VITTORIO f.

GUIDANO
THE SELF IN PROCESS
TOWARD A POST- RATIONALIST
C OGNITIVE THERAPY
Vittorio F. Guidano

"Thu id a creative a11d thought-provoking work, rich

in theoretical i2eaJ and cLi11icaL i,uight,11 which are weff
iffu<1trated with exte,uive Cade material. At the heart
of Gui2ano d approach Liu a paddionate and rigorow
commitment to a co,utructividt epidtemowgy and to a
view of human being,1 ad ,1e/[Link], de/f-determin-
i11g agent,11 capa6Le of ongoing growth and differenti-
ation. A dtirnufating and original contrilmtion."
- - Jeremy D. Safran, Ph.D.

Cognitive psychology, for the most part, still

firmly believes in an objective external reality
that can be readily observed and assimilated. If
environment is primary, the individual must
conform to it to be recognized as "rational." In
this powerful work, Dr. Guidano critiques the
separation of observer and observed, shows how
the very meaning of "self" is thus redefined, and
delineates the clinical ramifications of the newly
conceived self for a "post-rationalist" cognitive
therapy. Clinicians, according to Guidano, can
do more than help patients change dysfunctional
behavior. By directing therapy toward core
emotional themes and utilizing the interactional
aspects of the therapeutic relationship, practi-
tioners can modify patients' core patterns of self-
perception and thereby realize substantive and
lasting change.

Part I of the volume lays the theoretical ground-

work and Part II, replete with case examples,
discusses psychotherapeutic applications. In the
first part, Guidano explicates his construct of the
self, examining the differentiation of self-bound-
aries, discussing developmental pathway s of self-
organization, and describing the impact of self-
boundaries on lifespan development.

continued on back/ lap

THE SELF IN PROCESS
THE SELF IN PROCESS
Toward a Post~Rationalist Co,Rnitive Therapy

VITTORIO F. GUIDANO

THE GUILFORD PRESS

New York London
© 1991 The Guilford Press
A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc.
72 Spring Street, New York, NY 10012
AU rights reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise,
without [Link] permission from the Publisher.
Printed in the United States of America

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Guidano, V. F.
The self in process: toward a post-rntionalist cognitive therapy
/ Vittorio F. Guidano.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-89862-44 7-9
l. Cognitive therapy. 2. Self psychology. I. Tide.
[DNLM: 1. Cognitive Therapy. 2. Self Concept. WM 425 G946s]
RC489.C63G85 1991 .
616.89' 142-dc20
DNLM/DLC
for Library of Congress 90-14129
CIP
 Preface

Although the powerful development of the cognitive sciences

that has taken place over the last two decades has succeeded in
fostering more articulated models of human behavior and knowing
processes, the nature of human experience and the role that affectiv-
ity, meaning, and so forth 1 play in its construction are domains that
have remained largely overlooked.
What the nature and structure of human experience might be is,
in fact, a question that is not even asked in the empiricist epistemo-
logical perspective underlying the prevailing rationalist trend in
cognitive psychology. If reality is taken as a univocal, objectively
given, external order that exists independently from our observation
of it, we will inevitably take for granted our own characteristics as
observers. The only possible kind of investigation remaining in the
face of something "already objectively given" is that of limiting oneself
to the observation of various aspects of that given; and the most likely
methodology resulting from this is that in which the description ends
up coinciding with the explanation. Thus, describing the intercurrent
mechanism between environmental stimuli and their sensory registra-
tion substantially amounts to the same as explaining the human
sensory system. In the same way, describing human identity as merely
an organized set of cognitions, perceptions, and memories correlated
to a correspondent repertoire of feelings, emotional experiences, and
psychophysiological patterns amounts to the same as explaining the
nature and structure of selfhood.
If, on the other hand, we assume a nonempiricist perspective,
the essential point becomes instead that of understanding how our

V
vi PREFACE

characteristics as observers are involved in the process of observing,

and this brings us to a radical change in the fonnulation followed up to
now. It is not so much a question of describing what we feel or the
ingredients that appear in individual identity, but rather one of asking
why we feel what we feel, or why it is necessary to have a unit,iry sense
of self continuous in time in order to be able to function. In other
words, the unavoidable question becomes: "What is human experi-
ence?", and the only possible answer lies in researching the underlying
mechanisms and processes causative of the phenomena (i.e., human
experience) to be explained.
Hence, the assumption of an evolutionary epistemological per-
spective-that is, the study of evolving knowledge and knowing sys-
tems-necessarily become; the basic methodological stance, given
that, emphasizing how we cannot escape our particular way of being
animal, such a stance enables the reconstruction of the human em-
beddedness of human experience. Moreover, if the ordering of our
world is inseparable from our experiencing it, then the development of
knowledge unfolds into an irreducible ontological dimension in which
subjectivity underlies any ordering of that objective dimension of
reality commonly called human experience.
This interdependence between subjective and objective, emo-
tioning and cognizing, experiencing and explaining, etc., is con-
stitutive of any human knowing process, just as feeling ourselves to be
alive and the continuous explanation of this is constitutive of our
nature and is at the base of our experience of selfhood. Because
understanding is inseparable from existing, all understanding is self-
understanding. The experiencing/explaining interdependence un-
derlying self-understanding unfolds into an endless process of circular-
ity between the immediate experience of oneself ( the acting and
experiencing "I") and the sense of self that emerges as a result of
appraising and self-referring that ongoing experience (the observing
and evaluating "Me").
This crncial feature inherent in selfhood dynamics is the es-
sential thread around which the two parts of this book revolve. In Part
I, which is of a theoretical nature, we attempt to outline the dynamics
of the experiencing/explaining interface in selfhood development as
well as the role that affectivity, meaning, and so forth, exert on the
whole process. In Part II, of a more clinical nature, we try to show
how working in a therapeutic setting on the experiencing/explaining
interface may be a promising alternative to the rationalist methodics,
Preface. vii

essentially "persuasive" in nature, still largeli adopted in cognitive

therapy.
In conclusion, this book attempts to point out some of the basic
features and essential processes that underlie human experience with a
twofold intent: firstly, ·that of presenting an ontological model of
knowledge in which knowing is seen from the point of view of the
experiencing subject (i.e., how an individual experiences and is
affected by the self-knowledge he or she has been able to process);
secondly, that of deriving, in a ,manner consistent with the model
presented, a methodology and strategy of intervention for cognitive
therapy.

I wish to express my gratitude to the Center for Cognitive

Therapy of Rome for the support and collaboration given me, and, in
particular, to Giampiero Arciero, who, with involvement equal to
enthusiasm, has sustained me throughout the drafting of this book
with continual advice and suggestions.
There are many colleagues and friends to whom I owe thanks,
and it would be impossible to name them all. I recall with particular
gratitude the help of John Bowlby, Walter B. Weimer, Antonio
Caridi, Toto Blanco, Jeremy Safran, Mayte Miro Barrachina, Oscar F.
Goncalves, Mauro Ceruti, and Valeria Ugazio.
I extend special thanks to Michael J. Mahoney, both to cele-
brate a decade of friendship and to emphasize how this friendship has
profoundly influenced my personal and scientific development.
I should also like to thank all my trainees, with whom I have
discussed at length, and always profitably, the main ideas contained in
this book.
There are many people to whom I am grateful for having made
the editing and publishing work stimulating. Particular thanks to
Matthew Dallaway for helping me put the work into the final English
form; the readiness and professional competence of the staff of The
Guilford Press, together with the unconditional support and friend-
ship of Seymour Weingarten, have considerably eased the whole
operation.

V. F. G.
 Contents

1. THEORETICAL PREMISES

1. Selfhood Processes: An Ontological Approach 3

Preliminary Remarks .3
Ontology of Observing and the Structure of Human
Experience 4
An Evolutionary Approach to Selfhood Processes 7

2. The Differentiation of Self-Boundaries 16

Attachment and the Differentiation of Self-Boundaries 17
The Organizational Unity of the Emotional Domain 21
Selfhood as a Boundary-Maintaining System 27

3. The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensions 31

An Ontological Perspective 31
Developmental Pathways 35
Methodological Implications for Psychopathology 56

4. Self-Boundaries and Lifespan Development 65

Awareness and Self-Regulation 65
Love and Affective Style as Attachment Processes 71
Adulthood and Meaning Coherence 82

ix
X CONTENTS

II. PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

5. A Post-Rationalist Framework for Cognitive Therapy 93

Preliminary Remarks 93
The Therapist's Attitude and the Assessment Procedure 98
Self-Observation Method 103 ·
Structure and Dynamics of Therapeutic Change 108

6. Preparing the Clinical and Interpersonal Context 113

Introductory Remarks 113
Case Illustrations 113

7. Construing the TherapeutiG Setting 126

Focusing and Reordering Immediate Experiencing 126
The Reconstruction of the Client's Affective Style 145

8. Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 166

Introductory Remarks 166
Case Illustrations 168
Final Considerations 194
Appendix: Guidelines for the Reconstruction of a
Developmental History 198

9. Concluding Remarks 202

References 211

Index 231
I
THEORETICAL PREMISES

. .. we arc not like a tree which lives hut does not feel, for
whom earth, sun, air, rain imd wind ,lo not seen1 to he anything
that they are not, that is , either friendly or else harmful things.
W c men instead are born to a sorry privilege, that of feeling our-
selves to he alive, with the resultant great illusion: that is, to take
as :m external reality what is in fact an internal feeling of ours for
life, anJ is ch,mgeahle and varied, according to the times, our
situation anq our luck . . .
- L. Pn,ANDELL<\ The Lite Mattiu Pascal (1904/198 7, p. 159)
1
Selfhood Processes:
An Ontological Approach

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Cognitive psychology is., for the most part, still firmly anchored in
the empiricist tradition and its basic postulates: (1) that an unequivocally
given external reality exists in which a "sense of things" is objectively
contained; and (2) that this reality can be observed from outside and
assimilated, resulting in a univocal, objective understanding.
The information-processing perspective endorsed by proponents
of the dominant rationalistic/computational approach represents the
most current development based on these assumptions. This approach
decrees that reality consists of a mind-independent ordered set of
objects, knowledge about which coincides with a parallel set of in-
ternal representations derived from the progressive processing of ex-
ternal information. The validity (or truth) of knowledge as defined by
its degree of correspondence to external reality inevitably leads to the
positing of an outside, impartial viewpoint, making it possible to
analyze individual knowledge independently of the individual possess-
ing it (the so-called "God's eye point of view"; Putnam 1981 ). This
emphasis on the correspondence principle necessarily implies primacy
of the environment, on the basis of which adaptation becomes an
externally regulated process, consisting of the continuous modeling of
a knowing system to environmental pressures.
However, the interdisciplinary convergence that has taken
place in recent years has resulted in some remarkable epistemological
changes in the concepts of "reality" and "observer.'' These changes

3
4 THEORETICAL PREMISES

have rendered untenable a theory of the validity of knowledge that

excludes the influence of the knowing subject (Hayek, 1952; Gadam-
er, 1979; Jantsch, 1980; Maturana, 1988a; Maturana & Varela, 1987;
Weimer, 1979).
Reality is no longer thought of as unequivocal and ultimately
objective, but as a network of interwoven multidirectional processes,
simultaneously articulated along multiple levels of interaction. As
Maturana (1986) makes clear, the radical shift is from an independent
universum to a co-evolving multiversa, in which each versum is equally
valid and unique. In other words, we live in a plurality of possible
worlds and personal realities created by our own perceived dis-
tinctions. There are as many domains of existence as there are types of
distinction constructed by the observer.
Consequently, the observer can no longer be assigned the privi-
leged position of one who watches &om the outside; indeed, any
observing introduces into the network of interwoven processes an
ordering distinction through which all of the possible ambiguities
caused by the multiple, simultaneous interactions acquire, to the
observer's eyes, an unequivocal and necessary character. Any observa-
tion-.-far from being "external" and therefore "objective"-is self-
referential. It always reflects itself, that is, the perceiving order on
which it is based, rather than the intrinsic qualities of the perceived
object. Consequently, the order and regularity with which we habitu-
ally deal with things, as well as with ourselves, are not external and
objectively given, but are rather a product of our continuous interac-
tion with ourselves and the world. Thus, the histc)rical relativity of
knowing processes depends exclusively on their interactive and con-
structive nature, as is clearly expressed by the well-known aphorism
of the Chilean School: "Everything said is said by an observer to an-
other observer, who also could be him/herself' (Maturana, 1978,
p. 31).

ONTOLOGY OF OBSERVING AND THE

STRUCTURE OF HUMAN EXPERIENCE

Given that we can perceive the reality in which we live only

from within our perceiving order, human experience arises from the
J)raxis of our living which, in this sense, represents the absolutely
inescapable primary ontological condition:
Selfhood Processes: An Ontological Approach 5

We find ourselves as human beings here and now in the praxis of

living, in language languaging, in a priori experiential situations in
which everything that is, everything that happens, is and happens in
us as part of our praxis of living. In these circumstances, whatever we
say about how anything happens takes place in the praxis of our living
as a comment, as a reflection, as a reformulation; in short, as an
explanation of the praxis of our living, and as such it does not replace
or constitute the praxis of living that it purports to explain. {Matur-
ana, 1986, pp. 3-4)

Human beings cannot separate themselves from the way they

view life, both because of their previous experience as a result of their
praxis ot living, and because they are part of a specific historical
tradition. Hence, any understanding is always the result of interpreta-
tion: neither "subjective" (particular to the individual) nor "objective"
(independent of the individual) (Winograd & Flores, 1986). Such an
interpretation is the emerging product of the process of mutual regula-
tion continuously alternating between experiencing and explaining,
through which ongoing patterns of activity (immediate experiencing)
become subject to distinctions and references, bringing about a
reordering (explanatio~) which is able to change the very experienc-
ing of the patterns themselves. As Matmana (1986) emphasizes, at
the level of immediate experiencing it is not possible to distinguish
between perception and illusion. Thus, for example, the perturbing
feeling of having fleetingly s~en a ghost is, for the subject who is feeling
it, an irrefutable experience; only by shifting to the meta-experiential
level of intersubjective coordination of thoughts and actions through
languaging, can the individual explain the experience in terms of, let
us say, a trick of the light, thus managing to transform and assimilate
it into the perceived continuity of his or her praxis of living. In other
words, understanding is not separable from human experience, so that
to exist means literally to know. Hence, rather than representing a
"given" reality according to a logic of external correspondence, know-
ing is the continous constmction and reconstruction of a reality
capable of making consistent the ongoing experience of the ordering
individual (Arciero, 1989; Arciero & Mahoney, 1989; Mahoney,
Miller, & Arciero, in press; Winograd & Flores, 1986; Varela, 1987).
Even though they both belong to our praxis of living, experienc-
ing and explaining are, however, appraised in different ways by each
person; explaining, entailing conscious distinctions, is self-referred as
6 THEORETICAL PREMISES

one's own internal activity, while experiencing, being so intertwined

with our ordering of the world, is usually "outer-referred'' to a single,
external reality common to everybody.

Consider, for example, a group of people attending a symphonic

concert. The experiences of the various people will vary depending on
their interests, backgrounds, current state, etc. Some of the ·things
they experience will pertain to the sights of the hall and the members
of the orchestra, the sounds and beauty of the · music, and the total
atmosphere of the concert hall. Whatever experience each person has
phenomenologically, the colors, sounds, beauty and atmosphere will
to
appear them to be occurring outside of themselves (that is, in terms
of naive realism). But everything just mentioned occurs solely within
the conscious experiences produced by the nervous systems of the
people in the hall. . . . The human reality of the concert, in other
words, is a construction of the brain. It _is both created by and
experienced in the brain . . . our nervous system is responsible for
constructing the reality of the human environment. (Ritter, 1979, pp.
203-204)

Hence, moment-by-moment understanding unfolds through a

circular process in which an immediate and tacit ·p erception of self and
world (a priori first-order experiences) through explicit linguistic abili-
ties is reordered and scaffolded in terms of propositions distributed
within conceptual networks; this reordering makes possible new di-
mensions of experience, such as "true-false," "subjective-objective,"
etc. (a posteriori second-order experiences).
In all living beings, the affective-emotional system corresponds
to an immediate and irrefutable perception of the world. Therefore,
from an ontological point of view, feelings can never be mistaken,
since through them we can directly experience our way of being, so
that we always are as we feel we are (Olafson, 1988, p. 109). Errors
can be noticed only a posteriori, and depend on the point of view that
we, as observers, take in reordering our experiencing. Hence any
rational-cognitive reordering (explaining) consists of operating with
the coherence of semanticological rules based on premises tacitly
provided by immediate experiencing and accepted a priori. Every
rational system therefore has an emotional base, and this explains why
nobody can be convinced by a logical argument if they have not
already accepted its premise a priori (Maturana, 1988b).
Conscious-explicit restructuring makes new levels of abstraction
Seljhood Processes: An Ontological Approach 7

available, transforming the continuous modulation of internal states

into patterns of self-understanding that modify ongoing immediate
experience and facilitate its further articulation. Thus, while ex-
periencing would appear to be a necessary constraint for any explana-
tion, explaining is in turn crucial in giving consistency and meaning
to life events. As Dostoevski noted over a century ago in Memories
from Underground, no one can do without explaining to themselves
what is happening to them, and if one day they should no longer be
able to explain anything to themselves, they would say they had gone
mad, and this would be for them the last explanation left.
Hence, experiencing and explaining, although different in
terms of "embedded immediacy" versus "abstracted distancing," are
polarities which are ever present in the endless circularity of our
understanding, whether we are dealing with externals or with our-
selves. Now, the experience of "being-a-self' is something intertwined
with and arising from our praxis of living, so that, as Gadarner (1976)
says, "the self that we are does not possess itself: one could say that it
happens" (p. 55).
The experiencing/explaining interdependence underlying self-
understanding is matched by an endless process of circularity between
the immediate experience of oneself ( the acting and experiencing "I")
and the sense of self that emerges as a result of abstractly self-referring
the ongoing experience (the observing and evaluating "Me") (James,
1890; Mead, 1934; Smith, 1978, 1985). The self as subject ("I") and
as object ("Me") therefore emerge as irreducible dimensions of a
selfhood dynamic whose directionality depends on the ongoingness of
our praxis of living. Indeed, the acting and experiencing "I" is always
one step ahead of the current appraisal of the situation, and the
evaluating "Me" becpmes a continuous process or reordering and
reconstructing one's conscious sense of self.
We will now go on to outline briefly the theoretical framework
that can be developed out of the ontological perspective advanced
above.

AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
TO SELFHOOD PROCESSES

The epistemological change in the observer-observed relation-

ship, highlighting the co-dependence of knowledge. and order from
8 THEORETICAL PREMISES

the very beginning, has brought a new branch of epistemology to the

fore: evolutionary epistemology (see Campbell, 1974). This is an
approach that uses and relates data from cognitive, biological, and
evolutionary science to trace patterns and processes underlying the
interdependence of evolving knowledge and knowing systems, so that
such a methodology is also defined by the terms "natural" (Maturana,
1978) or "experimental" epistemology (Ceruti, 1989; Radnitzky &
Bartley, 1987). In effect, the application of an evolutionary perspec-
tive in order to understand the nature of knowing and the manner of
its acquisition reveals that knowledge itself has evolved along with
other aspects of life, and is now recognized as a specific field of the
natural sciences (Lorentz, 1973; Piaget, 1971; Popper, 1972, 1975,
1982; Popper & Eccles, 1977). Quite rightly, therefore, W·eimer
(1982) has suggested that epistemology has every right to be consid-
ered one of the psychological sciences, and, in particular, that evolu-
tionary epistemology should fo~ the basis for any consistent method-
ology of cognitive psychology.
The fact that any knowing reflects the specific self-referent
constraints through which a living system scaffolds its own reality,
allows us to put the problem of selfhood emergence in biological terms
as well as in terms of psychological processes, definitively removing
any "metaphysical" or "intuitionist" implications which for a long time
precluded its study. Indeed, if knowing is distributed along a con-
tinuum ranging from early rudimentary exploratoty behavior to hu-
man self-consciousness, then evolution emerges as an essential regula-
tory strategy aimed at achieving stability in an ever-changing medium
through the attainment of more complex levels of autonomous self-
referent functioning.

Selfhood is a necessary consequence of structurally complex systems

that satisfy certain constraints. That we know selves as embodied by
the highest primates is, in effect, due to local factors in this region of
the universe; selves could be embodied quite differently. (Weimer,
1982, p. 352)

The crucial point for understanding selfhood dynamics "in this

region of the universe" lies in the notion of self-organization, according
to which living systems, as a result of a basic evolutionary constraint,
organize themselves and work to preserve their systemic identity/
integrity (Adan, 1979, 1981, 1984; Jantsch, 1980; Nicolis & Prigo-
gine, 1977; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela, 1979).
Selfhood Processes: An Ontological Approach 9

Plainly, the temporal becoming of any individual knowing sys-

tem should be regarded as the unfolding of a self-organizing process
that, through the maturational development of higher cognitive abili-
ties, progressively constructs a sense of self-identity endowed with
inherent unique features and historical continuity, whose mainte-
nance becomes as important as life itself. The interdependence of
selfhood and knowledge processes makes it possible for the generation
and assimilation of information to be regulated by self-identity pat-
terns thus far structured, and this in tum makes possible the con-
tinuous ordering of experience along a unitary and coherent dimen-
·sion.
On th~ other hand, self-organizing in terms of internal coher-
ence implies that all the possible pressures for change that emerge as a
consequence of the ongoing assimilation of experience are subordinate
to the maintenance of the "experiential order" (personal meaning) on
which rests the perceived consistency and continuity of one's self.
Thus, a self-organizing system can reach an interactional equilibrium
in an ever-changipg reality to the extent to which environmental
pressures trigger viable changes in its experiential order that facilitates
the emergence of more integrated levels of self-identity and self-
consciousness.
Adaptation, therefore, is the ability to transform perturbation
arising from interaction with the world into information meaningful
to one's experiential order. Maintaining an adaptive adequacy es-
sentially means preserving one's sense of self by continuously trans-
forming the perceived world rather than merely corresponding to it.
This explains why the notion of the viability of knowing processes has
become much more important in recent evoluticnary epistemology
than that of their validity (see Zeleny, 1981).
Finally, the lifespan development of a human system is regulated
by an orthogenetic progression (Brent, 1978, 1984; Prigogine, 1976;
Werner, 1948, 1957); that is, shifts in experience assimilation pro-
duced by systemic reorganizations of ongoing patterns of internal
coherence eventually result in the discontinuous emergence of more
inclusive levels of the knowledge of self and of the world. The
development of this progression in many ways resembles the pattern of
"punctuated equilibria" proposed by post-Darwinian pluralistic evolu-
tionary approaches (see Gould, 1980). In actual fact, lifespan de-
velopment does not reflect a smooth curve of cumulative acquisition
of knowledge so much as a discontinuous curve in which periods of
10 THEORETICAL PREMISES

relative structural stability are "punctuated" by episodes of whole-

system upheaval in which major reorganizations (personal revolu-
tions) emerge to, become the next "tacit base-camp" of viability
(Mahoney, 1991).
We will now briefly outline the essential aspects that underlie
human self-organization of knowledge, that is, the "medium" in which
selfhood takes on form, and the existential dimension through which
it unfolds.

Intersubjectivity and Self-Individuation

In all primates a hignly complex social world has been superim-

posed on the mere physical environment, bringing about an in-
tersubjective reality in which knowing oneself and the world is always
in relation to others. Thus the greater viability in ordering experience
offered by synchronization and mutual coordination of actions is
matched by an increase in intersubjective learning (imitation, model-
ing, etc.) as well as by an increase in the capacity for self-individua-
tion. These capabilities became more and more indispensable as
adaptation transformed itself into a social affair (Buss, 1987, 1988;
Kummer, 1979; Passingham, 1982).
The ability to discriminate between individual others is hard-
wired in the primate organization, as is clearly shown by evidence of
the central role of the face in the primate emotional system. The
progressive elaboration of neocortical mechanisms underlying the
evolution of primate cognition does not depend on the replacement of
innate behavior by learned behavior, but on the selection and control
of innate behavior by conceptually stored information (Reynolds,
1981). Hence, facial recognition is a neocortical processing feature
whose evolutionary progression closely parallels the emergence of
more complex intersubjective dimensions (e.g., closer mother-infant
relationships, competition and social bonds) which require a greater
and greater capacity for attunement with others' behavior and in-
tentions in order to reach a proper adaptation (e.g., attainment of
secure attachments, adequate social ranks).
Facial recognition should therefore be regarded as a self-referent
ordering of intersubjective experience that facilitates the possibility of
self-individuation. On the one hand, the ability to discriminate be-
tween individual others allows one to anticipate their perception of
Selfhood Processes: An Ontological Approach 11

one's actions, thus improving interactional synchrony and reciprocity.

