Are Children Reliable Witnesses?: Ben F. Cotterill
Are Children Reliable Witnesses?: Ben F. Cotterill
Witnesses?
Ben F. Cotterill
Are Children Reliable Witnesses?
“This is an excellent book. The book explains when children can be relied on to
give accurate eyewitness testimony and provides important insights into why chil-
dren can sometimes be inaccurate. Best of all the book includes many relevant
examples of real life cases in which children have had to give evidence during
police interviews or in courts of law. The book is well researched with extensive
references to academic research. The book is very well written, and will be acces-
sible to anyone. This book can be highly recommended to parents and to students
of developmental psychology, sociology, law and linguistics, and to everyone who
is involved with children who, for whatever reason, may be involved with the
police and the courts.”
—Dr. Mark Blades, Senior Lecturer in Developmental Psychology, Department of
Psychology, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents
1 Introduction 1
The Scope of Children in the Legal System 4
An Introduction to the Book Chapters 6
3 An
Introduction to Suggestibility 19
Case Study 20
Suggestibility 20
Historic Views of Suggestibility 21
Binet 22
Modern Views of Suggestibility 25
Source Monitoring 28
Conclusions 29
Suggested Further Reading 30
v
vi Contents
4 Memory
Mechanisms and Developmental Factors of
Suggestibility 31
Memory 32
Externally Driven and Internally Driven False Memories 33
Case Study 36
Henry Otgaar’s Argument 36
Age-Related Differences in Memory 37
Knowledge Differences 38
Language Differences 38
Theory of Mind 40
Own-Age Bias 40
Social Influences 41
Other Influences 42
Children’s Ability to Lie 42
Conclusions 43
Suggested Further Reading 44
5 True
Cases of Child Eyewitnesses 45
Nevis Nursery Case 45
Devil’s Dyke Rape Case 47
Case of Jimmy Guard 48
Poland Abduction Case 50
Kidnapping of Elizabeth Smart 52
Murder of Courtney Smith 53
Disappearance of Maria Ridulph 57
Conclusions 61
6 Children’s
Describing and Identifying Capabilities 65
Are Children Capable Witnesses? 65
Everyday Conversations with Children 66
Children Answering Nonsensical Questions 67
Forensically Relevant Conversations with Children 68
Accuracy of Child Eyewitnesses at Describing 71
Accuracy of Child Eyewitnesses at Identifying 73
Conclusions 75
Suggested Further Reading 76
Contents vii
7 External
Factors of Suggestibility 77
Question Types 78
Question Repetition 80
Delay and Repeated Interviews 82
Interviewer Bias 83
Stereotype Induction 85
Interviewer Status 85
Emotional Tone 85
Current Interviewing Formats 86
Case Study 89
Case Study: Analysis 89
Conclusions 91
Suggested Further Reading 91
8 Individual
Differences Relating to Suggestibility 93
Interview Extract One—Child A 94
Interview Extract Two—Child B 95
Age 97
Gender 97
Socioeconomic Status 98
Cognitive Factors 98
Temperament 99
Conclusions 106
Suggested Further Reading 107
9 Juror Perceptions109
Case Study 110
Case Study: Analysis 113
Effects of Witness Age 114
Effects of Interviewing Technique 115
Effects of Witness Confidence and Shyness 116
Juror Gender 117
Juror Age 118
Juror Personality 118
Prosecution of Alleged Child Sexual Abuse 119
Conclusions 120
Suggested Further Reading 121
viii Contents
10 Conclusion123
References129
Index161
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Abstract This book will discuss the reliability and credibility of children
as eyewitnesses, exploring practices and influences that can increase or
decrease accuracy. Chapter 2 discusses the witch-hunt mentality of the
1980s and early 1990s, which led to many false imprisonments during the
day care sexual abuse hysteria cases, while also mentioning some of the
interviewing practices which led to false accusations being made. Chapter
3 explores historic views and modern views over children’s suggestibility.
Chapter 4 outlines memory mechanisms and general developmental fac-
tors that influence the capability of witnesses. Chapter 5 discusses true
cases where children were the primary eyewitness to a crime and their
testimonies were needed for trial. These cases showcase how both accurate
and inaccurate a child eyewitness can be. Chapter 6 explores the describ-
ing and identifying capabilities of young children when performing as wit-
nesses. Chapter 7 discusses external factors (i.e., those relating to the
interviewer) that influence children’s suggestibility and eyewitness perfor-
mance, while Chapter 8 outlines dispositional and demographical factors
(i.e., those relating to the child). Finally, Chapter 9 explores jurors’ per-
ceptions of children as eyewitnesses.
A six-year-old boy arrives at the neighborhood park with his mother and
baby sister. A light breeze whips against the boy’s face so he zips up the
jacket that his mother made him bring. Some older boys he knows from
school are playing football in the field. He turns to his mother, who is
helping his baby sister down the slide, and asks if he can go join the boys.
She says he can, so he runs off with a big grin. A man in a sweatshirt stands
at the edge of the field and stops the boy. He asks him where he is going.
“To play football,” the boy responds. “You like football?” the man asks.
The boy nods and tells the man the name of his favorite team. “I’ve got
some of their signed jerseys in my car,” the man tells him, and then asks if
the boy would like one. The boy thinks about this but shakes his head; his
mother has warned him against going with strangers.
Suddenly, the man attempts to pull the boy by the arm. The boy, how-
ever, manages to avoid him and run back to his mother. When he takes his
mother over to the field, the man is gone. His mother phones the police,
and they ask the boy for a description. The police will then use this to
check who was in the area, if anyone nearby has prior offenses of a similar
nature, and hopefully eventually produce a suspect to show the boy in a
lineup. Lastly, the boy may need to testify in court. Ideally, there will have
been some other witnesses in the park who remember seeing the man.
This way, their descriptions and identifications can be compared against
that of the boy’s to make sure they are all in agreement. What if, however,
no one else caught a glimpse of the man, and there is only the word of the
boy to go off? How much can we trust the boy’s description of the man?
Then, how much can we rely on the boy to accurately pick the right man
from a lineup? Lastly, how much will a jury trust the boy’s credibility as a
witness? Unfortunately, young children are the sole eyewitness to crimes
far too often, and so it is imperative that we can get accurate, detailed, and
compelling accounts from them.
Faulty eyewitness accounts are the leading cause of wrongful arrests;
since the Innocence Project was founded in 1992, they have helped over-
turn 360 wrongful convictions with post-conviction DNA evidence. Of
these 360 cases, witness misidentifications were present in 71% of them
(Innocence Project, 2020). To date, the National Registry of Exonerations
(2020) has a record of 2,625 cases of men and women wrongfully con-
victed in the United States. Collectively, these men and women have spent
over 23,000 years in prison for crimes they did not commit.
Evidence shows that children make poorer eyewitnesses than adult on
average, both remembering less and performing worse at facial
1 INTRODUCTION 3
recognition (Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Hershkowitz et al., 2012; Pozzulo &
Dempsey, 2006). Ricardo Rachell is one of these 2,625 cases. In 2002, an
eight-year-old boy ran down a street in Houston, crying and screaming.
He was taken back to his mother and made a statement to the police that
someone had held a knife to his throat and tried to kill him. The next day,
he and his family saw neighbor Ricardo Rachell riding his bike in town.
The boy identified Rachell as his attacker and added that Rachell had sexu-
ally assaulted him. Rachell was charged with sexual assault of a child and
was sentenced to 40 years in prison. In 2007, Rachell requested DNA
testing after doing some investigating of his own. He argued that the
actual person responsible was Andrew Hawthorne (a known serial rapist in
the area). In 2008, DNA tests proved that Rachell was innocent, and that
Hawthorne had committed the crime.
Disclosures of sexual abuse by children are only treated seriously by
parents and reported to police in the United Kingdom and the United
States 26% to 30% of the time (Royal College of General Practitioners and
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 2014; Snyder,
2000), even though it is estimated that only about 6% of child sexual
abuse accusations in the United Kingdom and the United States are false
(Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Everson & Boat, 1989; for a review, see O’Donohue
et al., 2018). This means many offenses against children occur without
ever resulting in an arrest. Since the child’s testimony is often the only
available evidence in cases involving child witnesses (Brewer et al., 1997;
Lamb & Brown, 2006), it may be that forensic interviews with children
are not eliciting sufficient evidence and this is a contributing factor to low
arrest rates. A 14-year-old French girl in 2013 reported to her school
counsellor that her father had been sexually assaulting her. She was told
that her words would not be evidence enough to convict him, so she set
up a camera in her room and filmed the next sexual assault (Goodman
et al., 2014). The contrasting examples of the American boy and the
French girl show the dilemmas that investigators face when children are
the primary eyewitnesses. It must be carefully considered how much
weight should be placed on the importance of eyewitness testimony. If
testimonies are believed without question, it could result in wrongful
arrests, but if they are not believed at all then guilty and dangerous offend-
ers will not be apprehended.
Things are made more complicated when the complaints come from a
parent, teacher, or guardian, and not the child themselves. Often, an adult
will have a suspicion that a child has been a victim of sexual abuse, though
4 B. F. COTTERILL
younger than 18 years old, and about 9% of them were younger than 13
years old. Children are also frequently required to testify in cases of domes-
tic violence and intrafamilial murders. Annually in the United States,
about 15.5 million children witness intimate partner violence (McDonald
et al., 2006).
would support the beliefs of the interviewers, and evidence that may have
proven otherwise was never sought. In some cases, positive reinforcement
(i.e., when an interviewer rewards a child for saying what the interviewer
wants to hear) and peer pressure (i.e., when a child is told their friends
already said one thing, and so they should say the same) were also used to
influence the statements of children.
and the town lived in constant fear of attacks from Native Americans. They
blamed these attacks, as well as other troubles such as outbreaks of small-
pox, on the wrath of God. During this time, the reverend’s 12-year-old
niece, Abigail Williams, was sent to live with the reverend and his family
after her parents were beaten to death by Native Americans at their home.
Abigail was likely traumatized after having witnessed the brutal death of
her parents. Nevertheless, she was expected to earn her place within her
uncle’s home by doing most of the chores and by caring for her sick aunt.
After chores were done, there was little to do during the cold winter
months except to stay inside and read stories (books about fortune-telling
were popular at the time). Abigail, her cousin, and friends from town
formed a circle in the evenings to share with each other what they had
learned from their reading. This earned them their nickname—“the
Circle Girls.”
At some point, one of the girls offered to tell the others their fortune
by putting egg whites into water, and then interpreting the shapes that
formed. Whatever happened, Abigail was apparently unhappy with the
result of her fortune, and she soon started acting out in bizarre ways. She
screamed, ran around the house, waved around her arms, threw things,
contorted into strange positions, and uttered unintelligible words. The
reverend called a doctor, but he was not able to identify any medical rea-
son for Abigail’s behavior and so concluded that she must be possessed by
the supernatural. Once children in town too started behaving strangely,
including the reverend’s own daughter, he pressed Abigail over who had
bewitched her, or perhaps over whether or not she was a witch herself.
Eventually, the 12-year-old girl claimed to the reverend that she had been
possessed by his Barbadian slave, Tituba.
People at the time believed witches were those who had entered into an
agreement with the devil, gaining powers in exchange for committing acts
of evil. At last, the townspeople had an answer as to why their town had
been continuously punished by God—they were harboring witches. Now,
in order to please God, they knew what they had to do—eradicate their
town of witchcraft. The townspeople questioned Abigail and the rest of
the Circle Girls over who else might be a witch in town, eventually gaining
the names of Sarah Osborne and Sarah Good. Meanwhile, the reverend
managed to collect a confession from his slave. As well as admitting to
10 B. F. COTTERILL
being a witch, Tituba also confirmed the guilt of Sarah Osborne and
Sarah Good.
Even after harsh questioning, both Sarah Osborne and Sarah Good
maintained their innocence. Their negative reputations in town and poor
financial standing, however, made them prime suspects for witches; Sarah
Osborne was an older woman who no longer attended church, and Sarah
Good was a homeless woman who cursed people under her breath for not
giving her charity. Sarah Good called for her husband to speak in her
defense. Unfortunately for her, he broke down in tears under questioning
and claimed he loved his wife, but that she probably was a witch because
she was just that mean and spiteful. All three women were sent to be held
in the Boston jail until their trials, though Sarah Osborne died of natural
causes in jail shortly after her arrest.
By May 1693—more than a year after the first accusation—the Circle
Girls had accused over 200 people in town of being witches. Those who
spoke publicly about doubting the accusations, such as John Proctor, were
arrested under charges of witchcraft, along with their families. Trials were
held, and 19 of the accused were found guilty of being witches and sen-
tenced to death; Sarah Good and 17 others were hanged, while another
woman was pressed to death. About a dozen more were spared execution
by pleading guilty, including Tituba. Eventually, as support for the trials
swiftly declined, the governor ended the trials by pardoning the remaining
accused. The change in public opinion was mostly due to large crop short-
ages stemming from the fact so many workers were in prison and the fields
were being untended. The townspeople, therefore, were being left to
starve, and many felt they were being punished by God for executing
innocent people.
Reverend Parris gave a public apology for giving so much weight to the
accusations of young girls, but he was never able to win public support
again. By 1697, he had been replaced as minister of the town and had
moved away with his family. It is unknown what happened to Abigail
Williams, as it does not appear that she moved away with the reverend.
Some historians believe she passed away of an illness during the trials, and
others say that the reverend forced her away because he blamed her for the
trials and executions. Other members of the Circle Girls later publicly
apologized and admitted they had made a mistake in accusing anyone of
witchcraft. No one was ever executed for being a witch in America after
the Salem witch trials, but the taking of 19 innocent lives surely took its
toll on the people involved for many years to come.
2 THE WITCH HUNTS 11
A year after the arrest, Ileana accepted a plea bargain in exchange for
testifying against her husband, though she made it clear at the time that
she was not pleading guilty because she had committed any crime but
because she thought this was her safest course of action. Ultimately, she
only served two years, instead of risking the same fate as her husband, who
received a 165-year sentence. Ileana has also since claimed that she was
kept naked in solitary confinement and physically assaulted before agree-
ing to testify against her husband. If this is true, then her treatment is not
too different from how the accused witches of Salem were treated nearly
300 years previously. Despite the uncertainty over the credibility of Ileana’s
testimony and the evidence of some poor interviewing practice, there still
remains persuading factors regarding Frank’s guilt. First, he has a prior
offense of fondling a nine-year-old girl. Second, unlike many of the other
day care sexual abuse cases, there was physical evidence to support the
children’s statements (e.g., they had rashes on their penises and/or anuses
and had been drugged). Third, Frank’s own six-year-old son tested posi-
tive for an STD. This raises the question of why none of the other children
would have tested for an STD, but virtually all of the children were taking
antibiotics at the time due to fevers and being suspected of having throat
infections.
Following this, many more cases of sexual abuse against children in day
care centers arose over the next two decades. In 1983, Gerald Amirault
was charged with abusing children at the Fells Acre Day Care. He was
released in 2003 after the Massachusetts Board of Pardons expressed great
doubt over his guilt. In 1984, Bernard Baran, a 19-year-old teacher’s
assistant was accused of molesting a boy at his work. The boy’s parents
were both drug addicts and police informants. Police interviewed the par-
ents of other children in Baran’s class, finding many of them were uncom-
fortable with the fact that Baran was gay and had long worried he might
be a danger to their children. Charges against Baran were not dropped
until 2009, when the Massachusetts Appeals Court declared there was not
and had never been any convincing evidence of his guilt. He died of a
heart attack in 2014, meaning only five years of his nonteenage life were
spent as a free man. In the Georgian Hills Day Center case (Tennessee,
1984), case of the Bronx Five (New York, 1984), Rogers Park case
(Illinois, 1984), Craig County’s Day Care case (Maryland, 1985),
Felix’s Day Care case (Nevada, 1985), Old Cutler case (Florida, 1989),
Oak Hill case (Texas, 1991), Faith Chapel Church case (California,
1989), Martensville case (Canada, 1992), and Wenatchee case
14 B. F. COTTERILL
parents understood what was normal and natural about the bodies and
sexual curiosity of children. A woman Kelly befriended in prison also testi-
fied that Kelly had said that she had not meant to hurt the children.
Usually, jailhouse informants can be dismissed as self-serving, but, in this
case, the individual had already been sentenced and was not rewarded with
any deals for her testimony. Some have argued that Kelly Michaels was in
fact guilty and that her release was part of a hysteric reaction to the devas-
tating McMartin case and fear over how poor interviewing practice can
lead to false convictions, but this is only speculation at best. The truth is
that because of the interviewing methods used, it is impossible to know if
many of the defendants in these cases were guilty or innocent.
Lastly, one more case worth discussing in some detail is the Little
Rascals Day Care case (North Carolina, 1989). One of the children at
the day care made a sexual abuse allegation against Bob Kelly, who owned
the day care with his wife. Officer Brenda Toppin and Child Protection
Services advised the other parents to have their children evaluated for sex-
ual abuse and supplied them with a list of recommended therapists. At
first, very few children made any disclosures, but after many sessions of
therapy (in some cases, only after ten months of sessions), 90 of the chil-
dren made allegations against Kelly and 6 other adults (including some
who did not work at the day care and claimed to have never stepped foot
inside the building). The allegations included being hung upside down
from trees, being set on fire, watching babies be murdered, and being
thrown into a sea full of sharks, as well as claims of rape. Despite these
claims, there was zero physical or medical evidence of sexual abuse or tor-
ture. Granted, some forms of sexual abuse do not leave any evidence, but
claims were made that forks and knives had been inserted into the chil-
dren’s anal and vaginal openings, which would certainly cause injury, yet
no scarring, tearing, or lesions were discovered. Additionally, no parents
ever spotted anything unusual when visiting the day care during the days
unannounced. The only evidence in the case was the coaxed claims of the
children via repeated interrogations. Bob Kelly’s trial lasted eight months,
and it became the most expensive criminal trial in North Carolina history,
and all of the defendants were charged. By 1995, however, all the convic-
tions had been reversed by the Court of Appeals.
It seems that the seeds of the case may have been planted a few months
before the first accusation was made. Police officers and social workers had
been warned about the present danger of day care sexual abuse at a confer-
ence. Additionally, one of the children at the day care had reported to
16 B. F. COTTERILL
their mother that Bob Kelly had slapped him across the face. The mother
demanded an apology from the day care owner, but he denied the accusa-
tion, so she pulled her son from the day care and warned other parents
about the slapping. As parents then asked their children whether Kelly had
hit them like he had hit another child, it is possible they developed a nega-
tive stereotype of the day care owner. Interestingly, when questioned by
authorities, many of the children reported that Kelly had hit one of the
children, without claiming to have been hit themselves by the day
care owner.
