Case: 3:22-cv-00004-jdp Document #: 78 Filed: 04/17/23 Page 1 of 83

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

MCP IP, LLC, §

§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. §
§ Case No. 3:22-CV-00004-jdp
RAVIN CROSSBOWS, LLC, §
§
Defendant. §
§
§

DEFENDANT RAVIN CROSSBOWS, LLC’S

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
II. Claim Construction .................................................................................................................... 3
A. Legal Standard ....................................................................................................................... 3
B. The Components of a Crossbow MCP’s Inconsistent Infringement Mappings ..................... 3
C. The Components of a Crossbow MCP’s Inconsistent Infringement Mappings ..................... 4
D. Omnibus Claim Construction for “Stock” Across Patent Families ....................................... 5
E. Claim Constructions for the ’375 Patent Family .................................................................. 12
F. Claim Constructions for the ’893 Patent Family .................................................................. 18
G. Claim Constructions for the ’220 Patent .............................................................................. 18
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ........................................................................................................ 23
A. Legal Standard ..................................................................................................................... 23
B. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement and/or Invalidity of the ’435
Patent......................................................................................................................................... 25
C. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ‘’375 Patent Family 37
D. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’433 Patent Family
and/or Invalidity of the ’939 Patent .......................................................................................... 46
E. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’893 Patent Family .. 49
F. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement and/or Invalidity of the ’220
Patent......................................................................................................................................... 54
G. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the D’195 Patent ........... 64
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 76

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d 1264, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Talbert
Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 275 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ....................... 21
Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co. is instructive. Akzo, 811 F.3d at 1342–43 ....... 44
Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ........... 28
AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Sols., 479 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ................... 28
Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 972 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ....................................... 40
Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) .............................. 55
CIAS, Inc. v. All. Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ..................................... 39
CommScope Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless Inc., 10 F.4th 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ................ 28
Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 812 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) .................... 54
Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635 F.3d 1373, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (en banc) .................................................................................................................. 66
Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635 F.3d 1373, 1380
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1307 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) .................................................................................................................................. 29
Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1340–43 (Fed. Cir. 2020)
................................................................................................................................................... 69
Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725 F. Appx. 980, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2018) .......... 80
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................. 78
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ................................ 28
Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ................. 72
Gemalto, 754 F.3d at 1374............................................................................................................ 44
Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ..... 45
In re Chudik, 851 F.3d 1365, 1373 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing In re Man Mach. Interface Techs.
LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................. 46
In re SP Controls, Inc., 453 F. App'x 990, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2011) .................................................. 39
In re SurgiSil, L.L.P., 14 F.4th 1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021) ........................................................ 69
Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at
1324) ........................................................................................................................................... 7
Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools Inc. v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing
Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
................................................................................................................................................... 36
Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc., 537 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Golden
Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 527 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ................................. 29
Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022) ......................... 40
MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Mas-
Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ................................... 28
Mosaic Brands, Inc. v. Ridge Wallet LLC, 55 F.4th 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting SRAM
Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006) .......................................... 29
Nat’l Prods., Inc. v. ProClip USA, Inc., No. 20-cv-439-wmc, 2022 WL 2304114, at *6 (W.D.
Wisc. June 27, 2022) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) ................... 27
Nautilius, Inc. v. Biosig Instr., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014) .............................................. 29
Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005)…………7

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O2 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008)....... 15
OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)............................ 80
Pause Tech., LLC v. TiVo, Inc., 419 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ....................................... 54
Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ..……………7
Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ....... 7
Rivera v. ITC, 857 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2017) …………………………………………. 68
Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Group, LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2020) (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. [Link], Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) .................................................................................................................................. 23
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ................... 29
Source Search Techs., LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ……...32
Super-Sparkly Stuff, LLC v. Skyline USA, Inc., 836 F. App’x 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ............ 72
TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38–40 (1997) ...................... 28
Tomita Techs. USA, LLC v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., 681 F. App’x 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2017) ............ 46
U.S. Water Servs., Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 843 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ............... 28
v. 7
Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1374, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (citing Phillips, 415.
F.3d at 1314–15) ......................................................................................................................... 7
Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Automobile Mechanics
Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740, 748
(7th Cir. 2007)........................................................................................................................... 27

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I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff in this action, MCP IP, is a shell company that holds patents that are mostly

either acquired by MCP IP or that purport to have been invented by Matthew McPherson—the

sole owner behind MCP IP and a number of other archery companies. For nearly the entirety of

his career, McPherson focused solely on vertical bows and did not sell crossbows because he was

“never really [] a crossbow fan.”1 McPherson only began selling crossbows in September 2012

after “huge pressure” from his dealer network and a realization that he was losing revenue.2

McPherson finally relented to the pressure in 2012 and sold his first crossbow under the Mission

brand in September 2012. Despite the benefit of his established business and dealer network with

vertical archery, McPherson’s crossbow business (sold under the Mission brand) was met with

only limited success and his crossbows have languished while the market has continued to innovate

and move forward. Indeed, Mission’s “flagship” crossbow, the “Sub-1,” has been on the market

for over 5 years with little or no updates during that timeframe.

Ravin Crossbows did not enter the crossbow market until the fall of 2016—four years after

McPherson sold his first crossbow. Despite its “infancy,” Ravin revolutionized the crossbow

industry with its portability, maneuverability, and overall ease of use. Ravin’s crossbows do not

require years of training and the significant strength required of vertical bow users (or traditional

crossbow users). Ravin’s crossbows also do not require that users carry, lift, and make precise aim

using a heavy crossbow with large limbs extending well off to the sides. Further, Ravin crossbows

simplify the task of loading an arrow and cocking the crossbow so that any user who can turn a

crank with little more than six pounds of force (or activate a motor) can load and cock a Ravin

crossbow. Ravin was the first company to make crossbows accessible to anyone in the industry.

1
[Link]
2
Id., see also [Link]

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For its innovation in the crossbow industry, Ravin has been awarded numerous accolades

such as “Favorite Crossbow,” “Bow of the Year,” and “Best Crossbow,” and is consistently ranked

as one of the top 5 crossbows in the world. Ravin’s success is driven by the passionate commitment

of its team to the singular goal of developing the world’s best crossbows. Ravin continues to

innovate, introducing more new crossbows in the last year than nearly any other company,

including Matthews.

Instead of competing in the marketplace, MCP has chosen to litigate with hopes of

overwhelming both Ravin and the Court with 10 patents covering a myriad of technologies. The

problem for MCP is that these patents are simply a bad fit. They claim outdated technology that

Ravin simply does not use (and that McPherson himself does not even use in many of his own

products), and some are directed towards vertical bows and not crossbows. To avoid this problem,

MCP’s infringement claims essentially remove entire limitations from the claims, assert invalid

patents, and redefine standard components within crossbows. MCP’s hope is that the sheer number

of patents and asserted claims will ensure its survival at summary judgment. The number of

patents, however, should not be an impediment to the Court granting summary judgment because

MCP’s claims are weak and should not be allowed in front of a jury.

For nine of the patents, there is only one accused product—the Ravin R500/R500E

(“R500”). The tenth patent only adds two additional accused products—the R26/R26X (“R26”),

and the R29/R29X (“R29”)—but the operation of the products is nearly identical for purposes of

this motion. Thus, Ravin has streamlined its summary judgment motion to present one or two

focused arguments that are dispositive for each patent and each Accused Product such that the

Court can, and should, dispense with this entire case through summary judgment.

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II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

A. Legal Standard

“Claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning the

term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” Power

Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 904 F.3d 965, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing

Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). While “‘[t]here is no

magic formula or catechism for conducting claim construction[,] . . . Claim language and the

specification (written description) are the dominant sources of interpretation, and prosecution

history can matter to a lesser degree[.]” Intel Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 809 (Fed. Cir.

2021) (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324.

A proper claim construction starts first with the claim language itself, and then “turn[s] to

the intrinsic record to determine whether the context in which the disputed term sits shines light

on its meaning.” Wi-LAN USA, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 830 F.3d 1374, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (citing

Phillips, 415. F.3d at 1314–15). Where “necessary, courts may also look to extrinsic evidence,

often presented in the form of expert testimony.” Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Arm Holdings, PLC,

403 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d

1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).

B. The Components of a Crossbow MCP’s Inconsistent Infringement Mappings

To aid in understanding the components of a crossbow, Ravin provides this general picture

from Bowhunter Ed:

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SOF ¶ 14. Though the Ravin bows in this case are significantly more advanced and complex, this

basic identification of parts from Bowhunter Ed is helpful in orienting the Court on the components

that will be discussed below. The parties’ disputes in this case center around the limbs, riser, cables

(also known as the “power cables”), the stock, the cams, the flight groove/arrow track (often

referred to as a “rail”) and the scope rail (the component to which the scope attaches), each of

which is generally identified above.

C. The Components of a Crossbow MCP’s Inconsistent Infringement Mappings

While many of the claim terms identified by the parties for construction have a well-known

plain and ordinary meaning that would not typically require an explicit construction, MCP’s

inconsistent and contradictory infringement claims necessitates an explicit construction. For

example, while the parties’ proposed constructions for “stock” differ, both parties believe “stock”

should be consistently construed across the Asserted Patents. Yet the component MCP accuses as

the “stock” in the R500 changes between Asserted Patents. For example, for the ’375 Patent

Family, the alleged stock is the lower portion of the crossbow that includes the grip, trigger, and

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rail and extends between the butt and the riser, but does not include the R500’s finger guard,3

which is accused as the first cable positioner attached to the stock. SOF ¶ 168 (emphasis added).

Similarly, for the ’433 Patent Family, the alleged stock is again the lower portion of the crossbow

that includes the grip, trigger, and rail and extends between the butt and the riser, but now only the

plastic slider within the finger guard is accused as the cable positioner. SOF ¶ 169. Then, for the

’893 Patent Family, MCP changes its mapping so that the stock now includes the finger guard.

SOF ¶ 170. Lastly, for the ’435 Patent, while it is also not clear what components MCP alleges

infringe the claimed stock, it is clear that the R500’s finger guard is now mapped as the claimed

extension member, instead of either being the stock or cable positioner as MCP had previously

claimed. SOF ¶ 171. Accordingly, Ravin has attempted to propose constructions for these

structural components that clearly delineate their bounds to ensure the respective claim terms are

consistently construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning across the Asserted Patents.

D. Omnibus Claim Construction for “Stock” Across Patent Families

“Stock” is recited in the asserted independent claims of every asserted utility patent except

for the ’220 and ’435 Patents. SOF ¶¶ 16–17, 34, 47–48, 92–94, 96–97, 106–107, 109–10, and

119. The proper construction for “stock” is “the central component of the crossbow to which

everything else attaches.” This is consistent with the disclosure of every Asserted Patent that

claims a stock.

‘375, ‘757, and ‘665 Patent Family: In the discussion of Figure 1 in the ‘375 Patent4, the

inventor of the ‘375 Patent differentiates the “stock” from the other components of the crossbow.

