12Yung 9/25/96 1:54 PM Page 61

“Top Down”
Planning and
Joint Doctrine:

Australians leading
American column,
Northern Territory.

U.S. Army (Al Chang)

The Australian Experience
By T H O M A S - D U R E L L Y O U N G

I
n terms of defense planning, Australia is a and a resilient alliance, it has retained a close se-
paradox. Though located in a remote region curity association with the United States.
of the world, Australians do not in general Australia is the world’s most urbanized soci-
draw a sense of security from their geo- ety with the overwhelming preponderance of its
graphic isolation. There are no land boundaries, populace in the southeast. Yet it is the climatically
and regional threats since World War II have been inhospitable, underdeveloped, and resource-rich
distant or sporadic. Nonetheless Australia’s anxi- north and northwest that have been receiving at-
ety over its exposed position proves that a coun- tention from the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
try does not need an identifiable threat to con- Geostrategic realities and recent experience
sider itself insecure. For example, while have combined to produce an advanced defense
sufficiently removed from the frontline in the planning system. Many post-Cold War difficulties
Cold War, Canberra was a staunch “blue force” facing Western militaries—such as developing ca-
during the period of superpower confrontation; pabilities-based planning systems and achieving
indeed, with shared experiences of many wars greater jointness—have tested defense leaders in
Canberra since the early 1970s. What initiated
the change in thinking was the official recogni-
Thomas-Durell Young is research professor of national security affairs in tion in 1972 that Australia had no threat against
the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.

Summer 1996 / JFQ 61

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12Yung 9/25/96 1:54 PM Page 62

■ ”TOP DOWN“ PLANNING AND DOCTRINE

reliance in light of the impending withdrawal of

the British from the Far East, the Nixon Guam
Doctrine, and evident failure of the U.S. interven-
tion in Vietnam.
The policy was further elucidated and with
stronger language in the Liberal-Country Party
coalition government’s Australian Defence, Novem-
ber 1976. Reliance on allied military assistance in

Combat Camera Imagery (April Alexander)

the event of a direct threat to Australia would no
longer be assumed, thereby giving impetus to de-
veloping a balanced, more self-sufficient force.
The apotheosis of self-reliance was reflected in
Defence of Australia 1987. For the first time, the
concepts of “self-reliance” and the “defense of
Australia,” with an endorsed national strategy
and policy guidance to help implement them, be-
F–111 arriving in came more than mere terms. A strategy of “de-
Darwin for fence in depth” was adopted to direct ADF devel-
Pitch Black ’93.
which to plan. To its credit, the defense establish- opment. Specific strategic guidance followed in
ment developed a top-down, threat-ambivalent 1991 and set the priorities for improving ADF ca-
planning system and force development method- pabilities to operate in the north by increased
ology. One outcome of this approach has been to force presence and facilities for deployments.
foster jointness by linking joint doctrinal develop- The 1994 paper further acknowledges the
ment to strategic guidance. Indeed, it is not un- new regional challenges involved in their pursuit
common to hear that commanders not only and “defence in depth” has become “depth in de-
know ADF joint doctrine but actually use it. fence,” thereby providing a more holistic ap-
While the U.S. Armed Forces have now proach employing all national assets, as opposed
adopted jointness as a formal discipline of study to its earlier more limited definition.
and have tomes of doc- One discernible change in previous policy is
it is not uncommon to hear trine, comparative litera- an acknowledgement that ADF must be more ca-
ture on joint matters is lim- pable of carrying out missions outside of the de-
that commanders not only ited. Thus the Australian fense of Australia. However, force development
know joint doctrine but use it experience warrants exami- will still be guided by the defense of Australia,
nation. This article analyzes with capabilities for regional engagement, peace-
two key elements of Aus- keeping, and external deployment being consid-
tralian jointness: defense planning/force develop- ered tangentially. The 1993 Strategic Review made
ment methodology and the development of joint no mention of “Australia’s area of direct military
doctrine. A description of the evolution of Aus- interest,” which had been given considerable
tralian defense policy will place these two systems prominence in Defence of Australia 1987. This con-
in context. Whereas it would be imprudent to cept had utility in the 1980s in shifting the focus
claim that the Australian experience is applicable more firmly from filial protection by “great and
to other defense establishments, the processes un- powerful friends” to the peculiar needs of Aus-
derlying its elements should be of interest to U.S. tralia’s defense. The job done, and with growing
planning and doctrine communities. engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, limited
boundaries were discarded as strategic and force
Defense Policy development tools. One result of Canberra’s policy
For those unfamiliar with Australian defense, of “regional engagement” was the ground break-
Defending Australia 1994, a white paper issued by ing December 1995 security pact with Indonesia.
the previous Labor government, is the latest itera- While it may appear that Australian planners
tion of a policy which has enjoyed general sup- have long been blessed by policy consistency, this
port across the political spectrum since 1972. In is not so at the implementation level. Between the
that year the ruling Liberal-Country Party coali- 1972 white paper and its 1987 counterpart, defense
tion (the Liberal Party being “conservative” in planners lacked adequate guidance from political
Australia) issued the first formal white paper on authorities. It took the publication of the Review of
defense. Significantly, the Australian Defence Re- Australia’s Defence Capabilities in 1986 by Paul
view argued in favor of a defense policy of self- Dibb, a consultant to the minister of defence, to
move the government to articulate and sanction
an official strategy. The 1987 defense white paper
offered thorough guidance in which Canberra

