INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

JOURNALS
OCTOBER 2019

Role of Diaspora in the Struggle for

National and Social Liberation
Antonio Tujan Jr.

On Class Struggle in China

During the Mao Era
Fred Engst
Copyright © 2019
All Rights Reserved

Institute of Political Economy

The Institute of Political Economy (IPE) undertakes research

and other support activities for policy formulation and the
development of alternatives for political economy issues in the
Philippines and the world. In particular, the IPE shall:

• Conduct in-depth research of value to a better

understanding of Marxist political economy issues and the
formulation of policies and alternatives;
• Conduct policy studies and publish its findings for the
formulation of alternatives and policies on political
economy concerns;
• Conduct fora, public discussions and similar activities on
major issues and significant socioeconomic development;
and
• Conduct training on policy studies work.

Executive Editor: Antonio A. Tujan Jr.

Managing Editor: Jennifer del Rosario-Malonzo

IBON Center
114 Timog Avenue
Quezon City 1103
Philippines

Telefax: +632 9276981

Email: ipe@[Link]

Design & Layout: Ron Villegas

Role of Diaspora in the Struggle for
National and Social Liberation
Antonio Tujan Jr.1

The imperialist policy of neoliberal globalization since the 1970s created an

upsurge of migration by implementing the system of labor contractualization
and labor placement agencies in industrialized countries. This system easily
gave way to labor contracting through partners in source countries in the South
such as the Philippines where the dictator Marcos promoted this as official
policy of labor export to amass profits by its bureaucrat capitalist cronies.

Thus, the issue of migration naturally became the more prominent issue
requiring attention in addressing labor along with the increasing cases of
abuse experienced by the overseas contract workers (OCW). We took on the
task of organizing the migrant workers and building their militant movement,
be they temporary or undocumented migrant workers or immigrants most of
whom are workers.

The question of cross-border refugees (due to political/manmade or natural

causes) also means that the toiling masses who compose the majority sooner
than later become migrant workers in the host country of refuge. A decade ago
we have started to look at the whole movement of migrants or compatriots
not simply as migrants workers but as diaspora.

Migrants, migrant workers, and refugees of all kinds are all part of diaspora –
the exodus or mass relocation of peoples due to societal or/and natural causes.
The individual who migrated autonomously is still part of a phenomenon
of mass displacement. Whether the displacement is apparently voluntary
or involuntary through commercial recruiters (such as manning agencies,

1 Antonio Tujan Jr. is a social activist working on Philippine and international issues for more than 40
years. He is the executive editor of the Institute of Political Economy. He is one of the founders of IBON
Foundation and the Director Emeritus of IBON International. He is the Vice-Chairperson for Internal
Affairs of the International League of Peoples’ Struggle. He is a researcher, editor, educator and writer. He has
written and/or edited various articles and books on food sovereignty, globalization and related issues.
4  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

placement services and other private trafficking businesses and ‘official

trafficking policies’). Conflicts and natural calamities are sudden events that
produce refugees in a mass scale. But societal or/and natural conditions can
also be slow-evolving, resulting in voluntary migration of individuals. All of
this result in a diaspora – displacement and the creation of a mass of peoples
or communities of the displaced.

Imperialism creates more conditions for diaspora through world wars,

aggression/invasion, intense oppression and exploitation resulting in poverty
and misery. Climate change as a result of monopoly capitalism further results
in more calamities, and climate migrants. Neoliberal globalization slowly
strangles economies and livelihoods and promotes more individual labor
migration. Particular policies of contractualization and the promotion of labor/
manning agencies can be construed as simply trafficking through legalized
temporary contracts. They are not at all very different from illegal trafficking
through fraudulent methods of unregistered recruiters.

By its definition (displaced collective community), diaspora is an adjunct

to the homeland, and shares history, social and cultural characteristics. This
means compatriots identify with and share the responsibility to focus to the
lot of the homeland and intuitively identify with the struggle for freedom and
democracy. The responsibility is not simply normative from the perspective of
activities and revolutionaries but the objective fact as a result of a community’s
collective experience from the homeland and as existence diaspora.

An individual’s subjective choice and objectively involuntary choice to search

for better living conditions does not diminish the various layers, features and
factors of ties to the homeland. This means that every individual remains
a part of the diaspora community through generations, even though there
will be variations of individual’s psychosocial identification to the diaspora
community. On one hand, the push factors of integration through work, school
and politics in the host country are contradicted by pull factors of family and
community, and socio-psychological-cultural factors and influences from the
diaspora community and the homeland.

The diaspora is another appellation for the compatriots who form an import
part of national democratic revolutions in semi-colonial semi-feudal countries
and other countries of the periphery. They are a motive force and become
important contributors to the struggle in the semi-colonial homeland which
are the weakest links of imperialism, and have the best opportunities to
contribute to the eventual downfall of imperialism.
 OCTOBER 2019  5

Diaspora movements of each homeland where possible can be developed in

any host country.

In diaspora or compatriot mass movement building we follow the mass line

and adhere to the class line where we give principal attention to: a) organizing
the temporary contractual workers and undocumented workers than the
immigrants, and b) workers with immigrant status rather than the highly paid
professionals and business people among immigrants.

Besides organizing workers in associations of workers and into unions as

appropriate and desirable, we also strengthen compatriot organizing and
agitation as part of the national democratic revolution in the homeland.
In this regard, workers associations are complemented by sectoral women’s
organization composed mostly of migrant working women and sectoral youth
organization with a strong contingent of students. Young migrant workers
give more life to the migrant worker organization.

We should strive to give shape to the diaspora community in each country

which can give voice of the community to address the issues in the homeland,
but also to the specific issues of social cohesion in a multicultural framework of
the host country. Thus we should look at the role of the workers’ organization,
the women and youth organization, the role of other organization of artists/
cultural workers, church people and social-cultural-faith-based progressive
and traditional organizations. The experiences of Filipino diaspora such as in
the US where the combination of Bayan (national democratic center), Nafcon
and Malaya (broad patriotic alliances) make up the broad progressive shape
of the community.

Building the identity of the diaspora community should be essentially political

– the diaspora community’s common struggle for freedom and democracy of
the homeland. This struggle puts the community in diametric opposition to
the puppet state of imperialism and its consulates and embassies which seek
to bring traditional and conservative organizations into its fold. The patriotic
diaspora community, aptly named Malaya in several countries, takes a broad
strategic framework of fighting for freedom and democracy. In the past, the
Philippine diaspora communities launched specific antifascist struggles such
as that against Marcos and recently against the US-Duterte regime. These
became the basis in building a broader antifascist united front and alliance
work with different progressive as well as traditional diaspora organizations.
6  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

Malaya shows the way towards building a diaspora community on the basis
of a more strategic goal of realizing national freedom and democracy for
the Philippines. To strengthen this goal, we pay attention to developing the
strongest multiple links with national, regional, sectoral and issue-based
forces in the homeland, develop social-political national integration as part
of the national democratic struggles in the homeland. Planned individual
or programmed groups tours, vacations and family visits can be developed
for different forms of immersion en masse. Host country national or local
governments and peoples’ organizations and institutions can be tapped to
fund solidarity visits for host peoples but also for national reintegration of
compatriots.

Diaspora expresses a duality as a community – their fight for freedom and

democracy in their homeland and their struggle for rightful integration.
Diaspora seeks a role in a multicultural host country but have to fight forced
integration and racism and xenophobia by the status quo and conservative
sections of the ruling classes. National democratic movements in diaspora
communities strengthen integration and unity with the homeland, while
expressing and practicing solidarity with host people in their struggle against
imperialism both domestically and internationally.

The other face of this duality is being part of the host country, whether as
temporary workers or as immigrants and new citizens is best expressed in the
day to day solidarity of the migrant with the host people. It also takes shape
politically in the solidarity organizing by the migrants of their friends and
co-workers to participate in their struggle through solidarity support to the
national democratic struggles of the people in the homeland. A prime example
of this is the International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines.
Diaspora communities along with organizations based in the homeland also
strengthen solidarity activities with their counterpart organizations such as
trade unions, churches and with youth, women, and artist associations.

Diaspora organizations and institutions are also expected to participate in

affairs of the host societies where solidarity is especially needed such as in
issues and struggles of workers, migrants, and other sectors, and also in such
issues of racism, xenophobia, discrimination, migration as well as urgent
issues of general import. Where their communities and organizations are
strong enough, they even participate in national elections or strengthen their
participation in government bodies (usually at local level).
 OCTOBER 2019  7

Interdiaspora or intermigrant movements and institutions have a positive

role in developing the capacity of diaspora communities to contribute to the
struggles in their respective homelands, as well as developing exchange and
solidarity with migrants in different countries.

Migrants who do not have strong roots in the homeland can be carried away
with anarchist or Trotskyite influences. The duality of diaspora can be utilized
by Trotskyites where migrants can be turned into a force for their supranational
militant campaigns. These incessant international campaigns have no national
bearing in the national revolution but only serve the purpose of international
campaigning against their perceived supraimperialist enemy.

Many national revolutionary movements can develop their diaspora population

in many countries where they have refugees and migrant workers. These
communities can be linked together as a global movement to participate in
the national democratic struggles in the semi-colonial semi-feudal countries
of the periphery. Many of these join the International League of Peoples
Struggle and International Migrant Alliance (IMA) where their international
linkages and campaigns are supported.

Where possible different diaspora movements in one host country can link
arms to fight common issues of discrimination and oppression against migrants
and refugees. They can build chapters of IMA which address solidarity
among different diaspora communities where they can become a powerful
contribution to the struggles against the elite rule in the host countries, such
as migrant workers issues or even broad political struggles in alliance with the
trade unions and other workers organizations.

In the waning years of imperialism and the dawn of socialism, diaspora –

or the migrants and refugees – is critical in every country whether in their
homelands or in the host countries beset with crisis where the people are
revolting for change.
 OCTOBER 2019  9

On Class Struggle in China

During the Mao Era
Fred Engst1

Abstract

To decipher the laws of class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat,
it is necessary to investigate thoroughly the specific forms of those struggles in
China at every stage of the Mao era, especially during the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution (GPCR).

From these observations one finds, in essence, that the history of class struggle
in new China since 1949 is a history of the process whereby capitalist roaders
(a phrase coined by Mao in 1965, denoting Party persons in authority taking
the capitalist road) emerged, proliferated, expanded their reach and eventually
took over the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese State. It
was also a process through which revolutionaries conceived, deepened and
matured their understanding of the danger capitalist roaders constituted while
confronting them.

The process can be divided into four stages. The first was the period from 1949
to 1956 where it accomplished the socialist transformation. The main feature of
this stage was its accomplishment of the socialist transformation. At the same
time, however, it gave birth to capitalist roaders through the establishment of
bureaucratic privileges. The second stage was the intense struggle from 1957

1 Fred Engst teaches economics at a university in Beijing. Fred was born in Beijing and grew up in the years
after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. His American parents are Erwin (Sid) Engst (a dairy
farmer) and Joan Hinton (a nuclear physicist) who arrived in the country after WWII to participate in
China’s new democratic revolution and socialist construction. He was a “Red Guard” during the Cultural
Revolution, and later was a factory worker for 5 years before moving to the U.S. in 1974. He continued to
work in various factories for a dozen years more, while studying part-time through college. He earned an
economics Ph.D. in 1997. By 2007, he returned to China to pursue his research interests, which include the
socialist economy and the Cultural Revolution, among others. Send feedback to: fredengst@[Link]
10  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

to 1962 over explorations of the road to socialist development. This was a

gradual process whereby revolutionaries grasped the true nature of capitalist
roaders and the grave danger they posed. The third stage was the 4-year
preparation phase before the GPCR where the struggle over a socialist versus
capitalist road erupted openly. The fourth stage was the decisive battle between
revolutionaries and capitalist roaders during the 10-year period of the GPCR
starting from 1966. The complexity of the class struggle that emerged was
unpatrolled in human history.

Throughout its various stages, the laws of class struggle seemed to display the
following characteristics:

First, although the main form of class struggle during the period of proletarian
dictatorship was that of the struggle between revolutionaries and revisionists
(i.e. capitalist roaders) over a socialist versus the capitalist road as the aim
within the Party, it was disguised by two-line struggles over means (more on
this distinction in part II).

Second, on the question of how to both distinguish and deal correctly the
two kinds of contradictions, i.e. those between the people and their enemies
versus those within the people’s camp, two polar opposite targets, lines and
policies were advocated both within and outside of the Party. One tried to
“convince others by reasoning” and believed in “learning from past mistakes to
avoid future ones, and curing the disease to save the patient.” The other tried
“conquest by force of arms,” and believed in “ruthless struggle and merciless
blows.”

Third, factionalism is the Achilles heel of the working class. Primarily among
those less advanced members of the vanguard who were unintentional capitalist
roaders, factionalism within the working class was the key that caused the
tragic demise of the GPCR.

Thus, it is clear that class struggle has its own laws. While class membership
might not be fixed, each class tries to fight on its own terms and ways; all are
constantly exploring and trying to sum up their particular experiences. As long
as the conditions for capitalism are not completely eliminated, that is, as long
as humanity’s most fundamental production activity remains the main means
of livelihood for most workers rather than their voluntary pursuit, or their
“life’s prime want” as Marx eloquently put it, then the means of production
(such as buildings and machinery) has the possibility of becoming capital, a
tool for enslaving living labor. The managers who were entrusted to coordinate
 OCTOBER 2019  11

the production of social wealth then have the possibility of becoming a new
class, a formation that actually controls the social wealth, and a capitalist
production relation can thus be materialized.

The working class must transform itself as it changes the world. The task
of changing the world cannot be achieved without the leading role of the
working class vanguard leading role in storming its enemies’ bulwarks, while
self-transformation is primarily reflected in the vanguard’s self-rectification.
This vanguard does not fall from the sky. Instead, it emerges amid struggles
and is tempered by struggle. Therefore, the key to whether the working class
can change the world depends on whether its vanguard can undertake self-
rectification.

Prohibiting bureaucratic privileges and adhering to the mass supervision of

the proletarian vanguard are fundamental measures to inhibit the formation
of an alien class stratum and to prevent the restoration of capitalist relations
of production. These are the eternal core principles of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.

While part I of this paper goes through the four stages of class struggle
during the Mao era, part II tries to give this experience a theoretical summary. 

Chronology of some key events during the Mao era

Land reform 1950
War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea 1950-1953
Wage reform 1955-1956
Rectification Movement 1957
Anti-Rightist Movement 1957
Great Leap Forward 1958
Lushan Conference 1959
Three Years of Difficulties 1959-1961
Seven-Thousand Cadre Meeting 1962
Socialist Education Movement 1963-1966
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution 1966-1976
12  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

List of the main characters during the Mao era

Name Chinese Highest Standing as of date
Bo Yibo 薄一波 politburo alternate, deputy Aug. 1966
premier
Chen Boda 陈伯达 politburo standing Sep. 1970
Chen Yun 陈云 deputy chairman Aug. 1966
Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 secretary general Aug. 1966
Deng Zihui 邓子恢 central committee, deputy Sep. 1962
premier
Gao Gang 高岗 politburo, deputy Feb. 1954
chairman PRC
Jiang Qing 江青 politburo Oct. 1976
Lin Biao 林彪 deputy chairman Sep. 1971
Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 deputy chairman, Aug. 1966
Chairman PRC
Mao Zedong 毛泽东 chairman Sep. 1976
Peng Dehuai 彭德怀 politburo standing, Sep. 1959
defense minister
Peng Zhen 彭真 politburo Aug. 1966
Wang Hongwen 王洪文 deputy chairman Oct. 1976
Wang Renzhong 王任重 alternate central Aug. 1966
committee
Zhang Chunqiao 张春桥 politburo standing Oct. 1976
Zhou Enlai 周恩来 deputy chairman, premier Jan. 1976

Preface

For the working classes of the world, the outbreak of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution (GPCR) a half century ago was, after the Paris Commune
and the October Revolution, the third milestone on the road to emancipation.

Marx and Engels identified the Paris Commune as an example of the

dictatorship of the proletariat. However, it would have been premature for
them to put forward any specific approach whereby the proletariat could seize
state power and bring its dictatorship into effect successfully.
 OCTOBER 2019  13

Lenin, in exploring the means through which the proletariat could seize
state power, soon realized they who had nothing, yet sought to overthrow
the highly organized capitalists with their vast political, economic, military
and cultural advantages, could do nothing other than build their own highly
centralized vanguard party that was unified under the principle of democratic
centralism. It is only through this vanguard that the proletariat could gain
political, economic, military and cultural advantages by virtue of the sheer
magnitude of its population.

Stalin upheld Lenin’s principle of Party-building, and tried, at least subjectively,

to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat by keeping the country’s means
of production under the ownership of the people2 as a whole. However, he
was not able to address the tough question of how to prevent victorious
revolutionaries from becoming new oppressors.

After leading the Chinese people to complete the new “bourgeois” democratic
revolution3 in 1949 and the socialist transformation in 1956, Mao — as a
thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninist — astutely perceived the existence of
two types of contradictions in a socialist society. Aware of the crucial need
to prevent revolutionaries from becoming oppressors, he soon realized the
imminent danger of the dictatorship of the proletariat transforming into its
opposite, especially after seeing what had happened in many other countries
in the “socialist camp.” Based on a series of concrete explorations and practices
aimed at combating and preventing revisionism, he put forward the theory of
“continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat”.

However, historical materialism believes that theory can only come after
practice. Although Mao had tremendous foresight he was not a prophet; he
could not foresee the emergence of capitalist roaders. His understanding of
capitalist roaders derived mainly from his struggles with them, and it was
only through such struggles that his understanding matured. By the time the
proletarian revolutionaries under Mao’s leadership finally comprehended the
grave danger capitalist roaders constituted, the latter had become a strong,
firmly entrenched force. This is why historical materialism shines. If not for the

2 Here the concept of “the people” is as defined by Mao, i.e. during “the period of building socialism, the
classes, strata and social groups which favor, support and work for the cause of socialist construction all come
within the category of the people, while the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution and
are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are all enemies of the people.” See [Link]
reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_58.htm
3 The “new democratic revolution” in China refers to the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution lead by
the working class, i.e. the CPC; in contrast to the “old democratic revolution” that was lead by the capitalists.
In either case, the nature of the revolution was still “bourgeois.” See Mao’s work “On New Democracy” for
a more in-depth analysis in [Link]
mswv2_26.htm
14  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

threat posed by these increasingly powerful capitalist roaders, revolutionaries

in the communist movement would not have been able to gain sufficient
understanding of the phenomenon these roaders represented.

It was under these circumstances the GPCR broke out.

Half a century has since passed, and the GPCR can clearly be seen as a great
and heroic struggle between the Chinese working class who had obtained state
power, and the hidden, newly emerged capitalist class. Their struggle over a
capitalist or socialist road forward for China after the 1949 revolution was
camouflaged as a two-line struggle between revolutionaries over the correct
or the best means to build socialism. Although the GPCR was short-lived,
its spirit, in common with that of the Paris Commune and of the October
Revolution, is eternal.