While the parents were instructed to take their children to therapists for
evaluations, they were discouraged from taking their children to indepen-
dent therapists (who might have questioned some of the accusations).
Instead, Officer Toppin recommended a small list of intertwined thera-
pists, who kept in regular contact with her and the district attorney. There
seems to have been little, if any, theories considered by the therapists that
were not related to sexual abuse. While bedwetting and a reluctance to go
to school can be a sign of abuse, they can also be signs of many other
causes, but no other cause seems to have ever been entertained. Instead,
children were pressed with leading questions about touching and pre-
sented with anatomically correct dolls to point out where they had been
touched. For example, one child—Lisa—became upset when the day care
closed. She stated that she missed Mr. Bob because he had been nice to
her. Her mother became suspicious of this and sent her to one of the rec-
ommended therapists. Lisa had never made any accusation that she had
been sexually touched, but by using one of the anatomical dolls, she even-
tually claimed to the therapist after many sessions of therapy that Mr. Bob
had touched her buttocks, and also expressed curiosity over how babies
are made. It did not seem to occur to the therapist that perhaps Lisa was
curious about how babies are made because she had just gotten a new
baby sister, or that perhaps she had touched the doll because she had just
been subject to intensive questions about sexual touching. Instead, the
therapist concluded that Lisa’s question about how babies are made was
her way of leading to a disclosure and her touching of the doll was an
indication of penetration. Lisa then went on to make this claim in court
against Bob Kelly.
As mentioned previously, this widespread hysteria was not restricted to
the United States. In the United Kingdom, there are similar prominent
examples, including in Rochdale, Merseyside, and Orkney, Scotland.
Typical of these cases, the Rochdale case began with a six-year-old boy
2 THE WITCH HUNTS 17
spreading stories about ghosts and zombies, only for social workers to
then become convinced he had been the victim of satanic ritual abuse after
a lengthy period of coercive interviews with the child. The case led to 20
children being taken from their families. It later turned out that the boy
had been watching horror movies and then recounting them to his friends
(Pendergrast, 2017). Children during these cases were subject to multiple
interviews and harsh questioning. In the Craig County’s Day Care case,
for example, children were interviewed as many as 54 times before inves-
tigators got the information they wanted.
Conclusions
What all these cases have in common is that they started with vague claims
or suspicions and led to serious allegations that had drastic consequences
for the defendants. Certainly, in some cases, there were definite injustices.
In the case of Bernard Baran, homophobia and an incompetent defense
played a role in his conviction. During his trial, only edited versions of the
children’s interviews were shown to the jury by the prosecution.
Remarkably, the defense never requested to see the full interviews. After
his conviction, the full interviews were supposedly lost, meaning only the
prosecution’s edited versions of the interviews were available as evidence
and Bernard had zero chance for an appeal. It was not until 21 years after
his arrest, following the death of the district attorney, that the original
interviews were “discovered” by the new district attorney, leading to all
charges being dropped. In other cases, however, it is possible that fear over
children’s suggestibility led to guilty individuals being released. In the
Country Walk case (the only case outlined in this chapter with convictions
not yet overturned), the poor interviewing practice was perhaps exagger-
ated. There were more spontaneous accusations in this case than in the
others, and the claims were not as outrageous as often claimed. There will
often be examples of bad practice within interviews, but that does not
necessarily mean that convictions should be overturned.
A study by Schreiber et al. (2006) analyzed the police’s interview tran-
scripts of the McMartin case and Kelly Michaels’ case, revealing that 64%
and 56% of the questions respectively could be classed as leading, while
only 7% of questions from the McMartin case and 11% of questions from
the case of Kelly Michaels could be classed as inviting free narrative. An
overwhelming 78% of questions from the McMartin case and 67% of ques-
tions from the case of Kelly Michaels were classed as option-posing.
18 B. F. COTTERILL
Bruck, M., & Ceci, S. J. (1995). Amicus brief for the case of State of New
Jersey v. Michaels presented by Committee of Concerned Social
Scientists. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 1(2), 272–322. https://
[Link]/10.1037/1076-8971.1.2.272
Cheit, R. E. (2014). The witch-hunt narrative: Politics, psychology, and the
sexual abuse of children. Oxford University Press.
Garven, S., Wood, J. M., Malpass, R. S., & Shaw, J. S., III. (1998). More
than suggestion: The effect of interviewing techniques from the
McMartin Preschool case. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(3),
347–359. [Link]
Noblett, J. (2020). From Salem to Eden: Satanic ritual abuse and American
Law. The Macksey Journal, 1(43), 1–15.
Schreiber, N., Bellah, L. D., Martinez, Y., McLaurin, K. A., Strok, R.,
Garven, S., & Wood, J. M. (2006). Suggestive interviewing in the
McMartin Preschool and Kelly Michaels daycare abuse cases: A case
study. Social Influence, 1(1), 16–47.
CHAPTER 3
An Introduction to Suggestibility
Case Study
In 1990, Donna Smith was a teenager who began therapy with social
worker, Cathy Meyers. Despite having no prior suspicions over the fact,
Meyers repeatedly interrogated Donna over whether or not her father had
sexually abused her as a child. Eventually, following months of suggestive
questioning and urges to dig deeper into her memory, Donna began to
consider the possibility. She then gave some specific accounts, and Meyers
reported Donna’s father to the authorities. In 1992, he was arrested and
charged with 12 counts of sexual abuse dating back eight years. Donna
argued for him to be released, but her therapist explained that victims
often try to recant their statements after an arrest is made. They continued
therapy, and Donna began to believe that she had been a victim for years
of sexual abuse by her father, recounting specific incidents and satanic ritu-
als that her father used to perform. It was not until after stopping therapy
that Donna’s mind began to clear, and she became sure that no abuse had
occurred. She was diagnosed with a hormonal condition, explaining some
of her emotional troubles.
Suggestibility
Suggestibility is when memories are altered as a result of deliberate or
undeliberate suggestion. For example, in the day care sexual abuse hysteria
cases (Chap. 2), some of the children’s accusations clearly stemmed from
police coaxing them into making certain statements, or because parents
had previously characterized the defendants negatively to their children.
Even now—30 years later—some of the children from the McMartin case
still believe that they were sexually abused at day care, despite having no
independent memories of any abuse (CBS Los Angeles, 2014). This shows
the potentially long-lasting and tragic consequences of suggestion. The
case of Donna Smith is not an isolated incident. There are many cases of
adults entering therapy for various reasons and then uncovering “repressed
memories” of traumatic abuse, before later realizing that no abuse
occurred.
Elizabeth Loftus and Jaqueline Pickrell (1995) conducted an experi-
ment to test how easy it would be to plant false memories. They found
that college students could recall vivid descriptions of times they were lost
in a mall as young children, even though such an incident never occurred.
They achieved this after repeatedly asking participants to recall the event
3 AN INTRODUCTION TO SUGGESTIBILITY 21
with suggestive questioning. After the study was complete, the subjects
were amazed that their memories were false because they felt so real.
Similar studies have had college students “remember” times they nearly
drowned as young children (Heaps & Nash, 2001) or times they were
attacked by a bear (Porter et al., 1999), even though the events were com-
plete fabrications.
Suggestibility does not solely refer to believing things occurred that in
fact did not, but also believing things transpired differently than they actu-
ally did because of suggestion. For example, Pezdek (2003) revealed that
about 73% of Americans “remember” watching footage on 9/11 of both
planes crashing into the World Trade Center buildings, even though foot-
age of the first plane crashing was not shown until the next day. Similarly,
Ost and colleagues (2008) found that 28% of a sample of participants
“remembered” watching a video of the Number 30 London bus explod-
ing in the July 2005 London bombings when asked three months after the
incident, even though no such video exists. When interviewing eyewit-
nesses about events that have been heavily publicized in the news—such as
plane crashes—it is common for eyewitnesses to include details they have
heard elsewhere as part of their own testimony and to mistake those details
as being part of their own memories. Pynoos and Nader (1989) inter-
viewed 113 children who attended a school that had been a victim of a
sniper shooting five years previously. Even children who had been absent
the day of the shooting claimed to have “memories” of the event. It seems
the children heard about the event from their peers and then incorporated
their reports into their own autobiographies.
Binet
Alfred Binet was a French developmental psychologist, best known for
developing the IQ test. While he is less known for his work on children’s
suggestibility, he was one of the first researchers in the field, and his find-
ings were not investigated in the United Kingdom or USA until nearly a
century later. His 1894 article, Natural suggestibility (translated by Nicolas
et al., 2011), outlined his work with children aged between 7 and 14 years
old. This consisted of an experiment in which the children were shown a
series of lines progressively increasing in length until the lines in the series
eventually remained the same length. When asked to replicate the series of
lines in writing, the children drew the lines as though they continuously
got longer, without ever remaining constant in length. He theorized that
this type of suggestion came from the subject themselves (autosugges-
tion). Other studies by Binet also showed however that suggestion can be
due to influence from another person in the form of leading questions. In
one experiment, he had children view various objects and then asked them
either open-ended or misleading questions surrounding details about the
objects they had seen (e.g., color). He found that children were likely to
agree with the interviewer’s misleading question, rendering them less
accurate than those who were asked the open-ended equivalent question.
Interestingly, when asked if they thought they had made any mistakes,
children in Binet’s first experiment were immediately able to correct them-
selves, but children in the other study refused to admit they had been
inaccurate. It would seem that when children make a mistake because of
autosuggestion, they may be aware on some level that they are inaccurate.
However, when children report errors due to external suggestions, they
have a strong and misplaced confidence in their statements. Binet sum-
marized his work within a book, La Suggestibilit in 1900, though there
has still never been an English translation of the book published.
3 AN INTRODUCTION TO SUGGESTIBILITY 23
Stern
William Stern (another pioneer in the field of intelligence research) was a
German psychologist, who conducted two types of experiments that are
still used by eyewitness memory researchers today. In the first, children
between the ages of 7 and 18 years old were shown pictures to study for a
brief period of time, and then were asked questions surrounding what they
remembered from the picture (Stern, 1910). Though we typically use
video footage now to better reflect real life, this is a very similar arrange-
ment to current studies. Stern found that open-ended questions and state-
ments inviting free recall (e.g., “Tell me what you remember”) produced
more accurate responses than misleading questions (questions that
requested information about nonexisting objects). He also found that
younger children reported the highest inaccuracies. In his second study, to
better reflect real life, he organized staged events to occur in classrooms,
and then asked the students afterward what they remembered (Stern,
1939). For example, he had two children pretend to argue during a class
and then had one of them draw a gun. The students each reported between
4 and 12 errors. Additionally, he found that inaccuracies over the second
half of the scenario were higher, when the subjects were at their most
stressed. Along with Otto Lipmann, Stern cofounded the Journal of
Applied Psychology, where he communicated to a wide range of other
researchers that most eyewitnesses do not intentionally falsify their reports
during testimony, but rather most inaccuracies are unintentional. He
explained that an eyewitness’s confidence in being accurate does not nec-
essarily equate to accurate reports, and that certain factors like leading
questions and repeated questioning can taint testimonies. Furthermore,
he highlighted that there were differences between how accurate an adult
witness was likely to be and how accurate a child witness was likely to be.
This was because in both of Stern’s studies children performed poorer
than adults.
Varendonck
It is difficult to identify exactly when the first psychologist testified as an
expert witness, but Hale (1980, as cited in Davis, 2020) suggested that it
was perhaps Albert von Schrenck-Notzing in 1896. He was asked to tes-
tify at the trial of a Munich man who was accused of murdering three
women. Since the press had reported on the incident so extensively, he
24 B. F. COTTERILL
they had never got their hands caught in a mousetrap and asked them
whether or not they had ever got their hands caught in a mousetrap and
had to go to hospital to get it removed. They all said that they had not,
then he came back and asked them again in a week. Again, they all said
that they had never got their hands stuck in a mousetrap. By the sixth,
seventh, and eighth week of questioning, children were not only “remem-
bering” about times they got their hands stuck in mousetraps but were
recounting incredibly detailed accounts of how it had happened, who had
taken them to hospital, and how they had got there. When confronted
with the fact that it had never happened, but had all been part of an experi-
ment, some of the children refused to believe it was all fake and still main-
tained that they really had got their hands caught in a mousetrap (Ceci
et al., 1994). Similar to the previously mentioned case of the school shoot-
ing, these findings have been linked to source-monitoring errors (see
below), meaning the children were perhaps misattributing the source of
the information (i.e., confusing the specific event of getting their hand
caught in a mousetrap with information they had heard in previous
interviews).
When reinterviewed some months later by Ceci and Hoffman, the
number of children in the mousetrap study who believed they had caught
their fingers in the trap dropped dramatically (Lyon, 2014), suggesting
some element of compliant responding. Compliance is when people are
motivated to please and/or avoid conflict with an authority figure
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Milgram, 1963). Therefore, as highlighted in the
studies mentioned earlier by Binet, there is a distinction between internal
and external sources of suggestion. For example, in the day care sexual
abuse cases, some children came to genuinely believe the truth of implanted
statements (i.e., cognitive suggestibility), while others acceded to certain
statements but did not internalize them as true.
By the mid-1990’s, Ceci had a much better understanding of how sug-
gestibility may influence the accuracy of children’s reports, and he was
asked to testify in a stay of execution case in El Paso, Texas. Federico
Macias was accused and convicted of murdering someone in his trailer
park. A key witness for the prosecution was a nine-year-old girl, named
Jennifer F. She claimed to have seen the defendant washing blood off his
hands in his trailer, but the defense claimed that it would have been impos-
sible for her to have seen Macias’ sink from where she was in her trailer at
the time. The girl had a negative view of the defendant because her mother
used to tell her to stay away from his trailer because he was a “bad man”
28 B. F. COTTERILL
who had previously been to prison. Furthermore, she had not been inter-
viewed by police until five weeks after the incident. The defendant was
scheduled to be executed by lethal injection in a week, but following the
stay, he was eventually acquitted. The nine-year-old witness later reported
to papers that she had never been certain about her testimony, but her
multiple interviews with police had confused her into making statements
that she was uncertain about.
Following this, Ceci wanted to understand more about stereotype
induction in order to investigate if children could make false accusations
about strangers based upon hearing negative statements about that per-
son. A classroom of young children was visited by a man named Sam Stone
(Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). Some were given false stereotypes about Sam
being clumsy, including that he always broke things and spilled things.
They were then interviewed four times over eight weeks with suggestive
questions about things Sam Stone may have done. At the end of the study,
these children all reported vivid stories about clumsy things Sam Stone
had done in their classroom, even though he had not actually done any of
those things or acted clumsy in any way. This is similar to the day care
sexual abuse hysteria cases of the 1980s and early 1990s, when investiga-
tors would use peer pressure and negative stereotypes of the defendants to
get disclosures from the children.
Source Monitoring
According to Johnson et al. (1993), source monitoring is the process of
knowing when and where a memory came from. A source-monitoring
error, therefore, is when the source of a memory is incorrectly attributed
to a different source. For example, it may include being unsure if you
locked the house door or only thought about locking it, or it may involve
reporting that you heard something from the news when you actually
learned about it from a friend. Contextual cues help identify the source of
a memory. For example, you may specifically remember locking your
house door that morning because you remember dropping your keys
afterward, or you may remember that you heard about a news story from
a friend because you remember how they told it or by certain words they
used. The ability to accurately identify the source of a memory is some-
thing that develops during childhood (Foley, 2014; Ghetti &
Angelini, 2008).
3 AN INTRODUCTION TO SUGGESTIBILITY 29
Conclusions
Ever since the Salem witch trials, children’s accusations were viewed with
incredible skepticism and courts frowned upon allowing children to testify
as witnesses. There was no significant research on the suggestibility of
children after around 1900 in mainland Europe—which had all just rein-
forced the idea that children were too gullible and suggestible to act as
competent witnesses—until the 1980s when American researchers decided
they had to learn more about the subject. As more and more children
testified in sexual abuse trials, research in the field of children’s suggest-
ibility only increased further. All of those studies revealed that memory is
not like a recording device, where we can just play back in our minds
exactly what happened whenever we want. Rather, we can reconstruct
events, but that reconstruction is incredibly sensitive to what types of
questions we are asked, post-event information, and how long ago the
event occurred. Young children are particularly suggestible because of
their difficulties with source monitoring. Children may come to believe
false memories or false stereotypes (in the case of the Sam Stone study) as
they become part of their autobiographies and, at least in some cases, cor-
rupt their memories permanently. The following chapter will discuss chil-
dren’s general capability to stand as witnesses.
30 B. F. COTTERILL
Memory
Before one can understand a child’s capabilities as an eyewitness, one must
first have insight into the memory mechanisms that account for these
capabilities. There are three stages to memory (Pozzulo, 2017). First is
the process of encoding, which is when information is initially perceived
and converted into memory. A person may be aware they are encoding
new information, or they may not be (e.g., Yang et al., 2012). Second,
memory must be stored. Rehearsal may help some memories to be stored
as a long-term memory, rather than only lasting as a short-term memory,
though not all visual or sensory information even require rehearsal to be
stored as a long-term memory (Baddeley et al., 2020; Cowan, 2008). The
final stage is retrieval, when memories are located and remembered by the
individual. Generally, the process of remembering is viewed as construc-
tive, rather than reproductive, meaning our minds do not accurately
record everything like video recorders and we cannot just play memories
back in our minds exactly as they happened (Patihis et al., 2013). Rather,
when retrieval occurs, our memories must be reconstructed, and this pro-
cess is vulnerable to a number of influences, including leading questions
and post-event information (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1995; Schmidt, 2004).
As we typically only remember the gist of an event, rather than all the
exact details, we tend to fill in the gaps with what we think we experienced
and not always with what we actually experienced. Not only may we alter
memories of actual experiences, but we may create completely false mem-
ories of fabricated events, such as seen by Loftus’ Lost in the Mall experi-
ment (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Consequently, memories are far less
accurate than most people realize. False memories can be triggered by
stories from family members or even from family photographs (e.g., Wade
4 MEMORY MECHANISMS AND DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS… 33
supplied to them into their reports, especially in the case of child partici-
pants. Moreover, as already discussed, false memories can be implanted for
entirely fictitious childhood events, such as being lost in the mall (Loftus
& Pickrell, 1995), being attacked by a bear (Porter et al., 1999), and
nearly drowning (Heaps & Nash, 2001). Other studies have successfully
implanted false memories of hot-air balloon rides that never happened
(Wade et al., 2002), and even alien abductions (Otgaar et al., 2009). In
these cases, also, children were more susceptible to false memories
than adults.
