UNEXPECTED

Test 1: A380 Boarding

Captain Incapacitation 29
Unreliable Altimeter Indication 30
Bird Ingestion with Flameout 34

Test 2: Runway Incursion

Miscommunication 32
Adverse Weather 28
Hydraulic Failure with Flaps Up Landing 33

Test 3: Belly Landing

Radar Failure (Loss of Radar Contact) 40; 60
Engine Failure with Overweight Landing 2
Total Electrical Failure 1, 39

Test 4: Birdstrike (Smashed Radome)

Loss of Thrust after T/O 38
Bolt Strike with Navigation System Failure 24
Unreliable FMS Information (Wrong Airway) 52

Test 5: Emergency Evacuation

Strong Engine Vibration 15
Low Oil Pressure Indication 21
Uncontrollable Fire 22

Test 6: Volcanic Ash

Thunderstorm/Turbulence with Injured Passengers 49
Open Door with Depressurisation 48*
Escape Slides Deployed by Mistake 17

Test 7: Boarding Air Bridge (Dangerous Goods)

RTO after Engine Stall/Flameout 51
Birdstrike with Cracked Windshield 9
Runway Incursion by Dog 45

Test 8: Simulator Session

Auto Pilot (AP) Failure 36
Lightning Strike with Engine Failure/Flameout 38
Military Airspace Infringement 37

Test 9: Runway Excursion

Near Miss 4, 31
Emergency Descent after LH Flameout 53
Dog Loose on the Apron 54
Low oil pressure 21

Test 10: A380 Expo

GPS Failure and iPad Blank 8, 47
Hydraulic Failure with Loss of Ailerons 7
Unreliable Altitude 30

Test 11: Tail Strike

Fire in Cargo Hold (Wrong Place) 58, 59, 25
Airport Closure with Pilots transporting Organs for Transplant 57
Emergency Electrical Configuration 1, 39
UNEXPECTED

“Now tell me in your own words everything that the pilot and controllers said”
“Now, considering the three situations you’ve just heard on part III, how can you compare them?”
Thank you that’s the end of Part III

1) Total Electrical Failure - Dubai, UAE

Pilot: Dubai Approach, Flydubai 648. We suffered a total electrical failure and we are running on
batteries only, battery endurance is 30 minutes. We request vectors to return and priority to
land.
ATC: Flydubai 648, Dubai Approach, understood. Fly direct to UKRIM, that’s U-K-R-I-M, descend
to 2,000ft, expect ILS runway 12 Left.
Fly Dubai 648 said they had suffered a total electrical failure and that they were running on batteries only and
their battery endurance was 30 minutes. They requested vectors to return and priority to land.
Dubai Approach said they had understood and instructed Fly Dubai 648 to fly direct to
UKRIM and ordered the pilots to descend to 2,000ft and to expect ILS runway 12.

Q: What are the possible causes of an electrical failure/emergency electrical configuration?

Q: Which systems are lost when an aircraft suffers a total electrical failure?
Q: Which systems remain operating when an aircraft suffers a total electrical failure?

2) LH Engine Flameout - Rome, Italy

Pilot: Fiumicino Tower, Alitalia 676. We lost our left hand engine, we are unable to dump fuel
and we will perform an overweight landing.
ATC: Alitalia 676, Fiumicino Tower, roger. You are cleared to land runway 16 Right. Emergency
ground support will be on standby.
Alitalia 676 said they had lost their left hand engine and that they were unable to dump fuel and
they would need to perform an emergency landing.
Fiumicino Tower claimed they had understood and cleared Alitalia 676 to land on 16R and
informed emergency ground support would be on stand by.

Q: How bad can an engine flameout be?

Q: What are the possible consequences of an engine flameout?
Q: Are engine flameouts worse in higher levels?
Q: Why is it important for pilots to jettison or dump fuel?
Q: What are the possible consequences of an overweight landing?
3) GPS Accuracy - San Francisco, USA
ATC: Jetblue 417, NORCAL approach. Radar service is terminated. Resume your own navigation
and expect visual approach runway 19 Right.
Pilot: NORCAL Approach, Jetblue 417. We cannot resume our own navigation because our
navigation system is inaccurate. We will need vectors for a raw data approach.
NORCAL Approach let Jetblue 417 know that radar service was terminated and instructed the pilots to
resume their own navigation and to expect visual approach for runway 19R.
Jetblue 417 claimed they could not resume their own navigation as they navigation system was not
accurate and informed NORCAL Approach that they would need vectors for a raw data approach.

Q: Can pilots rely on just one source of navigation?

Q: Can pilots rely on just one navigation system to fly?
Q: Do you think GPS navigation is reliable?

4) Near Miss - Boston Logan, USA

Pilot: Boston Approach, Delta 2665. We have just had a near miss. A small Cessna almost
collided with us, in descent at our two o’clock position.
ATC: Delta 2665, Boston Approach. We are not aware of any traffic in your sector. It must be a
Class Bravo airplane. We’ll file a safety report.
Delta 2665 stated that they had had a near miss with a small Cessna in descent at
their two o’clock position.
Boston Approach replied that they were not aware of any traffic in their sector and it must have
been a Class “B” aircraft.

Q: How can near miss reports prevent similar incidents in the future?
Q: How mid-air collisions happen in controlled airspaces?
Q: How can pilots and controllers avoid mid-air collision?

5) RNAV Contingency - Frankfurt am Mein, Germany

ATC: Cityflyer 8761, Langen Radar. You are cleared ASPAT 2 Whisky RNAV arrival. Fly LEPSA
waypoint and descend to FL120. Expect RNAV Y approach for runway 25 Centre. Over
LEPSA contact Frankfurt Director on 127.275. For your information, all conventional NAVAIDS are
unserviceable.
Pilot: Langen Radar, Cityflyer 8761. We have a ‘NO RAIM’ (Receiver Autonomous Error
Indication) error and we do not comply with RNP for an RNAV approach. We will need vectors
to RATRU. We intend to perform a visual approach on runway 25 Centre.
Langen Radar cleared Cityflyer 8761 ASPAT 2W RNAV Arrival. Langen ordered the pilots to proceed to LEPSA
waypoint and to descend to FL120, expecting RNAV “Y” Approach on 25C. Langen also requested Cityflyer to
call Frankfurt Director on 127.275 at LEPSA and informed all conventional Navigation Aids (NAVAIDs) were out
of service.
Cityflyer pilots replied that they had a “NO RAIM” issue with their GPS and that they did not comply with the
RNP for RNAV procedures. The crew requested vectors to RATRU and declared that they intended to perform
a VFR Approach on 25C.
 Q: Can pilots rely on just one source of navigation?
Q: Can pilots rely on just one navigation system to fly?
Q: Do you think GPS navigation is reliable?
6) Windshield/Glareshield - Paris Bourget, France
Pilot: Le Bourget, Scandi 579. We are unable to proceed with our flight. We need vectors to the
nearest airport, our glareshield is damaged.
ATC: Scandinavian 579, Paris Bourget. Roger, you can return to Le Bourget. Descend to FL140,
and fly heading 270. Confirm extension of windshield damage so that we can offer you further
assistance.
Scandinavian 579 declared to Paris Bourget that they were unable to proceed would their flight and they said
that they needed vectors to the nearest suitable airport because their glareshield was damaged.
Paris Bourget replied that Scandinavian 579 could return to Le Bourget and instructed the pilots to
descend to FL140 on heading 270. Paris misunderstood the nature of pilots’ report (glareshield/windshield) and
questioned the extension of the windshield damage so that they could offer further assistance.

Q: How can pilots and controllers avoid miscommunication?

7) Hydraulic Pressure and Aileron Fault - Carrasco, Uruguay

Pilot: Carrasco Approach, Copa 368. Our Hydraulic System is failing, pressure is dropping and we
have lost control of ailerons. We will have to perform an emergency landing. Can you confirm
your longest Landing Distance Available?
ATC: Copa 368, Carrasco Approach. You are cleared ILS Runway 19. Descend to 3,000ft and fly
SUNGA position. Runway 19-01 (LDA) is 2,500 metres long.
Copa 368 informed Carrasco Approach that their Hydraulic System was failing, that the pressure was
dropping and that they had lost control of the ailerons. They declared that they would have to perform an
emergency landing and asked Carrasco if they could confirm their runway with the longest landing
distance available.
Carrasco Approach cleared Copa ILS on runway 19 and ordered the crew to descend 3,000ft SUNGA
waypoint inbound. Carrasco informed Copa that their longest runway was 19-01 with 2,500 metres of
length/long.

Q: Why do aircraft in hydraulic emergency take up more runway to land?