3
As shown in SOF ¶ 216, the finger guard is the component that has the triangular shapes that covers the rail on which
the arrow rests and from which the arrow is expelled. Its purpose is to protect the user from the more dangerous part
of the crossbow.
4
The ’375 Patent has a familial relationship with the ‘757 and ‘665 Patents and all share the same specification and
disclosure. SOF ¶ 67.

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Specifically, the ’375 Patent notes “a crossbow 10 comprises a compound bow portion 20 and a

stock portion 40. The bow portion 20 comprises limbs 12, rotatable members 14 and a bowstring

16.” SOF ¶ 68. Importantly, this disclosure shows the ‘375 Patent separately defines each of these

components. Moreover, the ‘375 Patent makes clear that stock 40 is the component to which

everything else on the crossbow attaches. For example, the ‘375 Patent discusses how the “first

cable positioner 48” is … “attached to the stock 40.” SOF ¶ 70. Figure 1 also clearly shows how

these various components are all attached to the stock (or to another piece that is then attached to

the stock). SOF ¶ 71. For example, as can be seen in Figure 1 below, the cable positioner 48

(including body 24) are attached to the stock 40. Limbs 12 attach to the stock 40. The scope rail

attaches to the stock. Each of these separate components all attach to the central component of the

crossbow—the stock 40.

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Id. The prosecution history of the ’375 Patent also compels the same conclusion. There, the original

claims of the ’375 Patent were rejected over another patent issued to Darlington. SOF ¶ 22. There,

the examiner identified component 12 of Darlington as being the “stock” as seen in Figure 1 of

Darlington below:

SOF ¶¶ 23–24. As Figure 1 shows, component 12 (identified as the stock by the examiner) is the

component of the Darlington crossbow to which every other component attaches. This indicates

that even the Examiner was applying the same construction to, and understanding of, the term

“stock” that Ravin now proposes.

Moreover, MCP’s response to the rejection shows it was applying the same understanding

as well. To overcome Darlington, MCP added narrowing limitations to claims 1, 5, 15, 18, 19, and

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20 requiring the cable positioner (48/24) be attached to the stock, citing Figure 1 as support. SOF

¶ 28. The attachment to the stock is clearly seen in original Figure 2 from the ’375 Patent

Application:

SOF ¶ 20. Here, the cable positioner comprises a light gray portion (body 24) that is fixedly

attached to the stock via two visible bolts. SOF ¶ 21. In both Darlington and the ‘375 Patent, the

stock is the key component to which the cable positioner would attach thus further emphasizing

that the correct construction of “stock” is the central component to which everything else attaches.

‘433 and ‘939 Patent Family: The ‘433 Patent family (which includes the ‘939 Patent)

similarly describes the “stock.” For example, in describing Figure 4, the ’433 Patent states “the

crossbow 10 comprises a stock 12, a trigger 14, a string latch 16 and a bow portion 20. [] The bow

portion 20 can comprise any suitable type of bow. In some embodiments, the bow portion 20

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comprises a prod 22 that attaches the stock 12, a first limb 24 and a second limb 26.” SOF ¶ 99

(emphasis added). Like the ‘375 Family, the ‘433 Patent treats the stock as the central component

to which everything else on the crossbow attaches. The centrality of the stock as the attachment

point for all other components is also seen clearly in Figure 2:

SOF ¶ 100. Limbs 24 and 26, connect to stock 12. The trigger 14 is connected to stock 12. The

scope rail attaches to stock 12. Prod 22 connects to stock 12. Again, the centrality of the stock is

made clear from this Figure (and others). It is always the key component to which everything else

attaches.

‘435 Patent: Not surprisingly, the ’435 Patent also is similar. In describing the crossbow

shown in Figure 2, the ’435 Patent notes “a crossbow 10 is shown comprising a bow portion 30, a

barrel 14, a stock 16, a latch 20 and a trigger 24. The bow portion 30 desirably comprises at least

one limb 34 and a string 42.” SOF ¶ 122. A quick review of Figure 2 makes clear that the stock

(once again) is the component to which everything else on the crossbow attaches:

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SOF ¶ 121.

‘893 and ‘056 Patents: The ’893 Patent family (which includes the ‘893 and ‘056 Patents)

is no different. In describing Figure 1, the ’893 Patent notes “a crossbow 10 comprises a stock 20,

a trigger 12, a latch 14, and a bow portion 30. In some embodiments, the bow portion 30 comprises

a prod 32. In some embodiments, the prod 32 is attached to the stock 20. In some embodiments,

the prod 32 supports a first limb 40 and a second limb 42.” SOF ¶ 113. The specification of the

‘893 Patent makes clear that the stock is the component to which everything else on the crossbow

attaches as can be seen in Figure 1 (below):

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SOF ¶ 112. Once again, the prod 32, limbs 40/42, scope rail and other components are all attached

to a central component—the stock 20. There is no other disclosure in the ’893 Patent that describes

any other arrangement—the stock is always the central component to which everything else

attaches.

This is one of those cases where “the ordinary meaning of [the] claim language ... may be

readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than

the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” O2 Micro Int'l

Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008. That the stock is the

central component to which everything else attaches is “readily apparent” and the Court should

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construe “stock” consistent across all patents—“the central component to which everything else

attaches.”

MCP’s Definition of Stock: To avoid the problem of inconsistency between each patent

with its identification of different components of a “stock” in the Accused Products, MCP has

offered a definition of stock that is simply “a supporting framework or structure.” While this

definition would, on its face, appear to be the same as what Ravin is proposing, it is not. First,

MCP’s construction fails to give guidance on where the stock would reasonably begin and end

when compared to the other components of the crossbow. For example, when looking at the

crossbow depicted in Figure 1 of the ’375 Patent, MCP’s definition leaves it up to the jury and the

Court to guess as to whether the prod, limbs, or scope rail are part of the “structure” or

“framework” of the stock.

Because MCP’s “construction” does not provide any guidance, it runs afoul of Federal

Circuit precedent. In O2 Micro, the Federal Circuit made clear that a claim construction that simply

leads to the parties further disputing the scope of that construction “does not resolve the parties’

dispute, and claim construction requires the court to determine what claim scope is appropriate in

the context of the patents-in-suit.” O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361. Moreover, the Federal Circuit has

found it is improper to leave the jury free to consider the claim construction arguments, a role that

is solely with the Court. Id., at 1361–62. Because MCP’s definition does not provide any specifics,

and simply pushes the claim construction fight to the jury, it is improper and should be rejected.

E. Claim Constructions for the ’375 Patent Family

1. Extending Between

The independent claims of both the ’375 Patent and the ’757 Patent all require a bowstring

and at least a first cable extending between the first and second rotatable members, while three of

the four independent claims further require a second cable extending between the first and second

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rotatable members. SOF ¶¶ 16–17, 34–35. Properly construed, each of these claims require that

the bowstring, first cable, and second cable extend between, and contact, the first and second

rotatable members.

a. The intrinsic evidence exclusively and consistently supports Ravin’s

proposed construction for extending between

At the outset, the ’375 Patent specification confirms that “extending between” means the

same thing for each of the bowstring, first cable, and second cable. See, e.g., SOF ¶¶ 73–74

Moreover, every embodiment shown in the Figures in the ’375 Patent has a bowstring and cables

extending between and contacting or connecting to the first and second rotatable members. SOF

¶¶ 75–79. Figure 1, annotated below, is representative:

SOF ¶ 75.

The ’375 Patent specification also makes clear that the bowstring, first cable, and second

cable’s connection to each rotatable member is necessary to the operation of the claimed invention.

Indeed, as the bowstring is pulled back from brace orientation to a drawn orientation, the bowstring

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unwinds from the cams as depicted in red below. When the trigger is pulled and the bolt released,

the bowstring travels rapidly forward where it is then taken up by (e.g., wrapped around) the cams.

SOF ¶ 76 (annotated).

If the bowstring were not connected to the cams (the “rotatable members”), the bow simply

would not function as intended. The bowstring would hang slack and would interfere with the

operation of the crossbow. The specification of the ‘375 Patent is consistent with this expected

operation of the crossbow. For example, discussing Figure 3, the ’375 Patent explains the “drawing

the bowstring 16 causes the rotatable members to rotate, where at least one of the first or second

cables 18, 19 will be taken up on a cam track 15 . . . caus[ing] the limbs 12 to flex, storing energy.”

SOF ¶ 80 (emphasis added). Similarly, discussing Figure 10, the ’375 Patent specification explains

that “a cable 18, 19 comprises an end portion 68 that is arranged to feed out from the rotatable

member 14 during at least a portion of the draw cycle. In some embodiments, an end portion 68 is

arranged to unspool from the rotatable member 14 during at least a portion of the draw cycle. In

some embodiments, an end portion 68 wraps around at least a portion of spool member 74 in the

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brace condition. In some embodiments, the end portion 68 does not contact the spool member 74

in the drawn condition.” SOF ¶ 81 (emphasis added).

Further still, the ’375 Patent explains that in some embodiments, “either the first cable 18

or the second cable 19 comprise a control cable or secondary feed out cable.” SOF ¶ 82. The ’375

Patent also makes clear that in some embodiments, the “cables 18, 19 and rotatable members 14”

described in U.S. Patent No. 6,990,970 may be utilized. SOF ¶ 83. Unsurprisingly, the ’970 Patent

explains that its bowstring, control cable, and power cable not only “extend between” the rotatable

members but are also “anchored to” each of the rotatable members. SOF ¶ 84. This is also seen in

Figure 2 of the ‘970 Patent (incorporated into the ‘375 Patent by reference), which shows that the

cables (both bowstring and power cables) are attached/affixed to, or otherwise in contact with, the

rotatable members.

SOF ¶ 85.

The ‘375 Patent also incorporated another one of McPherson’s patents, U.S. Patent No.

8,020,544. SOF ¶ 86. In the ’544 Patent, McPherson describes his invention of “force vectoring

anchors” for use with rotatable members (cams). In that patent, McPherson again notes the

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“bowstring 18 can extend between the first and second rotatable members 20, 22,” which are

meant to take up at least a portion of the bowstring. SOF ¶ 88 (emphasis added). McPherson also

makes clear the cams include grooves in which the bowstring is oriented. But perhaps most

importantly, the ’544 Patent makes clear he is using “vectoring anchor 30” as a “effective anchor

point … of the power cable 26” meaning the bowstring and power cables are affixed/attached to

the rotatable members. SOF ¶¶ 89–90.

Given the ’375 Patent’s extensive intrinsic evidence, the only proper construction for

“extending between” must require that each of the bowstring, first cable, and second cable extend

between and contact, or are anchored to, the first and second rotatable members.

b. MCP’s overbroad proposed construction for extending between would

render the claimed invention inoperable

MCP proposes a construction of “extending between” as “at, into, or across a space

separating.” But this construction provides no understanding of how it would be applied or what

component would, or would not, meet the claim limitation. It is a textbook example of error under

O2 Micros because jurors would simply be left to guess as to what “at, into, across a space” means

or the bounds of such a construction. O2 Micro, 521 F.3d at 1361–62. Such a construction will

simply lead to the parties “providing an argument identifying the alleged circumstances when the

requirement specified by the claim term must be satisfied,” which is not a construction that will

resolve the parties’ dispute. Id., at 1361. Thus, MCP’s construction can be rejected outright under

the guidance of O2 Micro. More construction is necessary there to define the metes and bounds of

what “extending between” encompasses.