On the other hand, internally driven false memories (or spontaneous
false memories) are those that occur when a person makes assumptions
over what happened or makes an error due to relying on gist information
(Brackmann, Otgaar, Sauerland, & Jelicic, 2015). This difference can be
further understood via the fuzzy trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005),
which was intended to demonstrate how eyewitnesses encode information
during the event of witnessing a crime and how those memories may be
retrieved at a later point in time. This theory suggests that memories are
encoded, stored, and retrieved using two processes that work in parallel
with each other (i.e., the two processes occur at the same time, but work
differently). First, verbatim traces capture specific details of an event, such
as the make, model, and color of a gun. Meanwhile, gist traces capture
only the general information from an event, such as the mere presence of
a weapon. While both traces stem from the same event, the way they are
encoded, stored, and retrieved are different. For instance, verbatim traces
typically dissipate more rapidly than gist traces.
Gist information relies on prior knowledge and so is viewed as less accu-
rate than verbatim information. For example, a famous study by Bartlett
(1932) had participants read an old Native American story called War of
the Ghosts and then later asked those participants to retell what they had
read. Bartlett found that the participants reported only the gist of the
story, leaving out various details, and that they altered some parts of the
story to be in harmony with their own view of the world, rather than that
of the Native Americans. As previously noted, gist information relies on
previous experiences and prior knowledge; thus, adults are more likely to
use this process than children. For example, an adult might be more likely
than a child to misremember locking their front door. Presumably, the
adult does this every day and so it may be harder to separate one specific
memory of locking their door from the countless other memories of lock-
ing their door.
4 MEMORY MECHANISMS AND DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS… 35
Research suggests that adults are more likely than children to be vul-
nerable to internally driven false memories, as a result of being more likely
to rely upon gist information (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2008). This is perhaps
due to the fact that adults are more likely to have a schema for a given
event due to their greater life experience. According to Schank and
Abelson’s (1977) schema theory, a schema is a unit of knowledge for a
particular subject or item based upon past experience, such as what hap-
pens and the order in which things happen when we go to the supermar-
ket or visit a restaurant. Even externally driven false memories can increase
with age when the participants use gist information, rather than verbatim.
An experiment by Otgaar et al. (2014, as cited in Brackmann, Otgaar,
Sauerland, & Merckelbach, 2015) showed a video of a robbery to young
children, older children, and adults. Some related details of the robbery,
such as the culprit’s weapon, were left out of the video. When presented
with misinformation, adults and older children were more likely than
younger children to accept having seen the absent details. Most likely, this
is because adults and older children are more likely to have a schema for a
bank robbery that involves a weapon (e.g., from greater exposure to bank
robberies portrayed on TV and in movies).
In a famous study by Roediger and McDermott (1995), adult partici-
pants were instructed to study a list of words (e.g., dream, pillow, blanket,
and bed) that all centered around a theme (e.g., sleep). When asked to
reproduce the list of words, a significant number of participants incor-
rectly reported having seen the theme on the list of words, even though it
was not present, suggesting the association formed a false memory. The
implication is that verbatim information is item-specific (i.e., the exact
words on the list), while gist information relies on knowledge and associa-
tions (i.e., the fact that all the words on the list were related to “sleep”).
When verbatim information is not available to be retrieved from memory,
we rely on gist information, which can lead to an increase in false memo-
ries. When this study has been replicated with child participants, they are
less likely than adults to misreport having seen the theme on the list of
words (Brainerd et al., 2011), perhaps because they are less likely to make
these associations.
Therefore, it is not correct to view testimonies by adults as always being
more accurate than those by children. Under certain circumstances, chil-
dren may be more reliable witnesses, and less prone to false memories,
than adults. Ironically, this is particularly likely to be the case in situations
that are familiar to an adult, due to the fact they will already have
36 B. F. COTTERILL
Case Study
“Vicky” (not her real name) was a 16-year-old girl from the Netherlands
who witnessed her mother’s murder in May 2011. When police responded
to calls from the neighbors over noises of screaming, Vicky opened the
door and immediately told the responding officers that her father had just
been. They saw Vicky’s mother lying in a puddle of blood on the floor—
she had been stabbed—and asked Vicky what had happened. She instantly
replied that her father had done it. Later that day, Vicky was officially
interviewed about what had happened. She claimed she had been in her
room when she heard noises from downstairs, so she went to investigate
and found her father stabbing her mother. Two months later, she was
questioned once more, and she told the exact same story. Her father
denied the charges, and Vicky was the primary witness at trial. Two expert
witnesses were called. The defense called a clinical psychologist who testi-
fied that eyewitnesses are vulnerable to autosuggestion (a subtype of spon-
taneous false memories), and that children especially are vulnerable to
misremembrances. The prosecution called Dr. Henry Otgaar, a researcher
from the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, who outlined recent
research showcasing why it would be unlikely for Vicky to have been vul-
nerable to spontaneous false memories.
& Price, 2015; Schneider & Pressley, 1989). The research suggests that
children have a weaker ability to encode, store, retrieve, and source moni-
tor information (e.g., Davis & Loftus, 2005). Since suggestibility is gener-
ally linked to the strength of memory, this also might explain why children
often are more suggestible than adults. For example, if a child does not
have a clear memory of an event that they are being questioned about
(because their encoding and storing abilities are weaker than that of
adults), then it will be fairly easy to suggest something happened that
actually did not. Similarly, if a child’s memory trace is weaker then they
may be more easily led astray during target-absent lineups (i.e., when the
lineup does not contain the perpetrator) when there is an individual within
the lineup that looks similar to the actual perpetrator (e.g., Pozzulo &
Dempsey, 2006).
Knowledge Differences
While there may be some areas in which children have greater knowledge
than adults, such as cartoon shows, knowledge generally increases with
age. Just like if a memory trace is stronger, it is harder to be led to sugges-
tion, the same is true when one has greater knowledge. For example, Chi
(1978) asked participants to memorize chess board positions.
Unsurprisingly, she found that chess experts performed better than chess
novices. This is supported by Elischberger (2005), who tested five- and
six-year-old children’s resistance to suggestive questioning after only half
of the children received factual information about the topic. Children who
received the factual information before being exposed to suggestive ques-
tioning were significantly more resistant. Therefore, due to their poorer
knowledge base, it may be easier to implant suggestions in children than
in adults, especially when it comes to topics that children know very little
about such as sexual abuse.
Language Differences
Like memory and knowledge, one’s language ability also develops with
age. Adults may make better eyewitnesses than children because they have
more words to express their thoughts and are more successfully able to
articulate what they remember about an event. Since the number of
descriptors that eyewitnesses tend to use increases with age (e.g., Pozzulo
& Warren, 2003), this seems to support this theory. Furthermore, in a
4 MEMORY MECHANISMS AND DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS… 39
(Wilcock et al., 2018) and are also perceived as having more credibility by
jurors (Collins et al., 2016). Therefore, this is one method to overcome
difficulties stemming from differences between witnesses in language abil-
ity. There is also the possibility for the Registered Intermediary to help the
witness overcome other difficulties. For example, one Registered
Intermediary requested an interview be held in the morning to accom-
modate a child with ADHD and asked for questions to be repeated on the
behalf of a child witness with a speech impediment and heading difficulties
(Thomas, 2018).
Theory of Mind
One aspect of cognitive development that is associated with memory recall
and suggestibility is theory of mind (for reviews, see Bruck & Melnyk,
2004; Klemfuss & Olaguez, 2020). This refers to a child’s growing ability
to understand that other people have different thoughts and beliefs than
they do, typically beginning to develop between years 3 and 6 (de Villiers
& de Villiers, 2014). Research has found conflicting results in regard to
the connection between theory of mind and eyewitness performance (e.g.,
Bright-Paul et al., 2008; Karpinski & Scullin, 2009; Klemfuss et al., 2016;
Melinder et al., 2006). On one hand, once children develop theory of
mind, they may understand they hold different knowledge of what
occurred than an interviewer, thereby reporting more information and
rejecting any misleading questions by the interviewer. However, if they
understand the interviewer holds different views than they do based upon
suggestive questions by the interviewer, they may assume these views are
more valid than their own and so adjust their testimony accordingly
(Waterhouse, 2016). Klemfuss and Olaguez’s (2020, p. 166) review con-
cludes that theory of mind “may be related to children’s resistance to sug-
gestion … but that the association with interrogative suggestibility is
tenuous.”
Own-Age Bias
Usually, a young eyewitness will be significantly younger than the perpe-
trators they are describing and identifying. Just as people are more likely
to correctly identify perpetrators who are of the same race (Chiroro et al.,
2008; Valentine & Endo, 1992; Young et al., 2012), witnesses are also
more likely to correctly identify perpetrators who are of a similar age
4 MEMORY MECHANISMS AND DEVELOPMENTAL FACTORS… 41
(Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005; Stein et al., 2014; Wiese, 2012). The most
likely explanation for this is that people have more experiences with others
in their own age groups, and, thus, are better at recognizing those from
that age group (Anastasi & Rhodes, 2005). The degree to which one has
experiences with those within their own age group therefore has a signifi-
cant influence. For example, older adults recruited from nursing homes
are more likely to have higher levels of daily exposure to people of their
own age, and, thus, have a higher degree of own-age bias than older adults
recruited from the local community (for a review, see Rhodes & Anastasi,
2012). Therefore, children may perform poorer than adults at identifying
adult targets in lineups due to spending most of their time around other
children, especially if they attend nursery or school (Anastasi &
Rhodes, 2005).
Social Influences
Undergoing an interview by police and then identifying a suspect from a
lineup also contains social influences which may impact a child differently
than they would an adult. Children are less likely to give an “I don’t
know” response than adults (Pozzulo & Lindsay, 1997), and are more
likely to feel that the mere presence of a lineup demands they choose
someone (Ceci et al., 1987). This is supported by the fact that children are
more likely than adults to make errors during target-absent lineups, but
not during target-present lineups (e.g., for a review, see Havard, 2014;
Pozzulo & Dempsey, 2006). These findings are still true even when
regarding a subject highly familiar to a child. For example, Pozzulo et al.
(2012) asked both children (four to seven years old) and adults to select
familiar cartoon characters from a lineup. Children produced almost 100%
accuracy rates during target-present lineups but were significantly lower in
accuracy than adults during target-absent lineups. Since these characters
were clearly familiar to the children, their incorrect responses can only be
explained by social influences, rather than factors stemming from memory,
knowledge, or language abilities. These findings can be applied to descrip-
tive eyewitness studies, too. For example, if child witnesses feel compelled
to select a target in a target-absent lineup, they may also feel compelled to
answer a question they do not know the answer to (Ceci & Bruck, 1995;
Hughes & Grieve, 1980; Pratt, 1990; Waterman et al., 2000). This will be
explored in more detail later in this chapter, when explaining the various
question types that witnesses are asked. Individual differences (e.g.,
42 B. F. COTTERILL
shyness) within children may help to explain why some children are
affected more significantly by these social influences than other children.
This will be discussed in more detail during Chap. 8.
Other Influences
Stress and arousal are general factors likely to be present in all eyewit-
nesses. Of course, stress is likely to be higher in some cases than others,
such as when the witness is also the victim. In some cases, stress and
arousal appear to increase the accuracy of eyewitness reports (e.g., “I was
so scared, I’ll never forget that face”), and in others it appears to decrease
accuracy (e.g., “I was so scared, it’s all just a blur”). For example, when a
weapon is present, eyewitnesses tend to divert their attention to the
weapon (i.e., weapon focus), and, thus, remember fewer descriptors about
the perpetrator (Ross et al., 1994). The Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes &
Dodson, 1908) suggests that a moderate level of stress and arousal pro-
duces the optimum levels of accuracy in memory. It would appear that a
certain level of arousal is required for an individual to really pay attention
to details, but the individual becomes overwhelmed once a certain level of
arousal is reached. Little research has investigated whether or not these
levels change depending on age. It may be that younger eyewitnesses have
a lower optimal threshold for arousal than adult eyewitnesses. Research,
however, suggests that age has no effect on weapon focus (i.e., the mem-
ory of children is negatively influenced by the presence of a weapon to the
same extent as that of an adult, not more so; Davies et al., 2008). This
does not support the idea that children may become more easily over-
whelmed than adults, but research should still investigate further causes of
emotional arousal to see if there are other differences between adults and
children in terms of responses.
Conclusions
This chapter began by defining the mechanisms of memory, and then
went on to explain developmental factors that generally influence the
capability of children as eyewitnesses, including memory, knowledge, lan-
guage ability, and threshold for arousal. It seems logical that memory and
knowledge particularly would be linked to eyewitness performance. For
example, if one is asked about their birthday, their response will likely be
accurate no matter how misleading the question is, since the memory
trace of one’s own birthday is just too strong to be overwritten. However,
if one was to be asked about a friend’s birthday, which has not been rein-
forced in one’s memory to the same extent, then it would likely be signifi-
cantly easier to have that person incorrectly report the wrong day after
planting enough suggestion. Generally, it has been assumed that children
are significantly more likely to generate false memories than adults, but
this is because most of the research has focused on suggestion-induced
false memories, rather than spontaneous false memories. Recent evidence
shows that perhaps children are less at risk to spontaneous false memories
than adults are, but this still needs to be further explored. The next chap-
ter will discuss some true cases of children performing as eyewitnesses.
44 B. F. COTTERILL
Abstract This chapter outlines seven true cases when a child was the pri-
mary (or only) eyewitness to a crime. Some of the cases were addressed by
modern police procedures, while others are more dated. The aim of this
chapter is to portray how police can best elicit descriptions and identifications
from child witnesses. In some of the cases, the children’s testimony was unre-
liable, while in others the account was accurate, detailed, and compelling.
This chapter outlines seven true cases when a child was the primary (or
only) eyewitness to a crime. Some of the cases were addressed by modern
police procedures, while others are more dated. The aim of this chapter is
to portray how police can best elicit descriptions and identifications from
child witnesses. In some of the cases, the children’s testimony was unreli-
able, while in others the account was accurate, detailed, and compelling.
car with an open trunk. A man grabbed her and tossed her into the vehi-
cle, then drove off to Devil’s Dyke, a valley outside Brighton. The man
raped her and then strangled her until she fell unconscious. Afterward, he
left her for dead in the woodlands. The girl regained consciousness and
came across some walkers, who took her to the police station. Rachel man-
aged to describe to police various tools that had been in the trunk of the
car, as well as her attacker. From her description and the similarities in the
crime to the murders of Nicola and Karen, police immediately thought of
and arrested Russell Bishop. He denied his guilt and argued he was being
harassed because police had failed to prove their case against him previ-
ously. Rachel however was accurate about the tools that they found in the
back of Bishop’s car, the clothes he had been wearing, the watch he had
on, and his facial hair. She picked Bishop from a lineup without hesitation.
DNA evidence then confirmed that Bishop was the man who had raped
Rachel. He was convicted and sentenced in December 1990 to a mini-
mum of 14 years in prison for abduction, molestation, and attempted
murder. In 2005, double jeopardy laws in England were repealed, and
police began rebuilding their case against Bishop over the Babes in the
Woods Murder. In December 2018, he was retried and found guilty of
both murders. He was ordered to serve a further minimum sentence of 36
years, meaning he will be at least 89 years old before he can be released.
had been quite chubby, that he had short afro hair, and that his height was
between 5'7" and 6'1". The detective asked CM if she would be able to
identify her attacker if she saw him again, and she confirmed that she would.
Detective Jensen went to CM’s school the next day to show her a photo
array of six men who he felt matched her description. Among the pictures
was a photo of Jimmy Guard, who the detective had seen on a person of
interest bulletin describing a similar incident in Springfield, Utah. CM was
shown the pictures one at a time. When Detective Jensen presented her
with the photo of Jimmy Guard (the third photo), she announced without
hesitation that he was the man who had attacked her. When canvassing the
area with Jimmy’s photo, Detective Jensen managed to find three eyewit-
nesses to the incident after questioning about 20 people. The first was a
ten-year-old friend of CM’s who had seen the attack from about a block
away. Initially, she had thought it was CM’s brother (perhaps because of
the similar short afro hair). When asked what the attacker had been wear-
ing, she told Detective Jensen that he had been wearing blue pants, a black
shirt, a cap, and white shoes. The second eyewitness was 49-year-old
neighbor, Darwin Goode, who said that he had seen a man standing at a
bus stop across the street from his house for about 30 minutes and then
following a group of girls, though he had not seen the man grab or attack
any of them. When the detective showed Mr. Goode the picture of Jimmy
Guard, Mr. Goode confirmed that was the man he had seen. The third
eyewitness was Kathleen Speckard, who had seen a man run past her home
just after the time of the attack. When shown Jimmy Guard’s photo, she
could not say for sure that he was the man she had seen but said it certainly
looked like him.
Two days after the incident, Detective Jensen arrested Jimmy Guard at
his place of residence, which was about a mile from the attack site. When
searching the house, the detective could not find the baseball cap or black
T-shirt described by CM. He could also only find a pair of blue running
shoes (even though CM and her friend had both separately told police the
attacker was wearing white). Jimmy Guard claimed to have been at the
library in Salt Lake City on the day of the attack (a place he visited fre-
quently). He described the staff members there and claimed to have had
interactions with them that day, but when questioned by Detective Jensen,
none of them remembered seeing Jimmy on the day in question. Detective
Jensen combed through the library’s surveillance but did not find anyone
that he thought resembled Jimmy Guard. Guard still maintained that he
had been at the library that day and hired a private investigator to prove
50 B. F. COTTERILL
the matter. The PI looked at the surveillance and testified at court that she
believed the video showed Guard entering the library. Screenshots of the
man in the surveillance were admitted as evidence at trial, but it was debat-
able as to what extent they resembled Jimmy Guard.