Q: How do pilots recognize that they are having a hydraulic malfunction?
Q: What are the most common systems reliant upon hydraulic systems?
Q: How can pilots steer the aircraft when the ailerons fail?
Q: What can pilots do when all their hydraulic systems fail?
Q: Why do pilots need to perform landing computations when landing with a hydraulic
failure?
8) Blank GNSS Display - Brasilia, Brazil
Pilot: Brasilia Control, PT-WSW. We are now passing 3,000ft and climbing to FL360, heading 350.
ATC: WSW, Brasilia Control. Roger. Report reaching and maintaining FL360. What’s your ETE for
ATF (Alta Floresta) VOR?
Pilot: Brasilia Control, WSW. Our GPS went blank and our iPad is not working either. We are
unable to confirm enroute estimates.
ATC: WSW, Understood. Fly raw data to radial 355, 80 nautical miles from Brasilia (BSI) VOR.
After the VOR, you are cleared to resume your own navigation to Alta Floresta VOR.
PT-WSW advised Brasilia Control that they were passing 3,000ft in climb to FL360 on heading 350˚.
Brasilia Control acknowledged WSW’s exchange and requested the pilots to report FL360. Brasilia also
questioned WSW’s ETE for ATF VOR.
PT-WSW replied to Brasilia Control that their GPS had gone blank and that their iPad was not working
either and that for this reason they were unable to confirm enroute estimates.
Brasilia Control said they had understood and solicited pilots to fly raw data to radial 355˚ 80 nautical miles
of Brasilia VOR and instructed WSW to resume their navigation to ATF after the VOR.

Q: Can pilots rely on just one source of navigation?

Q: Can pilots rely on just one navigation system to fly?
Q: Do you think GPS navigation is reliable?
Q: What are the possible consequences of losing FMS in flight?
Q: How would you react if you had lost your FMS in flight?

9) Birdstrike with Cracked Windshield - Lisbon, Portugal

Pilot: Lisbon Tower, EasyJet 7638. We have just struck a flock of birds and our LH windshield is
cracked. We’ll need to return.
ATC: EasyJet 7638, Lisbon Tower, understood. Climb to 4,000ft and fly U-P-K-A-T. Contact Lisbon
Approach on 119.1.
Easyjet 7638 advised Lisbon Tower that they had struck a flock of birds (had suffered a bird strike) and as a
result of the incident their LH Windshield was cracked and for this reason that they would need to
return.
Lisbon Tower ordered the pilots to climb to 4,000ft UPKAT inbound and instructed the pilots to call
Lisbon Approach on 119.1.

Q: What are the possible consequences of a bird strike right after takeoff?
Q: What are airplanes’ most affected areas in bird strikes?
Q: When are birdstrikes more critical, during takeoff or landing?

10) Both Engine Inoperative - London Heathrow, UK

Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Heathrow Director, This is Cathay 239. We suffered a dual
engine stall. Neither of them is operative. We’re descending from FL100 and we will have to
perform an emergency landing.
 ATC: Cathay 239, Heathrow Director. Radar contact at 20nm Southeast sector. Descend no
lower than 3,000ft on BENPA waypoint. Expect a visual (dead-stick) approach for runway 09R.
Cathay 239 declared an emergency and informed Heathrow Director that they had suffered a dual engine
stall and that neither of the engines was working. The crew stated that they were in descent from FL100
and that they would have to perform an emergency landing.
Heathrow replied that they had identified Cathay 239 on the radar at 20nm in the Southeast sector of the
airport. Heathrow asked Cathay to cross BENPA waypoint at 3,000ft or higher and to expect a VFR
Approach on Runway 09R.

Q: How should pilots behave if they lost thrust?

Q: How should pilots act in case of a dual engine failure?
Q: How bad can a loss of thrust be?
Q: What are the possible consequences of an engine flameout?
Q: Are engine flameouts worse in higher levels?
Q: What are the main cause of dual engine flameout?

11) Dual Hydraulic Failure - Toulouse Blagnac, France

Pilot: Toulouse Approach, AirFrance 6130. We are unable to complete our STAR. We are
experiencing a Dual Hydraulic Failure and we’ll have to carry out an emergency landing but
before we need to hold over a fix to complete ECAM actions and to complete performance and
landing computations.
ATC: AirFrance 6130, Toulouse Approach, Roger. Hold over BO508, intercept inbound leg 143˚
and maintain 5,000ft. Expect ILS Runway 14 Right. When ready call Blagnac Tower on 118.10.
Air France 6130 let Toulouse Approach know that they were unable to complete their Arrival because they
were experiencing a Dual Hydraulic Failure and that they would have to perform an emergency landing. The
pilots maintained that before they did it that they needed to hold at a fix to complete ECAM actions and
performance and landing computations.
Toulouse Approach permitted Air France 6130 to hold at BO508 maintaining 5,000ft with an inbound leg of
143˚. Toulouse also informed the pilots to expect ILS 14R and contact Blagnac Tower on 118.10.

Q: Why do aircraft in hydraulic emergency take up more runway to land?

Q: How do pilots recognise that they are having a hydraulic malfunction?
Q: What are the most common systems reliant upon hydraulic systems?
Q: How can pilots steer the aircraft when the ailerons fail?
Q: What can pilots do when all their hydraulic systems fail?
Q: Why do pilots need to perform landing computations when landing with a hydraulic
failure?

12) Level Bust after Thunderstorm - Moscow Sheremetyevo, Russia

ATC: KLM903, Sheremetyevo Approach. Confirm altitude you are maintaining. Altimeter setting
is 1030.
 Pilot: Sheremetyevo Approach, KLM903. We entered a storm cell and lost altitude. Some
passengers are hurt. We request return and medical assistance upon arrival. Is there an
appropriate area for jettisoning?
ATC: KLM903, Sheremetyevo Approach. We do not have a designated area for fuel dumping.
Proceed to BESTA position. Call Sheremetyevo Radar on 118.10. Expect vectors for a straight-in
approach runway 24 Left.
Sheremetyevo Approach asked KLM903 to confirm the altitude they were maintaining and informed that
QNH was 1030 hPa.
KLM 903 told Sheremetyevo Approach that they had entered a storm cell/CB and had lost altitude,
claiming that some passengers were hurt. The pilots asked to return and medical support upon
landing. The crew also asked if there was an appropriate area for fuel dumpling/jettisoning.
Sheremetyevo informed KLM903 that they did not have a designated area for fuel dumpling/jettisoning and
instructed the crew to proceed to BESTA position and to contact Sheremetyevo Radar on 118.10.
Sheremetyevo told the KLM crew to expect vectors for a Straight-In Approach 24L.

Q: What are the risks of flying through bad weather/CB?

Q: How can weather conditions affect piloting?
Q: How can foul weather affect flight safety?
Q: Why is it important for pilots to jettison or dump fuel?
Q: What are the possible consequences of an overweight landing?
Q: What are the most common causes of flying at the wrong FL?

13) Interception - French Airspace

ATC: D-ABFA, from the fighter on your left, on 121.50. I say again, you have been intercepted by
the French Air Force Police.
Pilot: The Callsign is BER344E.
ATC: B-E-R-3-4-4-E. Maintain your elements, stand by for radio and instructions.
The fighter/the intercepting aircraft informed D-ABFA that they were on their left and urged the pilots of to
call them on frequency 121.50. The interceptor said that ABFA had been intercepted by the French Air Force Police.
The D-ABFA pilots declared that their callsign was BER344E.
The French Air Force Police then ordered BER344E to maintain its elements and to stand by for further
instructions.

Q: Are pilots allowed to depart from ATC instructions?

Q: In what cases can pilots disobey ATC instructions?
Q: What are the causes of unintentional airspace infringement?

14) Severe Turbulence with Injured Passenger - Kennedy New York

Pilot: New York Departure, United 148. We are now experiencing severe turbulence at flight
level 230. A passenger is badly injured and we request to return to New York.
ATC: United 148, New York Departure. Turn left heading 320, proceed to I-G-N VOR and descend
to FL 190. Medical support will be on standby.
 United 148 informed New York Departure that they were experiencing severe turbulence at FL230 that one
of their passenger got injured and as a result they were requesting return to New York.
New York Departure told United 148 to turn left heading 320˚ and requested the crew to descend to FL190
IGN VOR inbound and they also informed the pilots that medical assistance would be on standby.

Q: What can a severe turbulence cause to passengers?

Q: What are the consequences of severe turbulence to the aircraft structure?