I. The many stages of class struggle in China during

the Mao era

In the Mao era, the class struggle inside and outside the Communist Party of
China was interrelated, as were the struggles within the upper echelons and
at the grassroots of the Party. There were scrambles for power and privilege
among emerging bourgeois (i.e. capitalist) elements within the Party, and
also struggles over which road forward (i.e. the two-road battle) between
revolutionaries and capitalist roaders. Even those who turned out to be capitalist
roaders, most of them did not initially have the conscious determination to
go against the socialist road. Similarly, revolutionaries did not always correctly
distinguish and deal with these two distinct contradictions. Therefore, one
could not easily discern between capitalist roaders and revolutionaries.

The proletarian revolution has always been carried out by people laden with
baggage from the old society. The revolution is thus inevitably a dual process
that changes not only the world but also transforms the revolutionaries
themselves. To accomplish this, any true revolutionary must unite the majority
of the revolutionary force and the masses. Rather than “persecute” them, Mao
and other revolutionary leaders tried time and again to transform the vanguard
of the working class, i.e. members of the Party and leading cadres at all levels
(themselves included), and propel the whole Party onto the revolutionary path
while simultaneously carrying out the struggle to transform the world.
 OCTOBER 2019  15

In retrospect, the capitalist roader phenomenon that emerged within the

vanguard of the working class was inevitable. After the founding of new
China, certain Party persons in authority enjoyed bureaucratic privileges and
perks4, and were defensive about supervision by the masses. To develop the
economy, they followed — whether habitually, instinctively, or subconsciously
— capitalist logic. Through this logic, they strive for more accumulation under
their control and saw material incentives as essential to promote production
by the masses. Thus, they misunderstood the goad of socialism and failed to
acknowledge the enthusiasm socialism inspired in the masses. Such people
could be labeled as unintentional capitalist roaders. Although subjectively
they wanted to change the world and be a part of the revolutionary process,
they nevertheless inherited certain ideologies and wrong understandings of
socialism by the class society from which they came. The conflict between
them and the masses, however, should be considered non-antagonistic, or as a
contradiction among the people within the revolutionary movement.

The purpose of movements like the Socialist Education Movement and the
GPCR had been to educate Party leaders at all levels that had unintentionally
made capitalist roader mistakes, and help them change their orientations. The
actual effect, however, was to change many people in authority, especially the
upper echelon of the Party leadership, from unintentional capitalist roaders to
diehard capitalist roaders with an acute class consciousness. Diehard capitalist
roaders were those revisionists in authority who staunchly defended their
bureaucratic privileges and firmly opposed any accountability to the masses.

In hindsight, the history of class struggle in the Mao era is a history of the
process by which capitalist roaders emerged, proliferated, expanded their
reach, and eventually took over the Party and the State. But it was also a
process whereby revolutionaries conceived, deepened and matured their
understanding of the nature and the danger posed by capitalist roaders.

The process can be divided into four stages. The first was the socialist
transformation period from 1949 to 1956, during which the working class
and its Party carried out struggles against both open and hidden forces of
the capitalist class. The main feature of this stage was its accomplishment
of socialist transformation, evident in the collectivization of agriculture and
the nationalization of industries. At the same time, however, it gave birth to

4 Instead of to each “according to the amount of labor performed”, as formulated by Lenin in “State and
Revolution”, bureaucratic privileges linked pay scale and individual economic well-being of party and
government officials to their rank within the leadership hierarchy. In other words, higher pay was received
for greater “responsibility.” For a more in-depth analysis of bureaucratic privileges, see On the Relationship
Between the Working Class And Its Party Under Socialism by Fred Engst,
16  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

capitalist roaders through the establishment of bureaucratic privileges. The

second stage was the intense struggle, from 1957 to 1962 over explorations
of the road to socialist development. Its main feature was the gradual process
whereby revolutionaries realized the true nature of capitalist roaders and the
grave danger they posed after going through a flip from the Rectification
Campaign to the Anti-Rightist Movement, then the Great Leap Forward,
and the ensuing Three Years of Difficulties. The third stage was a 4-year
preparation phase for the GPCR. The main feature of this period was the
struggle that erupted openly in China over the socialist versus capitalist roads
when capitalist roaders were openly designated as targets of the Socialist
Education Movement, and their “left in form, right in essence” counterattack.
The fourth stage was the decisive battle between revolutionaries and capitalist
roaders during the 10-year of the GPCR. The complexity of the class struggle
that emerged was unpatrolled in human history.

Stage [Link] struggle over socialist transformation (1949-1956)

During this period, the class struggle in China had two fronts. On the one
front, it was an open struggle against overthrown landlords in the countryside,
the bureaucratic capitalists in cities and the nationalist capitalists who had
been part of the united front during the new “bourgeois” democratic revolution
period, as well as that of the Korean War against U.S. imperialism. On the
other front, it was a struggle against capitalist worldviews within the Party.

As early as 1939, Mao said in The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist
Party,5 “The new democratic revolution clears the way for capitalism on the
one hand and creates the prerequisites for socialism on the other.” Moreover,
since the “democratic revolution clears the way for capitalism,” its spontaneous
tendency will appear in all possible ways, independent of human will.

Not all the people who joined the Party were committed communists. The
“bourgeois” democratic revolutionaries (in contrast to the true communists)
in the Party were relatively staunch anti-imperialists, anti-feudalists and
anti-bureaucrat capitalists. They joined the new democratic revolution before
1949 because they could see the old “bourgeois” democratic revolution led
by Sun Yat-sen was a dead end. However, their theory on socialism ended
with government intervention in the economy, which was in line with one
of Sun Yat-sen’s, “The Three People’s Principles,” (or sometimes translated

5 [Link]
 OCTOBER 2019  17

as “nationalism, democracy and the livelihood of the people”)6 i.e. restrained

capitalism. They did not understand the full meaning of the dictatorship of
the proletariat, which safeguards the means of production as owned by the
people as a whole.

Since its founding in 1949, new China had faced the issue of which road
to take. This struggle occurred on several fronts. Among them, whether or
not to “consolidate the new democracy”7 as Liu Shaoqi proposed, was one;
whether or not to tax state-owned and private-owned companies at an
“equal” rate as proposed by Bo Yibo, was another; and whether or not to push
forward the campaign for farm cooperatives was yet another. The latter debate,
however, was the fiercest and lasted the longest. It revealed that the ideological
understanding of a great number of Party leaders at all levels had remained
at the stage of the new “bourgeois” democratic revolution. These leaders had
an instinctive resistance to socialist revolution, for it entailed shaking the very
foundations of private enterprise.

After the Land Reform, peasants at the grassroots level were allocated parcels
of land from landlords, but livestock and large farm tools could not easily
be divided and shared out. The inevitable solution was to form mutual-aid
teams. New contradictions occurred: peasants helped each other during slack
periods, but each family tended to take care of their own in the busy harvest
season. The solution was either to re-concentrate farming tools in individual
households and re-polarize the countryside, or to upgrade the mutual-aid
teams to cooperatives. The former meant peasants would sooner or later lose
ownership of their land, hence the nullification of Land Reform. Only the
latter solution could prevent recurrence of the historical circles of dynastic
change after each peasant rebellion, and prevent Land Reform doubling as
a regime-changing sham. One reflection of this struggle at the grassroots
was the question of whether Party members could hire workers, and whether
cooperatives should be given a try in some villages.

Mao, standing on the side of the proletariat, gave full support to revolutionaries
in the Party (such as the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee, which proposed
cooperative experiments in 1950), and to socialist enthusiasm that was apparent
among poor and lower-middle peasants. To deal with Party cadres who were
unwilling to go beyond the new “bourgeois” democratic revolution (which was
only anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, but not socialism), Mao and others

6 More on this see [Link]

7 Ibid., and since the “New Democracy” is only a stepping-stone towards socialism, “consolidation” makes no
sense.
18  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

broke through many roadblocks they laid and through passionate persuasion,
led the whole Party to its completion of the socialist transformation in 1956.

Resistance against cooperatives came initially from Liu Shaoqi and Bo Yibo,
who were in charge of the Northern Bureau of the Party, and later from
Deng Zihui, who was mainly responsible for the Party’s rural work. Back
then, Liu Shaoqi advocated the line of initially pushing forward rich peasants’
development. Paraphrasing the idiom “fatten the pig before slaughter”, he
argued that after the rich peasant economy had developed to a certain level
it would then be time for “the state to collectivize by decree and confiscate
their properties.”8 This was in line with his belief that mechanization should
necessarily precede collectivization. After cooperatives proliferated, Deng
Zihui thought they had developed too fast and had begun to threaten rich
peasants’ interests, so he gave orders to dissolve hundreds of thousands of
them.9

Meanwhile, after the establishment of New China in 1949, the proletarian

vanguard changed status from the Party leading the revolutionary struggle
to the Party in power. By then, however, not all members of the vanguard
were equally advanced. Some joined the revolution to change society, while
others wanted more of a change in regime. Although the latter made great
contributions to the new “bourgeois” democratic revolution, they cared
most about their prestige after the founding of the new Republic. Therefore,
power struggles inevitably broke out among the “bourgeois” democratic
revolutionaries in the Party, notably the Gao Gang case. Gao Gang, a leader
of the northeastern region of China, represented the contempt that a large
number of cadres from the “Red Zone” (Red Army-controlled areas during
the revolutionary wars) felt for cadres from the “White Zone” (underground
Nationalist-controlled areas)10. He looked down upon people who had not
directed any military battles, criticized Liu Shaoqi for having risen to the top
by “giving speeches,” was unforgiving of his mistakes, launched factional fights
and advocated the slogan “those that fought in wars, should chair in peace.”

8 Tao Lujia (陶鲁笳), A High Level Argument at the Beginning of the Nation’s Foundation (2009) (in Chinese)
[Link]
9 Du Runsheng (杜润生) recalled in one of his memories of Mao Zedong, “He had called Liu Shaoqi, Peng
Dehuai and Deng Zihui together for a talk, and criticized them for not being enthusiastic about socialism,
warning them not to make that mistake in 1953. Mao mentioned this several times, and Peng Dehuai
also made some self-criticisms during his speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 7th CPC Central
Committee.” See excerpts (in Chinese) from Du Runsheng, Rin Chinese) [Link]
news/2015-10-08/[Link]. Also see MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, volume
1: contradictions Among the People 1956-1957, New York: Columbia University Press; 1974. According to
him, on p. 19, the number of collectives that were dissolved was 20,000 out of 670,000 collectives instead of
“hundreds of thousands”.
10 The dichotomy can also be understood as conflicts between the civilian leaders vs. military leaders in the
Party.
 OCTOBER 2019  19

Gao Gang lost his fight with Liu Shaoqi within the Party, and eventually
committed suicide in 1954.

At that time, it was not at all easy to perceive the true nature of those struggles.

The fight against capitalist worldviews was not only reflected in the struggle
over collectivization and opposition to factionalism within the Party, but was
also manifested in other areas. For example, should China follow the Soviet or
Western model of economic and cultural development? Or should it chart an
independent road forward based on Chinese conditions? Mao’s writings “On
the Ten Major Relationships”11 and his critique of the movie “The Life of Wu
Xun”12 were all attempts in the latter direction, as were the debates over the
“General Line of Socialist Construction” and his opposition to the so-called
“Opposition to Rash Advances” campaign.

Later generations tend to jump to the conclusion that the deaths from hunger
during the Three Years of Difficulties are attributable to the debates over the
“General Line of Socialist Construction”, arguments over the “Opposition
to Rash Advances” campaign in 1956 and the Great Leap Forward in 1958.
They thus commit the fallacy of causation and do not discern the differences
between managers and strategists. Managers like Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun
tended to focus on keeping things in balance. In contrast, Mao, as a strategist,
stressed the need to leapfrog in building socialism.13

During the Mao era, in order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat,
rapid industrialization was needed in order to change China’s poor and
backward state without further delay. This, therefore, required mobilizing the
masses to carry out production and reconstruction, and overcoming imbalances
through the people’s productive enthusiasm. Those “bourgeois” democratic
revolutionaries in the Party advocated a steady process of industrialization
that relied on experts, and whose organization and industrial production
arrangements depended on bureaucrats. In their view, laborers needed to do
no more than obey and cooperate, and they regarded the aim of socialism as
empowering the people to be their own masters as an empty slogan. This was
the true nature of the struggle over “Opposition to Rash Advances.”

11 [Link]
12 [Link]
13 Similarly Deng Xiaoping who, based on the strategic need to consolidate political power upon taking over in
the early 1980s, lavishly and purposefully handed over funds to Party leaders at all levels and intellectuals to
spend in order to win popular support for his policies. He was not overly concerned about the inflation this
would inevitably cause later on, for he was confident by then that tanks could be used if need be to deal with
any resistance from the people, and use them he did.
20  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

In retrospect, people tend to notice the struggles that were clearly apparent
at that time, while ignoring another incident of far-reaching significance.
This was the reform of the cadre wage system that began in 1955. The
institutionalization of bureaucratic ranks, with a more than 10:1 wage
differential between the top and 24th grades — on top of associated perks
and privileges — reflected profound corrosion of the capitalist ideology
within the proletarian vanguard. It abandoned the system of in-kind fixed
living allowances for cadres that had been in practice since the Yan’an Period
for a hierarchical wage system whereby cadres could endure “feast or famine”
conditions depending on promotions or demotions14. This violated one of the
cardinal principles of the Paris Commune, i.e. limiting the official’s pay to that
of skilled workers. It moreover provided a fertile ground for the proliferation
of capitalist roaders.

It was the establishment of this system of income tied to hierarchical rank,

rather than past contributions, educations, or experiences, etc. that brought
bureaucratic privileges into being. Office positions began to be sought after,
and that led to the formation of a class stratum as well. Based on the idea of
“curing the disease to save the patient,” a Party official who had committed
political errors or errors of line could generally make a self-criticism and be
forgiven. However, anyone who talked back to or offended his or her leader,
or disobeyed orders from above, risked demotion and the loss of his or her
job, which meant disastrous consequences for them and their entire family.
Therefore, “rather be wrong politically than organizationally” became the life
philosophy of the “bourgeois” democratic revolutionaries at that time.

Therefore, although the socialist transformation of agriculture, industry and

commerce was accomplished by 1956, it also provided material conditions
for certain “bourgeois” democratic revolutionaries in the Party to become
capitalist roaders. Unfortunately, most Party cadres were unaware of this.
Mao had repeatedly shown his favor for the earlier system of fixed living
allowances for cadres. He was also dissatisfied with the institutionalization
of bureaucratic and military ranks, as expressed in his refusal to accept the
military rank of Generalissimo. As a minority under democratic centralism,

14 The equalitarian in-kind fixed living allowances for cadres were unsustainable after the revolution. For
one, people’s needs can be vastly different. Also, most of the people joined the revolution to fight against
oppression, but they did not necessarily signed-up for an equalitarian society. Furthermore, there was a large
quantity of intellectuals and low-level government officials from the old regime need to work for the new
society, and they will not go along with an equalitarian system of pay. The social “norm” is to pay for more
contribution, for more education, or for more experience, etc. This is the so called “bourgeois rights” that
Marx addressed in his Critique of the Gotha Program, [Link]
gotha/[Link].
 OCTOBER 2019  21

however, he was not able to find any other workable way out of this, other than
to wait and see what could come through exploration and practice.

Stage 2. Struggles over which kind of socialism to build (1956-1962)

After the completion of the socialist transformation in 1956, the question

of what kind of socialism to build came to a head. At that time, new social
conflicts were appearing. Internationally, there were the uprisings in Poland and
Hungary and Khrushchev’s secret denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Congress
of the CPSU. Domestically, tens of thousands of workers and students were
on strike, and even some were rioting,15 all of which reflected an acute sense of
alienation from the bureaucracy by the people, and their instinctive resistance
to it. Confronted with this situation, many Party cadres handled the people’s
dissatisfaction in the same way they dealt with class enemies; by regarding
them as “a handful” of bad elements who instigated riots.

To get a firm grasp on the complex situation both internationally and

domestically, Mao felt an intense need to devote more time to study and to
train other leaders to shoulder the responsibilities of leadership. He delegated
the day-to-day running of the country and of the Party to a group of first-line
leaders that included Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, on the
understanding he would step in only when necessary.16

Through his investigations, Mao became acutely aware of the two distinct
types of contradictions bearing different characteristics that existed in a
socialist society, i.e. those between the people and their enemies versus those
within the people’s camp. He warned Party cadres, “The large-scale, turbulent
class struggles of the masses characteristic of times of revolution have in the
main come to an end, but the class struggle is by no means entirely over.”17
He repeatedly urged leaders at all levels not to treat contradictions among the
people as contradictions between the people and their enemies. Instead, he
advocated, “Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought
contend,” as a means to address debates with different opinions among the
people. He sought through the Rectification Campaign to overcome the
growing bureaucratic style of work within the Party. As quoted: “Our aim is to

15 The Biography of Mao Zedong (Central Party Literature Press, 2003), Page 612 (in Chinese)
16 Mao raised this idea in a politburo meeting after Stalin’s death in 1953, but not much was implemented until
the 8th party congress of CPC in 1956. See The Biography of Mao Zedong (Central Party Literature Press,
2003), Page 278 (in Chinese). Another reference is MacFarquhar The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 1
sited above p. 105.
17 Mao Zedong, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, [Link]
archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_58.htm
22  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

create a political situation in which we have both centralism and democracy,

both discipline and freedom, both unity of will and personal ease of mind
and liveliness, and thus to promote our socialist revolution and socialist
construction, make it easier to overcome difficulties, build a modern industry
and modern agriculture more rapidly and make our Party and state more
secure and better able to weather storm and stress. The general subject here is
the correct handling of contradictions among the people and those between
ourselves and the enemy. The method is to seek truth from facts and follow
the mass line.”18 One can apprehend much of Mao’s vision by this statement
alone.

At that time, Mao began to study questions mentors like Marx and Lenin
hadn’t considered, and which Stalin only noticed a bit towards the end of his
life but found no solutions. On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among
the People elevated Mao Zedong Thought to Maoism. While MZT was the
application of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions, Maoism deals with
how to continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

1. The class struggle in 1957: The flip from the Rectification Campaign
to the Anti-Rightist Movement, the formation of a class stratum and the
birth of capitalist roaders

As for how to both correctly differentiate and handle these two distinct
contradictions, the actual struggle was much more complex than Mao had
imagined. Consequently, he could do no more than explore it through practice.
During this period, due to the rise of capitalist roaders, he took certain detours
and experienced setbacks in many instances. Among them, perhaps the biggest
was the struggle in 1957 whereby the Rectification Campaign became the
Anti-Rightist Movement.

