Notes for Outlines of Scepticism by Sextus Empiricus
translated by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes
General Contextual Notes
Other English language editions worthy of consideration include translations by R.G. Bury, Benson
Mates, and Richard Bett. It’s worth mentioning the Mates rendering makes use of contemporary
academic philosophy language more than I’m comfortable with because of the increased likelihood of
misinterpretation resulting from anachronism. Also, Richard Bett’s translation of Outlines published in
2021 is slightly abridged and includes selections from Against the Mathematicians which he justifies
adding for the sake of clarity.
In the preface to this 2007 reprinting, Annas indicates the most recent revision which includes the
introduction largely represent contributions from Barnes. Traditionally the title given to the text is
Outlines of Pyrrhonism but the authors justify a preference for “Scepticism” hoping it would be less
likely to confuse potential readers. (pg xxxiv)
On The Introduction by Jonathan Barnes
A Summary Historical Background of Hellenistic Skepticism, Outlines, and Sextus
The Latin translation published in 1562 by Henri Estienne corresponds to a shift in European
philosophy from grounding stances in metaphysical foundations towards the epistemological. Henri
Estienne, also known as Henricus Stephanus is also the source of so-called Stephanus pagination which
is still widely used to refer to line numbers from Plato’s collected works. René Descarte lived from
1596 to 1650 and arguably contributed to what I've characterized as a shift towards epistemological
foundations. He also directly responded to issues he referred to as skeptical concerns.
It's worth noting the Middle ages have provided us with very little evidence that Pyrrhonism was
widely known or highly regarded. As such most of the records referred to as sources for the tradition
are ancient texts or skip ahead to works written in the mid 16th Century or later. There are, however, a
few texts with scholarship on the transmission of source documents for skepticism through the middle
ages in case anyone is interested.
Here are a few of the best example I can think of ATM:
The History of Scepticism From Savonarola to Bayle by Richard H. Popkin
Sextus Empiricus: The Transmission and Recovery of Pyrrhonism by Luciano Floridi
Outlines of Pyrrhonism in the Middle Ages by Roland Wittwer
The trouble with our ancient records is also noteworthy. Many only survive as fragments and what little
we have of Hellenistic skepticism in the form of complete texts come almost entirely from Sextus
Empiricus. When did Sextus live? Barnes gives an educated guess based on clues from Sextus himself
and commentary by folks like Diogenes Laërtius: early 2nd Century CE. Where might he be from? This
is even more speculative than when Sextus may have lived: probably near to a major ancient Roman
city, but even this is implied by a few clues and a lot of speculation as Barnes clarifies.
What was his background? It makes sense to think of him from a few perspectives: author, philosopher,
and medical practitioner chief among them. The name Sextus Empiricus and a few comments from one
of his texts suggests that he served a doctor within the empiric tradition. There's evidence Sextus wrote
medical works in addition to philosophy but only three of his philosophical texts have survived. The
corpus available to us has also unfortunately had transmission issues which has led to them receiving
misleading titles in a couple cases among other interpretive issues. Barnes offers a few insightful
remarks on Against the Mathematicians and how people tend to approach the reading order. (pg xiii, 4th
paragraph)
Book One of Outlines of Pyrrhonism serves as a general overview of Hellenistic skepticism based on a
survey conducted by Sextus. It attempts to distinguish the tradition from other philosophical outlooks
and explain basic practices. Book Two presents the skeptic's account of topics and issues concerning
logic and reason. Book Three offers consideration for science and ethics topics. The other surviving
works of Sextus can be viewed as extending the investigations given in Books Two and Three of
Outlines.
It’s likely Sextus engaged in regularly copying contextually relevant texts by his peers and
predecessors. It's difficult to imagine offering conclusive proof of the conditions for authorship, this
view as conveyed by Barnes ought to give us pause in any case. It helps to account for the perception
of inconsistencies within the textual points: perhaps the points where Sextus appears to offer variations
or contradictions in his account represent distinctions in approaches to understanding the tradition
between other authors revered by Sextus. Maybe it’s indicative of differences between the voices of
these other thinkers themselves depending on how much of the words are verbatim copies.