At trial, the defense filed motions to suppress CM’s eyewitness identifi-
cation and to call Dr. David Dodd, an expert witness on eyewitness mem-
ories. The court denied both motions. It was decided to provide the jury
with a “long instruction” on the issues surrounding eyewitness memories,
rather than have expert witnesses testify on the matter. The judge also
ruled that CM’s eyewitness testimony met the five factors set out in State
of Utah v. Ramirez (1991) and thus her identification of Jimmy Guard was
admissible. These five factors state that to be credible, (1) an eyewitness
must have had the opportunity to view the defendant during the event;
(2) must have had a good degree of attention on the defendant during the
event; (3) must have the capacity to observe and recall an event accurately;
(4) must have made the identification spontaneously and not as a product
of suggestion, while also maintaining that identification consistently; (5)
and that the event in question was of a nature that would make it likely for
the eyewitness to perceive and remember it accurately. During the trial,
CM testified that she had seen Guard wearing blue running shoes when he
attacked her (despite stating in both her interview with Officer Becerra
and with Detective Jensen that they had been white). Guard was found
guilty by the jury of child kidnapping and was given a life sentence with a
nonparole period of ten years. In 2013, he was granted a new trial on the
basis of the court’s decision to exclude an expert witness on eyewitness
memories. This was reversed however in 2015 after a review of the case by
the Supreme Court, deciding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
judge to exclude an expert witness.
was informed the following morning about the abduction. The same
morning, Agent Huyler received a call stating that a vehicle matching the
description of the abduction vehicle was reported nearly two months pre-
viously by a man in Littleton, less than ten minutes away from the abduc-
tion site. The man, Stanley Ellis, had noted the driver of the car talking to
his five-year-old daughter outside his home. He had taken record of the
license plate (ADV627) and so handed it over to the authorities. The car
belonged to a man named Robert Thiret in Denver, less than a 20-minute
drive from Sheridan.
In the afternoon of the same day, Agent Huyler and three other FBI
agents drove to Thiret’s house. They then called the Sheridan Police
Department after finding the vehicle outside. Chief Joseph Stephenson
and two detectives responded to the call and arrived at the house. They
knocked on the door and introduced themselves to Thiret, explaining that
his car matched that of the one involved in the kidnapping of a young girl
and requested permission to look around his house. He granted them
permission, and they spent about 45 minutes searching the house from
the top floor to the basement, looking inside anything that a small child
might be hiding inside. While the search occurred, one of the FBI agents
interviewed Thiret. He claimed that he had been napping the previous day
and had left his keys in the car’s ignition, suggesting someone may have
used his car to kidnap the girl but he knew nothing of it. The agent asked
Thiret if he would take a polygraph test and he agreed, so they left for the
district attorney’s office. About five minutes after Thiret left with the FBI
agent, his car was towed and impounded for a search. The police also had
one of the eyewitnesses come to confirm the car was the one they had seen
a small girl enter. The car was not searched by a crime lab until after Thiret
gave written consent.
Three days after her abduction, Lori Poland was found by birdwatch-
ers, Steven and Cynthia Gaulin in Stapleton Park near Denver. They dis-
covered her calling for help in a 10-foot pit underneath an outhouse,
wearing nothing but her underpants. When asked what she was doing
there, she replied, “I live here.” She clung to her rescuers and begged to
not be sent back to the pit. At a nearby hospital, she was reunited with her
parents. There were no signs of sexual abuse, but no one could tell how
long she had spent inside the pit, and her feet were badly swollen after so
long of standing in liquid. Lori was shown a photo lineup of 12 men, and
she identified Robert Thiret as her abductor, exclaiming that he was the
man who put her in the hole and that he had been mean to her. When
52 B. F. COTTERILL
shown another lineup, without Robert, she asked where his picture had
gone. Three days later, she was given an additional lineup and again
pointed out Robert Thiret without hesitation.
Police arrested Robert Thiret for the crime, but all evidence obtained
in the initial search of his house was suppressed. In the court’s view,
neither the FBI nor the police had the right to conduct such a search,
and the search exceeded the scope of the defendant’s consent. Any evi-
dence obtained in the search of the car was also ruled as inadmissible,
including a reported hair from Thiret ‘s vehicle that was found to be a
match for Lori Poland’s hair. The only evidence that the prosecution had
remaining to present to a jury was Lori’s identification of Robert Thiret
as her abductor. Uncertain that a jury would convict Robert Thiret
based solely on the identification of a three-year-old child, the prosecu-
tion offered him a deal. With no parole conditions, he was released in
1990 after serving six years, but had to register as a sex offender for the
rest of his life. Lori Poland graduated high school in 1998, chosen as
both homecoming queen and prom queen by her peers. She then gradu-
ated from college in 2003 and now works as a therapist, helping others
overcome trauma.
in the hallway. She narrowly avoided being seen and snuck back into bed,
where she pretended to be asleep for about two more hours. In the early
hours of the morning, she woke their parents and told them what hap-
pened. At first, they did not believe her but soon realized the truth after
finding the screen of the kitchen window had been cut with a knife.
At first, Mary Katherine’s eyewitness reports were of little value to
investigators; her descriptions were not very detailed (and not very accu-
rate either as it would turn out). About four months after the kidnapping
though, as Mary Katherine was flipping through a Guinness World Records
book, she stopped on a page about a muscular woman and suddenly real-
ized how she knew the voice of Elizabeth’s kidnapper. She claimed to her
parents that the voice had belonged to a man named Emmanuel—some-
one who had worked for the family briefly a long time ago. It is not clear
how this book jolted Mary Katherine’s memory, but her mother has since
suggested that she might have been reading it while Emmanuel was work-
ing at the house. Police were skeptical, but, nevertheless, a sketch of
Emmanuel was released to the media, including via Larry King Live and
America’s Most Wanted. The family of Brian Mitchell identified him from
the sketch and sent pictures to the police.
In March 2003—nine months after the kidnapping—Brian Mitchell
was spotted with two women in Sandy, Utah, by a couple who had seen
his picture on the television. One of the women was his wife and the other
was Elizabeth Smart. Immediately, Elizabeth was rescued, while Brian
Mitchell and his wife were arrested. Mitchell claimed to be a prophet and
said that he kidnapped Elizabeth because God had chosen the 14-year-old
Mormon girl to be his wife. Elizabeth has said that he planned to marry
and bed dozens of young virgins after her. It took about nine years to
convict Mitchell because of differing conclusions regarding his mental
health and whether or not he was competent to stand trial. Eventually, he
was sentenced to life in prison, while his wife received a 15-year sentence
for her role in the kidnapping. Since her rescue, Elizabeth has gone on to
work as an advocate for missing people. Her harrowing tale has inspired
several books and movies (including one produced by Smart herself).
was the sole eyewitness to the kidnapping. It was not until 7:00 PM the
following evening that people realized Courtney was missing. Before that,
everyone thought she was with another family member. Ashley told her
family in the morning that Courtney was gone, but Ashley had a habit of
telling stories and she had not been believed. When told to stop playing
and to tell the truth, Ashley said that Courtney was still sleeping. When
people finally realized she was missing, friends and family were called to
search. After no luck, they called the police at about 8:00 PM. Within a
few hours, hundreds of townspeople had joined in the search. The small
town’s police chief, Ceci Russell, oversaw the search. He told everyone to
go home at about 1:00 AM, but he never stopped searching, except for a
few hours of sleep in his squad car. He found Courtney’s body a little after
sunrise, in a pond about 80 yards from the house. He pulled her from the
pond, laid her on the ground, and wrapped her in his jacket. She was
dressed in nothing but a T-shirt and was bleeding from both her head
and groin.
The Noxubee County Sheriff’s Office soon took over the investigation.
Further inspection of the body revealed that the girl also had been stran-
gled—though probably died of drowning—and that she had most likely
been penetrated by a blunt object. Deputy Ernest Eichelberger was one of
the first men on the scene from the sheriff’s department and quickly took
control of the investigation, despite only having a few years of experience
in law enforcement. He began his investigation by turning his attention to
all the men who might have had access to the home. William Mickens—
Courtney’s great uncle—was the first man to be arrested. He coached
baseball, was a known alcoholic, and had been known to make inappropri-
ate comments toward women. Also arrested were Robert Goodwin (a
neighbor), John Hodge (the boyfriend of Courtney’s mother), William
McCarthy (a family friend who had visited that night), David Harrison
(who had lent William McCarthy his car that night), Tony Smith
(Courtney’s uncle), Lee Harris (a friend of Tony Smith’s), Ernest Smith
(uncle), and William Smith (uncle).
Despite having been the sole eyewitness to the kidnapping, Ashley
Smith was not officially interviewed until about a week after the crime.
The sheriff’s department had no one who was particularly experienced or
trained in forensic interviews with children, so Officer Robert Williams
was chosen to conduct the interview. He was selected because he had
spent 18 years working on children’s television, sketching animal cartoons
as “Uncle Bunky,” a once-beloved TV personality by the local community.
5 TRUE CASES OF CHILD EYEWITNESSES 55
During his first interview with Ashley Smith, she constantly contradicted
herself and reported things that the police knew to be false, including that
her sister’s abductor had taken her away on an airplane. Initially, she
reported that there had been several accomplices, then she changed her
story to there being only one accomplice, and then to no accomplices.
During the interview, she said that Courtney’s abductor “had a quarter in
his ear,” and then later added that he “took the quarter out and put it up
in my sister’s ear.” Officer Williams understood this as meaning the abduc-
tor wore an earring (it was a fad at the time to wear a quarter in one’s ear
and a young child, he thought, may have confused this with an earring),
and so that is what he reported.
Levon Brooks was an ex-boyfriend of Courtney’s mother (who she
referred to as “Tie-Tee”) and was one of the few men in town who wore
an earring. He had no history of sex crimes and was working the night of
the murder, though his alibi did not dissuade Deputy Eichelberger.
Instead, Deputy Eichelberger became convinced that Levon Brooks was
Courtney’s killer, and he sent Officer Williams to conduct a photo lineup
with Ashley. The photo of Levon was old, and he was the only one from
the lineup to have afro hair, while the other pictures were all new, all had
short hair, and were all strangers to Ashley. Unsurprisingly, Ashley picked
Levon from the lineup, and he was subsequently arrested, with Deputy
Eichelberger claiming that Levon had always been the prime suspect
(despite having previously arrested nine other men for the crime). He
claimed that he had interviewed Ashley just shortly after the crime, and
that she had first identified “Tie-Tee” as her sister’s abductor to him then,
though there is no record of this interview ever occurring. Furthermore,
Courtney’s mother stated that Levon had not been to the house, had
barely met Ashley, and that Ashley would not have known her nickname
for him.
Ashely confirmed to police and prosecutors that Levon was her sister’s
abductor, adding that he had come back later that night to eat potato
chips and brag to her that he had stolen her sister, and that he had been
carrying a big bag of money. Satisfied with Ashley’s identification, all that
Deputy Eichelberger needed now was some “physical evidence.” There
was no DNA left behind on the body or at the scene, but there were some
bite marks found on Courtney’s wrist. Pathologist Dr. Steven Hayne said
that the marks were human bites, and dentist Dr. Michael West claimed
that he had compared the marks on the body with the teeth of Levon
Brooks. He stated at trial, “it could be no one but Levon Brooks that bit
56 B. F. COTTERILL
(The Cadaver King and the Country Dentist: A True Story of Injustice in
the American South). He resigned from the American Academy of Forensic
Science in 1994 after being the subject of an ethics investigation. Tests by
the Innocence Project in 2007 in fact confirmed from DNA on Christine
Jackson’s body that the real rapist was Justin Albert Johnson, a local
51-year-old man with a history of sexual violence. After his arrest, Justin
Johnston confessed not only to Christine Jackson’s murder but also to
Courtney Smith’s.
Justin Johnston was diagnosed with schizophrenia and claimed halluci-
nations taunted him into killing, as well as that he had been under the
influence of alcohol and drugs during the nights of the murders. Deputy
Eichelberger had interviewed him during the original investigation due to
his car being spotted at the pond on the night of the murder, having a
record of previous sex crimes, and not having an alibi for the night of the
crime. Despite all this, he was never considered as a serious suspect, prob-
ably because Deputy Eichelberger had his eyes only on Levon Brooks at
the time. Levon Brooks was released in 2008, after serving 16 years for a
crime he did not commit. He was given half a million dollars in compensa-
tion from the State of Mississippi, and he also filed a lawsuit against Dr.
West and Dr. Hayne in 2009 but it was dismissed in 2014. In 2013—five
years after his release—he was diagnosed with colon cancer, which he then
passed away from in January 2018. During his false imprisonment, Justin
Johnston—the real culprit—had gone on to commit other violent sexual
crimes in the area.
asked Johnny for the time, and he told her it was 7 o’clock. When Kathy
returned from her home at the opposite end of the block, neither Maria
nor Johnny were anywhere in sight.
Kathy checked to see if Maria had gone home, but she had not. Both
she and Maria’s family went out searching for the girl to no avail. They
went to inform the police at 8:10 PM, who then organized the towns-
people into search parties. By 8:15 PM, police were stopping and search-
ing every vehicle coming in and out of town. They interviewed Kathy, and
she told them Johnny had been between 25 and 30 years old, had long
blond hair, had gapped teeth, and had been wearing a multicolored
sweater. Maria’s mother told police that she had dropped Maria’s sister off
at piano lessons just after 6:00 PM as always and returned home about
6:15 PM. Both times she drove past Maria and Kathy, they were playing
alone. One neighbor—Roy Paiper—remembered seeing the girls playing
alone at about 6:30 PM, and another neighbor—Stanley Wells—saw them
talking to a strange man sometime after. Maria’s mother, father, and
brother all remembered Maria coming to collect her doll from the house
after 6:30 PM (her father remembered because an episode of Cheyenne
was airing). Kathy’s mother said that Kathy came home to collect her mit-
tens at about 7:00 PM, and the Ridulphs remembered that Kathy came to
their door just after 7:00 PM to look for Maria. Two neighbors (in sepa-
rate homes, interviewed separately) also reported hearing a scream at
about 7:00 PM. Based on all this information, a timeline was established,
stating that Johnny must have approached the girls between 6:30 and
6:40 PM and that Maria must have been abducted at about 6:55–7:00 PM.
The next day, FBI agents were assigned to the case, led under the com-
mand of Special Agent Richard Auerbach. FBI Director Edgar Hoover
demanded and received daily updates on the case, and he also kept
President Eisenhower informed on any progress. They released Kathy’s
description of Johnny to the public, and three days after the kidnapping
received an anonymous tip that 18-year-old neighbor John Tessier fit the
description. He was known for being a little odd and also to have given
younger children piggyback rides. FBI visited his home and interviewed
his parents. They said they had discussed the idea that John might fall
under suspicion because of his approximate height, hair color, and first
name matching that of the kidnapper. According to his parents, John had
been at the Air Force recruitment center in Chicago on the day of the
kidnapping, had gotten a train back to Rockford from Chicago later that
night, and then called at about 7:00 PM for a lift home (there is about 40
5 TRUE CASES OF CHILD EYEWITNESSES 59
miles between Rockford and Sycamore). After having collected him from
the train station in Rockford, John’s mother claimed that he had been
home all night. The FBI returned when John was home to give him a lie
detector test, and he obliged, claiming he had nothing to hide. He
answered all of their questions via an interview. During this interview, he
added that he had made a second call from Rockford to arrange a date
with his girlfriend for about 9:00 PM. FBI confirmed his alibi by finding
that he had made a call from Rockford to Sycamore at 6:57 PM, and that
he had also been spotted by two eyewitnesses in Rockford at 7:15 PM that
night. They thus ruled him out as a suspect.
Kathy Sigman, meanwhile, found herself with few children willing to
play with her after the kidnapping of her best friend. She was picked up
daily from school by the FBI to go look at lineups of suspects (she never
saw John Tessier in any lineup because the FBI had cleared him). During
the month of December, she viewed dozens of lineups with no results,
until 19 days after the kidnapping when she pointed to a man—Thomas
Rivard—who was much older than her original description (he was 35
years old). Thomas Rivard had a solid alibi (he was working on a farm-
house outside Madison with six other coworkers at the time of the kidnap-
ping). FBI worried that Kathy’s memory was fading and so began having
her repeatedly describe Johnny. Her mother too told her she had to con-
stantly relive the event and play it back in her mind’s eye so that she would
never forget Johnny’s face. Generally, Kathy’s description remained fairly
stable over the following months.
On April 26, 1958—about five months after the kidnapping—Maria’s
body was discovered by two tourists, hunting for mushrooms in the for-
ests along Route 20, nearly 100 miles from the town of Sycamore (and
about 60 miles from the town of Rockford). Her body had been placed
underneath a fallen tree and had been there for at least four months. She
was so badly decomposed that investigators at the time could not identify
exactly when she had been killed or what the cause of death had been. The
FBI immediately withdrew from the case, but local police continued tak-
ing Kathy to lineups, though less and less frequently. The last lineup
occurred in 1961. Even after looking through thousands of suspects, she
never picked anyone out again since that time in late December 1957.
Police had only one other major suspect—Johnny Hilburn, a factory
worker who went through Sycamore often and claimed to have asked two
small girls there for directions the night of the kidnapping. He refused to
take a lie detector test or answer questions, lawyered up, was the right age,
60 B. F. COTTERILL
matched the description, was inconsistent about his whereabouts, and had
a previous conviction of sexually assaulting his own five-year-old daughter.
Police presented him in a lineup to Kathy within the month of May in
1958, but she failed to point him out and so he was released.
Nothing further happened with the case until 1994, when John
Tessier’s mother passed away. On her deathbed, she supposedly confessed
to John’s two sisters that John was responsible for Maria Ridulph’s disap-
pearance and that they had to let people know. They reported the confes-
sion, but neither the local police nor the FBI wanted to take on the
investigation. In 2008, after the death of their father, the sisters approached
the Illinois State Police, who decided to reopen the case. Their investiga-
tion led to John’s girlfriend at the time admitting that she too had lied for
him back in 1957—she had never seen him for a date the night of the
kidnapping. On top of this, she had kept John’s train ticket (bought by the
Air Force to travel from Rockford to Chicago)—it had never been used.
Kathy Sigman was then given a photo lineup containing a picture of John
Tessier from 1955, along with yearbook photos from roughly the same year.
She identified John—who now went by the name of Jack McCullough—as
Johnny. There were, however, several significant problems with the photo
lineup: (1) all of the other pictures had white backgrounds, while John’s
picture had a black background; (2) all of the other men in the pictures had
been wearing suits, except for John; (3) all of the other men in the pictures
were looking to the side of the camera, while John was looking straight
ahead; (4) and all of the other pictures had been professional yearbook pho-
tos, while John’s picture was cropped from a family picture and shone
brightly. When presenting the same photo lineup to strangers, both John’s
family and defense lawyers later found that the vast majority of people would
select John’s photo after being read Kathy’s description of Johnny (even
though all the men were meant to match the description). This indicates
that there was indeed something potentially suggestive about the lineup.