On the other hand, simulating how others will regard one's actions
entails the c~pacity to view oneself from the perceived perspective of
others. This enhances the possibilities for self-bordering and self-
indi vidua tion.
Thus, in the co-evolution of intersubjectivity and individuation
which are the distinguishing marks of primate organization, the ability
to differentiate between self and others emerges as the essential condi-
tion for structuring a stable self-recognition. Studies in self-recogni-
tion processes using mirror-image techniques have shown that prior
exposure to interaction with others is the fundamental requisite for
greatapes, placed in front of a mirror, to be able to ~efer the reflected
image to themselves, thereby achieving a rudimentary, stable, self-
individuation (Gallup, 1970, 1977; Gallup, McClure, Hill, & Bundy,
1971; Gallup & Suarez, 1986). Hence, in the continuum of primate
evolutionary progression, facial recognition and mimicking are first
steps in the mirror-image mechanism which, along with the emerg-
ence of language, gives rise to the more structured and integrated
levels of self-recognition that characterize human self-awareness. One
of the first clear manifestations of self-recognition in chimpanzees was
seen in an experimental situation which required simultaneously a
mirror-image (a capacity for self-referring) and a language (a capacity
to operate distinctions in immediate experience) (Gardner & Gard-
ner, 1971). Initially, the researchers had taught their young female
chimp, Washoe, a sign language similar to the manual alphabet used
for communication by . deaf-mutes, which contained a number of
words, including the name Washoe. Later she was put in front of a
mirror, and to the question "Who's that?" Washoe replied, "It's
Washoe," demonstrating ability both to distinguish the reflected im-
age from immediate experience and to refer the former to the latter
(Morin, 1986; Morin & Piatelli-Palmarini, 1974).
Basically, language is matched by the emergence of a new level
of self-referent ordering according to lexical and semantic rules that
allow for the restructuring of immediate experience in terms of propo-
sitions, that is, "objects" abstracted from space and time for which the
predication of "truth" or "falsehood" is meaningful. The possibility of
sharing common criteria for "truth" disengaged from the immediacy of
experience makes possible, in its tum, the emergence of new di-
mensions in the reciprocal coordination of actions and intentions, as
well as in the negotiation of mutual agreements.
12 THEORETICAL PREMISES

The basic function of language as a system of orienting behavior is not

the transmission of information or the description of an independent
universe about which we can talk, but the creation of a consensual
domain of behavior between linguistically interacting systems through
the development of a cooperative domain of interactions. (Maturana,
1978, p. 50)

Naturally, the dimension of intersubjective experience offered

by language further articulates the already existing capacities for in-
dividuation and self-recognition, bringing about the development of a
sense of self, both as a subject ("I") and as an object ("Me").
The increased ability for synchronic attunement with others'
intentions through linguistic interactions is paralleled by an increased
ordering of the flow of internal states and psychophysiological rhythms
that lend continuity to immediate experiencing ("I"). Along with
this, the capacity to view oneself from the perspectives of others is
increased by linguistic abstracting abilities, giving rise to a recogniz-
able sense of one's perceived continuity and sameness ("Me"). This
capacity, disengaged from the immediacy of the interactional context,
becomes an essential instrument for reordering immediate experience
and stabilizing internal coherence.
In other words, self-consciousness should be regarded as an
ontological process in which the ability to balance a distinction
between immediate experience and its appraisal through interactions
with others is matched by the ability to refer the experiencing "I" to
the appraising "Me." Thus, while being an event of our praxis of living
that is at once discursive and actional, self-consciousness is always
consciousness of others, existing by means of language and within a
historical context.

The consciousness at work in decentered subjectivity is both linguistic

and actional, embedded in a history of social practices. It thus borrows
its being from the prax:ial history of speaking and acting subjects as
they respond to the speech and action of others. Through this borrow-
ing, consciousness is dialogically constituted. Admittedly, conscious-
ness can be alone; it can fashion a soliloquy and it can monitor an
individual act in solitude. In all this, consciousness is experienced as
"mine." Yet, being alone is itself a peculiar modality of being with
others; soliloquy is carried out by a language that belongs to the public,
and individual acts have meaning only within the wider context of
social practices. One can be alone only because one has already been
Selfhood Processes: An Ontological Approach 13

in communal [Link] with others; one can speak "by" and "to"
oneself only with a grammar that has a social history. ([Link], 1986,
p. 172)

Finally, the bipolarity of selfhood processes, in accordan'c e with

which the "I" comes to recognize itself as a "Me" through the "mirror-
image" provided by others, makes an ontological, irreducible demarca-
tion between "subjective" and "objective," "inner sense" and "outer
sense," "experiencing" and "explaining" which is central to the un-
folding of ,mr praxis of living as human beings. A bipolar selfhood is
found in both Eastern and Western conceptions of self; however,
rather than attempting to differentiate it, the East tends to experience
selfhood as simultaneously subjective and objective, while the West
tends to differentiate the inside (self as subject) from the outside (self
as object), consequently perceiving "external" objects as existing sepa-
rately from the observer (Johnson, 1985).

Meaning as the Human Dimension of Existence

The most singular aspect of the human experience is its "effort

after meaning," as is evident from both evolutionary and ontogenetic
points of view.
As far as the evolutionary aspect is concerned, the emergence of
language and reflexive self~referring-transforming the immediacy of
living into an endless circularity between experiencing and ex-
plaining-makes the construction of meaning an essential ingredient
of the process of self-individuation and self-recognition.

Human self-consciousness breaks the unity of people within Nature.

Self-consciousness with forethought and afterthought gives rise to the
human existential predicament. At least for the last 50,000 years, we
and our forebears have faced the puzzle (which we have had the words
to pose to ourselves) of whence we came into the world, why we are
here and what happens when we die. But as we know, this is no matter
of mere curiosity. Since reflective language made us persons, we have
cared about ourselves and each other as persons. So, the inevitability
of the eventual death of self and loved ones and the arbitrary un-
predictability of death from famine, disease, accident, predation or
human assault becomes the occasion not for momentary animal terror
but for what is potentially unremitting human anguish. And the quest
14 THEORETICAL PREMISES

for meaning, for meanings compatible with a human life of self-

conscious mortality, becomes a matter of life and death urgency. . . .
Yet, contrary to the old myth, our forebears cannot have been cast out
of Nature's Garden of Eden in a sudden, tragic "birth trauma." Even if
the final full attainment of language competence worked itself out very
rapidly once the basic structural-generative principles of human lan-
guage had been hit upon, self-conscious selfhood, with its imperative
challenge to find supportive meaning in the face of creature mortality,
must have emerged over a period of time. If so, the symbolic resources
of language-bearing human communities could meet the need for
meaning as it arose. Thus emerged the many worlds of myth, ritual and
religion that provided the traditional answers to the question of what it
means to be human. (Smith, 1978b, p. 1055)

The social structure of human reality made it possible, right

from ,the beginning, for the core meaning of being human to be
founded on the emotions triggered by reciprocal interactions with
others aimed at maintaining mutual coordination and consensus be-
tween people. The human quest for meaning should therefore be
regarded as the development of a proactive understanding biased by a
set of specific intersubjective constraints (parent-child relationships,
social bonds, group cohesiveness, etc.) which define a range of pro-
totypical emotions (attachment and love, bereavement and grief,
etc.) for sharing meanings in terms of a shared symbolic-linguistic
dimension.
At the individual level, this continuous search for meaning
takes form in the lifespan construction and maintenance of a coherent
personal meaning, that is to say, how the experiencing subject ("I")
relates to the "meaning-of-being-human" as prescribed by the tradi-
tion in which it lives, able thereby to define and recognize itself in a
continuous and unequivocal way ("Me"). Thus, on the one hand, the
emotional modulation connected to the process of demarcation be-
tween self and others constrains the development of any personal
dimension of meaning; on the other hand, the "I"/"Me" differentia-
tion resulting from such demarcation corresponds to that type of
ontological understanding included in the terms of personal meaning.
Indeed, any differentiation of self-boundaries implies an ontological
understanding (how the "Me" is able to appraise its experiencing "I")
in which personal. meaning represents the proactive process. That is,
an ongoing ordering of networks of related meaningful events makes
possible an experiencing of the world capable of triggering patterns of
Selfhood Processes: An Ontolol{ical Approach 15

emotional modulation ("I") specifically recognizable as the unity and

continuity in time of one's owns self ("Me") .
In other words, from a self-organizing perspective, bringing
forth a coherent world is the first and last condition for having a
consistent self-identity, with personal meaning as the proactive un-
derstanding that reveals a specific mode of beiilg becoming the key
notion in the elaboration of an ontological theory of personality. This
is what we shall try to do in the remaining chapters of the first part of
this book.
2
The Differentiation of
Self-Boundaries

Because the evolutionary and developmental human environ-

ment essentially corresponds to an interpersonal reality structured and
made consistent by language, any knowledge of the world always rests
on, and is mediated by, intersubjective experience. Any newborn
human being would appear to be naturally endowed with the capacity
for intersubjective experience, that is, with a hard-wired propensity
for knowing people, and him- or herself in relation to others (Trevar-
then, 1979, 1982). While self-knowledge has its epistemological
foundation in the sense of similarity perceived in interaction with
others (Cooley, 1902; Hamlyn, 1974; Mead, 1934), its ontological
development takes place through an increasingly individualized pro-
cess of differentiating one's own self from the common attributes and
meanings shared with others-a unique differentiation from other
ways of experiencing life (nonself) upon which rests the very possibil-
ity of self-perception. Becoming an ontological self corresponds to a
self-referent ordering of the essential tension perceived in the in-
teractional synchrony with others. Others' perceived similarity is the
necessary requisite for experiencing a sense of personhood, but at
the same time, the differentiation from such perceived similarity is the
necessary condition for experiencing a sense of selfhood. The oscil-
lative balance inherent in such self-referent ordering should be con-
sidered as an ongoing moment-to-moment result of the perpetual pro-
cess of negotiating a mutual consensus with, and acceptance by,
others. Throughout lifespan development, the self-no'nself differen-
tiation acts as the basic self-organizing principle that underlies the

16
The Diffcrcnriution of Sdf-Jloundaric5· 17

ontological process of psychological and existential individuation

(self-identity and personal meaning).
In order to obtain a unified picture of the developmental dy-
namics of self-identity, it will be helpful to bear in mind the differ-
ent-but closely interwoven-levels of the relevant processes:

1. The way in which structured interactions with specific others

(attachment processes) are involved in the emergence of
self, both as subject (the "I," i.e., the sense of self felt in an
immediate and direct way) and as an object (the "Me," i.e.,
the self that one comes to know through one's own be-
havior).
2. The emotional and ctignitive processes that articulate these
subsystems into a specific self-referential process of personal
meaning.

ATTACHMENT AND THE

DIFFERENTIATION OF SELF-BOUNDARIES
It now seems to be well established that, from the earliest phases
of development, the infant is equipped with basic feelings, as well as
the basic ability to communicate them through expressive-motor
mechanisms that are mainly concentrated in the face system. The
propensity for modulating environmental contingencies with feeling
reactions expresses very well the infant's ability to become attuned
with others, and in particular with significant others as caregivers
(Buck, 1984; Ekman, 1972, 1984; Fox & Davidson, 1984; Izard,
1977, 1980; Reite & Field, 1985; Plutchik, 1984).
Effectively, the interdependency and reciprocity of psychophysi-
ological rhythms between infant and caregiver appear to he inherently
co-dependent and co-existing with the child's activity in ordering self
,md world perception from the very beginning (Bell & Ainsworth,
1972; Brazelton, Koslowski, & Main, 1974; Stayton, Hogan, & Ains-
worth, 1971). M,my data, moreover, indicate that even during gesta-
tion there is real "inrra111erine
\
learning" resulting from the fetus's
active participation in such rhythmic reciprocity (Brazelton, 1983;
Ianniruberto & Tajani, 1981; Milani Comparetti, 1981).
Considering knowledge 'as a self-organizing process (i.e., as a
viable way of "bringing-forth-a-world" while "being-in-it") the strong
tendency to make close emotional bonds with caregivers emerges as
18 THEORETICAL PREMISES

the fundamental ontological constraint that underlies any possible

ordering of experience. Through the self-referent ordering carried out
by his or her search for proximity to caregivers, the infant can border
the dimensions of exchange with the world and perceive the sensory
inflow along an approach-avoidance continuum centered and ,bal-
anced on attachment figures. Jn other words, attuning oneself with an
identifiable external source of cyclical rhythms transforms an other-
wise unknowable space dimension into a highly personal reality made
understandable by relatively simple physical parameters; thus, even
the attribution of spatial qualities (proximity-distance) to the sur-
rounding world rests on an intersubjective apperception of that world.
At the same .time, matching the flow of one's inner states against an
ordered, external set of rhythms and intentions makes it possible to
perceive recurrent regularities in that flow, and to modulate in more
specific ways one's approach-avoidance oscillations. Again, any pos-
sible attribution of feeling qualities to ongoing psychophysiolog-
ical reactions is matched by a perceived similarity to significant
others.
Given that the search for proximity to caregivers and self-
organizing abilities seem to be inextricably interwoven, it will be
helpful to examine the intersubjective processes mediating the in-
terdependency between attachment and selfhood.
Being equipped, as a primate, with neocortical processes that
mediate facial recognition, the human infant from the moment of
birth exhibits a specific ability to imitate caregivers' actions (Field et
al., 1982). Rather than being an instinctive releasing mechanism
(i.e., a passive coupling between a response and a specific stimulus
display), neonate facial recognition and imitation are actually self-
referent orderin~activities. Through intermodal coordination, per-
ceptual data from the visual system are connected with other per-
ceptual modalities (e.g. ,,proprioceptive feedback, psychophysiological
modulation) and ordered into affective-motoric patterns of response
(Meltzoff & Borton, 1979; Meltzoff & Moore, 1985; Zajonc & Mar-
kus, 1984). If facial recognition, as a behavioral pattern, already
reflects a self-referent procedure for mapping and coordinating differ-
ent sensorial modalities, it should be quite clear how, at a more
organizational level, the reciprocal emotional attunement between
caregivers' mimicking on the one hand and infant imitation on the
other could be actively ordered, by the infant, into recurrent primor-
dial units of self-perception.
The organizational role that attachment exerts, both in the
The Differentiation of Sdf-Houndarie.1 19

development of a sense of self as a subject ("I") and as an object

("Me"), can be outlined as follows:
While the attunement to a synchronous source of regularities
organizes the sensory inflow into a stream of recurrent psychophysio-
logical rhythms, the emotional aspects of attachment transform feel-
ing tonalities into specific emotional modules. Through regularities
drawn from caregivers' behavior and motivations, the infant can start
to connect diffuse basic feelings to perceptions, actions and memories,
turning them into specific emotional schemata susceptible to subjec-
tive experience. The emergence of subjective experience is matched
by the perception that one is an entity differentiated from other
objects and people in the surrounding world. Physiological rhythms
and emotional schemati} become basic ingredients of infantile con-
sciousness, which is truly affective in nature and quality (Buck, 1984;
Emde, 1984; Izard, 1980). The self-feeling immediately and directly
perceived as an inner kinesthetic sense (the "I") is therefore primarily
organized around prototypical emotional schemata differentiated out
of the attachment reciprocity with caregivers.
The "l" comes to see him- or herself as a "Me" (i.e. , like other
surrounding persons) only through the consciousness that caregivers
have of his or her behavior. Anticipating others' perception of one's
actions facilitates the recognition of ongoing patterns of emotional
schemata out of the stream of recurrent inner states, structuring them
into specific emotional experiences connected to related intentions
and goal-oriented behaviors. Evidence suggests that infants' per-
ceptions of their image through caregivers' behavior are not confined
to those situations
\
in which parents attempt to meet their basic needs.
Parents' imitation of infant behavior is very common from the earliest
periods (Bretherton & Waters, 1985; Harter, 1983) and, very prob-
ably, such imitation is an essential cue allowing the infant to recognize
as his or her own the characteristics and attitudes through which
caregivers perceive him or her as a person. In other words, self-
consciousness emerges from a self-recognizability made possible by the
empathic ability to take the attitudes of others onto oneself; elaborat-
ing a conscious self-image consists of bordering the profile of the "Me"
out of the perceived "I."
Self-other differentiation is a complex, multilevel process in
which the actor's sense ("Me") of felt uniqueness and oneness ("I") is
found both in attunement to others and in differentiation from others,
both equally necessary conditions for its experiencing. On the one
hand, the intersubjective process of knowing from understanding
20 THEORETICAL PREMISES

another person entails identifying oneself with, insofar as it always

unfolds through empathic variables (feeling what another feels) sup-
ported and mediated by a perceived similarity with a significant
other-that is, an emotional involvement with an attachment figure
(Hoffman, 1975, 1978). On the other hand, perceiving the similarity
of others' feelings as a requisite for recognizing the same feeling within
the self means bordering one's subjectivity out of the objectivity of an
interpersonal, sharable reality.
The notion of internal working models of attachment figures
and self dearly implies the organization of a system for transforming
intersubjective experience into personal knowledge (Bowlby, 1969,
1983, 1973, 1980; Bretherton & Waters, 1985). In this sense, an
attachment figure does not CQrrespond to an isomorphic representa-
tion within a specific sensorimotor modality of caregivers' behavior, as
if it were a sort of perceptual entity mediating information about
attachment-related events. On the contrary, internalizing an attach-
ment figure within a rhythmic and self-regulating modulation of inner
states actually involves shaping an intermodal patterning of sensory-
motor-affective modules into a unified configuration that can result in
a sense of self and the world.
Just as facial recognition is matched by a self-ordering in pro-
prioception and body experience, similarly, imitating or identifying
with another person corresponds to perceiving oneself as "being-in-
the-world." A child, when appraising a stimulus situation by referenc-
ing the mother's face (social referencing; Campos & Stenberg, 1981;
Klinnert et al. , 1983), perceives a recognizable sense of his or her
being in a specific situation through the understanding of the mother's
af(ective state. Social referencing is therefore a basic process ordering
the intersubjectivity inherent in the attachment system (i.e., the
other's image corresponds to a perception of self).
Throughout development, any shifting of levels in intersubjec-
tive abilities (e.g., from the mere sense 0f others' existence to con-
ceptual perspective-taking) is matched by a parallel increase in the
capacity for empathic attunement (e.g., from imitation to identifica-
tion). Feeling oneself emotionally involved in perceiving a similarity
with significant others therefore seems to be the essential invariant
underlying any development of ontological knowledge during the
lifespan. In the concrete social referencing of maturational stages, the
child's intersubjectivity is, to a large extent, bound to the immediate
existential situation, so that the sense of being a unique and specific
The Differentiation of Self-Boundaries 21

person is usually attained through an emotional identification with

attachment figures. The abstract social referencing of adulthood,
disengaging the individual from the current aspect of interaction,
allows the attainment of a definite sense of personal reality through
the construction of even more abstract perceived similarities to signifi-
cant others, as in common love relationships. In any case, whether it
be an emotional identification with another's image, or a more ab-
stract construction, feeling oneself involved in a unique and exclusive
interaction is crucial in bringing forth a sense of the world which is
able to produce a quality of self-perception ("I") recognizable as one's
own self ("Me"). In this sense, perceived uniqueness of significant
bonds may function in a manner analogous to the syntactic principles
of organization that underlie a semantic structure of understanding
(Marris, 1982), thus exerting an essential role in the development of
any affective relationship.

THE ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY

OF THE EMOTIONAL DOMAIN

In a space-time dimension apprehensible in terms of proximity-

distance from an attachment safe-base, the psychobiological attune-
ment to caregivers allows the newborn human primate to order its
sensory inflow into feelings decodable only on an approach-avoidance
continuum. In primates, where any ordering of reality is matched by
intersubjective experience, attachment acts by regulating the rhyth-
mic oscillation between arousal-inducing (exploration, play) and
arousal-reducing (security, clinging) psychophysiological patterns, as
well as by modulating fear and anger by switching these same patterns
(Fox & Davidson, 1984; Reynolds, 1981; Suomi, 1984).
At the human level, the structure and quality of early emotional
reciprocity inherent in ongoing patterns of attachment is closely
correlated to the infant's experience of caregivers' accessibility in
response to bis or her need for proximity and contact. Out of the great
variety of possible responses by parents to that search for contact,
constrained by the infant's limited scheme of reference, a finite set of
experiences about caregivers' availability evolves. That is, the access
to caregivers is felt as secure and so is the attachment exhibited; or the
access is experienced as blocked and the infant exhibits an insecure-
avoidant attachment; or the access is perceived as unpredictable and it is
22 THEORETICAL PREMISES

matched by an insecure,ambivalent attachment (Ainsworth et al.,

1978; Bretherton, 1985; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985). The pres,
ence of true central attachment organizations from the earliest stages
of devele>pment clearly demonstrates the selfregulatory and self,
organizing capabilities exhibited by attachment processes. Essentially,
these consist of assembling various patterns of arousal,inducing and
arousakeducing modules, adjusting their modulation through anger
and fear (i.e., ambivalent or avoidant attachments) to produce a
viable level of emotional reciprocity (security proximity).
A central attachment organization is the emergent result of a
process of selection and stabilization from the flow of recurrent in,
ternal states and psychophysiological rhythms of patterns of self,
perception, making them avajlable to appraisal and recognition by the
experiencing subject. In other words, if an attachment relationship is
a self,referential process for "having,a,world" while "being,in,it," then
the stability of attachment patterns exhibited by an infant reflects a
way of "bringing,forth,a,world" capable of producing a quality of
self,perception ("I") recognizable as one's own self (''Me").
Bordering the "Me" while organizing the "I" is a complex and
multilevel developmental process that gradually unfolds as the infant
achieves self,recognition (e.g., the ability to recognize and respond to
the self independently from the immediate perceptual contingencies;
Bertenthal & Fischer, 1978; Lewis & Brooks,Gunn, 1979). The
emerging ability to perceive oneself within a feeling of permanence
and continuity in space-time (cf. the Piagetian stage of object per,
manence) is matched by an increased awareness of the differentiation
between self and others, as reflected by the first surfacing of the fear of
strangers, preeminently the "others" (Wolf, 1982). An increased
awareness of others as distinct objects is matched by an increased
understanding that one is a distinct opject too.
A quite stable, even though rudimentary, sense of self allows
the unfolding of a new level of self, referentiality, that of starting to
refer to oneself the immediacy of one's experiencing ("I"), thus
being able to begin recognizing it ("Me"). In other words, the felt
sense of self, once it can be focused and appraised, can give rise to a
second order of self,referred experiences: self,explanations, that is,
a reorder of immediate experience which makes it recognizable
and understandable. Thus, self,recognition is actually bordering
from the perceived distinctness of others a definite sense of indi,
viduality ("Me") out of one's unique and pervasive feeling of being
apart ("I") .
The Differentiation ()f Self-Boundaries 23

If we consider human knowledge from an ontological perspec-

tive, we can affirm that in the human lifespan, self-recognition is the
first explanation we manage to give ourselves of OllI feeling of being
alive. We are thus dealing with a prifnary ontological differentiation
in which a fairly stable sense of self-recognition results from an equally
stable demarcation between self-perception (the "inner sense" sub-
jectively felt) and world-perception
.
.
( the "outer sense" objectively.
experienced with others). The integration of inner and outer senses,
crucial in the maintenance of one's internal coherence, allows for an
even more arti.c ulated self-referentiality in knowing processes. Thus,
any information from world perception corresponds to information
about the self (e.g., how others' perceptions regulate the appraisal of
the "Me") and, qmversely, a self-knowledge development parallels
the process by which the individual comes to understand reality (e.g.,
how the organizational content of the "I" influences the structuring of
defining features of self and world).
The stabilization of a sense of self, which parallels the process of
self-recognition, takes place through the assembling of psychl°>physio-
logical motor rhythms, and sensory, motor and emotional modules,
into a self-ordering core of affective, autonomic, and behavioral activ-
ity. Clusters of emotional schemata (e.g., prototypical affecdaden
scenes abstracted from events and situations repeatedly experienced}
are ordered into an oscillative, recursive loop capable both of generat-
ing a sense of self-perception matched with specific emotions and
behaviors, and of self-regulating through the rhythmic activation/
deactivation of its opponent feeling tonalities (Mineka et al., 1981;
Solomon, 1980). Thus, the avoidant attitude exhibited by children of
rejecting parents is the dynamic moment-to-moment balancing be-
tween opponent emotional states, like attachment and anger, aimed
at preserving the level of emotional reciprocity compatible with the
inaccessibility perceived in the relationship. The rhythmic interplay
between opponent emotional states is internal to the infant and has no
direct reference to the present course of the relationship; it is as
though the contact itself arouses anger and withdrawal, and with-
drawal leads again to contact that leads again to anger and withdrawal
(Cassidy & Kobak, 1988; Main & Weston, 1982). The ability ro
maintain and regulate one's sense of self rests on the organizational
unity which the developing emotional domain acquires from the very
beginning.
The rhythmic and oscillative interplay between basic ensembles
of opponent emotional schemata provides the decoding context for
24 THEORETICAL PREMISES

the further differentiation of a whole set of discrete emotions. That is,

emotional differentiation appears as a match-to-pattern process between
preformed emotional schemata and ongoing feelings. The search for
internal coherence, biasing any possible decoding pattern, acts as the
main regulator, giving unity and functional continuity in time to the
whole development, while the perception of discrepancy acts as the
essential trigger for differentiating new emotional tonalities (Guidano,
1987). On the other hand, the decentralized control that governs the
recursive" loop of modular processing units allows the maintenance of a
sense of self through a recombination of these modules within various
subsytems. Thus; the activation of anger, although specifically con-
strained by a perceptual key as rejection or the threat of it, may become
part of the patterns of atta<;,hment (Reynolds, 1981; Sander, 1975) as
well as of exploration and play (Suomi, 1984), supplying continuity and
unity to the immediate experience of oneself. In the process, the gradual
unfolding of concrete cognitive abilities lends further stability to the
current sense of self, and schooling and peer relationships, progressively
broadening the experiential domains, foster the progressive articulation
of that sense of self.
Once the sense of self that emerges through a central attach-
ment organization has stabilized, a more structured and articulated
level of self-referentiality regulates the dynamics between subjective
and objective boundaries of the self, bringing about new dimensions of
intersubjective experience, and hence of self-knowledge. Being able
to differentiate between the subjectivity of the immediate experience
of oneself and the objectivity of caregivers' perception of oneself
entails the self-referent reordering of one's immediate experiencing
("I") as if it were an object ("Me"), that is, from the perceived
viewpoint of caregivers. The psychophysiological and affective mod-
ulation provided by the rhythmic oscillation between prototypical
emotional schemata may be appraised through a definite sense of self
resulting from the increasing awareness of one's distinctness from
others. In this way, a continuous reordering of one's immediate expe-
rience to make it consistent with that sense of self becomes possible.
Any reordering of immediate experience takes place at the level of
explicit knowledge procedures made available by gradual cognitive
growth; that is, the experienced consequences of events and actions
are abstracted into a conceptual cause-effect frame and stored in
accessible, manipulable form ( expectations, beliefs, procedures for
problem solving, etc.). Explicit knowing procedures are self-referen-
The Differentiation of Self-Boundaries 25

tial processes aimed at making ongoing tacit experience consistent;