In dealing with events like the Hungarian uprising in 1956, whether to

overcome bureaucratic tendencies within the Party and to resolve contradictions
among the people through rectification or to suppress and cover up those
contradictions by scapegoating, these two different approaches proved the
most fundamental disagreement between revolutionaries and those top Party
leaders who were soon-to-be capitalist roaders.19

18 Mao Zedong, The Situation in the Summer of 1957, [Link]

works/volume-5/mswv5_66.htm
19 MacFarquhar The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, gave a very insightful contrast in Ch. 12 between Mao,
Zhou Enlai vs. Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen on their respective response to the Hungarian crisis. Mao and Zhou
stress the internal factors while Liu and Peng stressed the role that the imperialists played.
 OCTOBER 2019  23

Faced with increasingly acute social contradictions, Mao’s initial prescription

was to go all-out in pushing forward the Rectification Campaign20 in the
Party and around the country. However, as the campaign deepened over time,
the masses’ criticism of bureaucrats within the Party became ever sharper.
Some bureaucrats and those “bourgeois” democratic revolutionaries within the
Party who were keen to “reap the fruit of the revolution,” therefore, became
increasingly uneasy. Their instinctive reaction was to demand retaliation.
Meanwhile, the old capitalists in society and its representatives in intellectual
circles took this opportunity to attack the leadership of the Party, the
proletarian dictatorship, and the socialist system. This provided an extremely
convenient pretext for the Party bureaucrats’ counterattack.

In hindsight, true rightists would not have been able to overturn socialism at
that time; they had no control over the army or media and had no mass base
either. Their challenge, therefore, could easily have been resolved through a
slight counter-strike. However those soon-to-be capitalist roaders among top
Party officials took advantage of these rightist attacks to grossly exaggerate
the danger, blowing these challenges totally out of proportion and fanning the
flames of rage by acting like the sky was about to fall.

May 14, 1957 was the turning point. That morning, Mao remarked on a
sheaf of documents that he forwarded to a few top Party officials: “Our Party
will be destroyed without Rectification.”21 On the evenings of May 14 and
16, however, the top echelon of the Party had two back-to-back expended
Politburo meetings that arrived at the opposite conclusion. The official Mao
Zedong Biography does not elaborate on this, but one can easily perceive it from
a before and after comparison of the two-day meetings. Top Party officials
were infuriated with the Rectification Campaign. They exaggerated beyond
all bounds the extent of the rightist attack, overturned Mao’s judgment and
reached a contrary conclusion that the Party will be destroyed if Rectification
continues. Thus, the Rectification Campaign came to a screeching halt, and
the movement around the country took a U-turn and was redirected into the
Anti-Rightist Movement.

At the beginning of the counter-attack against the rightists, Mao was

extremely worried, thinking he might have misjudged terribly. As recorded
in the Mao Zedong Biography: “On those tensest days, he sent people almost
daily to Peking University, Tsinghua University, Beijing Normal University,
Renmin University of China and so on to read big-character posters. He asked
20 It was also known as the “Hundred Flowers Campaign”, see for example MacFarquhar R. The Hundred
Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals. New York: Praeger; 1966.
21 The Biography of Mao Zedong, same as the above, Page 689
24  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

his office staff, ‘Do you or do you not think that the rule of the Communist
Party in the country is solid?’ He was terribly anxious at that time. Later when
he recalled that period, he said, ‘I was constantly anxious, especially at the end
of last May, when the rightists attacked. I then had meals and worked in bed,
and would read those materials all day. Most were highly critical of us.’”22

A week later or two later, Mao recovered and gained a firmer grasp of the
situation. Mao believed in sticking back at the rightists ideologically, as seen
by his writings that followed,23 but not physical punishment or persecution
for backward ideas that one might have. Furthermore, he found the rightists
were not all that fearsome, and was confident that they could not overturn the
system. More than a month later, in his directive to the party on June 29, he
estimated there were just a few thousand right-wing intellectuals around the
nation. He also stressed: “For those who have only right-wing remarks but no
right-wing actions, they should be distinguished from those far-rightists who
have both speech and action (many people have historical misdeeds). When
criticizing the former, to take a reasonable and humane attitude, don’t rashly
label them as rightist.”24

It took many years, however, for Mao to realize to what extent the Rectification
Campaign had been hijacked by the Anti-Rightist Movement. As the Party’s
Secretary General who presided the Anti-Rightist campaign, Deng Xiaoping
was able to achieve a hundred-fold expansion of the right-wing population to
over 550,000.25 People thereafter were generally afraid of telling the truth and
the disastrous consequences therein, such as the “exaggeration and boasting”
in 1958 and consequent deaths from starvation during the 3 difficult years
that followed.

It now appears that by using the Anti-Rightist struggle, the new capitalists
not only defeated challenges that were faced by the old capitalists but also put
all revolutionaries who disagreed with them on the line. Mao was trapped in
a defensive situation. His voice became the loneliest among top Party officials.
His idea on how to correctly handle contradictions among the people was
utterly ignored, and democratic centralism restricted him from openly voicing

22 Ibid., page 696

23 For example, on July 9th, 1957, Mao gave a speech in Shanghai titled: Muster Our Forces To Repulse The
Rightists’ Wild Attacks, see [Link]
mswv5_63.htm
24 Chronicle of Mao Zedong Vol. 3 (Central Party Literature Press, 2013), Page 181 (in Chinese), The original
words are: “As for the population of the Rightists and extreme Rightists, counting people who could be
singled out for criticism in areas such as thirty or forty universities and colleges as well as tens of institutions
in Beijing, there are about four hundred people or so, while nationally, there are about four thousand people
25 R. MacFarquhar & J. Fairbank (Eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14: The People’s Republic, Part 1:
The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1949–1965, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p139
 OCTOBER 2019  25

his dissatisfaction with the target, the line and the policies of the Anti-Rightist
Movement.26

Mao tried on many occasions to limit the scope of the Anti-Rightist Movement
but had no effect. On June 8, he drafted a directive on the Anti-Rightist
Movement in which he said: “If all goes well, a month or so will see the whole
process through and we can then switch to inner-Party rectification, which
will proceed like ‘a gentle breeze and a mild rain’.”27 A month later on July
8, he made another speech in Shanghai, again expressing the hope that the
Anti-Rightist Movement would be wrapped up within a month or so: “The
nature of this struggle is primarily political. At the next stage of the struggle,
it will mainly be ideological, which should be conducted like ‘a gentle breeze
and a mild rain’. I see past July, and by August it should return to ‘gentle breeze
and mild rain’.”28

Mao’s desire to get back to the Rectification Movement showed he was worried
about the Party’s degeneration, but top Party officials were more concerned
about the Party’s downfall. In the socialist period, before there was any clear
understanding of the true nature of capitalist roaders, separating and correctly
handling these two distinct contradictions was no easy task.

On the surface, the capitalists had been ferreted out and defeated due to
the Anti-Rightist Movement. The proletarian dictatorship seemed more
consolidated than ever, and the system of private enterprise had been quashed.
In reality, however, through the Anti-Rightist Movement, whether consciously
or not, “bourgeois” democratic revolutionaries inside the Party became
capitalist roaders. By suppressing any criticisms from the people, they declared
to the world that mass supervision was not good, bureaucratic privilege was
just, critical opinions should be crushed and no “tiger’s backside” should be
touched. From then on, the system whereby revolutionaries were accountable
to both the Party and to the people was abandoned. In its place, promotions of
officials were based on their accountability only to leaders above. As a result, as
people celebrated the “success” of the Anti-Rightist Movement, a time bomb
had been planted in the body of the proletarian vanguard, and a class stratum
independent of the proletariat emerged. At that time, two necessary conditions

26 As recounted by Qi Benyu (戚本禹), Mao’s spirit was unusually down in the summer of 1957, burdened by
deep thoughts. Memoirs of Qi Benyu (I), (China Cultural Revolution History Press, April, 2016), Chapter 7
(in Chinese)
27 Muster Our Forces To Repulse The Rightists’ Wild Attacks [Link]
selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_63.htm
28 Chronicle of Mao Zedong Vol. 3, Page 188 (in Chinese). However, after seeing what happened to those that
dared to criticize local Party leadership in the hostile Anti-Rightist Movement, going back to Rectification is
not possible.
26  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

for the existence of capitalist roaders had been fulfilled: the establishment of
bureaucratic privileges and the prohibition of mass supervision. The “success”
of the Anti-Rightist Movement, therefore, became in effect the celebration
of the birth of capitalist roaders, and “the Party’s leadership” might no longer
represent that of the proletarian vanguard.

Intentional or not, the flip from the Rectification Campaign to the Anti-
Rightist Movement was, in reality, a struggle between revolutionaries and
capitalist roaders. The mass movement during the GPCR was the continuation
of the Rectification Campaign.29 The anti-people’s suppression on June 4,
1989, however, exposed its true class nature in the personage of Deng, who
presided the Anti-Rightist Movement of that time. No matter how those in
power branded themselves, the question, “Is our aim to protect or suppress the
people?” that Mao angrily asked at the beginning of the GPCR highlighted
the fundamental divide between revolutionaries and capitalist roaders.

If simply venting grievances about one’s leader can be labeled as anti-Party and
anti-socialist, then this kind of “socialism” will not be what the great masses of
the people would struggle for. As it happened, the Anti-Rightist Movement
treated the masses of the people who were not initially against socialism but
held certain grievances against their leaders at various levels as class enemies.
This in turn forced the majority to side with the true Rightists. It also labled
frank but not always perfect revolutionaries within the Party who dared speak
the truth and go against false leadership as “Rightists.”

In retrospect, the point of the Rectification Campaign was to guard against

the degeneration of the Party. Thus, the movement’s spearhead was aimed
upward in the Party. Processed according to the theory “a fish begins to rot
from the head down,” the movement first tried to solve ideological issues
within the Party, especially those concerning senior figures. The line was to
trust the masses, to rely on the masses and to mobilize the masses by way
of a mass movement to air all views and to write big-character posters. This
method was intended, through criticism and self-criticism, to achieve the goal
of uniting the majority rather than to “strike with one blow” those that made
mistakes. This was modeled after the Yan’an Rectification Movement that
started in 1942, under the principle, “Learn from past mistakes to avoid future
ones, and cure the disease to save the patient.” This was what Mao stressed
repeatedly in a series of speeches and instructions when he pushed forward
the Rectification Campaign.

29 This is evident even by Western China watcher, such as MacFarquhar who viewed the origin of the cultural
revolution begins in that period by titling this book as such.
 OCTOBER 2019  27

The point of the Anti-Rightist Movement, however, was to defend the

holders of power within the Party, as manifested by Liu Shaoqi’s speech on
May 25th where he warned the danger of workers joining with the students
in the Rectification Campaign, “then we won’t be able to stand our ground.”30
Therefore, the spearhead was aimed downward and outside of the Party. Its
policy was top-down manipulation of the masses, and its method was a polar
opposite to that of the Yan’an Rectification Movement. Under the principle
of “ruthless struggle and merciless blows,” the Party leaders used mudslinging,
character assassination, name-calling, fabrications and many other dirty tricks
to put down anyone who criticized them. Most of those eventually classified
as “Rightist” lost all perks and pay, and had to live on a meager subsistence
wage. The effect was the destruction of any democracy in and outside of the
Party, and the serious fusion of two distinct contradictions, i.e. those among
the people and those with their enemies.

Thus, in reality, the Anti-Rightist Movement was the newborn capitalist

roaders’ first shot at trying to shift the main target of struggle. By covering one
tendency with another, it became the model by which the few are protected by
cracking down on a large portion of the masses. Therefore, the Anti-Rightist
Movement seriously misdirected the enthusiasm of the masses. It is clear now
the so-called “success” of the Anti-Rightist Movement was of little value, but
instead caused profound harm during the rest of the Mao era and could not be
excused simply by casting it as a mistake of “broadening the targets.”

Superficially, the “broadening the targets” mistake of the Anti-Rightist

Movement was comparable to those similarly named during the Campaign
to Eliminate Counterrevolutionaries within the Red Army31 and during the
Rectification Movement in Yan’an to save “those who took false steps in life.”32
However, the Anti-Rightist Movement was fundamentally different from the
“broadening the targets” mistakes of the previous movements. The people who
had previously committed these errors were revolutionaries who wanted to
make revolution. Their mistakes were ideological in nature. As such, they were
a part of the two-line struggle, i.e. the different means, approaches or methods
through which revolutionaries pushed forward revolution.

30 MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 1, p221.

31 For example, the father of the Chinese President Xi: “By his own account, he was within four days of
being executed when Mao Zedong arrived on the scene and ordered Xi and his comrades released.” See (in
Chinese)
32 During the rectification campaign, many people were purged, kept in custody, censored, mentally
and physically tortured, and occasionally executed. See (in Chinese) [Link]
GB/64162/64164/[Link]
28  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

The “broadening of the targets” of the Anti-Rightist Movement, led by Liu

Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, proved not to be a simple mistake caused by a
wrong ideology. The Anti-Rightist Movement was generally supported by
the officialdom of the Party because it provided an excuse for those eager to
“take the spoils of the revolution” to consolidate their positions. This was a
part of the socialist vs. capitalist roads dispute, i.e. the struggle over the aims
and goals of the revolution, reflected in whether or not the masses of people
have the right to be masters of society. It was a classical case of “left” in form,
reactionary in deed.

A pattern thus began to emerge. The struggles over the aim of the revolution are
being covered up as struggles over the means to push forward the revolution.
We will see this repeatedly later on.

2. The class struggle during the Great Leap Forward and the People’s
Commune Movement: the role of capitalist roaders

The Great Leap Forward was launched perhaps to counter the dampening
impact of the Anti-Rightist Movement on the economy, and to release the
masses’ enthusiasm for socialism. This brought to light the main benefit of
collectivization — the capacity to build reservoirs and dams — which led to
the campaign for People’s Communes.

Meanwhile after the “success” of the Anti-Rightist Movement, those

“bourgeois” democratic revolutionaries were ready to contend for power.
They had become capitalist roaders with deeply embedded private enterprise
mentalities — subconsciously or otherwise — driven by the greed that was
inherent in their core values. How to parcel up the fruits of revolution for
personal advantage and seize the lion’s share thus became the basis of their
power struggle.

At the same time, many true revolutionaries made mistakes. Examples include
unrealistic steel and grain production targets,33 the “communist wind”34 that
expanded each collective accounting unit from a few dozen families to level
of townships or even counties, and the popularization of village communal
kitchens35. All of this gave those Party bureaucrats, having transformed from

33 The target for steel was as high as 12 million tons. See R. MacFarquhar & J. Fairbank (Eds.), The Cambridge
History of China, 14 , p367.
34 The “communist wind” refers to a phenomenon in the countryside where egalitarianism prevailed and
manpower and material resources were transferred arbitrarily in disregard of the collectives to which they
belonged, or from one level of ownership to another, in the name of communism.
35 See for example Peking Review, No. 36, 8 September 1959, [Link]
review/1959/[Link]
 OCTOBER 2019  29

“bourgeois” democratic revolutionaries into capitalist roaders, the leverage to

wreak havoc, such as the “communist wind”36 that expanded each collective
accounting unit from a few dozen families to the level of townships or even
counties.

Unrealistic high production targets were the ploys, executed through

“exaggeration and boasting”, and aimed specifically at raising ones’ political
prestige. The “communist wind” enabled bureaucrats to control more social
wealth and, through communal kitchens, to loot the fruits of peasant’s labor,
even when there was grain shortage. As peasant meals in communal kitchens
were free before the shortage began, high-ranking cadres in cities believed
they were entitled to privileged supplies, more so after the shortage hit.

On the one hand, after terminating the Rectification Campaign, the “success”
of the Anti-Rightist Movement greatly enhanced the prestige and power of
capitalist roaders within the Party while Mao’s voice was often ignored. On
the other hand, due to the contempt cadres from the “Red Zone” displayed for
cadres from the “White Zone”, as exemplified in the case of Gao Gang, civilian
cadres like Liu Shaoqi felt compelled to ramp up ostensible economic successes
in order to consolidate their position within the Party. Liu consequently
expressed his expectation that the national economy “probably needs to go
through several decisive battles to surmount the hump and gain a decisive
victory, like the three major campaigns during the War of Liberation.”37

Contemporary readers need to know the historical context of the mistakes

that the true revolutionaries made in setting up high production targets, as
well as the source of the “exaggeration and boasting.” At the time, China
was under incredible pressure to industrialize, on the one hand, to defend its
national independence, and to assist Korea, a brotherly nation, in their anti-
imperialist struggle. Dirt-poor and known as the “Sick Man of East Asia,”
China achieved a draw with the arrogant overlord of the world after WWII
in Korea, which was considered a staggering achievement. However, on the
other hand, China’s backward industrial base made the cost of waging the
War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea exorbitant. Industrialization,
therefore, was vital for China to avoid hegemonic bullying, on top of the
need to rise from poverty, and to liberate its peasants who constituted the
overwhelming majority of the population from backbreaking manual labor.
As peasants represented the bulk of China’s population, the country’s

36 The “communist wind” refers to a phenomenon in the countryside where egalitarianism prevailed and
manpower and material resources were transferred arbitrarily in disregard of the collectives to which they
belonged, or from one level of ownership to another, in the name of communism.
37 Liu Shaoqi, Speech in the Meeting for Nanjing Party Members and Cadres (September 27, 1958) (in Chinese
30  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

primitive accumulation of industrialization relied heavily on them. Hence the

more grain peasants can turn over, the faster China’s industrialization could
progress. Thus, with the gradual introduction of 156 Soviet aid projects38, the
demand for grain grew rapidly along with the rapid pace of industrialization.
The more grain a leader could raise or purchase, therefore, the bigger his or her
contribution was to China’s industrialization, and the more prestige within
the Party he or she gained. This was the objective condition behind high
production targets and was an important factor in the drive for “exaggeration
and boasting.”

Consequently, a strange phenomenon spread throughout the country. Those

with authority in the Party, including Liu, who had previously opposed
cooperatives now seemed to find them as a more convenient way of exacting
grain from the peasants. Motivated by potential political prestige, they
pushed hard for rash communization. Leaders around the country competed
with each other unrealistically over the pace and extent of communization
up to a point where certain top leaders proposed patently absurd ideas. Liu,
for instance, suggested military regimentation of cooperatives whereby men
and women slept in separate dormitories.39 Mindful that peasants might be
unwilling to share their wealth once they prospered, the best time to march
towards communism, according to Liu’s proposal, was while they were still
poor.40 Chen Boda suggested abolishing the commodity economy, i.e. markets.
Carried away, perhaps, by the huge achievements and successes during the
10 years after liberation, these bureaucrats went from one extreme to the
other. As main exponents of the widespread “exaggeration and boasting,”
these bureaucrats fabricated “fake news” in Chinese media about bumper
harvests, often inflating actual output more than tenfold. Under the guidance
of philosophical idealism and the world outlook of universal harmony, they
pushed the “communist wind” even further.