John had a previous conviction of a sex crime against a teenage girl in
Seattle. He had also gone to court in 1962 for being accused of raping his
sister but had been found not guilty by a judge in this case. During an inter-
view with police, he maintained the alibi he had given back in 1957.
However, all the witnesses who had claimed to have seen him in Rockford
had now passed away, as well as the operator who had connected his call
from Rockford to Sycamore the night of the kidnapping, and so had his
parents who had claimed to have given him a ride back and forth between
Sycamore and Rockford. This meant that John’s alibi could no longer be
5 TRUE CASES OF CHILD EYEWITNESSES 61
presented during trial as there were no living witnesses to confirm any of the
details. He was found guilty in 2012 of murdering Maria Ridulph and was
sentenced to life in prison. John’s wife, stepdaughter, and son-in-law all
vigorously maintained his innocence, and so did Jeffrey Dean Doty’s book
Piggyback (2014). Once the FBI files were released to the public via FOI
requests, it became quite clear that the timeline of events could not have
permitted John to have abducted Maria. It was inarguable that John had
phoned from Rockford to Sycamore at 6:57 PM on the night of the kidnap-
ping, and the reports of at least 11 different people testified to the theory
that Maria had been kidnapped around the same time. Based upon this,
John was released after an appeal in 2016 and was then officially declared
innocent of the crime by the State of Illinois in 2017. Unfortunately, it is
likely that no one will ever know for sure what happened to Maria Ridulph,
but many people of Sycamore (including Maria’s siblings) still believe that
John Tessier was Johnny due to the identification made by Kathy Sigman.
Conclusions
In some of the cases, there is no reasonable doubt over the guilt of the
defendants. In the Nevis nursery case, the initial complaint from a three-
year-old boy was both spontaneous and detailed, and a large amount of
child pornography was found on Mark MacLennan’s computer only after
the accusations by the children were made. Unlike some of the previously
mentioned day care cases (Chap. 2), the case did not start with suspicions
by parents and the investigation did not consist of trying to coax accusa-
tions from dozens of children. In the case of Russell Bishop, DNA con-
firmed that he was the man who raped Rachel at Devil’s Dyke (statistically,
there is about a 1 in 80 million chance that the DNA found on the victim
belonged to a man other than Russell Bishop). On top of this, Rachel was
able to describe him, his clothes, his car, and the contents of his car all
impeccably. His arrest then also successfully led him to being convicted for
two other murders for which he had previously evaded capture.
In other cases, it is at least more difficult to conclude on the guilt of the
defendant. Jimmy Guard, for example, was convicted based solely on the
accounts of eyewitnesses who all either saw Jimmy from far away or were
initially uncertain. In her first interview with Officer Becerra, CM stated
that she was uncertain about the face of her attacker but was both incred-
ibly specific and detailed about what clothes he was wearing, yet none of
these clothes were found to be owned by the defendant. Of course, it is
62 B. F. COTTERILL
possible that Jimmy threw these items of clothing away after the crime,
but his guilt would be far more convincing if the prosecution had been
able to find someone (i.e., an old friend or neighbor) who could testify to
ever having seen Jimmy wear such clothes items (i.e., the Steve Austin
T-shirt and the cap with an A). It is also interesting that CM said in both
her earlier interviews that the attacker had been wearing white shoes but
stated in court that he had been wearing blue shoes. This seems unlikely
to be a coincidence, meaning police likely told her at some point what
color of shoes they found in Jimmy’s house. This is not something that
police should ever have discussed with CM, as it had the potential to taint
her testimony. Of course, it is possible that CM had originally been incor-
rect about the color of the shoes in her earlier interviews, and then remem-
bered closer to the trial that the shoes had been blue. However, this seems
unlikely given that CM’s friend had also reported the shoes being white in
a separate interview.
There are many cases like the one of Levon Brooks when an innocent
person was sentenced to prison due to the misidentification of a child eye-
witness (e.g., Michael Caesar Seri, Joseph Lamont Abbitt, James Anderson,
Randall Lynn Ayers, James Bain, Jimmy Ray Bromgard, Knolly Brown,
Jr., Ronnie Bullock, Juan Carlos Gonzales-Barboza, Donald Wayne Good,
Marshall Hale, Leonard McSherry, Guy Randolph, Jacques Rivera, George
Rodriguez, Peter Rose, Mario Vasquez, David Lee Wiggins, George
Wilcox, Jimmy Williams, Johnny Williams, Jr., and Larry Youngblood),
just like there are numerous cases when mistaken identifications sent the
wrong person to prison from eyewitnesses of all ages. The National
Registry of Exonerations lists thousands of cases, so examples of children
making poor eyewitnesses are not hard to find.
There are, however, thousands of children every year who are eyewit-
nesses to crimes and are asked to give evidence in court. Only a tiny minor-
ity of these cases end with exonerations. It would be wrong, therefore, to
explore more examples of children as poor eyewitnesses just because these
cases make more publicity and are easier to research. Instead, it is the
author’s hope that the true cases outlined in this chapter portray the many
differing concerns surrounding children as eyewitnesses. Not only do the
cases show that children can be sometimes accurate, and sometimes inac-
curate (especially as a result of suggestions), but they show that insuffi-
cient interviews with children can lead to charges being dropped (such as
in the Nevis nursery case), and that there are concerns over how credible
a jury will find a child witness (such as in the Poland abduction case). They
5 TRUE CASES OF CHILD EYEWITNESSES 63
also show that a child witness can be correct about some details, while
incorrect about others, as well as that accounts can come both spontane-
ously, or after significant delay such as was the case with Mary Katherine
Smart. The murder of Courtney Smith portrays the tragedy that can ensue
when child witnesses are treated and presented as being credible when
they are simply unreliable, as well as the dangers that can arise when inves-
tigators alter the facts to make an arrest stick.
As previously discussed, regarding the day care sexual abuse hysteria
cases (Chap. 2), interviewing children requires nonsuggestive questioning
and an understanding in regard to a child’s ability to discern fact from fic-
tion. Officer Williams, however, thought he could get Ashley Smith to
report the truth simply by drawing her pictures. When asked about his
forensic interviews with children, he told the local newspaper in Tupelo,
“I’ll sit down with them, draw for them, and before long, they’re telling
me everything—who’s done what to them.” It took about a week before
Ashely Smith was even interviewed after the crime. During this time, her
memory had become tainted by both things she had heard other people say
and by things that she had imagined. Officer William completely believed
all the parts of the interview that made sense to him, and just ignored those
parts of the interview that he did not like or that did not make sense.
Moreover, he took the things that Ashely said and made them fit with his
own understanding, such as in regard to the kidnapper having an earring.
Sometimes, eyewitnesses are unfortunately just too young, too prone to
suggestion, or too prone to fantasy, or their memory is simply too inaccu-
rate in order for them to be credible witnesses, never mind the sole eyewit-
ness in a death penalty trial. In these instances, the evidence is just not
there, and investigators need to explore other avenues. If DNA evidence
was insufficient, competent investigators would not just simply plant DNA
to get the evidence they wanted, and manipulating the statements of wit-
nesses in any form should be regarded as just as unacceptable.
What is interesting about the disappearance of Maria Ridulph case is
that to this day Kathy Sigman believes wholeheartedly that John Tessier
was the man who once asked if she wanted a piggyback ride and then
abducted her best friend. This identification was the main reason as to why
prosecutors took the case so seriously and why so many people believed
(and still believe) so strongly that John committed the crime. It does not
seem likely, however, that a person could see someone when they are eight
years old and then identify them from a black-and-white photograph 55
years later. In addition to this, there were clear unconscious cues regarding
64 B. F. COTTERILL
what picture Kathy should select from the lineup, meaning that her mem-
ory is forever tainted because there is no way of knowing to what extent
the photo lineup has influenced her subsequent memory. Of course, it is
possible for a picture to jog a memory, but it does not seem reasonable
that Kathy would not have seen John at some point when she was a child;
she played with his siblings, lived only a few doors down, and her father
had once hit John with his car when John was a kid. Despite this, Kathy
claims that she had never seen John as a child (other than the time he
offered her and Maria piggyback rides as Johnny). However, she also does
not remember ever selecting Thomas Rivard from a lineup (even though
selecting out a suspect before the FBI would probably be a significant
event for a child), and has also forgotten many other details from her ini-
tial report (including that Johnny touched her arm while they waited for
Maria to grab her doll and that Johnny had told her the time was 7 o’clock
before she left to grab her mittens).
As already discussed, sexual abuse cases, domestic violence cases, and
intrafamilial murders are the cases in which children are most often eyewit-
nesses. Children know their abuser in between 75% and 90% of cases
(Davies & Noon, 1991; Finkelhor & Jones, 2012, as cited in Carroll
County Child Advocacy Center, 2015; Whealin, 2007, as cited in Carroll
County Child Advocacy Center, 2015). In these cases, the abuser is often
a family member or a friend of the family. Furthermore, the abuse is fre-
quent, if not every day. Therefore, though it is important to understand
the identifying capabilities of children, it should be highlighted that some
of the cases described in this chapter are some of the more unusual sort.
Much like in the Nevis nursery case, teachers, babysitters, school volun-
teers, and school employees are also responsible for a large number of
child abuse cases, as securing employment that involves working with chil-
dren is one effective way for a child sex abuser to get close to children
(Miller, 2013). When it comes to more ordinary cases involving family or
friends of family, the quality of the interview matters more than the child’s
describing and identifying capabilities. Therefore, such cases will be dis-
cussed in Chap. 7. Later chapters will also give details regarding court-
room arguments that occur when children testify in murder trials (e.g., the
Clarence Elkins case, the Jessie Dotson case, the Frederico Martinez
Macias case (already discussed in Chap. 3), and the Quincy Norton
case). In later chapters, the factors that can make children more or less
suggestible to making false identifications will be discussed while making
further reference to these cases.
CHAPTER 6
Of course, the true cases outlined in Chap. 5 show just how much the
accuracy and amount of information provided by child witnesses can vary.
They usually contain at least some inaccurate details, like in the initial
reports of Mary Katherine Smart and Ashley Smith, and are almost always
brief. Indeed, Pozzulo (2017) claims that investigators should be wary if
initial reports are too detailed. However, there are clear exceptions to this.
Most notably, Rachel W. in the Devil’s Dyke rape case. Not only were her
descriptions of the man—Russel Bishop—who raped and strangled her
incredibly detailed and accurate, but she also recounted the items that had
been in the back of his car impeccably, even though she was doubtlessly
afraid for her life while she was held there. In sum, children can be accu-
rate witnesses, and they can also be inaccurate.
trained professionals have not been able to tell the difference between
abused and nonabused children based upon their behavior with anatomi-
cal dolls (e.g., Realmuto & Wescoe, 1992). A significant problem is that
there is little consistency to how abused children interact with the dolls,
and so there is no way to devise a pattern of behavior. For example, some
abused children will avoid the dolls, and other abused children will show
high levels of sexual and aggressive behavior with the dolls (e.g., Bruck
et al., 2000). According to Dupree et al.’s (2016) review, however, a
child’s temperament may impact how beneficial anatomical dolls are likely
to be. For instance, they have been found to be less beneficial to children
higher in emotionality (Gordon et al., 1993), perhaps because they are
more likely to play aggressively with the doll, regardless of sexual abuse
history.
A number of factors can impact how likely a child is to disclose details
over sexual touching. A child is significantly less likely to disclose sexual
abuse if the perpetrator is a family member or if the child is experiencing
feelings of guilt or shame (Leander et al., 2005, 2007). Younger children
are also less likely to disclose (Goodman-Brown et al., 2003; Lippert et al.,
2009). Furthermore, they are less likely to understand that the abuse con-
stitutes a crime (Shannon & Törnqvist, 2011, as cited in Ernberg et al.,
2016; Sjöberg & Lindblad, 2002) or to question claims by the perpetrator
that the abuse is a secret between the two of them (Shannon & Törnqvist,
2011, as cited in Ernberg et al., 2016).
One method to get disclosures of sexual abuse from children other than
specific leading questions is the putative confession technique. This is
when the investigator tells the child that the suspect has already made a
full confession and that the investigator now wants to hear it from the
child. This may be beneficial to children who are afraid of how the suspect
will react once hearing that the child has reported any abuse. A study by
Evans and Lyon (2020) found that putative confessions increased the
number of children who disclosed having witnessed someone destroy a
laptop from 13% to 62%. Importantly, putative confessions in this study
did not lead to any false disclosures. Of course, witnessing someone
destroy a laptop is quite different from being a victim of sexual abuse, and
so further research is required on the impact of putative confessions in
this regard.
6 CHILDREN’S DESCRIBING AND IDENTIFYING CAPABILITIES 71
Research suggests that hair color is probably the most often reported
descriptor by eyewitnesses, both in lab studies (Pozzulo, 2017) and in real
life (e.g., Kuehn, 1974). Pozzulo and Warren (2003) found that hair color
was the most frequently reported and the most accurate of descriptors
provided by both child (10 to 14 years old) and by adult participants.
Other than hair color, clothing, gender, height, and race are all also fre-
quently reported descriptors. Research suggests that children of any age
are far more likely and far more accurate at describing exterior features
(e.g., hair and clothes) than interior features (e.g., eye color and nose
shape; Campbell et al., 1995; Davies et al., 1989, as cited in Pozzulo,
2017; Pozzulo & Warren, 2003). In fact, Pozzulo and Warren (2003)
found that their child participants struggled significantly with all interior
features compared to exterior significantly more than adult participants
did. This is unfortunate as while a perpetrator is likely to change their
clothes or may change their hair style, interior features are far more likely
to remain constant and thus be more valuable to police.
Within the true cases outlined in Chap. 5, Rachel W. (Devil’s Dyke rape
case), CM (case of Jimmy Guard), Mary-Katherine Smart (kidnapping of
Elizabeth Smart), and Kathy Sigman (disappearance of Maria Riduph) all
described their target’s hair color and clothing. It is worth noting though
that Mary-Katherine Smart was incorrect about what clothes Brian
Mitchell was wearing and that CM was inconsistent over what color of
shoes her attacker had been wearing. Only one of them described an acces-
sory worn by their target (Rachel W. described Russell Bishops’ watch),
and only one of them described an interior feature of their target (Kathy
Sigman described Johnny as having gapped teeth). At least most of them
guessed their target’s age and height (but usually only after prompting), as
well as their target’s race.
As part of their study, Pozzulo et al. (2009) had child participants
engage with a target for about 20 minutes in the classroom and then
describe everything they remembered after the target left. Descriptors
mentioned included hair color (mentioned by 58% of the children), cloth-
ing color (47%), hair length (20%), clothing type (17%), height (7%), eyes
(1%), body type (1%), and accessories (1%). Similarly, Karageorge and
Zajac (2011) had children (between 5 and 11 years old) view a target for
between 30 and 45 seconds at a trip to the fire station, then asked some of
the children to describe the target after a period of one to two days and
the other children to describe the target after a period of two weeks.
Overall, children provided an average of 2.47 descriptors after being given
6 CHILDREN’S DESCRIBING AND IDENTIFYING CAPABILITIES 73
suspect, 34% selected a known innocent, and 10% failed to make any iden-
tification from the lineup.
Lab research suggests that during target-present lineups, children as
young as six years old can be just as accurate as adults (e.g., for a review,
see Havard, 2014; Lindsay et al., 1997). However, during target-absent
lineups, children are significantly more likely than adults to make a false
identification (e.g., Dekle et al., 1996; Gross & Hayne, 1996; Humphries
et al., 2012; Keast et al., 2007; Lindsay et al., 1997; Parker & Carranza,
1989; Pozzulo & Balfour, 2006; Pozzulo & Warren, 2003). The main
reason is probably because children feel pressured into selecting a photo
even when they do not recognize anyone from the array (e.g., Pozzulo
et al., 2012). Additionally, children are likely less aware than adults toward
the potential consequences of false identifications. While research suggests
that adults tend to make less false identifications when photos in a lineup
are presented one at a time (sequential lineup) compared to when they are
all presented at once (simultaneous lineup), this perhaps makes children
more likely to make guesses. Wells and Olson (2003) found that children
made multiple identifications when presented with a sequential lineup.
Furthermore, Park (2014) suggests that even adults provide less correct
identifications during sequential lineups. Therefore, sequential lineups are
not necessarily more accurate than simultaneous lineup, but are still widely
recommended (Park, 2014).
One successful method of reducing false identification rates is by add-
ing an additional photo to the lineup consisting of a silhouette with a
question mark. Zajac and Karageorge (2009) introduced the idea and told
children to point to the silhouette card if they did not see the target in the
lineup. When testing the idea on children aged between 8 and 11 years,
they found that correct rejections increased from 46% to 71% during
target-absent lineups. They then replicated the findings with children aged
between five and seven years old (Karageorge & Zajac, 2011). This time
correct rejections increased from 29% to 84%. Importantly, they also found
that there was no negative influence of the silhouette card on positive
identification rates during target-present lineups. There are a number of
reasons as to why this could be beneficial. First, if children feel compelled
to select from the lineup due to pressure, then they can still do so without
incorrectly identifying an innocent person. Second, it allows the child to
still give a positive response rather than feel they are disappointing the
interviewer.
6 CHILDREN’S DESCRIBING AND IDENTIFYING CAPABILITIES 75
Conclusions
Generally, young children are indeed capable of making competent wit-
nesses. First, they are unlikely to make disclosures of sexual touching if no
such touching has occurred. However, they are also unlikely to make dis-
closes of sexual touching without the presence of specific questioning,
even if such touching has occurred. Children are more likely than adults
to respond to questions that they do not understand—including those
about sexual touching—but only if the questions are presented as closed-
ended or option-posing. Second, while young children are likely to pro-
duce fewer descriptors than adult eyewitnesses, they are still likely to be
accurate with those descriptors, especially when it comes to descriptors
regarding hair and clothing. Third, young children are just as likely as
adults to accurately identify a perpetrator from a target-present lineup.
However, young children are more likely than adults to inaccurately iden-
tify a perpetrator from a target-absent lineup. There is still research needed
to be conducted within this area, but it would appear that by including an
additional mystery target during a target-absent lineup, one might be able
to decrease the number of inaccurate identifications made by young chil-
dren. Even though children are generally capable of making competent
witnesses, some children certainly make more competent witnesses than
others. This is due to a mix of situational factors (discussed more in Chap.