This strategy also makes it easier to explain how he may have conducted his research and compiled his
sources as well as understanding how he may be viewed as presenting an account of skepticism without
espousing a commitment to any particular ideological conception of the tradition or other such
dogmatic concerns. As it says in the introduction: "A subtle reader can always, or almost always,
explain away the anomalies which appear on the surface of most texts; but there is such a vice as
oversubtlety, and it is a vice to which clever scholars are by temperament inclined. In my view, a reader
of Outlines should not strive too hard to iron out the creases." Lastly, this stance provides some clarity
on the matter of Outlines lacking much commentary on philosophical issues that would've been raised
by contemporaries around the lifetime of Sextus.
Accounting for the earlier developments of skeptical thought in ancient times is an incredibly
challenging task. It can be traced all the way back to Homer if remarks by folks like Diogenes are to be
believed. The trouble is such accounts don't track well when compared against other available ancient
evidence. It can also be valuable to reflect on possible contributions from Presocratic figures, the
sophists, Socrates, Plato, and even Aristotle. Though Pyrrho is traditionally credited as the first Greek
skeptic, we have no direct record of his teachings and what fragments we do have from his student
Timon are themselves a matter of interpretive contention, even in antiquity.
A few other figures that arise as part of the narrative are Aenesidemus, Agrippa, Arcesilaus, and
Carneades. The influence of the first two ostensibly led the second two towards skepticism while
leading Plato's Academy.
So, for Sextus, the obvious origin point is Pyrrho of Elis...
It’s helpful to distinguish the development of academic skepticism from Pyrrhonism.
Note Aenesidemus and the Ten Modes...
Also note Agrippa and the Five Modes...
Lastly, note contributions from the medical skeptics...
What is it to be a skeptic? (pg xix, 2nd paragraph)
Barnes argues maintaining an ordinary English definition of skepticism is not a concern and from my
point of view it’s likely to get in the way of developing a more nuanced understanding of the narrative.
Consider the difference between having never considered something and neither assenting to nor
denying something after thoughtful reflection.
Why explain skepticism by referring to propositional reasoning?
Barnes says having no reason to be skeptical is of no interest in this context but I might disagree,
though I can understand why he'd make the point. It'll never be easy to explain why a person would
lack confidence in propositional reasoning without referring to reasons for making such a choice
consciously and I’m not going to attempt it in my notes here. Nevertheless I get the impression this
move undermines something like psychological and meta-philosophical explanations for what it means
to be a skeptic.
The characterization presented by Barnes matches up roughly with contemporary treatments of
skepticism in widely cited scholarship nowadays. But how might this be understood as compared to the
ancient way?
A sketch summary of the process involves skeptical inquiry, suspension of judgment, mental balance
and a return to inquiry...
It’s important to understand what it means to have the ability to set out oppositions.
Equipollence presents a variety of challenging interpretive issues but investigating different scholarly
perspectives on the matter can itself be a rewarding endeavor.
Why a suspension of judgment? Because it’s an obvious choice (psychologically and conceptually), in
support of an unbiased return to inquiry, for the sake of mental balance...
Sextus can be read as conveying a position which ultimately lines up with the contemporary summary
offered by Barnes, but it isn't the only viable stance in the relevant scholarship. A few examples of
people with different interpretations: Richard Bett, Katja Vogt, and Ethan Mills.
Can Sextus be read as being merely facile?
Might a suspension of judgment as Sextus explains it be unimaginable in real life?
Maybe he wasn't skeptical of every kind of belief or with respect to a limited range of beliefs?
How could Sextus be a skeptic as he explains it and also be our source for understanding it?
It’s helpful to understand what Barnes says about urbane skepticism.
How might belief relate to or differ from judgment?
Another valuable distinction made by Barnes: local versus global skepticism.
Addressing feeble arguments… could he have been insincere or openly engaging in some kind of
deception?
Consider the example of providing different remedies for different ailments as an analogy to the way
Sextus goes about conducting skeptical case analysis.
On Book 1: Sections i – xv
§i The Fundamental Difference
A person engaged in inquiry may make a discovery, confess inapprehensiblity or continue searching.
Euresis (discovery) is for the dogmatist, akatalypsis (inapprehensiblity) for the academic and zetesis
(investigate) for the pyrrhonist.
Outlines represents a report of what appears to be the case rather than an affirmation of belief.
§ii The Accounts
Book 1 presents a general account (the overview); Books 2 and 3 present specific accounts (case
examples of skeptical inquiry).
Sextus characterizes skepticism as having neighboring philosophies which can be confusing.
He also suggests accounting for the dogmatists is in a sense arguing against philosophy.
