons testified regarding her attitude towards her workers.
The lower court adjudged her to lack the temperament required of a judge. Her acts, according
to the lower court, were not mere admonitions to correct the employees’ wrongdoings.

Issue:
WON Judge Singson is guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

Held:
Yes. Judge Singson is guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law. Under Canons
4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, judges are required to be studious of the principles of law and
to administer their office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
that they are not depositories of arbitrary power, but judges under the sanction of law. Judges of trial
courts, either of limited or general jurisdiction, should never forget that they are in the forefront in the
sacred task of administering justice. Any decision or order causing injustice or resulting in oppression or
failure of justice would have a negative effect in the Judiciary itself. Judges must not allow this to
happen.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge MARVIE R. ABRAHAM SINGSON was DISMISSED from the
service with forefeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-appointment in any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. This dismissal is effective upon her receipt of a copy of this decision.

What are the Constitutional Qualifications of a Justice or Judge? Republic vs. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428,
May 11, 2018 Aian

G.R. No. 237428

Republic vs. Sereno 
May 11, 2018
Facts:
From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning a period of 20 years, Sereno served as a member of
the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of [Link] being employed at the U.P. College
of Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, respondent was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations: (a) PIATCO v. Republic of the Philippines and MIAA; and (b)
Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (PIATCO cases).

Incidentally, the U.P. HRDO certified that there was no record on respondent's 201 file of any permission
to engage in limited practice of profession. Her engagement as legal counsel for the Republic continued
until 2009.

After having served as a professor at the U.P. College of Law until 2006, and thereafter as practitioner in
various outfits including as legal counsel for the Republic until 2009, the respondent submitted her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in July 2010.

Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P. HRDO, the Ombudsman and the ORSN of the JBC stand,
the only SALNs available on record and filed by respondent were those for the calendar years 1985,
1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her 20-
year government service in U.P. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as
legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was there a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of
Law as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of August 16, 2010.
A month after, or on August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed by then President Benigno C. Aquino
III (President Aquino III) as Associate Justice, and on August 16, 2010, respondent took her oath of office
as such.
On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an impeachment
complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against respondent with the Committee on
Justice of the House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for culpable violation of the
Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that
respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs.
The impeachment complaint was endorsed by several members of the House and, thereafter, was found
to be sufficient in form and substance.1âwphi1 The respondent filed her answer to the impeachment
complaint. After the filing of the reply and the rejoinder, the House Committee on Justice conducted
several hearings on the determination of probable cause, the last of which was held on February 27,
2018.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is eligible to occupy the position of chief justice.

Ruling:
The Constitution identifies and enumerates only three qualifications for appointment to the Supreme
Court: (1) natural born citizenship; (2) age, i.e., at least forty years; and (3) an experience of at least 15
years either as judge of a lower court or in the practice of law in the Philippines. They assert that the
filing of a SALN, taking of psychological or physical examination, and similar requirements, are merely
discretionary administrative requirements for consideration of the JBC, not Constitutional requirements,
hence, can be waived, removed entirely, or adjusted by the JBC in the exercise of its discretion.
According to the said movant-intervenors, Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that,"[ a] Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence", does not speak of objective constitutional qualifications, but only of subjective
characteristics of a judge. They, therefore, contend that "qualifications" such as citizenship, age, and
experience are enforceable while "characteristics" such as competence, integrity, probity, and
independence are mere subjective considerations.

Qualifications under the Constitution

cannot be waived or bargained
away by the JBC
As emphasized, the JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the Constitution itself when it prescribed the
qualifications absolutely required of a person to be eligible for appointment as a Member of the Court.
The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of
the Constitution:

SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the
Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or
more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person
may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of
the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity,
and independence. (Emphasis ours)

Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our fundamental law is clear that a
member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.
The filing of SALN is a
Constitutional and statutory
requirement
The filing a SALN is an essential requirement to one's assumption of a public post. It has Constitutional,
legal and jurisprudential bases.
Of paramount significance, Section 1 7, Article XI of the Constitution on the Accountability of Public
Officers states:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often as
may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. 

From the foregoing discourse, it appears that respondent was specifically singled out from the rest of
the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P.
College of Law. This is in obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who submitted SALNs, or
whose years in government service correspond to the period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713.
The foregoing discourse thins down to a public officer's accountability to the public.1awp++i1 The very
purpose and nature of public office is grounded upon it being a public trust. No less than our
Constitution gave special importance on the principle of a public office being a public trust. Section 1,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution categorically states that:
 Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

In this case, it was found that respondent is ineligible to hold the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
position for lack of integrity on account of her failure to file a substantial number of SALNs and also, her
failure to submit the required SALNs to the JBC during her application for the position. Again, one of the
Constitutional duties of a public officer is to submit a declaration under oath of his or her assets,
liabilities, and net worth upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law.
When the Constitution and the law exact obedience, public officers must comply and not offer excuses.
When a public officer is unable or unwilling to comply, he or she must not assume office in the first
place, or if already holding one, he or she must vacate that public office because it is the correct and
honorable thing to do. A public officer who ignores, trivializes or disrespects Constitutional and legal
provisions, as well as the canons of ethical standards, forfeits his or her right to hold and continue in
that office.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is
found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING
the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and
EXCLUDED therefrom.

Pangasinan vs. Guerrero – A.M. No. 94-1200 (242 SCRA 11) Angelica

Lim vs. Domogas (227 SCRA 258) Cynthia

Medina vs. De Guia (219 SCRA 153) Clarence

Panis Jr., et. al. vs. Judge Dinopol, A.M. OCA-IPI Nos. 07-2618 (2/12/13) Crenzel

OCA vs. Judge Fernando Fuentes III, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2342 (3/6/13) Harold

OCA vs. Hon. Rosabella Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (3/12/13) Jackie

Sonia C. Decena and Rey Decena vs. Judge Nilo Malanyaon, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217 (4/8/13) Giana

Decena v Manlayaon
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2217
April 8, 2013

Facts:
On April 10, 2007, complainant Rey C. Decena filed an administrative case in
Regional Office No. V of the Civil Service Commission in Legaspi City, Albay against
Judge Malanyaon’s wife, Dr. Amelita C. Malanyaon (Dr. Amelita), that during the
hearing of the administrative case on May 4, 2006, Judge Malanyaon sat beside his
daughter, Atty. Ma. Kristina C. Malanyaon, the counsel of Dr. Amelita in this case.
Judge Malanyaon coached her daughter in making manifestations/motions before
the hearing officer, by scribbling on some piece of paper and giving the same to the
former.
Atty. Zamora inquired regarding the personality of Judge Malanyaon, being seated
at the lawyer’s bench beside Atty. Malanyaon, Judge Malanyaon then proudly
introduced himself and manifested that he was the "counsel of the respondent’s
counsel". Atty. Zamora proceeded to raise the propriety of Judge Malanyaon sitting
with and assisting his daughter in that hearing, being a member of the judiciary, to
which Judge Malanyaon loudly retorted that he be shown any particular rule that
prohibits him from sitting with his daughter at the lawyers’ bench. He insisted that he
was merely "assisting" her daughter, who "just passed the bar", defend the respondent
and it's his filial duty to lend his family moral and legal support.
Issue:
Whether the actiuations of Judge Malanyaon complained of, constituted conduct
unbecoming of a judge
Ruling:
Actuations of Judge Malanyaon rendered him guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. Section 3527 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits sitting judges
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients.
Section 11, Canon 4 (Propriety), of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 5.07 of

the Code of Judicial Conduct reiterate the prohibition from engaging in the private
practice of law or giving professional advice to clients. The prohibition is based on
sound reasons of public policy, considering that the rights, duties, privileges, and
functions of the office of an attorney are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion, and privileges of a sitting judge.
It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending favors to their private interests, and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.
Court finds and pronounces JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of Branch
32 of the Regional Trial Court in Pili, Camarines Sur, administratively liable for conduct
unbecoming of a Judge, and penalizes him with a fine of ₱40,000.00.