MCP’s construction also is improper because it renders the crossbow unusable. For

example, it would encompass a bowstring that is simply “across” or “into” the space between the

cams without actually contacting the cams. As discussed above, the very purpose of the cams is to

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take up the strings and allow for the transfer of energy that propels the arrow forward. A string

simply “across” or “into” the space between the cams without being attached to the cams would

render the crossbow useless. “‘[A] construction that renders the claimed invention inoperable

should be viewed with extreme skepticism.’” AIA Eng’g Ltd. v. Magotteaux Int’l S/A, 657 F.3d

1264, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Talbert Fuel Sys. Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp., 275 F.3d

1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002, vacated and remanded on other grounds, 537 U.S. 802 (2002)).

2. First Cable Segment / Second Cable Segment

The claimed “first cable segment” is recited in independent Claims 1 and 12 of the ’665

Patent while the claimed “second cable segment” is recited only in independent Claim 1 of the

’665 Patent. SOF ¶¶ 47–48. This is a slightly different phrasing than used in the ’375 and ’757

Patents, but it is intended to perform the very same purpose and should be construed similarly.

Claim 1 and claim 12 of the ‘665 Patent includes a “bowstring” just like the ‘375 and ‘757

Patents. Because the ’665 Patent is a continuation of the ’375 and ’757 Patents, it includes the

same disclosures, figures, and incorporations by reference discussed above relating to the

bowstring. SOF ¶ 67. Thus, the specification makes clear that the bowstring must be attached to,

or otherwise in contact with, the rotatable members or it would be inoperable.

Claim 1 and Claim 12 of the ‘665 Patent also include a “first cable segment” and a “second

cable segment,” which are not used anywhere in the specification, only the claims. SOF ¶¶ 47–48.

Thus, the only disclosure that would apply to what this “cable segment” is, and how it operates,

would be the discussions relating to the “first cable” and “second cable” of the ‘375 and ‘757

Patents. And, as discussed above, the only disclosure in the specification is that these cables that

extend between the first and second rotatable members. See supra Section II.E.1. There is no other

disclosure and there is no other embodiment where the cables (cable segment or otherwise) attach

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to something other than the rotatable members. Thus, the same construction that is used for

“extending between” should be applied here to the “cable segments,” which requires them the

cable segments to be attached/affixed to, or otherwise in contact with, the rotatable members. Id.

F. Claim Constructions for the ’893 Patent Family

1. Structural portion [of the stock] / Sidewall of a stock / Prod / Overlaps

Ravin contends each of these limitations should have their plain and ordinary meaning and

do not require an explicit construction. However, MCP has proposed explicit constructions for

each of these terms. Not yet having had the benefit of MCP’s arguments in support of these explicit

constructions, Ravin will provide its responsive arguments regarding these terms in its responsive

claim construction brief.

G. Claim Constructions for the ’220 Patent

1. Compound Archery Bow

The ‘220 Patent is probably the best example of the patent with the worst “fit” in this

matter. As the Court will see, a simple examination of the ‘220 Patent shows that it was never

contemplated to apply to crossbows. There is not a single picture of a crossbow and the

specification does not include crossbows within its definition of archery bows. In fact, the

specification never even uses the word “crossbow.” Undeterred, MCP is asserting this patent

against Ravin’s crossbows and, to do so, it has contorted the meaning of the claims significantly,

starting with claim construction.

The preambles of Claims 1 and 10 of the ’220 Patent both recite “[a] compound archery

bow having a brace condition and a drawn condition[.]” SOF ¶¶ 141–42. Properly construed,

“compound archery bow” should be limiting and construed as encompassing only vertical

compound archery bows, but not including crossbows.

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“‘Whether to treat a preamble as a limitation is a determination ‘resolved only on review

of the entire[] … patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and

intended to encompass by the claim.’’” Shoes by Firebug LLC v. Stride Rite Children’s Group,

LLC, 962 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. [Link],

Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Among other instances, a preamble may serve as a claim

limitation (1) when the preamble “is ‘necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality’ to the claim[,]”

(2) when limitations in the body of the claim depend “on a particular disputed preamble phrase for

antecedent basis,” and (3) “[w]hen the preamble is essential to understand limitations or terms in

the claim body.” Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808–09. Here, a review of the entire ’220 Patent and

the claim language itself confirms MCP did not intend its claims to encompass crossbows and that

the only invention actually invented by MCP was a vertical compound archery bow.

Beginning with the claim language itself, both Claims 1 and 10 rely on the recitation of

“compound archery bow” in the preamble for antecedent basis in the body of the claim. SOF ¶¶

141–42. The preamble is essential to understand other limitations in the claim body because the

claim term “riser” (appearing in the first limitation following the preamble) has as specific meaning

for vertical bows that does not apply to crossbows.

The inventors used the word “riser” just one time in the detailed description of the

specification: “Whereas older bows typically had spacing between the limbs 16, 18 that

continuously increased as the limbs 16, 18 were traversed from the handle/riser 14 toward the axles

26, 28 . . .” SOF ¶ 146. Everywhere else in the Detailed Description, the ’220 Patent simply refers

to it as a “handle.” SOF ¶ 147. Thus, in the ’220 Patent, the “riser” is synonymous with the handle,

identified in the Figures by reference number 14:

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SOF ¶ 155 (annotated).

Thus, the ‘220 Patent makes clear the “riser” can only be considered interchangeable with

the “handle” on a vertical bow. On a crossbow, the riser is located towards the front and top of the

crossbow, while the handle is located below and rearward. SOF ¶ 14. A user would not grip the

riser in a crossbow as a handle, especially given that it would place the user’s hand in a dangerous

location as compared to the travel of the arrow:

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Id.

Next, the specification of the ’220 Patent confirms MCP’s invention was limited to vertical

compound archery bows. As noted above, there is not a single mention of crossbows in the ‘220

Patent. Starting with the figures, the ‘220 Patent includes ten figures, five of which depict the

entirety of embodiments of “an archery bow,” which is depicted exclusively as a vertical bow and

not a crossbow. SOF ¶ 155. As for the specification, the ’220 Patent never describes a crossbow

embodiment of the claimed invention and, in fact, the ’220 Patent never even uses the word

“crossbow.” SOF ¶¶ 143–44. And the discussions that are included in the specification refer only

to vertical bows, not crossbows. Id. For example, in discussing a hypothetical reference line drawn

between the axles of the first and second rotatable members in compound archery bows, the ’220

Patent states that “line would typically be oriented vertically.” SOF ¶ 145. But in a crossbow, that

hypothetical line would be oriented horizontally, not vertically.

For at least these reasons, Claims 1 and 10 of the ’220 Patent have no support for extending

the invention to a crossbow and the term “compound archery bow” should be construed as being

limited to a vertical compound archery bow.

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2. Riser

Independent Claims 1 and 10 of the ’220 Patent each require “a riser supporting a first limb

and a second limb” and “defining a predetermined location.” SOF ¶¶ 141–42. This Court should

give the claimed “riser” its plain and ordinary meaning which, in view of the intrinsic and extrinsic

evidence, must include the bow’s handle.

First, as noted above, the Detailed Description of the ’220 Patent uses the term riser just

once—at column 4, line 37. There, the ’220 Patent says “handle/riser 14.” SOF ¶ 146. Thus, the

Applicant clearly intended that the claimed riser must include the handle. Moreover, every other

mention of component 14 in the Detailed Description of the ’220 Patent calls it the “handle,” not

the riser. SOF ¶ 147. Notably, this is true even when the describing the claimed requirements for

the riser. For example, the ’220 Patent explains that the claimed predetermined location 30, which

Claims 1 and 10 demands be defined by the riser, is “on the handle 14.” SOF ¶ 148. Similarly,

discussing the claimed movement of the reference plane towards the predetermined location during

the drawing process, the ’220 Patent explains “[m]ovement of line/plane b in a direction toward

the handle 14 can allow more energy to be stored in the bow.” SOF ¶ 149. The description then

goes on to describe various embodiments of the claimed invention where the specific movement

of the reference plane differs, but in each embodiment the reference plane moves in reference to

the handle 14. SOF ¶¶ 150–54. Additionally, as shown above, the handle/riser 14 is exclusively

shown in the Figures as including the bow’s handle. SOF ¶ 155.

The intrinsic evidence’s consistent and exclusive description of the riser as including the

bow’s handle confirms that the claimed “riser” must include at least the bow’s handle. In addition,

because a riser that includes a handle is only ever found on a vertical compound bow, the ’220

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Patent’s description and discussion of its riser is further evidence that Claims 1 and 10 should be

construed as being limited to vertical compound archery bows.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

1. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). Thus, “[s]ummary judgment must be granted against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to a party’s claims on which that party

has the burden of proof.” Nat’l Prods., Inc. v. ProClip USA, Inc., No. 20-cv-439-wmc, 2022 WL

2304114, at *6 (W.D. Wisc. June 27, 2022) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). “A dispute is genuine ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the non-moving party.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986)). The Court reviews motions for summary judgment “‘construing all facts, and drawing all

reasonable inferences from those facts, in favor of … the non-moving party.’” Wis. Cent., Ltd. v.

Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Automobile Mechanics Local 701 Welfare &

Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2007).

2. Infringement

MCP alleges Ravin infringes the Asserted Claims by direct, literal infringement, and also

alleges that Ravin infringes the asserted claims of the ’375 Patent Family and ’433 Patent Family

under the doctrine of equivalents.5 SOF ¶¶ 1–13.

5
As a threshold matter, MCP did not present a theory of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for either the
’375 Patent Family or the ’433 Patent in its Infringement Contentions and has therefore waived the right to assert its
infringement theories under the doctrine of equivalents. See ViaTech Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 733 F. App’x
542, 553 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Teashot LLC v. Green Mountain Coffee Roasters, Inc., 595 F. App’x 983, 987 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).

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For literal infringement “the meaning ascribed to the claims is significant.” CommScope

Techs. LLC v. Dali Wireless Inc., 10 F.4th 1289, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2021). So “[t]he burden is on a

patent owner to show that ‘the properly construed claim[s] read[] on the accused device[s]

exactly.’” Id. (quoting Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1996)

But if “even one claim limitation is missing or not met, there is no literal infringement.”

MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Mas-

Hamilton Grp. v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

As for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement “may be found when

the accused device contains an ‘insubstantial’ change from the claimed invention[,]” which “may

be determined . . . based on the ‘triple identity’ test, namely, whether the element of the accused

device ‘performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same

result.’” TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008)

(quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 38–40 (1997). To survive

a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must come forth with “particularized testimony and

linking argument on a limitation-by-limitation basis that create[s] a genuine issue of material fact

as to equivalents.” AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Sols., 479 F.3d 1320, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir.

2007; Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 811 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016.

3. Invalidity

A claimed invention will be invalid as anticipated where a single prior art reference

“‘disclose[s] each and every feature of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.’” U.S.

Water Servs., Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 843 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Eli Lilly &

Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “While anticipation is

a question of fact, ‘it may be decided on summary judgment if the record reveals no genuine

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dispute of material fact.’” Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. VUTEk, Inc., 537 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir.

2008) (quoting Golden Bridge Tech., Inc. v. Nokia, Inc., 527 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Thus, “‘a moving party seeking to invalidate a patent at summary judgment must submit such clear

and convincing evidence of facts underlying invalidity that no reasonable jury could find

otherwise.’” Mosaic Brands, Inc. v. Ridge Wallet LLC, 55 F.4th 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2022)

(quoting SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

To comply with the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, the claim, when read

in light of the specification, must apprise those skilled in the art of the scope of the claim.

SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d 1331, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005. “[A] patent is

invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and

the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the

scope of the invention.” Nautilius, Inc. v. Biosig Instr., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).

Similarly, to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, the

patent specification must describe an invention in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can

clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention. Synthes USA, LLC v. Spinal

Kinetics, Inc., 734 F.3d 1332, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013). While this is a question of fact, summary

judgment is appropriate “‘in cases where no reasonable fact finder could return a verdict for the

non-moving party.’” Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp., 635

F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299,

1307 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

B. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement and/or Invalidity of

the ’435 Patent

The ‘435 Patent was not originally invented by McPherson. Instead, he purchased it shortly

after his dealers forced him to enter the crossbow market. SOF ¶ 118. McPherson then hid evidence

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of a competitor’s crossbow—the Stryker crossbow—from the Patent Office so that the ‘435 Patent

would issue, thus protecting his entrance into the crossbow market. In order to avoid the allegations

of fraud committed by McPherson in obtaining the ‘435 Patent, MCP has put itself into a box in

attempting to balance both its infringement allegations and its contention that the ‘435 Patent is

valid. Both cannot be true in this case. Either the ‘435 Patent is not infringed by the Ravin Accused

Products, or the ‘435 Patent is invalid because of the Stryker crossbow.

1. Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement on the ’435 Patent

Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’435 Patent because

none of the R500, R26, or R29 infringe “the latch positioned in the cavity” limitation of Claim 1.

Separately, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the ‘435 Patent as to

the R26 and R29 because they do not include one either the claimed “butt” or claimed “cheek rest.”

Relevant to the latch limitation at issue, Claim 1 first requires “a latch configured to retain

said string in a drawn condition.” SOF ¶ 119. Further, Claim 1 also defines “an extension member

positioned above said stock, the extension member comprising a cheek rest and a picatinny rail,”

and further recites that the claimed “cavity” is defined by “the extension member and stock.” Id.

However, to avoid a finding of invalidity over the Stryker crossbow that McPherson did not

disclose to the Patent Office, MCP has contended that not only must the latch be “positioned in

the cavity,” but that it also be “beneath the cheek rest” specifically. SOF ¶¶ 128–139.

MCP’s contention regarding the location of the cheek rest and the latch is crystal clear and

set forth in both its opposition to the Motion to Amend and its expert report. First, in its opposition

to the Motion to Amend, MCP distinguished the Stryker crossbow and explained that the ’435

Patent claims require the cheek rest extend over the latch to create the claimed cavity:

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SOF ¶ 129. What this means, according to MCP, is that the cheek rest of the ’435 Patent claims

MUST be over the latch:

Id.

MCP then further distinguished the Stryker crossbow from the claims of the ’435 Patent

by claiming its missing feature—what makes them different (and not an invalidating piece of prior

art for the ‘435 Patent)—is the fact that Stryker crossbows place the cheek rest behind, and not

over, the latch within the cavity. SOF ¶¶ 128–32; 270.

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MCP then further clarified what this distinction looks like in a crossbow by identifying the

cheek rest (in green) and the cavity (in purple). According to MCP, because the cheek rest is not

over the latch in the cavity, the Stryker does not meet the limitations of the ‘435 Patent:

SOF ¶¶ 128–132; 270. MCP’s expert maintained the same contentions. Id.; see also SOF ¶¶ 133–

39.

Thus, according to MCP, “the Styker lacks fundamental limitations representing one of the

value propositions of the ‘435 claims.” SOF ¶ 132.

The Federal Circuit has repeatedly held that “‘[i]t is axiomatic that claims are construed

the same way for both invalidity and infringement.’” Source Search Techs., LLC v. LendingTree,

LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). Thus, under MCP’s contentions, if

the cheek rest of the Accused Products is not over the latch, then it “lacks fundamental limitations”

of the ‘435 Patent and cannot infringe under MCP’s own construction.

There is no genuine dispute that the latch of the R500, R26, and R29 is not positioned

“beneath the cheek rest” in the drawn orientation. Indeed, the Accused Products utilize a similar

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setup to the Stryker bow where the cheek rest ends before the latch thus keeping the latch out from

being underneath the cheek rest. This is easily seen in the below annotated photos of each Accused

Product showing the location of the cheek rest (circled in green), the latch (yellow line) and the

termination point of the cheek rest (green line):

(R500)

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(R26)

(R29)

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SOF ¶¶ 242, 246, 250 (annotated). This was confirmed by Ravin’s expert, Dirk Duffner. SOF ¶¶

243, 247, 250. And even by MCP’s own expert’s evidence, which shows the latch after the end of

the cheek rest:

(R500)

(R26)

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(R29)

SOF ¶¶ 244, 248, 252.

These pictures show the Ravin Accused Products are just like the Stryker with the cheek

rest not extending over the latch. Accordingly, because even MCP’s evidence shows the alleged

latch of each Accused Product is not positioned beneath the cheek rest, Ravin is entitled to

summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’435 Patent.

2. Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’435 Patent

as to the R26/R26X and R29/R29X

Claim 1 of the ’435 Patent explicitly recites (1) a “butt located rearward of the latch, the

butt spaced apart from the handgrip” and, separately, (2) “an extension member positioned above

said stock, the extension member comprising a cheek rest and a picatinny rail.” SOF ¶ 119. Thus,

there is “a presumption that those components are distinct.” Kyocera Senco Industrial Tools Inc.

v. ITC, 22 F.4th 1369, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Tyco

Healthcare Grp., LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2010). That presumption is confirmed here

by the ’435 Patent. Not only are the butt and cheek rest exclusively described as separate

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components, the ’435 Patent envisions an embodiment where the cheek rest—but not the butt—is

removable. SOF ¶¶ 123–126. Similarly, while the ’435 Patent explicitly envisions that the cheek

rest can be “a unitary portion of the extension member 48,” the ’435 Patent never similarly suggests

the butt can be a “unitary part of the cheek rest” or vice versa. SOF ¶¶ 125, 127.

There is no dispute that neither the R26 nor the R29 utilize a butt that is separate and distinct

from the cheek rest:

(R26)

(R29)

SOF ¶¶ 245, 249. Accordingly, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the

’435 Patent as to the R26 and R29.

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3. Ravin is entitled to summary judgment that the asserted claims of the ’435
Patent are invalid as anticipated

MCP cannot have its cake and eat it too. It simply cannot balance its allegations of

infringement and validity. Thus, if MCP argues the Accused Products still infringe regardless of

the location of the latch and the cheek rest, then the Asserted Claims are invalid as being

anticipated by Stryker.

Ravin has put forth evidence, including expert testimony, that the prior art Stryker

crossbow includes every limitation of Claim 1 and dependent Claims 6–8, 10–13, and 15. SOF ¶¶

254–55, 258–286. MCP does not dispute Ravin’s evidence except that evidence relating to the

“latch being positioned in the cavity” limitation of Claim 1. Id. Thus, there is no genuine dispute

that Ravin has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the Stryker discloses every limitation

besides the “latch positioned in the cavity” limitation. Moreover, because MCP’s alleged evidence

regarding the “latch positioned in the cavity” limitation is insufficient as a matter of law to create

a genuine dispute, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment that Claims 1, 6–8, 10–13, and 15 are

invalid as anticipated.

As already explained, the claims must be construed the same for infringement and

invalidity. See supra Section [Link], if the Court finds that MCP has not narrowed the scope

of the “latch being positioned in the cavity” limitation to require the latch be positioned beneath

the cheek rest, that broad interpretation of the claims also applies to the invalidity analysis. Id.

MCP’s only argument for why the Stryker does not include a “latch being positioned in the cavity”

is that the latch of the Stryker crossbow is not positioned “beneath the cheek rest.” SOF ¶ 270.

Indeed, Dr. Paulus admits the latch is positioned in the cavity. Id. But whether the latch is

positioned “beneath the cheek rest” is immaterial if MCP has not narrowed the scope of the claims.

Moreover, MCP’s distinction is immaterial under a plain reading of the claims.

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Limitation 1(g) of the ‘435 Patent is the “extension member” limitation. That claim

requires an extension member “comprising a cheek rest and a picatinny rail.” SOF ¶ 119. Then the

claim tells us that a cavity is formed: “the extension member and the stock defining a cavity.” Id.

Finally, “the latch [is] positioned in the cavity.” Id. Notably, in defining the term “extension

member” the claim uses the word “comprising,” which “is a term of art used in claim language

which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form

a construct within the scope of the claim.” In re SP Controls, Inc., 453 F. App'x 990, 994 (Fed.

Cir. 2011) In other words, “the term “comprising” is well understood to mean “including but not

limited to.” CIAS, Inc. v. All. Gaming Corp., 504 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Thus, the

extension member of the ’435 Patent must include, but is not limited to, a cheek rest and a picatinny

rail.

The claim then requires the extension member and stock to define a cavity. Applying the

Federal Circuit’s long-standing definition of “comprising,” this means the cavity will be formed

by a component that includes, but is not limited to, a cheek rest and picatinny rail. Because the

word “comprising” is used, the claim is broadly written to encompass a scenario where some other

component of the extension member is directly over the latch, so long as the cheek rest is still part

of the extension member. This reading of the claims is confirmed by dependent claim 2, which

requires “at least a portion of said cheek rest oriented over said latch.” SOF ¶ 120. Because

dependent claim 1 depends from claim 1, and because claim 2 further narrows claim 1, this

language means claim 1 is broader. Indeed, “by definition, an independent claim is broader than a

claim that depends from it, so if a dependent claim reads on a particular embodiment of the claimed

invention, the corresponding independent claim must cover that embodiment as well. Otherwise,

the dependent claims would have no scope and thus be meaningless.” Littelfuse, Inc. v. Mersen

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USA EP Corp., 29 F.4th 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see also See Baxalta Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,

972 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020 (“The district court’s construction [of the independent claim]

which excludes these explicitly claimed embodiments [in the dependent claims] is inconsistent

with the plain language of the claims.”).