Under the “get rich by promotion” system in place among bureaucrats,

combined with the tragic ends of so many dismissed cadres after the Anti-
Rightist Movement, any cadres or individuals among the masses who dared
expose “exaggeration and boasting” by sticking to the facts faced serious
consequences. The phenomenon of officials at all levels concealing the truth
from those both above and below them became rampant. It eventually became

38 R. MacFarquhar & J. Fairbank (Eds.), The Cambridge History of China, 14, p. 158
39 Comrade Liu Shaoqi Inspects Cities and Villages in Jiangsu Province, (People’s Daily, September 30, 1958) (in
Chinese)
40 In November 1958, Mao Zedong said at the Wuchang Meeting: according to the opinions of Shaoqi and
Peng Zhen, it is better to implement (communism) while people are poor, because otherwise, it will be harder
to do so. See Xu Quanxing, Theories and Practice in Mao Zedong’s Late Time, (China Main Encyclopedia Press,
1993), 187, 189.(in Chinese)
 OCTOBER 2019  31

apparent that the higher up the official, the further away their information
was from reality. Consequently, Mao had no choice but to send his trusted
followers and office staffs, including bodyguards, to the grassroots to obtain
factual data.41

By the summer of 1958, Mao and other revolutionaries were aware matters
had taken a serious turn. They consequently opposed high production targets
and instructed the press to publish more down-to-earth, realistic reports.42
They also held meetings with high-level leaders in efforts to correct certain
misguided tendencies and elements of the “communist wind.” However, there
was at that time a dearth of true revolutionaries within the Party who dared
speak the truth. Most officials, such as Chen Yun, were wise and took care to
cover their backs. Aware these high production targets were unrealistic, they
nevertheless defended them to avoid being labeled as Rightists during key
meetings. Even so, it was relatively easy for revolutionaries to correct high
production targets, but it took them longer to truly recognize and acknowledge
the “communist wind” in full. Adjustments to the communal kitchen system,
moreover, did not take place until three years later.43

During the spring of 1959, to curb the spread of “exaggerations and boasting”
and the “communist wind”, Mao, as Chairman of the Party, bypassed those
first-line leaders by sending a circular on April 29 directly to all six layers of
Party organizations (regions, provinces, prefectures, counties, communes, and
villages), right down to grassroots cadres in collectives, instructing them to
disregard unrealistic demands from above. This caused outrage among certain
local leaders. For example, the provincial Party “boss” in Sichuan went so far
as to refuse to forward Mao’s letter to lower levels in the province.44

3. Debates during the Lushan conference in 1959

During the Anti-Rightist Movement, whether or not they were from the “Red
Zone”, capitalist roaders within the Party were all on the same page. However,
having defeated attacks from rightists outside the Party, it was inevitable those
within it should start contending for power and prestige.

41 See Memoirs of Qi Benyu (I), Chapter 9

42 Wu Lengxi (吴冷西), Recalling Chairman Mao – Several Fragments of Significant Historical Events I
Experiences by Myself (Xinhua Press, 1995), Chapter 5 & 7(in Chinese)
43 It was at a meeting in Beijing on June 12, 1961 where Mao explicitly rejected the communal kitchen. See
[Link] (in Chinese).
44 See, for example, Memoirs of Qi Benyu (I), Chapter 13
32  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

The original intent of the Lushan Meeting was to criticize the mistakes
of “exaggeration and boasting,” and to overcome the naiveté of the leftists’
“communist wind.”45

The Lushan Meeting was slated for only two weeks originally. Peng Dehuai,
then the defense minister, wrote a letter to Mao just before the closure of the
meeting and said that he was not happy to end the meeting without anyone
being held responsible for the mistakes in 1958.

For this reason the conference was extended for another two weeks. Heated
debate and often shouting matches between Peng and his supporters versus
the first-line leadership ensued. All of those “crazy” behaviors during the
Great Leap Forward undoubtedly formed the basis of Peng’s charge of “petty
bourgeois frenzy” against those first-line leaders. Instead of “curing the disease
to save the patient”, however, the Peng Dehuai-led, battle-tested capitalist
roaders took advantage of the shortcomings and errors exposed during the
Great Leap Forward to embark on a damning critique of the less seasoned
Liu Shaoqi-led capitalist roaders and other first-line leaders.

To watch Liu’s faction make fools of themselves, Peng made no comments

whatsoever on any of the numerous central committee meetings, from those
during the Great Leap Forward through the one just before the Lushan
Meeting, in which mistakes were being identified one by one and steps were
taken to overcome them. He then tried to reap prestige at their expense
during the Lushan Meeting, and this caused considerable anger among
revolutionaries led by Mao.

Opposition to the People’s Communes was the underlying motive of these

capitalist roaders. This set them apart from Mao, who constantly sought to
preserve the superiority of the communes, as well as to protect the peasants’
enthusiasm for labor, which was later formalized in collectives as the “Three
levels of ownership with the work team as the base.”46 As open opposition to
the People’s Communes was not advisable, Peng’s group instead claimed it
was their rash implementation that had caused the difficulties of the Great
Leap Forward.

45 See, for example, MacFarquhar The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 2, p. 191
46 Mao had stressed the distinction of 3 levels of ownership (township size commune, village size brigade, and
dozen family size work team) for peasants in early 1959, and it was later formulated as the Party’s policy
by 1962. See Mao’s Speech At Cheng-chow [Link]
volume-8/mswv8_27.htm
 OCTOBER 2019  33

It’s ironic that while Peng was opposing the Great Leap Forward and the
People’s Commune within the Party, outside of it both the U.S. imperialists and
the Soviet revisionists were simultaneously trashing the Great Leap Forward,
the People’s Communes and the General Line of Socialist Construction, all
of which added fuel to the revolutionaries’ anger at Peng.

Although Liu Shaoqi flip-flopped from right to left, from his opposition
to cooperatives in the early 1950s to his push for the “communist wind” in
1958, he continued to conceal his true colors as a capitalist roader. On such
questions as whether or not to mobilize the People’s Communes, whether or
not to carry forward mass movements, as well as how to treat shortcomings
and errors committed during a mass movement, Liu’s defense during the
Lushan Meeting was well clothed in Marxist-Leninist rhetoric. This was in
stark contrast to his attitude at the beginning of the GPCR. Therefore, the
leader whom Peng opposed at that time was not Liu the capitalist roader, but
one who on the surface was a revolutionary who supported cooperatives.

Reviewing the Lushan Meeting more than half a century later, it seems to
feature elements of contention for power among capitalist roaders and the
struggle between capitalist roaders and revolutionaries over China’s road
forward. Mao, in hindsight, regarded the struggle that had occurred at the
Lushan Meeting as a class struggle that was reasonable both internationally
and domestically, and which had stood the test of time. However, at the time,
Mao saw saw it mainly as a reflection of class struggle in society in the realm
of ideology, and not as a direct attack by the newly emerged capitalists on the
proletariat.

4. Class struggle during the Three Years of Difficulties

Peng Dehuai interrupted the Lushan meeting halfway through by challenging

the authority of first-line leaders and rejecting the Three Red Banners.47
Unfortunately, however, this struggle between the two cliques of capitalist
roaders at the Lushan Meeting made the “exaggeration and boasting” and
“communist wind” even more rampant.48 Instead of overcoming these, after

47 “Three Red Banners of the general line for socialist construction, the great leap forward and the people’s
commune,” [Link]
48 Mao commented on Mar. 5, 1961: “Before the Lushan meeting, our understanding of the situation was
relatively clear, but it was not clear after the Lushan meeting. Because the anti-rightwing campaign after
the Lushan meeting, those that tell the truth, talk about difficulties, talk about existing problems, talk about
objective actual situations, etc., were considered to be rightwing. The result was an air that doesn’t dare to
tell the truth. On the contrary, there was another kind of atmosphere, which was not practical. For example,
Henan’s original grain output was only 24 billion kilograms, and they said that there were more than 40
billion kilograms. All of which was due to the anti-rightwing campaign.” Chronicle of Mao Zedong Vol. 4, p.
547 (in Chinese)
34  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

Peng was removed as Defense Minister,49 the second wave of Anti-Rightist

Movement targeting people like Peng in the Party ensued.

This coincided with three consecutive years of large-scale natural disasters and
repayment of the Korean War debt to the Soviet Union. The superimposition
of all three resulted in the Three Years of Difficulties, when people died of
hunger and starvation. It was surely the most tragic incident in the history
of the new Republic. Being clear about its cause is key to understanding the
class struggle between the proletariat and capitalists, as well as the struggle
between the socialist and capitalist roads in China.

Right-wing propaganda ascribed the gross death toll during the Three Years
of Difficulties to abnormal deaths, ignoring the fact that the relatively high
average death rate of 1.8 percent50 (i.e. 1.6 percent, 2.5 percent, and 1.4
percent each year, in contrast to 1.2 percent in 1958) was still lower than
the normal death rate of 2.2 percent over the same period in India.51 What’s
more, the same level of natural disasters in other developing countries would
have caused even worse famines and higher deaths. However, the absence of
nutrition and consequent decline in immunity due to famine caused a death
toll way above what would normally be expected in a socialist country. Based
on semi-official statistics, around 10 million abnormal deaths occurred during
those three years,52 concentrated in Henan, Anhui, Shandong and Sichuan
provinces among others. These were the provinces where “exaggeration and
boasting” and “communist wind” were most prevalent during the Great Leap
Forward. The local effect of these disasters can barely be comprehended.

The main leaders, such as Wu Zhipu of Henan and Zeng Xisheng of Anhui,
were so obsessed with their prestige in the Party they ignored severe natural
disasters in their provinces and falsified production figures presented to the
central government with total disregard for the lives of the people living there.
When peasants had no extra grain to hand over, leaders demanded their feed
grain — and even seeds — to meet the quota based on bumper harvests they
had falsely reported, in the belief that peasants were hoarding grain. When real
famine struck, they blocked news to protect their reputations and prevented
residents from leaving to find food elsewhere. When the truth was exposed,
they made scapegoats out of the hundreds of thousands of cadres in their

49 His membership in the politburo was intact. He was invited to all meetings but refused to participate in any
of them.
50 National Bureau of Statistics of China, [Link]
51 Unlike the Chinese data, the death rate data from India is a bit too smooth. See World Bank data: https://
[Link]/indicator/[Link]?locations=IN
52 Literature Review of the Toll of Abnormal Deaths in the Three Years of Difficulty in National History Net http://
[Link]/gsyj/jjs/rkzyyhj/200909/t20090905_29888.html (in Chinese)
 OCTOBER 2019  35

production team by placing them under arrest.53 Yet these “fascists” who owed
such an enormous debt of blood were vindicated in the 1980s after Deng
Xiaoping came to power.

Aside from individual responsibilities, one must address these questions, why
it was so difficult to stop the “exaggeration and boasting” and “communist
wind,” why certain people bragged and lied to gain political leverage and,
through the “communist wind,” grab the wealth that belonged to the people.
In the final analysis, the capitalists were a group of people who, in the interests
of few individuals or small groups, exercised their power to control socialized
production and distribution. Whether they were called “bosses” or “Party
secretaries” made no difference. It thus became clear that the core value of
these people who join the revolution was national socialism, not communism.
The conclusion Mao reached on May 14, 1957, “Our Party will be destroyed
without Rectification”, was therefore correct. This was the root cause of the
Three Years of Difficulties and starvation, not the Great Leap Forward nor the
People’s Commune. Only by recognizing the nature of the capitalist roaders
can one understand why they so ruthlessly pushed forward the “exaggeration
and boasting” and the “communist wind.”

At that time, however, Mao did not believe that taking the capitalist road was
the actual intent of those top Party leaders. At first he thought the problem lay
in a lack of understanding of the laws of economics in a socialist society, and
so tried to act as a guide by studying Stalin’s works on economic issues in the
Soviet Union. After the Lushan Meeting, he seemed to see the main problem
lay in a lack of investigation, and hence called on leaders at all levels to find
an area at the grassroots in which to carry out thorough investigations. Right
through to the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, he still thought the lack
of democratic centralism within the Party was the fundamental reason for the
troubles. It is therefore clear Mao was not inclined to dismiss those that have
wronged, but always tried to find ways to overcome difficulties by educating
and uniting with the people who he thought had made mistakes.

53 Zhang Shufan (张树藩), Xinyang Incident: a Sad History Lesson [Link]

content/09/1214/02/34235_11062701.shtml (in Chinese)
36  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

Stage 3. Struggles on whether capitalists were inside the Party and

spearheading up or down (1962-1966)

This was actually the preparatory stage for the GPCR.

The Seven Thousand Cadres Conference54, held around Spring Festival in

1962, attempted to summarize lessons to be learned from the Three Years of
Difficulties. Capitalist roaders, led by Liu Shaoqi, believed it was caused by
the premature establishment of the People’s Communes (as was Peng’s charge
during the Lushan conference!). He was compelled to do self-criticism, but
not for the role he played in “exaggeration and boasting,” nor for so strongly
pushing the “communist wind.” Instead, he diverted this self-criticism to the
“Central Committee” that he represented. The focus of the debate during the
conference was on whether to rely on the collective economy or on individual
effort to overcome the difficulties. Although the Three Red Banners55 were
confirmed at the meeting, in its aftermath those capitalist roaders who
had earlier opposed cooperatives still managed to use the Three Years of
Difficulties to negate cooperatives, and to push for privatization to overcome
the difficulties.

Although it was glaringly obvious that the disasters were caused by these
leaders’ parts in “exaggeration and boasting” and the “communist wind,” they
nevertheless insisted on using the “privatization drive” to resolve them. In
advocating the use of capitalist logic to build socialism, the true intent of these
capitalist roaders was finally exposed beyond all doubts. If the “privatization
drive” was the ultimate means of overcoming the difficulties, where then
did that leave the superiority of socialism? It became obvious that the easy
access to peasants’ grain,56 which a larger commune provided, was the main
reason those capitalist roaders pushed for the “communist wind.” It was thus
the appearance of the “privatization drive” that forced Mao to acknowledge
the challenges constituted by these capitalist roaders. Realizing there was a

54 Mao concluded that: “We made mistakes at work, engage in a ‘five winds’, high procurement, several big
pushes. It seems that our mistakes were mainly commandism (give arbitrary and impracticable instructions),
high procurement.” Chronicle of Mao Zedong Vol. 5, p. 129 (in Chinese).
55 It consisted of the General Line for Socialist Construction, the Great Leap Forward and the people’s
communes.
56 Mao concluded that: “We made mistakes at work, engaged in a ‘five winds’, high procurement, several big
pushes. It seems that our mistakes were mainly commandism (give arbitrary and impracticable instructions),
high procurement.” Chronicle of Mao Zedong Vol. 5, p. 129 (in Chinese)
 OCTOBER 2019  37

danger of splitting the Party57 he reminded the people “never to forget the
class struggle,” and went on to mobilize the Socialist Education Movement,
i.e. the “Four Clean-ups” Movement.58

To give guidance on how to carry out the Socialist Education Movement the
Central Committee sent out a sequence of contradictory directories, i.e. the
initial “First Ten Points,” the “Later Ten Points,” and finally the “Twenty Three
Points.” The focuses of the debates were on targeting ringleaders at the top or
small potatoes at the bottom; mainly pursuing those capitalist roaders within
the Party or landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements
and Rightists outside the party; specifically pinpointing capitalist roaders as
the main target of the campaign or just “corrupt officials.”

To highlight what exactly constituted the socialist road, based on concrete

conditions and drawn from experience at the grassroots, in 1963, Mao put
forward the slogans, “In industry, learn from Daqing; in agriculture, learn from
Dazhai,” which were in sharp contrast to the “profit in command” in industry
and “privatization drive” in agriculture the capitalist roaders proposed.

However, to “guide” the Socialist Education Movement and avoid the two-
road battle head-on, Liu Shaoqi sent his wife Wang Guangmei to work in
a local village, and later summarized the “Taoyuan Experience,” which was
the model of attacking many as a way to protect a few. Unauthorized by the
Central Committee, this document was spread throughout the country. This
model, whereby everyone was “guilty until proven innocent,” brought endless
suffering to grassroots cadres. It foreshadowed the “down with everything”
trend during the GPCR.

Stage 4. Mass movements and counterattacks during the GPCR (1966-1976)

The GPCR—when for the first time in human history the great masses of the
people explored extensively how to exert their rights as masters of society on
a full, thoroughgoing scale—was inevitably an extremely complicated political
movement. Its complexity had been foreshadowed by the flip from the

57 Mao warned a group of high-level Party cadres on Aug. 5, 1962 about privatization of agriculture: “It is
said that the people’s commune to collapse sixty percent, leaving forty percent. Others say to dispense them
all and be privatized, agricultural production can be recovered in four years. Those that have already been
privatized, don’t fore it back. After half a year or a year, once people have seen that polarization has occurred,
then this problem is solved. It is okay to allow a few to ten percentages of privatization, for 90% are still in
the collectives! I don’t agree if all or mostly privatized. If you do that, the party will split…” Ibid.
58 The official title of the moment was called the “Socialist Education Movement”, but since there were four
specific goals concerning the movement people often refer it as the “Four Clean-ups Movement.”
38  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

Rectification Campaign to the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957. As the most

widely participated political movement that encompassed schools, factories,
mines, farms and institutions throughout China, all kinds of political forces
and ideologies were necessarily expressed doggedly during the GPCR. For
example, was the thread that advocated toppling socialism weaved within or
outside of the Party? Was it better to rely on and mobilize the masses, or to
“chaperone” the masses to resolve the problems under socialism?

The main thrust of the mass movement during the GPCR was a repudiation
of the target, the line and the policies of the Anti-Rightist Movement, yet
those capitalist roaders perniciously adhered to them throughout. The end of
the GPCR triggered an avalanche of so-called “scar” literature condemning the
practices of the Mao era. In reality, however, the practices it mainly condemned
were those of capitalist roaders, who purposefully fused two different types
of contradictions. After those capitalist roaders came to power, they turned
around and blamed the crimes they had committed during the GPCR on the
GPCR itself, while at the same time expressing great “sympathy” for those
elites they had suppressed during the GPCR.

Therefore, even under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the class struggle
has its own laws. It could not be dictated by any “master” design, however
eloquent it might be. Mao and other revolutionaries could only make the best
of the situation. An unexpected explosion of factionalism within the working
class on top of stubborn resistance by capitalist roaders considerably altered
the cards held in the hands of the revolutionaries, so to speak. Although
bureaucratic privileges — whereby promotion brought higher pay and perks
while demotion had the reverse effect — were abolished during the GPCR,
this reform came a bit too late, for the class stratum had already been formed.
The burst of factionalism that almost spiraled out of control underlined the
immaturity of the working class, and the determined resistance of the capitalist
roaders exposed the extent of degeneration within the vanguard. These were
the two fundamental reasons for the tragic demise of GPCR.

Owing to limitations of space and the availability of materials, this article can
make only a preliminary sketch or outline of the GPCR, but certain laws of
class struggle do clearly emerge.

1. Mobilization for the GPCR: The “May 16 Circular”

Given that the Socialist Education Movement failed to address the core
question of which road was actually being promoted by leaders at all levels,
 OCTOBER 2019  39

it became clear a top-down approach to resolving this issue was impossible.