Maricor Garado vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778 (6/5/13) Grethel

Maricor Garado vs. Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778
June 5, 2013
FACTS:

Petitioner Maricor Garado filed a complaint against respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres,
Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, with violation of the Rule
3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in connection with Civil Case No. 20129 entitled "Maricor
Garado v. Rose Virgie Estor."

Civil Case No. 20129 involves a claim for the payment of a loan amounting to ₱50,000 plus
interest and a claim for damages amounting to ₱30,000 which remained unresolved for more than 20
months from the time it was filed.
 The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Torres to file her Comment in several
instances but respondent judge up until her dismissal from the service by the Court on November 23,
2010, had not complied with the OCA directives. Moreover, respondent also failed to comply, despite
due notice, with the Resolutions dated March 10, 2008 and July 14, 2008 of the Court itself.

Note that respondent judge faces eight other pending administrative cases filed by different
litigants involving offenses of similar nature.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres violated Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Whether or not Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres violated Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court and of Supreme Court directives.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that respondent judge violated Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct and Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and violation of Supreme Court directives and as
well as Canon 6 and 7 of The Canons of Judicial Ethics which further exhort judges to be prompt and
punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts.

The Court found Judge Torres failure to comply tantamount to insubordination, inefficiency, and
neglect of duty emphasizing that it was respondent’s duty then not only to obey the lawful orders of her
superiors, but also to defend herself against complainant’s charges and prove her fitness to remain a
member of the bench. Because of her dismissal from the service in Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres she was
found LIABLE of the less serious charges of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129 and violation of
Supreme Court directives. She is FINED the amount or ₱20,000 for the first offense and another ₱10,000
for the second offense, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.

Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides that ‘[a] judge shall dispose
of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.’

Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters filed after
the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the date
of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution mandates
all justices and judges to be efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or matters pending in
their courts.

Canon 6 of The Canons of Judicial Ethics (PROMPTNESS)

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice
delayed is often justice denied.

Canon 7 of The Canons of Judicial Ethics (PUNCTUALITY)

 He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of
litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a
bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.

Col. Danilo Lubaton vs. Judge Mary Josephine Lazaro, A.M. No. RTJ-12-2320 (9/2/13) Isella

OCA vs. Hon. Santiago Soriano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683 (9/11/13) Jean
 CamScanner

Atty. Jessie Tuldague vs. Judge Moises Pardo, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962 Jerica

Tuldague vs. Pardo

 A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962 
October 17, 2013 

FACTS

Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Balajo, Jr. filed administrative complaint against Judge Moises
Pardo for Corruption and Violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the alleged, asking and
receiving money in exchange for a favorable decision on his application for probation; Obtaining money
for a speedy release of a copy of the granted petition in land registration case; Asking and receiving one
deer in exchange for a favorable decision; Receiving money in exchange for endorsing to the position of
Process Server of RTC. Likewise receiving a cow in exchange for endorsing a Utility in the Office of the
Clerk of Court.; Taking out two (2) cans of coat master paint from the Hall of Justice and brought home.
Which Judge Pardo vehemently denied in his Comment/Answer. 

Atty. Jessie Tuldague and Atty. Alfredo Balajo, Jr. accuse Calpatura of corruption, in cahoots with Judge
Pardo. That Calpatura offered assistance to litigants in exchange for money or animals and that he was a
“fixer” and “bagman” of Judge Pardo. In his Comment/Answer Calpatura essentially denied the
allegations against him. 

A judicial audit was conducted in the RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino, to investigate Judge Pardo. The audit
team submitted their initial report providing that, Judge Pardo, accumulated a total of: (a) forty-four
(44) cases without further action or settings for a considerable length of time; (b) seven (7) cases
submitted for decision or resolution but already beyond the reglementary period to decide or resolve;
and (c) one (1) case not yet set for hearing.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the charge of corruption, demanding money
or live animals in exchange for indorsing applicants for vacant positions and taking of court property
against respondents Judge Pardo (now retired), and Calpatura, Legal Researcher of the said court, be
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence; Judge Pardo be FINED for violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits; and the matter regarding the judicial
audit conducted in Branches 31 and 32 of the RTC be now considered CLOSED and TERMINATED.

The Court notes that this is not the first offense of Judge Pardo as he was charge and fined for Ignorance
of law and warned that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. He was also been
dismissed of the charges of grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and violation of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not Judge Pardo violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.
2. Whether or not Judge Pardo is liable of Gross Misconduct.
3. Whether or not Calpatura is guilty of corruption

RULING

1. Yes. Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states
that “Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.” Section 2, Canon 2 of the Code states that “The
behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary.”
Section 1, Canon 4 of the Code states that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities.”

2. Yes. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. It is punishable by: (1) dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2)
 suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three months but not
exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.

3. No.  While the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant, suspension, replacement or
dismissal must not be resorted to unless there is substantial evidence to merit such penalties. In
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, Calpatura cannot be held accountable for
the charges against him. 

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Moises Pardo, retired Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31, GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINE him 140,000.00 to be deducted
from his retirement benefits. The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to release the
retirement pay and other benefits due Judge Pardo unless he is charged in some other administrative
complaint or the same is otherwise withheld for some other lawful cause.
We DISMISS the complaint against Jaime Calpatura, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge, Branch
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 32, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Mamasaw Sultan Ali vs. Hon. Baguinda-Ali Pacalna, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1505 (11/27/13) Kristine

MAMASAW SULTAN ALI, Complainant,

vs.
HON. BAGUINDA-ALI PACALNA, Presiding Judge HON. PUNDAYA A. BERUA, Acting Presiding Judge
HADJI IBRA DARIMBANG, Clerk of Court and MANDAG U. BATUA-AN, Court Stenographer, all the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Municipality of Balindong, Province of Lanao del Sur, Respondents.