§iii Nomenclature
Important terms:
Zetetic – investigative
Ephectic – suspensive
Aporetic – puzzled or at a loss
Pyrrhonist – the tradition following Pyrrho: not the Academics.
§iv The Concept?
What does it mean to have an ability to set out oppositions? Mates prefers disposition to ability which I
like.
I understand equipollence as a state of equality between conflicting accounts...
"By equipollence we mean equality as regards credibility and the lack of it, that is, that no one of the
inconsistent statements takes precedence over any other as being more credible." (tr Mates)
Epoché – Suspension of judgment: in the sense of neither assenting nor denying.
Ataraxia – tranquility: in the sense of being unperturbed or having the mental clarity to act normally.
§v The Skeptic
— No notes
§vi Principles
What are skeptics after? The hope of becoming tranquil.
What sort of people tend to embrace skepticism? Those troubled by rational inconsistency and
suffering as a result. These people investigate rational matters in order to determine solutions and thus
achieve tranquility. Skepticism provides a means for achieving this tranquility.
§vii Beliefs?
We don't mean belief in any old sense – we mean the sort of belief which involves “the assent to some
unclear matter investigated by the sciences” (tr. Bett)
Note how uttering the phrases is a matter of of reporting appearances.
Example: the using of tools to take things apart can also be used on the tools themselves.
§viii A School?
“If a school is an attachment to many beliefs that are consistent with one another and with apparent
things” – and belief implies assent to an unclear matter: then no to a school.
“If a school is an approach that follows a certain rationale in line with what appears, where that
rationale indicates how it is possible to seem to live properly and extends to the ability to suspend
judgment” – then yes to a school.
“We do follow a certain rationale that, in line with what appears, marks out a life for us that fits with
ancestral customs and the laws and the culture and our own reactions.” (tr. Bett)
§ix Natural Science?
“If the point is to make declarations with strong confidence about any of the things on which doctrines
are held in natural science, we do not do natural science. But if the point is to be able to oppose to
every argument an equal argument, and to achieve tranquility, we do engage in natural science. This is
also how we cover the logical and the ethical parts of so-called philosophy.” (tr. Bett)
§x Appearances?
Skepticism isn't about denying the appearance of things because some things happen to us regardless of
what we think and that's what we take as being apparent.
“When we investigate whether the actual object is such as it appears, we allow that it appears, and our
investigation is not about the apparent thing but about what’s said about the apparent thing; and that’s
different from investigating the apparent thing itself.” (tr. Bett)
Consider the honey example...
“And even if we do go ahead and raise arguments against apparent things, we put these forward not
with the aim of doing away with the apparent things, but for a show of the dogmatists’ rashness; for if
argument is so tricky that it just about snatches apparent things from under our eyes, how can we not
be suspicious of it on unclear matters, and hence avoid following it and acting rashly?” (tr. Bett)
§xi The Standard (Bett likes criterion)
By criterion we mean a way of acting — “by attending to this in life we do some things and don’t do
others, and this is [what] we’re now talking about.
So, we say that the criterion of the skeptical approach is what is apparent, in effect here meaning the
appearance; for it has to do with a reaction, with how we’re affected whether we like it or not, and so
is not up for investigation. I mean, whether the actual object appears this way or that, surely no one
will dispute; it’s whether it is as it appears that gets investigated.
Paying attention, then, to the things that appear, we live without opinions according to the routine of
life, since we can’t be completely inactive. This ‘routine of life’ seems to have four aspects: one is
involved with the guidance of nature, one with the necessity of how we’re affected, one with the
handing down of laws and customs, and one with the teaching of skills.” (tr. Bett)
§xii Its Aim
Aim as the final object of desire (Bett likes "endpoint of things desired")
Though skeptics may begin doing philosophy in order to deliberate between appearances so as to grasp
which are true and false for the sake of achieving tranquility, we fell into a dispute with sides of equal
strength. Since we couldn’t resolve it, we suspended judgment. But in suspending judgment, it just so
happened that tranquility in matters of opinion accompanied this.
Example: painting the horse
The skeptic isn't trouble-free... we're just not about to say whether the troubles we experience are good.
How does the ancient Greek concept of ataraxia contrast against sophrosune?
§xiii General Modes
The modes can be understood as providing a basic breakdown of the process of developing a skeptical
case study.
Sextus briefly explains putting things in opposition...
With examples including: the tower, heavenly bodies, good doing badly and bad doing well, and the
color of snow...