15) Engine Vibration, Porto Alegre Salgado Filho, Brazil

Pilot: PAlegre Control, TAP 118. We are undergoing strong engine vibration on our number 2. We
need to hold over a fix for some check and I will call back for vectors
ATC: Air Portugal 118, PAlegre Control. Hold over G-A-V-I-R at 4,000. When (you are) ready to
return, call PAlegre Control on 120.55.
TAP118 let PAlegre Control know that they were undergoing strong engine vibration on their RH Engine and
that they needed to hold at a fix to carry out some checks. The crew informed that once they were ready that
they would need vectors to return.
PAlegre Control asked Air Portugal 118 to hold at GAVIR maintaining 4,000 and instructed the pilots to
contact Porto Alegre Control on 120.55 for the return.

Q: What are the possible causes of engine vibration?

Q: How should pilots handle cases of strong engine vibration?

16) Fire Rear Toilet - Toronto Pearson, Canada

ATC: Air Canada 826, Toronto Tower. Turn right now, heading 132 and intercept Radial 102˚. Call
Toronto Departure on 127.575 to proceed on ANCOL 3 departure.
Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Toronto Tower, Air Canada 826. Our rear toilet caught fire
and we are performing a U-turn. Please provide firefighting assistance upon arrival.
Toronto Tower requested Air Canada 826 to turn right and to fly heading 132˚ to join Radial 102˚. The
Tower also instructed Air Canada to contact Toronto Departure on 127.575 in order to continue on ANCOL 3
Departure.
Air Canada 826 announced that their rear toilet had caught fire and informed Toronto Tower they were
performing a U-Turn. The pilots also requested Toronto to provide firefighting assistance upon arrival.

Q: How could technology help to prevent cabin fire?

Q: What is the most common cause of fire aboard?
Q: Do you think that prohibiting electronic devices aboard is a good way of reducing the
risks of fire aboard?

17) Inadvertent Deployment of Escape Slide, Milan Malpensa, Italy

ATC: Alitalia 1028, Malpensa Tower. We can see you have deployed your slides. Do you need
assistance to evacuate the aircraft? Contact Malpensa Ground on 121.825 for ground support.
 Pilot: Malpensa Tower, Alitalia 1028. Negative. We do not need any assistance. One of the flight
attendants forgot to disarm the door and inadvertently deployed the escape slide.
Malpensa Tower warned Alitalia 1028 that they could see that they had deployed theirs escape slides and
asked if Alitalia crew needed assistance to evacuate the aircraft. Malpensa instructed the pilots to call
Ground on 121.825 should they require assistance to evacuate the plane.
Alitalia informed Malpensa that they did not need any assistance, they said that one of the flight
attendants had forgotten to disarm the door and had inadvertently deployed/opened the slides.

Q: How are flight attendants trained to deal with emergency evacuations?

Q: Why are escape slides accidentally deployed?

18) TCAS Resolution Advisory - Jorge Newbery “Aeroparque”, Buenos Aires

ATC: GOL3245, Aeroparque Approach. Turn Left on 040 to intercept Radial 1-1-4˚ of San
Fernando VOR, then proceed to P-T-A. Climb and maintain FL 170.
Pilot: Aeroparque Approach, GOL3245. Unable to Comply, TCAS RA.
Aeroparque Approach asked GOL3245 to turn left heading 040˚ to intercept Radial 114˚ of San Fernando VOR
and to proceed to PTA, climbing to FL170.
GOL3245 declared they were unable to comply with Aeroparque’s instructions because they were
(executing an evasive manoeuvre) on TCAS RA.

Q: Are pilots allowed to depart from ATC instructions?

Q: In what cases can pilots disobey ATC instructions?

19) Slats Jammed & Icing, Kastrup UIR, Copenhagen (Denmark)

Pilot: Kastrup Arrival, Icelandair 7213. We’re on TESPI 1N Arrival. Our slats are jammed. We
suspect of ice accretion. We may take up more runway than usual and we may excur. We will
need a longer runway.
ATC: Icelandair 7213, Kastrup Arrival, Roger. We can give you 4L. Fly B-A-S-L-O, descend to 3,000.
Kastrup Tower on 1[18.1].
Icelandair 7213 advised Kastrup Arrival that they were on TESPI 1N Arrival, that their slats were jammed and
that they suspected it was due to ice accretion. They told Kastrup Arrival that they might take up more
runway than usual and that they might excur and for this reason they said they would need a longer runway.
Kastrup Arrival said that Icelandair could land on 4L and requested the crew to descend 3,000ft BASLO
inbound and to call Kastrup Tower on 118.1.

Q: Why do aircraft with slats jammed take up more runway to land?

Q: How do pilots recognise that their slats are jammed?
Q: What are the most important function of slats?
Q: Apart from jamming flight control surfaces what are the other consequences of icing?

20) Flameout after Suspected Volcanic Ash, Reykjavik UIR (Iceland)

 Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Reykjavik Centre, this is Icelandair 614. We suffered an All
Engines Flameout. We are descending from FL410 and we will attempt a relight at a lower
altitude. Do you have any Pilot Reports (PIREPs) of Volcanic Ash?
ATC: Icelandair 614, Reykjavik Centre. We have no reports of Volcanic Ash. Please keep us
informed and advise if you require additional assistance.
Icelandair 614 declared a May Day and advised Reykjavik Centre that they had suffered an All Engine
Flameout. They informed Arrival that they were descending from FL410 and that they would attempt a
relight at a lower altitude. The crew asked if Reykjavik had any PIREPs of Volcanic Ash.
Reykjavik Centre told Icelandair 614 that they did not have any reports of Volcanic Ash and asked the crew
to keep them informed and to advise if they required further assistance.

Q: How should pilots behave if they lost thrust?

Q: How should pilots act in case of a dual engine failure?
Q: How bad can a loss of thrust be?
Q: What are the possible consequences of an engine flameout?
Q: Are engine flameouts worse in higher levels?
Q: What are the main cause of dual engine flameout?

21) Low Oil Pressure - Barajas Airport, Madrid

ATC: Speedbird 0457, Barajas Ground. Continue taxi to the holding point 14R. Take your right on
J2. When ready contact Barajas North Tower on 118.150.
Pilot: Barajas Ground, Speedbird 0457. We’ll have to return to the gate. We are having a Low Oil
Pressure indication and we suspect we have a leak.
Barajas Ground cleared Speedbird 0457 to taxi to the holding point runway 14R. Barajas instructed BA to
take its right on J2 and to contact Barajas North Tower on 118.150.
Speedbird 0457 let Barajas Ground know that they would have to return to the gate because they were
having a Low Oil Pressure Indication and they suspected they had a leak.

Q: What are the possible consequences of Low Oil Pressure?

Q: What are the main functions of the lubrication system?

22) Uncontrollable Engine Fire - Jorge Chavez, Lima

Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Lima Approach, this is AeroMexico 046. We have
uncontrollable fire on our engine number 2. We need vectors to land ASAP and we request
firefighting assistance during evacuation.
ATC: AeroMexico 046, Lima Approach. Descend outbound on Radial 320 of J-C-L VOR to 1,700
feet. At 10 miles, turn right and intercept ILS Y for Runway 15. Do not contact Lima Tower,
maintain our frequency. We will coordinate your emergency landing with them.
AeroMexico 046 declared an emergency and informed Lima Approach that they had uncontrollable fire on
their engine number 2. AeroMexico told Lima that they needed vectors to land ASAP and they requested fire
fighting assistance during evacuation.
Lima Approach ordered AeroMexico crew to descend 1,700ft Radial320 outbound JCL VOR. Lima told
Aeromexico crew to turn right and intercept ILS Y 15 at 10 DME. The ATCO asked the pilots not to contact
 Lima Tower and to maintain their frequency and advised the pilots that they would coordinate their
emergency landing with them.

Q: How are engine fires detected by the pilots?

Q: In cases of engine fire are shutdowns always mandatory?
Q: If uncontrolled or unextinguished, what are the possible consequences of an engine fire?
Q: What are the most common causes of engine fire?
23) Wake Turbulence - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Pilot: Lumpur Departure, Malaysia 4 passing 3,000 to FL330 on MITOS 1M. We encountered
wake vortex and we request deviation to mitigate turbulence.
ATC: Malaysia 4, Lumpur Departure. Turn approximately 2-0 degrees to your right and proceed
direct to B-A-T-A-R.
Air Malaysia 4 advised Lumpur Departure that they were passing 3,000ft in climb to FL330 on MITOS 1M
Departure. Malaysia pilots told Lumpur they had encountered wake vortex and for this reason they
requested deviation in order to mitigate/reduce the turbulence.
Lumpur Departure ordered Malaysia 4 to turn approximately 20˚ to their right and to fly direct to BATAR.