In the Matter of: Petition for Absolute Judicial Clemency of Former Judge Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna,
MTCC Marawi City 
 

FACTS:
A Petition for judicial clemency was filed by the Respondent, Baguinda- Ali Pacalna, former Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Balindong, Lanao Del Sur. Pacalna was previously
found administratively liable for dishonesty, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and grave
misconduct. He also violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which enjoins judges to uphold the integrity
of the judiciary, avoid impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in all activities and to perform their
official duties honestly and diligently (Canons 1, 2, and 3).

Subsequently, another administrative complaint was filed against him for serious misconduct. He was
meted the penalty of 6 months suspension converted to the forfeiture of the corresponding amount of
his salary. Pacalna resigned while he was being investigated by the OCA but has sought to rejoin the
judiciary and filed his application for the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Marawi City Branch 9. He held that
his 17 years of experience and his promise before the Almighty God not to repeat the omissions he
committed would qualify him; and that the only hindrance to his nomination was the penalty imposed
on him on the present case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pacalna should be allowed to rejoin the judiciary.

HELD:
No. AM No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter if Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan trial Court of QC Branch 37,
Appealing for Judicial Clemency) provided the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited
to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges’ associations and prominent members of the community with proven
integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or
similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reformation.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead
of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of
public confidence in the courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof
of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.  The Respondent’s petition
was DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.

OCA vs. Judge Raymundo Lopez, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1790 (12/11/13) Leigh

Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Josephine Lorica vs. Judge Marivic Cacatian-Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367
(1/13/14) Bong

OCA vs. Judge Cader Indar (A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012) Maricel

State Prosecutors II Josef Comilang and Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman vs. Judge Medel Belen (A.M. No.
RTJ-10-2216, June 26, 2012) Mariz

STATE PROSECUTORS COMILANG AND SUÑEGA-LAGMAN VS. BELEN

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216
June 26, 2012

FACTS:
State Prosecutor Josef Albert Comilang was designated to assist the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. He then appeared before Judge Arnaldo Medel Belen
manifesting his inability to appear because his inquest duties in the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office.
Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in Criminal Case No.
12654-2003 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Estacio requiring him to (1) explain why he did not
inform the court his previously-scheduled preliminary investigation and (2) pay a fine of P500.00 for the
cancellation of all the scheduled hearings. 

Prosecutor Comilang file his explanation with motion for reconsideration, however, Judge Belen directed
him to explain why he should not be cited of contempt and to pay the postponement fee of P1, 200.00
for the 12 cases. Prosecutor Comilang then filed a case against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority
and gross ignorance of the law.

Prosecutor Comilang alleged theat Judge Belen acts were intended to harass, oppress and prosecute
him to place him in a disadvantageous position as he was prosecuting the libel case instituted by
Prosecutor Suñega-Lagman against Judge Belen when he was still a practicing lawyer. State Prosecutors
Comilang and Suñega-Lagman jointly filed a letter of complaint to the Office of Chief Justice.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Belen actuations showed grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.

RULING:
Yes. The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Belen guilty of grave abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law. Penalty dismissal from  the service and forfeiture of benefits except accrued leave
credits and with prejudice to reemployment in the government or any agency and government-owned
and controlled corporations.

Marcos vs. Judge Pamintuan (A.M. No. RTJ-07-2062, January 18, 2011) Mc Rae

Sy vs. Judge Oscar Dinopol (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2189, January 18, 2011) Michelle

Gacal vs. Judge Jaime Infante (A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845, October 5, 2011) Pete
A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1845               October 5, 2011
[Formerly A.M. No. IPI No. 03-1831-RTJ]
ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, IN ALABEL, SARANGANI, Respondent.

Facts: Atty. Gacal sought the inhibition of Judge Infante on the ground of his gross incompetence
manifested by his failure to exercise judicial power to resolve the issue of bail regarding Criminal Case
No. 1136-03 where a charge of murder with a recommendation for bail in the amount of ₱400,000.00
was filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo Barcelona, Jr., which was not originally
recommended from the findings of Judge Balanag Jr., from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
In his motion for inhibition, Atty. Gacal insisted that the issue of bail urgently required a resolution that
involved a judicial determination and was, for that reason, a judicial function; that Judge Infante failed
to resolve the issue of bail, although he should have acted upon it with dispatch, because it was unusual
that several persons charged with murder were being detained while Ancheta was let free on bail even
without his filing a petition for bail; that such event also put the integrity of Judge Infante’s court in
peril; and that although his motion for reconsideration included the alternative relief for Judge Infante
to motu proprio correct his apparent error, his refusal to resolve the matter in due time constituted
gross ignorance of law.
Moreover, Atty. Gacal stated that Judge Infante and the public prosecutor were both guilty of violating
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for giving undue advantage to Ancheta by allowing him bail
without his filing a petition for bail and without a hearing being first conducted.
Judge Infante commented by which he denied any transgression in the granting of bail to Ancheta.
Issue: Whether or not, Judge Infante was not worthy of his position as a judge either because he
unjustifiably failed to exercise his judicial power or because he did not at all know how to exercise his
judicial power; that his lack of judicial will rendered him utterly incompetent to perform the functions of
a judge.

Held: Yes. Judge Jaime Infante was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules; and, accordingly,
FINE him in the amount of ₱20,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the
commission of another serious offense will be more severely dealt with.
Rationale: The 1987 Constitution provides that, all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law (Sec. 13, Art.
III).
The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, no person charged with a capital offense or
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment shall be admitted to bail when the
evidence is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution (Sec. 7, Rule 114).
The offense of Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248,
RPC). By reason of the penalty prescribed by law, Murder is considered a capital offense and, grant of
bail is a matter of discretion which can be exercised only by respondent judge after the evidence is
submitted in a hearing. Hearing of the application for bail is absolutely indispensable before a judge can
properly determine whether the prosecution’s evidence is weak or strong (People vs. Dacudao, 170
SCRA 489). It becomes, therefore, a ministerial duty of a judge to conduct hearing the moment an
application for bail is filed if the accused is charged with capital offense or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If doubt can be entertained, it follows that the evidence of guilt
is weak, and bail shall be recommended. On the other hand, if the evidence is clear and strong, no bail
shall be granted.
Bail hearing was mandatory and indispensable.
Under Canon 10, Rule 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall observe the rules
of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

OCA vs. Judge Uyag Usman (A.M. No. SCC 08-12, October 19, 2011) Rockie

OCA vs. EJ Romeo (A.M. No. RTJ-21-018 (September 29, 2021) RB

OCA vs. EJ Romeo (A.M. No. RTJ-21-018 (September 29, 2021)
Legal Ethics – Judicial Ethics – New Code of Judicial Conduct – Integrity – Propriety – Improper Facebook
Posts by a Judge
FACTS:
Judge Romeo Atillo, Jr., maintains a Facebook profile page. He posted pictures of himself where
he was half-naked, revealing tattoos on his torso. Apparently, this did not sit well with someone who
was able to view the pictures, and that someone sent an anonymous complaint against Judge Atillo to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
            The OCA conducted an investigation. Judge Atillo explained that the privacy settings of his posts
were "friends only," which means that his posts were meant to be viewed not by the public but only by
him and his friends. He explained that someone hacked his Facebook account and changed the privacy
settings of his posts to "public."
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Atillo acted with impropriety.
HELD: 
Yes. If the posts were made by an ordinary citizen, there would have been nothing wrong with
them. But Judge Atillo, as a judge, has to strictly comply with the exacting standards required of a judge.
The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the OCA that the pictures posted by Judge Atillo
created an altogether different impression on the viewers and somehow would make a layman question
the fitness of Judge Atillo as a judge. These negative impressions of the public in general are what taint
Judge Atillo’s integrity as a judge.
Judges must always conduct themselves irreproachably and in a manner exemplifying integrity,
honesty, and uprightness, not only in the discharge of their duties but also in their personal lives. As the
visible personification of law and justice, judges are held to higher standards of conduct.

b. Cases involving or against Lawyers: (N.B.: Case Nos. 1 to 24, for MIDTERMS; Nos. 25 to 55, for
FINALS)

Who may practice law?