In the end, the task of distinguishing among those in authority between
revolutionaries and capitalist roaders, as well as between diehard revisionists
and unintentional capitalist roaders within the Party, could only be achieved by
relying on, trusting in and mobilizing the masses. By then it had become clear
many leading positions at all levels of the Party, both in the government and
army, were occupied by capitalist roaders of various shades. To avoid a repeat
of the flip from the Rectification Campaign to the Anti-Rightist Movement
of 1957, Mao had to unite with most of the Party cadres, especially Politburo
members; on the other hand, he needed to push forward the agenda of the
GPCR by taking advantage of the contradictions among capitalist roaders to
fight those roaders one at a time.

Therefore, besides the Four Clean-ups Movement, revolutionaries also carried

out a massive movement to repudiate the feudalism, capitalism and revisionism
that had long pervaded the nation’s culture and art — in particular, the opera
Hai Rui Dismissed from Office was cited as a target of criticism.59 Capitalist
roader Peng Zhen, a past master of mudslinging and character assassinations
when combating his opponents, became prominent at that time. He drafted
the so-called “February Outline”60 for the Central Committee which restricted
repudiation of culture and art to academic discussions, in order to suppress the
participation of the masses in that movement.

Under pressure from revolutionaries, capitalist roaders within the Party could
not openly advocate the capitalist road. In May 1966, the top Party leaders in
Beijing held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo under Mao’s directives from
Shanghai. They passed unanimously the “May 16 Circular” which criticized
the “February Outline” where the latter tried to limit the movement to only
academics, and so officially launched the GPCR. However, a contest, as in
the Rectification Campaign vs. the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957, was
inevitable.

2. Arousing or suppressing the masses

Although the May 16 Circular had been released, exactly how to arouse
the masses remained a challenge. At the end of May, a big-character poster
written by a group of teachers headed by Nie Yuanzi of the Department of
Philosophy criticizing the Peking University Party Committee drew Mao’s

59 See MacFarquhar, The Origins of the Cultural Revolution, 2 for more background on this play, starting on p.
207.
60 See Ch. 1 of MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M., Mao’s last revolution. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press; 2006.
40  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

attention. After given order to publicize in radio broadcast and in the press,
people in higher education and other institutions began to follow suit and
criticize certain mistakes their particular leaders had made. Under the guise
of “strengthening Party’s leadership” Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, both
of whom were in the first-line leadership of the Party Central Committee,
hastily dispatched a set of new work teams to all colleges and universities
to replace the previous ones from the Four Clean-ups movement. At that
time, criticizing capitalist roaders had been superseded by the slogan “Sweep
away all monsters and demons!” after the eponymously titled People’s Daily
editorial of June 1, 1966. During the 50 plus days from early June to mid-July,
a repeat of the 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement took place. In Beijing alone,
tens of thousands of teachers and students in various Beijing universities and
colleges were labeled as “Rightist” or “active counter-revolutionaries.” When
Mao returned to Beijing in mid-July, he asked angrily: “Who suppressed
the students’ movement? Only the Northern warlords. Those who suppress
the student movement will not have a good end!” He then added: “The
fundamental difference between the Communist Party and the Nationalist
Party is whether to protect or to suppress the people!” He launched a critique
of the “bourgeois reactionary line”61 by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping for
suppressing the mass movements.

Also at the end of May — inspired by the May 16 Circular — a group of

students from the Tsinghua University Affiliated High School secretly
organized the first group of Red Guards. These children of high-ranking
officials had experienced severe conflicts with the work team responsible for
their school. Their rebellious spirit soon spread to other schools in Beijing,
where groups of Red Guards rapidly sprang up. Because it was the children of
high-ranking officials who had first organized these Red Guards, the people
in power did not initially oppose them. The Red Guards at the Tsinghua
University Affiliated High School wrote a letter to Mao at the end of July and
received his conditional support.

Mao was against top-down social engineering. Instead, he respected the

initiative and creativity of the masses. He saw in the Red Guards an energetic
and spontaneous mass organization outside the ruling Party bureaucracy that
had huge potential. He accordingly insisted on meeting with millions of Red
Guards throughout the country on eight occasions within a few months. This
pushed the Red Guard movement forward to the whole country on a grand
and spectacular scale. Through the Red Guards’ massive networking effort,

61 In hindsight, this is a misnomer. A line can be right or wrong, but not revolutionary or reactionary. A better
phrase might be “bourgeois reactionary objectives.”
 OCTOBER 2019  41

facilitated by free train travel to anywhere in China in order to fan the “flames”
of the GPCR nationwide, the local Party organs’ monopoly on information and
authority was broken and diffused throughout China. This greatly encouraged
the masses to participate widely and deeply in the struggles of the GPCR
through self-education and self-emancipation.

While the revolutionary masses were engrossed in the GPCR and the
release of a torrent of “free expression of opinions and big-character posters,”
the capitalist roaders continued to guard their backs. To show what “true
revolutionaries” they were, and so divert the main target of struggle away
from them, they advocated the slogan, “Crush the dying enemy.”62 They then
instructed the Public Security Bureau in cities to provide addresses of people
the government had classified as “capitalists, landlords, rich peasants, counter-
revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists” to certain loyalist Red Guards63
and mass organizations. Fired by that slogan, those zealots then ransacked the
homes of these people, and even massacred some families, so instigating the
bloody “Red August.”64

3. Seizing power: The January storm

As the waves of mass movement surged, the GPCR began to expand from
schools to factories and mines. Gradually, certain workers began to question
their local leaders through big-character posters. However, unlike students
and intellectuals, most of the workers at that time trusted and treasured the
new regime, and many felt a strong sense of gratitude. They did not realize
the importance of defending their right to be masters of their affairs, and so
doubted the motivation of those workers who had dared criticize their leaders.
These rebel workers were consequently suppressed by their own work units
through massive posters opposing them, and so they became aware of the
importance of becoming organized.

In November 1966, a group of Beijing Red Guards organized a southern

expedition to Shanghai. Some of them were instrumental in helping their
fellow rebel workers form the Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebels General
Headquarters. The leadership of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee
rejected the invitation to participate in their founding conference of the
Worker’s Headquarters. Fearing repercussions from the establishment, nearly
62 The literal translation is “relentlessly beating a drowning dog.”
63 Loyalist is a term used widely during the GPCR to refer to individual or organizations that defended local
party or government officials.
64 See Memoirs of Qi Benyu (II), ibid. , Chapter 11 & 12, also Li Xun (李逊), Age of the Revolutionary Rebel:
Draft of Shanghai Cultural Revolution Movement History (Oxford University Press, 2015), Chapter 4 (in
Chinese)
42  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

10,000 rebel workers opted to redress injustices in Beijing and so boarded

various trains heading north. They were stopped, however, and one group
became stranded in a small station called Anting near Shanghai. Some workers
then intercepted other north-bound trains, causing a temporary blockage of
the main north-south rail artery which alerted the central government. Zhang
Chunqiao was charged with dealing with the incident. After remonstrating
with almost 10,000 agitated rebel workers who have gathered in Anting for
over 12 hours amid freezing drizzle in an effort to convince them to return
to Shanghai, Zhang Chunqiao realized agreeing to these workers’ demands
was the only way of resolving the matter. The sole alternative was to call in
the army. The moment of truth that tests a revolutionary had arrived! Zhang
Chunqiao said later he could not believe there were so many counter-
revolutionaries among Shanghai workers. Given that he couldn’t get approval
from the Central Committee ahead of time, and despite the risk of ruining
his political future, Zhang Chunqiao acceded to the workers’ demands and
endorsed the Shanghai Workers Revolutionary Rebels General Headquarters.
After shifting the responsibility for the whole incident onto the Shanghai
Municipal Party Committee, he received the workers’ support and the crisis
was resolved. From then on, Zhang Chunqiao became a thorn in the side of
those diehard capitalist roaders and walked a perilous tightrope between the
two irreconcilable factions.

After the incident, Mao praised Zhang Chunqiao’s decision. This triggered
serious resentment from the Shanghai Party Committee, which decided to
form its own loyalist group, the “Scarlet Army”, to fight against the rebels. In
the belief that by making matters worse they could force the Party Central to
capitulate. The group incited workers in key industries, such as in rail dispatch
departments and dockworkers, to leave their jobs and travel to Beijing, as the
rebels had previously tried to do. In this way, they threatened the stoppages of
Shanghai’s power, water and transportation.65 This overt demonstration of the
irresponsibility of the people in authority in disregarding the dire consequences
of such drastic action angered the rebels. In order to ensure the progress of
the GPCR and the wellbeing of the people in Shanghai, therefore, the rebels
established the so-called “Front Line Headquarters of Grasping Revolution
and Promoting Production”, which took over the administrative departments
of the municipal government. Mao was keenly aware that this signified the
seizing of power, and the “January Storm” thus began.

65 Li Xun, ibid., Chapter 14

 OCTOBER 2019  43

4. The Eruption of factionalism: full-scale civil war looms

Although governmental powers in other localities and chains of command in

factories and mines elsewhere were considerably constrained by the radical
actions of student Red Guards and rebelling workers, those in power did not
handle the GPCR the same way as the Shanghai Party Committee did — that
is to say, by simply throwing up their hands. The rebels’ seizure of power in
those places, therefore, was far less straightforward. Faced with the tidal waves
of mass movements, local power holders nationwide quickly built up loyalist
organizations to combat rebel groups. The latter, meanwhile, was consumed
by factional infighting and consequently splintered rather than united in
their struggle against the capitalist roaders. This made their seizure of power
increasingly complicated, and factions in many places gradually resorted to
armed conflict on a growing scale.

Behind those armed conflicts were not only provocations by local power
holders, such as the so-called “Million Heroes” Wuhan loyalists, who carried
out armed repression of rebels in the spring of 1967,66 but also the deep-rooted
petty bourgeoisie factionalism that existed among the broad masses of the
people,67 evident in the “Hundred-day War”68 between Tsinghua’s “Jinggang
Mountain” and “April Fourteen” factions.69

Most local power holders were doubtless capitalist roaders of various shades,
but not to the extent of being diehards. They instinctively enjoyed their
privileges and resented supervision by the masses. Thinking of themselves as
true revolutionaries fully committed to hard work, they were suspicious of
people who opposed them and suspected their motives for doing so. They
may even have believed their opponents to be class enemies, thus justifying
their merciless use of the instruments of dictatorship when dealing with
their political enemies. To guard their personal interests, they completely
disregarded the need to correctly identify and handle two distinct types of
contradictions. All this reflected petty bourgeoisie factionalism within the
Party, which, combined with that among the masses, created fertile ground
for armed conflicts around the country. Instead of a grand unity among rebels

66 For more detail on this, see Wang Shaoguang (王绍光), Failure of Charisma: Cultural Revolution in Wuhan,
Oxford University Press ( July 13, 1995), and Ch. 12 of MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M., (2006). Mao’s
last revolution. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
67 Here, attributing the term factionalism to “petty bourgeoisie” is only to stresses the class nature of
factionalism, for it necessarily reflects bourgeois or petty bourgeois class interests. Since only class warfare
reflects proletarian class interest, any attempt to assert “proletarian” factionalism is futile.
68 W. Hinton, Hundred Day War, Monthly Review Press, 1972
69 Xu Aijing (许爱晶), Tsinghua KuaiDafu (China Cultural Revolution History Press, 2011), Chapter 19 (in
Chinese)
44  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

in seizing political power, therefore, matters evolved rapidly, nearly becoming

a full-scale civil war.

In hindsight, having achieved mobilization of the masses, factionalism was

the next biggest stumbling block to the GPCR’s progress. The emergence of
loyalists, and their use of violence to crush any rebels daring to criticize leaders,
underlined the immaturity of the proletariat. The actions of such loyalists,
therefore, directly deprived the proletariat of its right to be masters of society.

The contrast between the two representative cities is quite revealing. Both
Shanghai and Wuhan were big industrial cities. In Shanghai, workers were
mostly multi-generational, with a long tradition of revolutionary struggle.
Workers from Wuhan, on the other hand, were mostly first-generation
industrial workers with pronounced petty bourgeoisie characteristics, as
revealed during the struggle to seize power. For example, the “Workers General
Headquarters” in Wuhan mainly comprised of workers from large-scale heavy
industrial enterprises, who looked down on the “General Headquarters of
Rebel Workers,” whose main associations were with workers from small and
medium-scale light industries.70 As a result, all attempts by rebel workers
in Wuhan to seize power failed due to a lack of solidarity, which provided
opportunities for loyalist counterattacks. This phenomenon was not evident
in Shanghai. The workers there were staunchly opposed to factionalism from
the very beginning. For example, the rebel leader Wang Hongwen insisted any
loyalist workers that changed their stance should be allowed to join the rebel
ranks and be absorbed.71 Wuhan rebels, in contrast, were comparatively slow
to mature.

Not only the workers but also the cadres in the two cities were strikingly
different. Both Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Renzhong72 were deputy heads
of the Central Cultural Revolution Group73, yet their conduct was quite the
opposite. The former was steadfastly opposed to factionalism among the
workers, while the latter was a master at inciting workers to fight among
themselves. There was in Shanghai a large number of cadres at all levels, such
as Ma Tianshui, who presided over all Shanghai industries and supported
the rebels. In Wuhan, meanwhile, there were great numbers of cadres at all
levels who stubbornly resisted the GPCR and all rebels, as represented by
Commander Chen Zaidao of the Wuhan Military Region and Governor
Zhang Tixue of Hubei Province. The world-renowned July 20,1967 Incident

70 Wang Shaoguang, Failure of Charisma: Cultural Revolution in Wuhan, , Chapter 4

71 See Li Xun, ibid., Chapter14
72 More on him, see Ch. 4 of MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M., Mao’s last revolution
73 Ibid.
 OCTOBER 2019  45

(where a group of soldiers stormed the compound in which Mao resided in

Wuhan at the time and kidnapped one representative dispatched from the
Party Central to overcome factional arm conflicts there) reflected just how
strong resistance among cadres at all levels of the local Party, government and
the military was.74

5. Combating factionalism: the formation of Revolutionary Committees

During the period from struggle to seize power at the beginning of 1967 to the
opening of the 9th Party Congress in April 1969, revolutionaries concentrated
all their energy on taming the wildfire of factionalism and preventing its
escalation to full-scale civil war. By promoting the “three-in-one” Revolutionary
Committees, which were composed of representatives of mass organizations,
of representatives of the army who were in the “Supporting-the-Left” team75
and of certain cadres who were no longer sidelined — and after strenuous
arm-twisting to amalgamate various rebel factions — reconstruction of local
Party and government institutions was outwardly accomplished. This was
instrumental in calming factional infighting and armed conflicts throughout
the country.

Faced with factionalism among the people that inevitably crop up in any
mass movement, capitalist roaders and proletarian revolutionaries adopted
fundamentally different approaches. Capitalist roaders were good at
manipulating the masses. They pushed forward those groups who suited their
purposes but showed no mercy in suppressing those who did not. The relentless
armed conflicts that occurred in so many places were the direct result of this
approach. Revolutionaries, by contrast, tried all means possible to empower
the masses. Rather than exert overt repression, they encouraged those who
were fighting on the correct side and criticized, educated and tried to persuade
those who were on the wrong side.

It was perhaps the armed conflict in Shanxi Province that lasted the longest of
any around the country. The cause of it was the long-lasting dispute between
the “General Liaison Office of the Red Rebels” headed by Liu Geping, director
of the Shanxi Revolutionary Committee, and the “Liaison Office of the Red
Rebels” headed by Zhang Riqing, deputy director of the Shanxi Revolutionary
Committee and second political commissar of the Shanxi Military Region.
74 Xu Hailiang (徐海亮), Documentation of Wuhan July 2 Incident (China Cultural Communication Press, 2010)
(in Chinese)
75 On March 19, 1967, the Central Military Commission (CMC) of China issued the decision on
concentrating its forces on the tasks of supporting the left, supporting agriculture, supporting industry,
military takeover and military training (hereinafter referred to as the decision of “three supports and two
militaries”). More on this, see Ch. 10 of MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M., Mao’s last revolution
46  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

The former tended to support the rebels, while the latter was more behind
the conservatives. Borrowing Wu Si’s analysis: “The thing about factions is
that, once formed, they have a life and drive of their own. The original cause
becomes muted and of little importance. No matter what differences there
might be on the surface between each side’s views or slogans, each has actually
become a tangible object that influences the position, interest, prospect and
even life and death of a group of living people. From afar, we can see two
opposite groups vying with each other, and neither one gives an inch. The
bigger the threat from the other side and the more lives lost, the more united
it becomes. The more united, the more powerful it becomes, and the bigger
the threat it becomes to the other side. This will lead the threatened side to be
more united and thus more powerful. A vicious circle is thus formed, which
could be called independent of man’s will.”76 Eventually, the Party Central had
no choice but to replace the two deadlocked principal leaders, and put an end
to more than two years of armed conflicts.

To overcome factionalism, after the 9th Party Congress in 1969 the Party
Central Committee launched the nationwide movement to “Purify the Class
Ranks” and arrested people who were allegedly involved in the “May 16
Group.”77 In 1970, it again directed a “One-Strike, Three-Anti Campaign”
(strike counter-revolutionary elements, anti-graft and embezzlement, anti-
profiteering and anti-extravagance and waste). However, as in all bureaucracies,
there were ways of getting around any policy directed from above. Those
capitalist roaders, both diehard and unintentional, took the opportunity after
regaining their official positions within the Revolutionary Committees to
turn the movement’s spearhead against the rebels who had previously opposed
them. In the vengeful counterattack they launched, groups of rebel leaders
were arrested, jailed on various pretexts, and some even executed on the spot.

6. Partisan politics: the Lin Biao incident

The advent of the Lin Biao Incident78 dealt a near-fatal blow to revolutionaries.
There is no doubt the GPCR could not have been carried out without the
support of the military, i.e. the instrument of state violence. Exactly which
class, which line and which road such an instrument of state violence stood
for in the two-line struggles and two-road battles within the Party was always

76 Wu Si (吴思), Chen Yonggui: Mao Zedong’s Peasant [Link] (in

Chinese)
77 See “MAY 16th ULTRA-LEFT GROUP” under [Link]
78 (林彪) replaced Peng Dehuai as the defense minister in 1959 and became the deputy chairmen before his
plane crashed and burned in Mongolia while attempting to escape to the USSR on Sep. 13, 1971, after his
son tried to assassinate Mao. More on the Lin Biao incident, see Ch. 19 of MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals,
M., Mao’s last revolution
 OCTOBER 2019  47

the most crucial question. The Lin Biao Incident exposed the Achilles’ heel of
the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Compared with the capitalist roader mistakes that leaders and cadres at all
levels of Party and government organs generally made, those evident in the
bureaucratic privileges within the army were the most serious, and subject to
the least supervision by the masses. The military was hence the most likely
bastion of capitalist roaders. The July 20 Incident in 1967 had revealed the
strong resistance among the military to the GPCR, while the Lin Biao
Incident exposed the degree of antagonism towards it among top military
commanders.