that is, the processing of expectations, beliefs, etc., is the essential
modality for trying to appraise and recognize the immediate experi-
ence of any given situation and to make it coherent with one's own
sense of continuity.
Thus, as the developmental processes become more complex
and multidirectional, more integrative conceptual devices become
necessary to support an overall dynamic view, both of the interdepen-
dence between affect and cognition, and of the part it plays in the
differentiation of self-boundaries. In our opinion, if viewed within a
self-organizing perspective, the conceptual framework provided by
script theory (Abelson, 1981; Carlson, 1981; Carlson & Carlson,
1984; T omkips, 1978, 1987) offers very interesting integrative
possibilities. In particular, the notions of nuclear scripts and nuclear
scenes (e.g., a nuclear script as a set of ordering rules for the connec-
tion of ensembles of prototypical affect-laden scenes-nuclear
scenes-continuously reordering themselves as a result of their own
activity) can be used to explain how the self-referentiality of ontolo-
gical knowing (stabilization and maintenance of self-boundaries) un-
derlies any interaction between affect and cognition. To this end, the
essential aspects which characterize script processing-the develop-
ment of which is traceable from early infancy (Bretherton, 1984;
Nelson & Ross, 1982)--can be schematized as follows:
1. Script processing draws attention to how affect and cogni-
tion, although differentiated by their means of processing data (im-
mediacy vs. distancing), end up acquiring a specific interdependence
within a self-organizing process, such as the differentiation of self-
boundaries. More specifically, the ongoing activation of opponent
nuclear scenes simultaneously produces an idiosyncratic perception-
of-the-world conjoined to a specific pattern of self-perception ("I")
which becomes recognizable as one's own self ("Me") through script
processing. In other words, the psychophysiological modulation con-
nected with fear can only be appraised by experiencing oneself en-
dangered ("I") and recognizing fear as an emotion consistent with
one's sense (if continuity and distinctness from others ("Me") through
the expectations, beliefs, behavior, etc., capable of being generated
about the self in this mode (cf. Cicchetti & Pogge-Hesse, 1981; Izard
& Buechler, 1980). In the case mentioned above of children facing
rejecting parents, for example, the activating of shame/anger is
appraised through a heightened experience of the feeling of being
26 THEORETICAL PREMISES

apart and ordered in the ongoing sense of self through the generation
of consistent cognitions (low lovableness and self-worth) and behavior
(avoidant attachment). It is hence possible to say that during the
maturational stages, bordering the "Me" out of the perceived "I" is a
process by which the immediacy of one's experience of self and the
world is transformed into basic categories of meaning (self-identity,
truth-falsity, competence-control, etc.), that is, into core ordering
processes capable of producing and assimilating experience (Mahoney,
1988, 1991).
2. The ordering of nuclear scenes into scripts is a self-referent
process, and as such involves the construction of an image of the
world with an immediate and definite feeling of uniqueness to one's
being-in-it, rather than mei;.e reproduction-both faithful and, pre-
cisely for this reason, adaptive--0f important aspects of the outside
world. No wonder, then, if, as Tomkins (1987) notes, one of the most
characteristic peculiarities of scripts is that of being "more self-
validating than self-fulfilling." Indeed, script processing is more than
the fine-tuning of a strategy for coping with the critical situations
abstracted in nuclear scenes; it is a self-referential device constrained
to activate a pattern of emotional modulation capable of stabilizing
the sense of self in the world which has unfolded from those critical
situations. Hence, the avoidant attachment exhibited by children of
rejecting parents stabilizes the sense of being alone in a world made up
of refusals or threats thereof, and it is just this stable perception of self
and of external which permits considering distance as a way of main-
taining emotional reciprocity. Thus, the categories of personal mean-
[Link] matched by core ordering processes do not reflect simply the
degree of adaptive adequacy to the environment as much as the
stabilization of a coherence between the explicit sense of self and the
tacit patterns of self-perception underlying it.
3. Through the maturational stages, the rhythmic and oscilla-
tive activation of prototypical nuclear scripts reordering the ongoing
inflow of experience g~ves rise to a progressive growth and to differen-
tiation of further subsystems of scenes and related scripts. The rate and
continuity of growth of nuclear scripts reflect the course of emotive-
cognitive development; in other words, the emerging subsystems are
the differentiation · of new perceptual-affective-motoric modulations
(scenes) connected to the explicit procedures for making them con-
sistent with one's sense of continuity (scripts). Thus, even if for each
child there are relatively few prototypical nuclear scripts, they bring
 The Differentiation of Self-Boumlarie$ 27

about the progressive and self-regulated differentiation of a range of

strictly interconnected emotional tonalities which provides his or her
tacit apprehensional level with an organizatjonal unity that makes
every aspect of mental processing highly personal and idiosyncratic.
The differentiation of a structured repertoire of emotional states
and rules for decoding them takes place through a matching-analogi-
cal process: perceived similarity/nonsimilarity with the immediate
apprehension of reality provided by nuclear activation is the self-
referent procedure for ordering the ongoing flux of events (having-a-
world) while preserving the continuity of one's personal experiencing
(being-in-it). The same analogical procedure also applies to the capac-
ity for self-referring which underlies the differentiation of self-
boundaries: the affective modulation acompanying the tacit apprehen-
sion of similarities ("I"), continuously decoded and reordered through
available explicit processes, results in a perception of reality in which
the perceiver's ongoing experience is made understandable ("Me").
Constructing a world is, therefore, a matter of abstracting one's ex-
periential basis, and the gradual structuring of mental dimensions
(categories of meaning) is seen as a process of making bod-
ily experiences understandable. This in turn explains the ~rucial
role exerted by metaphor development in the emergence of higher
levels of rationality and cognitive abilities (Smith, 1985; John-
son, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Shanon, 1987,
1988).

SELFHOOD AS A
BOUNDARY-MAINTAINING SYSTEM

An emerging sense <>f selfhood can begin to recognize and

· identify itself the moment it can differentiate between an inner sense
subjectively felt and an outer sense objectively experience with others.
If one [Link] selfhood as the underlying thread in personality
development, it becomes clear that it unfolds as an open-ended and
spiraling process of constructions and reconstructions resulting from
the ability to experience oneself as both subject and object (Haber-
mas, 1979; Kegan, 1982). In distinguishing the most important
aspects of the development of an "I"/"Me" dynamic, it will help to
bear in mind both the sequence of essential steps in ascending to more
integrated levels of subject-object differentiation, and the mech-
28 THEORETICAL PREMISES

anisms of systemic coherence that ·result once these differentiations

have been produced.
The differentiation between self and others that occurs with
early self,recognition (first to second year) has mainly physical charac,
teristics, and is essentially concentrated on the immediate experience
of the body (Broughton, 1978; Damon & Hart, 1982). The emerging
awareness of the distinctness of others' physical appearance is oscillat,
ing and unstable for rather long periods; the edges of caregivers'
boundaries slip in and out of the infant's attention, with consequent
changes in his or her self,perception. Moreover, from an "others',
perspective,taking" ability rooted in physical dimensions, the infant is
_hardly able to differentiate between self and the rest of the body; he or
she makes no clear distinction between inner and outer experiences,
and the sense of self is scarcely demarcated from the swift stream of
events and related feelings in which it is embedded.
Even though it diminishes because of progressive availability of
,,t-oncrete abstraction, this blurred differentiation continues to exist
through the preschool years, making it possible for the sense of self,
while gradually stabilizing, to remain bound to key perceptual features
of ongoing attachments. The presence, during ontogeny, of an oscil,
lating period preceding the stable awareness of self as demarcated from
others' distinctness is probably important in modulating and further
articulating the child's ability to attune, increasing empathic
capabilities much more than would be the case if the sense of others
were attained suddenly (Hoffman, 1984). However, it is clear that in
tjle presence of distorted patterns of attachment, a period of loose
demarcation from the perceived emotional attitudes of caregivers can
also become one of critical vulnerability in the acquisition of an
integrated sense of continuity and individuality. Behavior which from
an external observer's viewpoint seems simply nonadaptive has a
self,organizing function if looked at as a way of maintaining the
internal coherence of the child. This is the case with avoidant chil,
dren, whose particular kind of attachment, although matched by a
negative sense of self, in practice reduces the extent of painful,
disrupting emotions, establishing an emotional distance between the
self and those who may hurt it.
The shifting from physical to psychological differentiation be,
tween self and others usually occurs in early childhood (ages 6-7),
when others' distinctness is perceived in terms of psychological and
emotional attitudes, and is matched by an increasing appreciation of
 The Diffcrmtiation uf Self Rournlaries 29

one's subjectivity, felt as unique and Ct)ntinuous in time. By now the

child clearly recognizes differences between inner and outer states,
becoming able to more accurately demarcate imagination from percep-
tion, as well as to perceive psychological experiences as logically
different from actual behavior.
The emerging awareness of the difference between one's inner
experience ("I") and one'.s outer appearance {'.'-Me") has some relevant
consequences on self-boundary dynamics. As soon as the child be-
comes aware of having privileged access to his or her immediate
experiencing, the sense of being an independent agency appears, and
conscious deception becomes a real possibility for controlling rela-
tionships with significant others. Paralleling the growth in cognitive
and motoric competence, the ability to actively manipulate the emo-
tional modulation immedately experienced ("I") to maintain one's
appraisal of self ("Me") as consistent increases notably because of the
new possibility of self-deception now available (Buck, 1984; Damon
& Hart, 1982; Habermas, 1979).
The triggering of specifically perturbing emotions (e.g., anger or
) helplessness in avoidant children) is short-circuited by selectively
excluding sensory inflow coming from critical experiential domains.
The excluding capacity obviously depends on the degree of available
cognitive abilities. In young children, excluding procedures are main-
ly direct, and inflow, though registered, is not consciouly appraised.
This type of direct exclusion is limited because covert facial motor
patterns of the "true" emotional tonality that has been registered still
promote some experiencing of that emotion (Campos & Caplovitz
Barrett, 1984). Therefore, young children's immediacy constrains
their flexibility and makes them more vulnerable to complex,
ambiguous situations, whereas older children's excluding procedures,
being much more indirect and mediated by semantic understanding,
are more effective in changing the direction and reference of perturb-
ing feelings.
Furthermore, whenever a child is faced with intense and not
easily avoidable situations, excluding procedures become much more
involved with an active manipulation on current levels of self-
monitoring and awareness. One of the first modalities is that of
disconnecting rhe perceived affect from the interpersonal situation
that triggered it (Bowlby, 1980, 1985; Bretherton, 1985) . When the
disconnection is complete, one's experience ("I") seems completely
unintelligible in terms of one's reactions ("Me") and can be better
 30 THEORETICAL PREMISES

explained by attributing it to external causes such as somatic or

psychological complaints. A second modality is that of preventing the
appraisal of the perturbing affect from activating other feelings,
thoughts, and behavior that may change one's focus of attention. In
this way, children may busy themselves with many different di-
versionary activities (sometimes in the form of clear-cut symptoms,
such as rituals, phobias, overeating, etc.) that divert them from
further processing the information that, although registered, is being
excluded (Bowlby, 1980, 1985). It is thus evident that exclusion of
information and diversionary activity selectively constrain the
elaboration of a very personal range of appraisable emotions (the only
ones the child can recognize ?-~. his or her own) matched by a reper-
toire of automatic cognitive-emotional reactions which, by manipu-
lating the focus of attention, allow the stabilization of such a range.
Hence, throughout childhood, the self-regulating core of affective
continuity-structured during preschool years as an epigenetic boun-
dary-maintaining system-constructs from moment to moment its
~ developmental pathway on the basis of contingencies deriving from its
own pattern of internal coherence.
Finally, along with the development of reflexive abstraction
occurring during adolescence, there emerges a further level of self-
referring, that is, the selfs awareness of its own self-awareness (Sel-
man, 1980), and the regulative mechanisms of the boundary-
maintaining system themselves become reflexive. Since the subject is
able to take the perspective of the other toward him- or herself and
simultaneously neutralize his or her own and the other's perspective
· · from the third-person point of view (Dobert, Habermas, & Nunner-
Winkler, 1987), one's appraisal of the self ("Me") is relatively in-
dependent from others' feedback, and so self-deceptive mechanisms
maintaining consistency in one's immediate experience ("I") depend
more and more on life values and philosophical axioms elaborated by
the subject. In other words, the stabilization of a definite sense of self
("Me") can no longer be secured only through . the level of con-
firmation/disconfirmation deriving from living relationships, but has
to be secured reflectively, that is, through a commitment toward life
embodying the uniqueness of one's being a person ("I").
3
The Self-,Organization of Personal
Meaning Dimensions

AN ONTOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

\ If the ordering of our world is inseparable from our being in it,

then knowing corresponds to existing, and meaning is the way in
which existing becomes apprehensible. Far from being a correspon-
dence between individual beliefs and external reality which concerns
almost exclusively the realm of language and abstract thought, mean-
ing belongs primarily to the whole self-organizing activity of a human
being. In other words, meaning is an ontoloijcal understanding in which
the perceived recursiveness of one's ongoing affective-physiological
modulation is consistently recognized and appraised as unitary and
continuous in time through the structuring of basic categories (self-
identity, truth-falsity, competence~ontrol, etc.) of exchange be-
tween self and world able to produce and assimilate coherent experi-
ences (Johnson, 1987; Olafson, 1988; Shanon, 1987, 1988) . The
qualitative aspects of this search for internal coherence are con-
strained by the interactional n ature of human experience, where any
sense of self is matched by the experience of being part of others'
awareness; within an intersubjective dimension in which others sup-
port our identity, in order to feel ourselves as consistent, we have, in
some way, to perceive our identity as positive enough to be supported.
Indeed it seems probable that, with the emergence of abstract reflex-
ive abilities, the primate tendency to strive for high social rank,
subject to specific pressures resulting from the availability of new
dimensions of intersubjectivity, had evolved into corresponding levels

31
32 THEORETICAL PREMISES

of reflexive self-referentiality, namely, the need to maintain self-

esteem. The emerging properties of neocortical processing allowed the
observer to be represented to him- or herself according to others'
points of view (as perceived by the observer), and this in turn made
possible a new appraisal of one's social rank in terms of more abstract
self-evaluations (Barkow, 1975, Buss, 1987, 1988; Passingham, 1982;
Reynolds, 1981). Striving for an acceptable self-image becomes cru-
cial in ontological understanding, regulating both the process of mak-
ing one's appraisal of self consistent and unitary and of scaffolding the
experiences on which such appraisal rests.
If we start from this premise, it will be evident that any in-
dividual knowing system should be regarded, ontologically, as a self-
regulating organization of personal meaning processes. Because the
capacity of reflexive self-referring makes the ongoing, tacit experienc-
ing consistent, selfhood and personal meaning come to be inextricably
interwoven. Thus, consciousness, as the immediate experience of
one's self, is simultaneously matched by the perception of one's being
the causal agent of such experience, thereby inevitably affecting the
ongoing set of possibilities in the current living context. There is no
conscious experience without the influence of categories of causal
attribution and self-responsibility. Moreover, the immediate experi-
ence of one's self includes a positive or negative affective modulation
(perceived as a feeling oflovableness/unlovableness), and is appraised
and made consistent through specific categories of self-esteem. Given
that self-esteem is, as we have seen, the way in which we seek to make
our conscious self-image suitable for support by others, we are justified
in expecting that, in general, a perceived unlovableness corresponds
to more rigorous criteria of self-esteem and vice versa. In other words,
any differentiation of self-boundaries implies an ontological un-
derstanding (how far the "Me" is able to appraise its experiencing "I")
in which personal meaning represents proactive processing: an ongo-
ing ordering of networks of related mea11-ingful events that brings forth
a perception of the world capable of triggering recursive patterns of
emotional modulation ("I") specifically recognizable as one's own self
("Me"), unified and continuous in time.
By means of this proactive nature, personal meaning develop-
ment appears as a spiraling, open-ended process through which the
essential tension inherent in selfhood dynamics unfolds: the acting
and experiencing "I" is always one step ahead of the current appraisal
of the situation-making it possible to perceive more than one experi-
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimension.1 33

ences, and to experience more than one attends to (Dennet, 1978)-

thus transforming the "Me" into a continuous process of reordering
and reshaping one's conscious self-image. This endless processing
(linearly exemplified by Mead's [1934] affirmation that "the ''l' of this
moment is present in the 'Me' of the next moment") resembles a kind
of "infinite game," that is, a game which, following its own rules in
an internal temporal dimension distinct from the social-objective di-
mension, is played not so much to win, but to continue playing
(Davis, 1983; Eigen & Winkler, 1981). We can thus confidently
state that the irreducibility of the "I"/"Me" dynamics-with its in-
herent proactive understanding-works as a basic push-and-pull,
and consequently the progressive unfolding of personal meaning
processes constrain_s the generative directionality cif any individual
lifespan.
If ontologically the human way of being-in-the-world is by
seeking and creating meaning (Smith, 1978a), it should be possible,
within the intersubjective dimension that constrains the invariance of
human experience, to identify a possible set of different personal
meaning organizations, in the same manner in which, for the sake of
an analogy, it is possible to identify different physical constitutions on
the basis of the morphological invariance of the human body. Hence,
an ontological, process-oriented approach to the person should lead
us, in the final analysis, to a kind of science of meaning with. an
inherent grammar of composition and recombination that can permit
the classification of the various patterns of organized coherence exhib-
ited by people in their search for and creation of meaning.
The self-referent processes underlying the ordering of a personal
meaning organization ([Link].) can be outlined as follows:
A [Link]. should not be interpreted as an entity defined by a
specific knowledge content (e.g., beliefs), but instead as a unitary
ordering process in which continuity and internal coherence are sought
in the specificity of the formal, structural properties of its knowledge
processing (i.e., flexibility, generativity, and abstracting level), rather
than in the definite semantic properties of its knowledge products.
This leads to the adoption of a systems/process-oriented methodology
that can identify the deep syntactic rules ("I") capable of generating a
consistent range of surface, semantic representations ("Me") accord-
ing to an ever-changing interaction with the world. In this way, the
essential tension of selfhood as a whole would be found in the focus of
the observer's attention and, consequently, the way in which the
34 THEORETICAL PREMISES

"Me" can recognize and make the perceived "I" consistent would
become the unifying ordering process that coherently organizes pat-
terns of affective, motor, and cognitive activity.
The self-ordering of different patterns of organizational unity of
the emotional domain-structured on the basis of different develop-
mental pathways---underlies the unfolding of correspondingly differ-
ent [Link]. The next section of this chapter will outline four
[Link].: the "depressive," the "phobic," the "obsessive-compul-
sive," and the "eating disorders." In the experience of psychotherapy
over the last 20 years these have proved to be the most typical and
frequent (see Guidano, 1987; Guidano & Liotti, 1983). In each of
th?5e, the early array of nuclear scripts (as the initial unfolding of a
specific developmental pathway) gives rise, in the course of matur-
ational stages, to basic categories of personal meaning (self-identity,
truth-falsity, etc.) which, starting from adolescent reflective abstrac-
tion, brings forth a scaffolding of reality that can produce supportive
evidence for one's ongoing appraisal of self and world.
Naturally, further research in this direction, including describ-
ing many subsystems within each meaning dimension, will in all
probability reveal some other basic dimensions of personal meaning.
The point I wish to make, however, is that the number of possible
basic [Link]. should be relatively small, probably between four and
six, at most nine or ten. Indeed, if we assume that personal meaning
reflects the pattern of emotional and psychophysiological organiza-
tion, and we bear in mind the relatively small number of fundamental
emotions that human beings can experience (Ekman, Levenson, &
Friesen, 1983), we can see how the possibilities for combination and
recombination which can produce reliable self-perception matched by
an acceptable level of self-esteem must be rather small. In other
words, in the face of the ever-changing multiplicity and variability of
possible environmental disturbances, a differentiated set of [Link].
represents the self-referent modalities through which human con-
sciousness comes to order that multiplicity and variability in a way
which is consistent with its experience of living. This self-organizing
ability for achieving coherence in a dynamic environment (in which
the context for stability is continuously changing) is found from the
very first stages of selfhood differentiation. For example, Main, Kap-
lan, and Cassidy (1985) have emphasized that, leaving aside the
multiplicity and variability of possible parental attitudes, it has so far
been possible to outline, quite reliably, three patterns of early central
The. Self-Ortanization of Personal Mraninl( Dimcmiom J5

attachment. Once more, if early central organizations are the ex-

pressions of the self-regulative and self-organizing ability of attach-
ment processes, then these too are finite and limited in number.
Indeed, the recombinatorial possibilities between emotional modules
that can produce an emotional reciprocity, which in tum guarantees
an acceptable level of intersubjective experience, are also necessarily
reduced.
On the basis of these premises and referring the reader to
previous works for a more detailed treatment (Guidano, 1987; Guida-
no & Liotti, 1983), we now provide an outline of the essential features
(e.g., patterns of early reciprocity, self-boundary differentiation, "I"/
"Me" dynamics) that characterize the developmental pathways of each
of the [Link] -.s mentioned above.

DEVELOPMENTAL PATHWAYS

The Depressive Organization

Patterns of Early Reciprocity
The trend of attachment relationships is punctuated by a series
of affect-laden events which lend themselves to being perceived by the
child as losses, whether they be due to actual loss of a parent or to
repeated failures to develop a secure attachment through neglect
and/or rejection by uncaring parents (Bifulco, Brown, & Harris, 1987;
Bowlby, 1980; Brown, 1982; [Link], 1987; Parker, 1983a; [Link]-
man et al., 1987).
As a defensive strategy in response to parental rejection, infants
usually exhibit avoidant patterns of attachment, that is, active pre-
vention of contact with caregivers and marked reduction in the ex-
pression of both distressed affect and attachment. On the one hand,
avoidant attitudes help the infant actively exclude any processing of
information that would trigger attachment, precisely in order to pre-
vent the activation of attachment behaviors that would likely not be
met with comfort or support, thus probably arousing distress and anger
(Ainsworth, 1985; Bowlby, 1980). On the other hand, with the use of
this same attitude, the infant becomes able to selectively exclude from
conscious processing a whole set of moment-to-moment rebuffs from
uncaring parents, thereby preventing the direct expression of anger
which would make further rejection even more probable; the cogni-
36 THEORETICAL PREMISES

tive disconnection of perceived rejections, reducing the perceived

level of arousal, helps the infant keep his or her ongoing patterns of
self-perception stable in proximity to an attachment figure (Main &
Weston, 1982). Indeed, in the histories of avoidant children, there is
an absolutely characteristic tendency to minimize the experience of
distressing affect on the part of the child, and a tendency to dismiss
the importance of the relationship with parents as a source of comfort
and support (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988).
Thus, the experience of loneliness in avoidant infants is
matched by a sort of "self-caring" attitude, on the basis of which they
feel able to maintain an acceptable level of reciprocity with others
only by masking, at the face-to-face level of interaction, the negative
affective modulation [Link] during interactions with others (Lut-
kenhaus, Grossman, & Grossman, 1985). This involves a whole series
of inappropriate affective displays in current social situations, which,
almost inevitably, result in further stabilization of just that experience
of loneliness on which they depend.

SelfBoundary Organization

Whether scaffolded through real deaths or separations or

through parental affectionless and uncaring attitudes, the experience
of loss exerts a constructional role in organizing recurrent and stable
patterns of self-perception ("I") capable of being recognized and scaf-
folded into a stably bordered sense of self ("Me").

Organizing the "I. " The reciprocal interdependence between the

perception of loss and feelings of helplessness/sadness and anger is a
characteristic of the biological make-up of organisms which live in an
intersubjective reality, as is the case with primates (Bowlby, 1973,
1980; Panksepp, 1988; Rosenblum & Paully, 1987; Suomi, 1984).
Making basic feelings such as despair and anger appraisable through a
perceptual key such as loss involves the triggering of an emotional
modulation (grief) of great importance for survival and adaptation; it
increases the cohesion of the group through the strengthening of
existing bonds.
The centrality of the loss experience during early infancy will be
reflected in the selective differentiation and assembling of prototypical
scenes-abstracted from events and situations repeatedly experi-
enced-recursively oscillating between opponent emotional polar-
The Self-( )rganization of Pernmal Meaning Dimensions 37

ities such as helplessness/sadness and anger. By the age of 3, therefore,

a recursively oscillating set of nuclear scenes begins to stabilize. Its
rhythmic oscillation is able, on the one hand, to generate a quality of
self-perception matched by specific psychophysiological reactions
(continual alternation between anger/acting out and sadness/
withdrawal) and, on the other hand, to self-regulate through the
recurrent activation of its opponent emotional tonalities (contact ~
anger~ sadness----"? contact). Given that prototypical nuclear scenes
become basic ingredients of infantile consciousness, the emerging "l"
conveys an irreducible and immediate self-feeling which reflects the
infant's experience of "being-in-the-world" (i.e., being alone in an
utterly unreliable and uncontrollable world in which efforts and out-
comes are p_erceived as unrelated); moreover, the maintenance of this
inner sense through rhythmic opponent regulation cannot be ex-
perienced otherwise than through a continual succession of brusque
upheavals, both within the self and in the surrounding reality.

Bordering the "Me. " Given that self-recognizability is made

possible through the empathic ability to take the attitudes of signifi-
cant others (in oneself, the profile of the "Me" that comes to be
bordered invariably corresponds to a negative self-image where
lovableness and personal worth are deeply underestimated. The expe-
rience of finding oneself at the center of dramatic upheavals is self-
referred through the perception of one's being the causal agent of such
experiences. Thus, on the one hand, the structuring of categories of
internal causal attribution and self-responsibility in an attempt to
tame a reality that defies control is matched by helplessness/sadness
modulati~m; on the other hand, through the resulting anger and
self-blaming attitude, it is possible to recover at least part of this
control by concentrating on the negative aspects of self in order to
circumscribe them. The infant's self-esteem thus coincides with the
ability to make an effort to correct his or her perceived negativity and
in this way maintain acceptable contact with others. The con-
comitant experience ofloneliness also adds a sense of having to rely on
oneself, both in the struggle against one's negative self, and in explor-
ing the unknown surrounding world ("compulsive self-reliance'';
Bowlby, 1977).