Q: What are the possible consequences of a wake turbulence?

24) Lightning Strike (Bolt) - Hong Kong International

Pilot: Hong Kong Approach, VietJet 885. We suffered a bolt strike and lost 3 out of our 5 display
units. We are incapable of proceeding IFR. We request a hold and a VFR straight-in approach.
ATC: VietJet 885, Hong Kong Approach. Hold over L-I-M-E-S at FL100 and contact Hong Kong
Director on 119.5 for visual approach to 07L.
VietJet885 informed Hong Kong Approach that they had suffered a bolt strike and that they had lost 3 of
their 5 displays and therefore they were unable to proceed IFR. The crew requested to hold before
completing a VFR approach.
Hong Kong Approach instructed VietJet pilots to hold at LIMES maintaining FL100 and to call Hong Kong
Director on 119.50 for visual approach on 07L.

Q: What are the possible consequences of a bolt strike?

Q: What kind of damages should pilot expect from a bolt of lightning?

25) Uncontrollable Fire in the Cargo Hold - Abu Dhabi International, UAE
Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Abu Dhabi Radar, this is Etihad 7. We have fire in the cargo
hold and we were unable to put it out. We’ll need priority to land and firefighting assistance
upon landing.
ATC: Etihad 7, Abu Dhabi Radar. Fly I-M-S-I-G, altimeter setting is 1002 hPa. Medical and
Firefighting assistance will be on stand-by.
Etihad 7 declared a May Day and let Abu Dhabi Radar know that they had fire in the cargo hold and said that
they had not been able to extinguish it. The crew said they would need priority to land and firefighting
assistance upon landing.
 Abu Dhabi then cleared Etihad to fly direct to IMSIG waypoint and informed that the QNH was 1002hPa,
saying that medical and firefighting assistance would be on standby.

Q: How are fires in the cargo bay detected by the pilots?

Q: In cases of fire in the cargo compartment, which should be the pilots’ first reaction?
Q: If controlled or not extinguished, what are the possible consequences of a fire in the
cargo hold?
Q: Is it important for pilots to know the location of dangerous goods or hazardous
materials in the cargo hold?

26) Unruly Passenger - Bangkok Suvarnabhumi International, Thailand

ATC: Garuda 9586, cleared takeoff runway 19L. Above 1,000, call Suvarnabhumi Departure on
119.25. Wind 190 at 10.
Pilot: Suvarnabhumi Tower, Garuda 9586. There has been an incident and we’ll have to return
to the gate, there’s a passenger unwilling to cooperate and brawling with crew members and
passengers. We are seeking police support for passenger removal.
Garuda 9586 was cleared takeoff runway 19L. The flight was also instructed to call Suvarnabhumi
Departure on 119.25 above 1,000ft. The pilots were informed that the wind was 190˚ at 10 knots.
Garuda 9586 warned Suvarnabhumi Tower that there had been an incident with an unruly passenger, that
the passenger was unwilling to cooperate and he/she was brawling with crew members and other
passengers and that for this reason they would have to return to the gate. Garuda also told Suvarnabhumi
that they were seeking police support to have the passenger removed.

Q: In your opinion what usually triggers unruly behaviour?

Q: How do you think the incidence of disruptive behaviour could be reduced amongst
passengers?
Q: Do you know anything about the levels of threat involving unruly passengers?

27) Flight Plan Expired - Rio Santos Dumont, Brazil

Pilot: Rio Clearance, LATAM 3913, (we are at) Apron 1A, (we are parked on) Stand 11 (we are)
requesting IFR Clearance to Congonhas.
ATC: LATAM 3913, Rio Clearance. Your flight plan expired 10 minutes ago, you will have to file a
new one before you can proceed.
LATAM 3913 contact Rio Clearance to inform they were at Apron 1A, that they were parked on Stand 11 and
that they were requesting IFR Clearance to Congonhas.
Rio Clearance told LATAM 3913 that their filed flight plan had expired 10 minutes before and informed
LATAM that they would have to file a new one before they could proceed with their flight.

Q: What are the flight plan rules regarding startup time and flight plan presentation?
Q: How long after you file a flight plan does it expire?
Q: Do you think it is important to file flight plans or do you think there are easier ways to
manage air traffic control?
28) Adverse Weather - Punta Cana, The D.R.
Pilot: Punta Cana Approach, JetBlue 6174. We are passing 8,000 to FL180 on PIXAR 7. We
request heading 250 to avoid adverse weather.
ATC: JetBlue 6174, Punta Cana Approach. Maintain 8,000 and fly 240 for separation.
JetBlue 6174 notified Punta Cana Approach that they were passing 8,000ft and that they were in climb to
FL180 on PIXAR 7 Departure. JetBlue requested heading 250˚ to avoid foul weather.
Punta Cana Approach instructed JetBlue 6174 to maintain 8,000ft and to fly heading 240˚ for separation.

Q: What are the risks of flying through bad weather/CB?

Q: How can weather conditions affect piloting?
Q: How can foul weather affect flight safety?

29) Captain Incapacitation - Tocumen International, Panama City/Panama

ATC: Copa 472, Panama Approach. Maintain runway heading and continue on SIMAN 1A
Departure after KUDEL, that’s K-U-D-E-L.
Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. This is Copa 472, the Captain is unconscious. We’ll have to
return. Can you provide vectors to 03L?
Panama Approach ordered Copa 472 to maintain runway heading to KUDEL waypoint and to proceed on
SIMAN 1A Departure.
Copa 472 issued a May Day and informed Panama Approach that they had a pilot incapacitation that the
Captain was unconscious and for this reason they would have to return. The crew asked Panama Approach to
provide vectors to runway 03L.

Q: How can pilots train for incapacitation?

Q: How are crew members trained to deal with pilot incapacitation?
Q: What are the main causes leading to pilot incapacitation?

30) Unreliable Altitude/Airspeed - London City, London/UK

ATC: Speedbird 706, City Tower. Maintain runway heading, climb to 7,000. After 3,000
continue on the D-V-R-5-U Departure. Contact Thames Director on 132.70. Good day.
Pilot: City Tower, Speedbird 706. We’ll have vectors to come back, please. We are having
unreliable altimetre indication and we are unable to/cannot proceed with the flight.
City Tower requested Speedbird 706 to maintain runway heading and to climb to 7,000ft. City instructed
Speedbird to continue on the DVR 5U Departure once they were above 3,000ft. They asked the crew to call
Thames Director on 132.70 and wished the crew a good day.
Speedbird 706 warned City Tower that they were unable to continue with their flight because they were
having unreliable altimetre indication and for this reason they would need vectors to return.

Q: How should pilots proceed in a situation involving unreliable ____?

Q: What are the possible consequences of an unreliable _____?
31) Near Miss/Airprox - Pitkin Airport, Aspen/Colorado
ATC: American 3250, Aspen Tower. You’re cleared to land runway 33. Wind 340 at 15knots. For
your information, windshear has been reported on final.
Pilot: PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN. Aspen Tower, American 3250. We are going around, we
had an airprox with a small Cessna at our 2 o’clock position. We are climbing to the MSA and
we will attempt a new approach.
Aspen Tower cleared American 3250 to land on runway 33, they informed American the wind was 340 at 15
and that windshear had been reported on final.
American 3250 declared a PAN PAN and said that they were going around because they had had an
Airprox/ Near Miss with a small Cessna at their 2 o’clock position. The pilots advised Aspen Tower that they
were climbing to the MSA and that they would attempt a new approach.

Q: How can near miss reports prevent similar incidents in the future?
Q: How mid-air collisions happen in controlled airspaces?
Q: How can pilots and controllers avoid mid-air collision?

32) Flight Level Misunderstanding - Washington Dulles (Potomac Approach)

ATC: Southwest 1196, Potomac Approach. Are you requesting medical assistance? Descend to
FL240.
Pilot: Potomac Approach, Southwest 1196. Negative, we are having a NAV System Failure. We
will need vectors. Cleared descent FL 250.
ATC: Southwest 1196, flight level is 240. Please acknowledge receipt.
Potomac Approach asked Southwest 1196 if they were requesting medical assistance and cleared the
pilots to descend to FL240.
Southwest 1196 informed Potomac that they were not requesting medical assistance, they declared that
they were having a Navigation System failure and informed that they would need to be vectored. The
pilots then incorrectly read back the flight level, saying FL250 instead of FL240.
Potomac then corrected Southwest saying that the flight level was 240 not 250 and asked the crew to
acknowledge receipt.

Q: How can pilots and controllers avoid miscommunication?

Q: In this situation there are two miscommunication which are the worst?