Cayetano vs. Monsod (201 SCRA 210) Reema

Manangan vs. CFI (189 SCRA 217) Rhey

“Good moral character” as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar:

Cordova vs. Cordova (179 SCRA 680) Richelle

Attorney’s Duty to Court and to Public

Maglasang vs. People (190 SCRA 306) Rina

Duties to the Bar; the IBP:

Re: 1989 Elections of the IBP (178 SCRA 398) Romeo

Bautista vs. Gonzales (182 SCRA 151) Rowena

BAUTISTA v RAMON A. GONZALES

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

FACTS

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was
charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this
Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of
particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more
definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required
complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended
complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and
Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees,
for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of
the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil
Case No. Q-15490;

3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject
of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending;

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971
for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's
fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City;

5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting to be true
copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the
same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by
respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936;

6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client;

7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the Court of First
Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of
facts in his pleadings;

9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell
the truth either."

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.

RULING

Yes. Respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct and suspended from the
practice of law for SIX (6) months.
a. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case
where the properties were involved.

Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with
a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation.

Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust
all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, the Court,
considering the above quoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as
well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in
litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought
against him.

b. Concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development
agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement.

This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and
failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him.

c. Misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who
had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their
signatures. 

Respondent’s conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a
manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of
Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility].

The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and
the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the
administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar." 

Attorney-Client Relationship; Right to Counsel; Conflict of interest:

People vs. Rio (201 SCRA 702) Walter

PEOPLE v. RICARDO RIO
GR No. 90294, September 24, 1991
 
FACTS:
Ricardo Rio was charged and convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, interposed his
appeal and as a consequence, the clerk of court of said regional trial court branch forwarded the records
of the case to the Court of Appeals.  The appellate court, however, forwarded the records of the case to
the Supreme Court in view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.

However, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two letters addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J.
Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the
appeal due to his poverty.
 
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court in a resolution, denied the
appellant's motion withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant
for, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the
only reason offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a
counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking
justice in any forum.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-appeallant ceased upon the conviction by the trial court.

RULING:
No. Pursuant to Section 13 of the Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and Section 11 of Article lll of the 1987
Constitution that the Court can appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his appeal. The Court hereby
admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients'
causes, whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest requires that an attorney exert his best
efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause."  Lawyers are an indispensable part
of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. And a lawyer who performs that duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.   This is
so because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client
but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. 

Tiania vs. Ocampo (200 SCRA 427) Wilbert

Attorney’s Duty to Client:

Garcia vs. Francisco (220 SCRA 512) Achilles

Concordia B. Garcia vs. Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco, AC No. 3923, March 30, 1993

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case by Concordia B. Garcia against Atty. Crisanto L. Francisco. The
complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before different
courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided
against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from th lease contract and involved the same issues and parties,
thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping. Respondent, in his comment, says that he
inserted in defense of his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.

ISSUE:
 WON Atty. Francisco should be punished for misuse of judicial process.

HELD:
  A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing
a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain
only such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay any man for money or malice, he
has besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of  trust reposed
in him by law as an officer of the Court.

Tan vs. CA (199 SCRA 212) Aian

G.R. No. 97238

Julia Tan and James Tan vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines

Facts: 
This is a petition to review the decision as well as the resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the order dated June 16, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Civil Case No. Q-
89-2357 convicting petitioners Julia L. Tan and James L. Tan of indirect contempt and sentencing each of
them to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay a fine of P500.00 each.
Petitioner Julia L. Tan is an 84 year old widow who is the Principal of Grace Christian High School offering
both elementary and secondary courses while petitioner James L. Tan is the Administrative Consultant
of the school.
This case arose from the refusal of the petitioners to admit and enroll certain students for the school
year 1987-1988 because heated controversies, acts of misbehavior, and a refusal to dialogue with the
school administration led the school authorities to believe that it would be best for all concerned if
these children enrolled in other schools.
Two separate petitions for mandamus with prayers for preliminary mandatory injunction were
eventually filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The first case docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
51039 was assigned to Branch 79 of the court. The second case which led to the present petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 and was assigned to Branch 88. The latter case was filed by
Vicente Luy and his daughter Vonette Luy, who were also petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-51039.
On July 1, 1987, Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. The school and the petitioners were ordered to allow enrollment of the subject
children.
While the two cases were pending in court, the children were enrolled and continued their studies.
During the enrollment period in May, 1989, however, the petitioners refused the enrollment in the first
year high school of Carmella Ang See, Michael Robert Ang, Karen Gay Dipasupil and Vonette Luy on the
ground that the school was under no legal duty to still accept them in the high school after graduating
them from the elementary course.
On May 23, 1989, Vicente Luy (father of Vonette Luy) together with other parents Josefina Ang, Teresita
Ang See and Teresita Dipasupil filed in Branch 79, a motion to hold in indirect contempt the petitioners
for refusing to enroll their children in alleged disobedience of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
on July 1, 1987.
On May 25, 1989, Branch 88 issued an order in the second case granting the prayer for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordering the petitioners to enroll Vonette Luy in the
first year high school.
In the meantime, the herein petitioners challenged in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 13179) the
order granting the writ of a preliminary mandatory injunction by Branch 79.
On June 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals set aside the order prompting the respondents to file a petition
for certiorari with us. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 90063.
In a resolution dated December 12, 1989, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit and resolved "that .
. . the children here affected shall be allowed to finish the current school year (including the summer
term if any), as the questioned order of the Court of Appeals shall take effect only as of the beginning of
school year 1990-1991."
Meanwhile, the case in Branch 88 continued its independent course. Thus, on June 16, 1989, the trial
court upon motion of Vicente Luy issued the questioned order. This order is now challenged by the
petitioners in this case.
While Civil Case No. Q-51039 was being considered on appeal by the Court of Appeals and later the
Supreme Court, the proceedings were also going on in Civil Case No. Q-89-2357, which had been filed by
Vonette C. Luy and her father Vicente Luy and were assigned to Branch 88 on April 26, 1989.