Military generals like Lin Biao tolerated and even welcomed attacks on Party
and government leaders like Liu Shaoqi, who had no combat experience. This
was especially the case after a large number of army representatives joined the
“three-in-one” Revolutionary Committees, and military commanders entered
organs of powers in the Party and government at all level — all of which made
the 9th Party Congress resembled a summit of a “military regime.” What the
next step would be became the focus of arguments between revolutionaries
and capitalist roaders of all shades. Diehard capitalist roaders, represented by
Lin Biao, thought of the GPCR as no more than a movement through which
to change leaders. Of the three stated missions of the GPCR: to “struggle,
criticize and change,” they thought of “change” in the context of a change
of dynasties. They hence advocated restoring the former system without
changes other than personals, as they neither opposed bureaucratic privileges
nor accepted supervision by the masses, and were even hostile to the idea of
continuing the revolution. All this became evident in the struggles over the
contents of the political report of the 9th Party Congress, in the struggles
over whether or not to restore the position of Presidency, and in the Outline
of Project 571.79

7. The impasse between capitalist roaders & revolutionaries

The strength of the revolutionaries had been substantially weakened by

persistent factionalism and armed conflicts around the country, and the Lin
Biao Incident was another grave blow. The top priority at this point was to
strengthen unity among the left, focus on the main contradictions, so as to
avoid battling against attacks from all sides and win over the large group of
cadres and intellectuals who had made capitalist roader mistakes but were
willing to mend their ways.

79 Ibid.
48  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

Instead, through the “Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius” campaign, many
revolutionaries made mistakes borne of leftist naiveté by taking the “Anti-
Rightist” approach to such fields as economics, culture and education. For
example, upon encountering different opinions on economic policies, as
well as shortcomings and mistakes in literary works, they exaggerated
others’ mistakes and almost stooped to the level of mud-slinging, character
assassination and name-calling when dealing with people who disagreed with
them. This behavior effectively isolated the revolutionary ranks.

Mao consequently criticized the four top leaders, who became known as the
“Gang of Four.” Although Shanghai led the nation in all areas of work, the
revolutionaries who came from Shanghai, such as Wang Hongwen, lacked
experience governing the country. When confronted with battle-tested army
generals, they could summon little clout.

Since the purpose of GPCR was not to “persecute people” but to educate
them, there was no reason not to restore cadres like Deng Xiaoping — who was
talented, capable and had sworn “never to reverse the verdict” on the GPCR
— to their work. This was the background of Deng Xiaoping’s comeback.

Soon after Deng was reappointed to a leading position, he began gradually to

undermine the fruits of the GPCR under all kinds of pretexts. He marginalized
those cadres who supported the GPCR and those rebel representatives who
emerged during the GPCR, repossessed the power that had been previously
taken and restored old leading groups around the country without first holding
mass discussions and getting the approval of the people. In the name of
combating factionalism, he targeted “those who persisted in making factional
demands.” “Replace, repudiate or denounce them as needed”80 was his battle
cry when restoring the old order.

At that time, Deng Xiaoping’s insidiously duplicitous propensity to say one

thing and mean another had been somewhat exposed. Although he vigorously
promoted economic development as the key to everything, he refused to learn
about or promote the best national practices based in Shanghai.81

In response to the counterattacks of diehard capitalist roaders represented by

Deng, revolutionaries launched a feeble “Oppose Right Deviation and Reversal

80 Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Volume 2, Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1994, p. 9
81 For example, after regaining power a decade later, he summarily terminated the Shanghai-centered and Wang
Hongwen-led large passenger airplane project Y-10 in order to negate entirely all the achievements of the
GPCR and of Shanghai, even though this delayed China’s technological aircraft manufacturing progress by
decades.
 OCTOBER 2019  49

of Past Verdicts” campaign, whose apparent vigor was strictly superficial.

Although Deng was once more removed from office, due to fatigue from
factional infighting, the sentiments of the Party, the army and the people had
been swayed by capitalist roaders. Unintentional capitalist roaders, moreover,
sided almost completely with the diehards of that camp. Revolutionaries were
thus trapped in unprecedented isolation, as amply demonstrated by the April
5 incident in 1976 over the traditional Memorial Day activities after Zhou
Enlai’s death.

8. Victory for the capitalist roaders

Less than a month after Mao’s death, diehard capitalist roaders launched a
coup and the dictatorship of the proletariat was “smashed in one fell swoop.”
Large numbers of revolutionaries around the country were arrested. However,
due to stiff opposition from the working class — notably the people’s almost
nationwide resistance in 1989 — it took the new ruling capitalist class more
than 20 years to complete China’s capitalist reconstruction, guided by the
theory of “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”

Over the past four decades, the authorities have either grossly distorted or
sealed off the true history of the GPCR. They blame the monstrous crimes
committed by anti-GPCR forces on the GPCR itself. This is as ridiculous
as blaming the crimes of the Nanjing Massacre on the Anti-Japanese War.
According to their logic, if not for the GPCR there would have been no
“Elimination of the Four Stereotypes”82 movement, or widespread factional
armed conflicts. Similarly, therefore, without the Chinese People’s War of
Resistance against Japanese Aggression, which is to say, if the Chinese people
had been willing to be conquered by Japanese imperialists, then the Japanese
would not have needed to waste guns and bullets on the massacre of Chinese
people in Nanjing. However, where there is oppression, there is bound to be
resistance, which inevitably leads to more repression. Blaming the oppressors’
crimes on those who dare to rebel is confounding right with wrong, and
standing truth on its head.

The same is true of the GPCR. When revolutionaries sought to arouse the
masses as a whole, capitalist roaders would incite groups of Red Guards
headed by princelings to ransack people’s homes and smash antique cultural
relics; and when revolutionaries supported rebels in taking over the power
of capitalist roaders, the latter would provoke factional conflicts among the
masses. Capitalist roaders committed multiple misdeeds during the GPCR,

82 See Ch. 6 of MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M., Mao’s last revolution
50  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

yet they got away with them in the aftermath. Wielding full control over the
media, they blamed all wrongdoings on the GPCR itself. Today, the children
and relatives of those who were killed or whose property was confiscated
during the GPCR, as well as the rebels who were imprisoned in its wake
and falsely charged with all kinds of crimes, expect justice. They want those
responsible to be held accountable for their crimes. They moreover demand
a clear report of what really happened during the GPCR, of who instigated
factional armed conflicts and ordered, for example, “smash and grab” raids. As
the true history of the GPCR is a source of trouble and worry to the current
authorities, however, they continue to stick to “staying with generalities rather
than digging for details” approach to covering up their crimes. The reason
why the GPCR is still a forbidden topic underlines precisely the authorities’
studied avoidance of the truth of the matter.

9. Analysis of the demise of the GPCR

Since the diehard capitalist roaders came to power, the dictatorship of the
proletariat has been overthrown and capitalism restored. The GPCR thus fell
short of its expected goal. In this sense, it failed.

As to the reasons for its failure, rather than pinpointing the mistakes the
revolutionaries made, theorists who emphasize “objective-factors” believe it
was due to the capitalists’ superior strength, the dominance of small-scale
production, the existence of bourgeois rights and the three main differences
(cities versus the countryside, industry versus agriculture, and intellectual
versus manual labor), the imperialist blockade and others.

All these were true. However, revolutionaries must also consider the subjective
factors of the failure of the GPCR.

First, revolutionaries were late in recognizing capitalist roaders;83 therefore,

they did not advocate measures in time to prevent their emergence. For
example, revolutionaries neither abolished bureaucratic privileges nor
implemented effective supervision by the masses before the GPCR, and most
notably failed to prevent events like the flip from the Rectification Campaign
to the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957.

Second, during the GPCR the delineation of power between local authorities
and mass organizations was not clear. Therefore, two inevitable “mistakes” were
83 Stalin was partially responsible for this. He had the chance but failed to recognize capitalist roaders while he
was alive. Without the Soviet experiences, however, it would have taken Mao much longer to see the problem.
In that sense, the Soviet experience was a valuable lesson on what not to do.
 OCTOBER 2019  51

made during the GPCR: one was to stage a revolution without the leadership
of the local Party Committees (although the masses could not otherwise have
been mobilized); the other was to dissolve all mass organizations except that
in Shanghai (but a full-scale civil war would have erupted otherwise). These
inevitable “mistakes” were unique to the first GPCR, due entirely to the lack
of experience.

Third, the most fundamental problem was the rash of factionalism. That is
to say, the immaturity of the proletariat was the key in the GPCR’s tragic
demise. On the surface, the direct cause of the overturn of the GPCR was
due to capitalist roaders who purposefully usurped the Party’s leadership and
seized state power. It was they who gradually transformed after 1949 into
diehard capitalist roaders. However, the key as to why revolutionaries were
not able to prevent this outcome during the GPCR lies in the factionalism
among the rank-and-file of the working class. A large section of the working
masses, Party members and cadres possessed certain class-consciousness yet
were plagued by their particular petty-bourgeois factionalism. All too often
they did not proceed from class interests, which created abundant scope for
diehard capitalist roaders to foment troubles.

Shanghai’s achievements during the GPCR were the greatest throughout the
country, and the city was the least factional. Shanghai workers were also the
only ones who considered using arms to resist the 1976 coup. However, it was
in any event impossible for the majority of Shanghai workers to predict their
destinies when the capitalist roaders came into power, and consequently not
possible for them to take such a risk by rebelling.

In other places, factionalism made difficult any objective analysis of class

interests. Official appointments tended to be based on cronyism rather
than merit. It thus became harder to distinguish between the two distinct
contradictions. As a result gross exaggerations, mud-slinging, character
assassination, name-calling, fabrications and many other dirty tricks might
be used against factional opponents, i.e. treating them as enemies. It was thus
impossible to unite the people while factionalism reigned.

To unite, there must be constraints on all sides. The aspirations and interests of
all parties must be considered; laying equal blame on all parties or glossing over
differences cannot resolve factionalism. Rather criticism and self-criticism,
as in the Yan’an Rectification Movement, is the only feasible approach to
building solidarity. Only through a consensus of understanding can unity be
achieved. Therefore, people should be allowed to make mistakes and have the
52  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

opportunity to correct them. Of course, this is more easily said than done. In
this regard, the Anti-Rightist Movement set a devastating precedent.

After all, most capitalist roaders were not diehard capitalist roaders.
Subjectively speaking, they did defend the dictatorship of the proletariat.
However, because of the deviations of understanding, they accorded little
importance to supervision by the masses. Influenced by a deeply embedded
mentality of private enterprise, they instinctively tried to safeguard their
bureaucratic privileges. Such unintentional capitalist roaders provoked most
of the factional armed conflicts as a result of inappropriate handling of
contradictions among the people. Furthermore, the contradictions between
revolutionaries and these unintentional capitalist roaders, if handled correctly,
could have been considered contradictions among the people.

It is obvious food can only be eaten one bite at a time, battles can only be fought
one after another and problems ought to be resolved one by one according
to relative importance or urgency. Similarly, the proletarian revolutionaries
needed to consider how to unite and educate the majority of the cadres and
masses. They could not launch attacks in all directions. Those rebels and the
“Gang of Four” who failed to see this made left-leaning mistakes of casting the
net of their attacks too wide. This could be seen clearly from Mao’s handling
of the July 20 Incident. While Lin Biao wanted to use this case to “make a
fuss”, Mao tried repeatedly to save those cadres who had made mistakes.84

All of these factors combined made the demise of the first GPCR inevitable,
even if Mao had lived 20 years longer or more.

10. Remarks on a few key figures

A summary of the GPCR must surely include evaluations of certain key figures,
among which the most important and most controversial are undoubtedly
“The Gang of Four” and Zhou Enlai.

“The Gang of Four”

The so-called “Gang of Four:” Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing
and Yao Wenyuan, were actually brave proletarian fighters. Their contributions
to the revolutionary cause far outweighed their shortcomings and mistakes.
Yet for the last 40 years or more, capitalists within and outside China that
monopolize public opinion have ganged up and, through rumors and slander,

84 See Xu Hailiang, same as above

 OCTOBER 2019  53

carried out frenzied attacks on this group. Their abuse of Jiang Qing and
defamation of her character in particular, have diminished and retarded the
status of women in China for decades. It is hard, even today, for women to
hold their heads high on political issues.

However, attacks from class enemies should not be used as a basis on which
to hinder later generations from making realistic analyses of the mistakes such
revolutionaries made, just as heated battles on the front line during the anti-
Japanese war did not prevent the Yan’an Rectification Movement.

According to the existing literature and materials, on the one hand, Jiang
Qing’s strengths were distinctive. They were manifested in the immortal
model operas, in her firm support for rebels during the GPCR and in her
sharp criticism of capitalist roaders. However, on the other hand, one of Jiang
Qing’s biggest shortcomings was her failure to unite with people who made
mistakes. She neither distinguished precisely nor handled very well the two
types of contradictions (for example, at the later stage of the GPCR she
voiced excessively strong critiques of many works of art, and often grossly
exaggerated their mistakes). She also made enemies of too many people,
and so isolated the left. Such shortcomings generally existed among the left.
(For instance, Zhang Chunqiao did not get along and unite with other great
revolutionaries like Chen Yonggui.)85

Further analysis shows that among the four, other than Zhang Chunqiao,
who was a true and tested proletarian revolutionary based on his independent
action during the 1966 Anting Incident, the other members of the group
could only be counted as brave fighters under the leadership of Mao. Before
their arrest, they had not been similarly tested according to their independent
actions.

Zhou Enlai

Although Zhou Enlai was a revolutionary with extraordinary capabilities,

he lacked a clear vision of socialism beyond the fundamentals. He was a
typical example of those who excel in immersing themselves in task-oriented
hard work. As the Chinese metaphor has it, he was one of those good at
pulling a cart forward with his head down, but not at raising his head and
watching the road ahead. In the history of new China, those far-reaching
hierarchical systems such as the “urban-rural dual structure” and the “get rich

85 Zhang Huaiying (张怀英), Dazhai’s•ChenYonggui! -- My Thinking and Memory (China Cultural

Communication Press, 2013), Chapter 6 (in Chinese)
54  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

by promotion and stricken poor by demotion” mode of wage payment were

partially institutionalized by people like Zhou. They were good at dealing
with the specific tasks at hand but lacked political foresight and enough
consideration of the long-term consequences, as well as side effects, of those
systematic designs.

In the course of the two-line struggles within the Party, Zhou often failed
to gain a clear understanding and made numerous mistakes. However, at the
same time, he was exceedingly faithful, open and aboveboard. He corrected his
mistakes as soon as he became aware of them and never engaged in intrigues.

While the GPCR was inseparable from Zhou’s full support, a fact that has
been repeatedly pointed out by certain rightists. On the other hand, he was
often a half-beat off in comprehending Mao’s theory of Continuing the
Revolution under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. This was the basis on
which certain capitalists with Chinese characteristics attempted to separate
Mao and Zhou. It was also at the root of certain leftists’ laying the blame on
Zhou for the demise of the GPCR.

However, unlike most of the top leaders in the Party who have proven to be
unintentional capitalist roaders or worse, Zhou was a conscious revolutionary.
He was against bureaucratic privileges for the most part and a strong advocate
of supervision by the masses. He believed in and relied upon the people’s
enthusiasm for socialism. However, preoccupied as he was with the excessive
details specifically relating to running the country, he neither excelled at nor
had the time for theoretical studies. Therefore, he couldn’t become a mentor
to the revolution.

If he and “The Gang of Four” experienced any contradictions, they would

have been similar to those between Zhou and Mao. There were contradictions
among comrades, concerning the different means and struggles over different
lines among revolutionaries on how to push forward the socialist revolution.
They were thus to be expected, and it would be surprising if matters had been
otherwise.

A brief summary of the class struggle in the Mao era

There were two key events in the early Mao era that shaped the nature of class
struggle in China.
 OCTOBER 2019  55

The first was the institution of pay according to rank in the bureaucracy
starting from 1955. The second was the flip from the Rectification Campaign
to the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957.

The harm that the institutionalization of income tied to bureaucratic and

military ranks inflicted on socialism was profound. It was not due solely to the
denial of the unsustainable system of fixed living allowances for cadres, for
people’s needs can be vastly different. Nor was it due to its failure to abolish
the inevitable ranking differentials in the socialist period, for the negation
of income differential based on contributions, education or seniority was
unobtainable, at least at that time. The fundamental damage it caused was
reflected in the failure to segregate an individual’s political status from his or
her economic standing. Because one can “get rich by promotion and stricken
poor by demotion,” this poisonous system of distribution according to “rank,”
“position,” “responsibility” or “power” rather than work, severely corroded
struggles inside the Party.

The flip from the Rectification Campaign to the Anti-Rightist Movement

was more or less an attempt by the capitalist roaders to protect their newfound
privileges.

The persistent “exaggeration and boasting” as well as the “communist wind,”

despite repeated prohibitions during 1959-1960, and the cover-ups from top-
level authorities of the deaths from starvation by local Party bureaucrats that
occurred during the Three Years of Difficulties can all be traced back to these
two events.

Thus, the nature of the class struggle and the inner-Party struggle before 1949
were vastly different from those after.

Beginning with the collective movement, we see that the two-road battles
about aims were repeatedly being disguised as two-line struggles among
revolutionaries to advance socialism. This is evident from the Anti-Rightist
Movement in 1957 to the “exaggeration and boasting” in 1958 to the
“Taoyuan Experience” in 1964. In the summer of 1966, to suppress leftist
teachers and students in universities and colleges who were critical of the Party
Committees, Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping sent work teams to denounce
them as “Rightists.” When that failed, they pushed for the bloody “Red
August” in 1966. Later in 1969, the followers of Liu and Deng pushed for
the “One Strike Three Antis Campaign,” and then the “May 16” witch-hunt
in 1970. Ten years after coming to power, Deng Xiaoping used right-wing
56  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

students’ demand for “Westernization” as a pretext for suppressing the people

with tanks. All of these bear an ostensibly “left” facade. However, it was those
very people who, once they got into power, began to accuse revolutionaries of
being “ultra-leftists.”

From all of these actions, a pattern emerged. Capitalist roaders among top
Party leaders consistently used attacks on the right as excuses to suppress the
revolutionary masses. Right-wing intellectuals were just “collateral damage”
of their suppression of the people, just as they had been in 1957, during the
GPCR and again in 1989. Their stands against the people were consistent
among those who wanted to “cash in on their contribution to the revolution.”

One key feature of capitalist roaders had thus been clearly demonstrated: they
were experts at being “left” politically to cover their reactionary right-wing
nature, of not only taking the capitalist road on economics but also being
hostile and oppressive towards the people.

In contrast to Stalin’s brutal treatment of his opponents, one can argue perhaps
Mao went to the other extreme and had unrealistic expectations of those
decades-long former comrades-in-arms-turned-capitalist-roaders mending
their ways, especially among top-ranking Party officials. Mao had a soft spot
towards them. Although Mao’s “medicine” can be quite bitter, he always
tried and hoped to “save the patient.” Many of them, however, did not want
to be “saved.” Once they got used to enjoying their bureaucratic privileges,
they were not easily persuaded to get rid of them. Furthermore, as someone
customarily giving orders, being challenged from below was a bitter pill for
some of them to swallow. In hindsight, giving people like Deng a second
chance will inevitably follow the script of the farmer and the viper. Kindness
toward diehard capitalist roaders was objectively cruelty toward the people,
as history has shown. However, without giving a second chance, how can one
tell who is a diehard capitalist roader? That is the challenge for revolutionaries
under socialism.