33) Flap Up Landing - Hartsfield-Jackson, Atlanta/US

Pilot: Atlanta Approach, Delta 1775. Two of our Hydraulic Systems are not operating properly.
We will have vectors for the longest runway available. We intend to perform a flaps up landing.
ATC: Delta 1775, that will be 09L. Fly R-Y-E-N-N at 7,000 and expect ILS on 9L. Please confirm
remaining fuel and souls on board. Medical and Fire Support will be on reserve call for you.
Delta 1775 advised Atlanta Approach that two of their Hydraulic Systems were not operating properly and
they told Atlanta that they would have vectors for their longest runway because they intended to
perform a flaps up landing.
 Atlanta Approach informed Delta 1775 that their longest runway would be 09L and told the pilots to cross
RYENN waypoint at 7,000ft and to expect ILS 09L. Atlanta asked the pilots to confirm the remainder fuel
and POB and informed that medical and fire assistance would be on stand by.

Q: Why should a pilot request the LDA when he had a hydraulic failure?
Q: Why do aircraft in hydraulic emergency take up more runway to land?
Q: How do pilots recognise that they are having a hydraulic malfunction?
Q: What are the most common systems reliant upon hydraulic systems?
Q: Why do pilots need to perform landing computations when landing with a hydraulic
failure?

34) Bird Ingestion - Santos Dumont & Galeão, Rio de Janeiro/Brazil

Pilot: Santos Dumont Tower, Azul 2656. Our RH Engine ingested a bird and flamed out during
departure from 02R. We request diversion to Galeão, preferably runway 33.
ATC: Azul 2656, Santos Dumont Tower. Turn left, fly heading 340˚ and maintain altitude 2,000ft.
We will inform Rio Approach. Call Galeão Tower on 118.20.
Azul 2656 communicated to Santos Dumont Tower that their RH Engine had ingested a bird and had
flamed out during takeoff from runway 02R. Azul then requested to divert to Galeão, stating that they
preferred runway 33.
Santos Dumont ordered Azul to turn left and to fly heading 340˚ and instructed Flight 2656 to maintain
2,000ft. The Tower also informed Azul that they would inform Rio Approach and asked the pilots to call
Galeão Tower on 118.1

Q: How dangerous can a bird ingestion be?

Q: What are the possible consequences of ingesting a bird?

35) Uncontrollable Fire on Board - Auckland/New Zealand

Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Auckland Oceanic, Virgin 169. We have fire in the cabin
and we were unable to extinguish it. We need to expedite our descent. Please provide fire and
medical support upon landing.
ATC: Virgin 169, Auckland Oceanic. Continue on TAZEY 1N Arrival. At PEBLU, P-E-B-L-U, call
Auckland Approach on 124.3. Ground support will be awaiting.
Virgin 169 issued Auckland Oceanic a May Day saying that they had cabin fire and that they had been unable
to extinguish it. They crew advised Auckland that they needed to expedite their descent and put in for fire
and medical support upon landing.
Auckland Oceanic instructed Virgin 169 to proceed on TAZEY 1N Arrival and when over PEBLU to contact
Auckland Approach on 142.3. Auckland advised the crew that ground assistance would be on standby.

Q: How can a fire in the cabin be controlled?

Q: In your opinion, what are the most common causes of fire aboard?
Q: Do you think that prohibiting electronic devices as a carry-on would be a good way of reducing
risks of fire on board?
 Q: Are smoke and fumes always conducive to fire?

36) Auto Pilot Failure - Paris ACC/London ACC

ATC: Air India 161, Paris Centre. Proceed KOBOR inbound at FL360. At KUNAV contact London
Area Control 132.605.
Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Paris Centre, Air India 161. Our Auto Pilot failed and we are
unable to maintain the cleared altitude. We will need to divert to the nearest suitable
airport. Can you provide us with vectors to Charles de Gaule?
Paris Centre ordered Air India 161 to maintain FL360 KOBOR inbound and asked the crew to contact London
Area Control on 132.602 over KUNAV.
Air India 161 then declared a May Day, saying that their Auto Pilot had failed and that they were unable to
continue on their cleared altitude. The pilots informed Paris Centre that they would need to divert to the
nearest suitable airport and questioned Paris if they could provide vectors to Charles de Gaule.

Q: What are the advantages and disadvantages of flying with autopilot?

Q: What are the advantages and disadvantages of flying highly-automated aircraft?
Q: How do the use of autopilot impact on pilots’ manual flying skills?

37) Military Airspace Infringement & Adverse Weather - PAlegre Approach

ATC: Avianca 6123, PAlegre Approach. Turn left and join DOMPA 1A Arrival. After NUVUK, turn
right to avoid Canoas Military Controlled Airspace.
Pilot: PAlegre Approach, Avianca 6123. We are unable to comply. We cannot deviate to the right.
There is a huge storm cell at our starboard.
PAlegre Approach cleared Avianca 6123 to turn left and join DOMPA 1A Arrival and to turn right after NUVUK
to avoid entering/infringing Canoas Military Controlled Airspace.
Avianca 6123 then let PAlegre Approach know that they were unable to comply saying that they could not
deviate to the right because there was a huge storm cell/CB at their right/starboard.

Q: Are pilots allowed to depart from ATC instructions?

Q: In what cases can pilots disobey ATC instructions?
Q: What are the causes of unintentional airspace infringement?
Q: What are the risks of flying through bad weather/CB?
Q: How can weather conditions affect piloting?
Q: How can foul weather affect flight safety?

38) Loss of Thrust and Lightning Strike - São Paulo Control/Brazil

ATC: Air Europa 0058, São Paulo Control. Continue on ROMIB 3A Departure. Pass SCP above
FL170. Transition altitude is 8,000.
Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. São Paulo Control, Air Europa 0058. We suffered a
lightning strike and both our engines flamed out. We will need to perform an emergency
landing.
 São Paulo control requested Air Europa 0058 to proceed on ROMIB 3A Departure and to cross SCP above
FL170. São Paulo also informed Air Europa that the transition altitude was 8,000ft .
Air Europa Pilots declared a May Day and informed São Paulo Control that they had suffered a lightning
strike/they had been struck by a lightning and as a result both engines had flamed out. The crew advised that
they would need to perform an emergency landing.

Q: What are the possible consequences of a bolt strike?

Q: What kind of damages should pilot expect from a bolt of lightning?
Q: How should pilots behave if they lost thrust?
Q: How should pilots act in case of a dual engine failure?
Q: How bad can a loss of thrust be?
Q: What are the possible consequences of an engine flameout?
Q: Are engine flameouts worse in higher levels?
Q: What are the main cause of dual engine flameout?

39) Emergency Electrical Configuration, Koebenhavn Centre/Denmark

Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Koebenhavn Centre,Turkish 1788. We are in Emergency
Electric Configuration. We were struck by a bolt, both generators are out. Our batteries have
just 3-0 minutes to spare. We need vectors to the nearest suitable airport.
ATC: Turkish 1788, Koebenhavn Centre. You can return to Kastrup, descend 3,000ft LAMOX
inbound and expect ILS DME 22R. Call Kastrup Arrival 118.45 now.
Turkish 1788 issued a May Day/emergency distress signal informing Koebenhavn Centre that they were in
Emergency Electrical Configuration that they had been struck by a bolt and that for this reason both of their
generators were out. The crew advised Koebenhavn that their batteries had just 30 minutes to spare.
Koebenhavn Centre informed Turkish could return to Kastrup and urged the crew to descend 3,000ft
LAMOX inbound and to prepare for an ILS DME procedure for runway 22R. The ATC also requested 1788 to
contact Kastrup Arrival on 118.45.

Q: What are the possible causes of an electrical failure/emergency electrical

configuration?
Q: Which systems are lost when an aircraft suffers a total electrical failure?
Q: Which systems remain operating when an aircraft suffers a total electrical failure?
Q: How should pilots handle a total electrical failure?

40) Radar Failure, Johannesburg Radar/South Africa

ATC: Springbok 8857, JoBurg Radar. Only basic service is available. Resume own navigation due
to radar failure. Hold at 8 miles south of J-S-V maintaining 8,000 and call OR Tambo Tower 118.6
for coordination.
Pilot: Johannesburg Radar, Springbok 8857. Hold at 1-8 nautical miles south of Johannesburg
VOR and call Tambo Tower on 118.6.
Johannesburg Radar notified Springbok 8857 that following a radar failure only basic service was available
and for this reason they requested the crew to resume their own navigation. JoBurg instructed Springbok to
hold at 8 nautical miles south of JSV VOR maintaining 8,000ft and requested the crew to contact OR
Tambo Tower on 118.60.
Springbok crew read back Johannesburg’s instructions incorrectly stating that they would hold at 18
instead of 08 nautical miles south of Johannesburg VOR but the crew correctly confirmed OR Tambo
frequency, 118.60.