Significantly, the petitioners also pointed out to the court that Vicente Luy and his daughter were
engaging in forum shopping because Civil Case No. Q-51039 had been filed earlier by Mr. Luy himself
and various other parents. There was pending exactly the same cause of action on contempt and both
cases were raising the same issues.
As earlier stated, the first case on the grant of mandatory injunction was at that time already with the
Court of Appeals.
On June 9, 1989, Vicente Luy filed a motion to declare the petitioners in contempt of court for refusing
to enroll Vonette Luy in high school.
We note that on this same date, June 9, 1989, the other court presided over by Judge Godofredo
Legaspi denied the similar motion for contempt filed by Mr. Luy, Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang See, and
Teresita Dipasupil.
On June 13, 1989, Judge Tirso Velasco ordered the petitioners to comply with the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction or he would act on the motion for contempt. The petitioners opposed this order
stating that Judge Legaspi had just denied the similar motion for contempt in the other case (Civil Case
No. Q-51039). In this opposition, the petitioners again charged Mr. Luy with forum shopping contending
that the first case he filed with others should take precedence over Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 pending
before Judge Velasco's court.
Issue:
 Whether or not the action taken by the Court of Appeals is constitutional
 Whether or not there is a right to enroll in high school of students who graduated from the
elementary department of the same institution
 Whether or not Vicente Luy has violated  forum-shopping

Ruling:
The respondent Court of Appeals should have been aware that in the related case (G.R. No. 90063), we
had already set aside the writ of preliminary injunction similar to the writ from which emanated the
contempt order directing that the petitioners be imprisoned and made to pay fines. If this Court had
already found a preliminary injunction invalid and sustained the school's position that there was no
unmistakable and indubitable right to enroll the petitioners' children, any lower court's decision to the
contrary is not only unenforceable and ineffective, but certainly cannot be the basis for a contempt
order.

We cannot close this case without deploring the action of Vicente Luy and his counsel for filing Civil Case
No. Q-89-2357 in 1989 when exactly the same issues were already before Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-
51039 filed by, among others, Mr. Luy in 1987. This results not only in unnecessarily clogging the heavily
burdened dockets of our courts but also in the unseemly sight of two Branches of the same trial court
and two Divisions of the Court of Appeals issuing contradictory decisions –– one in favor of the school
and the other in favor of the students and their parents. This problem of forum shopping is now before
our Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court.
Pending any amendment of the Rules or a circular remedying this problem, lawyers and litigants alike
are warned to be more candid with courts of justice and not engage in forum shopping through
deliberate splitting of actions or appeals in the hope that even as one case is dismissed, another would
still be open.
The Court of Appeals in this case was also misled. It ruled:

It is important to note that Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed for the purpose of requiring appellants to
maintain the eight (8) students in the roll of students in the Elementary Department. This prayer was
granted when the court issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction asked for. Herein appellants
thereafter complied with the said order. It was only when the school refused to admit the eight (8)
students in its High School Department that they filed the motion for contempt. Said motion was denied
because what the initial petition prayed for was for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to maintain the enrollment in the Elementary Department of the students and not their
admission in the High School Department of said school. Therefore, the right of the students to be
admitted in the High School Department was not in issue hence, the court was correct in ruling that it
had no jurisdiction to declare the appellants in contempt of court for the act complained of, thereby
dismissing the charge without considering its merits. 

Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed by Vicente Luy and other parents not only to continue enrolling their
children in the elementary department but also to compel the enrollment of their other children in the
high school department of Grace Christian School. As pointed out by the petitioners, there were
eighteen (18) students involved in Civil Case No. Q- 51039, not eight (8) as stated by the Court of
Appeals. Vonette Luy had two sisters, Vivian Luy and Virna Luy who were high school students and who
joined in the petition. The case involved not only elementary grade but also high school
students.1âwphi1
No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is suffering from the effects of a serious
deterioration of academic and other standards in our educational system. This Court is disturbed by the
big number of candidates taking the bar examinations who, after six (6) years in the elementary grades,
four (4) years in high school, and eight (8) years in college appear to be functionally semi-illiterate
judging from the answers they give to bar examination questions. The same is true of other disciplines,
professions, and occupations. A drastic upgrading of educational standards especially in the elementary
and high school levels is imperative.
It is for the above reason that the Government should uphold and encourage schools and colleges which
endeavor to maintain the highest standards of education. We have consistently sustained the rights of
students to legitimately address their grievances both to school authorities, media, and the general
public to the extent of sometimes countenancing uncivil and rowdy behavior. However, we have not
hesitated to strike down violence and anarchy when certain students and their inevitable supporters
misuse the grant of "ordered liberty" mandated by the Constitution. Educators who insist on high
standards and who enforce reasonable rules of discipline deserve support from courts of justice and
other branches of Government.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned DECISION and RESOLUTION of the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners are ACQUITTED of the offense of indirect
contempt of court.

Libet vs. Oliva (237 SCRA 375) Angelica

Mariveles vs. Mallari (219 SCRA 44) Cynthia
Vill Transport Service Inc. vs. CA (G.R. No. 76232, 1/18/91) Clarence
Sol. Gen. Francisco Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan and Enrile (193 SCRA 282 Crenzel

Fiduciary Obligations of Attorney to Client:

Buted vs. Hernando (203 SCRA 1) Criz

Lee vs. Abastillas (234 SCRA 29) Harold

Authority of Attorney:

Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. CA (233 SCRA 484) Jackie

People vs. Dacudao (170 SCRA 487) Giana

People vs Judge Renato Dacudao

G.R. No. 81389

February 21, 1989

Facts:
On August 11, 1987, Information for Murder with the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge Renato C. Dacudao, against accused Rey
Christopher Paclibar and Nero Desamparado for the death of Cesarlito Nolasco. Upon
arraignment, Accused Rey Christopher Paclibar entered a plea of ‘not guilty to the offense
charged.
On September 18, 1987, Accused Rey Christopher Paclibar filed a motion for bail,
furnishing the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu with a copy thereof.
On September 29, 1987, without conducting a hearing in the bail application, the
respondent Judge issued an order granting the motion for bail.
Atty. Alex Monteclar, a private prosecutor, protested the grant of bail stating that
no hearing was conducted, thus denying the prosecution procedural due process.
Issue:
Do private prosecutors have the authority to act in criminal cases?
Ruling:
No. A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the People of
the Philippines before the Court. It is the Government's counsel, the Solicitor General
who appears in criminal cases or their incidents before the Supreme Court. At the very
least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the conformity of the Solicitor General, should
raise the issue, with the conformity of one of the Assistant Provincial Fiscals. To resolve
this petition on its merits, with a warning to the private prosecutor and the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal to follow the correct procedure in the future.

Compensation of Attorney:

Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank vs. CA (202 SCRA 543) Grethel
Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank vs. CA
G.R. No. 95625
October 4, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a review or certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 21002
regarding the correct computation of the attorney’s fees.

Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank (Hiyas Savings) was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 6821-M
entitled "Delfin Mendoza, Et. Al. v. Victoriano Evangelista, Et. Al." for annulment of a mortgage
contract with a prayer for a preliminary injunction seeking to restrain the foreclosure sale and public
auction of the properties subject of the mortgage. After trial, a decision was rendered in favor
of the defendant Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank. No appeal was taken by the parties from the decision
of the trial court. Hence, it became final. The dispositive ruling include:
1. P200,000.00 representing the principal amount of loan payable by plaintiffs to private
defendant, with 14% interest per annum thereon from January 10, 1982 (date of maturity
until the same is fully paid by the plaintiffs or satisfied out of the sale of the mortgaged
properties;
2. Ten percent (10%) of the amount due as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
3. The costs of this suit.

In the execution of the decision, petitioner’s attorney’s fees were computed based on the principal
amount of loan and not the total amount due which is formulated as 10% of the (principal amount of
loan + interest on the loan amount + the cost of suit) amounting to P448,941.92. However, the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan fixed the attorney’s fees based on the principal loan amount of P200,000.00
instead of the amount due of P448,941.92 and reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment in affirming The Regional Trial
Court’s decision in denying the amended motion for execution filed by petitioner in Civil Case No. 6821-
M which resulted in the substantial amendment of the final and executory judgment rendered therein.

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its decision, thus reversing the said
decision. Judgment is rendered granting the amended motion for execution filed by the petitioner
basing the computation on the amount due of P448,941.92 and not the principal amount of loan
P200,000.00 based on the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 6821-M.
 The Court in its decision reminded to be careful in writing their decisions, to be clear and
precise in the use of words, especially in the dispositive portion. Ambiguities must be avoided. And,
when the dispositions in the decision are clear, courts must avoid interpretations which result in the
substantial amendment thereof which are violative of the rule on immutability of final and executory
judgments.

Del Rosario vs. CA (237 SCRA 39) Isella

Solid Homes Inc. vs. CA (235 SCRA 299) Jean

Attorney’s Lien:

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA (181 SCRA 367) Jerica

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v The Honorable Court of Appeals 

G.R. No. 86100-03
January 23, 1990
FACTS

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner should pay the certain amount based on the charging lien on the civil case filed
against them, which resulted to its dismissal. In the dismissed case, private respondent Arturo Alafriz
and Associates filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an
exchange of arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private
respondent. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in
order to avoid suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful. 
 
ISSUE
1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney’s fees.
2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.
3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current
market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis. 

RULLING

1. No. On the matter of attorney’s liens, Section 37, Rule 138 provides: “x x x He shall also have a
lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after
the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the
records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have
the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.” 

Consequent to such provision, a charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of
attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in
pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A
lawyer may enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main
action in which his services were rendered when something is due his client in the action from
which the fee is to be paid.

Nonetheless, it bears mention at this juncture that an enforceable charging lien, duly recorded,
is within the jurisdiction of the court trying the main case and this jurisdiction subsists until the
lien is settled. There is certainly no valid reason why the trial court cannot pass upon a petition
to determine attorney’s fees if the rule against multiplicity of suits is to be activated. These
 decisional rules, however, apply only where the charging lien is valid and enforceable under the
rules.

2. Yes. A petition for recovery of attorney’s fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in
the main action, has to be prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other
money claim. The persons who are entitled to or who must pay attorney’s fees have the right to
be heard upon the question of their propriety or amount. Hence, the obvious necessity of a
hearing is beyond cavil. 

3. No. Besides, in fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the
basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the importance of the
subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer. These are aside from the several other considerations laid down by this
Court in a number of decisions as pointed out by respondent court. A determination of all these
factors would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private
respondent can adduce evidence to establish its right to lawful attorney’s fees and for petitioner
to oppose or refute the same. 

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court
of Appeals of February 11, 1988 affirming the order of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
without prejudice to such appropriate proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to
establish its right to attorney’s fees and the amount thereof.

Law Firm of Raymundo Armovit vs. CA (202 SCRA 16) Kristine

THE LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC., Respondents.
 

FACTS:
The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit, Petitioner, was the legal counsel of the Bengson Commercial
Building, Inc. (BCBI) when the latter filed an action against GSIS to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure of
its real estate and chattel mortgages, which were used to secure loan that it had taken out with the
GSIS. The RTC ruled in favor of the BCBI; hence GSIS filed for an appeal. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling
and ordered GSIS to reimburse the amount of P 2, 760, 000 to BCBI as rentals earned by one of its
properties. It was Atty. Armovit who sought the execution thereof; however, BCBI eventually ordered
Armovit to no longer take part in the execution proceedings and ignored his billings. Armovit moved for
the entry of attorney’s lien in the case records but later on withdrew in efforts to amicably settle with
BCBI. The Court approved the withdrawal and had the partied comply faithfully with their duties,
Bengson paying Armovit P300, 000 which the Court deemed to be faithful compliance with its
obligation.
Armovit appealed, claiming for P 252, 000 more pursuant to the contingency agreement where the body
of is decision stated that, “we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for 20% of all recoveries to be
unreasonable”.

ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Armovit is entitled to the sum of P252, 000 or more, in addition to the sum
of P300, 000 already paid him by the private respondent; and
Whether the courts have erred in ruling that the petitioner’s attorney’s fees are limited to 20%
of the rental arrearages only; excluding the rest of the recoveries made by BCBI.

HELD:
BCBI was held liable for the total amount of P552, 000, representing the 20% of the P2, 760, 000
received by BCBI as payments from GSIS, rental reimbursements constituting the only monetary award
in favor of BCBI.
Contingent fees are valid and that attorney’s fees must at all times be reasonable. While the
body of the decision quoted the 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered by
favorable judgment on the cases, the Court ordered the payment of the sum of P252, 000 only, in
addition to the total amount holding BCBI liable (20% of the P2, 760, 000).

Cadalin, et. al. vs. POEA Admin. (238 SCRA 721) Leigh

Liabilities of Attorney; Suspension and Disbarment; Grounds for Discipline; Procedure for Discipline
and Reinstatement: (for FINALS)

Sulit vs. Tiangco, 115 SCRA 207 Bong

Rolito Go vs. CA, 240 SCRA 91 Maricel

De Eco vs. Ramirez, A.C. No. 1647 (1/20/95) Mariz

DE ECO VS. RAMIREZ
A.C. No. 1647
January 20, 1995

FACTS:
Elena De Eco went to the office of Commissions Insurance Co., Inc. to follow up the case her husband
who died while employed in the Hapseng Grocery and Bakery and its insurer, Commissions Insurance
Co., Inc. Complainant and her daughter, Beata Elona, were met by Atty. Benjamin Ramirez, who asked
them to wait for a while. Afterward, he told them that the insurance company was not liable for her
husband’s death but the company will help by giving them “P650.00 as limos.” He asked her to get a
residence certificate in order for her to receive the money only after she thumb mark a blank piece of
paper and her daughter signed as a witness.