MCP’s construction of no cheek rest over the latch and the cavity runs afoul of this

precedent. Claim 2 confirms that claim 1 would include embodiments where “at least a portion”

of the cheek rest is over the latch. SOF ¶ 120. Similarly, this means claim 1 must be broader and

would also include embodiments where all of, or none of, the cheek rest is oriented over the latch,

so long as the cheek rest is still part of the components that “comprise” the extension member.

Under this interpretation, Stryker would anticipate claim 1 of the ’435 Patent because its

extension member “comprises” (includes, but is not limited to) the cheek rest and picatinny rail.

Thus, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of anticipation of Claim 1 of the ’435 Patent unless

MCP has presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute that the Stryker’s latch is not

“positioned in the cavity.”

MCP has not done so. In fact, Dr. Paulus’ readily admits the Stryker’s latch (annotated in

yellow) is located squarely in the cavity Dr. Paulus identified:

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SOF ¶ 270. Accordingly, MCP has not presented any evidence sufficient to create a genuine

dispute that the Stryker does not disclose every limitation of Claims 1, 6–8, 10–13, and 15, and

Ravin is entitled to summary judgment.

C. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ‘’375 Patent

Family

MCP has failed to come forth with evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of

material fact that the R500 infringes any of the asserted claims within the ’375 Patent Family either

literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.

1. The R500 does not literally infringe the “extending between” limitation of the
asserted claims of the ’375 Patent Family

As explained above, properly construed, each of the independent claims asserted from the

’375 Patent and Claim 18 of the ’757 Patent require at least a [first cable / first cable segment] that

extends between and contacts, or connects to, the first and second rotatable members. See supra

Section II.E.1. and II.E.2. Similarly, Claims 1 and 18 of the ’375 Patent and Claims 1 and 15 of

the ’665 Patent further require a [second cable / second cable segment] that extends between and

contacts, or connects to, the first and second rotatable members. Id. There is no dispute that the

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R500/R500E do not include any cables that extend between and contact, or connect to, the first

and second rotatable members. SOF ¶¶ 173–82. Instead, the R500’s cables extend from cam-to-

limb (e.g., a cable is connected to a cam on the right and the limb on the left and vice-versa):

SOF ¶ 173–77. As shown in the close up of the left rotatable member below, there is no dispute

that the cables’ connection to the limb is not contacting or connecting to the rotatable member but

to the end points of the limb:

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SOF ¶ 179. And MCP concedes the alleged first and second cables do not extend between and

contact or connect to the first and second rotatable members. SOF ¶¶ 181–82. Accordingly, Ravin

is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law of no literal infringement of the ’375, ’757, and

’665 Patents.

2. The R500 does not infringe the “extending between” limitation of the asserted
claims of the ’375 Patent Family under the doctrine of equivalents

MCP has also alleged that, if the Asserted Claims of the ’375 Patent Family are construed

to require the bowstring, first cable / first cable segment, and second cable / second cable segment

extend between and contact, or be anchored to, the first and second rotatable members, the

R500/R500E still infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. More specifically, MCP alleges the

R500/R500E’s “cam-to-limb” cabling arrangement is equivalent to the claimed “cam-to-cam”

cabling arrangement. SOF ¶ 183 However, MCP has failed to present sufficient evidence as a

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matter of law to create a genuine dispute of material fact. As such, Ravin is entitled to summary

judgment of no infringement of the Asserted Claims of the ’375 Patent Family under the doctrine

of equivalents.

The totality of Dr. Paulus’ opinions that the R500 infringes the “extending between”

limitations under the doctrine of equivalents are:

[T]he R500/R500E design of the cable extending between the cams and the
opposing axle structure (see discussion above) would still be performing the same
function, which is allowing the cams to be drawn together as the bow is drawn. The
R500/R550E [sic] would be performing that function in the same way by rotating
the cams and “taking up” the cables on the cams. And the result is the same – energy
is stored in the limbs as a result of the above operation.

See, SOF ¶ 183. Dr. Paulus’ conclusory and scant opinions are not sufficient to create a genuine

dispute of material fact to survive summary judgment of non—infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents and run afoul of Federal Circuit precedent.

The Federal Circuit’s decision in Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co. is

instructive. Akzo, 811 F.3d at 1342–43. There, the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgement

of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents where the plaintiff’s only evidence was

conclusory expert testimony almost identical to Dr. Paulus’ testimony here:

“Dow's and Michelman's piping and heat exchangers perform the same function
(maintain the pressure) and achieve the same result (maintaining sufficient pressure
to prevent boiling of the aqueous medium) in substantially the same way (by
collecting the dispersed material in a contained volume) as the vessel used by the
inventors in Examples 2 and 3 of the patent.”

Id. at 1343. The Court faulted the expert because he had not “articulate[d] how Dow’s accused

process operates in substantially the same way” and had “fail[ed] to articulate which construction

of ‘collecting’ he invokes, much less articulate how the differences between the two processes are

insubstantial.” Id. Thus, the Court held that “[s]uch ambiguity and generality cannot create a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id.; see also Gemalto, 754 F.3d at 1374 (concluding the plaintiff

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failed to establish infringement under the doctrine of equivalents because they lacked the

“particularized testimony and linking argument” required to show equivalency).

Dr. Paulus’ testimony suffers from the exact flaws as those rejected by the Federal Circuit

in Akzo. Like the expert in Akzo, Dr. Paulus provided a single, conclusory sentence on each of the

function, way, and result prongs. SOF ¶ 183. And again like the expert in Akzo Dr. Paulus did not

explain how the differences between the two arrangements were insubstantial. Id. This threadbare

testimony is wholly insufficient and does nothing more than parrot a legal conclusion. There is

nothing here for a jury to consider and, thus, Dr. Paulus’ conclusory and unsupported opinions

regarding infringement under the doctrine of equivalents are insufficient as a matter of law to

create a dispute sufficient to defeat Ravin’s motion for summary judgment. Akzo, 811 F.3d at 1343.

Bolstering this conclusion is the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Duffner. Dr. Duffner

explained that Dr. Paulus had over-generalized the function, way, and result of both the alleged

inventions of the ’375 Patent Family and the R500/R500E to such an abstract level, and in

contradiction to his own earlier opinions, that any cabling arrangement used in a dual cam bow or

crossbow would be an equivalent. SOF ¶¶ 184–85. Dr. Duffner then provided substantial analysis

under the function, way, and result prongs. SOF ¶¶ 186–201. Most importantly, Dr. Duffner

explained how the novel cabling arrangement of the R500 allowed it attain results that the claimed

cabling arrangement cannot obtain. SOF ¶¶ 194–201. For example, the novel cabling arrangement

of the R500 results in double the amount of mechanical advantage as the R500 is drawn, allows

for stiffer limbs and a narrower form factor, and allows for a more advantageous bowstring angle.

SOF ¶¶ 195–201. These improved results confirm Dr. Duffner’s opinions that the R500 cabling

arrangement is not an equivalent under the function, way, result test. Gemstar-TV Guide Int’l, Inc.

v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 383 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that an accused product did

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not infringe because it “relied on different technology that could produce results unattainable by”

the corresponding structure in the subject patent); see also Tomita Techs. USA, LLC v. Nintendo

Co. Ltd., 681 F. App’x 967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (same).

Accordingly, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of no infringement of the Asserted

Claims of the ’375 Patent Family under the doctrine of equivalents.

3. The R500/R500E do not include a cable positioner “arranged to bias” as

required by Claim 12 of the ’665 Patent

Claim 12 of the ’665 Patent requires a first cable positioner “arranged to bias” the first

cable segment away from the shooting axis. SOF ¶ 48. The Federal Circuit has observed that the

plain and ordinary meaning of “arranged to” is analogous to “adapted to,” “which means ‘made

to,’ ‘designed to,’ or ‘configured to[,]’” but “occasionally has a broader meaning of ‘capable of’

or ‘suitable for.’” In re Chudik, 851 F.3d 1365, 1373 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing In re Man Mach.

Interface Techs. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Here, the intrinsic evidence confirms

the plain and ordinary meaning of “arranged to” in Claim 12 is the narrower “made to” or

“designed to.”

The ’665 Patent explains that “[d]esirably, the cables 18, 19 are held away from the

shooting axis 34, which allows clearance for a bolt 80.” SOF ¶ 69. To accomplish this, “the

crossbow 10 comprises a first cable positioner 48 arranged to position the first cable 18.” Id. And

“[i]n some embodiments, the first cable positioner 48 comprises a body 24 that is arranged to

position the first cable 18 away from the shooting axis 34.” SOF ¶ 70. This interaction is depicted

in Figure 1, where the first cable 18 would intersect and interfere with the shooting axis if the cable

positioner was not provided to bias the cable upwards:

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SOF ¶ 71.

This is further confirmed by the ’665 Patent’s prosecution history. The Examiner rejected

Claims 1 and 12 as anticipated in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,990,970 to Darlington. SOF ¶ 50. The

Examiner stated that Darlington taught “a first cable positioner arranged to bias the first cable

segment (56) . . . and the first cable positioner is located above the shooting axis (56 places cable

28 above the shooting axis, Fig. 5-6).” SOF ¶ 51. Distinguishing Darlington, the applicant

explained that, in one embodiment, the native positioning of Darlington’s cables did not interfere

with the shooting axis, so the alleged cable positioner was not being provided to laterally bias the

cables. SOF ¶¶ 58–61. Instead, the applicant argued, the alleged cable positioner was being

provided only to “prevent them from fouling each other as they pass over one another.” SOF ¶¶

63–65. Thus, the applicant confirmed the alleged cable positioner must be arranged to bias the

cables out and away from the shooting axis.

There is no genuine dispute that the alleged cable positioner of the R500 is not designed to

bias the first cable segment away from the shooting axis. SOF ¶¶ 202–06. Instead, because the

R500’s unique cam-to-limb cabling arrangement allows the various power cables to pass through

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the stock and finger guard of the R500 without interfering with the shooting axis (shown in red),

there is no need for a component to bias the cables away from the shooting axis:

SOF ¶ 178 (annotated); see also SOF ¶¶ 202–06. The alleged cable positioner is used simply to

prevent the various power cables from fouling one another, not to move them out of the path of

the arrow:

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SOF ¶ 206. Indeed, even Dr. Paulus’ acknowledges the alleged cable positioners serve a different

purpose. SOF ¶¶ 203–04. Nor has MCP come forth with any evidence to suggest the alleged cable

positioners are designed to bias the power cables away from the shooting axis. SOF ¶ 205.

Accordingly, because the R500’s alleged cable positioner is not “arranged to bias” the first

cable segment away from the shooting axis, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-

infringement of Claim 12 of the ’665 Patent and its dependent claims.