Q: How can pilots and controllers avoid miscommunication?

Q: How does radar failure impact on airport operation?
Q: What can happen if ATC loses radar contact with a given aircraft?
Q: What are the operational changes that take place if radar contact is lost in terminal
area?
Q: In this situation there are two emergencies which are the worst?
Q: What changes if radar cover is lost in a terminal area?

41) Severe Turbulence with Injured Crew - Ottawa Departure/Canada

Pilot: Ottawa Departure, Air Canada 445. We are experiencing severe turbulence at FL 200.
Three crew are injured and we will have to return to Ottawa.
ATC: Air Canada 445, Ottawa Departure. We’ll expedite your return. Descend 1,700 AMOBI
inbound. Call now Ottawa Arrival 135.150.
Air Canada 445 advised Ottawa Departure that they were experiencing severe turbulence at FL200. The
pilots stated that three crew members were injured and advised Ottawa that they would have to return.
Ottawa then told Air Canada that they would expedite their return. The ATC asked 445 to descend 1,700ft,
to proceed to AMOBI and to contact Ottawa Arrival on 135.150.

Q: What can a severe turbulence cause to passengers?

Q: What can a severe turbulence cause to the aircraft structure?

42) Tail Strike - Munich Radar, Germany

Pilot: Munich Radar, Vueling 6297. We had a tail strike during takeoff. We need to climb to the
minimum safe altitude in order to check some systems before we can return.
ATC: Vueling 6297, Roger. Hold at BEGEN, inbound leg 080˚ maintaining 5,000ft and
advise us when ready to return.
Vueling 6297 told Munich Radar that they had had a tail strike during takeoff and that they needed to
climb to the MSA so that they could check some systems before they could return.
Munich Radar acquiesced and ordered Vueling to hold at BEGEN waypoint maintaining 5,000ft with
inbound leg of 080˚ and asked Vueling pilots to let them know when they were ready to return.

Q: What are the effects of a tail strike?

Q: Can we say that all the causes of tail strikes are human?
Q: When do you think tail strikes prevail, at landing or during takeoff?
43) Dual Engine Stall - Dubai Departure, Dubai/UAE
Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Dubai Departure, Flydubai 844. Both of our engines
stalled, we’ll try to return to Dubai but we are extremely likely to ditch.
ATC: Flydubai 844, Roger. Turn left, fly heading 230˚, expect ILS approach 3oR.
Flydubai 844 issued a May Day signal and informed Dubai Departure that both of their engines had stalled
and that they would try to return to Dubai but they were extremely likely to ditch.
Dubai Departure acknowledged Flydubai’s distress and demanded the pilots to turn left and to fly heading
230˚ expecting ILS Approach on 30R.

Q: How should pilots behave if they lost thrust in all engines?

Q: How should pilots act in case of a dual engine failure?
Q: How bad can a loss of thrust be?
Q: What are the possible consequences of an engine flameout?
Q: Are dual engine stalls worse in higher levels?
Q: What are the main cause of dual engine flameout?

44) Fuel Imbalance, Leak Suspected - Mumbai/India

ATC: Jet Airways 4143, Mumbai Approach. Hold at 8.1 DME of Mumbai VOR, B-B-B, inbound leg
135˚ at 7,000. You are number 5 for landing.
Pilot: PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN. Mumbai Approach, Jet Airways 4143. We have a fuel
imbalance and we suspect we have a leak. We think it is best if we land ASAP or we’ll have to
shut one of our engines.
Mumbai Approach requested Jet Airways 4143 to hold at 8.1 DME of BBB VOR, Mumbai VOR, with
inbound legs of 135˚ maintaining 7,000ft. Mumbai advised Jet Airways crew that they were number 5 for
landing.
Jet Airways pilots declared a PAN PAN informing that they had a fuel imbalance and saying that they
suspected they had a leak. The crew informed Mumbai that they thought it was best to land ASAP (As Soon
As Possible) or they would have to shut one of the engines.

Q: What should be the pilots’ first course of action when a fuel imbalance is suspected?
Q: What should be the pilots’ first course of action when a fuel leak is confirmed?
Q: How do fuel imbalances relate to aircraft performance?
Q: What do you reckon to be the most common causes of a fuel imbalance?

45) Takeoff Delay, Runway Incursion by Animal - Casablanca/Morocco

ATC: Royal Air Maroc 802, Mohammed Tower. You are cleared to line up and take off 35L. After
you are airborne, right turnout to join RALEK 1D departure. Wind is calm.
 Pilot: Mohammed Tower, Royal Air Maroc 802. There’s a stray animal on the runway. We are
holding position until the canine is removed.
Mohammed Tower cleared Royal Air Maroc 802 to line up and takeoff runway 35L and requested the crew to
execute a right turnout after they were airborne and to join RALEK 1D Departure. The Tower also
informed Air Maroc that the wind was calm.
Royal Air Maroc then let Mohammed Tower know that there was a stray animal on the runway and that they
were holding position until the dog/canine was removed.

Q: How can airports make sure animals will not get onto the runway?
Q: How can airports avoid animals getting onto the runways?
Q: Have you ever experienced a similar situation?
Q: How would you proceed if you were the Captain?

46) Severe Reset (Loss of FMS Data), Cape Town App/South Africa
ATC: Springbok 7156, Cape Town Approach. Continue on runway heading climbing FL180. After
5,500 turn right and proceed via KODES 1B, as filed.
Pilot: PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN. Cape Town Approach, Springbok 7156. We suffered a
Severe Reset and lost all our FMS Data, including (our) GPS bias. We need to hold at a fix to
restore our database cycle.
ATC: Springbok 7156, you are on Radial 340 at 20 miles out of Robben Island VOR. Proceed raw
data and join a holding pattern at R-I-V maintaining 10,000. Let us know when you are ready.
Cape Town Approach instructed Springbok 7156 to maintain runway heading, climbing to FL180. Cape
Town requested Springbok to turn right after 5,500ft and to join KODES 1B, as filed.
7156’s pilots declared a PAN PAN and said they had suffered a Severe Reset and informed Cape Town they
had lost all of their FMS Data, including their GPS bias. They crew told the ATC that they needed to hold at a
fix to restore their database cycle.
Cape Town then let South African know that they were on Radial 340, 20 miles inbound Robben Island VOR.
The ATCO asked 7156 to hold at RIV VOR (Robben Island) maintaining 10,000ft and to call when they were
ready.

Q: Can pilots rely on just one source of navigation?

Q: Can pilots rely on just one navigation system to fly?
Q: Do you think GPS navigation is reliable?
Q: What are the possible consequences of losing FMS in flight?
Q: How would you react if you had lost your FMS in flight?

47) Loss of GPS/iPad Blank - Brasilia Control, Brazil

Pilot: Brasilia Control, PT-WSW. (We are) Passing 3,000ft in climb to FL300 on ESBUX 2A
Departure.
ATC: WSW, Brasilia. Confirm your estimates to G-I-G-T-I.
Pilot: Brasilia, WSW. We lost our GPS, the screen is blank and our iPad is not receiving GPS signal.
We cannot pass our ETE.
 ATC: WSW, Roger. Fly raw data B-S-I-3-5-5-0-8-0, that’s radial 355˚ 80 miles of Brasilia VOR, that is
GIGTI waypoint.
PT-WSW informed Brasilia Control that they were passing 3,000ft in climb to FL300 following ESBUX 2A
Departure.
Brasilia then asked WSW pilots to confirm their estimates to GIGTI waypoint.
WSW crew then told Brasilia that they had lost their GPS, that their screens were blank, that their iPad was
not receiving GPS signal and that for this reason they could not provide Brasilia Control with their
estimates/ETE.
Brasilia then urged WSW pilots to fly raw data to BSI355080 that it was radial 355˚ at 80 nautical miles of
Brasilia VOR. Brasilia Control then informed the pilots that at this radial was GIGTI waypoint.

Q: Can pilots rely on just one source of navigation?

Q: Can pilots rely on just one navigation system to fly?
Q: Do you think GPS navigation is reliable?
Q: What are the possible consequences of losing FMS in flight?
Q: How would you react if you had lost your FMS in flight?