II. Several theoretical summarizations of the class struggle under

socialism

Having investigated the specific forms of class struggle during different stages
of the Mao era, it is time to embark on a discussion of some of the theoretical
 OCTOBER 2019  57

issues arising from this examination and to summarize their consistencies. To

this end, this part of the paper attempts to demonstrate the material basis for
the existence of classes during the socialist period, to define class divisions, to
clarify the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat and to identify the core
contradictions within it. Based on this, certain main features of class struggle
during the socialist period may be summarized.

A. Objective conditions and material bases for the existence of classes during
the socialist period

Socialism is the transition from capitalism to communism, i.e. the transition

from a class society to a classless society; the existence of classes is thus
inevitable. There are at least two reasons for this.

First, when material conditions are not sufficient to eliminate class, which
is to say when, for the overwhelming majority of the people, labor is mainly
a way of making a living rather than an enjoyable pursuit, or before labor
becomes, as Marx eloquently put it, “life’s prime want”,86 the division of labor
tends, in the areas of politics and economics, to differentiate people’s social
statuses.87 Second, a lagging ideological response to the changing social reality
causes a similar delay in the responsive changes in customs and habits to that
changing social reality. As the delayed ideological response to the changing
reality is easy to grasp, to understand the material bases for the existence of
classes, it is necessary to explore more deeply the relationship between the
division of labor and social status.

1. Defining classes

Unlike the self-sufficient class societies of the past, capitalism is a class society
based on large-scale socialized commodity production. Carrying out this type
of production requires the division of labor and coordination of responsibilities
among many people. This gives rise in the production process to the dichotomy
between managers and managed. As long as productivity remains inadequately
developed due to insufficiently abundant material output, labor will inevitably
remain the way for workers to make a living and support a family, rather than
being “life’s prime want.”

86 Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program.

87 Only when the necessary labor that people tolerate rather than enjoy is mainly done by robots and the like,
and when those doing the remaining tasks can be rotated as in military service, can we finally say the material
conditions for communism have been achieved. The division of labor will then no longer be a basis for
differences in social status or a tool for class oppression.
58  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

Under this circumstance, the nature of the contradictions between managers

and managed is determined by this question: in whose interests is the production
process, as well as the distribution of its products, organized and scheduled? If
production managers at all levels proceed from the people’s overall and long-
term interests in organizing and scheduling the production process, as well
as the distribution of products, then the fundamental interests of the two are
consistent. The contradiction between managers and the managed is, then,
a non-antagonistic one among the people that can be resolved accordingly.
Otherwise, it is an antagonistic contradiction between workers and their
employers, i.e. between labor and capital.

The capitalists are the group of individuals who in reality control socialized
mass production and the distribution of social wealth for the benefit of
individuals or small groups, such as joint-stock companies. This group can be
either those capitalists or owners of businesses under commodity production
and a market economy that emerged from a feudal society, or those diehard
capitalist roaders who carried the communist banner under a planned economy.

Before the GPCR, people knew only the former and could comprehend
the latter. They thought the capitalists could only exist under a market
economy, wherein commodity production has legal ownership of the means
of production. Unexpectedly, however, the ghost of the defeated capitalists
reemerged through the back door. The bourgeois “DNA” attached itself to
those lesser advanced among the proletarian vanguard whose worldview
tended to be more bourgeois, and who gradually became agents of capital.

For example, even though the establishment of the new Republic in 1949
overthrew the rule of the Chinese bureaucratic capitalists, the existence of
capitalist logic prevented the complete abolition of the more or less capitalist
production relations, and capitalism was not entirely eradicated. This is the
unavoidable reality of the transitional period from a capitalist class society to
a communist classless society.

The capitalist cared about their ability to dominate social wealth more than
their titles. It made no difference whether a person was known as the “boss”
or the “Party secretary” as long as the capitalist logic did not change, and as
long as he or she had the final say according to his or her particular interest,
or that of a small group. As long as he or she could become “top dog” by virtue
of having objective control of social wealth, even without legal ownership of
the means of production, he or she could be the actual possessor of capital in
varying degrees.
 OCTOBER 2019  59

The proletariat is the group of people who have no control — as individuals

or small groups — over production and distribution under conditions of
socialized mass production. In a capitalist society, members of this class have
to make a living by selling their labor power. In a socialist society, they remain
workers who exchange their means of living for their labor. The fundamental
difference is that under socialism the working class controls production and
distribution both as a class and as the master of the state — not as individuals.
Therefore, they have the right as a class to speak and make decisions on the
allocation of production. In the Mao era, the most prominent yet harrowing
manifestation of this power was the widespread factional fighting among
workers verging to a civil war over local politics that was so hard to quell
during the GPCR.88

Although the overwhelming majority of the population during the Mao

era was petty-bourgeois peasants, they were the product of land reform that
overturned the feudal land ownership system. Thereafter they could either
stand with the proletariat and walk the socialist road, as was the case during
the Mao era, or defend the system of private enterprise, and so inevitably
become the proletariat as the capitalists came to power and steadily deprived
them of their livelihood. There was no other way out for peasants. This is why
the class analysis here is mainly focused on the dichotomy between labor and
capital.

2. Class dictatorships

In all class societies, the property owning relationship is indisputable in the

eyes of the ruling class. In other words whoever owns the means of production,
or whoever has the final say on the use of the land, factories, enterprises, etc.
is beyond challenge. No democratic process ever decides the ownership issue
is the essence of the dictatorship of a ruling class.

Under conditions of socialized mass production, what bourgeois dictatorship,

i.e. capitalism, defends is private ownership of the means of production (i.e.
private enterprise) where individuals or small groups have the right to make
decisions about what, where and in whose interest to produce. The guiding
principle here is private property is “sacred and inalienable.” Therefore,

88 To have a civil war, at least one side must be the ruling class (otherwise, for example, the U.S. civil war under
British rule would be impossible). In contrast to factional fighting among capitalists and incessant fighting
among mercenary armies hired by warlords, however, factional armed conflicts during the GPCR were
fought by voluntary armed workers on both sides in the spirit of self-sacrifice (such as the bloody Chongqing
factional fights). If the working class had not been the ruling class, they would not have had such a privilege
to engage in spontaneous factional fights. Instead, facing them would have been the machine guns of the
state.
60  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

capitalists cannot allow any private enterprise that belongs to individuals

or small groups to be transformed against their will into an entity that is
owned by the people as a whole, even by the most democratic means. They
denounce any such proposal, which threatens the right of private enterprise,
as “populism,” “robbery” or “class war!”

By contrast, what proletarian dictatorship, i.e. socialism, defends is ownership

of the means of production by the people as a whole, where the people have the
right to make decisions about what, where and in whose interest to produce.
The guiding principle here is ownership by the people in common is “sacred
and inalienable.” Therefore, socialists cannot allow anyone to transform
this ownership of the means of production by the people as a whole into
an entity that is owned by private individuals or small groups, even by the
most democratic means. They denounce any such proposal, which threatens
such ownership by the people in common, as “backward,” “reactionary” or
“counterrevolutionary!”

Therefore, whether under bourgeois dictatorship or proletarian dictatorship,

what its army and police, i.e. the instruments of state violence, primarily
defend is the class affiliation of property rights, not the rights of democratic
participation by the people.

Thus, democracy ranks secondary relative to the system of ownership. This is

why capitalists are so opposed to the so-called “tyranny of the majority.” Even
progressives who seem to regard democracy as primary (e.g. social democracy)
will not allow the majority to decide on all matters. They too defend certain
basic principles, such as “human rights.”89 Many often conceal their true class
intentions under the banner of democracy. Marxist-Leninist-Maoists do not
disguise the true purpose of the dictatorship of the proletariat that defends
the ownership of the means of production by the people as a whole. They
know only in this context will the people be able to enjoy the widest possible
democracy. Any political theory of democracy that sidesteps the issue of
ownership of the means of production can be nothing more than a facade.

Although democracy is secondary to class rule, the lack of democracy in a

capitalist regime tends to imply its fragility. Faced with strong resistance
from the working class there were times when the capitalists had to resort to
dictatorial rulers like Hitler, Mussolini and Franco to effectively suppress it.
But dictators often threaten the interests of many other capitalists, and their

89 For example, they won’t allow the white majority of a country to classify or treat minorities as second-class
citizens by any means, however democratic.
 OCTOBER 2019  61

conflicts might be difficult to resolve. This is likely to create breathing space

for revolutionary forces.

Only when the intensity of domestic class conflicts does not reach the extent
of threatening the rule of the capitalists will it have enough confidence to
enact the formalities of “democracy of the people,” or “one person one vote.”
In reality, however, the “democracy of the dollar” or “one dollar one vote” status
quo remains in place. Those with the most dollars carry the most weight by
virtue of their control over the economy, media, etc. This is how capitalists
prefer to settle intra-class conflicts.

By contrast, the dictatorship of the proletariat ceases to exist without

democracy within the class. Otherwise, the working class is no longer the
ruling class, and “ownership by the people in common” becomes vacuous.
However, what the dictatorship of the proletariat depends on is not simply
the formalities of “one person one vote.” Instead, owing to the predominantly
capitalist ideology among the majority of the working class, democracy within
the class is a system that combines democratic centralism within the vanguard
of the proletariat on one hand, and the masses outside the Party exercising
a wide range of powers to supervise leaders at all levels on the other, as was
explored during the GPCR.90

3. Principal-agent dichotomy

Owing to the development of modern science and technology and the

expanding scale of production in capitalist society, the capitalists are becoming
less able to directly manage the production and state apparatus in its service.
Capitalists, who are a shrinking proportion of the population, must hence
appoint and employ more specialists to serve as their agents. The capitalist
principal-agent dichotomy has thus come into being. Through equity
controls and incentives, capitalists oblige the business managers they employ
to maximize their profits. Politically, management of the state apparatus
(including the instruments of state violence) and the control over other
political institutions that serve capitalists interests is based on the “one dollar
one vote” principle, i.e. those with the most capital carry the most weight.

In a socialist society under the dictatorship of the proletariat, although the

old capitalists have been overthrown, the inevitable c ontradictions between

90 For a more in-depth analysis of this, see On the Relationship Between the Working Class And Its Party Under
Socialism by Fred Engst cited above
62  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

managers and the managed still exist within socialized mass production. As
under capitalism, therefore, the principal-agent contradiction still exists.

The difference is that in a capitalist society the capitalists, which accounts for a
tiny minority of the population, entrusts its particular agents to dominate the
majority of the population, which the proletariat and other working people
constitute. On the other hand, in a socialist society the proletariat entrusts
certain full-time specialists as agents to govern the economy and the state
apparatus that serves them, i.e., the class puts itself under the management of
someone it has delegated to do so.

This is indeed contradictory. On the one hand, those specialists who manage
the proletarian state are entrusted by the class itself, rather than by any
individuals or cliques within that class, to serve the interests of the class,
rather than the benefit of any individual or clique. On the other hand it is
impossible to designate any entity (such as trade union representatives who
look out for the interests of particular industries or factions) that is capable
of comprehensively representing the interests of the proletariat as a whole,
other than its own unified and centralized political party that implements
democratic centralism.

Therefore, the central issues that arise are: whether or not this party truly
represents the interests of the class as a whole; which interests the administrators
actually serve; and how the working class supervises its own party.

The historical rise of the new capitalists under the dictatorship of the
proletariat lies precisely in the fundamental change of the vanguard of the
proletariat from a revolutionary party to a party in power that has the ability
to control the wealth in society, and thus arises the question: in whose interest
must this power be exercised? Therefore, the relationship between the working
class and its vanguard party also embodies the principal-agent dichotomy. The
danger of transforming the relationship between the working class, as master
of society, and its party, as guardian of the class, into their opposites, therefore,
becomes particularly prominent.

Because for the majority of the people under socialism working is still the
main means of subsistence rather than a personal enjoyment, or “life’s prime
want,” their focus is necessarily more on how to make ends meet rather than
on the purpose of production with their labor. This is why to each “according
to the amount of labor performed”91 in the socialist period is necessary. Under

91 Lenin: ”State and Revolution”, [Link]

 OCTOBER 2019  63

such circumstances the relationship between workers and managers can readily
be transformed from the originally intended principal-agent relationship
into the oppressed-oppressor relationship. Those entrusted managers can
easily form a class stratum based on bureaucratic privileges, and the master-
guardian relationship between the proletariat and its party can be overturned.
The essence of “ownership by the people as a whole” thus may be muted, even
if the form of state ownership is retained.

This is the main content of class struggle in the socialist period.

B. Major features of class struggle in the socialist period

In summing up the experiences of class struggle during the Mao era, several
basic laws of class struggle under socialism stand out.

First, although the main form of class struggle during the period of proletarian
dictatorship was the struggle between revolutionaries and revisionists (i.e. the
capitalist roaders) over the socialist versus capitalist road as the aim within the
Party, it was disguised by two-line struggles over means.

Second, on the question of how to both distinguish and deal correctly with the
two kinds of contradictions, i.e. those between the people and their enemies
versus those within the people’s camp, two polar opposite targets, lines, and
policies were advocated both within and outside of the Party. One tried to
“convince others by reasoning” and believed in “learning from past mistakes to
avoid future ones, and curing the disease to save the patient.” The other tried
“conquest by force of arms,” and believed in “ruthless struggle and merciless
blows.” Starting with the flip from the Rectification Campaign to the Anti-
rightist Movement in 1957, the struggle between the two permeated the last
20 years of the Mao era.

Third, factionalism turned out to be the Achilles heel of the working class.
Primarily among those lesser-advanced members of the vanguard who were
unintentional capitalist roaders, factionalism is the key reason for the tragic
demise of the GPCR.

The following is an attempt to prove these points.

The concentrated expression of the class struggle during the period of

proletarian dictatorship was, of course, the conflict between the socialist and
64  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

capitalist roads. However, the newly emerged capitalists represented by the

capitalist roaders — whether or not they were diehard revisionists — could
not directly control the means of production. They had to attach themselves,
at least initially, to the state institutions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Consciously or not, they followed the logic of capital accumulation and tried to
change the world according to the capitalist worldview, meanwhile disguising
the differences between them and the revolutionaries as a two-line struggle
among comrades over the means to build socialism.

The leadership of the proletarian vanguard and a planned economy are

undoubtedly the necessary conditions for sustaining the dictatorship of the
proletariat. However, they do not constitute conditions sufficient to guarantee
the dictatorship of the proletariat. To distinguish between the roads that
leading Party members advocated as either socialist or capitalist, it is necessary
to take into account several other distinctive differences: whether they opposed
or defended bureaucratic privileges, supported or opposed mass supervision
of their leadership, relied on empowering the masses to build socialism or
followed the logic of capitalism in developing the economy. In other words,
whether or not they were indeed vanguards of the proletariat needs to be
examined.

A core difficulty in debates and arguments among revolutionaries is often

that of distinguishing between the two-road battles over aims verses the two-
line struggles over means. However, this distinction is the key to untangling
the complex class struggle during the Mao era in China. Thus, this distinction
needs to be clearly delineated, otherwise revolutionaries would be unable to
decide correctly whom to unite and whom to fight.

1. The nature of two-line struggles about means

Two-line struggles in general are over the different ways and means
revolutionaries within the communist movement try to achieve their goals.
For example, the early stages of the Chinese revolution featured arguments
over the strategy of urban uprisings versus that of “surround the city from
the countryside,” and during the Anti-Japanese War there arose Wang
Ming’s92 proposition of “everything through the united front” versus Mao’s

92 Wang Ming (王明 May 23, 1904 – March 27, 1974) was a senior leader of the early CPC. Before WWII,
Wang pushed for urban uprising and frontal confrontation with the KMT which lead to major defeats of the
Red Army and the ensuing Long March. Wang epitomized the intellectualism and foreign dogmatism Mao
criticized in his essays “On Practice” and “On Contradiction”. More on this in the “Resolution on Certain
Questions in the History of Our Party” adopted by CPC Central Committee on Apr. 20, 1945 (where Wang
Ming’s true name in this document is Chen Shao-yu), [Link]
MaoZedong/Pamphlets/[Link]
 OCTOBER 2019  65

“independence and initiative within the united front.” In the Soviet Union,
meanwhile, there were arguments between the Stalinist and Trotskyist lines
over whether socialism can be built in one country.

The nature of any two-line struggle is contradictions among revolutionaries. As

long as there is no evidence of betrayal or treachery, disputes among comrades,
however grave line differences, remain non-antagonistic contradictions among
revolutionaries within the communist movement.

Antagonistic line struggles are the result of improper handling of such

conflicts. In this regard, Mao’s handling of Zhang Guotao’s attempt to set
up an alternative Central Committee and split the Party during the Long
March93 seemed to be more mature than Stalin’s handling of the conflict with
Trotsky.

Two-line struggles within the Party and within the international communist
movement is a reflection of the ideological struggles between the two
main classes in society. the fundamental reason for these struggles was the
incomplete transformation of the revolutionaries’ worldviews. Reflected in
the revolutionary ranks, wrong lines fall under at least three categories. One
type is based on individualism, turf mentality, sectarianism and factionalism.
Another type is due to a lack of investigation, self-righteousness and narrow-
mindedness. The third is having violent swings from petty-bourgeois frenzy
and rashness to pessimism, desperation and defeatism. Serious errors of line,
such as those put forward by Zhang Guotao, came from the desire to contend
for power and privilege, to be above the rest and to strive to be the “top dog”
within the revolutionary movement. These problems are ideological in nature,
even those before their to blatant betrayals exemplified by Zhang Guotao.
Therefore, they were indirect rather than direct class struggles.

The solution to line differences lies in democratic centralism, based on Mao’s

principle of the “three do’s and don’ts,” i.e. “Practice Marxism-Leninism,
not revisionism; unite, don’t split; be open and aboveboard, don’t intrigue
and conspire.” The main reason why Trotskyism could no longer be resolved
within the international communist movement is that Trotskyists violated
the principle of the “three do’s and don’ts,” especially “unite, don’t split.”

93 Leading a Red Army of 80,000 strong, Zhang Guotao (张国焘) challenged the leadership of the Central
Committee who had an army of less than 10,000 at the time the two armies met. Zhang Guotao lost most of
his army in battle after leading them south and then west instead of north. In 1938, after Mao won over all of
his followers, Zhang Guotao escaped and betrayed the revolution. More on this in the “Resolution on Certain
Questions in the History of Our Party” cited above (in it, Zhang’s name is spelled: Chang Kuo-tao).
66  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

Furthermore, they refused to observe the discipline required by democratic

centralism and placed factional interests above the Party.

As regards two-line struggles, Mao was always opposed to cover-ups and

skirting controversy but was at the same time against splitting over them.
Two-line struggles are over differences of principle. Therefore, it is wrong to
blur the line between right and wrong or to make unprincipled concessions.
However, one must abide by the principles of democratic centralism, i.e., the
minority is subordinate to the majority. Splits between revolutionaries signify
the immaturity of the movement.