62 JFQ / Summer 1996

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Yo u n g

HMAS Dubbo and

HMAS Fremantle
during Kangaroo ’95.

Australian Defence Public Relations (K. Piggott)

U.S. Marines preparing
to jump with Australian
paratroops. Second, the defense establishment develops
appreciations of regional military capabilities in
Australian Defence Public Relations (Gary Ramage ) being as well as prospect. These are not official
threat assessments but rather surveys of regional
defense capabilities.1 As such, there is no consider-
stated national security aspirations and announced ation of, or judgment on, the motives or intent of
a strategy of “defense in depth.” Importantly, this regional countries. An appreciation of a nation’s
paper also had the effect of limiting force structure geographic setting and the military capabilities of
planning specifically to the defense of Australia. regional states informs judgments on warning
time and defense preparation requirements.
Defense Planning Third, these findings suggest what is credible
Australian defense policymaking has four and what is not in the form of “contingencies.”
major steps. First, planners consider geopolitical For example, an invasion or conquest of Aus-
and geostrategic factors such as the proximity of tralian territory would be too demanding on
states, population centers, terrain, infrastructure, enemy combat, combat support, and logistics ele-
et al. Overall, planners face defending an island ments. Japan might have thundered on the
continent distant from other countries, having a northern coast during World War II but never re-
vast and climatically inhospitable north with a alistically looked like conquering the country.
limited population base and infrastructure. On On the other hand, while no motive or intent
the positive side, Australia has a formidable “air- for conflict at any level can be perceived, prudence
sea gap” between its coast and the archipelago demands the ability to meet feasible contingen-
farther north through which an attacker would cies, now called “short-warning” (rather than the
have to pass. earlier low or escalated) conflicts.2 The scale and
intensity of short-warning conflict could range

Summer 1996 / JFQ 63

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■ ”TOP DOWN“ PLANNING AND DOCTRINE