48) Rapid Depressurization - Zurich ACC Radar/Switzerland

Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Zurich Radar, this is Eurowings 769. We are in emergency
descent from FL340 to FL140. We experienced a rapid depressurization and we have grounds to
suspect of a deliberate act. We’ll need to return.
ATC: Eurowings 769, identified, 20 miles East of Strasbourg. Squawk 7700 now and contact
Zurich Arrival 131.15 for vectors. Security services will be provisioned.(9)
Eurowings 769 declared a May Day and told Zurich Radar that they were in Emergency Descent from
FL340 to FL140. The pilots reported that they had experienced a rapid depressurization and that they had
grounds to suspect of deliberate act and for this reason they would need to return.
Zurich Radar then informed that Eurowings had been identified (on the Radar) at 20 miles East of
Strasbourg. Zurich solicited flight 769 to squawk 7700 and to call Zurich Arrival on 131.15 requesting
vectors. The ATC has also informed the crew that security services would be provided.

Q: What are the risks of a sudden depressurization?

Q: How could technology help prevent depressurization?
Q: Why do pilots need to perform an emergency descent following depressurization?

49) Turbulence with Injured Passengers - Shannon Control, Ireland

Pilot: PAN PAN, PAN PAN, PAN PAN, Shannon Control, Aer Lingus 3402. We have just flown
through some thunderstorm and we have encountered severe turbulence. There are injured
passengers aboard. We won’t make it to Donegal, we will have to return to Dublin. Do we need
to follow any special instructions to jettison fuel?
ATC: Aer Lingus 3402, Shannon Control. There are no special instructions for dumping fuel. Let
us know when you are finished and we’ll vector you to ILS 28.(8)
 Aer Lingus 3402 declared a PAN PAN/urgency signal saying that they had just flown/entered some
thunderstorm and that they had encountered severe turbulence. The crew advised Shannon Control that
there were injured passengers on board and informed they thought they would not make it to Donegal/they
would not be able to reach Donegal. Aer Lingus told Shannon that they would have to return to
Dublin and questioned the ATC if they needed to follow any special instructions to dump fuel.
Shannon Control made Aer Lingus cognisant that there were no special instruction to jettison fuel and
asked 3402 to advise them when they were finished and ready to return promising that they would vector
Aer Lingus to ILS for runway 28.

Q: Why is it important for pilots to jettison or dump fuel?

Q: What are the possible consequences of an overweight landing?

50) Dog on the Runway - Liège, Belgium

Pilot: Liege Tower, Qatar 8262 (we’re) ready at the holding point 22L.
ATC: Qatar 8262, Liège Tower. Line up and maintain. Repeat, maintain. Do not take off.
There’s a canine on the runway and we are having it removed.
Qatar 8262 informed Liege Tower that they were ready at the holding point runway 22L.
Liège Tower then instructed Qatar to line up and maintain and emphasised that the instruction was to hold
position and not to takeoff because there was a canine/dog on the runway and they were having it removed.

Q: How can airports make sure animals will not get onto the runway?
Q: How can airports avoid animals getting onto the runways?

51) RTO Engine Stall - Dallas Fort Worth/US

Pilot: Dallas Tower, Spirit 972 discontinued takeoff 36R because our left engine stalled.
ATC: Spirit 972, vacate runway 36R via F1 and WJ, return to stand B113.
Pilot: Dallas, we’d rather park in a hardstand position so that we can have engineers looking into
our aircraft.
Spirit 972 informed Dallas Tower that they had discontinued takeoff on runway 36R because their LH
Engine had stalled.
Dallas then instructed Spirit 972 to vacate runway 36R via “F1” and “WJ” returning to stand B113.
The pilots then told Dallas that they would rather park in a hardstand because they wanted to have
their aircraft mended/serviced/maintained.

Q: What is the PM (Pilot Monitoring) supposed to monitor during takeoff?

52) Unreliable FMS Information, Wrong ATS Route - Tokyo Departure/Japan

ATC: American 26, Tokyo Departure. Press Squawk Ident and confirm ATS route you are
maintaining.
Pilot: Tokyo Departure, American 26. Squawk Ident pressed. We are at OTR5, 10 miles inbound
EMRON (waypoint).
 ATC: American 26, EMRON (waypoint) is on OTR7. You are either having Unreliable FMS
information or your AIRAC Cycle Database is not up to date.
Tokyo Departure asked American 26 to press Squawk Ident and to confirm the airway they were maintaining.
American 26 then advised Tokyo that they had pressed Squawk Ident and informed Departure they were at
OTR5 and that they were 10 miles inbound EMRON waypoint.
Tokyo then warned American pilots that EMRON waypoint was on OTR7, not on OTR5, and concluded that
they were either having Unreliable FMS information or that they AIRAC Cycle Database was not up to date/
out-of-date/obsolete.

Q: Can pilots rely on just one source of navigation?

Q: Can pilots rely on just one navigation system to fly?
Q: Do you think GPS/RNAV/FMS navigation is reliable?
Q: What are the possible consequences of losing FMS in flight?
Q: How would you react if you had lost your FMS in flight?

53) Emergency Descent after Engine Flameout, Curitiba Centre/Brazil

Pilot: MAY DAY, MAY DAY, MAY DAY. Curitiba Centre, Emirates 247 in Emergency Descent, our
port side engine flamed out.
ATC: Emirates 247, Curitiba Centre. Descend to FL190 at your own discretion. Confirm remainder
fuel and POB. When it is convenient, let us know if you intend to continue the flight to Ezeiza or
if you will need to divert.
Emirates 247 issued an emergency distress signal informing Curitiba Centre that they were in Emergency
Descent because their port side engine had flamed out.
Curitiba Centre then instructed Emirates 247 to descend to FL190 at his own discretion and questioned
Emirate’s remainder fuel and POB/souls on board. Curitiba Centre also asked if Emirates intended to
continue the flight to Ezeiza or if they would need to divert.

Q: How should pilots behave if they lost thrust?

Q: How should pilots act in case of a dual engine failure?
Q: How bad can an engine flameout be?
Q: What are the possible consequences of an engine flameout?
Q: Are engine flameouts worse in higher levels?

54) Dog Running Loose, Passenger Aboard - Galeão/Brazil

Pilot: Galeão Ground, Iberia 6024. It’s been 30 minutes since we last requested push and start.
How much longer will we have to wait?
ATC: Iberia 6024, Galeão. We apologise. A dog escaped the kennel embarked on your aircraft
and is running loose around taxiway “G”. The owner is on your flight. Do you think you could ask
the owner to come and help us fetch his dog?
 Pilot: Galeão Ground, Iberia 6024. That’s fine, we’ll make an announcement and we’ll try to
reach him.
Iberia 6024 pilots informed Galeão Ground that it had been 30 minutes since they had requested
pushback and startup. The crew also enquired how much longer they would have to wait.
Galeão Ground apologised to Iberia stating that a dog (had) escaped the kennel that had been embarked on
their aircraft and they claimed the dog was running loose around taxiway “G”. Galeão informed the
pilots that the owner of the dog was a passenger on their flight and asked the crew if they could get the
owner to come and help them fetch his dog.
Iberia told Galeão Ground that it was fine and that they would make an announcement and would try to
find the passenger.

Q: How can airports make sure animals will not get onto the runway?
Q: How can airports avoid animals getting onto the runways?
Q: Have you ever experienced a similar situation?
Q: How would you proceed if you were the Captain?

55) Low Fuel Dogleg - Curaçao/Netherland Antilles

Pilot: HATO Tower, Insel Air 302, (we are) joining downwind leg, runway 11.

ATC: Insel Air 302, HATO Tower. There’s an aircraft running short of fuel coming to our field. Can
you dogleg to final runway 11?

Pilot: HATO Tower, sorry, we couldn’t get it, there was some static interference. Can you
repeat?

ATC: We asked if you could dogleg to final 11, shorten your approach, cut short your circuit
pattern, expedite your landing.

InselAir 302 informed HATO Tower that they were joining downwind leg runway 11.
HATO Tower advised InselAir that there was another aircraft running short of fuel coming to the airport and
enquired if the crew could dogleg to final runway 11.
Pilots then replied HATO Tower that they had not understood because there had been some interference
during the transmission and for this fact they asked if the Tower could repeat their broadcasting.
HATO Tower then explained to InselAir that they had asked if they could dogleg to final 11 or if they could
shorten their approach, cut short their circuit or expedite their landing.

Q: What can happen when controllers rush pilots into landing?

Q: Would you have collaborated with the ATC in their request?

56) Request Denied Airspace Infringement - Langen Radar/Germany

Pilot: Langen Radar, G-BYKL. We are maintaining FL090 on M150 heading LADAT, L-A-D-A-T. If it
is possible, we would like to continue direct to Karlsruhe after LADAT.
 ATC: G-BYKL, Langen Radar. Denied. If you fly direct to Karlsruhe you will overfly
French Airspace and we will have to hand you over to Reims. Please proceed as filed.