The Workmen’s Commission decided the case in favor of De Eco and ordered the Hapseng Grocery and
Bakery and Commissions Insurance Co., Inc. jointly and severally to pay the sum amount of P4,880.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Ramirez made it appear that complainant signed a receipt as full payment
for the complainant’s claim.
RULING:
Yes. The respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year from the receipt of
the Resolution. The preponderance of evidence has been amply proved That Atty. Ramirez deceived the
complainant by making it appear in a document she received more than what she actually got.

Under Section 27of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office. Respondent’s act of defrauding an illiterate complainant of the monetary award of his
husband’s death, for she waited nearly ten years, is deplorable and should not be viewed lightly. Not
only does respondent degrade himself as a lawyer but he thereby besmirches the honorable profession
to which he belongs. 

De Los Reyes vs. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 Mc Rae

Constantino vs. Saludares, 228 SCRA 223 Michelle

Dinoy vs. Rosal, 235 SCRA 419 Pete

[A.C. No. 3721. August 17, 1994.]

JULIAN C. DINOY, Complainant, v. ATTY. JESUS ROSAL, Respondent.

Facts: Mr. Julian C. Dinoy, complainant charged Atty. Jesus Rosal, respondent with having notarized a
Special Power of Attorney dated 8 May 1989 in favor of one Estela Gentacutan, at a time when some of
the principals mentioned in the document were already dead. Respondent asserted that
notwithstanding the heavy workload of documents to be notarized which he faced on the day he dealt
with the document in question, he was able to interview each of the persons who executed the Special
Power of Attorney regarding their personal circumstances and the consequences of their act; he was
satisfied the persons who signed the document were the ones who represented themselves to be such.
Respondent asked that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not, Atty. Legaspi failed to exercise due diligence in notarizing a Special Power of
Attorney with undue care in ascertaining the identities and capacities of the individuals who executed
the document.

Held: Yes. Attorney Jesus Rosal is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months
for negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public with the WARNING that repetition of the
same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Rationale: Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity; courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a notary public and
appended to a private document. Consequently, it is the duty of the notarial officer to demand that a
document be signed in his presence by the real parties thereto: the notarial officer must reserve
"utmost care" to comply with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties. 
Furthermore, although the Court agrees with the IBP’s recommendation that the respondent be
administratively sanctioned for his negligence, we find the recommended penalty of six (6) month’s
suspension from the practice of law to be unduly harsh, considering that complainant had not shown
that the respondent had deliberately acknowledged and recorded a falsehood when he notarized the
document dated 8 May 1989, 3 and considering further that the present complaint relates to the
notarization of one (1) document only. 

Gamido vs. New Bilibid Prisons Officials, G.R. No. 114829, 3/1/95) Rockie
Fernandez vs. Grecia, 223 SCRA 425 RB
In re: Tranquilino Rovero, 101 SCRA 799 Reema
Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr. 239 SCRA 268 Rhey
Keld Stemmerik vs. Atty. Leonuel N. Mas, A.C. No. 8010 (6/16.2009) Richelle
Johnny Pesto vs. Marcelito Millo (A.C. No. 9612, March 13, 2013) Rina
Florence Teves Macarubbo vs. Atty. Edmundo Macarubbo (A.C. No. 6148, January 22, 2013) Romeo
Emilia Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio Padilla (A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012) Rowena
Emilia Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio Padilla
(A.C. No. 9387, June 20, 2012)
 
FACTS
A disbarment case was filed by Emilia Hernandez (complainant) against her lawyer, Atty. Venancio B.
Padilla (respondent) of Padilla Padilla Bautista Law Offices, for his alleged negligence in the handling of
her case.
Complainant and her husband were the respondents in an ejectment case filed against them with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC). And a Decision penned by Judge Rosmari D. Carandang (Judge
Carandang), the RTC ordered that the Deed of Sale executed in favor of complainant be cancelled; and
that the latter pay the complainant therein, Elisa Duigan (Duigan), attorney’s fees and moral damages.
Complainant and her husband filed their Notice of Appeal with the RTC. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals
(CA) ordered them to file their Appellants’ Brief. They chose respondent to represent them in the case.
On their behalf, he filed a Memorandum on Appeal instead of an Appellants’ Brief. Thus, Duigan filed a
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. The CA granted the Motion in a Resolution 2 dated 16 December 2003.
No Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the Resolution dismissing the appeal was filed by the couple.
Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent several times about the status
of the appeal, but despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response to the damage and prejudice of
the spouse.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship entered into by the parties as to hold the
respondent remiss in his duties as a counsel. 

RULING
Yes. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to
serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty.
Respondent, as a litigator, was expected to know what should apply on ordinary appealed cases or Rule
44 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Canon 5 of the Code reads: CANON 5 — A lawyer shall keep abreast
of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to achieve
high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in
disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.
Respondent's plea for leniency should not have been granted. The supposed lack of time given to
respondent to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence.
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation. If respondent lawyer felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters
involved, as he was approached by complainant's husband only two days before the expiration of the
period for filing the Appellant's Brief, respondent should have filed a motion for extension of time to file
the proper pleading. 
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the
moment he received the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed
against him. But because of his negligence, he chose to sit on the case and do nothing.
Second, respondent, as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure
to do so amounted to a violation of Rule 18.04 of the Code, which reads: Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep
the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan’s Motion to
Dismiss is negligence on his part. Under Rule 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in
handling the client’s case, viz: Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their
duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. Respondent has failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer. When a lawyer violates his duties to his client, he engages in unethical and unprofessional
conduct for which he should be held accountable. 
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as
well as Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely.

Engr. Gilbert Tambokon vs. Atty. Mariano Pefianco (A.C. No.6116, August 1, 2012) Walter
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON vs. ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO
A. C. No. 6116               August 1, 2012
 
FACTS:
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon referred spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap) to respondent Atty.
Mariano R. Pefianco in an action for partition of the estate of the late Benjamin Yap. Respondent
undertook to give him 20% commission, later reduce to 10% of the attorney’s fees.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of
his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children, and
cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business 5 without the required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not dividing commission with a non-lawyer is proper.
 
RULING:
Respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco vs. Atty. Pablo Bernardo (A.C. No. 6368, June 13, 2012) Wilbert

Teresita Santeco vs. Atty. Luna Avance (A.C. No. 5832, February 22, 2011) Jerica

TERESITA D. SANTECO v ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE 

A.C. No. 5834
February 22, 2011

FACTS

Teresita D. Santeco filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling a Civil
Case. Respondent was found guilty of gross misconduct for, abandoning her client’s cause in bad faith
and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation. She was
ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed to
return to complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the amount which complainant paid her for the
filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which she never filed.

Subsequently, while respondent’s five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, she
had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as “Atty. Liezl
Tanglao.”  

In a resolution, respondent was required to comment within ten (10) days from notice, however, failed
to t even when the Court reiterated the directive to comment. Accordingly, the Court issued a
Resolution on finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt.  

“ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in
the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely. 

A copy of the Resolution was sent to respondent’s address of record. However, despite due notice,
respondent failed to pay the fine imposed.