contingencies are used as a from small raids to larger Force Development

protracted operations, The process used by the Australian Depart-
baseline against which defense still a demanding pros- ment of Defence and Headquarters ADF to carry
capabilities can be weighed pect in the sparse tracts out force development has three stages: strategic
and remote waters of the concepts, defence force capability options papers,
far north. and specific capability proposals, including key
Contingencies are not used for formal threat- capability submissions. The process must be seen
based planning but as a baseline against which de- as a continuum since distinctions drawn between
fense capabilities can be weighed. Credible contin- the stages are somewhat arbitrary.
gencies have a direct influence on developing ADF Stage 1—Developing strategic concepts. Guid-
capabilities to meet conflicts that could arise in ance identifies likely ADF roles in the defense of
the near term, and the defense expansion base (re- Australia. Currently, strategic concepts are written
serve forces and defense industrial capabilities) for for each of eight roles. The concepts are devel-
conflicts that would take longer to develop. oped to ensure a joint focus as well as the full and
Fourth, planners generate five and ten-year complementary capabilities of ADF:
plans based on realistic financial guidance set by
■ intelligence collection and evaluation
the government. This provision grew from a fail-
■ surveillance of maritime areas and northern
ure to garner the appropriations which the Dibb Australia
review and earlier white papers assumed. ■ maritime patrol and response
This planning process produces the follow- ■ protection of shipping, offshore territories, and
ing conclusions: resources
■ air defense within maritime areas and northern
■ Australia possesses a natural and formidable air-
sea barrier. approaches
■ defeat of incursions on Australian territory
■ There is no identifiable country with the intent
■ protection of civil and military assets (including
or ability to threaten fundamental national interests, let
alone national security (that is, to launch and sustain a infrastructure and population centers)
■ strategic strike.
lodgement on Australia).
■ Certain countries do possess some capabilities But because these roles are broad, a strategic
which could be employed against Australia, and their concept derives a list of tasks including specifica-
acquisition of more threatening weapon systems could tion, in the greatest possible detail, of task para-
be countered by increasing ADF capabilities.
meters such as rates of effort, location, duration,
■ Nevertheless, in the short term and without ex-
pansion, such capabilities could only generate conflict
and sustainability and, whenever possible, initial
well short of major attack or invasion. judgments of task priorities.
■ As a consequence, Australia will protect itself Tasks derived from strategic concepts must
through a strategy of depth in defense. be identified correctly and comprehensively as
they evolve since they form the basis for force de-
These conclusions equal a net assessment
velopment. It must be made clear what is to be
and establish requirements for a standing force
done, where, when, how many times, and for
structure and defense base. The assessment has
how long. Note that strategic concepts do not
the following implications for defense policy:
specify how to accomplish missions.
■ In light of Australia’s threat-ambiguous environ- An update of these concepts over time is en-
ment, sophisticated intelligence gathering and assess- visaged as factors change. Moreover, once all
ment capabilities are crucial to providing sufficient
eight have been endorsed they will be supported
warning to allow an appropriate political response.
■ Inhibiting incursions and monitoring sovereign
by environmental (land, sea, and air) concepts
territory and seas require refined air, maritime, and and one master concept as a baseline repository
ground surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities for common consideration.3
suitable for peacetime and wartime. Stage 2—Defence force capability options papers.
■ Priority must be directed to meeting short warn- These documents examine the extent to which
ing-time conflict. current and approved ADF capabilities can under-
These processes establish a practice by which take tasks identified in endorsed strategic con-
defense officials can delineate ADF missions with- cepts. Where tasks cannot be completed to an ad-
out accentuating implausible threat scenarios. equate level, the papers identify broad options for
This is not always easy since it requires clear policy overcoming deficiencies. This drives the system
and consensus on key areas in the defense com- to examine in a joint manner what can be done
munity. The system has provided planning with with existing capabilities and, should deficiencies
stable direction to develop force structure for the arise, to determine what capabilities are required
defense of Australia in a top-down manner. for the future.

64 JFQ / Summer 1996

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Yo u n g

Australian troops land-

ing from HMAS Tobruk.

Australian Defence Public Relations (C. Woods)

Capability options papers are developed to ■ How much is enough? (Identify where excess/
accomplish the following: shortfall exists and what to do about it.)
■ What are the costs and risks?
■ Assess the performance likely from using all ex-
■ What are the preferred generic options?
isting capabilities.4 This step establishes the baseline
against which the cost of adjustment options will be Stage 3—Specific capability proposals, including
measured. major capability submissions. Following approval
■ Determine what level of performance is accept- of generic options, the final step before funding
able and the consequences of not meeting that standard; approval and acquisition is determining specific
that is, does a deficiency need to solutions and matching resources with force
just as force development is be overcome? This analysis must structure requirements. Questions involved at
also consider the effects of not
influenced by strategic this stage focus on cost, type, and density of
completing the tasks. Conversely,
equipment required and timing of procurement.
concepts, so is joint doctrine surplus capability requires a deci-
sion as to whether to reduce
structure or shift excess capabili- Joint Doctrine
ties elsewhere; for example, reserve components. Just as Australian force development is
■ Explain how a defense force could reduce the highly influenced by strategic concepts, so is
deficiency inexpensively with cost-effective adjustments joint doctrine. In short, endorsed strategic con-
such as changes in doctrine, training, or command and cepts provide the foundation for the develop-
control. ment of ADF joint doctrine. So important are
■ If the defense force cannot fulfill a task, this
these concepts that it is extremely difficult for a
stage will explain ways it can acquire greater proficiency
service to obtain new capabilities unless it can
by improving such components as manpower, facilities,
equipment, training, organization, etc. show that they would directly support existing
■ Estimate level of improvement and likely costs strategic concepts.
of an enhancement option as well as consequences of Joint doctrine must demonstrate how ADF is
not performing to the level judged acceptable. capable of performing the missions described by
■ Finally, establish force development priorities strategic concepts and has thus become more influ-
based on the preceding analyses as well as the best re- ential. For instance, while responding to an inher-
turn for expended resources. ently low “force-to-space ratio” through a series of
While complicated, this process can be command reorganizations, ADF has had to become
summed up as follows: more proficient in joint operations. Consequently,
■ Can the identified tasking be done now? (What
are existing capabilities and how well can they perform
the task?)