In these cases, rapid oscillations between anger/acting out and

helplessness/withdrawal, accompanied by corresponding variations in
38 THEORETICAL PREMISES

self-esteem perception and self-blaming attitudes are practically the

rule in the first part of preschool years, as though reality could be
understood only through a series of alternating rejection and anger
reactions. In the early years of childhood (ages 6-7), paralleling the
growth in cognitive and motoric competence, the ability to actively
manipulate the immediacy of emotional modulation ("I") in order to
keep the appraisal of self ("Me") consistent enables the child to
actively center on intermediate emotional modulation so as to avoid
exposure to sudden upheavals, while still confirming and stabilizing
the current sense of self. Hence, as empathetic abilities improve,
shame, as the empathetic or vicarious experience of another's rejec-
tion of the self, gradually becomes a more continuous and pervasive
emotional tonality, increasing the child's sensitivity to criticism, con-
tempt, and rejection, and thus also the possibility of anticipating them
(Izard & Schwartz, 1986; Lewis, 1986, 1988). From the second stage
of childhood on, the child stabilizes around steady patterns of self-
perception by keeping the range of perceived rejections or failures
fairly constant through a series of self-deceptive, decentralized con-
trols. The avoidant style, which permits reduction in the emotional
arousal resulting from interpersonal events, is accompanied by an even
more selective and efficient exclusion of critical inflow from the
significant interpersonal domain. In addition, the repertoire of di-
versionary activities permits a certain degree of control over anger,
thus further reducing the possibilities of rejection or failure. For
example, the frequency of self-injuries (also reported in separated
monkeys; Suomi, 1984), apart from averting one's own anger away
from others, also works as an emotional self-stimulus within a situa-
tion which mimics the features of partial sensory deprivation.
The developmental pathway that emerges is one in which the
continuous anticipation of loss by the helpless child is, at the same
time, the self-referent process for confirming and stabilizing one's
ongoing sense of being-in-the-world and the most effective way of
reducing the intensity of disruptive emotions from losses and rejec-
tions, which in tum are perceived as certain and inevitable.
From the end of puberty and paralleling the emergence of new
levels of reflexive self-referring, the internal causal attribution that
characterizes the "Me" and the struggle to overcome negativity expand
considerably throughout adolescence and youth, becoming more and
more abstract and independent of the immediate emotional context,
giving rise to a more articulated and inclusive way of ordering reality.
The Self-Organization of Persoru1l Meaning Dimensions 39

"]"/"Me" Dynamics and Systemic Coherence

Selfuood dynamics in depressive meaning rest on the essential

tension between the pervasive and immediate scaffolding of the world
in terms of losses, rejections, and failures ("I") and explicit reordering
of the world in terms of a negative self and internal causal attribution
("Me") as the essential self-referent strategy for consistently recogniz-
ing and appraising one's moment-to-moment experiencing.
From one point of view, the internal causal attribution underly-
ing a negative self-image makes it possible to restore an actor's sense of
being a person who is recentering the struggle for control over the self,
rather than over an unreliable world. From this perspective, the
depressive attributional style described by the reformulated model of
learned helplessness in which uncontrollable events are attributed to
characteristics of the self in a stable and global way (Abramson,
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman & Peterson, 1986) appears to
be the primary self-regulatory process for preserving the internal
coherence of a depressive meaning in assimilating experience. Con-
sequently, the scaffolding of reality in terms of losses and failures
should not be considered only an abnormal feature, as if it merely
consisted of a sort of cumulative and passive reverberation of past
schemata. On the contrary, it is an autonomous and creative knowing
strategy in which generativity and novelty are based on the active
construction of a growing sense of the inaccessibility of reality. In-
deed, if a stable, external negative attribution were coupled with a
steady emotional modulation in terms of helplessness/anger ("I"), the
"Me" that would be appraisable would be perceived only as a helpless
object at the mercy of an adverse, unpredictable reality; a more
definite sense of the "Me" as an active agency would then become
possible only through the structuring of a persecutory, frightening
delusion of living in a hostile world.
From another viewpoint, the rhythmic oscillation between an-
ger/motor activation and helplessness/motor slowing down is ex-
perienced as abrupt and contrasting changes in one's ongoing self-
perception, perceived, most of the time, in rapid succession in the
same situation. These perceived reversals in one's immediate ex-
periencing are recognized and tentatively made consistent by varying
the intensity and quality of the internal causal attribution to the
negative self, eventually triggering equally abrupt reversals of quality
(in the sense of self-esteem) in the course of a given situation. Thus,
40 THEORETICAL PREMISES

within the same situation, the immediate sense of being unlovable and
worthless may be perceived as something which can be strenuously
and competently fought against with the feeling that one's personal
worth really depends on such a struggle (anger and motor activation).
Moments-l-ater, however, the same negative traits may be perceived as
intrinsic, inescapable ingredients of the self, toward which the only
coherent attitude is a self-blaming one with consequent deactivation
of any activity under way (helplessness and motor slowing down).
This continual alternation of feeling, chosen or damned by the same
destiny, so characteristic of the depressive meaning, also becomes
evident, in our opinion, on the microgenetic level (cf. Draguns,
1984), when one tries, within single and discrete cognitive-emotive
abilities, to trace patterns that appear in a telescoped fashion in
overall lifespan development. Hence, for example, depressive people,
compared to others, tend to show heightened initial reactions to
emotionally significant warning stimuli, followed by withdrawal and
slowing down of affective processing as the actual stimulus approaches
(Yee & Miller, 1988). Similarly, during recognition trials applied to
negative mood induction procedures, depressive people exhibit an
alternating display of both elated and dysphoric contents (Small &
Robins, 1988).
Evidently, then, the essential aspect that transforms the "I''/
"Me" dynamics of depressive meaning into an open-ended process is
the fact that reordering perceived losses in terms of internal attribu-
tion is always one step behind experiencing reality in terms of losses.
This is reflected in the depressive's striking tendency to bring about a
series of events in his or her social and cultural network, all of which
are capable of being scaffolded in terms of losses and failures. Con-
sequently, the orthogenetic directionality that constrains the unfold-
ing of depressive meaning should be identified (in terms of positive
progression) with a continuous differentiation and integration of
the loss theme, matched by a shifting of the capability for reflex-
ive self-referring toward more and more abstract levels, to the point
where the individual experiences loss as a category of human ex-
perience rather than as a personal destiny of loneliness and rejec-
tion. It goes without saying that such a point should be considered
more as a kind of "ideal" normative progression rather than as an ef-
fective goal to be reached in one phase or other of the individual
life cycle.
The Self-Organization of Persoruil Meaning Dimensions 41

The Phobic Organization

Patterns of Early Reciprocity

Despite their diversity, the invariant aspect characterizing pat-

terns of parental attachment consists of an indirect inhibition of the
infant's autonomous exploratory behavior, either through overprotec-
tion or through the parents' unavailability as a safe base. As far as the
infants are concerned, the invariant aspect consists of the fact that
they never feel that their lovableness or personal value is put into
question. In the overprotective pattern they feel their liberty of move-
ment is restricted because they are loved too much; but it is they
themselves who, because of a kind of excess of solicitousness, take the
initiative in maintaining close contact with the parents, and refrain
from exploring their surroundings (Arindell, Emmelkamp, Monsma,
& Brilman, 1983; Bowlby, 1973, 1983, 1988; Parker, 1979, 1983b).
In other words, the indirect way in which inhibition is carried
out represents the crucial variable, and consequently feeling oneself
limited in one's freedom of movement can only be experienced as
something that is necessarily part of an attachment relationship which
can be perceived as stable and "safe" (Guidano, 1987, 1988; Guidano
& Liotti, 1983, 1985). Clearly, the infant's experience of his or her
being-in-the-world is specifically constrained, from the very start, by
this stipulation. Indeed, on the one hand, the interference with
inborn tendencies toward autonomous environmental exploration is
matched by an appreciable degree of emotional distress which, further
intensifying the search for proximity to an attachment figure, gives
rise to a true anxious attachment; that is, the infant feels protected
from the environment, perceived as dangerous, only when in close
physical contact with a caregiver (clinging attitude). On the other
hand, the indirectness of such interference prevents the infant from
perceiving the distress as coming from parents' intentions concerning
upbringing, and therefore as something referable to his or her own
emotional attitudes or qualities, and so the child is unable to localize it
inside his or her emerging subjective experience. As a consequence,
the emotional distress is experienced as localized in the physical aspects of
the self, and the infant becomes able to control it by selectively excluding
any arousal modulation which, regardless of its emotional content, would
exceed his or her perceived range of stability.
42 THEORETICAL PREMISES

Nonetheless, controlling embodied distress by excluding any

arousal modulation is paralleled by a pervasive feeling of low com-
petence in managing one's emotional states. All this would lead to a
further reduction in the perceived range of stability were it not coun-
terbalanced by an overcontrolling attitude toward the environment
which excludes any initiative that would decrease the proximity from
a protective figure by perceiving any possible novelty as a potential
danger. It follows that an attitude of this kind brings with it a
continual reproduction of feelings of constriction and limitation,
ending with the stabilization of the experience of an endangered and
distressed self on which it depends.

Self-Boundary Organization

Within a developmental pathway characterized by overcontrol

of distress perceived through the body, selfhood differentiation is
carried out through somewhat specific patterns.

Organizing the "I. " The inhibition of autonomous exploration is

reflected in the selective differentiation and unitary assembling of
prototypical scenes in which attachment and separation, rather than
regulating reciprocally and developing side by side, are experienced as
situations in which one excludes the other; this is equivalent to
perceiving any temporary separation from a protective figure as an
impending danger, then immediately feeling constricted and limited
the moment physical contact with that same figure is re-established.
So at about the age of 3, the array of recursively oscillating nuclear
scenes regarding the mutal exclusion of protection and autonomy
brings forth a self-regulating pattern of self-perception in which the
felt need for freedom and independence is matched by the distressing
perception of a dangerous world in which being lovingly protected is
the only possible way .to be-in-it.
Fear and distress experienced through the oscillation of body
arousal become the main ingredients of the emerging "I," selectively
orienting ongoing perceptive-cognitive processing toward a "sensorial"
decoding of any emotional modulation in such a way as to forestall any
arousal oscillation which may overreach one's perceived range of
stability.

Bordering the "Me." While the subject's sense of continuity rests

on the experience of controlling the modulation of arousal resulting
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensions 43

from the rhythmic oscillation of negative emotional tonalities, that is,

distress/need for protection and need for freedom/fear, overprotective
parental attitudes bias self-recognizability toward a positive bordering
of the "Me." Because of the capability for stabilizing one's ongoing
arousal by a selective tuning to the sensorial aspects of emotional
experience (i.e., feeling emotions through the body), the child be-
comes able to appraise him- or herself as lovable and valuable. The
pn1file of the "Me" that emerges is one in which emotionality and
effusive behavior are equated with fragility and weakness, and are
consequently excluded from the perceived emotional range. Since
controllable emotions are identified with controllable sensorial mod-
ulation, the dimensions of personal subjective experience are some-
what reduced from the start, and self-esteem and self-competence
become closely related to self-control. This appraisal of the self is
made consistent by attributing the felt need for protection to a stable,
negative external cause (i.e., an "objectively" dangerous world) and
explaining one's overcontrolling attitude in terms of the need for
freedom and independence.

As childhood progresses, the child becomes more able to keep

within an acceptable range any discrepant modulation of arousal
connected to frightening experiences of loneliness (need for protec-
tion) and constriction (need for freedom). Orienting attention on the
sensorial cues of feelings and refraining from further processing other
aspects of emotionality relevant to his or her subjectivity, the child
can achieve a dynamic and steady equilibrium through specific pat-
terns of self-deceptive, decentralized control by: (1) progressively
excluding all sensory 1nflow capable of activating the need for freedom
and independence which would invariably trigger loneliness distress;
and (2) structuring a repertoire of somatic and visceral complaints that
act as diversionary activity for maintaining proximity to protective
figures without having to decode it as a constriction.
Consequently, in a developmental pathway of this kind, many
ensembles of affect-laden nuclear scripts are not properly reordered
and transformed into semantic cognitive content. The activation of
these scripts is likely to be expressed through arousal-motor patterns of
reaction, and this further stabilizes the existing trend of referring one's
emotions to perceived bodily modifications. Fear and distress thus
remain the most structured and easily recognizable feelings within
one's perceived emotional range, making it indispensable to seek
44 THEORETICAL PREMISES

proper self-control through the achievement of secure proximity to

protective figures. ·
Finally, from adolescence on, the emergence of new levels of
reflexive self-referring allows for a more abstract reordering of the
"Me" overcontrolling attitude. The rhythmic oscillation of opponent
emotional experiences ("I") is matched by a sense of being a control-
ling agent ("Me"), and the attitude appraised as either self-reliance-
if based upon confirmation of one's ability to find other available
protective figures in every possible new circumstance (need for pro-
tection)--or as autonomy and independence-if based on confirma-
tion of one's ability to control interpersonal relationships able to
provide an adequate sense of protection (need for freedom).

"I"l"Me" Dynamics and Systemic Coherence

Phobic selfhood dynamics rest on the essential tension between

the pervasive and immediately experienced need to rely on secure,
affective relationships ("I") and the explicit reordering in terms of a
controlling agent ("Me") which renders the individual unable to
master the existential and emotional aspects inherent in the human
affective domain.
On the one hand, an explicit self-image whose positivity relies
on emotional overcontrol and exclusion entails the tendency to as-
sume an external attributive attitude toward one's immediate ex-
periencing, in which feelings and emotions are regarded as external to
the self. Controlling procedures are therefore based on an almost
automatic prevention or avoidance of emotions, rather than on their
understanding in terms of personal meaning (Guidano, 1987, 1988;
Guidano & Liotti, 1985).
On the other, the rhythmic oscillation between distress/need for
protei::tion and need for freedom/fear implies a tendency to overreact
with high emotional intensity to variations, even minimal, in one's
affectional balance. This may occur particularly in reaction to threats
of detachment (however imaginary) from protective figures, and con-
versely, to any increase in emotional involvement in an ongoing
affective relationship which may be perceived as a limitation of one's
freedom of action. However, the same overcontrolling attitude makes
the "Me" blind to the emotions being experienced ("I"), to the point
where they can be felt only as physical distress, either as a need for
protection or as a fear of constriction. It is well known, in fact, that
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensiom 45

whenever there are difficulties in using appropriate cognitive scaffold-

ing to decode one's ongoing emotional modulation, the latter is
[Link] as alien, negative, and more or less painful (Bowl-
by, 1985; .Marshall & Zimbardo, 1979; Maslach, 1979).
It is thus evident that the generativity of phobic "l"/"Me"
dynamics lies precisely in the attempt to control an emotion, to the
point where it is excluded from the explicit self-image, but only after
this same emotion has actually been experienced. Making new affec-
tive bonds, breaking old ones, or perceiving growing loneliness or
constriction in significant relationships can easily trigger emotional
experiences whose control would require more complex self-
explanations than those allowed by the ongoing controlling attitude.
Howeverh through the assimilation and integration of such dis-
equilibria, a phobic meaning can undergo a progressive differentiation
of the perceived range of personal emotions and eventually reach more
articulated and comprehensive balances between its central, opposing
needs.

The Eating Disorders Organization

Patterns of Early Reciprocity

Despite their diversity from one case to the next, attachment

relationships are characterized by certain invariant aspects which
concur to trigger a specific experience in the' child's unfolding selfhood
by combining together into a unitary sequence in the course of matu-
ration (Guidano, 1987, 1988). Parental attachment style is usually
ambiguous and undefined, and generally contradictory. On the one
hand, they portray themselves as parents completely devoted to the
well-being and upbringing of their children; on the other, their par-
enting behavior is more concerned with obtaining confirmation of
that image from others than with fulfilling their children's concrete
need for emotional warmth and support. Hence, mothers, although
very concerned with the infant, derive no pleasure from nursing, and
self-control prevails over caring and tenderness (Selvini-Palazzoli,
1978). This maternal selective inattention to the infant's cues results
in interference in the rhythmic and synchronic patterns of reciprocal
attunement right from the beginning of mother-infant dyadic interac-
tion (Chatoor, 1989; Chatoor, Egan, Getson, Menvielle, & O'Don-
 46 THEORETICAL PREMISES
(
nell, 1988). Difficulty in abstracting meaningful self-referent regulari-
ties from caregivers' behavior prevents the infant from scaffolding his
or her sensory inflow into an organized stream of recurrent psy-
chophysiological rhythms. Apart from the primitive bodily rhythms
connected with hunger and motility, many others remain deregulated
and desynchronized, since adequate interconnections with basic feel-
ings and motor patterns cannot be established. Consequently, self-
recognition processes can only give rise to a blurred sense of self, and,
given the parents' essential upbringing strategy of constant anticipa-
tion or redefinition of the infant's feelings, the child easily develops a
deep and pervasive feeling of umeliability in recognizing his or her
ongoing inner states. Various factors (rhythm deregulation, intrusive
parenting, etc.) interf~re with the emergent perception of being an
entity distinct from other people, and the infant can only achieve
self-recognition, and hence a reasonably stable pattern of self-
perception, through an enmeshed relationship with ·an attachment
figure (Minuchin, 1974; Minuchin, Rosman, & Baker, 1978).
Given that the child, in order to achieve a stable, definitive
sense of self, must comply with the expectations of an attachment
figure perceived as an absolute model, any reappraisal of that figure
can obviously only be experienced as a disappointment--one so in-
tense as to call into question his or her already established self-image.
In this way, the "physiological" change of parents' image (i.e., relativ-
ization resulting from more abstract conceptual perspective-taking)
which comes with the maturation of reflexive cognitive abilities again
triggers the emergence of a blurred and wavering immediate ex-
periencing, making the achievement of a stable sense of self problem-
atic. However, since an enmeshed relationship with a significant
figure remains the essential strategy for obtaining a definitive self-
image, the problem now becomes one of finding reliable partners
without risking further possible disappointments and failures.

Self-Boundary Organization

In a developing situation characterized by a poor demarcation

between self and others, selfhood differentiation can be outlined as
follows.

Organizing the "I." The deregulation/desynchronization of early

rhythms is paralleled by a relatively undifferentiated patterning of
The. Self-Organization of l'enorwl Me,mi11g Vimensium 47

psychophysiologkal modulation, giving rise to a pervasive and dis-

tressing blurred experiencing of self. Moreover, the rehearsal of nu-
clear scenes con.c erning the nonrecognition or disconfim1ation of any
expression of autonomous feelings and thoughts brings about the
selective structuring of opponent sets of prototypical scenes, all rather
undifferentiated and loosely interconnected. As a result, the im-
mediate self-feeling is continuously wavering between the experience
of being "externally hound" in recognizing one's internal states (in
which the obtained sense of individuality is matched by a sense of
personal ineffectiveness) or the experience of being "internally bound"
in defining one's ongoing emotional modulation (in which the per-
ceived stronger sense of individuality is intermingled with a feeling
of emptiness and~ self-unreliability). Thus, personal ineffectiveness
and a sense of emptiness, continuously triggered by wavering self-ex-
periencing, become the main ingredients of the emerging "I," and,
as the infant's attention selectively attunes to interpersonal cues,
eventually give rise to an overreliance upon external frames of ref-
erence.

Bordering the "Me." The reordering of one's immediate experi-

ence into a definite sense of self is carried out according to external
frames of reference. Self-recognizability therefore eventually coincides
with perceived expectations of an attachment figure, and the profile of
the "Me" is reflected by the corresponding self-image able to fit with
such expectations. Hence, if the problem consists of drawing a defi-
nite sense of self out of others' attitudes and judgments, perfectionism
becomes the way to provide an optimal solution to this problem. As a
consequence, the "Me" is framed according to standards of perfection,
as absolute as they are conventional, and the attempt to achieve them
is considered the most reliable way of attaining an acceptable level of
self-esteem and self-worthiness. ,,
The quality of the appraisal of disappointment, while restricting
one's range of self-exposure and self-confrontation, defines the pre-
vailing orientation of causal attribution (i.e., external vs. internal),
even though such orientation, stemming from a blurred and wavering
immediate experience, remains within loose, vague margins. Whether
an external rather than internal orientation will prevail depends on
the extent to which the appraisal of the prototypical disappointment is
actively "discovered" (i.e., experienced as the result of one's own
activity) as opposed to being passively "accepted" (i.e., experienced
48 THEORETICAL PREMJSES

coercion to adapt to an overwhelming distressing event) (Beattie-

Emery & Csikszentmihalyi, 1981; Guidano, 1987).
In the case of an external orientation, the "Me" perceives others
mainly as deceitful and intrusive; striving against a deceitful reality by
strenuously displaying positive, controlled, self-sufficient attitudes be-
comes the essential means for keeping the pervasive feeling of in-
effectiveness and emptiness below acceptable limits. This attribution-
al style, which involves more active bodily and motoric patterns, can
give rise, whenever unbalanced, to typical anorexic disorders.
In the case of internal orientation, however, the "Me" will be
focused on restricting the distressing effect of expected disconfirma-
tions by attributing them to specific, concrete traits of the self, rather
than to feelings of personal ineffectiveness and emptiness that pervade
one's immediate experiencing. Whenever unbalanced, this attribu-
tional style, .involving more passive bodily and motoric patterns, can
be the source of bulimic disorders and obesity.

Hence, from the end of childhood on, a blurred and wavering

"I" is reordered into a self-image whose competence and worthiness
depend on the equilibrium which one has been able to establish
between the absolute need for significant others' approval and the
impending fear of being intruded upon or disappointed in significant
relationships. On the one hand, adhering to absolute standards associ-
ated with everyday common sense brings forth an image of the self as
reliable and worthy because of the perceived ability to manipulate
others' judgment in one's own favor. On the other hand, avoiding
self-exposure and self-confrontation allows the recovery of individual-
ity and demarcation from others in one's self-image because of the
perceived ability to control the intrusiveness and deceitfulness of
others. ,·
Clearly an attitude of this kind implies the selective excli:i-s-i on of
any inflow which is able either to interfere with the attunement to
absolute standards, or to increase self-exposure, given that in both
cases challenging disconfirmations of one's self-image would become
more probable. Hence, the most striking feature of the eating disor-
ders personal meaning is the vague and continually oscillating attitude
of the "Me" toward the "I"; that is, the oscillative and uncertain
attribution of causality with respect to one's feelings and inner mod-
ulation self-regulates in such a way that the perfectionist attitude is
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensions 49

buffered against disconfirmations by the parallel structuring of very

specific self-deceiving patterns. Both the attributive oscillation and
the overreliance on external frames of reference, in fact, make it
possible for perceived feelings to emerge in consciousness as loosely
and vaguely interconnected with other concurrent emotions, images,
and conscious thoughts. This capability for managing different and
often contrasting aspects of consciousness by not connecting them in
turn prevents the ''Me" from becoming completely aware of what the
"Me" itself actually knows. In this manner, a variety of possibilities
open up for self-manipulative mechanisms designed to maintain one's
perceived self-esteem; for example, it then becomes possible to assert
from moment to moment either that one feels prey to fear or that one
never experiences fear because of one's willpower. All this, moreover,
is not even perceived as a discrepancy, given that, rather than making
ongoing immediate experience consistent, it is the moment-to-
moment search for a "coherence of appearance" that stabilizes one's
self-image. Also, the modulation of basic bodily rhythms like hunger
and motility provides the only possibilities for a reliable self-percep-
tion within a continuously wavering immediate experiencing; there-
fore, variations in eating and motor behavior act as diversionary
activities which reduce the chance of challenging feelings of empti-
ness and/or ineffectiveness entering consciousness.
Finally, because of the role that formal and aesthetic aspects
play in a coherence of appearance, the possibility of having an unac-
ceptable body image is the essential way of embodying feelings of
ineffectiveness or emptiness once the latter have been triggered by
inevitable or unpredictable confrontations. The more active anorexic
pattern strives against this image of failure by overcontrolling biologi-
cal impulses; the obese pattern, on the contrary, in trying to circum-
scribe an expected failure, tends to give up the struggle.

"I" /"Me" Dynamics and Systemic Coherence

The essential tension underlying selfhood dynamics in the eat-

ing disorders meaning is easily traceable to the problem of a loose and
indefinite demarcation from others. The pervasive and compelling
need for supportive intimacy in order to experience a fairly stable
pattern. of self-perception continuing in time ("I") is accompanied by
its explicit reordering as a competent and valuable self-image ("Me")
50 THEORETICAL PREMISES
I
whose absoluteness, while being the perceived requisite for attaining
supportive intimacy, requires a nearly total reduction of self-disclosure
which eventually excludes any intimacy whatever.
Thus, in order to avoid any definite affective commitment and
self-exposure-which would imply the risk of negative judgments
calling into question the established standards for one's self-image-a
whole repertoire of relational strategies aims at obtaining a priori from
the partner the absolute guarantee of a supportive intimacy. However,
in the rather improbable case that such an external guarantee were to
be obtained in this manner, it would in no way solve the compelling
need to experience an "inner-founded" self; as Pirandello put it in his
famous play Rules of the Game: the mirror usually reflects only the way
others see us, the way we are expected to behave, forced to behave-
hardly ever what we really are. Thus, in most situations, an affectional
style characterized by ambiguity, indefiniteness, and constant "test-
ing" of the partner often brings about the very criticisms and disap-
pointments which could have been avoided.
However, the assimilation and integration of such distressing
feelings, triggering further reorderings of the "Me," enable it to recog-
nize internal frames of reference in the "I" for organizing more reliable,
stable patterns of self-perception. In other words, the "ideal," genera-
tive lifespan directionality of an eating disorders meaning is one in
which a progressive demarcation from others, with the consequent
relativization of those others, is matched by a growing sense of in-
dividuality and personal autonomy.

The Obsessive-Compulsive Organization

Patterns of Early Reciprocity

The essential feature of the organization of obsessive meaning is

the unitary combination which, in the developing infant, acquires
two aspects which may be considered invariant: firstly, an ongoing,
immediate experience in terms of intense, antithetical feelings which
increase the need for emotional/analogue processing; secondly, a
primacy given to verbal/analytical processing which eventually re-
duces the actual possibilities of viable emotional decoding.
Parenting behavior in these cases assumes all the characteristics
of a truly ambivalent "double-faced" attachment, where concealed
 The Self-Organization of Per$cmal Meaning Dimensions 51

\[ejecting attitudes are camouflaged by an outward facade of absolute

devotion and concern. The simultaneousness of parents' antithetical
attitudes seems to be the crucial variable, given that eventually it
takes the form of a "double-bind" situation, that is, a communicative
setting in which any available understanding is inevitably experienced
by the infant as probably wrong (Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weak-
land, 1956; Sluzki & Veron, 1976). While the image of an apparently
all-giving, overindulgent parent is matched by an emotional modula-
tion conveying a feeling of reliability of one's being-in-the-world, the
simultaneous experiencing of the same parent as demanding, controll-
ing, and rejecting triggers an opposite emotional modulation in which
one's perceived unacceptability is mixed with feelings of anger and
hostility. In oth~r words, the uncontrollability perceived by the infant
could be paraphrased by saying that the experiences "He or she loves
me; I'm lovable" and "He or she loves me not; I'm unlovable" both
have evidence in their favor and explain equally well the same ongo-
ing attachment relationship.
In this way, the structuring of a psychophysiological modulation
characteriied by abrupt and recurrent oscillations between antithetical
feelings parallels the emergence of split patterns of self-recognition
which, being mutually exclusive, reduce the possibility of organizing
unitary patterns of self-perception. As a whole, parents' attitudes
outline a highly verbal a,n d motorically underactive intersubjective
dimension (Adams, 19 73), that is, an almost absolute predominance
of rational explanations and analytical reasoning procedures over
immediate forms of communication (positive or negative emotional
exchanges, games and physical activity, spontaneity, etc.). The con-
tinual need to adhere explicitly to an established external order of
rules and absolute principles gives shape to a truly unreasonably
demanding environment for the child, and eventually becomes an
instrument for the parents to obtain virtually total control over
his or her behavior and emotions (Clark & Bolton, 1985; Salzman,
1973). Feelings and emotional expressions are eventually excluded
from this established order through a characteristic proced~re: not
that feelings should he controlled, but rather that they are not to be
felt at all. Since feelings once triggered are, by their very nature,
unavoidable and inescapable, any emotional moduladon is likely to
be experienced by the child as a pervasive sense of uncontrollability,
further stabilizing his or her orientation toward the verbal/analyt-
ical dimension.
52 THEORETICAL PREMISES

Sel/Hourulary Organization

Organizing the "I." The rhythmic rehearsal of nuclear scenes

concerning ambivalent situations and unresolvable dilemmas tacitly
perceived is matched by recurrent and abrupt oscillations between
antithetical feelings and opposite and incompatible perceptions of
self. Patterns of self-recognition, structured on the basis of such
oscillations, outline a "double-faced" experiencing of the self, alter-
nately perceived as a pervasive feeling of ambivalence, or as a distress-
ing fear of uncontrollability. Thus, ambivalence and uncontrollabil-
ity, frequently surfacing as bizarre and frightening "insights" about
oneself, become the main ingredients of the emerging "I," selectively
attuning the infant's available resources toward a "cognitive" search
for consistency/certainty and control.