Mao’s consistent approach to preventing splits among revolutionaries was to

seek truth from facts, to reason things out, to sum up lessons learned through
criticism and self-criticism sessions and full internal democracy, rather than
“dictatorial” methods of dealing with comrades who held different opinions
or who made mistakes.

In previous two-line struggles within the Party, it was precisely those

representative individuals who took the wrong line that were exponents of
the “ruthless struggle and merciless blows” method. They suppressed differing
opinions and conducted two-line struggles — not for the sake of achieving
unity through struggle, but rather to denigrate others. It was they who became
arrogant and junked the spirit of self-criticism soon after taking over the
leadership of the revolutionary movement.

In a non-China context, Stalin’s handling of Trotskyists, which Trotskyists

still resent to this day, also sharpened the contradiction between the two sides.
Mao’s policy of “Execute no one and arrest hardly any” during the Yan’an
Rectification Movement was partially based on his summary of experiences
in the history of inner-Party struggles. To a large extent, it was also aimed
at certain people in the Party who tried to imitate Stalin’s misguided “Great
Purge” from 1936 to 1938.

2. The nature of two-road battles about aims

Battles over which road the people’s struggle must take, in the broader sense,
refers to either the general direction or the immediate goal of the struggle
against oppression. For example, during the first period of cooperation
between Sun Yat-sen’s Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, their
steps forward in the general direction of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism
were consistent although their ultimate goals were vastly different.
 OCTOBER 2019  67

Thus, when the dispute over the ultimate goal was not the main issue going
forward, the two sides could shelve such differences or avoid turning them
into antagonistic conflicts and engage in joint combat against the common
enemy. As long as reformists outside of the Party did not resist the proletarian
revolution and joined the revolutionary united front, the contradictions
between the two were not antagonistic.

The battle over which road is the way forward, in a narrower sense, refers to
the aim or direction in which the communist movement should be heading
as well as to the ultimate goal of struggle. As communists, there should be
no such dispute. Arguments on such questions do arise, however, since the
success of Marxism-Leninism on the theoretical front obliges anti-Marxists,
consciously or not, to conceal their true intent under the banner of Marxism-
Leninism.

Consider the dichotomy of “going north” or “heading south” as a metaphor

for the dispute among revolutionaries over which road is the way forward.
As was the case during the Long March, there are tens of thousands of paths
available for “going north.” Once a mountain is encountered, whether to make
a detour to its left or right or climb over it directly (if possible) boils down
to a matter of time and cost. The arguments over which path to take “going
north” are metaphorically similar to line struggles. Some lines are good, some
are bad, and some are death traps. However, those who truly wanted to “head
south” would always find abundant reasons to take detours in that direction,
even when paths to the north had clearly been opened.

This kind of two-road battle constitutes an irreconcilably antagonistic

contradiction between the people and their enemy. Democratic centralism
is not designed to resolve this kind of two-road battle over aims within
the revolutionary movements, however, for the very premise of democratic
centralism is predicated on trust between opposing sides within the movement
in a common goal. Revolutionaries that refused to split from others that
had a different agenda are, in effect, betraying the revolution. This was the
fundamental reason for the split between Russia’s Bolsheviks and Mensheviks,
for example.

3. The two-road battles about aims disguised as two-line struggles

about means

The rise of capitalist roaders after the working class gained state power is a
new phenomenon in the international communist movement. The struggle
68  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

between Marxist-Leninist-Maoists and diehard capitalist roaders, i.e.

revisionists, must thus have seemed at first like a two-line struggle over means.

The difficulties of the revolutionary road were due not only to the strength
of the enemy but also to the difficulties of distinguishing and separating the
two-road dispute about aims from two-line battles about aims from the two-
line struggles about means within the revolutionary movement. Those within
the movement who are actually against MLM tended initially to use the
two-line struggle over means as a pretext. This blurred from the beginning
the distinction between the two types of contradictions and complicated
further the struggle between the two roads, i.e. between those of real and fake
Marxist-Leninist-Maoists.

This is because we cannot read other peoples’ minds, and people change their
minds over time.

For example, the struggle between Mao and the capitalist roaders right after the
1949 revolution looked initially like a two-line struggle over means. Liu Shaoqi,
for example, was at first opposed to cooperatives without mechanization, and
later he pushed for the “communist wind” and “exaggeration and boasting.”
Afterwards, he tried to blame its subsequent crushing defeat on the “premature”
establishment of people’s communes. On the surface, however, these were all
two-line struggles over the means to advance socialism.

As those people within the revolutionary movement who are against MLM
nonetheless carried the MLM banner, correctly distinguishing the struggle
with them as either a two-line battle over means or a two-road dispute
about aims seems to be based on the following criteria. Who, in practice,
do they rely on and unite with, and who do they oppress? Was the way they
conducted struggle aboveboard and based on a desire for unity, or do they
underhandedly engage in intrigues? And, more fundamentally, do they use
the powers entrusted on them to protect or to suppress the people? Thus, one
might say, the struggle with dogmatism is a struggle about means, not aims.
In contrast, the struggle with revisionists and opportunists are struggles about
aims, not about means.

Furthermore, we must distinguish between the two-road battle about aims

within the revolutionary movement where revisionists or opportunists don’t
yet have the repressive power of the state versus those that do. Once revisionists
or opportunists come to power, the struggle between revolutionaries and those
power holders is no longer a two-road dispute about aims.
 OCTOBER 2019  69

History proves revisionists coming to power means capitalists becoming the

ruling class. Once they seized state power, those diehard capitalist roaders were
no longer merely capitalist roaders, but full-blown capitalists with control over
the instruments of state violence to oppress the working class. Therefore, the
struggle between the proletariat and this kind of capitalists was no longer a
fight over which road forward, but rather a direct, naked, life-or-death class
struggle.

On the international front, for example, the Chinese and Soviet parties engaged
in a ten-year debate (1956-1966) more than half a century ago on the general
line of the international communist movement. At first, people thought it
was a two-line struggle over means among revolutionaries. They found later
it was not even a struggle over which way forward within the revolutionary
camp, but rather the people of the world’s struggle against social-imperialism.

4. The two-line struggle on contradictions among the people

There are diametrically opposite ways and methods of dealing with

contradictions within the Party and people’s movement, which reflect the
interests of different classes and their worldviews. Although the struggle of the
oppressed against oppression is a typical class struggle, the fight over power
and prestige among the oppressed for “top dog” positions is a continuation of
the system of oppression within a class society, and thus remains a part of the
class struggle.

What the communist worldview pursues is an end to the class society

where human beings exploit and oppress others. Proletarian revolutionaries
who develop this consciousness know it is only by liberating humanity in its
entirety that the proletariat itself can finally achieve emancipation as a class.
Therefore in dealing with contradictions among the people, often expressed
through different opinions and arguments, true communists take the attitude
of “letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought
contend.” Similarly, in dealing with comrades who have made mistakes, they
insist on starting from the desire for unity by seeking truth from facts, and
reasoning things out through criticism and self-criticism, so to achieve the
goal of “curing the disease to save the patient.”

Thus, no matter how intense arguments among comrades might be, they
presume the innocence of critics, absorb as much truth as they can and
learn what they can from it, even if such criticism is not well-grounded. The
organization’s decision, in the end, is based on democratic centralism, i.e. the
70  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

minority is subordinate to the majority. One can be removed from office after
an intense struggle. However, under socialism, one’s income should not be
affected (other than in cases of corruption or of felons). Political two-line
struggles must not be linked to individuals’ economic wellbeing (the GPCR
was the first time this delinking took place). If the policy of “Execute no
one and arrest hardly any” can be carried out during times of war, there is
no reason to arrest some and deprive others of the freedom of speech in
peacetime. Even in the case of fellow travelers who wavered in the two-road
battle, revolutionaries still insist on allowing people to make mistakes and to
correct them, so offering them a way out, rather than hitting them with a “big
stick.” This is the method of struggle through which proletarian revolutionaries
handle contradictions among the people.

Striving to be “top dog,” to stand out and be the boss is the crux of the
bourgeois and petty-bourgeois worldview. This is often reflected among
the revolutionary ranks as turf mentality, sectarianism, factionalism, self-
centeredness and other forms of individualism. The Marxist slogan “Workers
of the world, unite” so becomes distorted to “unite around me.”

Therefore, the petty-bourgeois among the revolutionary ranks have no desire

for solidarity or to win others to the revolutionary side. Their goal is not
to “save the patient” but to put others down, regardless of any differences.
Consequently, their method of struggle is to win arguments by any means,
including fabrication, mudslinging, character assassination and name-calling.
They are unforgiving of others’ mistakes and exaggerate others’ faults, at
the same time ignoring others’ contributions. When in power they do not
hesitate to use force or violence to arrest and silence those they cannot win
over with their arguments. Capitalist roaders used this method of struggle to
handle contradictions among the people, as amply manifested by the so-called
“bourgeois reactionary line” that they propagated during the early days of the
GPCR.

Thus, there is a two-line struggle too on the question of handling contradictions

among the people. One line is to “convince others by reasoning,” “learn from
past mistakes to avoid future ones” and “cure the disease to save the patient.”
The opposing line, embraced by the capitalist roaders and other petty-
bourgeois among the revolutionary ranks, waves the flag of “ruthless struggle
and merciless blows” and “forceful conquest.”

The latter was clearly shown throughout the factional fights between different
mass organizations during the GPCR. It was clear that the purpose of
 OCTOBER 2019  71

these struggles was not to seek truth from facts, but rather to see who could
“win arguments” over whom; not for the emancipation of humanity, but to
overpower opponents; not to destroy oppressive class relations, but to become
“top dog.” Therefore, they could not be convinced by anyone, and were even
proud to “go at it alone.”

When engaged in the two-road battle over aims, however, diehard capitalist
roaders presented themselves as underdogs or victims. They nevertheless
accused revolutionaries of subjecting them to baseless or exaggerated
criticisms, or of mere nitpicking. The capitalist roaders’ tactic is to deliberately
muddy the distinction between means vs. aims and muddle the two kinds of
contradictions.

In his later years, Mao put forward the principles of the “three do’s and
don’ts,” which were highly condensed summaries of his entire life experience
of struggles within the Party. “Practice Marxism-Leninism, not revisionism”
was about the two-road battle over aims, “unite, don’t split” was about the
purpose of the two-line struggle over means, and “be open and aboveboard,
don’t intrigue and conspire” was about the methods of the struggle itself.

5. The relationship between factionalism and class struggle

Ideological differences and struggles, and divergent views and arguments, are
inevitable as long as there is a crowd, even in the classless communist society.
However, such differences do not automatically turn into factional divisions.94
Factional struggles are products of a class society. Since such struggles are
closely related to the interests of individuals or small groups, they are more
than just ideological differences. Thus, factionalism means specifically the
pursuit of the interests of a small group that goes against those of other groups
within the same social class at the cost of the common interests of the class
as a whole.

94 Factionalism means organized forces, even if only loosely so, rather than ideological differences. The
difference between factional fights and ideological struggles could be metaphorically compared to the
difference between Humanities versus Science and Engineering. Due to their lack of objective standards and
close relations to individual interests, Humanities have many factions. There can be never-ending arguments
about which has the final say and which has authority on a subject. However, when there are academic
disputes in Science and Engineering, there can be unproven hypothesis, rather than different factions as
regards objective understandings. Even when greedy for fame, each side can contend for scientific research
funds by means fair or foul. Eventually, however, whoever’s viewpoint represents the truth is decided by
experimental results rather than by any authority. Similarly, once communism is achieved and distribution is
based on need (both at the individual level and the society as a whole), people’s disagreements and arguments
might not be related to individual material interest; difference of opinions will be more like those about
Science and Engineering, and factional fights will lose their material basis. For example, the different ideas
within the “open source” movement feature more contradictions among people in communist society.
72  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

The essence of the capitalists, like all other exploiting classes, is to contend
for power and greed. Thus, factional struggles are second nature to them. In
contrast, the dictatorship of the proletariat — that is, the defense of ownership
by the people as a whole — cannot exist unless its vanguard adheres to the
principle of the supremacy of the interests of the whole class as a whole,
expressed as a unified party upholding such interests. Factional struggles
among proletarian revolutionaries would amount to a betrayal of communism.

The principle of factionalism is to draw lines primarily according to factional

interests and to forget, ignore or exclude the principle of the supremacy of the
interest of the whole class, even openly betraying class interests. The difference
between upholding the proletarian party line versus factionalism lies in which
interests are considered primary: those of the entire class, or those of a small
group.

The root cause of the persistence of factionalism within the proletariat lies
in small-scale production. In the process of turning from an agrarian society,
represented by small-scale production, into an industrial society, represented
by large-scale mass production, large numbers of laborers were transformed
from small-scale producers like peasants and artisans into wageworkers toiling
in factories. There is a duality in their resistance to capitalism. On one hand,
as proletarians they resist exploitation and oppression and aspire after full
social emancipation. On the other, those who retain the small-scale producer
mentality are nostalgic for the “freedoms” associated with the autonomous
nature of the self-sufficient peasant economy and resist the strict discipline
and regimentation associated with socialized large-scale mass production.

One clear manifestation of such small-scale production mentality was when

many villagers in China cheered “freedom” after Deng’s regime broke up the
people’s communes. Such a mentality relished the “freedom” to “do it alone”
or to “be one’s own boss,” the “freedom” not to wait in line, the “freedom”
not to follow traffic rules, the “freedom” not to be on time for work and the
“freedom” to pursue individual interests. Within the revolutionary movement,
this mentality is evident in the urge or demand for the “freedom” to form
cliques and factions.

During the Mao era in China, the main form of factionalism was that of
capitalist roaders, especially during the GPCR. They emerged from a class
stratum that arose independently of the proletariat, based on bureaucratic
privileges, which poisoned the inner party struggle. It was their factional
interests during the Anti-Rightist Movement in 1957 where they sacked most
 OCTOBER 2019  73

of those cadres and masses who opposed them as “Rightist.” This faction also
propped up loyalists within the working class who defended those local Party
leaders within the working class around the country during the GPCR.95 In
the name of fighting factionalism, however, these capitalist roaders cleverly
disguised themselves as defenders of the Party line while condemning as
factional organizations those rebel groups that opposed them.

Organized rebel groups were formed precisely to fight the capitalist roaders
who had transformed many local Party organizations under their watch
into factional ones that served the interests of individuals or small groups.
Dialectics would have it that the vanguard Party of the proletariat based on
democratic centralism that outlawed internal factions needs “factional” mass
organizations that are not based on democratic centralism to serve as a check
on the Party. As long as there are capitalist roaders, rebel mass organizations
are at times needed, even if they are “factional” on the surface. The real challenge
is to delineate properly the jurisdictions and responsibilities between the local
Party authorities and mass organizations, the details of which can only be
ironed out in future struggles.

The key to overcoming factionalism within the working class lies in first
overcoming the factionalism of those unintentional capitalist roaders among
the proletarian vanguard. To achieve this it is necessary to abolish bureaucratic
privileges, which provide a fertile breeding ground for capitalist roaders. In
addition, spontaneous grassroots mass organizations, such as those formed by
workers during the GPCR, must be mobilized at times to effectively supervise
the party leadership. These points encapsulate the basic experience gained
from the GPCR.

Conclusion

The working class must transform itself as it changes the world. The task of
changing the world cannot be achieved without the working-class vanguard’s
leading role in storming its enemies’ bulwarks, while self-transformation is
primarily reflected in the vanguard’s self-rectification. This vanguard does
not fall from the sky. Instead, it emerges amides struggles and is tempered
by struggles. Therefore, the key to whether the working class can change
95 The strength of the loyalists highlighted the immaturity of the Chinese working class. When they resorted to
violence to suppress the rebels that were critical of capitalist roaders, they, in effect, denied their own rights as
masters of society.
74  INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY JOURNALS

the world depends on whether its vanguard can undertake self-rectification.

All previous two-line struggles, from the founding of the Communist Party
of China in 1921 to the establishment of new China in 1949, constituted
the self-rectification process of the vanguard. The Yan’an Rectification
Movement was the culmination of this transformation. The Rectification
Campaign in 1957 was also a deliberate attempt by the proletarian vanguard
to consciously prepare for a continuation of this transformation. However,
the flip to the Anti-Rightist Movement, which misdirected the focus
of attack, reflected the fact many Party cadres, especially those within
the top leadership, were either unwilling or simply refused to accept this
transformation.

At that time the Chinese working class faced not only the task of
transforming its vanguard but also of rebuffing enemy attacks from all sides,
including powerful external threats by imperialist forces as well as desperate
internal attempts by the overthrown exploiting classes to restore their rule.

The superimposition of the transformation of the world and the

transformation of the vanguard of the proletariat rendered the class struggle
in a socialist society both sharp and complex. It was extremely difficult to
untangle and deal with the two distinct kinds of contradictions that were of
diametrically different natures.

Proletarian revolutionaries could only wage revolution in the concrete

circumstances in which they found themselves and with the cards they had
been dealt with, so to speak. Thus, their ranks are inevitably a mix of diverse
characters. Although most of them wanted to wage the revolution, many
had no clear idea of how or were unwilling or reluctant to subordinate their
individualism and personal considerations. This hindered the revolution.

The success of the Chinese revolution in 1949 changed the political and
economic status of the vanguard and its relations with the rank and file of
the Chinese working class. Guiding those members of the vanguard who
were still laden with baggage from the old society toward finishing the
socialist revolution was a daunting task for revolutionaries. The goal of the
GPCR was not to knock them down but to transform them. However,
certain members of the supposed vanguard, who had degenerated to various
degrees or become entirely retrograded (i.e. diehard capitalist roaders),
doggedly refused to undergo that needed self-transformation. This was the
source of the extreme difficulties the GPCR encountered.
 OCTOBER 2019  75

The root cause of the tragic demise of the GPCR was the step-by-step
deterioration and eventual betrayal of the proletariat by certain former
revolutionaries. This change was a quantitative to qualitative metamorphosis.
Such was the core process of the history of class struggle during the Mao
era.

Class struggle has its laws, independent of anyone’s will. While class
membership might not be fixed, each contending class tries to summarize its
own experiences and constantly explores new ways to advance its interests.
As one side comes up with its particular policies and strategies, the other
formulates its counterstrategies and tactics.

As long as the fertile ground for capitalism is not eradicated, that is to say
as long as the most basic productive activity for human existence is still, for
the majority of workers, an obligatory way to make a living rather than an
enjoyable pursuit or “life’s prime want,” then crystallized labor may again
become the tools that enslave living labor, i.e., it may become capital. The
managers who are entrusted to coordinate the production of social wealth
thus have the possibility of forming a new class stratum that controls social
wealth, and capitalist production relations inevitably materialize.

Prohibiting bureaucratic privileges and adhering to the mass supervision of

the proletarian vanguard are fundamental measures to inhibit the formation
of this class stratum and to prevent the restoration of capitalist relations of
production. These are the eternal core principles of the Great Proletarian
Cultural Revolution.