7) and individual differences (discussed more in Chap. 8). For instance, it
is also critical to consider the developmental stage of the child when esti-
mating their capacity to serve as a witness (see Chap. 8).
76 B. F. COTTERILL
Question Types
The type of questions asked by investigators can significantly affect chil-
dren’s responses (e.g., Lamb et al., 2018). Investigators are typically
encouraged to apply a “funnel approach,” which involves exhausting free
recall invitations and other open-ended prompts before reverting to more
focused questions (Lamb et al., 2009). Therefore, police will usually begin
by eliciting free recall (e.g., “Tell me everything that happened from the
beginning until the end” or “Tell me what the suspect looked like”), both
with children and adults, when they are questioning eyewitnesses about a
criminal event or about a suspect. This way, the witness reports only what
comes to mind without influence or suggestion from the interviewer.
During free recall, young children’s responses are generally just as accu-
rate as adults’, however not very detailed (Lamb et al., 2018). For exam-
ple, when asked about the appearance of a suspect, a child witness may
only list one or two descriptors, rather than report everything they remem-
ber. Children aged five years and younger do not always realize that adults
may not know information that they themselves know (see Flavell, 2004
for a review on taking the perspective of others (theory of mind)). By
about the age of six years, children are significantly more forthcoming
when it comes to reporting information and are significantly less suggest-
ible (e.g., Eisen et al., 2007; Goodman & Reed, 1986). As previously
mentioned, however, it remains a developmental progression (McWilliams
et al., 2013).
In order to elicit more information so that the police can narrow down
on a suspect, follow-up questions are required. Due to this, interviewers
often struggle to maintain best practice, and an overuse of improper ques-
tioning is reported (e.g., Luther et al., 2015; Roberts & Cameron, 2015;
Waterhouse et al., 2018). The safest types of follow-up questions are those
that are open-ended as they generate more detailed, accurate, and coher-
ent responses than any other type of follow-up questions (e.g., Feltis et al.,
2010; Hershkowitz et al., 2012; Orbach et al., 2000; Lyon, 2014; Snow
et al., 2009). According to Cronch et al. (2006), cued invitations are the
safest types of open-ended follow-ups (e.g., “You mentioned the man
touched you. Tell me more about that”) as these types of questions only
ask the witness to expand on points that were first mentioned by the wit-
nesses themselves. Other types of invitations are general invitations (e.g.,
“Then what happened”) and time segmentation invitations (e.g., “Tell me
7 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF SUGGESTIBILITY 79
everything that happened from the first time he touched you until he
ran away”).
In order to narrow in on specific details, investigators will then typically
use open-ended directive questions (e.g., “What did he do when he
touched you?” or “How did he touch you?”). Directive questions require
a more direct response and usually begin with “How,” “What,” “Where,”
or “Who,” but so long as they do not force the child to choose from a
limited number of possible answers, then the question may still be consid-
ered open-ended (Lamb et al., 2018).
Even open-ended follow-ups may not elicit enough information, and
so police may then proceed to use closed-ended follow-ups. These may be
directive questions that require a one- or a two-word response (e.g., “You
mentioned he touched you in the house. What room in the house?”), or a
question that option poses in some other form (e.g., “Was he alone or was
he with someone?”). Most often though, these types of questions require
only a “yes” or “no” response (e.g., “Was he tall?”). Research shows that
option-posing often makes young children more likely to answer a ques-
tion even when they do not know the answer or understand the question
(e.g., Peterson et al., 1999; Waterman et al., 2000, 2001, 2004).
Lastly, if investigators still do not elicit enough information from open-
ended or closed-ended follow-ups, they may resort to using suggestive or
leading questions (Lamb et al., 2018). These are questions that force the
response in a specific direction (e.g., “He touched you, didn’t he?”) or
introduce information not already mentioned by the child during the
interview (e.g., asking about touching when the child has not mentioned
touching). Unlike in lab settings, investigators in real life have no way to
know if their question is misleading (a leading question that uses false
information) or not. In sum, free recall and open-ended follow-ups may
not elicit a whole lot of information from young children, but they are the
best way of guaranteeing that responses will be accurate.
In a study by Hill and Davies (2013), researchers carefully analyzed
transcripts of forensic interviews with child witnesses from England and
Wales, examining how frequently each type of question was uttered by
investigators. This study examined 13 interviews between 1993 and 1998
using the Memorandum of Good Practice (MoGP) and 12 interviews
between 2002 and 2009 using the latest implemented guidelines in
England and Wales for interviewing child witnesses (i.e., Achieving Best
Evidence; ABE). In both samples, free invitations only made up about 8%
of the overall questions asked by investigators. There was also a similar
80 B. F. COTTERILL
Question Repetition
Children do not have to be asked a leading or misleading question to pro-
vide inaccurate information. Evidence suggests that when children are
asked the same question repeatedly, they seem to sometimes think they
must have previously given an incorrect response and so should change
their answer, or if they did not answer to begin with then they may suspect
that the interviewer is looking for an answer and so give one even if they
are uncertain. Importantly, the more children repeat an answer, the less
their uncertainty becomes detectable (Poole & White, 1991).
Unfortunately, there are numerous examples from real cases over the neg-
ative effects of question repetition. Below is an extract from an interview
with a child from the Little Rascals case:
Prosecutor: Do you remember telling Miss Judy that you had to put
your private next to her private? Did you have to do
that, Bobby?
Bobby: No, sir.
Prosecutor: What did you say?
Bobby: No, sir.
Prosecutor: Did you say no or yes?
Bobby: Yes, sir.
Interviewer: When Kelly kissed you, did she ever put her tongue in
your mouth?
Child: No.
Interviewer: Did she ever make you put your tongue in her mouth?
Child: No.
Interviewer: Did you ever have to kiss her vagina?
7 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF SUGGESTIBILITY 81
Child: No.
Interviewer: Which of the kids had to kiss her vagina?
Child: Me.
Clearly, the use of repeated questions can confuse children and cause
their statements to be inconsistent. Now that judges and lawyers are more
informed about how suggestible children can be, inconsistent statements
can cause the child to appear as an unreliable witness and have their testi-
mony be excluded from trial. The use of improper questioning, therefore,
benefits no one. If the child is incorrectly swayed by improper questioning
and their testimony is given at trial, it may result in a wrongful arrest. On
the other hand, if the child is correctly swayed by improper questioning,
their testimony may be suppressed, and the guilty suspect could walk free.
Nowadays, the negative effects of repeated questioning are well under-
stood by researchers, but their recommendations are still solemnly fol-
lowed by investigators (e.g., Luther et al., 2015; Roberts & Cameron,
2015). The issue of question repetition has been largely ignored by most
interviewing protocols, such as the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development (NICHD) interview protocol in America and the
guidelines in Norway and Sweden (Cederborg, 2004; Cederborg et al.,
2000; Myklebust & Alison, 2000). In England and Wales, the Achieving
Best Evidence (Home Office, 2007) interviewing protocol warns against
the use of verbatim repetition (using the exact same words each time).
Verbatim repetition is the only type of question repetition that has been
widely addressed by research (e.g., Howie et al., 2004; Krähenbühl &
Blades, 2006; Memon & Vartoukian, 1996; Poole & White, 1991; Powell
& Thomson, 1996); however, Krähenbühl (2007) found that verbatim
repetition only accounted for 10% of repetition by police interviewers
when analyzing transcripts of police interviews in England and Wales. It
would seem that when warned against repeating questions verbatim,
investigators still repeat questions, but just in another form. Though every
type of question repetition had a negative influence on the accuracy and
consistency of children’s reports, Krähenbühl and Blades (2009) found
that verbatim repetition had the least effect when comparing the effects of
four different types of question repetition. Gist repetition (maintaining
the meaning, but not the wording of the question) was the most fre-
quently found form of repetition, accounting for over half of all types of
repetition, and was found to have only a slightly worse effect than verba-
tim repetition. Specific to closed (repeating a specific question in the
82 B. F. COTTERILL
Interviewer Bias
Another factor thought to affect the quality of eyewitness testimony is
interviewer bias. This is when an interviewer has prior beliefs about the
subject of the interview and only asks questions that seek to elicit state-
ments in support of those beliefs, while consciously or unconsciously
avoiding questions that may result in statements that are in conflict with
those beliefs (Ceci et al., 2016). For example, in the day care sexual abuse
cases, investigators often thought that abuse had happened before chil-
dren had even mentioned anything about abuse. The questions during
these interviews revolved around coaxing the children into making state-
ments that would reveal details about the abuse (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1995;
Garven et al., 1998; Schreiber et al., 2006), and the interviewers avoided
questions which may have provided alternative explanations over the
behavior of the children.
To demonstrate interviewer bias, a study by Clarke-Stewart et al. (1989,
as cited in Ceci & Bruck, 1995) introduced five- and six-year-old children
84 B. F. COTTERILL
to a janitor named Chester during their class. For some groups of children,
Chester merely cleaned some dolls and toys in the classroom. For other
children, Chester handled the doll far more roughly. Later, the children
were interviewed about what they had witnessed. Some of the interviewers
were accusatory (suggesting that Chester had been playing inappropriately
with the toys), some were exculpatory (suggesting that Chester was merely
cleaning the toys), and some were completely neutral and nonsuggestive.
When interviewed by a neutral interviewer, the children’s accounts were
incredibly accurate with what they had witnessed. However, when the
interviewer contradicted what the child had witnessed, the accounts of the
children conformed to the suggestions of the interviewer. By the end of
the study, 90% of the children gave answers that were in agreement with
what the interviewer was suggesting, rather than with what had actually
happened.
Often, interviewer bias is reflected by emotional tone and by body lan-
guage. For example, if an interviewer is getting the responses they desire,
then they may give the child positive feedback or nod their head.
Interviewer bias may also be demonstrated via question repetition, option-
posing, leading questions, stereotype induction, or any kind of feedback.
Either way, it is extremely risky for an interviewer to pursue one single
theory over an event. In a study by Leichtman and Ceci (1995), for exam-
ple, preschool-age children were interviewed about a man’s visit to class.
For some of the children, the interviewer provided highly biased state-
ments that indicated the man was clumsy. By the end of the questioning,
a significant portion of these children had provided false reports of the
man damaging property and behaving clumsily, even though the visit had
been brief and ordinary. In a similar study, Quas et al. (2007) found that
children interviewed by a highly biased interviewer about a play session
were significantly less accurate than those interviewed by a less-biased
interviewer. These studies suggest that biased statements and interviewer
pressure can increase the chances of false reports. This is similar to the day
care sexual abuse hysteria cases of the 1980s and early 1990s, when inves-
tigators would use peer pressure and negative stereotypes of the defen-
dants to get disclosures from the children (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). A range
of factors may impact the potential impact of interviewer bias upon a child,
including those relating to the child and to the interviewer, such as per-
ceived interviewer status (for a review, see Hritz et al., 2015).
7 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF SUGGESTIBILITY 85
Stereotype Induction
Stereotype induction is one method that reflects interviewer bias. For
example, in the Little Rascals case, at least some of the children had been
given negative statements about the day care workers before they were
ever questioned. This may then have influenced their responses when
being interviewed. A demonstration of stereotype induction is the Sam
Stone study by Stephen Ceci (Chap. 3).
Interviewer Status
Children are more likely to believe adults than other children based solely
upon their status as being older (e.g., Ceci et al., 1987). More than this,
young children seem to recognize status to a certain extent and are more
suggestible when they are interviewed by police officers with a more senior
position (e.g., Tobey & Goodman, 1992). Overall, there is little evidence
that this is a serious concern so long as proper interviewing practice is
applied (i.e., proper questioning and no interviewer bias). For example, in
the case of Kelly Michaels, one of the police officers told a young witness
that he could put bad people in prison, and if the boy told him what he
wanted to hear, he would introduce him to the other important men who
put Kelly in prison (Ceci & Bruck, 1995). In this instance, the police offi-
cer abused his status to coax the response that he desired from the young
witness. Once this happens, children are vulnerable to suggestion and,
thus, to making inaccurate statements.
Though it may seem reasonable that recognition of status may impact
a child’s suggestibility, little research has further investigated this. Bull and
Corran (2002) argue that this is because many researchers consider it to
be a resolved issue, given that the American Psychological Association
(1998, as cited in Bull & Corran, 2002) instructs psychologists, when
interviewing children, to appear relaxed and informal. Therefore, a num-
ber of researchers, inspired by this line of research, have instead investi-
gated the potential impact of emotional tone on suggestibility.
Emotional Tone
Young children provide more accurate information when they feel com-
fortable during the interview, and when the interviewer is both supportive
and positive in tone (e.g., Goodman, Bottoms, et al., 1991). Furthermore,
86 B. F. COTTERILL
the child that they may know information the adult does not during a
forensic interview.
There is then a rapport-building phase, in which the investigator should
attempt to generate a positive relationship with the child witness. This
may involve asking the child about something they like to do (Lamb et al.,
2018). As children may be asked to provide information that is potentially
embarrassing or that makes the child uncomfortable, they will be more
likely to provide details if a sense of trust is created between the child and
the investigator (e.g., Saywitz et al., 2015; Vallano & Schreiber
Compo, 2015).
The third stage is a practice interview, sometimes referred to as training
in episodic memory. This is an interview about a neutral, unrelated event
(e.g., a holiday, a hobby that came up during rapport building). This
allows the child to become familiar with what is expected during the actual
interview (i.e., that they should provide lots of details in response to open-
ended questions). During this stage, it is important for the investigator to
use open-ended questions. Research shows that children produce 2.5
times as much information during the actual interview if they are asked
open-ended questions during the rapport-building (or practice interview)
phase compared to closed-ended questions (Sternberg et al., 1997).
As it transitions to asking about the crime in question, the following
stages of the protocol rely on free recall and uses open-ended follow-up
questions (e.g., general invitations, cued invitations, and time segmenta-
tion invitations) to prompt further information as it transitions to asking
about the crime in question. It is recommended that the use of directive
questions be deferred and that closed-ended and suggestive questions are
avoided, if possible (e.g., Lamb et al., 2018).
A study by Lamb et al. (2006, as cited in Lamb et al., 2018) compared
50 interviews using the NICHD protocol with 50 interviews not using
the protocol in the United Kingdom with child witnesses. They found that
the NICHD interviews produced a significantly higher number of free
invitations (34% vs. 7%), and that there was also a decrease in how many
of the questions were phrased as option-posing (18% vs. 27%). Furthermore,
56% of the details elicited during NICHD interviews were in response to
free invitations, as opposed to only 14% during non-NICHD interviews.
Similar results have been found in different countries, comparing question
types and details elicited by question types between NICHD interviews
and non-NICHD interviews (e.g., Sternberg et al., 2001).
88 B. F. COTTERILL
Cognitive Interview
Another commonly used interviewing format is the cognitive interview.
This was developed by Geiselman et al. (1984 as cited in Pozzulo, 2017)
to be used with both adult and child eyewitnesses. The main focus of the
protocol is to aid with reconstructing events so that minor details may be
uncovered that were not previously reported. To achieve this, the format
makes use of four recall techniques that have each individually been shown
to improve memory recall (for a review, see Memon et al., 2010): (1)
reinstating the context (i.e., having the witness put themselves back to the
time and place of the event); (2) limiting cognitive resources (e.g., having
witnesses close their eyes during memory recall to avoid cognitive over-
load); (3) reversing order, as witnesses may be more accurate reporting
what happened most recently rather than starting at the beginning; (4)
and changing perspective (e.g., asking what the perpetrator was looking
at). Saywitz et al. (1992) adapted the protocol to be used specifically with
children. It has been found that this was more effective than standard
interviewing protocols; however, it was more effective with older children
than younger children, unlike the NICHD protocol which has been found
to be effective with children of all ages (Hayes & Delamothe, 1997;
Saywitz et al., 1992). Recent research has revealed cognitive interviewing
may improve accounts among intellectually disabled children (Gentle
et al., 2013).
Stepwise Interview
One other widely used protocol is the Stepwise Interview, developed by
Yuille et al. (1993, as cited in Pozzulo, 2017). The Stepwise Interview is
the precursor of the Scottish procedure, used in all areas of Scotland except
for one, and the Achieving Best Evidence (ABE) interviewing protocol in
England (Home Office, 2001, as cited in Krähenbühl & Blades, 2006). It
has the interviewer follow specific steps, similar to the NICHD, including
the establishing of rapport, asking for free recall, and then the use of fol-
low-up questions. Like the NICHD protocol, the Stepwise Interview
includes a practice interview (though this step is not included in England’s
ABE). A quality analysis (La Rooy et al., 2013) of interviews conducted
with children in Scotland, however, examined 74 random transcripts, and
found that none of 74 interviews included the practice interview. It would
appear that though practitioners in Scotland are urged to follow the
7 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF SUGGESTIBILITY 89
specific steps of the Stepwise Interview, certain steps are largely ignored in
practice. The quality analysis did reveal that there are significantly fewer
leading and closed-ended questions being used by practitioners in Scotland
compared to interviews conducted two years previously, which is indeed
promising.
Case Study
On July 22, 2006, Tamika Mack-Norton was stabbed to death by her
36-year-old husband—Quincy Norton—in their home in Daly City,
California. All three of their children were home at the time of the murder,
including their nine-year-old son (QN), seven-year-old son (DN), and
one-year-old daughter (JN). Both the sons heard their mother screaming
from her bedroom. QN went to investigate and found his father standing
over his crying mother. Quincy Norton told QN to go back to his room.
The nine-year-old boy did as he was told. Moments later, Norton took all
three children from their beds and into the car. He drove them to his
cousin’s house, where he left them before going to stay at the home of one
of his girlfriends. Weeks later, she requested him to leave, and he was soon
arrested at a nearby bus stop. He claimed to police that he had returned
home to find his wife already dead, probably killed by one of his girl-
friends. When asked why he fled the scene and did not call police, Norton
explained that he thought he would be suspected because of his long his-
tory of domestic violence and other criminal behavior. The detectives
informed him that they had already interviewed his sons and that their
claims did not corroborate his story. At court, Quincy Norton argued that
their memories must have become tainted by leading questions from
detectives and family members. This matter was debated by legal experts
presented by both the defense and prosecution (see Chap. 9). The convic-
tion was overturned by the trial judge due to inadequate representation.
Two years later in 2010, there was a second trial. Quincy Norton was
given a life sentence for his wife’s murder with a minimum of 26 years to
be served in prison.