4. The R500 does not include a cable positioner that “biases” the first or second
cable away from the shooting axis

Claims 1 and 18 of the ’375 Patent and Claim 1 of the ’665 Patent require the alleged cable

positioner biases the first cable away from said stock, while Claim 18 of the ’757 Patent requires

the alleged cable positioner biases the first cable in a first direction and a second cable in a second

direction different from the first direction. SOF ¶¶ 16–17, 34. MCP’s proposed construction for

“cable positioner” requires “an arrangement of components designed to position a cable.” Thus,

applying MCP’s construction, each of Claims 1 and 18 of the ’375 Patent, Claim 1 of the ’665

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Patent, and Claim 18 of the ’757 Patent require a cable positioner designed to position and bias the

cables. Id. As explained above, there is no genuine dispute that the R500’s alleged cable positioner

is not designed to bias the cables because the cables naturally fall away from the shooting axis, so

no lateral bias is needed. See supra Section III.C.3.

D. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’433 Patent

Family and/or Invalidity of the ’939 Patent

Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’433 Patent Family.

First, the R500 does not include a “cable positioner arranged to bias” as recited in independent

Claims 1 and 8 of the ’433 Patent and independent Claim 1 of the ’939 Patent or a stock “arranged

to bias said cable away from the shooting axis” as recited in Claim 11 of the ’939 Patent. Second,

the R500 does not include an aperture “wherein a surface of the aperture biases the cable in a

direction lateral to the shooting axis” as required by independent Claim 14 of the ’433 Patent.

Third, either the R500 does not include a “shortest distance” where the “shortest distance” is

greater in a first draw orientation than in a second draw orientation or the “shortest distance”

limitations render Claims 1 and 11 of the ’939 Patent invalid as indefinite.

1. The R500/R500E do not include a cable positioner “arranged to bias” or a stock

“arranged to bias” the alleged cable in a direction lateral to the shooting axis

As explained for the “arranged to bias” limitation of the ’665 Patent, “arranged to” means

“designed to,” and there is no genuine dispute that the alleged cable positioner of the R500/R500E

is not designed to bias the alleged cable in a direction lateral to the shooting axis. See supra Section

III.C.3. By the same token, there is no genuine dispute that the R500’s stock is not designed to

bias the cables away from the shooting axis. SOF ¶ 207. Thus, for those same reasons, summary

judgment of non-infringement of Claims 1 and 8 and their respective dependent claims is

warranted.

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2. The R500/R500E do not include an aperture having a surface that biases the
alleged cable in a direction lateral to the shooting axis

Claim 14 requires that the aperture the claimed cable extends through has a surface that

“biases the cable in a direction lateral to the shooting axis.” SOF ¶ 94. But even viewing the

evidence most favorably to MCP that the R500’s cable is being biased by something, as shown

above there is no dispute that the cable is not being biased by the surface of the aperture. SOF ¶

208. This is because of the unique arrangement of the cables being connected from cam-to-limb,

which precludes any bias from a surface of an aperture because the cables naturally avoid the

shooting axis. SOF ¶¶ 173, 178, 192. Thus, summary judgment of non-infringement of Claim 14

and its dependent claims is warranted.

3. The R500/R500E do not include a first draw orientation and a second draw
orientation, where the “shortest distance” is greater in the first draw orientation
than in the second draw orientation

Claims 1 and 11 of the ’939 Patent are uniquely flawed. One the one hand, at first glance

the claims appear clear—they explicitly recite how to determine what the claimed “shortest

distance” is: the “shortest distance” is the measure of separation between the claimed cable and

shooting axis, as measured perpendicular to the shooting axis. SOF ¶¶ 96–97. The claims then rely

on that “shortest distance” as antecedent basis to require that specific measurement for the

remainder of the claim. Id. Specifically, the claims go on to require that “the crossbow having a

first draw orientation and a second draw orientation, the shortest distance being greater in the first

draw orientation than in the second draw orientation.” Id. But, ironically, it is that clarity that

causes the problems. Either Claims 1 and 11 are unresolvedly indefinite or, if the Court determines

Claim 1 and 11 are sufficiently clear to avoid indefiniteness, then Claims 1 and 11 are

uninfringeable.

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Starting with the claim language itself, the claims are directed to a crossbow comprising,

among other things, a “cable” that is “separated from said shooting axis by a shortest distance as

measured perpendicular to the shooting axis.” Id. The claimed crossbow also has “a first draw

orientation and a second draw orientation” where “the shortest distance” is “greater in the first

draw orientation than in the second draw orientation.” Id. Already there is ambiguity.

Is the “shortest distance” measured in the first draw orientation or the second? The claims

do not say. Does “shortest” mean “shortest,” i.e., the cable and shooting axis would intersect? That

would conflict with the limitation that a cable positioner be arranged to bias said cable away from

the shooting axis and be separated from the shooting axis. Id.

Then we have the problem of “shortest distance” compared to what? The bowstring? The

second cable? The stock? No answer is provided by the claims or the specification.

Then the claim requires a shortest distance as “measured perpendicular” to the shooting

axis. But in which direction? Perpendicular just means at a 90º degree angle to. Any given point

on the cable will have a corresponding point on the axis "perpendicular” to it.

How can the “shortest distance” be “greater” in the first draw orientation than the second

draw orientation? If one distance is “greater” than another it is, by its definition, not the “shortest.”

As Dr. Paulus affirmatively opined, “there will always be a shortest distance from the cable to the

shooting axis in the [] crossbows. By definition, there will always be one.” SOF ¶ 209 (emphasis

added).

The specification offers no help to resolve this ambiguity. The claimed “shortest distance”

is mentioned just once:

In some embodiments, a distance between the shooting axis 46 and the first cable
34 in a first draw orientation is different from the distance in a second draw
orientation. For example, in some embodiments, a distance between the shooting
axis 46 and the first cable 34 in a brace orientation is different from the distance in

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a cocked orientation. The distance desirably comprises a shortest distance between

the shooting axis 46 and the first cable 34, and the distance can be measured in a
direction orthogonal to the shooting axis 46.

SOF ¶ 104 (emphasis added). This is just as unclear as the claims. The distance between the

shooting axis and the first cable should be different in the brace and cocked orientation, but “[t]he

distance” should be the shortest distance. Again, which distance? Two distances are referenced—

the distance in the brace orientation and the distance in the cocked orientation—and they are

described as being different from one another. Yet the ’939 Patent simply states the distance is,

desirably, the “shortest.”

In sum, because the poor drafting of Claims 1 and 11 of the ’939 Patent make it impossible

for a POSITA to ascertain the scope of the claims with reasonable certainty, Ravin is entitled to

summary judgment that Claims 1 and 11 are invalid as indefinite.

E. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the ’893 Patent

Family

Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’893 Patent Family.

First, independent Claims 1 and 11 of the ’893 Patent and independent Claim 1 of the ’056 Patent

each require the entirety of the alleged rotatable member overlap with the structural portion of the

stock, either generally or in a drawn orientation. Because there is no genuine dispute that the entire

rotatable members of the R500/R500E do not overlap with the structural portion of the stock,

summary judgment of non-infringement of the Asserted Claims of the ’893 Patent and of Claim 1

of the ’056 Patent and its dependent claims is warranted. Second, Ravin is entitled to summary

judgment of non-infringement of Claims 1 and 11 of the ’893 Patent and Claims 5, 6, 14, and 15

of the ’056 Patent because no portion of the alleged rotatable member passes through a sidewall

of the stock or is oriented in an aperture or cavity in the sidewall of the stock under either parties’

construction for “stock.”

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1. The entire rotatable member of the R500/R500E does not overlap with a
structural portion of the stock or the stock in a drawn orientation.

Claims 1 and 11 of the ’893 Patent and Claim 1 of the ’056 Patent each demand that the

[first rotatable member / rotatable member] overlap with the [structural portion of the stock /

stock]. SOF ¶¶ 106–07, 109. At the same time, Claims 1 and 11 of the ’893 Patent and Claim 5 of

the ’056 separately demand that only “a portion of” the alleged rotatable member pass through a

sidewall of the stock. Id. Thus, the claims expressly distinguish between “the rotatable member”

or “first rotatable member” overlapping with the structural portion of the stock or the stock, and

only “a portion of” the rotatable member “passes through” a sidewall of the stock. In other words,

the claim drafter drew a distinction between an entire component and a portion of that component.

Thus, because the patentee chose to distinguish between “the first rotatable member” and “a

portion of” the rotatable member, the express language of the claims requires that the entire

rotatable member overlap with the structural portion of the stock. See Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq

Computer Corp., 812 F.3d 1313, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s construction of

“user interface” as “the site at which a user actually selects an operating mode” because “[t]he

claim term is ‘user interface,’ not just ‘interface.’ The word ‘user’ therefore must distinguish

between different kinds of interfaces”); Pause Tech., LLC v. TiVo, Inc., 419 F.3d 1326, 1334 (Fed.

Cir. 2005 (“In construing claims, however, we must give each claim term the respect that it is

due”).

There is no genuine dispute that the entirety of the alleged rotatable member of the

R500/R500E does not overlap with the structural portion of the stock or the stock. SOF ¶¶ 210–

11. The only evidence MCP has provided does not show an entire rotatable member overlapping

with the structural portion of the stock or stock. Id. But that is not what each of these claims

requires—they plainly require “the first rotatable member” or “the rotatable member” overlap with

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the structural portion of the stock or stock, e.g., the whole rotatable member must overlap with the

stock. SOF ¶¶ 106–07, 109. The Federal Circuit has “repeatedly and consistently recognized that

courts may not redraft claims, whether to make them operable or to sustain their validity.” Chef

Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Ravin is

entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement on Claims 1 and 11 of the ’893 Patent and

Claim 1 of the ’056 Patent.

2. The alleged rotatable member does not pass through a sidewall of the stock
under either parties’ construction for stock.

Claims 1 and 11 of the ’893 Patent and Claims 5, 6, 14, or 15 of the ’056 Patent each

require a portion of alleged rotatable member either pass through or be oriented in a sidewall of

the stock. Under either parties’ construction for stock, there is no genuine dispute that no portion

of the alleged rotatable member of the R500/R500E passes through or is oriented in a sidewall of

the stock. Thus, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement.

Ravin has proposed that the claimed stock be construed as “the central component of the

crossbow to which everything else attaches.” By contrast, MCP has proposed that the claimed

stock be construed as “a supporting framework or structure.” Under either of these constructions,

the R500/R500E do not infringe the “passes through” limitations of the ’893 or ’056 Patents.

MCP’s own allegations confirm this:

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SOF ¶ 212. As shown above, even accepting MCP’s allegations as true, no portion of the alleged

rotatable member passes through a sidewall of the stock. Instead, at best, a portion of the rotatable

member passes over the stock (identified with the yellow arrow below) and under/through the

finger guard (identified with the blue arrow below):

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Id.