He also gives an example of a time-based argument:
“We sometimes oppose present things to present things, like the ones just mentioned, but sometimes
present things to past or future things. For instance, when someone confronts us with an argument that
we cannot undo, [34] we say to him — Just as before the birth of the person who founded the school
you belong to, its reasoning was not yet apparent as being sound—even though, from nature’s
perspective, it was actually there – so too it is possible that the argument opposing the one you have
now presented is actually there, from nature’s perspective, but is not yet apparent to us, so that we
shouldn’t yet assent to an argument that now seems to be strong.” (tr Bett)
§xiv The Ten Modes
The three subordinate modes [38]
Deriving from the subject judging [modes 1-4] (Mates: "based on what does the judging")
...the object judged [modes 7 and 10] (Mates: "based on what is judged")
and combined from both [modes 5,6, 8 and 9]
The ten can be categorized into one of these three subordinate modes. The three can themselves be
taken as examples of the relativity mode.
Depending on the variations among animals [40]
Differences in reproduction and body composition
Different experience through senses
The way different animals consume and metabolize food
Consider the dog compared to humans as far as the credibility of what what appears to each.
...The difference among humans [79]
Differences in body and soul
Differences between particular bodies
Different souls and intellect
based on differences in preferences and/or personal values
Between opposing perspectives
There is no majority preference
Dogmatists prefer themselves as an unreasoned presupposition
...Differing constitutions of the sense organs [91]
Consider the Sage: The ideal embodiment of virtue
Disagreements between sense organs
Sight perceives texture different from touch
Different perceptions of pain
Distinct treatments for different organs
Depending on circumstances [100]
Different mental/physical conditions
Natural or unnatural / well or sick
Dreaming
Age (ie: old people get cold easier, and don’t sense as sharply)
Motion
Emotion (anger, hunger, love)
Substance alteration (drunk or hallucinating)
Anterior condition (the taste of wine after eating figs vs beans)
Everyone has a condition and is thus part of the dispute
Any proof is presumably based on a standard that itself requires proof
...Positions, intervals and places [118]
(Mates prefers positions, distances, and locations)
Objects appear different depending on perspectives
Position examples: picture angle, the color of a dove’s neck in different lights
Place examples: lamplight in the sunlight or in a building, the ore in or out of water
Interval examples: the colonnade depending on angle, or how far away a boat is
...Admixtures [124]
Nothing makes an impression by itself
The appearance of things depend in part on how they mix or share with other things that also appear
Also depending on environmental factors (so taken altogether)
An internal admixture example is the membrane and liquid of the eye
...Quantities and preparations of existing things [129]
(Mates renders the latter "constitution of external objects")
Explain the horn and marble examples (things taken apart versus taken together)
The medicine example: differences according to preparation
Deriving from relativity [135]
Relative to the subject (as reviewed by the first four modes)
Relative to the object (according to the fifth and sixth modes)
Consider: if things are not relative then which account do we prefer?
And how to distinguish between subject and object?
Relativity as itself relative?
Depending on frequent or rare encounters [141]
The Sun versus a comet: we notice things differently depending on how often they appear
We also value things differently based on how often they appear or according to rarity
...Persuasions [145]
(Mates likes ways of life),
customs, laws, and belief in myths or dogmatic suppositions
“Bears on ethics” – that is, according to conduct or customs
These oppose one another cross-culturally
Sometimes they even oppose themselves: and whether Zeus is the father god or Ocean, etc…
The also sometimes oppose across categories like the example of Cronus eating his kids where such a
thing among mortals is treated as immoral and illegal, etc.
§xv This Five Modes
The more recent skeptics… Agrippa
Dispute, ad infinitum, relativity, hypothetical, and reciprocal...
Dispute – as per differing and opposing dogmas
Ad Infinitum – every proof or source requires another such proof or source and so on
Relativity – as demonstrated by the ten modes or subordinate three
Hypothesis – according to proceeding from assumptions without proof
Reciprocal – when one thing is made convincing by another but the other thing is supposedly made
convincing by the first one
The Five are handed down to provide a more varied way of challenging the dogmatists rather than to
replace or supplant The Ten Modes
Additional notes on The Ten Modes, mostly on Mode 1
Modes can also be rendered as arguments, points, or schemata.
Sextus makes no affirmation of number or power (Mates likes force), also he claims they’re in no
particular order.