Bordering the "Me." The reordering of an ambivalent and anti-

thetical immediate experience into a definite sense of self results from
tlie differentiation of opposite patterns of self-perception and the
active selection of one of them as one's self-image. The criterion for
self-recognizability thus corresponds to the perceived external es-
tablished order, and the profile of the "Me" is then acceptable insofar
as it manages to exclude from processing a large part of ongoing
immediate experience. · In other words, while, for example, a de-
pressive "Me" is matched by a set of possible self-images relying on
polarities of helplessness and anger, an obsessive "Me" is forced to rely
moment-to-moment on only one of the polarities, that is, either he or
she is lovable and acceptable, or he or she is neither. Further limited
by poor growth of analogical/tacit understanding, · the child becomes
selectively inattentive to the emotional modulation provided by his or
her immediate experiencing-preferring thought and linguistic
capabilities to the point of making them the essential instrument for
any understanding. In comparison to the perceivable ambivalence of
images and emotions, verbal processes appear more consistent and
easily controllable, as their digital-sequential format allows the dis-
tribution of information into two distinctly differentiable opposites,
facilitating the selection of the right one.
Patterns of decentralized control for maintaining one's selected
self-image will therefore be based on this "verbal primacy." On the
one hand, the selective exclusion of free fantasy, imagery, emotions,
and impulses substantially decreases the surfacing into consciousness
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensions 53

of ambivalent feelings; on the other, a whole repertoire of diversionary

activities diverts selective attention from further processing by
moment-to-moment emotional modulation. These activities take on
the form of thoughts (ruminations, doubts, etc.) very often connected
to stereotyped behavior (rituals), since in the concrete stage of child-
hood, motoric patterns are the prevailing means of controlling the
unfolding of cognitive abilities.
The surfacing of mixed, ambivalent feelings, which continues to
occur, is made consistent through the structuring of a "Me" opposite
attitude, that is,= feeling and thinking exclusively by way of opposite
categories, passing from one to the other in an "all-or-none" way, so
that unless the perception of certainty is matched by a sense of total
control, the "Me" te11ds to perceive a total lack of control (Salzman,
1973). The "Me" all-or-none attitude carries out a self-referent pro-
cedure for perceiving a unitary identity out of the double-faced ex-
periencing "I"; in any situation, in fact, an all-or-none decoding
makes available a consistent and consequently certain perception of
self and reality, the only difference being that in one case it will be
positive, and in the other negative.
The attribution of causality will vary in an all-or-none way
depending on the quality of the "Me'' appraisal. In the positive
dimension, an external causal attribution will prevail, and the need
for certainty will be expressed by constant activity aimed at foreseeing
and anticipating any possible unexpected event brought about by a
deceiving, untrustworthy reality. In the negative dimension, con-
versely, the pervasive sense of an inherent and uncontrollable
negativity of the self is the essential means by which an internal causal
attribution attempts to control ambivalent and perturbing feelings
triggered by ongoing discrepant experience.

Within a developmental pathway in which the certainty of

one's perceived identity is acquired through the exclusion of one's
emotional life, the commitment to certainty in any domain of experi-
ence becomes the essential procedure for maintaining a unitary and
reliable self-perception. Because the perception of a unitary identity is
equated with the perceived certainty of having total control over
oneself, the overconfidence in thought, verbal fluency, and linguistic
competence eventually becomes a selective attitude for maintaining
the range of emotional processing within fairly narrow limits. By
regarding only the rational and logical aspects of one's ongoing emo-
54 THEORETICAL PREMISES

tional modulation as worthy of attention and further processing, it

actually becomes possible to exclude ambivalent feelings (which
would call into question the selected self-image) and feelings such as
hostility, anger, and sexuality, which could trigger a perturbing sense
of shame, incompetence, and unworthiness.
The constant search for certainty that one has total control over
oneself is matched by a perfectionist attitude resulting from the
moment-to-moment adhesion to a rigid set of moral standards and
rules. We are, however, dealing with a "nonspecific perfectionism,"
which is seldom actualized in one's ongoing life programs, for the
sense of being a positive and reliable person depends almost ex-
clusively on the formal adherence to moral rules perceived as absolute
certainties. Being perfect•thus means seeking justice, equity, and truth
for their own sake, with little correlation to the irreducible unique
aspects of ongoing existential situations.
The dynamic equilibrium between antithetical dimensions of
controllability and uncontrollability permitted by a selfhood dynamic
of this type is shored up by fairly specific self-deceiving patterns of
decentralized control. As a response to unpredictable double-faced
immediate experiences that split the current selected self-image into
opposing positive and negative ones, the "Me" regains total control by
displacing causal attribution, in an all-or-none way, toward an in-
ternally perceived negativity. This attributional shift temporarily dis-
locates these opposing self-images, so that the negative "actual" self is
matched by the positivity of a "potential" self perceived as possible in
the near future (Makhlouf-Norris & Norris, 1972). In other words,
the "Me" can maintain a negative but certain identity in actuality,
while at the same time preventing self-esteem from decreasing to
below acceptable limits.

"I" /"Me" Dynamics and Systemic Coherence

The essential tension underlying selfhood dynamics would thus

seem to be traceable to a deeply ingrained emotional imbalance
(dichotomous experiencing of the "I") reflected in the struggle to
attain a unitary and reliable perception of one's self-image ("Me"). In
a situation in which a steady double-bind attachment is the basis for
the undecodability of one's feelings, thought processes-in their con-
crete and, subsequently, abstract forms-are the only possible avenue
for reaching a unitary and reliable perception. In other words, the

I
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensions 55
(_

antithetical opposittbn between thinking and feeling, which emerges

as a result of a structural discrepancy in the "Me" appraisal of the "I," is
central to the organization of obsessive meaning, being at the same
time the source of a whole set of specific perturbations which may, at
any moment, prejudice the equilibrium it has attained. -
On the one hand, the search for certainty carried out solely
through cognitive modes is matched by the tendency to split up
ongoing experience, dwelling excessively on its constituent details
and failing to envisage the whole ("underinclusion"; Reed, 1969,
1985). The relative incapacity to reach integrated perspectives de-
pends both on the selective omission of global apprehensional frames
(i.e. , images) supplied by the ongoing emotional modulation, and on
the rigid dichotomization of any experience into opposing aspects, to
be certain of p~rsuing the positive aspects and carefully avoiding the
negative ones. Systematic doubting becomes the preferred strategy for
reaching a unitary and stable experiencing of reality, and the resulting
pedantic attitude is, usually, in keen contrast to the individual's
linguistic and rhetorical abilities. Doubting, procrastination, and
overconcern for details will therefore prevail whenever the situation
to be faced presents some complexity, reaching the point where, in
the most intense situations, the ability to make a decision is lost. The
perceived difficulty in deciding about something highly thou'g ht of and
valued is, in turn, one of the immediate experiences that is most likely
to trigger pervasive and ambivalent feelings, whose emergence into
consciousness would call into question the currently selected self-
image.
On the other hand, while a positive and emotionally "clear"
affective involvement would represent a possible source of nonam-
bivalent reciprocity, allowing for better decoding and reordering of
one's double-faced experiencing, the possibilities of genuine involve-
ment are reduced, since all the sense of unity and continuity depends
on the perception of having total control over oneself. Quite the
contrary, as mentioned, it is precisely the affective situations (making
and breaking affectional bonds, pregnancy, childbirth, etc.) which
turn out to be the most complex, and the most difficult about which to
make a decision. Furthermore, because the control of emotions is
directed at the rigid exclusion of any emotional-imaginative modula-
tion, th.e individual has a tendency to experience even the slightest
feelings that escape his or her control as extremely intense, with a
consequent tendency to overreact unduly. The possibility of perceiv-
56 THEORETICAL PREMISES

ing oneself as being at the mercy of one's own emotions is in tum

matched by a pervasive and distressing sense of uncontrollability
intermingled with other challenging feelings, such as shame, guilt,
and unworthiness.
The intermittent emergence of uncontrollable feelings that
challenge the reliability of one's self-image and, subsequent attempts to
assimilate and integrate them are at the core of the generativity and
orthogenetic progression exhibited by an obsessive meaning. The
resulting directionality should be expressed in the course of lifespan
development by a progressive relativization of the image of an absolute
and certain reality, matched by the emergence of an irreducible sense
of one's uniqueness based on a more adequate decoding of one's
emotional modulation~ In other words, the switching in meaning
level, which proves to be crucial in an obsessive lifespan, consists of
the existential discovery that the sense of a sure identity cannot rely
on the impersonal universality of thought, but rather on the perceived
uniqueness of one's personal emotional domain.

METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

The ontological perspective that has been sketched out up to

this point demands a drastic revision of the methodological program
underlying current notions in clinical psychology and psychopatholo-
gy. I shall limit myself to a few considerations on two essential points:
( 1) the necessity of a process-oriented, explicative psychopathology
which can take into account classes of behavior perceived as clinical
disturbances by an external observer; and (2) a reformulation in terms
of systems/process-oriented principles of current conceptualization
concerning mental health and mental disorders.

Explanatory Psychopathology as a Science

of Meaning

The basic ambiguity regarding current clinical methodology-as

exemplified, for instance, by DSM-III-R-lies in the fact that it is (1)
essentially atheoretical, and (2) merely descriptive (Faust & Miner,
1986; Weimer, 1979, 1984).
1. In trying to be an exemplifcation of the empiricist principle of
parsimony (i.e., remaining as close to the "data" as possible) an
The_Jelf-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensions 57

atheoretical clinical approach has in the end encouraged professional

acceptance of an almost total ignorance of etiology and psy-
chopathological processes, which, in fact, should be the essential
motivation for their research. This ignorance is the expression of a
methodological choice: avoiding any investigation of the etiological
problem. This choice emerges in full measure when the DSM-III-R
invites psychiatric clinicians to agree on the identification of mental
disorders on the basis of clinical manifestations without even agreeing
on how those disorders occur. We are dealing with a situation which is
becoming more and more evident and often embarrassing, as recent
data concerning the involvement of psychologists and psychiatrists in
the legal arena attest. Evidence indicates that professionals often fail
to reach reliable or valid conclusions, and the accuracy of their
judgments does not necessarily surpass that of laypersons, thus raising
substantial doubt that psychologists or psychiatrists meet legal stan-
dards for expertise (Faust & Ziskin, 1988).
It should be clear that the renunciation of etiological un-
derstanding excludes, in real terms, the possibility of establishing what
relationship there may be between observed behavior and the organi-
zation of the person who exhibits it. It is therefore natural that the
planning of treatment is the result of guesswork. All this, which at
first glance might seem a little paradoxical, like planning the decor of
a house one has not seen, corresponds to attitudes as ingrained as they
are accepted, given that it has been possible to prepare techniques for
modifying "erroneous" knowledge without stopping to ask how that
knowledge arises.
On the other hand, if, using the perspective we have been
presenting, we put ourselves in the position of the individual who
self-organizes his or her knowledge, it would seem to follow that we
should accept the fact that the only adequate etiological understand-
ing is that of a developmental psychopathology, that is, the multilevel
reconstruction of lifespan transformational experiences which bring
about the patterns of meaning coherence exhibited at present by the
individual. Rather than being random or totally empirical, as empiri-
cist postulates would require, such a reconstruction can be understood
through a developmental theory that appreciates the complexity of
adaptational processes as well as the regularity through which basic
transformations are carried out (Bowlby, 1988; Guidano, 1987;
Mahoney, 1988; Mahoney & Gabriel, 1987; Reda, 1986; Sroufe &
Rutter, 1984).
2. The usual methodology is descriptive in the sense that def-
58 THEORETICAL PREMISES

initions coincide with descriptions of clinical features of the disorders,

and in this way seem to shape the attempt, old but still effective, to
resolve a problem by omitting it. In fact, the problem lies precisely in
rendering intelligible how and why the clinical features observed
exhibit the characteristics that, descriptively, they do indeed possess
(Weimer, 1982). Hence, it is doubtful what use, whether in clinical
research or in psychotherapeutic practice, techniques of assessment
rhay have when based on such a methodological program. In this .
respect, Faust and Miner (1986) point out: "if theories only summarize
descriptions, they are virutally useless. A theory that does only this is
more like a filing system which knows and can discover only what is
already discovered and known" (p. 966).
Furthermore, this methodological attitude in the long rucy be-
comes misleading in that it reifies the descriptive diagnostic categories
with which it classifies the range of clinical features observed to the
point where these categories begin to look like clothes that a subject
might wear, according to circumstances. Consider, for example, the
diagnostic category labeled as depression: it would seem that once out
of a depressive episode (like removing an article of clothing) the
person returns to a ·mode of being which is quite different from that
in which he or she felt helpless. It is known, however, that even
in periods of complete well-being, these subjects exhibit, albeit
with lower frequency and intensity, attitudes, modes of thought, and
emotional reactions that are perfectly analogous to those present
in the acute phase (Reda, 1984). Identical, or closely matching, pat-
terns are also seen when one considers the trend of psychophysio-
logical parameters that reveal the basic sensory-perceptive attitude
of the subject (Reda, Arciero, & Blanco, 1986; Reda, Blanco, Gui-
dano, & Mahoney, 1988). It is thus clear how a depressive episode,
far from being something which strikes the person from without,
like a fever or disease, is intrinsically bound up with his or her way
of assimilating experience, of evaluating it and integrating it with
past data~in a word, within the coherence of his or her personal
meaning.
Finally, the epistemological premise can no longer be main-
tained on which the empiricist principles of parsimony and objective
description rest, that is, the existence-independent from us-of an
unequivocal external order in which a "sense of things" is objectively
contained which can be known as such through unbiased observa-
tions. As far as we know at this stage, it is impossible to distinguish our
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning Dimensions 59

perception of the world from our being in it, and this testifies de-
cidedly against that external, unequivocal order which we have
dreamed of and cherished since the time of Bacon (Jantsch, 1980;
Maturana, 1988a; Maturana & Varela, 1987; Olafson, 1988; Varela,
1979, 1984). If knowledge cannot be a reasonably faithful copy of an
order existing independently of it, we lose any possibility of evaluating
it according to criteria of objectivity valid in themselves. So it would
seem that the rationalist attitude of assuming the existence of standard
logical axioms on the basis of which one may evaluate the rationality
of any belief or attitude, independently of the whole functioning of
the subject exhibiting it, is part and parcel of this same atheoretical
and descriptive methodology.
A developmental approach to psychopathology centered on a
systems/process-oriented methodology should instead lead us to the
generation of a true science of personal meaning, that is, an approach
that not only takes into a-c count the multiplicity of levels of analysis
within a complex individual unit, but is also able to reconstruct the
whole array of reciprocal intercorrelations defining the coherence of
the functioning of the whole. In this light, for example, it would no
longer make much sense to talk of anxiety as a psychopathological
category as such, and thus unequivocal for all. Anxiety as such (like
other negative emotions of clinical interest) is part of a range of
emotional tonalities with which humans experience their world.
Within this same human experience, however, there exist different
patterns of meaning coherence, so the same emotional tonality may be
ordered and experienced in correspondingly different ways. Hence, a
phobic coherence will scaffold anxiety in terms of protection/constric-
tion, a depressive will do so in terms of losses, an eating disorders in
terms of disappointments, and, finally, an obsessive in terms of lack of
certainty.
Briefly, the methodological underpinnings of such a science of
meaning revolve around the following points:
Each individual unit is to be considered as a Personal Meaning
Organization ([Link].) whose ontological understanding viably
consists of "bringing-forth-a-world" capable of producing a quality of
self-perception ("I") recognizable as one's own self ("Me"). Each
[Link]. has its own. self-referent ordering logic-as viable and co-
herent as that of any other-which allows it to assimilate experience
in a manner consonant with its selfhood dynamics and the orthogene-
tic directionality deriving from it.
60 THEORETICAL PREMISES

Lifespan development should be regarded as an open process of

experience assimilation bringing about "punctuated" reorganizations
of personal meaning. On the other hand, it is quite evident that no
reorganization-not even if it brings about truly deep personal
growth-is completely painless, as it always requires a change in the
usual way of perceiving reality. This implies a triggering of intense
feelings that appear, at least at first, to be neither readily intelligible
nor easily controllable. Therefore, the [Link]. 's level of self-
awareness (i.e., to what extent the "Me" viably recognizes the "I")
exerts a crucial role in orienting an ongoing reorganization process
toward a direction of personal growth or toward one of existential
breakdown more or less intermingled with emotional disturbances. For
this reason the "symptoms" an individual system may -display at any
stage of its lifespan must be considered as fully fledged knowing
processes highlighting unsuccessful attempts to change, whose origin
goes back to a poor or nonviable level of awareness that prevents a
coherent assimilation of the personal experience produced thus far.
The essential tension inherent in selfhood dynamics underlies
the progressive unfolding of personal meaning as well as its punctuated
reorganizations, thereby constraining the generative directionality of
any individual lifespan. As a consequence, the causes of a "crisis" are
always within the [Link]. itself, and should therefore not be sought
in a supposed specificity of certain stressful life events, but rather in
the specific nature of personal meaning which determines the range of
events that are discrepant for one particular individual. On the other
hand, the critical role that a life event can play does not necessarily
imply that such meaning needs to be consciously processed, since
often what appears as a nonsense to the "Me" is in fact critical in the
experiencing "I." The relatively autonomous emergence of critical
feelings signaling an ongoing change in the "Me" appraisal of the "I" is
-made possible precisely by the proactive processes inherent in selfbood
dynamics.

Mental Disorders and Dimensions

of Systemic Coherence

As one might expect, an atheoretical and descriptive psy-

chopathology has profoundly influenced even basic notions regarding
mental health (i.e., normalcy) and mental disorders (i.e., neurosis
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning- Dimensions 61

and psychosis). In a nutshell, normalcy, neurosis, and psychosis have

always been considered static, fixed entities which function as filing
instruments for making an inventory of the descriptive features held to
be specific. Considering knowledge as a copy of external order, assimi-
lated in tum by a set of standard axioms (e.g., hedonistic motivation,
logic procedures, etc.), it became possible, on the basis of the degree
of correspondence to such a set, to define those descriptive features in
terms of specific knowledge contents (beliefs, emotions, attitudes, etc.)
identifying normal, neurotic, or psychotic behavior.
Now, the problem, as we know, is not so much that of evaluat-
ing how human beings keep to a presumed order independent of
themselves, but rather that of understanding which experiencing of
themselves accol!lpanies their constructing the coherent order with
which they coexist. Thus, rather than being identified with descrip-
tive features of knowledge content, normalcy, neurosis, and psychosis
are considered conceptual categories that refer to the organizations of
personal meaning ([Link].) which, making knowledge contents
coherent, are causally productive of those features. On the other
hand, the [Link]. outlined above should be considered as unitary
ordering processes whose coherence and continuity can be grasped
only in the specificity of the formal, structural properties of their
knowledge processing, rather than in the definite semantic aspects of
their knowledge contents. Hence, normalcy-which in accord with
Levine (1949) we hold to be "non-existent in a complete form, but
existing as relative and quantitative approximation"-rather than
being an entity identified with something considered "normal"
[Link]. or "normal" knowledge content, lies instead in the unfold-
ing of a dynamic process, that is, the flexibility, resilience, and
generativity with which a specific [Link]. develops its systemic
coherence throughout lifespan, and in the higher levels of organized
complexity and self-transcendence that it is consequently able to
achieve. In the same way, "psychotic" refers to a structural modality
of knowledge ordering whose coherence reduces flexibility and resil-
ience; a delusional attitude, for example, is not thus because its
thought content is not "close-to-reality," but rather because this
thought content (which of itself is also present in normalcy) is more
difficult to integrate with other contents, and thus less susceptible to
being transformed by the current experience.
In a systems/process-oriented methodology, therefore, normal-
cy, neurosis, and psychosis-rather than being seen as descriptive and
62 THEORETICAL PREMISES

static entities-should be regarded as dynamic and changeable process-

ing dimensions of a P.M. Org. 's systemic coherence, which appear to be
potentially reversible, as their borders are indistinct most of the time
(Marmor, 1983; Schwartz, 1987). Consequently, along the normalcy-
psychosis continuum, normalcy corresponds to the flexibility and
generativity with which a [Link]. articulates its fundamental ortho-
genetic directionality throughout lifespan. On the other hand, the
same [Link]., depending oh the quality and processing of de-
velopmental experiences, can evolve toward a "neurotic" dimension if
the concreteness-abstractness level of knowledge processing is in-
sufficiently articulated, or drift toward a "psychotic" dimension if, in
addition to the limit represented by too concrete processing, there is
also interference in the~self-synthesizing integrative ability which
provides functional unity to selfhood dynamics (Guidano, 1987). In
other words, neurosis and psychosis are nothing but different "lan-
guages"-matched by correspondingly different dimensions of im-
mediate experiencing and self-reflexive consciousness---that the same
pattern of meaning coherence can assume as a function of the in-
dividual's processing and integrating abilities (Figure 1). The assump-
tion that any pattern of meaning may be articulated along normal,
neurotic, or psychotic dimensions permits us to better understand the
nosographic categories that tum out to be confirmed (such as depres-
sion) and to lay down the basis for revising nosographic categories that
seem uncertain (such as schizophrenia).
As far as depression is concerned, its appearance as a defined

DIMENSIONS OF SYSTEMIC COHERENCE

NORMALCY NEUROSIS PSYCHOSIS

Flexibility < Flexibility < < Flexibility

Concreteness Qpnc,~~t!'l.f'!E!~~ Concreteness

abstraction. .. abstraction a6sir·actiori · · ·

Self-Integration Self-Integration Self-Integration

FIGURE 1
The Self-Organization of Personal Meaning- Dimensions 63

nosographic category derives exclusively from the fact that the de-
scriptive clinical features employed in its definition almost all belong
to the same pattern of personal meaning (helplessness/anger oscilla-
tions). Now, it is precisely depression which can demonstrate how the
same pattern of systemic coherence may be articulated along a con-
tinuum of processing dimensions. We need only think how the same
experience <l loss may be processed in a generative, creative way,
giving rise to professional, artistic, or simply human sensitivity which
- - -

is manifested in a high level of abstraction ("normal" dimension); or

to an interrupted chain of losses and grief reactions as if one had to
"concretely" face an inexorable destiny of exclusion ("neurotic" di-
mension); or, again, when transformations in the ordinary level of
self-consciqusness (i.e., "delusions" varying according to "negative"
[helplessness] or "positive" [anger] mood oscillations) become the
essential way of managing nonintegrable, too concrete experiences of
loss or anger ("psychotic" dimension). It will be seen, finally, that
such dimensions, being reversible and having rather indistinct bor-
ders, may overlap each other in a variety of ways along the same
individual lifespan.
Regarding schizophrenia, however, the heterogeneity of de-
scriptive clinical features used in the nosographic definitions has
always impeded the formulation of a unitary, etiopathogenic h ypoth-
esis which is reliable, so much so that its role as a nosographic category
in itself has even been called into question. This doubt becomes even
more consistent if different clinical observations made by longitudinal
studies in recent years are considered.
In the fiJst place, a significant proportion of schizophrenics have
only one episode from which they recover, and an even larger propor-
tion show a course of several episodes before final remission. Only a
small proportion reach chronicity, but evidence also shows that there
is considerable doubt whether much of the chronicity is indigenous to
schizophrenia; there is reason to believe that it may be an artifact
engendered by iatrogenic, ecogenic, and nosocomial factors (Zubin,
Steinhauer, Day, & van Kammen, 1985).
Secondly, various data show that a substantial continuity exists
between the structure of personality reconstructible before the episode
and that which is seen aft:er remission. After remission, moreover, an
emotional disorder of phobic, obsessive-compulsive, or other pre-
viously described types may appear, that is, a disorder not belonging in
64 THEORETICAL PREMISES

any way to the schizophrenic typology; this same disturbance existed

in a more or less intense, .but always reconstructible fashion, even
before the appearance of the episode (Ballerini & Rossi Monti, 1983).
It would thus seem legitimate to suppose that when we use the
term schizophrenia, we refer to the descriptive clinical features corre-
sponding to acute, critical episodes of nonintegrated self-processing,
episodes at which different patterns of personal meaning may arrive as
a function of the quality of their ongoing "I"/"Me" dynamics. As we
have seen, each [Link]. exhibits its own specific vulnerability in
being able to reach critical points of self-integration, whether under
the form of "wavering self'' (eating disorders), "dichotomous self''
(obsessive-compulsive), or "sensorial self'' (phobic).
4
Self--Boundaries and
Lifespan Development

The key feature underlying the autonomy of any [Link].

consists of the ability to transform into experience consistent with its
pattern of coherence (self-referent order) the randomness of per-
turbations coming both from the environment and from its own inner
oscillations (the so-called "order-from-noise" principle; Adan, 1981,
1984). The lifespan development of a P.M .Org. should therefore be
regarded as an open-ended, spiraling process, in which the continuous
reordering of selfhood dynamics brings about the discontinuous emer-
gence of more structured and integrated patterns of meaning coher-
ence. The self-regulating ability exhibited by a [Link]. in proceed-
ing along its orthogenetic directionality is expressed by that particular
dynamic equilibrium known as "order through fluctuations" (Brent,
1978; Dell & Goolishian, 1981; Prigogine, 1976); that is, con-
tinuous-both progressive and regressive~shifts of the point of equi-
librium in "l"/"Me" dynamics are the only way of maintaining the
coherence that scaffolds the continuity of one's experiencing, while at
the same time assimilating the perturbations that emerge from that
experiencing. In order to give a clearer picture of such a process, it will
help if we first take a look at the essential variables that regulate its
dynamics: the role of awareness in regulating and modulating challenging
perturbations, and the role of affectivity in triggering them.