Case Study: Analysis
QN and DN were not interviewed following any formal protocol.
However, the style taken by the investigators is similar to that of the
NICHD. Investigators began by building rapport with QN and DN,
90 B. F. COTTERILL
asking them about school and sports. They also established some rules,
making sure QN and DN knew the difference between the truth and a lie.
For example, one investigator asked QN, “If I say my T-shirt is white, is
that a truth or a lie?” This is similar to the examples suggested by the
NICHD’s script. The investigators in this case used a number of question-
ing styles, however, that would have been discouraged by the NICHD or
other formal interviewing protocols. For example, there were a number of
leading questions used that had the potential to taint testimony (e.g.,
“Didn’t you hear your mom crying again or yelling your guys’ names?”).
There were also a number of option-posing questions used. As already
discussed in this chapter, young children often do not realize they possess
information that adults do not. For example, one investigator asked DN,
“Do you know whether your father had a bulletproof vest?” DN replied,
“I didn’t know that.” During the interviews, questions were also repeated
in a potentially harmful way. For example, QN was asked seven times if his
father or mother were holding anything when he saw them in the bed-
room. QN responded “no” every time. In this sense, he was resistant to
the pressures of repeated questioning. Generally, QN was more resistant
to suggestive questioning and more consistent in his testimony than his
younger brother, as you would expect based upon what has already been
discussed in this text. For example, DN was inconsistent about the color
of shirt worn by his father.
There were, however, a number of positives about the interviewing
process in this case. First, QN and DN were first interviewed on the same
day as their mother’s murder, and then were interviewed again the next
day. As already discussed, children’s memory accounts are more likely to
be accurate after minimal delay. This also helps reinforce the memory,
making their statements more consistent in subsequent interviews and
making them more resistant to suggestive questions. Generally, accounts
by both QN and DN remained incredibly consistent across the years dur-
ing legal hearings. Second, the event took considerable time, as opposed
to only seconds. Research suggests that prolonged events such as this will
be more accurately remembered (Goodman & Hahn, 1987). Third, the
event involved the parents of QN and DN, as opposed to observing
strangers. Research suggests that events will also be more accurately
remembered when the people involved are familiar, and also when there
is personal significance for the witness (McWilliams et al., 2013). Finally,
the event of witnessing their mother’s murder would have been undoubt-
edly stressful. Research suggests that negative and more emotionally
7 EXTERNAL FACTORS OF SUGGESTIBILITY 91
Conclusions
Back at the beginning of the twentieth century, it seemed misleading
questions were the only suggestive technique. Now, research has indicated
various other factors that can increase suggestibility, including repeated
questioning, emotional tone, negative feedback, and stereotype induction.
These techniques are at their highest level of negative influence when in
the presence of interviewer bias. So long as the interviewer is testing alter-
native hypotheses, challenging the statements, and allowing the conclu-
sions to come straight from the words of the eyewitness, then at least most
of these factors should not pose serious problems. The next chapter will
discuss factors of suggestibility that are internal to the child.
Interviewer: No? Other kids have kind of worried about Patrick touch-
ing them. They didn’t feel very comfortable at all. Didn’t
it make you feel yucky when Patrick touched you in the
Ghostbusters House?
Child B: He didn’t touch me.
Interviewer: He didn’t touch you? Well think about when he lifted you
up so you could reach the prize in the pink piñata. Did he
touch you then?
Child B: [Shakes head.]
Interviewer: Did he touch you on your bottom?
Child B: [Shakes head.] No.
Interviewer: No? Didn’t he touch you on your behind?
Child B: No.
Interviewer: Are you sure?
Child B: [Nods.]
Interviewer: Some other kids told me that they didn’t like it when
Patrick touched them. Did he ever touch you in a way that
you didn’t like?
Child B: [Shakes head.] Uh-uh.
Interviewer: No? Are you sure?
Child B: [Nods.]
Interviewer: Yes? I bet it made you feel kind of yucky when he touched
you, am I right?
Child B: No.
Clearly, there were individual differences at play, other than age, which
influenced whether or not the children went along with the interviewer or
resisted. Some children will agree immediately with misleading questions
by interviewers, and some will continuously deny that a suggested event
ever occurred. In their review of 69 published and unpublished studies
involving 4848 children, Bruck and Melnyk (2004) examined the impacts
of various cognitive and personality factors on suggestibility, including,
but not limited to, attachment style, creativity, intelligence, and tempera-
ment. In 2020, Klemfuss and Olaguez’s updated review uncovered a fur-
ther 55 studies, including 6455 children, investigating similar dispositional
factors. In both reviews, intelligence and language ability were the factors
most frequently reported by studies to be significant factors. This chapter
will explore some of these factors in more detail.
8 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RELATING TO SUGGESTIBILITY 97
Age
As stated earlier in this text, age is one of the most reliable predictors of
memory recall in witnesses, with younger children (especially below the
age of six years) typically reporting less details than older children and
adults (e.g., Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995; Hershkowitz et al., 2012). During
free recall, though older children provide more details, there are often no
age-related differences in accuracy (e.g., Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). In
some cases, however, older children still perform significantly more accu-
rately than younger children even during free recall (e.g., Eisen et al.,
2002). As explained, younger children are typically more vulnerable than
older children and adults to external suggestive influences (e.g., Ceci &
Bruck, 1993; Ceci & Huffman, 1997; Ghetti et al., 2002; Loftus &
Davies, 1984; Otgaar et al., 2009; Wade et al., 2002).
Gender
Early theorists believed that boys were less suggestible than girls, and,
thus, made better eyewitnesses (e.g., Bolton, 1896; Gross, 1911; Hurlock,
1930; Lombroso, 1878, as cited in Meares, 2016; Messerschmidt, 1933;
Stern, 1910, as cited in Ceci & Bruck, 1993). German jurist Hans Gross
stated in a manual for judges, lawyers, and law students, “The boy just
growing out of childhood, in so far as he has been well brought up, is
especially the best observer and witness there is … while the girl of the
same age is often an unreliable, even dangerous witness” (Gross, 1911, as
cited in Meares, 2016, p. 1). Gross’s argument was supported by studies
at the time, generally reporting that females were significantly more vul-
nerable to external suggestibility in the form of leading questions and
submission to authority figures than males (Hurlock, 1930; Messerschmidt,
1933; Stern, 1910, as cited in Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Explanations for
these findings were presented in the form of unsupported biological
accounts, describing different memory capabilities between males and
females (e.g., Bolton, 1986). Overall, the work by Gross demonstrates
how stereotypes and social attitudes discredited the testimony of girls at
the beginning of the twentieth century. Studies by psychologists at the
time only reinforced these societal prejudices.
Contemporary findings, however, show that gender differences in sug-
gestibility and eyewitness performance are no longer reported (e.g.,
Alexander et al., 2002; Burgwyn-Bailes et al., 2001; Chae, 2004;
98 B. F. COTTERILL
Clarke-Stewart et al., 2004; Imhoff & Baker-Ward, 1999; Quas et al.,
1999; Roebers & Schneider, 2001; Rossi et al., 2011; Young et al., 2003).
It is interesting that these gender differences were reliably found by stud-
ies during the first half of the twentieth century and then ceased to be
found by researchers. It perhaps suggests either that early researchers
within a male-dominated psychological discipline sought results to rein-
force social prejudices or that as the status of women has improved female
participants in eyewitness studies feel more confident in correcting inves-
tigators when given misleading questions than they once did (Meares,
2016). A review of 20 studies by Bruck and Melnyk (2004) concluded
that there are no consistent gender differences. Klemfuss and Olaguez’s
(2020) review uncovered eight further studies examining gender differ-
ences. Only one study in their review found a significant effect, and it was
that boys were more susceptible to suggestion from misleading questions
than were girls (Gilstrap & Ceci, 2005). Unfortunately, it is still a com-
mon misconception even among academics that these gender differences
exist. For example, Volpini et al. (2016) hypothesized that girls would be
more suggestible than boys in their study; their results failed to support
their predictions.
Socioeconomic Status
There is little evidence to suggest that socioeconomic status affects eyewit-
ness performance or suggestibility in any way (Alexander et al., 2002;
Clarke-Stewart et al., 2004; Geddie et al., 2000), though few studies have
attempted to examine the relationship. One exception is a study by
McFarlane et al. (2002), which found that children from lower socioeco-
nomic backgrounds were more suggestible (though it accounted for little
of the variance—2%). This study had a larger participant pool than com-
parative studies (220 compared to 51–70; Alexander et al., 2002; Clarke-
Stewart et al., 2004; Geddie et al., 2000), which may indicate that any
influence of socioeconomic status may be small and only be detected in
large samples.
Cognitive Factors
Other than the effects of age, cognitive factors are the most widely studied
predictors of individual suggestibility and eyewitness performance. Since
eyewitness performance involves providing memory reports of witnessed
8 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RELATING TO SUGGESTIBILITY 99
events, it seems logical that certain cognitive factors would have a part to
play in how accurate those reports are. Generally, children with higher IQ
scores and better memory are less suggestible to misleading questions and
remember more accurate descriptors than children with lower IQ scores
and poorer memories (e.g., Bettenay et al., 2015; Danielsdottir et al.,
1993; Endres et al., 1999; Geddie et al., 2000; Gignac & Powell, 2006;
Henry & Gudjonsson, 2004; Hurlock, 1930; McFarlane et al., 2002;
Roebers & Schneider, 2001; Singh & Gudjonsson, 1992).
The research suggests that intelligence is particularly a significant influ-
ence of eyewitness performance when it comes to children with intellec-
tual disabilities (see London et al., 2013 for a review) or when it comes to
typically developing children under eight years of age. In the case of typi-
cally developing children aged eight years and over, intelligence is less of a
significant influence, and some researchers have not found any significant
relationship between intelligence and suggestibility when it comes to this
age group (for a review, see Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). This is likely because
by the age of eight years, even children with an average IQ are mentally
mature enough that they are generally resistant to suggestive questions. In
support of this, eyewitness performance typically increases, and suggest-
ibility decreases, as children experience developmental progressions in
cognitive inhibition, executive functions, and language abilities (e.g.,
Alexander et al., 2002; Clarke-Stewart et al., 2004; Danielsdottir
et al., 1993).
Temperament
Although less researched than cognitive factors, research has also sug-
gested that temperament characteristics or behavioral styles may impact
one’s understanding, interpretation, and processing of an event, as well as
one’s ability to resist suggestive questions when providing eyewitness tes-
timony (Shapiro et al., 2005). Ornstein et al. (1997) theorized that par-
ticular elements of temperament affect the perception of eyewitnesses as
they witness events take place (activity level, emotionality, and persistence),
while other elements (adaptability, shyness, and distractibility) impact on
their performance during forensic interviews. Temperament is a precursor
of personality and refers to behavioral traits that explain how one behaves,
thought to have a genetic origin, or at least be determined early in life
(Braungart et al., 1992; Buss & Plomin, 2014; Martin, 1988; McDevitt &
Carey, 1978; Mervielde et al., 2005; Posner & Rothbart, 2000).
100 B. F. COTTERILL
Activity
Activity refers to the degree to which one enjoys being physically active
and is considered to be one of the dimensions of temperament (Martin,
1988). The results of some studies have negatively correlated activity with
memory accuracy in young children, during both initial interviews and
delayed interviews (Chen, 2002; Palmer et al., 1998, as cited in Bruck &
Melnyk, 2004; Shapiro et al., 2005). Melnyk (2002) identified that chil-
dren characterized as hyperactive by their teachers performed significantly
poorer as eyewitnesses; these children typically fidgeted a lot, talked
102 B. F. COTTERILL
Adaptability
Adaptability refers to how easily one adapts to changes in one’s environ-
ment. Children who are more adaptable are more easily managed as
infants and accept new rules or changes to plans more easily than less
adaptable children (Martin, 1988). It seems reasonable that children who
struggle adapting to new environments may feel exceptionally uncom-
fortable being interviewed by the police and so may disclose only a lim-
ited amount of information. There are three known studies that have
found a significant positive relationship between adaptability and mem-
ory ability (Geddie et al., 2000; Greenhoot et al., 1999; Shapiro et al.,
2005), and other studies have found no significant relationship (Blackford
& Shapiro, 1999, as cited in Bruck & Melnyk, 2004; Burgwyn-Bailes
et al., 2001; Imhoff & Baker-Ward, 1999). As noted previously, a recent
study by Johnston et al. (2021) found that children higher in social flex-
ibility, a construct that combines high adaptability and low shyness, cor-
rectly disclosed significantly more transgressions during free recall than
other children.
8 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RELATING TO SUGGESTIBILITY 103
Distractibility
Distractibility refers to how easily one’s attention is diverted. The reasons
for why distractibility may be related to eyewitness performance may be
more obvious than other traits of temperament; the theory is that more
distractible children will encode fewer details regarding a witnessed event
and so be more easily confused during questioning, making them more
suggestible to misleading questions, as well as have less information to
provide in the first instance. Furthermore, they will presumably pay less
attention during a forensic interview and so may misinterpret questions.
One known published study (Benedan et al., 2020) and two unpublished
dissertations (Melnyk, 2002; Purdy, 2001) have found a significant, nega-
tive relationship between distractibility and eyewitness performance, while
other studies have found no significant relationship (Alexander et al.,
2002; Blackford & Shapiro, 1999, as cited in Bruck & Melnyk, 2004;
Burgwyn-Bailes et al., 2001; Brown et al., 1999, as published in Bruck &
Melnyk, 2004; Clarke-Stewart et al., 2004; Geddie et al., 2000; Imhoff &
Baker-Ward, 1999; Scullin, 1997). In Benedan et al.’s (2020) study, chil-
dren with higher attentional ability reported more information overall and
were significantly less susceptible to misleading questions. Part of the rea-
son for the difference in findings is the various ways in which distractibility
is measured across the studies. For example, some have used the distract-
ibility subscale from Martin’s TABC (teacher-version), while other studies
have used composite scores from various subscales in other measurements.
In Brown et al. (1999, as published in Bruck & Melnyk, 2004), teachers
were simply asked to rate a child’s attentiveness.
Emotionality
Emotionality refers to the intensity with which one’s feelings are expressed.
Young children who are more emotional will, for example, stomp their
foot, scream, or cry with more intensity than children who are less emo-
tional when they get into trouble or do not get their way (Martin, 1988).
Emotionality has been found to have a significant effect on eyewitness
performance by a larger number of studies than any other temperament
trait (Chae & Ceci, 2005; Chen, 2002; Geddie et al., 2000; Greenhoot
et al., 1999; Palmer et al., 1998, as cited in Bruck & Melnyk, 2004;
Scullin, 1997; Shapiro et al., 2005), though the direction of the relation-
ship is inconsistent and explanations are unclear. It may be that children
104 B. F. COTTERILL
who are typically more emotional will also be more emotional when wit-
nessing a criminal event, and this will impede the process of encoding
(Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). If this was the case, then it may depend how
emotionally arousing the crime is (e.g., a brutal attack will be more emo-
tionally upsetting to a witness than a nonviolent robbery) and may also
depend on who the victim of the crime is (presumably a child will be more
emotional if the victim is a family member or the child themselves).
Of course, this makes the effect of emotionality difficult for researchers
to study, as research projects typically aim to cause as little emotional upset
to participants as possible. While, in most cases, emotionality has been
found to be negatively related to eyewitness performance (Chae & Ceci,
2005; Geddie et al., 2000; Greenhoot et al., 1999), some research has
found the opposite—that high emotionality significantly correlates with
lower suggestibility (Chen, 2002; Scullin, 1997). This makes things more
confusing regarding how emotionality and eyewitness performance inter-
act, but it may be because although children who are more emotionally
intensive are less likely to remember a great deal of details during a stress-
ful event, they are also less likely to be coerced into making a false
statement.
Interestingly in Johnston et al.’s (2021) study, though reactivity was
unrelated to responses from children, it significantly impacted the behav-
ior of the interviewers. Indeed, more reactive (or emotional) children
received a significantly higher number of prompts. The authors explained
that more emotional children tend to give shorter answers, thereby requir-
ing further guidance from interviewers. There is a potential danger, there-
fore, that interviewers may become frustrated in response to challenging
behavior from children and be more likely to ask whatever questions they
think will help resolve the interview more quickly. In support of this, as
mentioned previously, Gilstrap and Papierno (2004) found that interview-
ers were significantly more likely to ask leading questions to shyer chil-
dren. This is another example of how interviewers may respond to
challenging behavior by straying from guidelines.
Persistence
Persistence, another temperament dimension, is linked to task perfor-
mance (e.g., Sandelands et al., 1988), and is defined as the extent to which
one will continue with an activity, a desire, or a frame of mind, even when
challenged (Martin, 1988). Blackford (2000) and Burress et al. (1999, as
8 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RELATING TO SUGGESTIBILITY 105
cited in Chen, 2002) found that children who were more persistent
remembered more peripheral details about a crime than those who were
less persistent. According to Chen (2002), persistence may be important
both for remembering details during the witnessing of an event and for
the process of an interview. This helps also to explain findings by Greenhoot
et al. (1999), when more persistent children were less likely to answer
“yes” to misleading questions than children who were less persistent.
Shyness
As discussed earlier, shyness refers to the degree to which one withdraws
from social situations (Martin, 1988). Children who are more sensitive to
the social aspects of an interview may report less information and may be
more easily swayed by suggestions from the interviewer. In support of this
theory, Kagan (1994, as cited in Schacter et al., 1995) found that inhib-
ited children were reluctant to oppose requests by adults. Gordon et al.
(1993) found that lower levels of shyness predicted a larger amount of
information reported by three-year-olds in response to open-ended recall
prompts, but not for five-year-olds. As outlined previously, a number of
studies have found shyer children to be less accurate as witnesses and to be
more suggestible to misleading questions (e.g., Endres et al., 1999;
Gilstrap & Papierno, 2004; Roebers & Schneider, 2001). Muir-Broaddus
et al. (1998) found no relationship between shyness and eyewitness recall,
but this was on a small sample of 36 five- to seven-year-olds. Importantly,
studies have all looked at different ages but there is yet no evidence of an
interaction effect between age and shyness on suggestibility, with the
exception of Gordon et al.’s (1993) paper.
This research ties in with studies showing that introverts typically per-
form poorer than extraverts on facial recognition tasks, independent of
general cognitive abilities (e.g., Lander & Poyarekar, 2015; Li et al., 2010;
Wang et al., 2012). The results show that introverts are poorer at extract-
ing social stimuli, such as faces, but are matched to extraverts when it
comes to recognizing nonsocial stimuli. It is theorized that this is due to
extraverts being more socially skilled than introverts, being less likely to
experience social phobia (Bienvenu et al., 2001; Davis et al., 2011).