The modes are:
1. Depending on the variations among animals
2. ...The difference among humans
3. ...Differing constitutions of the sense organs
4. Depending on circumstances
5. ...Positions, intervals and places (Mates prefers positions, distances, and locations)
6. ...Admixtures
7. ...Quantities and preparations of existing things (Mates renders the latter "constitution of
external objects")
8. Deriving from relativity
9. Depending on frequent or rare encounters
10. ...Persuasions (Mates likes ways of life), customs, laws, and belief in myths or dogmatic
suppositions
The three subordinate modes:
1. Deriving from the subject judging (Mates: "based on what does the judging")
2. ...The object judged (Mates: "based on what is judged")
3. ...And combined from both
– That is, the ten can be categorized into one of these three subordinate modes. The three can
themselves also be taken as examples of the relativity mode.
The long digression exploring the first mode can be read as a model example for the way Sextus
develops case analysis in Books 2 and 3 as well as what we have from Against the Mathematicians:
especially cases where he makes use of the Ten Modes.
Admittedly it's not the clearest of expositions and is easy to take as somewhat out of place... Bett goes
as far as excluding it from his recently published translation of Outlines. I think it's worth reflecting on
for the sake of observing the way Sextus goes about setting up opposing accounts.
The variations among animals:
Differences in reproduction and body composition – produced with or without copulation; some by
fire, water, food decay, earth, slime, mud, excrement, fruit, or corruption... via inter-species intercourse,
viviparously (from inside the body), oviparously (from eggs), or carniparously (from lumps of flesh).
Different experience through senses – regarding vision consider colors, shapes, sizes and orientation.
On touch considering shells, flesh, needles, feathers, and scales. On hearing considering the wide
variation of ear constructions. On smell with considerations but he throws in complications introduced
by illness. On taste he further complicates matters via environmental considerations.
The way different animals consume and metabolize food as well as dietary preferences are also
reflected on. All this should lead us to an awareness that we have no means for concluding anything in
particular about how it is in nature but only the possibility of accounting for ourselves.
At this point Sextus sketches out an example that reads to me like an ancient version of the sort of thing
Nagel points out in "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" That is, though we may wonder, we have a few
reasons to suppose there's no reliable account to be had including things like our anatomical and
subsequent experiential differences. He adds a bit on why it wouldn't help to argue our own experience
would serve an an account of what animals in general experience because it only leads us to question
difference between particular human experiences.
At this point he gets into a diatribe on the Stoics. Sextus and I have wildly different axes to grind and
I'm honestly not sure how to accurately characterize the core of his displeasure with the traditions he
attacks the most. I'll just say my guess is he's angling towards promoting Skepticism in ancient times
like people might promote their preferred brand in Western society today.
Consider the dog as compared to humans in terms of the credibility of what what appears to each.
It is agreeable that dogs have excellent perception based on performance.
As regards internal and expressed reason, Sextus claims the dogmatists believe internal reason involves
"acceptance of the familiar and avoidance of the alien" (tr Mates) with examples including knowledge
of expertise, grasping and relieving feelings, and acquiring virtue.
Sextus goes on to provide examples of the dog choosing what is congenial and avoiding harm, that it
has expertise like hunting, and how it acts with virtue. He cites Homer as cause for viewing dogs as
valiant and smart. Using the example of a dog tracking it's prey it is said that the dog uses reason.
The dog knows how to tend to its wounds, and treats illness for itself as it's able. for all the evidence to
consider it would appear the animal is perfect in terms of internal reasoning.
Examples of expressed reason include the utterances of animals, though we don't understand their
meaning. It's probable that they communicate with one another, dog to dog. We may also observe they
change sounds depending on alert, distress, or fawning. So it appears these so-called non-rational
animals share externally expressed reason as well. It thus appears we have no means for preferring our
own impressions to theirs. Since we're left with no wherewithal on the matter we're moved to suspend
judgment.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy Resources
Ancient Greek Skepticism by Harald Thorsrud
• Photius: The Bibliotheca; tr N.G. Wilson (1994), London: Duckworth
• Cicero: De Natura Deorum, Academica; tr Rackham, H. (1933), Harvard University Press: Loeb
• Cicero: De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum; tr Rackham, H. (1914), Harvard University Press: Loeb
• The Modes Of Scepticism; ed Annas and Barnes (1985), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings by Brad Inwood and Lloyd Gerson (1988),
Indianapolis: Hackett
• The Toils of Scepticism by Barnes, J. (1990), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Pyrrho, his antecedents, and his legacy by Bett, R. (2000), Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Scepticism and Everyday Attitudes in Ancient and Modern Philosophy by Bett, R. (1993),
Metaphilosophy 24.4: 363-81
• The Skeptical Tradition; ed Burnyeat, M. (1983), Berkeley: University of California Press
• Pyrrho and India by Flintoff, E. (1980), Phronesis 25: 88-108
The rest still needs to be formatted properly.
— Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification by Fogelin, R. (1994), Oxford: Oxford
University Press
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California Press).
— Sihvola, J., ed. (2000), Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition, (Helsinki : Philosophical
Society of Finland).
— Striker, G. (1990/1996), “Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquility” Monist 73: 97-110, repr. in Striker
(1996), 183-195.
— Striker, G. (1980/1996), “Sceptical Strategies,” in M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat, and J. Barnes, Eds
(1980),Doubt and Dogmatism, 54-83, repr. in Striker (1996), 92-115.
— Woodruff, P. (1988), “Aporetic Pyrrhonism,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6: 139-68.
Cicero: Academic Skepticism by Harald Thorsrud
— Brittain, C., tr. 2006. Cicero: On Academic Scepticism, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
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Press.
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Contemporary Skepticism by Duncan Pritchard
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J. Warnock, 44-84, Clarendon Press, Oxford, England.
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Skepticism, (eds.) M. D. Roth & G. Ross, 57-68, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Holland.
— Fumerton, R. (1995). Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland.
— Klein, P. (1981). Certainty, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
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England.
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& Unwin, London, England (1959).
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England.
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— Williamson, T. (2000b). Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford University Press, Oxford, England.
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Skeptical Theism by Justin P. McBrayer
— Plantinga, A. (1974) God, Freedom, and Evil (Eerdmans).
— Van Inwagen, P. (2003) The Problem of Evil (Oxford University Press).
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Resources
Arcesilaus by Charles Brittain;
last revision Fri Jul 2, 2021
— Annas, Julia, 1988, “The Heirs of Socrates,” Phronesis 33: 100–112.
— Burnyeat, Myles, 1980, “Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?”, in Doubt and Dogmatism, Malcolm
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in Myles Burnyeat (ed.), 1983, The Skeptical Tradition, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press,
pp. 117–48; reprinted in Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede (eds.), 1997, The Original Sceptics,
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, pp. 25–57.
— Cooper, John, 2004, “Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic,” in Knowledge, Nature, and the Good, John
Cooper, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 81–103.
— Long, A. A. and D. N. Sedley (eds.), 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge:
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— Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Pamela Mensch (trans.), Oxford and New
York: Oxford University Press, 2018.
— Perin, Casey, 2010, “Scepticism and belief,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism,
Richard Bett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 145–64.
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40.
— “Philodemus’ History of the Philosophers: Plato and the Academy (PHerc. 1021 and 164),” Paul
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Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Plato’s Academy: Its Workings and Its History, Cambridge: Cambridge
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— Sedley, David, 1983, “The Motivation of Greek Skepticism,” in The Skeptical Tradition, Myles
Burnyeat (ed.), London: University of California Press, pp. 9–29.
— Thorsrud, Harold, 2009, Ancient Scepticism, Stocksfield: Acumen, pp. 36–58.
— Thorsrud, Harold, 2010, “Arcesilaus and Carneades,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient
Scepticism, Richard Bett (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 58–70.
— Thorsrud, Harold, 2018, “Arcesilaus: Socratic Skepticism in Plato’s Academy,” Lexicon
Philosophicum 6: 195–220.
Other Textual Resources
How to Keep an Open Mind: An Ancient Guide to Thinking Like a Skeptic -
Sextus Empiricus Text Selected, Translated, and Introduced by Richard Bett
2021 Princeton University Press
Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India Nagarjuna, Jayarasi, and Sri Harsa (Studies in
Comparative Philosophy and Religion) by Ethan Mills
Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism by Alan Bailey
Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy edited by Diego Machuca
The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism edited by Richard Bett
Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus by Vogt and Vlasits
Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius by Katja Maria Vogt
How to be a Pyrrhonist the practice and significance of Pyrrhonian scepticism by Richard Bett
Skepticism in Philosophy A Comprehensive, Historical Introduction by Henrik Lagerlund
Disagreement and Skepticism edited by Diego Machuca
Epistemology and Skepticism by George Chatalian