AWARENESS AND SELF-REGULATION

In the discussion of self-boundary development (Chapter 2), we

indicated that awareness relates to the abstract-reflexive dimension
65
66 THEORETICAL PREMISES

through which immediate experiencing ("I") is self-referred in order to

be consistently reordered into the self-image currently appraised
("Me). From adolescence on, reflexive self-referring gradually be-
comes an essential regulator and modulator of "l"/"Me" dynamics, so
that any possible reorganization of self-boundary coherence during the
subsequent lifespan is constrained by concomitant shifts in the unfold-
ing of the abstract dimension of awareness. This is therefore a suitable
place to consider briefly the essential aspects underlying the dynamics
of such reflexive self-regulation before outlining the relationship be-
tween awareness and meaning coherence.

Awareness and Selfhqod Dynamics

Basically, awareness regulates the essential tension inherent in

selfhood dynamics, that is to say, the way in which the "Me" keeps up
with (reordering itself) the acting and experiencing "I" which is always
one step ahead of the current appraisal of the situation. Immediate
experiencing is constantly matched by an automatic scaffolding of
relevant information, which occurs independently from the selective
attention intentionally carried out by the conscious self. More specifi-
cally, the level and quality of emotional modulation raised by auto-
matic processes constrain the pathways of activation along which
immediate processing proceeds (Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1984; Posner
& Snyder, 1975). While attending to ongoing events, the recurrent
oscillation of the unitary network of nuclear scenes orders the flowing
of psychophysiological rhythms into feeling tonalities and emotional
experiences which are able to specify moment by moment the per-
ceived quality of one's being-in-the-world. Indeed, because of the
organizational unity of the emotional domain, the emotionality con-
nected with automatic processing-via spreading activation-is in-
variably matched by the implicit ordering in terms of personal mean-
ing, giving consistency and continuity in time to the immediate self
experienced moment by moment (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Dixon,
1981; Van den Berg & Eelen, 1984). We are thus dealing with a
specific apprehension of the world which tags incoming data with a
feeling of self-reference from which the data immediately acquire a
specific configuration in the subject's pre-existing personal experi-
ence. The activation of stored data, resulting from the attunement of
past experiences with current ones, is a retrieval carried out by means
Self-Boundarie.1 and Lifes/)an DevdoJ)ment 67

of an analogue pr<lcedure, similar to that described by Tulving (1972,

1983, 1985) with the term "episodic memory" (i.e., an emotional
memory mechanism which, through the retrieval of the perceptual
features and feeling tonalities with which the memories were ex-
perienced, brings forth an immediate reference to one's perceived
continuity). However, while the emotional modulation provided by
the experiencing "I" can exceed a certain threshold as it slips in and
out of the focus of consciousness, the effective possibilities of its being
appraised and recognized as one's conscious self ("Me") depend on
the abstract abilities of selrreferring which have so far been struc-
tured.
Any explicit reordering is a self-referent procedure aimed at
stabilizing the establi~hed patterns of immediate experience ("I") upon
which the perceived coherence of the conscious self ("Me") depends.
On the one hand, the ongoing tacit scaffolding constrains the set of
experiences allowed to proceed to the conscious level, and on the
other, the c0nsistency of explicit reordering results, primarily, from
perceiving this very set as stable and continuous in time. Thus, an
immediate experience is made understandable through a selective
appraisal of the sensory-affective-motor features already recognized as
its own by the current selr image. Self-conscious processes, in turn,
have an amplifying function on the perception of recognizable fea-
tures, while at the same time inhibiting the detection of other cues
(Cowan, 1988; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Spitzer, De Simone, &
Moran, 1988). Therefore, any explication of immediate experiencing
corresponds to a construction from the point of view of the "Me" that
is carrying it out, and is consequently aimed at confirming the current
appraisal of the world rather than at -exploring the experiencing "I."
Thus, the restructuring of episodic into semantic memory (Tulving,
1972, 1985) involves abstracting from a perceptual-emotional storage
(e.g., the experience of anger) expectations and thought procedures
to the perceived experience consistent with the sense of personal
continuity (e.g., having cognitions about one's own experiencing of
anger in keeping with the selected self-image).
More specifically, through the abstract self-referring that char~
acterizes the "Me"-appraisal-of-the"I," the ongoing psychophysiolog-
ical modulation is reordered into sequences of conscious emotional
states, that is to say, into affective experiences able to support
and further specify one's perceived uniqueness. The self-attribu-
tion of analogue/emotional processing is carried out through a set of
68 THEORETICAL PREMISES

specific semantic dimensions (Lang, 1984; Schwartz & Trabasso,

1984), which can be summarized as follows:

1. Valence, or polarity, accounts for a majority of the variance

in affective reports and involves locating perceived feelings
within the pleasure-displeasure continuum. AB a basic and
immediate distinguishable property of affective arousal, it
concerns mainly an appraisal of the intensity with which the
"Me" is affected by the experiencing "I," and is consequently
reflected by oscillations in approach-avoidance dispositions.
2. The pattern and the directness of the arousal, as a further
elaboration, affect the appraisal of the quality of the ex,
perienced affect;• allowing a discrimination of the emotional
content (i.e., imagery/memory modulation) as well as a
patterning of psychophysiological responses (i.e., bodily
sensations and motor activity).
3. As a final step, the self-other reference distinction specifies
whether the experienced affect is perceived as "internally
bound" and recognized as belonging to one's own self, or as
"externally bound" and attributed to other causes than the
self, such as the environment or the body itself. In general,
internal reference brings about a control of emotion through
understanding, thus facilitating further articulations in ab,
stract self,referring. External attribution, however, gives rise
to control of emotions based on their exclusion, and is
matched by a sense of being at the mercy of unpredictable
events and impulses which adversely affects self,analytical
abilities.

It is relevant to notice how cues for decoding valence and

directedness derive directly from the emotional modulation carried
out by the experiencing "I," while cues for self-other reference mainly
derive from the patterns of coherence enacted by the "Me." Given
that immediate experience and its conscious appraisal are matched by
different dimensions of knowing processes (i.e., ordering and reorder,
ing levels), feelings can exist in consciousness independently of cogni,
tion (Izard, 1977; Zajonc, 1984; Zajonc & Markus, 1984). In the
absence of cognitive decoding, however, their motor and autonomic
activation tends to be directly realized through somatic or motor
manifestations of emotion. These are likely to be experienced as fairly
Self-Boundaries and Lifespan Development 69

uncontrollable floating states overflowing one's usual range of recog-

nizable emotions. As a consequence, an experienced affect will be
perceived as an externally bound perturbation to the extent to which
it does not fit with the range of decodability allowed by current
patterns of coherence.
Therefore, as a multilevel and mulidirectional process, con-
tinuous self-reordering is inherently characterized, moment by mo-
ment, by a series of possible "I" /"Me" discrepancies, that is, perceived
gaps between immediate experience and self-consciousness that chal-
lellge ongoing patterns of self-control. The perturbing experience of
overflowing one's usual range of recognizable emotions is generally
kept within acceptable limits by a dynamic equilibrium in which
conscious attention selectively amplifies the current self-image, while
at the same time inhibiting potential discrepancies from rising into
active awareness. As studies on self-encoding processes have by now
shown, when reordering immediate experience, people have [Link]
unlimited access to past and current data they intend to look for, and
people themselves set the limits of the research (Bower & Gilligan,
1979; Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Mancuso & Ceely, 1980; Markus,
1977).

Awareness and Meaning Coherence

In strictly ontological terms, being aware of oneself means

reaching an explanation for the ongoing experience of being a unique,
irreducible and, often, unpredictable "I." As Nagel (1979) has pointed
out: "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is
something that it is like to be that organism-something it is like for
the organism" (p. 166). This means that immediate experiencing is
the "given" epistemic level that constrains any attempt at self-
explanation and on which any attained self-explanation depends.
Gadamer (1979) highlights this clearly and elegantly:

Long before we understand ourselves through the process of self-

examination, we understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the
family, society and state in which we live. The focus of subjectivity is a
distorting mirror. The self-awareness of the individual is only a flicker-
ing in the closed circuits of historical life. That is why prejudices of the
individual, far more than his judgements, constitute the historical
reality of his being. (p. 245)
70 THEORETICAL PREMISES

Hence, more than being an. image of oneself objectively seen

from outside, awareness is a reflexive process for self-referring im-
mediate experience ("I") which, through a continuous allocation of
attention and intention, aims at amplifying consistent aspects of the
perceived "Me," while inhibiting discrepant ones. Little wonder,
then, if from the external point of view of an "objective reality,"
verbal reports appear umeliable as valid descriptions of people's im-
m~diate experience (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As a matter of fact,
their function is to provide explanations of one's experiencing viable
for the internal viewpoint of one's sense of continuity. Therefore,
rather than more or less reliable "snapshots" of internal states, con-
scious self-reports should be regarded as procedures for making them
consistent with the current self-image, on the basis both of the specific
pattern of internal coherence and of the level of abstractness and
flexibility with which it is carried out (Ketterer, 1985; Miller, 1981;
White, 1980, 1988).
Furthermore, the essential tension inherent in selfhood dynam-
ics, allowing one to experience more than one perceives and to
perceive more than one attends to, makes it possible that in any
situation we are all in a position to experience much more than that
which would be required at that moment to maintain our own con-
sistency in that situation. As a consequence, the ability to manipulate
immediate experiencing while self-referring and reordering it becomes
essential, done in such a way as to impede the arising into conscious-
ness of irrelevant data, or of data that contrast with the selected
appraisal of the situation currently underway. Finally, if we consider
how, from its very first emergence, reflexive self-referring entails the
capacity for conscious deception, it will be seen that no self-awareness
will be viable without adequate self-deception. Excessive self-decep-
tion raises the undecodability of immediate experiencing to critical
levels of uncontrollability, while reduced self-deception increases self-
referring processes out of all proportion, easily reaching levels of
complexity in selfhood dynamics which would be difficult to manage.
Hence, any [Link]., while being characterized by critical emotive
tonalities in immediate experiencing, is also endowed with specific
self-deceiving procedures designed to manipulate their decoding so it
is consistent with the quality of awareness allowed by its level of
abstractness and flexibility. Through such procedures, critical feelings
can be appraised and made intelligible without calling into question
the self-image acceptability so far structured (see Chapter 3, "I"/"Me"
dynamics in P .[Link].).
[Link] and Ufc.1J1an Devcloprn.:nt 71

Moreover, in the dynamic equilibrium between the ongoingness

of immediate experiencing and current patterns of awareness, the
regulating role played by self-deceiving procedures is twofold: while
aiming at preserving the current equilibrium, they also, at the same
time, create the conditions for the emergence of "I"/"Me" discrepan-
cies, assimilation of which entails shifts of the point of equilibrium in
the direction of either a progressive or regressive personal reordering,
according to the level of abstractness and flexibility of awareness. In
regressive reorderings, the challenging of current self-control is always
matched by remarkable levels of overemotionality and personal imbal-
ance which often take on all the characteristics of cognitive dysfunc-
tions and emotional disorders usually exhibited by clinical syndromes;
the greater ~the undecodability of the "l"/"Me" discrepancy emerging,
the more intense will be the "splitting" experienced between one's
thoughts and feelings (Guidano, 1987). On the one hand, conscious
explicit processing will be more and more focused to maintain to the
utmost the current self-image through the elaboration of cognitions
and behavior that deny the discrepant feelings, which come to be
perceived as something extraneous to the self. On the other hand,
lacking a proper cognitive mediation, the motor, autonomic, and
affective setting that accompanies the ongoing activation of dis-
crepant, uncontrollable feelings tends to be directly actualized; the
activation meets no delays on the road to its terminus: emotional
outbursts, somatic disturbances, and stereotyped behavior.

LOVE AND AFFECTIVE STYLE

AS ATTACHMENT PROCESSES

As the "cognitive revolution" takes place in adolescence and

youth, attachment, although shifting toward a more abstract level,
maintains its fundamental interdependence with selfhood dynamics
and personal meaning. While attachment to significant others is
central to the differentiation of self-boundaries throughout matura-
tional stages, during adulthood, new patterns of attachment emerge
(e.g., intimate love relationships) which acquire the self-referent
function of confirming, supporting, and further expanding the pattern
of personal meaning coherence which has so far been structured. It
follows naturally that the influence of early attachments is now seen in
the style of attachment, which, having begun in early models, has
continued to differentiate along the entire developmental pathway
(Bretherton, 1985).
72 THEORETICAL PREMISES

Disregarding for the moment the different forms that it can

take, the continuity of attachment during lifespan is understandable if
we consider that the involvement with affective relationships per-
ceived as unique begins early in life, and adult bonds of love seem to
grow out of those very first attachments (Hazan & Shaver, 1987;
Marris, 1982; Shaver, Hazan, & Bradshaw, 1988; Weiss, 1982). Just
as the uniqueness of primary bonds seems to be a necessary requisite
for perceiving-a-world and recognizing one's being-in-it, so in adult-
hood, even though at a different level of abstraction, building a
unique relationship with a significant other is an important way in
which one may perceive a consistent sense of uniqueness in his or her
being-in-the-world. Hence, if working models of attachment figures
are interdependent with ongoing patterns of self-perception, it is clear
that any perceived modification of these models is matched by intense
perturbations in immediate experiencing; these perturbations can trig-
ger the emergence of "1"/"Me" discrepancies, which in turn challenge
the current appraisal of the self. In point of fact, the importance of a
balanced interplay of the individual's network of unique relationships
during lifespan is currently supported by evidence from various
sources. Firstly, life-events research has shown that the most disrupt-
ing emotions a person can ever experience in life are those triggered in
the course of establishing, maintaining, and breaking such rela-
tionships (Bowlby, 1977; Brown, 1982; Hafner, 1986; Henderson,
1982; Henderson, Byrne, & Duncan-Jones, 1981). Secondly, recent
epidemiological evidence has shown how the "social network index"
should be regarded as a significant predictor of health, since social and
affective isolation is a major risk factor for morbidity and mortality
(House, Landis, & Umberson, 1988).
These data make the intersubjective nature of human experi-
ence even more evident, and therefore a closer analysis of the in-
terdependence between attachment and selfhood processes is war-
ranted.

Attachment, Perceived Uniqueness,

and Selfhood Dynamics

The intersubjectivity inherent in attachment systems unfolds

through a basic self-referent process articulated along different levels
of abstraction and processing abilities according to the developmental
Self-Bourularies and Lifespan Development 73

phases of the individual lifespan. Thus, in the earliest periods the

internalization of an attachment figure through emotional identifica-
tion is matched by an intermodal patterning of sensory-motor-
affective modules into a unitary configuration which brings forth a
specific sense of self and the world. In the same way, the more abstract
construction of attachment figures resulting from adult love rela-
tionships is paralleled by a reordering of immediate experience that is
perceived in a variety of ways according to the specific selfhood
dynamics inherent in the individual. In this sense, adult bonding
corresponds to the sc:affolding of a synchrony between psychophysio-
logical rhythms of both members of the pair, matched by a behavioral
meshing of their interactional patterns (Field, 1985; Field & Reite,
1985; Hinde, 1979; Kelley et al., 1983). Through the selective emo-
tional modulation that they can provide, intersubjective reciprocal
attunements work as basic regulators of selfhood dynamics, allowing
the uMe" to recognize the perceived uniqueness of the experienced "I"
as consistent in time. This regulatory role, together with the sensory,
motor, and temporal patterning of actual interactions, also includes
the whole stream of significant interpersonal experiences, and, there-
fore, past close relationships. Attributes extracted from past attach-
ment figures trigger memories intermingled with expectancies that
involve the activation of sensory-motor-affective patterns, thus bring-
ing about specific qualities of self-perception.
Hence, as Hofer (1984) notes, independent selfregulation does
not exist in adulthood or in childhood, and intersubjectivity is con-
strained by a basic self-referent ordering through which the construc-
tion of a significant other's image comes to be correlated to a percep-
tion of self. On the other hand, only by considering the image of the
other, not so much as a mere "cognitive representation," but rather as
an intermodal coordination of sensory-motor-affective modules, does
it become understandable how the presence of, or physical contact
with, another person can modulate human cardiovascular activity and
reactivity in general and, particularly, in stressful situations (House,
Landis, & Umberson, 1988; Melnechuk, 1988; Panksepp, Siviy, &
NormanseU, 1985).
In other words, assuming a systems/process-oriented methodolo-
gy, attachment can n o longer be considered a mere structural device
for the maintaining of proximity and contact with a significant figure,
as is usually the case in descriptive methodologies based on empiricist
principles of parsimony (Trevarthen, 1980, 1984). Within an onto-
74 THEORETICAL PREMISES

logical perspective trying to explain how a human being comes to

experience a unique and specific sense of individuality, attachment
becomes the self-referential system that preeminently underlies the
development and maintenance of selfhood dynamics. That is, the
unfolding ability to take others' perspectives on oneself is paralleled by
the progressive ability to reorder immediate experience ("I") in such a
way as to make it recognizable and understandable in terms of one's
own self ("Me").
Furthermore, within the intersubjective dimension inherent in
human experience, the perceived uniqueness of one's being-a-person
lies in the dynamic intersection of a multilevel and oscillative process.
No human being can perceive a sense of self independently of empath-
ic attunement with significant others' consciousness of him- or herself;
at the same time, this ·sense of self results from an active differentia-
tion between one's felt subjectivity and the perceived objectivity of
others' perspective.
. . . the unity of the person, which is constructed by way of in-
tersubjectively recognized self-identification (analyzed by G. H.
Mead) is based on belonging to , and demarcating oneself from, the
symbolic reality of a group, and on the possibility of locating oneself in
it. (Habermas, 1979, p. 109)

Finally, during lifespan development, the unfolding of the op-

ponent regulative dynamics between "belonging to" and "demarcating
from" takes on the form of an endless process of negotiating mutual
consensus and acceptance; that is, at any moment, people engaged in
an interpersonal context must act in such a way as to enable the
differentiating-oneself-from-others to be recognized by those others.
Gadamer emphasizes this aspect with accustomed lucidity, pointing
out that
the inner historicality of all the relations in the lives of men consists in
the fact that there is a constant struggle for mutual recognition. This
can have very varied degrees of tension, to the point of the complete
domination of one person by the other; but even the most extreme
forms of mastery and slavery are a genuine dialectical relationship.
(1979, p. 323)

Bonding and Separation in Adulthood

In an ontological perspective, therefore, the crucial feature of
an affective, close relationship reciprocally consists of a self-referent
Self-Boundaries and Lifespan Dcvdo/Jment 75

construction of an image of the significant other which can stabilize

and, if need be, further develop the selfhood dynamics thus far struc-
ttired. More specifically, the physiological linkage with the other's
rhythms brings about a quality of immediate experiencing ("I") more
specifically perceived as one's "real" self ("Me"). Thus, the course of a
relationship is more closely linked to perceptions of the other than to
actual characteristics of the other (Scernber & Barnes, 1985), so that
in the process of bonding to somebody, one does not choose a person
so much as the mode of experiencing oneself with that person. Let us
briefly look at the essential variables which regulate a complex and
dynamic process of this nature.
First of all, the quality of the other's constructed image is closely
correlated to the pattern o(personal meaning. Hence, in a depressive
meaning, the other's image is always correlated to the sense of loneli-
ness and exclusion from the interpersonal world either in a positive
(redemption from a destiny of loneliness) or negative (confirmation of
such a destiny) way. In phobic meaning, the need to he relieved from
the fear of living in a dangerous world constrains any possible percep-
tion of an attachment figure, with the possibility of triggering a
positive (protection without any perceived limit to one's need for
freedom) or negative (perceived threats of losing protection and/or
freedom and independence) immediate experiencing. In eating dis-
orders, the image of an affective partner is perceived in terms of one's
own consciousness, giving rise to the possibility of decreasing (the
other's approvals perceived as absolutely noncontingent) or increas-
ing ( the other's perception as intruding and/or disconfirming) one's
blurred and wavering immediate experience. And lastly, in the obses-
sive dimension, the need to unify and stabilize a dichotomous -experi-
encing into a certain identity brings about two opposite possibilities
that shift from one to the other in an "all-or-nothing" way; that is,
either the perceived other confirms the certainty of having total
control, or he or she is [Link] as the only possibility for relieving
one's distressing sense of uncontrollability.
Secondly, the development of the immediate experience, de-
rived from the type of image that has been constructed, depends on
the de[Vee and quality of [Link] reciprocity in the affective relation-
ship.
fu far as the degree is concerned, it is now elem that the
perceived closeness of an attachment figure is highly correlated to the
intensity of emotional interdependence experienced in the relation-
76 THEORETICAL PREMISES

ship (Berscheid, 1983; Berscheid, Gangestad, & Kulakowski, 1984;

Kelley et al., 1983). Thus, the degree of closeness becomes a good
predictor of emotional reactions if the relationship dissolves, and here
also is a .clue for understanding how even intensely negative rela,
tionships produce a level of physiological linkage and interrelatedness
that can trigger intense grief reactions during the process of separation
(Clark & Reis, 1988; Levenson & Gottman, 1983).
The quality of emotive reciprocity depends on the type of nego,
tiation for mutual recognition which has been set up in the relation,
ship.
From one point of view, in order to realize the possibility of an
effective negotiation, the partner must in some way be perceived in
one's own "range," so that negative emotions are invariably triggered
if the perceived esteem for the partner is either too high or too low
(Tesser, 1987). As was noted more than three centuries ago by La
Rochefoucauld (1678/1959), "it is difficult to love people that we do
not esteem, but it is no less difficult to love those whom we esteem
much more than ourselves." From another point of view, the critical
variable is the type of response perceived in the opposite party to one's
affective style, which is to say, to the set of strategies marshaled to
obtain recognition and confirmation of one's selfhood dynamics.
To each pattern of personal meaning there corresponds, more,
over, a specific affective style. Thus, a depressive style will try to
obtain an unconditional acceptance of one's perceived unlovableness
through the rhythmic oscillation between emotional detachment and
compulsive caregiving. An eating disorders style will seek a supportive
intimacy that demands minimal sel£,exposure through a whole reper,
toire of "tests and retests" for the partner. Lastly, a style centered on
an effective control over all aspects of the relationship will be the
preferred strategy both in phobic (where overcontrolling the partner
supplies the indispensable "protective" base while confirming one's
need for freedom) and in obsessive style {where being in the "one,up"
role coincides with proposing oneself as the indisputable holder of
absolute certainties and truths).
It is clear that, within a continually tranforming long,lasting
relationship, each of these styles is able to produce a wide range of
both recognitions and disconfirmations of one's selfhood dynamics.
We do feel, however, that it is important to emphasize how a specific
affective style is able to produce, in the same relationship, both an
emotional reciprocity experientiable as a secure attachment, and a
Self-Boundaries and Lifespan Development 77

reciprocal conflictuality confirming the supposed impossibility of

attaining the desired security. In other words, in the lifespan unfold-
ing of personal meaning, an attachment style functions as a ''boun-
dary-maintaining system" which is able to produce in any phase of an
ongoing relationship a quality of immediate experience in keeping
with the continuity of one's perceived coherence.
In considering relationship dissolution, we shall distinguish, for
simplicity's sake, two aspects which are in reality closely intertwined
and so somewhat indistinguishable: the nature and dynamics of sepa-
ration and the distressing emotional reaction (grieving) connected
with it.
Regarding the nature of separation, it is important to note that, as
with any other lifespan structure, affective ties follow an orthogenetic
directionality progressively differentiating through developmental
changes from a state of undifferentiated globality to more integrated
levels of structural order and hierarchical organization. As we would
intuitively expect, the initial dimension of a relationship is relatively
global and undifferentiated, insofar as it coincides with the immediate
aspects of the emotional involvement (attraction, selrdisclosure, sexual
agreement/harmony/caring, etc.) which plays a role in the reciprocal
selection. As the relationship proceeds, however, these same aspects,
giving rise to a new intersubjective context (marriage, childbirth, choices
in career and work, reorganization of the social network, etc.), develop
into more articulated dimensions of emotional interdependence (in-
timacy, reciprocal commitment, etc.) that acquire more and more the
function of validating the sense of self of each dyad member.
Hence, relationship development progressively becomes a mul-
tilevel and multidirectional process, in which emergent dimensions of
exchanges, acquiring . their own orthogenetic course, will operate at
different levels of the same relationship, requiring for their function-
ing. a continuous process of hierarchical integration. Given that pro-
gress in hierarchical organization is seldom smooth, flexibility in
integrating emergent emotional dimensions and new attribute do-
mains is matched by oscillations in the quality of emotional in-
terdependence (ups and downs in perceived involvement) as well as
variability in reciprocal attitudes (shifting between affection and
hostility). These recurrent oscillations in themselves do not reveal
regressive aspects foreboding dissolution, in that they are simply phe-
nomenal indicators of the continuous reordering taking place within a
complex and changing system such as an affective relationship (Ler-
78 THEORETICAL PREMISES

ner, 1984). More specifically, it is the presence of minimal {low

flexibility) or maximal (high instability) oscillations that positively
correlates to. the termination of a relationship.