G-BYKL informed Langen Radar that they were maintaining FL090 on airway M150 heading LADAT waypoint.
The crew asked Langen if it was possible to continue direct to Karlsruhe after LADAT/The crew told Langen
that they would have liked to proceed direct to Karlsruhe after LADAT.
Langen Radar Control denied KL’s request stating that if they flew direct to Karlsruhe they would overfly
French Airspace and that they would have to hand them/G-BYKL over to Reims Control. Langen then urged
the pilots to adhere to their filed flight plan.

Q: What can happen when you inadvertently infringe airspace without communicating?

57) Airport Closure, Bad Weather & Hot Air Balloon - Rome Fiumicino/Ciampino, Italy

Pilot: Roma Director, LH240, R-I-T-E-B outbound on RITEB 2C Arrival maintaining FL90.

ATC: LH240, Roma Director. Hold at RAVUX waypoint maintaining FL90. Fiumicino is closed for
foul weather and hot air balloons.

Pilot: Roma Director, LH 240. We are not able to hold. We are carrying human tissue for
transplant. We request diversion to Ciampino.

ATC: LH240, proceed direct to Campagnano VOR, C-M-P, and descend to 6,000. Expect vectors
for ILS Z Runway 15. Ciampino Tower 120.5.

Lufthansa 240 informed Roma Director that they were outbound RITEB waypoint on the RITEB 2A Arrival and
that they were maintaining FL90.
Roma Director then instructed LH240 to hold at RAVUX waypoint at FL90. Roma let LH240 know that
Fiumicino was closed/had closed due to bad weather and hot air balloons.
Lufthansa then told Roma that they were not able to hold because they were carrying human tissue for
transplant and for this reason the pilots decided to divert to Ciampino.
The ATC then ordered Flight 240 to proceed direct to Campagnano VOR, CMP, and asked the pilots to descend
to 6,000ft and to expect ILS Z for Runway 15. The Controller also asked the crew to call Ciampino Tower on
120.5.

Q: Under what circumstances do airports close?

Q: When do airport runways close?

58) Fire in the Cargo Compartment - Lesquin/Lille, France

Pilot: Lille Approach, FEDEX 78. We are climbing to FL70 via Abbeville 6R Departure. We have an
indication of fire in the cargo compartment and we are requesting vectors for immediate return
and fire brigade at our arrival.

ATC: FEDEX 78, Lille Approach. Expect ILS X Runway 26. Descend to 2,000 and proceed direct to
L-L NDB, that’s the outer marker. On reaching 2,000, transfer onto Lille Tower 118.550. Do you
confirm return due to fire in the Cargo Hold?
 FEDEX 78 informed Lille Approach that they were climbing to FL70 on the Abbeville 6R Departure. The pilots
informed the ATC that they had an indication of fire in the cargo compartment and that for this reason they
were requesting vectors for immediate return and fire assistance upon their arrival.
Lille Approach then advised the crew that they should expect ILS X 16. The ATC told the pilots to descend
2000ft LL NDB inbound and to call Lille Tower on 118.550. Lille also asked FEDEX to confirm their return
following fire in the cargo hold.

Q: How can a fire in the cabin be controlled?

Q: In your opinion, what are the most common causes of fire aboard?
Q: Do you think that prohibiting electronic devices as a carry-on would be a good
way of reducing risks of fire on board?
Q: Are smoke and fumes always conducive to fire?

59) Fire Misunderstanding - El Prat/Barcelona, Spain

Pilot: Barcelona Approach, Iberia 5316. We have fire in the Cargo Hold. We have been
unsuccessful in stifling it. We are under heavy workload. We will need radar vectors to return.
We will also need fire assistance on the runway. We are likely to evacuate the aircraft after we
land and you may have to close it.

ATC: Iberia 5316, Barcelona Approach. We are closing runway 07L for you. Descend 3,000 and
proceed to ASTEK waypoint. You are cleared ILS Z 07L. Contact Barcelona Arrival now 119.105.
We will inform fire fighters that you are returning due to Cabin Fire.

Iberia 5316 informed Barcelona Approach that they had fire in the Cargo Hold and that they weren’t able to
put it out. The pilots informed Barcelona that they were under heavy workload and that they would need
radar vectors to return and fire assistance on the runway after landing. The crew informed the Approach
Control that they were likely to evacuate the aircraft on the runway and that for this reason Barcelona might
have to close the runway.
Barcelona Approach let Iberia Pilots know that they were reserving runway 07L for them. Barcelona
instructed the crew to descend 3,000ft ASTEK waypoint inbound and told Iberia they were cleared ILS Z 07L.
The ATC ordered Iberia to call Barcelona Arrival on 119.105. They informed the crew that fire fighters would
be standing by to assist with the evacuation on the runway.

Q: How can Pilots control Cabin Fire?

Q: In your opinion, a fire in the Cargo Hold constitutes a Cabin Fire?
Q: Do you think that prohibiting electronic devices as a carry-on would be a good
way of reducing risks of fire on board?
Q: What is the importance of reporting correctly the location of a fire?
Q: How can pilots and controllers avoid miscommunication?

60) Radar Contact Loss - Auckland Approach, New Zealand

ATC: ZK-EGN, Auckland Approach. Radar Contact is Lost. Are you under VMC? Resume own
navigation and proceed under visual conditions to Ardmore Airfield. Coordinate your landing on
Ardmore UNICOM frequency 118.10. Runway in use at Ardmore is 03.
 Pilot: Auckland Approach, EGN. Affirm, we are under VMC. Continue by our own means to
Ardmore aerodrome and call Ardmore UNICOM 118.10 expecting to land on 03, GN.

Iberia 5316 informed Barcelona Approach that they had fire in the Cargo Hold and that they weren’t able to
put it out. The pilots informed Barcelona that they were under heavy workload and that they would need
radar vectors to return and fire assistance on the runway after landing. The crew informed the Approach
Control that they were likely to evacuate the aircraft on the runway and that for this reason Barcelona might
have to close the runway.
Barcelona Approach let Iberia Pilots know that they were reserving runway 07L for them. Barcelona
instructed the crew to descend 3,000ft ASTEK waypoint inbound and told Iberia they were cleared ILS Z 07L.
The ATC ordered Iberia to call Barcelona Arrival on 119.105. They informed the crew that fire fighters would
be standing by to assist with the evacuation on the runway.

Q: How can pilots and controllers avoid miscommunication?

Q: How does radar failure impact on airport operation?
Q: What can happen if ATC loses radar contact with a given aircraft?
Q: What are the operational changes that take place if radar contact is lost in
terminal area?
Q: In this situation there are two emergencies which are the worst?
Q: What changes if radar cover is lost in a terminal area?

UNEXPECTED

Test 1: A380 Boarding

Captain Incapacitation 29
Unreliable Altimetre Indication 30
Bird Ingestion with Flameout 34

Test 2: Runway Incursion

Miscommunication 32
Adverse Weather 28
Hydraulic Failure with Flaps Up Landing 33

Test 3: Belly Landing

Radar Failure (Loss of Radar Contact) 40; 60
Engine Failure with Overweight Landing 2
Total Electrical Failure 1, 39

Test 4: Birdstrike (Smashed Radome)

Loss of Thrust after T/O 38
Bolt Strike with Navigation System Failure 24
Unreliable FMS Information (Wrong Airway) 52

Test 5: Emergency Evacuation

Strong Engine Vibration 15
Low Oil Pressure Indication 21
Uncontrollable Fire 22
The most difficult situation is (1)
Test 6: Volcanic Ash (2) is not as serious as (1)
Thunderstorm/Turbulence with Injured Passengers 49 (3) is easier than (2)
Open Door with Depressurisation 48*
Escape Slides Deployed by Mistake 17
Test 7: Boarding Air Bridge (Dangerous Goods)
RTO after Engine Stall/Flameout 51
Birdstrike with Cracked Windshield 9
Runway Incursion by Dog 45

Test 8: Simulator Session

Auto Pilot (AP) Failure 36
Lightning Strike with Engine Failure/Flameout 38
Military Airspace Infringement 37

Test 9: Runway Excursion

Near Miss 4, 31
Emergency Descent after LH Flameout 53
Dog Loose on the Apron 54

Test 10: A380 Expo

GPS Failure and iPad Blank 8, 47
Hydraulic Failure with Loss of Ailerons 7
Unreliable Altitude 30

Test 11: Tail Strike

Fire in Cargo Hold (Wrong Place) 58, 59
Airport Closure with Pilots transporting Organs for Transplant 57
Emergency Electrical Configuration 1, 39