ISSUE
1. Whether or not Atty. Avance administratively liable for disrespecting judicial authority.
2. Whether or not Atty. Avance guilty of gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect.
3. Whether or not Atty. Avance deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.

RULLING
 1. Yes. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyer’s duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the
court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyer’s obedience to
court orders and processes. Here, respondent’s conduct evidently fell short of what is expected
of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Court’s orders.
She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year
suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to
evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law
practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions
from this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009
Resolution

2. Yes. We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyer’s suspension or even disbarment. Sebastian
v. Bajar, 532 SCRA 435 (2007), teaches Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the
orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s
conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is “not to be construed
as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively.
Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders not “only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders
which is only too deserving of reproof.” Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for gross
misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. 

3. Yes. In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of
membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself.
Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate
penalty of disbarment. 

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of
Attorneys. 

Pacita Verzonilla vs. Atty. Victoriano Pascua (A.C. No.6655, October 11, 2011) Kristine

PACITA CAALIM-VERZONILLA, Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. VICTORIANO G. PASCUA, Respondent
 

FACTS:
Atty. Pascua, Respondent, prepared, facilitated, and notarized two deeds of Extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of the deceased Lope Caalim with sale. Petitioner complained about the identical registration
numbers, page numbers and book numbers on the notarial portion and further claimed that both deeds
are spurious as the supporting document, the Community Tax Certificate (CTCs) of her mother and sister
were falsified. Also, the sister, Shirley Mipanga, was only sixteen at that time and was suffering from
mental concerns.

In his defense, Atty. Pascua was “moved by humane and compassionate disposition” that he agreed on
the terms proposed, resulting to the crafting of second deed.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of such acts

RULING:
Yes. Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. As
a lawyer, respondent should have ensured that the solemnities of the act of notarization were followed;
should have refused drafting a document that reflected untruthful consideration that served to reduce
unlawfully the tax due to the government; and should not have completed the act by notarizing and
converting the document into a public document.

Ergo, the Court decided that the Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years,
suspension of his notarial commission for two (2) years with warning that a similar violation in the
future will be dealt with severely.

Additional references:
 Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice – Refusal to Notarize
 Section 2m Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice – Entries in the Notarial Register
 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court – Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds herefor

Judge Rene Baculi vs. Atty. Melchor Battung (A.C. No. 8920, September 28, 2011) Leigh
Rodolfo Espinosa vs. Atty. Julieta Omana (A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011) Bong
Spouses Rafols vs. Atty. Ricardo Barrios (A.C. No. 4973, March 15, 2010) Maricel

Willem Kupers vs. Atty. Johnson Hontanosas (A.C. No. 5704, May 8, 2009) Mariz
KUPERS VS. HONTANOSAS
A.C. NO. 5704
May 8, 2009

FACTS:
William Kupers filed an administrative case against respondent Atty. Johnson Hontanosas for allegedly
preparing and notarizing contracts that are both invalid and violates the limitations on aliens leasing
private lands under P.D. 471. He knowingly indicated that the contract shall be enforced for 49 years
instead of 25 years, and renewable for another 49 years. He failed to inform his clients of the limitations
of the aforesaid law and by his acts, deliberately prepared a document contrary to law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Hontanosas violated the Lawyer’s Oath and several canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts.
RULING:
Yes. In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath and
several canons of the Code of the Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an
attorney-at-law is to “obey the laws of the Philippines.” Under Canon 1, which provides that a lawyer
shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
process. Also Canons 15 and Canon 17 states a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

Tanu Reddi vs. Atty. Diosdado Sebrio, Jr. (A.C. No. 7027, January 30, 2009) Mc Rae

Dolores Belleza vs. Atty. Alan Macasa (A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009) Michelle

Rosario Mecaral vs. Atty. Danilo Velasquez (A.C. No. 8392, June 20, 2010) Pete
A.C. No. 8392               June 29, 2010
[ Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2175]
ROSARIO T. MECARAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DANILO S. VELASQUEZ, Respondent.

Facts: Rosario T. Mecaral charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct by
converting his secretary into a mistress. Hence, the disbarment complaint against respondent.
Additionally, complainant charges respondent with bigamy for contracting a second marriage to Leny H.
Azur on August 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.

Issue: Whether or not, Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez should be disbarred because he ceased to possess the
qualifications of a lawyer by engaging in acts which are grossly immoral and acts which constitute gross
misconduct.

Held: Yes. Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez is disbarred, and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys. 

Rationale: The Respondent’s acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two
marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society in the world can
countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the complainant is gross misconduct which only
a beast may be able to do. Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
Not only did the respondent commit bigamy but the respondent also made his secretary (complainant)
his mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All these circumstances showed the
moral fiber respondent is made of. Hence, the recommendation the disbar Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez.
Aside from violating Canon 1 of the CPR, he like wise violated the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 7.03 of the
CPR.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Eugenia Mendoza vs. Atty. Victor Deciembre (A.C. No. 5338, February 23, 2009) Rockie
Atty. Bonifacio Barandon Jr. vs. Atty. Edwin Ferrer (A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010) RB
Atty. Bonifacio Barandon Jr. vs. Atty. Edwin Ferrer
(A.C. No. 5768, March 26, 2010)

Facts:
Atty.  Bonifacio T.  Barandon, Jr.  filed a complaint with the IBP seeking the disbarment,
suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent
Atty.  Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for series of offenses, such as; falsification of public documents, abusive,
offensive, improper   language, sexual   harassment   and   acts   of lasciviousness.  The Investigating
Commissioner Milagros V.  San Juan of the IBP-CBD submitted to the Court a Report, recommending the
suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on
record to prove Atty.  Ferrer’s violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP Board of   Governors   however, passed   Resolution   adopting   and   approving  
the   Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one
year. Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied. Nonetheless, the Court
resolved to treat Atty.  Ferrer’s comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

Issue:
Whether the respondent, Atty.  Ferrer, violated Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Held:
Yes. The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal
proficiency   and   morality.   Any   violation   of   these   standards   exposes   the   lawyer   to
administrative   liability.   Atty.   Ferrer   violated   Canon   8   of   the   Code   of   Professional
Responsibility which commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel, specifically, in Rule
8.01.  The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum.   Atty.  Ferrer
had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that enjoins lawyers to uphold
the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 which prohibit lawyers, whether in
public or private life, to behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty.
Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in
the public estimation and erode public respect for it. All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed
officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must
conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty.  Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court,
before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to
uphold.

Foodshere Inc. vs. Atty. Melanio Mauricio Jr. (A.C. No. 7055, July 31, 2006) Reema
Avelino Angeles, et. al. vs. Atty. Amado Ibanez (A.C. No. 7860, January 15, 2009) Rhey
Wilberto Talisic vs. Atty. Primo Rinen (A.C. No. 8761, February 12, 2014) Richelle
Carlito Ang vs. Atty. James Joseph Gupana (A.C. No. 4545, February 5, 2014) Rina