The finger guard is the component of the R500 with rounded triangular cutouts that attaches

to the stock and prevents a user’s fingers from entering into the path of the bolt as shown in the

picture below:

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SOF ¶ 213 (cropped and annotated), ¶ 216. The fingerguard is not the stock and it is not a structural

portion of the stock. Those are the parts depicted in the red box in the picture immediately above.

The cam never passes through this portion of the stock, as can be seen from MCP’s own pictures.

Thus, summary judgment is proper.

F. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement and/or Invalidity of

the ’220 Patent

Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the Asserted Claims of the

‘’220 Patent for at least three reasons. First, properly construed the claims of the ’220 Patent are

limited to vertical compound archery bows. Because the R500/R500E is not a vertical compound

archery bow, it does not infringe. Second, the R500/R500E do not include the claimed “cable guard

attached to said riser.” Finally, the alleged reference plane of the R500/R500E does not

“continually” or “initially” move towards the predefined location as the bow is drawn, as required

by the independent claims of the ’220 Patent.

Separately, if the Court determines the claims of the ’220 Patent are not limited to vertical

compound archery bows, then Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of invalidity because the

’220 lacks written description support for its claimed invention embodied in a crossbow.

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1. The R500/R500E are not “compound archery bow[s]” as properly construed

As explained above, the asserted claims of the ’220 Patent properly construed are limited

to vertical compound archery bows. See supra Section II.G.1. The R500/R500E are not vertical

archery bows, they are crossbows. SOF ¶ 172. Accordingly, there is no genuine dispute that the

R500/R500E cannot read on the independent claims, and Ravin is entitled to summary judgment

of non-infringement of the ’220 Patent as a matter of law.

2. The R500/R500E do not include “a cable guard attached to said riser”

Independent Claims 1 and 10 of the ’220 Patent both require “a cable guard attached to

said riser[.]” SOF ¶¶ 141–42. First, as explained above the claimed “riser” should be construed as

including at least the “handle.” See supra Section II.G.2. The R500/R500E do not include a handle

on their risers. SOF ¶¶ 213–14. The handle for the R500/R500E is located on the rear of the

crossbow behind the trigger. Id. Thus, summary judgment of non-infringement is warranted.

But even if the Court adopts MCP’s construction for the claimed “riser,” Ravin is still

entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement. MCP’s proposed construction for the claimed

“riser” is “a structural component that supports a bow or limb.” MCP has accused the component

identified as reference number 2 below as the claimed riser, and has accused the component

identified as reference number 10 as the claimed cable guard:

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SOF ¶ 217. The spatial relationship between these two components is more clearly shown below,

where the riser is highlighted in yellow, the R500’s separate finger guard/picatinny rail is

highlighted in green, and the separate cable guard is highlighted in red:

SOF ¶¶ 214–15.

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As clearly shown above, the alleged cable guard is not attached to the riser. First, there is

no dispute the alleged cable guard is located within the finger guard. SOF ¶ 216. Thus, to the extent

the cable guard is “attached” to anything, it is the finger guard, not the riser. Second, there is no

dispute the alleged cable guard is even “attached” at all—it may freely move forward and

backward in the slot it is disposed in. SOF ¶ 218.

3. The R500/R500E do not include a reference plane that “continually” or

“initially” moves toward the predetermined location as they are drawn

Claims 1 and 10 of the ’220 Patent require, respectively, that the claimed “reference plane”

either “continually traverses toward the predetermined location as the bow is drawn” or “moves

toward the predetermined location as the bow is initially drawn[.]” SOF ¶¶ 141–42. There is no

genuine dispute of material fact that the alleged R500/R500E fail to satisfy this limitation.

The plain language of these limitations mean the reference plane must either continually

traverse towards the predetermined location (e.g., never move away from the predetermined

location) or move toward the predetermined location when the drawing process first begins. Id.

Yet MCP has not come forth with any evidence regarding the movement of what MCP has mapped

as the reference plane in the R500/R500E. Instead, MCP’s only evidence, viewed most favorably

to MCP, is that the mapped reference plane ends closer to the predetermined location in the drawn

condition (bottom photo) than it was in the brace condition (top photo):

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SOF ¶ 219.

But the claims require more than the reference plane simply being closer to the

predetermined location when in a drawn orientation. Even construing all facts and drawing all

reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of MCP, there is simply insufficient evidence as a

matter of law to establish the R500/R500E infringe the “continually traverse[] toward the

predetermined location as the bow is drawn” or “move[] toward the predetermined location as the

bow is initially drawn” limitations of Claims 1 and 10 of the ’220 Patent. SOF ¶¶ 141–42. Thus,

summary judgment of non-infringement of the ’220 Patent is warranted.

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Bolstering that conclusion, Ravin has come forth with uncontroverted affirmative evidence

establishing that the alleged reference plane of the R500 does not “continually traverse” or

“initially move” towards the predetermined location during the drawing process. First, Ravin’s

expert, Dr. Duffner, explained how, mathematically, the alleged reference plane of the

R500/R500E will initially move away from the predetermined location at the beginning of the

drawing process. SOF ¶¶ 220–21. Specifically, Dr. Duffner explained that because “the resting

state of the R500/R500E’s limbs in the undrawn or brace condition” fall outside of a reference line

drawn through the fixed end of the limb and its pivot point, as shown below, “the rotatable axes

have not yet reached the apex point of the arc-shaped travel path” they take during the drawing

process:

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Id. This is in contrast to the ’220 Patent. SOF ¶ 156.

Dr. Duffner then confirmed this mathematical reality with video evidence showing that the

travel path of the alleged reference plane initially moves away from the predetermined location.

Still shots from that video just before the draw process begin and just after the draw process begins

show the reference plane has moved backwards:

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SOF ¶¶ 222–23. In the first still shot, the reference plane (blue line) is just below the 17th red

reference line (counted down from the top of the reference sheet), while in the second still shot,

the reference plane falls just above the 17th red reference line. Id. This unequivocally confirms the

reference plane initially moves rearward, away from the predetermined location.

Accordingly, because MCP has no evidence showing the reference plane “continually

moves” or “initially moves” toward the predetermined location as the crossbow is drawn, and

because Ravin’s unrebutted evidence conclusively shows the reference plane initially moves away

from the predetermined location as the R500 is drawn, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of

non-infringement on all asserted claims.

4. If the claims of the ’220 Patent are construed to encompass crossbows, Ravin
is entitled to summary judgment of invalidity because the ‘’220 Patent lacks
written description support for its claimed invention embodied in a crossbow

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To meet the written description standard of 35 U.S.C. §112, ¶ 1, “[t]he disclosure must

‘reasonably convey[] to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed

subject matter as of the filing date,” where “[p]osession means ‘possession as shown in the

disclosure’ and ‘requires an objective inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the

perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the art.’” Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal

Beverage Container Corp., 635 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Ariad Pharms., Inc. v.

Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). If the Court determines the claims

of the ’220 Patent are broad enough to include crossbow embodiments, the ’220 Patent fails to

meet this standard, and the Court should invalidate the claims of the ’220 Patent for lack of written

description support.

The intrinsic evidence leaves no genuine dispute that the ’220 Patent does not have written

description support for a crossbow embodiment of its claimed invention. First, the title of the ’220

Patent is “Archery Bow.” SOF ¶ 140. The figures exclusively depict a vertical compound archery

bow, which the description of the figures again describes as showing “an archery bow.”

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SOF ¶ 155. Then, the Detailed Description exclusively and repeatedly describes the alleged

invention as an “archery bow” or just “a bow” when discussing the various embodiments of the

vertical bow shown in the Figures. SOF ¶¶ 143–44. In sum, nothing in the ’220 Patent supports

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MCP’s contention the claims encompass a crossbow embodiment—crossbow is never even

mentioned. SOF ¶¶ 143–55.

Notably, the substance of the ’220 Patent’s disclosure regarding the “archery bow” only

makes sense for vertical archery bows. First, as explained above, the term “riser” as used in the

‘’220 Patent refers to, or at least includes, the handle of the bow. See supra II.G.2. There is no

dispute that a crossbows handle is not called or part of the crossbow’s “riser.” SOF ¶¶ 14; 213–14.

It is much father back where the user’s hand will be far away from the front of the bow and the

path of travel of the arrow. Second, discussing a hypothetical reference line drawn between the

axles of the first and second rotatable members in compound archery bows, the ’220 Patent

explains that “line would typically be oriented vertically.” SOF ¶ 145. But in a crossbow, there is

no dispute that hypothetical line would be oriented horizontally, not vertically. Thus, because the

intrinsic evidence exclusively describes a vertical compound archery bow, there is no genuine

dispute that the inventor only invented and possessed a vertical compound archery bow. See Rivera

v. ITC, 857 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming determination of no written description

for a broad interpretation of the claims where the patent “consistently describe[d] an invention”

that was narrower than the broad interpretation advanced). Accordingly, if the claims of the ’220

Patent are construed broadly enough to encompass crossbows, Ravin is entitled to summary

judgment that the claims are invalid for lacking written description.

G. Ravin is Entitled to Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement of the D’195 Patent

Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the D’195 Patent for at least

two reasons. First, the claimed design of the D’195 Patent is limited to designs for a “crossbow

rail.” Because there is no dispute, or even allegation, that the R500/R500E employs the claimed

design on its crossbow rail, as well-understood in the crossbow field, the R500/R500E cannot

infringe. Second, even if the claim were not limited to designs for a crossbow rail, because the two

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accused designs embodied in the R500/R500E are plainly dissimilar to the claimed design of the

D’195 Patent, MCP’s infringement claim fails as a matter of law.

1. Ravin does not infringe the D’195 Patent because the R500/R500E do not
utilize the claimed design on its “crossbow rail”

It is well established that “[a] design is limited to the article of manufacture identified in

the claim; it does not broadly cover a design in the abstract.” In re SurgiSil, L.L.P., 14 F.4th 1380,

1381 (Fed. Cir. 2021; Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1340–

43 (Fed. Cir. 2020. Here, the claimed design of the D’195 Patent is limited to crossbow rails. SOF

¶¶ 157–58. Because there is no genuine dispute that the R500/R500E do not utilize the claimed

design of the D’195 Patent on its crossbow rail, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-

infringement of the D’195 Patent.

The “rail” of a crossbow is well-understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to refer

to a specific component. Namely, the rail is understood to be the component of the crossbow that

defines the flight groove of the arrow track. SOF ¶¶ 159–60. The D’195 Patent and related patents’

use of “crossbow rail” is consistent with this well-understood meaning in the art. First, Figure 1 of

the D’195 Patent shows the claimed design applied to a “crossbow rail.”

SOF ¶ 161. Moreover, U.S. Design Patent D868,194—which is also directed to a design for a

“crossbow rail” and was the basis for a non-statutory double patenting rejection during the

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examination of the D’195 Patent because it disclosed a design that was not “patentably distinct

from” the D’195 Patent’s design—shows the rail from another angle:

SOF ¶¶ 162–64.

