‘Root modality’ encompasses dynamic and deontic modality, reflecting an individual’s abilities, volitions, permissions, and obligations . It differs from epistemic modality, which deals with necessity and possibility based on knowledge and belief rather than personal capacity or external imposition . While root modality pertains to the potential and obligations within actual situations, epistemic modality relates to the likelihood or certainty of a proposition based on evidence or logic, providing a more subjective interpretation linked to information rather than action .

Huddleston and Pullum expand the concept of dynamic modality to include volition, thereby acknowledging personal willingness and intention as key components alongside ability and non-deontic root modality . This inclusion reflects a nuanced understanding that not only capability but also the willingness to act influences the realization of actions or events under dynamic modality . It recognizes the personal, internal motivations that contribute to the potential realization of situations, differentiating dynamic modality from strictly capability-focused interpretations .

Interpreting ability within dynamic modality to include circumstantial factors, as Palmer suggests, extends the traditional understanding of ability beyond personal attributes to include environmental and situational contexts . This broader perspective recognizes that personal abilities can be significantly influenced by external factors, thus providing a more holistic understanding of how capabilities are realistically enacted in various circumstances . It suggests that personal potential is not static but dynamically interacts with changing environments, potentially affecting outcomes and situational possibilities .

Both Huddleston and Pullum, and Palmer recognize dynamic modality as including not only ability and volition but also non-deontic root modality . However, Palmer's discussion does not distinctly recognize non-deontic root possibility as separate from ability, whereas Huddleston and Pullum categorize it as part of the non-deontic root modality . This suggests a nuanced difference where Huddleston and Pullum provide a more segmented view of dynamic modality, distinguishing between root necessity and possibility as independent elements within the dynamic modality .

Coates diverges from Palmer by proposing that circumstance-affected possibilities should be considered as non-deontic root possibility rather than being part of ability. This distinction is based on the observation that these possibilities do not share many semantic and syntactic features typically associated with ability . Palmer, however, does not recognize non-deontic root possibility as a distinct category, considering it part of the broader dynamic modality that includes ability and volition .

Palmer notes that in first-person contexts, the subject referent often coincides with the speaker, thereby directly linking modality to personal ability, volition, or circumstances affecting the speaker . In third-person contexts, however, the subject referent is distinct from the speaker, emphasizing the observation of another individual’s capacity or obligation rather than personal experience . This highlights the interplay between grammatical subject and speaker perspective in determining how modality is expressed and interpreted .

In Palmer's framework, the subject referent plays a crucial role in distinguishing dynamic from deontic modality. Dynamic modality is characterized by affecting the subject referent based on personal capability or willingness ('comes from the individual concerned'), whereas deontic modality ('comes from an external source') operates via affecting a discourse participant through imposed permissions or obligations . This distinction highlights a central focus on who or what is impacted by the modality and the source of that impact .

Palmer suggests that the concept of ability in dynamic modality should be interpreted broadly to include not just intrinsic physical and mental capacities but also circumstantial factors that might affect these capacities . This broader interpretation allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how ability functions within different situational contexts, highlighting the interaction of personal capabilities with external circumstances in determining the actualization of a situation .

Huddleston and Pullum categorize modality into three types: epistemic, deontic, and dynamic. In their framework, dynamic modality includes non-deontic root modality, encompassing both root necessity and root possibility . This categorization implies that root necessity and root possibility are understood as expressions of an individual's inherent capacities or circumstances rather than obligations or permissions, which aligns them more closely with dynamic rather than deontic modality .

Palmer distinguishes dynamic modality from deontic modality by attributing the source of the modality: dynamic modality arises from the individual's personal capability or willingness, while deontic modality stems from an external source that imposes permission or obligation . Dynamic modality always affects the subject referent based on personal abilities or volitions, whereas deontic modality affects a discourse participant based on external requirements or allowances .