Summer 1996 / JFQ 65

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■ ”TOP DOWN“ PLANNING AND DOCTRINE

all exercises are joint. The capstone ADF Publica- there is a routine method of ensuring that doc-
tion 1, Doctrine, has become umbrella guidance for trine remains relevant to operators in the field.
the three services, to which their own doctrines
must conform. The services have come to accept Post-1972 defense gave Canberra a twenty-
joint doctrine as a useful means to achieve the year head start in planning to operate jointly in a
often elusive goal of jointness, noting, however, threat-ambiguous regional environment. More-
the important role of each service’s professional over, geostrategic realities, financial exigencies,
doctrinal sources in influencing joint culture. and defense guidance forced ADF to take joint-
As concepts mature, joint doctrine increas- ness seriously. This is not to suggest that the Aus-
ingly flows from and supports specific concepts. tralian model is either perfect—it is evolving—or
ADF joint doctrine thereby provides methods by appropriate for other countries. Australia clearly
which the services can support national strategy. enjoys a unique strategic culture.
Although the individual services previously found What is relevant are the methodologies and
it difficult to demonstrate that they could execute systems outlined above. Developing a planning
strategic concepts separately, joint doctrine com- process that translates national policy and strate-
bined with emerging operational concepts pro- gic guidance into overarching concepts, capability
vides integrating and rationalizing guidance. options, and principles to govern force employ-
Lastly, joint doctrine will help the comman- ment should not be discounted. Given shortcom-
der, Australian Theater, and his one geographic and ings in current joint strategic planning within the
three environmental component commanders to Pentagon, the Australian experiences could hold
assess and demonstrate command preparations to answers for improvements in the U.S. planning
accomplish missions stipulated in the Headquar- system. Thus, in an era of financial penury in
ters ADF Master Task List, as well as respond to the many nations, and recognizing that future opera-
Chief of Defence Force’s Preparedness Directive (on tions will require joint capabilities, a study of Aus-
readiness levels and resource allocation). tralian defense planning and joint doctrine could
Joint doctrine is drafted at the ADF Warfare reveal what will and what will not work. JFQ
Centre by teams of field grade officers from all
services with recent operational experience. The NOTES
centre, organized in 1990 from two joint warfare 1 While defense officials emphasize that these ap-

schools, is chartered to develop and teach joint preciations are not threat assessments, references to “in-
doctrine, manage the ADF exercise analyses plan, telligent adversaries” and Australia’s “favorable security
and maintain a data base for post-exercise analy- environment” presuppose a threat, however ill-defined.
ses. It is concerned with developing and validat- Officials respond that their methodology does not allow
ing joint doctrine on the operational level. Con- threats to overly influence their force development
sequently, the centre does not normally develop methodology.
2 Levels of conflict include low-level, escalated low-
tactical level doctrine, which is done by the indi-
level, and more substantial conflict. Escalated low-level
vidual services in accordance with joint doctrine.
conflict is defined as an “attacker supplementing or
Valid joint doctrine must address strategic substituting unconventional tactics and forces with mil-
concepts when it is drafted. Once completed and itary units prepared to confront our forces direct.”
vetted, doctrine is reviewed by the Joint Opera- 3 As further feedback, an operational level concept for

tions Doctrine Group which is comprised of ser- the defense of Australia will produce the “warfighters’
vice representatives, joint commands, Headquar- view” and improve interaction of the separate service
ters ADF, and other interested parties. Draft planning for all eight roles or combinations of them.
4 Concept papers make assumptions on actual geo-
doctrine is then staffed through the services.
Agreement to publish is reached by consensus. graphic locations, frequency, intensity, and currency of
The tendency to water down joint doctrine which significant conflict periods similar to two MRCs and the
win/hold/win judgment.
can arise in the United States during consensus- 5 For a critique of the U.S. doctrine development
building is largely mitigated in Australia because process, see Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell
the process is focused on strategic concepts dur- Young, Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine, and Antipodean In-
ing the early stages of development and through- sights (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College,
out the coordination phase.5 Strategic Studies Institute, 1995).
Once endorsed, joint doctrine is validated
for relevance and utility through the observation
of joint and combined exercises by the ADF War-
fare Centre. The assistant chief of defence force
(operations) sponsors such observation visits,
thus ensuring the involvement of Headquarters
ADF in the review. Any observed inadequacies
can result in a doctrinal review. In this manner,

66 JFQ / Summer 1996