Further, the commercial embodiment for the D’195 Patent and D’195 Patents, the Mission SUB-

1 Family of crossbows also shows the design applied to what is well-understood to the be crossbow

rail, which shows that it is the flight groove or arrow track:

SOF ¶¶ 165–67.

In sum, the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence all confirm the claimed design of the D’195

Patent is limited to a design for the “crossbow rail,” as well-understood to persons of ordinary skill

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in the crossbow field. There is no dispute the R500/R500E do not utilize the claimed design of the

D’195 Patent on its crossbow rail. In the annotated picture below, the highlighted box in yellow

(immediately below) and in red (in the 2nd picture) is the crossbow rail that includes the flight

groove for the arrow track:

SOF ¶¶ 224–25. This component of the R500 has not been accused of infringement by MCP. MCP

only accuses the design on the fingerguard and scope mount, which are located above the crossbow

rail. Thus, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the D’195 Patent.

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2. Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the D’195 Patent

because the R500/R500E do not satisfy the ordinary observer test

Ravin is also entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement on the D’195 Patent

because the allegedly infringing designs on the R500/R500E are “sufficiently distinct” and

“plainly dissimilar” to the claimed design of the D’195 Patent. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v.

Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015 (“Where the claimed and accused designs are

‘sufficiently distinct’ and ‘plainly dissimilar,’ the patentee fails to meet its burden of proving

infringement as a matter of law”); see also Super-Sparkly Stuff, LLC v. Skyline USA, Inc., 836 F.

App’x 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2020). Even if that were not the case, in light of the existing prior art,

because an ordinary observer would view the differences between the allegedly infringing designs

and the claimed design of the D’195 Patent as significant, summary judgment of non-infringement

is warranted.

First, the allegedly infringing designs are plainly dissimilar to the claimed design of the

D’195 Patent. Where, as here, the claimed design is “a very simple design,” even minor departures

from the claimed design are sufficient to conclude there has been “a significant departure from the

claimed design,” warranting summary judgment of non-infringement. See Super-Sparkly, 836 F.3d

at 898. In Super-Sparkly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary

judgment of non-infringement based on plain dissimilarity between the claimed and accused

designs. Id. at 898–99. More specifically, the claimed design was to “a very simple design, in

which rhinestones are applied to two surfaces of a canister: the vertical cylinder and the bottom.”

Id. at 898. The accused canister removed rhinestones from the bottom surface of its canister. Id.

The Federal Circuit found that change to be a “significant departure from the claimed design” and

“plainly dissimilar [] because the accused design lacks rhinestones on one of the two surfaces

decorated in the claimed design” such that “an ordinary observer would not find the two designs

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substantially the same.” Id.

Given the very simple design claimed in the D’195 Patent, summary judgment of non-

infringement is likewise warranted for both of the accused designs in the R500/R500E. First, the

claimed design of the D’195 Patent, consisting of 4 identical rounded-triangular cutouts arranged

in parallel, is even simpler than the claimed designs at issue in Super-Sparkly:

SOF ¶ 161. Second, the differences between the claimed design and those accused of infringing

are more significant than those found in Super-Sparkly. First, below is the design on the R500’s

finger guard:

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SOF ¶¶ 227–28. And the design on the R500’s picatinny rail:

SOF ¶¶ 230–31.

Like Super-Sparkly and Ethicon, a number of obvious dissimilarities are immediately

apparent:

• Finger guard – (1) applied to a different component of the crossbow than the claimed

design; (2) cutouts applied to a sloped surface rather than flat face; (3) a more rounded

cutout shape; and (4) cutouts do not extend uniformly through the width of the alleged

“rail,” instead has hollow, open cavity between each sides’ cutout.

• Picatinny rail – (1) applied to a different component of the crossbow than the claimed

design; (2) the cutouts are not uniformly sized and also are a different shape that is not as

flat on the top/bottom rounded corners as the claimed design; (3) the height of the alleged

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rail the design is applied to gets smaller (e.g., pinches inward) as you move from left to

right in the depictions above; and (4) the design is applied to a surface that bevels outward

at the top and bottom rather than being applied to a flat surface.

SOF ¶¶ 233–36. Accordingly, given the “plain dissimilarities” between the accused designs and

claimed design, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of non-infringement of the D’195 Patent.

Even if the accused designs were not “plainly dissimilar” from the claimed design, a

comparison with the prior art confirms the accused designs do not infringe. Again, Super-Sparkly

is instructive. There, only one similar prior art design was discussed. Super-Sparkly, 836 F. App’x

at 898. That prior art design was also to a rhinestone canister but did not have rhinestones “on the

top (near the spray nozzle) or bottom of the cylinder.” Id. “Per Egyptian Goddess, then, the [prior

art] design highlights that the key difference between the ’172 Patent and the accused design is

that the bottom of the cylinder is decorated with rhinestones. As such, the attention of a

hypothetical observer conversant with bedazzled pepper spray canisters would be drawn to the

presence or absence of rhinestones on the bottom of the cylinder.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded

a “hypothetical ordinary observer would . . . find significant the lack of rhinestones on the bottom

of the accused design and would not confuse the design with the ’172 patent.” Id. at 898–99.

Here, in contrast with Super-Sparkly, there are ample prior art designs that, collectively,

show that the key differences between the designs were all known in the prior art. In fact, the prior

art shows that designs applying cutouts in a linear configuration to both flat and curved

components were abundant:

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SOF ¶¶ 287–303. Given how close the claimed design is to the above prior art designs, “small

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differences between the accused design and the claimed design are likely to be important to the

eye of the hypothetical ordinary observer,” so it is appropriate to focus on those features of the

claimed design that depart from the prior art designs. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543

F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2008.

Here, what distinguishes the claimed design from the prior art designs is its specific linear

arrangement of uniform cutouts, each having that unique shape, extending through a flat, solid

component. Indeed, the differences between the accused designs and the claimed design are all

present in the prior art. In fact, the design of the picatinny rail is nearly identical to the prior art

TacHeads Bi-Pod design—a patented Ravin design:

(Accused design)

(Ravin TacHeads Bi-Pod design)

SOF ¶¶ 231, 298.

While this evidence is sufficient even without expert testimony for the Court to grant

Ravin’s motion, as was the case in Super-Sparkly, Ravin’s non-infringement is confirmed by more

than ten pages of substantive, supporting expert opinion. Specifically, Ravin’s expert provided a

detailed analysis of the claimed design in view of the prior art concluding with his opinion as to

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what elements of that design were already disclosed in the prior art (SOF ¶¶ 232, 235, 304–05), he

then opined on how the existence of those elements in the prior art would narrow how an ordinary

observer looked at the claimed design (SOF ¶ 305), then walked through the similarities and

differences between the claimed design and the two accused designs (SOF ¶¶ 232, 235, 304–05),

and only then concluded that, considering both the similarities and differences in view of the prior

art, an ordinary observer would not believe the two designs were substantially the same or deceive

them into purchasing the accused designs believing them to be the claimed design. SOF ¶¶ 234,

238.

MCP, in stark contrast, has not presented any meaningful evidence sufficient to create a

genuine dispute that an ordinary observer would not confuse the claimed and accused designs.

MCP’s sole evidence is the conclusory opinion of its expert, Dr. Paulus, who essentially offered a

single paragraph of analysis for each of the accused designs. SOF ¶¶ 240–41. Not only did Dr.

Paulus fail to even consider the prior art (SOF ¶ 306), his analysis amounts to him just repeating

his belief that the designs are “virtually identical” while ignoring the differences “without

justification.” SOF ¶¶ 240–41. This is perhaps best exemplified in his opinions on the R500’s

picatinny rail design, where Dr. Paulus refused to even acknowledge the differences existed at all.

SOF ¶ 241 (“None of those differences, to the extent they exist (or can be understood) change the

fact that the designs are substantially similar to an ordinary observer.”). Such conclusory

“opinions” cannot be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Further, Dr. Paulus’ unsupported analysis is also contradicted by his own later opinions

provided in his rebuttal report. There, Dr. Paulus had no trouble at all identifying alleged

differences between the prior art designs and the claimed design. SOF ¶ 299. Perhaps the best

example of Dr. Paulus inconsistent analysis comes in discussing Ravin’s TacHeads Bi-Pod—

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which, as just discussed is almost an exact copy of the accused picatinny rail design that Dr. Paulus

claimed had no differences from the claimed design—where he has no difficulty observing that

“[a]n ordinary observer would also note that the triangular shapes in the TacHeads are not a

repeating design like claim 1 of the D’195 patent.” Id. But that is one of the plain dissimilarities

between Ravin’s picatinny rail design and the claimed design.

Because Dr. Paulus made no effort to meaningfully discuss the clear dissimilarities

between the claimed and accused designs or how an ordinary observer would weigh those

dissimilarities in view of the prior art, and then further contradicted those conclusory opinions, the

Court can and should disregard his opinions. See Dominion Energy, Inc. v. Alstom Grid LLC, 725

F. Appx. 980, 986–87 (Fed. Cir. 2018 (reversing denial of JMOL of non-infringement where the

plaintiff’s expert testimony was conclusory, unsupported, and in conflict with his own opinions);

OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (affirming district

court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement and determination that the “expert’s

opinion was wholly conclusory and devoid of any analysis regarding whether the ornamental

features created the overall similarity”). Accordingly, Ravin is entitled to summary judgment of

non-infringement of the D'195 Patent.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, Ravin respectfully requests the Court grant its motion for summary

judgment.

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Dated: April 17, 2023 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Adam P. Seitz

Adam P. Seitz (pro hac vice)
KS Bar No. 21059
Email: [Link]@[Link]
Michelle L. Marriott
KS Bar No. 21784
Email: [Link]@[Link]
Alex M. Matthews (pro hac vice)
KS Bar No. 29028
Email: [Link]@[Link]
Clifford T. Brazen (pro hac vice)
KS Bar No. 27408
Email: [Link]@[Link]
ERISE IP, P.A.
7015 College Blvd., Suite 700
Overland Park, Kansas 66211
Telephone: 913-777-5600; Fax 913-777-5601

J. Derek Vandenburgh
WI Bar No. 0224145
Email: dvandeburgh@[Link]
Carlson, Caspers, Vendenburgh &
Lindquist, PA
225 South Sixth Street, Suite 4200
Minneapolis, MN 55402
Telephone: (612) 436-9618

Sarah A. Zylstra
State Bar No. 1033159
BOARDMAN & CLARK LLP
1 South Pinckney Street, Suite 410
P.O. Box 927
Madison, WI 53701-0927
Telephone: (608) 257-9521
Facsimile: (608) 283-1709
szylstra@[Link]

Attorneys for Defendant RAVIN

CROSSWBOWS, LLC

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 17, 2023, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing

document has been filed via ECF which will send notice to all counsel of record.

/s/ Adam P. Seitz

Adam P. Seitz

78