Therefore, it is not extraversion in general, but experience of social inter-
actions that improve facial recognition performance. Participants high in
shyness or with an autism spectrum disorder diagnosis also may then dis-
play facial recognition problems if there is a history of social interaction
106 B. F. COTTERILL
difficulties (e.g., Yardley et al., 2008). It may be the case that this lower
recognition accuracy is due to weaker encoding. For example, participants
higher in social phobia may be less likely to look directly at the face of
targets during eyewitness studies. If this is the case, negative impacts
should be observed in eyewitness description studies regarding social
details, and not just eyewitness identification studies.
Measuring Temperament
In previous eyewitness studies, temperament is generally measured by hav-
ing parents or teachers rate the temperament traits of the children in their
classrooms via either the Behavioral Style Questionnaire (McDevitt &
Carey, 1978) or the Temperament Assessment Battery for Children
(Martin, 1988). The problem is that, unlike cognitive abilities, tempera-
ment cannot be objectively measured, especially when it comes to young
children who are too young to self-complete questionnaires. Studies con-
tinue to determine the temperament of child participants via ratings by
their teachers, even though research consistently shows that teachers have
poor reliability when it comes to rating the personality traits of their stu-
dents (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1998; Measelle et al., 1998; Rudasill et al.,
2014; Spooner et al., 2005), meaning that it is arguable to what extent
any of the previous studies have truly measured temperament traits; this
may explain why results in the area are so mixed. It is also possibly the
reason as to why there has been little progress in regard to the connection
between temperament and eyewitness performance in the last ten years.
Notably, evidence suggests the opinions of teachers do not converge with
those of other raters when it comes to interrater consistency on problem
behavior or personality traits (e.g., Achenbach et al., 1987; Stanger &
Lewis, 1993; Youngstrom et al., 2000)). In sum, it would seem that a
more accurate way of measuring temperament is required before studies
can really begin to understand the influence that temperament traits may
have on eyewitness performance.
Conclusions
When it comes to individual differences relating to suggestibility, there
remains a lot to learn. Still, there is enough evidence to indicate that indi-
vidual differences are a significant factor of eyewitness performance. Some
8 INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES RELATING TO SUGGESTIBILITY 107
of the factors may seem more obvious. For example, it may be clear as to
why children with higher intelligence, verbal ability, and better memory
perform better as eyewitnesses. However, other factors, such as traits of
temperament, require further exploration and understanding in regard to
how they may make a difference to eyewitness accuracy. Dispositional fac-
tors cannot be changed to improve accuracy, but a better understanding of
individual differences may offer suggestions regarding how system vari-
ables may be changed. For example, if it was found that less adaptable
children struggle more to describe a criminal event, it may be that investi-
gators will receive more descriptors if they conduct the interview at the
child’s house rather than at a police station or allow for the child to bring
their favorite toys to the interview, therefore meaning the child has less
environmental changes to adapt to. Temperament may also impact how
children are perceived as witnesses, rightly or wrongly, independent of
their actual memory performance. The next chapter will discuss how child
witnesses are regarded by jurors during trials, and how some of the exter-
nal factors and individual differences relating suggestibility can impact on
their perceptions.
Juror Perceptions
Case Study
The last case study of the text is that of Clarence Elkins. The case began in
1998, when six-year-old Brooke Sutton went to stay with her grand-
mother (Judy Johnson) one evening after a birthday party in Barberton,
Ohio. Brooke was upstairs when she was awakened by a disturbance
downstairs. A man had broken into the house. Downstairs, he was raping
and violently beating Brooke Sutton’s grandmother to death. Brooke
went downstairs to investigate and came face-to-face with her grandmoth-
er’s killer. The man proceeded to rape Brooke and then hit her over the
head with a blunt instrument, leaving her unconscious in a pool of her
own blood. The next morning, Brooke regained consciousness and called
the only number she knew—that of a friend. There was no answer, so
Brooke left a voicemail, saying, “I’m sorry to tell you this, but my grandma
died, and I need somebody to get my mom for me. I’m all alone. Somebody
killed my grandma. Now please, would you get a hold of me as soon as
you can? Bye.”
After leaving the voicemail, Brooke knocked on the door of the neigh-
bors. Tonia Brasiel opened the door, finding Brooke standing on her
9 JUROR PERCEPTIONS 111
doorstep, naked and covered in blood from the wound on her forehead.
Brooke told the neighbor that someone had killed her grandma. Tonia
responded by saying she had to get her kids ready for school and that
Brooke was to wait on the doorstep. Brooke was then left on Tonia
Brasiel’s doorstep for nearly an hour, still naked and coated in blood.
During this time, Tonia never called the emergency services or invited
Brooke inside. Eventually, Tonia returned to the door and questioned
Brooke on who had attacked her. Brooke did know who had attacked her,
but Tonia wanted to know what the person looked like. Brooke responded
by saying her attacker looked like her Uncle Clarence. Tonia then offered
to drive Brooke home. During the car ride, Brooke disclosed to Tonia that
it had indeed been her Uncle Clarence who killed her grandma and then
attacked her, not just someone who looked like him. In sum, Brooke had
gone from saying “somebody” had killed her grandma during the voice-
mail, to saying it was someone who looked like her Uncle Clarence on
Tonia Brasiel’s doorstep, to then saying that it was in fact her Uncle
Clarence who was responsible during the car ride home.
Tonia Brasiel dropped Brooke off at her house and told Brooke’s par-
ents that Brooke had disclosed to her that her Uncle Clarence had killed
her grandma and then attacked her. Tonia then left, not waiting to be
interviewed by police. Brooke’s parents drove to Judy Johnson’s house to
investigate, finding her body and the murder scene. They called the police,
who then questioned Brooke and asked her what had happened. Brooke
told them that her Uncle Clarence had killed her grandma and then
attacked her. Police went to Clarence Elkins’ house to arrest him for Judy
Johnson’s murder (his mother-in-law). At first, Clarence Elkins was
stunned but assumed it was all just a mistake and would soon be set right.
Police then informed him that there was no mistake as they had a witness
who had seen him commit the crime—his six-year-old niece.
At trial, Brooke Sutton pointed to Clarence Elkins in the courtroom
and told the jury that he was the man who killed her grandma and attacked
her. Tonia Brasiel then took the stand and testified that Brooke had identi-
fied Clarence Elkins as her grandmother’s murder immediately after the
incident. Clarence was found guilty of murder and two counts of rape and
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. It was not until
three years after the crime that Brooke confessed she had doubts over her
identification. Eventually, she explained to her family that she had been
having flashbacks of her rape and that it could not have been Clarence
who raped her because Clarence had blue eyes, but her rapist had brown.
112 B. F. COTTERILL
Mann was at the same prison as Clarence Elkins. Within this prison, there
are ten sections, and prisoners from one section have no interaction with
prisoners from other sections. Strangely, Earl Mann and Clarence Elkins
were being held within the same section. Melinda wrote to Earl Mann,
pretending that he had won money and urging him to write her back, so
that she could use the DNA from the envelope as a comparison with the
DNA from the crime scene. Earl never wrote back, and so she told her
husband that he would have to collect Earl Mann’s DNA. Clarence man-
aged to get a cigarette butt discarded by Earl and sent it to his lawyers for
testing. Days after this, Earl was transferred to another prison. The test
revealed a match. Amazingly, the district attorney still refused to release
Clarence, and so Clarence’s lawyers contacted Ohio State Attorney
General Jim Petro. For the first time in American history, a state attorney
general publicly pressured a prosecutor to dismiss the charges. After agree-
ing to complete their own tests, and finding that Earl Mann was a match,
the district attorney dropped charges against Clarence, and he was released
in 2005. In 2008, Earl Mann pleaded guilty and is currently serving 55
years to life in prison.
the lawyer’s suggestion. Using the scenario of a murder within their study,
Karla and Heath (1997) found that six-year-old bystander-witnesses were
rated as significantly less credible when leading questions were used, and
mock jurors were also significantly less confident in their guilty verdicts.
Similarly, Tubb et al. (1999) found that a nine-year-old’s reports of sexual
abuse were perceived as significantly less credible and the defendant was
significantly less likely to be perceived as guilty when the disclosure was
elicited by police through suggestive questioning (participants were pre-
sented with one of two types of hearsay evidence: written transcripts or
second-hand testimony by a police officer). In a study by Olaguez and
Klemfuss (2020), mock jurors read a transcript from either a direct exami-
nation or a cross-examination with a child witness in a sexual abuse case.
Those who read the direct examination rated the child as being signifi-
cantly more credible. Overall, there is evidence to suggest that how child
witnesses’ statements are obtained influences the interpretation of
mock jurors.
Juror Gender
Typically, when it comes to sexual abuse cases, female jurors are more
likely to find the victim-witness credible than male jurors and are also
more likely to vote for a conviction (e.g., Devine & Caughlin, 2014;
Schutte & Hosch, 1997). This is also true in the case of child sexual abuse
victims (Bottoms & Goodman, 1994; Bottoms et al., 2007; Quas et al.,
2002). This may be because women are usually more empathic toward
children than men (e.g., Christov-Moore et al., 2014; Mestre Escrivá
et al., 2009), or perhaps because women are more likely to be sexual abuse
victims themselves (Office for National Statistics, 2020) and so are more
likely to sympathize with the victim of the case. Golding et al. (2007)
118 B. F. COTTERILL
Juror Age
Juror age has been largely ignored in the literature. Though there is some
evidence to suggest that older jurors may be more likely than younger
jurors to give a verdict of not guilty (e.g., Mossière & Dalby, 2008), the
results are mixed and are dependent upon the characteristics of the crime
and the defendant (Anwar et al., 2012). The author is not aware of any
findings in regard to a connection between juror age and perceived cred-
ibility of child witnesses.
Juror Personality
Though few recent studies have investigated the influence of juror person-
ality, largely due to small effect sizes in early studies (Greene et al., 2002,
as cited in Clark et al., 2007), there is evidence that certain traits have an
impact on juror attitudes. For example, Haegerich and Bottoms (2000)
found that jurors higher in empathy rated a child defendant (accused of
killing their abusive parent) as being significantly less guilty than those
lower in empathy. A meta-analysis of 20 studies by Narby et al. (1993)
found strong evidence for a positive connection between authoritarianism
and guilty verdicts. Seeing as how one’s personality impacts their social
behavior and political ideologies (e.g., Burton et al., 2015; Carney et al.,
2008; Hirsh et al., 2010; Sibley et al., 2012; Xu et al., 2013), it makes
sense that it would also impact their behavior as jurors. For instance, those
higher in authoritarianism are more likely to be politically right-leaning, as
well as to be more angered by the violation of certain moral foundations,
specifically loyalty, authority, and purity (Haidt, 2012). Therefore, it is
perhaps not surprising that, in certain cases, those higher in authoritarian-
ism are more likely to render less lenient verdicts as jurors (McGowen &
King, 1982).
9 JUROR PERCEPTIONS 119
witnesses are aged five to nine, defense attorneys typically focus their argu-
ments on the topic of suggestibility. When child witnesses are aged 10 to
14, defense attorneys tend to talk about the tendency to lie in children. In
sexual abuse cases, defense attorneys also frequently include arguments
related to adult behavior in children, lack of force during sexual abuse,
sexual behavior in children, and continued contact between the child and
their abuser. When child witnesses are older than 14 years, defense attor-
neys tend to focus on more personal reasons the child might have for
lying, such as revenge, jealousy, and attraction toward the suspect (St.
George et al., 2020).
Conclusions
It is clear that eyewitness testimony can influence jury decision-making.
Conviction rates are typically higher in cases involving eyewitnesses than
those without, especially in the absence of jury instructions (Greene,
1988; Spanos et al., 1992). There is considerably more research investi-
gating how witness characteristics influence the perception of jurors, such
as witness age, compared to juror characteristics. This is likely due to the
cost and time required to investigate multiple juror characteristics. As dis-
cussed, there is evidence that jury gender can affect perceived reliability of
child witnesses, but other factors such as juror age require further investi-
gation. There is also some suggestion that the types of questions asked and
the shyness level of the child witness may impact on how they are per-
ceived by jurors, as these factors may affect how confident they come
across, and confidence remains a main persuading factor for jurors. It is
worth noting that most of the research in this field has investigated how
individuals acting as jurors make their decisions, rather than groups of
people (i.e., juror decision-making, rather than jury decision-making).
This is a significant issue in regard to the validity of these studies as people
are likely to make decisions differently on their own compared to when
within a group. The dynamic of the group also makes an impact on how
decisions are reached. For example, the more extraverted the foreperson,
the longer deliberations last and the more influence the foreperson is per-
ceived to have by other jurors (Clark et al., 2007). This chapter has focused
on the perceived reliability of child witnesses, but to learn more about
court accommodations for child witnesses, please see the recommended
reading below.
9 JUROR PERCEPTIONS 121
Conclusion
This text began by presenting the question of how reliable children are as
witnesses. The simple answer is that children can be reliable witnesses, but
that it depends on both the individual child and the situation. For instance,
closed-ended questions and misleading questions can lower chances of a
child witness being reliable in comparison to open-ended questions. There
are interview protocols, such as the NICHD, designed to make sure inves-
tigators stick to recommendations when interviewing children. Younger
children are less likely to be reliable witnesses than older children. There
are a number of developmental changes that may explain these findings,
including the development of language abilities, theory of mind, memory,
and social skills. Findings from research also suggest that temperament
impacts eyewitness performance. For example, distractible children often
provide less correct information and more errors during police interviews
than less distractible children. Findings such as this can help investigators
identify challenging behavior that may impact eyewitness performance so
that the interview may be tailored to make it more appropriate. For exam-
ple, investigators may benefit from implementing many short breaks for
distractible children, though more research needs to be done to measure
the potential effectiveness of this. This is information that may be useful to
Registered Intermediaries in England and Wales, as they may be able to
make recommendations to police during forensic interviews with children
after challenging behavior has been identified. Overall, children can be
trusted as reliable witnesses so long as the following eight recommenda-
tions are followed:
younger children (e.g., Davies et al., 1989; Karageorge & Zajac, 2011;
Kuehn, 1974; Lindsay et al., 1994; Pozzulo & Warren, 2003; Zajac &
Karageorge, 2009). Indeed, children younger than seven years are likely to
answer even nonsensical questions if they are presented in a way that poses
options (Hughes & Grieve, 1980; Pratt, 1990; Waterman et al., 2000).
make sure they are kept on topic (Lamb et al., 2018, p. 173). For example,
the interview room should be kept quiet and sparsely decorated.
5. Avoid delay.
This text has discussed some direct external pressures, such as using
peer pressure and negative stereotypes of the defendants to get disclosures
from children, as demonstrated when discussing the day care sexual abuse
hysteria cases. Fortunately, this is now less common. However, there are
still indirect external pressures that investigators should look out for,
including perceived interviewer status (for a review, see Hritz et al., 2015).
External pressures are more likely to occur when the investigators have a
preconceived notion of the truth and only ask questions that seek to elicit
statements in support of one theory. Often, interviewer bias is reflected by
emotional tone and body language. To avoid these external pressures,
investigators should be testing alternative hypotheses, challenging state-
ments, and allowing the conclusions to come straight from the words of
the eyewitness.
Child witnesses appear less reliable to jurors when leading questions are
used during cross-examination (e.g., Karla & Heath, 1997; Olaguez &
Klemfuss, 2020; Tubb et al., 1999). The presence of leading questions
may make child witnesses appear less confident (Wheatcroft et al., 2004),
or have jurors unsure if the child is only answering the question because
they are being agreeable.
It is the author’s hope that this is a useful collection of recent research
for people interested in the field of child eyewitness reliability. Of course,
we must be mindful of the fact that any laboratory research on eyewitness
memory is limited to some extent in its validity. This text has outlined
some horrific cases against children, including rape and the witnessing of
murder. Clearly, no lab study can ever come close to mimicking the trauma
and personal significance connected to such cases. Still, there are impor-
tant findings here that have been replicated across participants, genera-
tions, cultures, and contexts, and therefore that contain significant
implications for police, lawyers, social workers, judges, and juries,
among others.
Research in the field over the past few decades has been dedicated to
understanding factors that impact eyewitness accuracy and suggestibility.
Now, research is going in an even more interesting direction—to under-
stand what can be done to overcome these obstacles and test out proce-
dures that may decrease the likelihood of suggestibility as much as possible.
The goal here (at least, in the author’s view) is not to screen out witnesses
or to find out which witnesses should be excluded from testifying. Instead,
the goal is to understand what witness characteristics and interviewer
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Index
M
G Misidentifications, 2, 109, 112
Gender, 72, 97–98, 114 Misleading questions, 22, 23, 25, 40,
Gist, 32, 34, 35 68, 91, 93, 96, 98, 99, 102, 103,
Goodman, G. S., 3, 25, 26, 39, 78, 105, 124
83, 85, 110, 114, 115, 117
N
H National Institute of Child Health and
Hershkowitz, I., 3, 82, 83 Human Development (NICHD),
81, 82, 86–90, 124, 125
I
Identifications, 2, 5, 39, 45, 50, 52, O
55, 61–64, 73–75, 106, 111, Open-ended, 22, 23, 25, 26, 67, 73,
113, 116, 127 78, 79, 82, 87, 105, 125
Interviewer bias, 8, 12, Open-ended questions, 37,
83–85, 91, 126 67, 87, 124
Interviewer status, 84, 85 Option-posing, 17, 18, 75, 79, 80, 82,
84, 87, 90
Options, 8, 125
J Otgaar, H., 34–37, 42, 97
Juror age, 118 Own-age bias, 41
Juror gender, 117–118
Juror personality, 118
Jury gender, 120 P
Persistence, 99, 100, 104, 105, 113
Pozzulo, J. D., 32, 38, 39, 41, 66,
L 71–74, 88, 110, 114, 125, 126
Lamb, M. E., 3, 5, 37, 39, 78, 79, 86,
87, 119, 125, 126
Language abilities, 38–41, 43, R
96, 99, 124 Rapport, 48, 86–89, 125
Leading questions/leading Repeat, 8, 46, 66, 67, 80, 125
questioning, 8, 11, 16, 22, 23, questioning, 23, 81, 90, 91
26, 32, 36, 46, 48, 66, 69, 70, questions, 81, 82
INDEX 163