A relationship might survive one or even a few minimally or maximal-

ly oscillating dimensions--especially at early levels of relationship
development, when fewer dimensions exist and when they are rela-
tively more global (i.e. , behaviorally more stereotyped) and hence less
variable; but no relationship could be expected to survive when most
dimensions, especially key ones, exhibit relatively minimal or maximal
variability. If this should happen, the relationship would dissolve and,
in a sense, return to a state analogous to its initial one. It will exist in a
global state of no-longer-existing. In a sense, all relationships develop
towards this end, as when the death of a dyad member occurs. (Lerner,
1984, p. 133)

The notion that relationships do not have endless duration and

the probabilities of dissolution are "internal" (i.e., directly correlated
to the flexibility with which a dyad reorders its own experience) gives
us a better appreciation of the dynamics of separation.
First of all, it is clear that the reasons for the break-up of a
relationship are not so much due to the supposed specificity of particu-
lar life events . as to the dyad's available capacity for integrating
challenging perturbations into generative dimensions. The develop-
ment of a conjugal crisis will thus be even more unpredictable if
evaluated solely as a function of the event that triggered it, given that
a major unbalance may lead both to an irreversible breakdown and to
a greater involvement in the generation of new commitments.
S~condly, rather than considering separation as merely a more
or less distressing event, it should be regarded as a complex and
multidirectional process that unfolds and takes on form through time
(Duck, 1982; Lee, 1984). More specifically, the unfolding of an
oscillatory process between approach and avoidance patterns, whose
recurrence becomes more and more repetitive and stereotyped, seems
to be characteristic of any affective separation, so it is found both
in the termination stage of adult love relationships (Baxter, 1984)
and in the course of the "physiological" adolescent-parental sepa-
ration (Bloom, 1980). The intensity and duration of such an os-
cillatory process is directly correlated to the degree of emotional
interdependence structured so far, to the point where one not
infrequently observes that in many close relationships the process of
Sdf- BournLiric.s and Life_11Jan DevdulJment 79

separation ends up becoming the quantitatively most important phase

of the whole relationship.
The duration of the separation process is related to the extent of
the distressing grief that accompanies it. The term "grief' refers to the
psychophysiological processes triggered hy the experience of privation
of a loved person, processes which reveal a reciprocal interconnection
between the perception of loss and feelings of helplessness, sadness,
and anger. Widespread among human and nonhuman primates
(Rosenblum & Paully, 1987; Suomi, 1984), this interconnection rests
on genetically wired apprehensional schemata in which loss represents
the adaptive knowing dimension for scaffolding basic feelings (help-
lessness, anger, etc.) into specific emotional modulations which,
increasing group cohesion, become viable for survival. This is not the
place for an in-depth discussion of the data available on bereavement
and grieving; however, it is evident from them that grieving is a
process that unfolds in time through a sequence of stages (e.g.,
roughly, accepting and experiencing loss and, subsequently, reorder-
ing one's self-image in order to reinvest in other relationships; Bowl-
by, 1980; Parkes, 1972, 1982; Parkes & Weiss, 1983; Worden, 1982;
Zisook, 1988). I shall confine myself to some considerations which
will allow th.e further development of the ontological perspective
which has been carried forward to this point.
If in bonding one chooses not so much the person as the way of
experiencing oneself in relating to him or her, so in grieving what is
experienced as lost is just this specific way of feeling rather than the
"objective" absence of the person.
Given that the constructed image of an attachment figure reg-
ulates ongoing patterns of self-perception through intermodal coor-
dinations of sensory-motor-affective modules, the crucial variable un-
derlying any experience of being deprived of a loved one seems to he a
rather abrupt change perceived in this image. Grieving, in tum,
corresponds to a specific "I"/"Me'' discrepancy, in which the ex-
perienced interruption of one's ongoing sense of self is matched hy a
distressing psychophysiological modulation. Evidence of the internal
desynchronization and deregulation of psychophysiological rhythms in
experiencing the interruption of a significant relationship supports the
notion that the withdrawal of a previous regulation supplied by the
attachment figure is at the base of the perceived alteration in es-
tablished patterns of self-perception (Hofer, 1984; McGuire & Troisi,
1987). Moreover, if the "1"/"Me" discrepancy that results from
80 THEORETICAL PREMJSES

grieving is centered on the perceived disintegration of one's continu-

ity, it will be seen that subsequent attempts to restore continuity
progressively lead to a complex process of personal reorganization
which may develop progressively or regressively.
As the desynchronization between the image of the other and
self-boundary regulation is at the core of both the experience of
bereavement and the process of separation, there is a substantial
continuity between the different grief reactions, no matter whether
triggered by physical or affective losses. These two situations are
nonetheless profoundly different as to the structure of the perceived
change in the attachment figure: with death one loses physical and
emotional contact but preserves the positivized image intact; in the
case of an affective failure, it is precisely the image of the other that
changes radically, usually negatively, while physical and emotional
contact is usually maintained, owing to a variety of circumstances
( children, work, common social network, etc.). The impression that
one has from this, at least at a psychotherapeutic level, is that the loss
of the image of the other without loss of contact is able to trigger
grieving tonalities, less acute than bereavement, but far more
ambiguous and ambivalent and which need more time to be com-
pletely processed and assimilated. The need to recover a "valuable"
social role as soon as possible after a marriage dissolution, combined
with the preceding difficulties in decoding immediate experience, all
go to favor the establishment of grieving processes which are much
more varied, or anomalous, than those met with in true mourning.
Hence, the lesser emotional intensity when compared with bereave-
ment favors the appearance of chronic grief reactions, as in those
cases, for example, where the depressive state and social isolation
following a divorce never come to a satisfactory conclusion. Under
other circumstances, the emotional · reaction is minimal during
the process of separation and the grief appears to be delayed or post-
poned, with the tendency for recent losses, even minimal, to re-
activate grieving for a loss sustained earlier (Bowlby, 1980). Lastly,
people sometimes do not even minimally recognize that the difficul-
ties being experienced are related to the loss that has occurred, and
the grief reactions are masked as a result, and may thus take on the
most diverse forms, ranging from clear-cut clinical disorders (e.g.,
phobic, obsessive imbalances) to maladaptive psychosomatic re-
activity.
In light of these considerations, it should be clear that the
Self-Bouruwries and Lifespan Development 81

essential procedure underlying any attempt to avoid grieving by negat-

ing the loss involves the struggle to keep intact the image of the other
which has been structured up to this point. Basically, this procedure
works as a self-referent process in which the perceived unchangeability
of the other's image allows the subject to maintain his or her own
self-image. However, even though this is not in itself an anomalous
process, the difficulty of modifying the partner's image plays a signifi-
cant role both in the process of separation and in the grieving that sets
in after the separation. Regarding the separation process, the contin-
ual oscillations between approach and avoidance would seem to reflect
such a difficulty, as if there had been a change of mind immediately
after perceiving the other as different from what one had thought.
Furthermore, it seems equally clear that these same stereotyped oscil-
lations progressively and reciprocally erode the reliability perceived in
the other's image, thus making the progressive emotional detachment
irreversible.
Once the separation has taken place, however, the lower emo-
tional intensity in comparison with true bereavement, together with
the compelling need to recover a consistent social role, concur to
divert attention from further processing of the grief experience, so that
both the other's image and one's own sense of self relating to him or
her are scarcely modified. In this way, the unfolding of anomalous
grief reactions appears to be closely correlated to the presence of
affective-memory mechanisms focused on the immediate experiences
which occurred in the relationship, on its dissolution, and on subse-
quent meetings. As Harvey, Flanary, and Morgan (1986) showed, the
more depressed people were after a separation, the more vivid and
"flashbulb-like" their memories were, suggesting that relating to the
partner was still intensely charged with emotions.
Consequently, reorganizing one's sense of continuity following a
separation depends, to a large extent, on the flexibility and generativ-
ity with which the subject is able to change the appraisal of the
relationship, as well as the emotional reciprocity enacted in it. In
proportion to the delay and/or reduction in such transformations,
anomalous grief reactions tend to persist indefinitely in time, becom-
ing the habitual ingredients of immediate experience and giving rise to
maladaptive emotional attitudes, for example, perceived inability to
reinvest in other affective relationships, provocative behavior appear-
ing as soon as positive engagement is established, compulsive search-
ing for impossible partners.
82 THEORETICAL PREMISES

ADULTHOOD AND MEANING COHERENCE

The empiricist outlook regards the trend of an individual life-

span after maturational stages as a sort of "plateau," as if adulthood
consisted virtually of nothing more than maintaining indefinitely the
optimal equilibrium that is thought to be attained by the end of the
maturational period. This homeostatic perspective excludes any ·gen-
erative progression in lifespan, reducing adult development to a pas-
sive and cumulative process of data remodeling, regulated in any
moment by contingency relationships established with the environ-
ment. If adulthood is a cumulation deprived of any generative role,
then infancy, being at the very beginning of the cumulative process, •
logically becomes the only determining period of the entire life cycle.
This assumption of the primacy of early years is tacitly or explicitly
endorsed by most contemporary Western psychologies.
Rather than an "end product" or an "uninterrupted state,"
however, adulthood is an open-ended process of experience assimila-
tion continuously shifting-either progressively or regressively-the
attained point of equilibrium along the orthogenetic directionality of
increasing its structural order and complexity (Baltes, 1979; Brent,
1978, 1984; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981; Werner, 1957). Impor-
tant changes in immediate experiencing and meaning coherence fol-
low one upon the other throughout adulthood and aging, as the
ever-growing array of nuclear scripts is continually transformed by new
experiences so new levels of abstract self-referring matched by conse-
quent new articulations in selfhood dynamics can be attained. There-
fore, no specific moment of a lifespan can be identified as the one in
which an ultimate, exhaustive understanding is achieved, nor is there
any indication, within the individual's orthogenetic directionality, of
the existence of a "right" or "optimal" equilibrium, or indeed of
anything suggesting that an ultimate stage of maturity has been
reached. As Gadamer (1979) puts it: "To exist historically means that
knowledge of oneself can never be complete" (p. 269).
On the other hand, the orthogenetic progression, through
which higher levels of internal complexity are attained while preserv-
ing one's sameness, implies that any developmental change involves a
reordering of processes triggering discontinuity ( the emergence of
"l"/"Me" discrepancies) by processes preposed to restore continuity
(self-awareness integrative abilities). Thus, any lifespan directionality
unfolds through an essential tension between constancy and mutabil-
Self-Boundaries and LifesJ1an Development 83

ity, so that any developmental transformation always coincides with

the emergence of a new dynamic equilibrium between the processes of
maintenance and change.
Let us therefore briefly look at how the issues of continuity and
change interplay and overlap within the main dimensions that regu-
late meaning coherence throughout adulthood.

Orthogenetic Directionality and Core

Affective Themes

The unfolding of meaning coherence during lifespan develop-

ment relies on the organizational unity of the individual's emotional
domain. On the one hand, the rhythmic oscillation between core
affective polarities scaffolds immediate experiencing along the same,
continuous apprehensional dimensions; on the other, the endless
process of self-referring and reordering the perceived continuity of
immediate experience provides focus and direction in organizing
thoughts, emotions, and actions along dimensions of self-awareness
compatible with available levels of abstract processing.
Thus, the core affective theme maintains its prominence and
continuity in the ideational themes (beliefs, philosophical axioms,
self-conceptions, etc. ) which follow one. another during the whole
course of adult life (Haviland, 1984; Malatesta & Clayton Culver,
1984; Stewart & Healy, 1984). However, ideational themes undergo a
continuous process of change involving abstract differentiation and
integration regulated by logical rules of transformation, while affective
themes appear much more constant in time and seem to be pretty
much unaffected by logical procedures in their rate and mechanism of
change. In the first place, the articulation of affective themes from
childhood and adolescent thematic contents takes place through an
increasing number of relevant scenes made consistent through an-
alogical rules of derivation and metaphorical projection whose spa-
tiotemporal unfolding differs from the sequential linearity exhibited by
thought processes. Secondly, any change in the affective theme is a
result of the emergence of new emotional experiences which facilitate
further articulations and transformations of immediate experiencing
by adding new feeling tonalities and image schemata to the unitary
configuration of core affective polarities.
Thus the basic procedure underlying lifespan directionality
 84 THEORETICAL PREMISES

seems to be the process of making the tacit explicit, whereby the ,

ongoingness of immediate experiencing is constructively self-referred
along the dimensions of semantic understanding (Guidano, 1987).
Since the assimilation of emergent emotional tonalities facilitates the
further articulation of immediate experiencing, the process of making
the tacit explicit entails the structuring of self-maintained positive
feedback leading to levels of even more complex and integrated
symbolic-abstract processing. Consequently, the systemic coherence
relating to each specific [Link]. constrains a preferential direction
to its orthogenetic progression, in which the ascending toward higher
abstract levels is matched by a progressive disengagement from the
immediacy of one's experiencing of self. It is thus possible to broadly
trace what might <be the normative positive progression (i.e., that
which coincides with a truly personal growth) for each of the
[Link]. described in the previous chapter.
For a depressive meaning, the progressive directionality should
be identified with a continuous differentiation and integration of the
loss theme, until it is perceived as a category of human experience
rather than as a personal destiny of loneliness and misery; the norma-
tive progression of eating disorder organization should lead to an
ever-growing sense of one's uniqueness and individuality based on
"internal criteria" rather than deriving it from the perceived attitudes
of significant others; finally, in both phobic and obsessive meanings,
the positive progression should lead (by way of totally different pat-
terns and processes) to a growing sense of one's personal worth based
on the progressive acknowledgment and appreciation of one's emo-
tional domain and, consequently, to an increased ability to experience
and understand, with minimal distress, the complexity and ambiguity
inherent in the human interpersonal domain.
Needless to say, these directionalities represent "ideal" trajecto-
ries of adulthood that may be subject, at any time, to distortions and
regressive shifts, and are always extremely variable from one person to
. another. They should therefore be regarded in the same way as one
would identify an ideal or normative progression in maturational
stages despite the wide range of normal or pathogenic developmental
pathways that it can generate.

Reorganization of Meaning Coherence

The lifespan orthogenetic progression of any [Link]. does not

have a linear course; quite the contrary, it is a somewhat unpredict-
Self-BounJaries and Lifes/1an Development 85

able process that unfolds through critical, discontinuous emergings.

Because of such critical increases in internal complexity, a [Link].
maintains its continuity only by shifting the current pattern of coher-
ence toward a further articulation that implies a more or less thorough
reorganization of its experiential order. Unlike maturational stages,
the course of which is more linear and uniform, development in
adulthood proceeds by crises that, in a sense, are reminiscent in many
aspects of the pattern of "punctuated equilibria" proposed by post-
Darwinian evolutionary approaches (see Gould, 1980; Lerner, 1984).
Periods of stability in which the system seems to be only concerned
with the maintenance of its status quo, thus becoming extremely
predictable, are followed by very intense meta-stable periods in which
the slightest perturbation unexpectedly triggers major existential crises
and deep reorgani~~tion of personal experience (Allen, 1981; Brent,
1984).
On the other hand, the orthogenetic progression of an ontologi-
cal system unfolds within an irreversible temporal direction. While we
experience the irreversible direction of time from the past into the
future as the "objective" temporal dimension, each of us experiences
this irreversibility within a "subjective" time, flowing parallel to and
perceived as interwoven with the objective temporal order. Moreover,
any lifespan development is matched by the gradual emergence of
changes in the subjective experience of time irreversibility, which
becomes understandable in the light of the notion of "symmetry-
breaking" processes introduced by Prigogine (1973), that is, as a
history of progressive and irreversible differentiations between one's
sense of past and future.
Each lifespan starts out with a virtually total temporal symmetry
(i.e., the exclusive sense of the present that parallels, during infancy
and childhood, the immediacy of the experiencing of self and reality).
With the abstract self-referring that emerges during adolescence, this
symmetry breaks down, bringing about a growing experiential differ-
entiation between past and future. As one progresses in the lifespan,
the experienced irreversibility of time directedness is projected into
abstract reordering processes triggering transformations, equally
irreversible, in one's sense of continuity. Thus, at the time of the
"existential" discovery of the self in youth, the past is perceived as
being just begun, and the person feels he or she faces an unlimited
future full of potentialities. As time goes by, this sense of the future is
replaced by another more restricted one, connected to the emerging
awareness of death that takes place in early adulthood. With the
86 THEORETICAL PREMISES

beginning of middle age, the perceived finiteness of one's future

progressively gives rise to the disturbing experience of being embod-
ied, with no chance of escape, in a limited, unrepeatable and irrevers-
ible existence. Finally, in the course of aging, the future is less and less
perceived as a projection toward alternative posibilities, and the sense
of one's life is primarily based on a past that occupies, by now, nearly
all of one's lifespan.
Needless to say, any transformation in the subjective perception
of time is matched by a new space-:-time dimension that triggers a
substantial reorganization of personal experience; any reorganization,
in tum, exerts a great influence on the oscillations and transforma-
tions of the subsequent lifespan. It would therefore seem reasonable to
hypothesize that the~surfacing of symmetry-breaking processes roughly
coincides with the gradual emergence of the critical periods of adult-
hood (e.g., adolescence, age-30 transition, midlife transition) which
show up in longitudinal studies on life histories and biographies
(Gould, 1978; Levinson, 1978, 1986; Sheehy, 1976; Stewart & Hea-
ly, 1984; Vaillant, 1977). However, compared to the greater unifor-
mity in time and explanatory continuity of maturational critical per-
iods, adult stages exhibit, even with the same character of invariant
progression, greater variability and indeterminacy.
In the first place, individual differences in the concreteness-
abstractness dimension strongly influence whether the appraisal of the
emerging transformation in subjective time is made in terms of per-
sonal emotional domains or in terms of overwhelming experiences
extraneous to the self. Secondly, individual differences in self-
awareness deeply influence the quality of reorganization triggered by
the critical period, and therefore the very structure of the final state
attained. In other words, the continuity exhibited by maturational
stages in which the orthogenetic progression is rigidly regulated by
biological factors (unfolding of cognitive abilities), and so producing
the same characteristics in the majority of subjects, is replaced in adult
development by a greater indeterminacy, as orthogenetic progression
now becomes regulated mainly by psychological factors (qualitative
patterns of self-awareness) that vary from one person to another.

Transformation in Adulthood Dimensions

If we consider Western knowledge as a whole as if it were the

temporal becoming of an individual knowing organization, it shows
Sclf-Houndnries and Lifespan Development _ 87

characteristics of an orthogenetic progression whose directionality is

distinctly oriented toward a progressive increase of individuation and
self-awareness. From its beginnings, the crucial hallmark of Western
experience has been the enacting of the self in the process of explain-
ing it (Johnson, 1985) to the point where the individual has gradually
come to identify him- or herself with his or her individual conscious-
ness rather than with belonging to a pre-established cosmic order. The
primacy of the "psychological dimension" has gradually been assumed
in the course of the last century, and in no other era has there been
found a level of structural complexity in individual consciousness such
as that which is characteristic of our time (Aries & Duby, 1987;
Brandel, 1979). Such radical changes deserve mention in that they
play an important role in the nature and dynamics of personal
reorganization that characterize our experience of adulthood.
In the first place, the contemporary sense of self differs markedly
not only from that of the last century but even from that of the last
generation, especially in the sense that it is experienced as less per-
manent and more flexible than traditional models. The increased
complexity in individual consciousness has made possible a multi-
faceted experiencing of self inside the continuous sense of sameness,
widening the possibilities of abstract self-referring and, therefore, of
assimilation of experience. What is more, the perception of a many-
sided self has intensified the oscillatory tension between maintenance
and change processes, requiring a continual shifting of the point of
equilibrium. Personal experience has thus taken the form of an ongo-
ing process of an ever-evolving but unified self (Gide, 1980), in
which the perturbing mutability perceived in one's continuity is
matched by the ability to go beyond "old identities" and to build up
new ones. This existential dimension transpires from the everyday
understanding of Iife tacitly reflected by current products of our cul-
ture; writing his impressions to a friend about a film he had just
finished, Fran<;ois Truffaut, who always took such care in portraying
the sentiments and experiences of our age, noted that: "In the course
of life, we become many different people, and it is precisely this that
makes memoires seem strange. One person, the latest, strains to lmify
all the preceding characters" (1988, p. 243).
The experience of selfhood as a continued and evolving process
of personal growth has made it possible for awareness of self to take on
an increasingly important role as regulator, absolutely crucial in the
unfolding of individual lifespan.
88 THEORETICAL PREMISES

Awareness of our actions makes our actions objects of our reflections,

and opens their consequences to our liking or disliking of them.
Awareness of our liking or disliking of the consequences of what we do
makes us aware that we always do what we do because we want the
consequences of what we are aware that we do, even when we claim
that we do not want those consequences. In other words, awareness of
our liking or disliking of the consequences of what we do, constitutes
our responsibility because it makes us aware that we do what we do
because we want the consequences of what we do. Finally, awareness
of our liking or disliking of our liking or disliking of the consequences
of what we do, constitutes our human freedom by making us respons-
ible for our emotions through being aware of them, as well as for our
liking or disliking them ·in our actions. In the recursive involvement
between languaging, emotioning and becoming, that our epigenesis
entails, we human beings live our lives in a continuous recursive
involvement between awareness and becoming. In these circum-
stances it is not the same for us to be aware or not to be aware of what
we do in our interpersonal relations, and it is not the same for our body
dynamics in all its dimensions, because the courses that our lives
follow in our continuous body change and transformation, are at every
instant contingent to our awareness, or lack of awareness, of our
actions. We can be aware of this now. (Maturana, 1988a, p. 81)

However, the experience of life as continued personal growth is

likely to set up a positive feedback toward higher degrees of internal
complexity which may prove critical. Firstly, managing the perceived
changeability of one's continuity requires good levels of cognitive and
emotive flexibility and entails a progressive increase in self-conscious-
ness. Secondly, the rise in self-consciousness is paralleled by a growing
perception of ambiguity in the current appraisal of self that triggers
unbalancing emotions such as boredom, a sense of absurdity, and so
on, increasing, in the final analysis, the demand for flexibility.
Moreover, the changed appraisal of the self has set off a con-
sistent transformation in the ideology of love, which has profoundly
modified the role of affective relationships in adulthood as well as the
way of experiencing them (Smelser, 1980; Swidler, 1980).
Love is still central in the search for self-knowledge, but this
search is no longer identified as a single, decisive choice which will
bear a life commitment. Quite the contrary, love comes gradually to
be conceived of as a continuous process of personal growth and
self-identification taking place within a whole sequence of rela-
tionships and facing one crisis after another. In addition, while pre-
Self-Boundaries and Lifespan Development 89

viously the obstacles to reaching a stable life commitment were identi-

fied as external factors against which one could only rebel or give up,
now the obstacles to love are experienced as internal to the self and to
the relationship, so that the struggle for deepening communication
and for discovering "real" aspects of the self have become the main
ingredients of our love experience.

In the shifting structure of the love myth, the impulsive sides of the
self are given greater emphasis, and the ideal of permanence is un-
dermined. What is good about a relationship is not the commitment it
embodies, but how much a person learns about himself from the
relationship . Love is not the emblem of a crystallized identity but the
mandate for continuing self-exploration. In the traditional view, a
love that endecl was a failure, a sign of some terrible mistake in the
search for self and identity. But the new love imagery can claim great
gains from failed relationships. (Swidler, 1980, p. 129)

Thus, in the affective realm too, flexibility (i.e., the ability to

take up and leave close relationships) can help the subject manage
disrupting emotions, so influencing, to a large extent, his or her
capacity for further development. It should also be noted that this
change in the experience of love, while on the one hand making the
sense of personal identity much more flexible and generative, has, on
the other, increased the importance of the processes of separation and
grieving, lending to this increased self-flexibility a component of
emotional instability that surely plays a role in the existential crisis of
contemporary humankind.
II
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC
PRINCIPLES

It happens in reality, as much in personal life as in history, that

only in certain exceptional moments does doing correspond to
willing. Indeed, what characterizes human experience is exactly
the twofold necessity tmderlying any action: on the one hand re-
quired hy circumstance, to meet that challenge which circumstance
is continually casting hefore Man and to which he must respond
even at the cost of being annihilated; and on the other hand, re-
quired hy his own internal condition; it is exactly here that the
tragedy of human experience lies: every man knows himself, even
hefore thinking, as doing .and carrying out; he knows after he has
acted. When he does something, that which most answers his
passions, his longings, he does it without knowing that he is
doing so.
-M. ZAMJ\RAN O, Persona y Democracia (1958/1988, pp. 62-63)
5
A Post . . Rationalist Framework for
Cognitive Therapy

PRELIMINARY ·REMARKS

The ontological approach that we have attempted to outline

thus far entails a remarkable transformation in the conceptualization
of change and therapeutic methodology with respect to the current
rationalist perspective (Guidano, 1987, 1988; Mahoney, 1984, 1985,
1988, 1991; Mah()ney & Lyddon, 1988; Mahoney, Lyddon, & Arfold,
1989). The most important aspects of this transformation may he
outlined as follows (Guidano, 1991).
In traditional cognitive approaches, which still regard knowl-
edge as the representation of an objective and univocal order that
exists independently from our being in the world, emotional dis-
turbances derive from an insufficiently valid correspondence between
individual beliefs and external reality; that is, unpleasant feelings are
merely indicative of distorted thinking in accordance with the well-
known saying: "as you think, so shall you feel." Thus, because the
assessment is aimed at identifying "wrong" beliefs and irrational auto-
matic thoughts, comparing the client's behavior with a set of standard
rational axioms taken as universally valid, the basic principle of
change revolves around this theme: in order to modify perturbing
emotions, it is sufficient to change the corresponding "irrational"
beliefs as these gradually come to light.
A rational supremacy of this kind results in the establishment of
a self-control strategy centered on 1Jcrsuasion: the therapist tries with
every available means to Cl;nvince the client to endorse more rational
93
94 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

beliefs and to enact more convenient attitudes, while instructing him

or her to control and/or eliminate the effects of negative emotions.
The most suitable operational setting for such a procedure is a more or
less pressing dialectical confrontation in which the therapist plays the
role of "enlightened sage," "devil's advocate," or "hidden persuader"
according to his or her personal background and professional training.
Persuasion, in turn, technically consists of intervening at the surface
structure level (imagery, internal dialogue, beliefs, etc.), directed at
modifying the semantic aspects of explicit cognitive processes, while
neglecting the tacit syntactic rules which are at the base of these
processes.
In agoraphobic subjects, while basic syntactic rules maintain
clients' perceptions•of themselves as defenseless in a menacing, hostile
world, the intervention is focused, for instance, on the way they
represent to themselves a panic attack in the traffic, accompanied by a
series of instructions that they must introduce in their inner dialogue
whenever they again face the feared situation. No doubt clients will
obtain better control over anxiety in feared situations if they keep
telling themselves: "I must remember the doctor told me nothing can
happen to me . . . , " "I must keep calm, it's all my imagination . . . , "
''Nobody ever died from waiting at a traffic light. . . . " Undeniably,
though, the meaning of anxiety attacks remains unchanged for
clients, and furthermore, they still have no explanation for their being
so "strangely" oversensitive and vulnerable to unimportant situations
of constriction and/or loneliness. If the intervention is limited to a
modification of the cognitive appraisal, the perturbing emotional
reaction is in no way changed in tone, even though its intensity can
be better controlled (Zajonc, 1984). Critical emotions remain alien to
the subject who, instead, has acquired skills in controlling them "from
the outside." Thus, rather than a reorganization of personal meaning,
what has occurred is only a semantic change inside the same meaning
tonality.
Moreover, given that the aim is to make the client's behavior fit
with a set of rational axioms, the therapist is frequently driven to
induce more adaptive attitudes through relational or cognitive-
behavioral maneuvers (paradoxical prescriptions, challenging dialec-
tic disconfirmations, etc.) which almost completely exclude the
client's self-awareness, that is, the comprehension of his or her way of
experiencing and explaining self and reality. In other words, if the
perspective endorsed is centered on an objective, immutable outside
A Post-Ratiorwlist Framework for Cognitive Theraf!Y 95

order that unequivocally rules the trend and sense of human events,
the therapeutic relationship cannot become other than an instrument,
and a more or less authoritarian one, for the reestablishment of that
order-rather than a facilitator for clients' personal explorations in
finding a path for their gradual understanding of the rules that con-
strain the rigid coherence of their personal meaning, through the
apparent senselessness of their disturbing emotions.
On the other hand, if the ordering of reality into personal
experience is, ontologically, a self-referent construction, we cannot
expect to identify any objective outside point of view from which to
evaluate the degree of rationality and validity of the problematic
behavior exhibited. Rather than being an absolute criterion for judg-
ing an attitude in itself, rationality is instead intrinsically relativistic
and, as s~ch, simply permits a definition of the degree of adequacy of a
given attitude if the latter is referred to the specific personal meaning that
generated it and to which it belongs.
From an evolutionary point of view, rationality appears to be an
emerging property of self-organizing systems and from the beginning it
is connected to the development of more and more effective purpose-
directed behavior. Hence if rationality is interwoven with the experi-
ence of acting, it cannot refer solely to the logical-abstract categories
(true-false) employed in reordering such experience semantically
(Weimer, 1987). In other words, rationality merely highlights the
self-referentiality of adaptive processes in a given system, and adapta-
tion itself consists not so much of attaining a "right" or "true" purpose
(validity), as pursuing an aim whose usefulness is only possible from
the internal point of view of the system involved (viability).
In terms of the ontological perspective being presented, we can
thus say that through the continuous process of reordering immediate
experiencing ("I") into a conscious sense of self and the world ("Me"),
every subject is able to structure a stable, and at the same time,
dynamic demarcation between what is real and what is not in his or
her ongoing praxis of living. In this sense, clients' attainment of a
more articulated and exhaustive comprehension of their functioning
represents the crucial variable for assimilating extraneous and un-
pleasant feelings perceived as "unreal," and transforming them into
"real" personal emotions, that is, a reorganization of immediate ex-
periencing ("I") in which negative affect can be self-referred and
abstracted into one's conscious sense of continuity and uniqueness
("Me").
96 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

As is thus evident, an ontological, process-oriented approach

conceptualizes feelings and affect as forms of knowing in and of
themselves, that is, as the immediate ordering of reality that we
experience a priori in our ongoing praxis of living. On the one hand,
the continuous emotional modulation provided by recurrent and
oscillative psychophysiological patterns integrates past, present, and
anticipated experiences; on the other hand, the emergence of dis-
crepant feelings out of such modulation is the essential requisite for
triggering reorganizations in the patterns of coherence which regulate
the unfolding of personal meaning processes.
On these premises, we may formulate two general principles
about the close connection between affectivity and change in the
process of psychotherapy:

No change seems possible without emotions.

Throughout lifespan development the continuity and coherence
of personal meaning processes rely on the dynamic equilibrium be-
tween the organizational unity of the individual's emotional domain
("I") and the conscious self-image ("Me") through which this felt
experience is made consistent; the self-regulation between core affec-
tive themes provides a focus and direction in organizing the in-
dividual's thoughts, feelings, and actions along dimensions of abstract
and integrated knowledge compatible with his or her self-awareness.
In addition, while ideational themes (i.e. , dimensions of abstract
knowledge) usually go through a more or less continuous process of
differentiation, recombination, and integration, basic affective
themes seem much more constant in time and exhibit a different rate
and mechanism of change as compared to cognitive structures (cf.
Haviland, 1984). The assumption according to which a change in
cognition entails a corresponding change in emotions therefore turns
out to be groundless, in that self-regulation and self-development of
core affective themes seem not to be as influenced by logical rules of
differentiation and integration as ideational themes are. In other
words, it appears even more evident that while thinking usually changes
thoughts, only feeling can change emotions; that is, only the emergence of
new emotional experiences, resulting from the addition of new tonalities
of feelings to the unitary configuration of core emotional themes, can
affect self-regulation, modify current patterns of self-perception, and thus
facilitate a reordering in personal meaning processes.
 A Post-Rationalist Framework for CoRTiitive Therapy 97

The structure and quality of change depend to a large extent on the

level and quality of self-awareness with which the subject carries out
the reorganization process. ·
Indeed, far from being a beam of light which reveals an already
well arranged and complete configuration of elements, merely
acknowledging their presence, self-awareness is a constructive self-
referent ordering that determines to a large extent the fonn that
personal experience will assume. As an example, a ''personal revolu-
tion"-that is, a successful deep change (Mahoney, 1980)-and a
clear-cut clinical syndrome-that is, an unsuccessful deep change-
although both triggered by a deep emotional perturbation, are the
outcomes of different explicit reordering processes, which in tum
result from different qualitative levels of self-awareness and abstract
thought. Thus, a viable assimilation of perturbing feelings necessarily
requires a change in the "Me" appraisal of the experiencing "I," and so
it is necessary to trigger progressive shifts in current patterns of self-
awareness by increasing clients' comprehension of the way in which
they order ongoing experience. Both clinical and basic research
should therefore be more preferentially oriented toward (1) the study
of variables ( developmental patterns of immediate experience, self-
referring concreteness/abstractness levels, etc.) that underlie the
structuring of self-awareness in an individual lifespan; and (2) the
study of the relationship existing between the individual's level and
quality of self-awareness and the possible ways in which he or she can
reorder meaning coherence.
How are the above considerations reflected by the general meth-
odology of a nonrationalistic, process-oriented cognitive therapy?
In the first place, the crucial operational setting lies at the
interface between immediate experiencing and its explicit reordering;
the basic procedure consists of training clients, through self-observa-
tion techniques, to differentiate between immediate self-perception
- and conscious beliefs and attitudes, and then to reconstruct the pat-
terns of coherence that they follow in making what they feel con-
sistent.
Secondly, for such a strategy to be effective, the client must
gradually experience during the therapeutic process some affect-laden
events which can progressively exert pressure in the direction of
reorganization (Greenberg & Safran, 1987; Safran & Greenberg,
1991). Throughout the process, the therapist must be able to provide
98 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

tools of analysis and self-observation which, by increasing the flexibil-

ity and plasticity of clients' levels of self-awareness, will enable them
to gradually accomplish a progressive reordering of personal ex-
perience--one where the problematic perturbation is assimilated and
understood in a more abstract and integrated self-image, not involving
any particular emc)tional distress.
Finally, the therapeutic relationship is the specific context in
which it becomes possible for the therapist both to set off affective
change events and to guide the reorganization process that they
activate. The therapeutic relationship is for all intents and purposes a
real, living interaction, and its emotional aspects produce a facilitating
effect for the assimilation of new experiences or the reframing of
existing ones. "
To give more specifically articulated form to these observations,
let us go on to outline the most important aspects inherent in the
therapeutic methodology and strategy.

THE THERAPIST'S ATTITUDE AND THE

ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE

As one would expect in a perspective of this kind, the therapist's

attitude in the clinical setting is considerably different from traditional
approaches.
Within a therapeutic relationship intended to be essentially a
tool of exploration, the therapist will scrupulously avoid confronting
th.e perturbing emotions with a critical and/or worried attitude which
would inevitably confirm for the client the sense of extraneousness
with which he or she usually perceives such emotions, and would thus
further decrease the possibility of their assimilation. Moreover, since
the aim consists not so much of modifying the client's beliefs at any
cost, but rather of facilitating him or her to become aware of his or her
way of elaborating beliefs, the therapist orients, from the very begin-
ning, the client's comprehension toward his or her basic patterns for
self-referring immediate experience. Thus, by gradually reconstructing
the internal coherence existing beneath the apparent extraneousness
of disturbing feelings, the therapist makes the client realize with
growing clarity how such emotions contain fundamental information,
the understanding of which will very likely facilitate further com-
prehension of the current existential stalemate.
A Post-Rationalist Framework for Col{11itive Therapy 99

On the other hand, in order for the therapist to be in a [Link]

to maintain such an attitude, it is indispensable that, as part of his or
her professional experience, he or she should know the dynamics of
the principal organizations of personal meanings (P. M. Orgs.; see
Chapter 3) as well as the lifespan developmental challenges that are
encountered in their orthogenetic progression.
Negative affects (anxiety, sadness, helplessness, etc.) are part of
the range of feeling tonalities with which humans experience their
environment. However, the same tonality (e.g., anxiety) may be
ordered and experienced in very different ways (e.g., connected to
loss, danger, lack of certainty) according to whether it forms part of a
pattern of depressive, phobic, or obsessive meaning coherence. The
same may be ,said for more interpersonally structured affect, such as
the fear of negative judgments from others, which all humans, as
intersubjective animals, exhibit in their emotional repertoire. Howev-
er, for an eating disorders organization, the perception of negative
judgment is matched by an even more blurred and wavering sense of
self; in a depressive organization, it triggers a loss reaction and griev-
ing; in a phobic organization, it is felt as a threat to the need for
protection, and so on.
Indeed, adherence to a. process-oriented model of personal
meaning development makes the therapist less externally bound to
current problems, and allows him or her to use them to foster new
levels of comprehension, thus allowing the self-organization processes
of the client to influence the direction of the therapy. Rationalists
appear more externally bound to the immediate and concrete aspects
exhibited by current symptoms and tend to guide the course of the
therapy according to moment-to-moment presentation of problems
and specific goals (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988).
This does nor. mean "pigeon-holing" the client from the start,
applying a static "diagnostic label," as inevitably happens when the
descriptive nosography expressed by the DSM-III-R is adopted, or
when use is made of lists of critical beliefs supposed to be specific of
anxiety, depression, etc.
In the first place, the notion of a P .M. Org. is not to be regarded
as an entity made up of specific knowledge contents which can be
defined once and for all; rather, it is a unitary and self-organized
ordering of meaning invariants capable of structuring a wide variety of
possible knowledge contents, the coherence of which can be grasped
only by focusing on the processin[{ modalities (flexibility, abstraction,
100 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

integration) with which its meaning dimension unfolds throughout

the lifespan. Finally, although inevitably coming under the categories
of meaning within which the human experience of life is included,
each person is a unique experiment of Nature and thus has an absolute-
ly unique way of articulating both his or her meaning dimension and
the reordering processes that take place within it.
It is undoubtedly advisable to preface discussion of assessment by
pointing out that it is a little specious to talk of it as if it were
something unto itself. It is in fact part of a complex and multi-
directional process, psychotherapy, which unfolds simultaneously at
several levels all closely interwoven but irreducible one to another. In
particular, it is almost impossible to differentiate assessment from
intervention. Actually, the assessment is carried out at the experi-
encing/explaining interface through the self-observational skills that
the client is gradually developing and, therefore, as we shall later
see, is inherently linked to the ongoing reordering process. Our aim
will therefore be simply to outline the essential methodological
aspects.
The crucial feature characterizing the therapist's attitude in the
assessment procedure is constituted by the ability to differentiate
between immediate experiencing (i.e., what is happening in one's
praxis of living) and its explanation (i.e., making it consistent with
one's self-conception). It is certainly not an easy attitude to adopt as
the therapist is dealing with the well-known problem of distinguishing
fact from theory; this is a fundamental methodological problem
regarding scienti(ic knowledge in its entirety, and which, although an
essential problem, continues to be controversial, as is well exemplified
by Ritter (1979):

... I often have the impression that scientists forget what is fact and
what is theory. The frequency of light waves, for example, has been
associated with the experience of color. Some scientists seem to think
that light waves cpnstitute the real world and the conscious experi-
ences of color associated with them some kind of unreliable, shadow
events. But it is the light waves which are hypothetical (no one has
ever seen them). Color is a fact. Scientific theories are held with
varying degrees of confidence, and an essential tenet of science is that
theories can in principle never be entirely proven. Such is not the case
with conscious experience. That we experience color is not an idea to
be held with varying degrees of confidence: it is a fact of human
A Post-Rationalist Framework for Co1-,1Tiitive Thera/1 y 101

ex istence. Indeed, all conscious experiences are fact, and represent the
only things we can he certain of. (p. 208)

In other words, the point to hear in mind is that the "facts" correspond
to the client's immediate experiencing (as in the case of color experi-
ence) while his or her explaining/reasoning are ways for self-referring
facts in order to make them understandable (as in the case of light
waves). As a consequence, while assessing a given situation (e.g., a
marital quarrel), the therapist should not focus on the way in which
the client talks about what happened; quite the contrary, while
reconstructing the event with the same meticulousness with which
one would reconstruct a scene from a film, he or she should be able to
continually shift his or her focus from one level to the other:

1. How the client's experience happened in the situation (e.g.,

perception of discrepancy in the spouse's attitude, in ~hat
way the discrepany was felt in order to trigger anger, the
experience of anger and related feelings, the emotional
effects of becoming aware of being angry).
2. How the client self-refers and explains what is happening in
the situation (e.g., contingent reasons adopted for the quar-
rel which exclude, or at least reduce, responsibility for it;
explanations of his or her aggressive style in terms of per-
sonality traits or dispositions; inferences about [Link]
and moods of the spouse).

A basic distinction between the two levels is that the latter has
truth value while the former does not. In other words, immediate
experiencing simply expresses the inescapable way of being-in-the-
world and, as such, can never be mistaken, whereas explanations,
belonging to a semantic meta-level, can. be erroneous when compared
to the experience they are intended to explain. Thus, in the quarrel
example, even if the explanations and reasons adopted turn out to be
irrelevant and inconsistent with respect to the experiential situation,
the therapist should not limit him- or herself to criticism of the
irrationality of certain attitudes, and suggestions for more suitable
ones. Actually, experiencing anger as a response to minimal triggers is
an important indication, and should lead the therapist to a more
profound investigation of the structure of the relationship and the
quality of the emotional reciprocity.
 102 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

Proceeding in the assessment by alternately focusing on the

client's immediate experiencing and his or her explanations, the
therapist continually deals with direct (verbal/nonverbal behavior)
and indirect (reports of events) observational data. The therapist
-- should bear in mind that such data, as well as being closely in-
terwoven, appear to be so interdependent that they reciprocally in-
fluence and specify each other. This interdependence can be schema-
tized as follows:
Effect of direct data on indirect ("What happened is said now").
The way in which a past event is related (e.g. , gestures, semantic
patterns _used, emotional modulation) and the moment in the
therapeutic relationship at which the client decides to relate it (e.g.,
oscillations in approacli-avoidance balance, need for a greater in-
volvement in the relationship) provide a preunderstanding which
helps the therapist grasp the meaning tacitly attributed by the client to
the event, and this, in the final analysis, further clarifies the report
itself.
Effect of indirect data on direct ("What is said now is influenced by
what happened in the past"). The way in which the client manages
the reorganization he or she is going through (type of resistance to
change) as well as the client's emotional position within the therapeu-
tic setting (e.g., fears expressed, reassurances requested, affective
guarantees expected) allow a glimpse of the client's attachment his-
tory and developmental trajectory, and this in tum helps the therapist
grasp the meaning tacitly endorsed by the client in the ongoing
therapeutic interpersonal context.
Focusing alternately on experiencing and explaining and using
moment-to-moment the interdependence between direct and indirect
data should thus be considered basic methodological aspects of the
assessment procedure, both in the initial phases, when reconstructing
the patterns of coherence underlying the problematic behavior exhib-
ited, and in more advanced phases, when assessment of the client's
past history aids in the reconstruction of the developmental pathway
that has led to such patterns.
There is one final difference with respect to the attitudes of
proponents of other approaches toward resistance. In the rationalist
view, resistances are considered indicators of motivational deficits
(e.g., irrational fears, ambivalence, approach-avoidance conflict)
which must be overcome, whereas in an ontological and constructivis-
tic approach, resistances correspond to self-referent mechanisms for
A Pos1-Ratiorwli.1t Framework for Cognitive TheraJ>y lOJ

maintaining current patterns of internal coherence in spite of the

pressures to reorder them. Hence resisrances and self-regulation are
intertwined with self-deceiving patterns to slow down and/or distort
the assimilation of critical data, reflecting natural processes which
protect the individual from changing too much, too quickly; they
should be worked "with" rather than "against" (Bugental & Bugental,
1984; Mahoney, 1991). Finally, as Mahoney and Lyddon (1988)
remark, respect for the implicit wisdom of these systemic processes
is more likely to facilitate progressive psychological development
than attempts to deny their significance or to constrain their ex-
pressum.

SELF-OBSERVATION METHOD

Self-observation is the essential method for carrying on both the

assessment and the intervention, insofar as it permits the reconstruc-
tion of events of therapeutic interest, working at the interface be-
tween immediate experiencing and its explicit :reordering. 1t permits,
in this way, the analysis of both levels of processing as well as the
relationship existing between them. In this sense, therefore, self-
observation is clearly differentiated both from introspection (e.g.,
free-association technique) where the first level is privileged, and from
self-monitoring techniques (e.g., detection of automatic thoughts)
where the explicit level is privileged. The essential aspects. of the
method and the basic instructions given to the client are as follows:
First of all, one must always start with an event or a series of
events which may then be analyzed one by one. Any problem pre-
sented by a client may be reformulated in terms of the events that
produced it and to which it refers.
Adopting a kind of''cinematographic language," which, because
of ,its immediate comprehensibility, simplifies the instmctions and
makes them less boring, the therapist reconstructs with the client the
succession of scenes making up the event under investigation. Then,
as if one were in an editing room, the client is trained to "pan" the
succession of scenes, going back and forth in slow motion, to "zoom
in" on a single scene to focus on particular aspects, to "zoom out,"
reinserting the same scene enriched with new details hack into the
sequence, and so on ("moviola technique"). Clearly, whenever a
scene enriched with details is reinserted in th.e sequence, the latter
104 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

mutates, taking on new connotations, permitting the emergence of

further details in other scenes.

scene 1 . . . scene 2 . . . scene 3 . . . scene n

Zooming in/out
Panning

As can be seen, the basic procedure is relatively simple; it is clear,

however, that self-observation is essentially a method and can be
carried out at even more structured levels as one proceeds through the
phases of the therapy and the client's self-observational skills become
more efficient and articulated.
In the initial phases of the therapy, where it is necessary to guide
the client to an understanding and appreciation of the differentiation
between immediate experiencing and his or her self-referring and
explaining it, the basic scene analysis consists of reconstucting (1) the
patterns of immediate experiencing that occurred in the situation
putting into focus the entire way of happening of the client in the
scene (e.g., mimicry, gesture, posture, "reverse" or "unwilled" actions,
meaningful omissions, emotional role assumed in the interpersonal
context); and (2) the emotions consciously self-referred as the client
experiences the situation, and the interpretation rules by which that
situation called forth those emotions. These aspects can be recon-
structed directly from the client's reports.
Naturally, in addition to considering how they talk to them-
selves or others about their emotions and how they conceptualize
them after the event, clients should be suitably trained to focus on the
structure of their immediate experience that occurred in the course of
the situation. A simple way to do this is to point out that in investigat-
ing an emotional experience there are two types of questions one can
ask: (1) the why of that experience, which yields data on how a person
self-refers and self-explains what has been felt, and (2) the how of the
composition of what was felt, that is, its structure (e.g., imagery
modulation, basic affect tonalities and related feelings, sense of self).
Assuming that the therapist is able to make this differentiation in his
or her own emotional experiences, he or she, proceeding through the
scene-analysis procedure, should guide clients in shifting their point of
view from the "why" to the "how," while reconstructing the type of
difficulty experienced by them in such shifting.
The moment this differentiation gets under way, the client can
A Post-Rationalist Framework for CoRTiitive Therapy 105

begin to see him- or herself from two alternate points of view: while
carrying out a given scene in the first person ("subjective viewpoint"),
and while looking at oneself in that scene from without ("objective
viewpoint"). The client's flexibility in subjective/objective differentia-
tion further improves the possibilities of reconstruction of the im-
mediate experience, given that, from an objective viewpoint, the
client is now able to make inferenc es about the possible structure of
the subjective viewpoint experienced in the situation. This is more or
less what takes place when one thinks and talks about a scene from a
film: starting with the words and actions of a character, one tries to
reconstruct the moods, affective motivations, secret intentions, and
so on. The difference is that the person one is trying to reconstruct is
oneself. '
This same procedure can also be used in the more advanced
phases of the therapy when reconstruction of developmental history is
being undertaken (infancy and preschool years, childhood, adoles-
cence, and youth); because of the client's advanced skills, the recon-
struction of the subjective viewpoint with which the event was ex-
perienced at a certain age can be carried out from two different
objective viewpoints: ( 1) as one would have seen oneself from without
at that same age, and (2) as one sees oneself now from without while
focusing on that age.
As can be seen, rather than the modification of w;iys of thinking
judged to be erroneous, the essential aspect of the self-observation
method consists of clients' gradual acquisition of an appreciable degree
of flexibility in assessing their selfuood dynamics because of the abil-
ity, on the one hand, to differentiate their experiencing "I" from the
appraising "Me," and, on the other, to be able to see the whole process
from both a subjective and an objective viewpoint.
Both the increase in emotional openness and self-revelation
(better focusing on immediate experience) and the possibility of being
able to see oneself objectively from without inevitably modify the
current sense of self (Clark & Reis, 1988; Csikszentmihalyi & Figur-
ski, 1982; Miall, 1986). Moreover, repeatedly viewing the same
affect-laden scene in slow motion, going back and forth from many
points of view, brings about a modification of the way it is appraised
and self-referred, with a consequent change in the current relationship
between "episodic" and "semantic" memory (see Tulving, 1972,
1985) ; all this inevitably becomes translated into a reframing of the
same scene which triggers the emergence of other feeling tonalities.
106 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

Hence, while such flexibility increases, the usual viewpoint on oneself

("Me") is gradually challenged, so that new aspects of the experienc,
ing "I" can come into the picture.
Therefore, the basic therapeutic effect resulting from an increas,
ing flexibility in selfhood dynamics consists of a gradual changing in
the "Me" appraisal of the "I" matched by a consistent degree of
emotional restructuring; that is, new feeling tonalities in one's ongo,
ing immediate experiencing are recognized and self referred, thus
becoming essential ingredients in one's perceived range of conscious
emotions.
Finally, the self,observation method can gradually be directed
toward another basic modification in selfhood dynamics: an increased
flexibility about others' perspective taking. The attainment of such
flexibility is particularly important in those clinical situations in
which there is a marked vulnerability to others' judgments, both
actual and anticipated.
As we have seen (see Part I), we live in an intersubjective
dimension, so that from the very beginning each of us develops a
conscious sense of self ("Me") for making ongoing immediate experi,
ence ("I") consistent which is closely correlated to how one perceives
others seeing one.
In a healthy developmental pathway, the self-nonself differenti,
ation achieves a stable and defined demarcation from others, so that
the subject sets his or her ongoing continuity and sameness as the
point of reference in self,organizing his or her experience with others
while interacting with them. Any pattern of immediate experiencing
("I") which is recognized and self,referred as a dimension of the
conscious self ("Me") becomes, simultaneously, a tool for recognizing
the same dimension in others, while the perceived difference stimu,
lates the search for new patterns in one's ongoing immediate experi,
ence. In other words, the subject is "internally bound" in self
defining, so that information coming from interactions with others is
mainly used to understand people as separate persons, autonomous in
their thinking and feeling.
In contrast, in a developmental pathway in which the self-
nonself differentiation has been poor (see Chapter 3, eating disorders
organization), a sense of self is mainly constructed with the ex,
pectations perceived in others, and consequently the "Me" results
from assuming the perspectives of significant others. The experiencing
"I" therefore becomes recognizable and self referable to the extent to
A Post-Rationalist Framewurk for Co!{Tlitive Therapy 107

which its patterns of emotional modulation fit with the perspectives

perceived in others. That is, the subject is "externally bound" and
derives the definition of him• or herself from the behavior and atti-
tudes of others, as if they were a mirror. This state of things, apart
from showing patterns of emotional overreactivity linked to the per-
ception of noncorrespondence with others' expectations (oversensitiv-
ity to others' judgments), also makes it possible that others are never
seen as autonomous persons, but only as confirmation or disconfirma-
tion of the current sense of self, and are thus always magnified
positively or negatively.
The self-observational procedure has shown itself to be most
useful in triggering a modification of the viewpoint on oneself (i.e., a
change in the "Me" _appraisal of the "I") linked to a concomitant
modification of how others are seen. After the initial phase, necessary
in order that clients may grasp the experiencing/explaining differenti-
ation and see themselves alternately from a ,subjective and objective
viewpoint, they are trained, in the "moviola technique," to see the
same affect-laden scene with a significant other alternately from two
different viewpoints:

l. Perceiving others' behavior as information about oneself

(e.g., "If A behaves that way, what about me? Who am I?").
2. Perceiving others' behavior as information about them (e.g.,
"If A behaves that way, what about him or her? Who is he or
she?").

The first goal consists of making the client realize that these
different types of attribution correspond to totally different dimensions
of oneself and reality. In subsequent steps, through the scene analysis
of relevant interactional events, the therapist guides the client in
shifting his or her viewpoint on others, while at the same time
assessing and reconstructing the difficulties inherent in such shifting.
We are here dealing with a ·self-observational procedure that
should be used in all circumstances linked to problems connected with
eating disorders [Link]., where the attunement to the perceived
judgment of others may reach the point of a true sense of self-
annihilatioil. However, as sensitivity to the judgment of others is
typical of human experience, one may often also come up against this
hypersensitivity in other [Link]., which, even if it is less intense
and has a different meaning, may still become a source of perturbing
108 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

feelings in ongoing interpersonal relationships. Given that the

sensitivity to judgment is based on taking the behavior of others as
information about 01,1-eself, this same method can also be used in these
circumstances.

STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS

OF THERAPEUTIC CHANGE

In a therapeutic perspective centered on the reorganization of

personal meaning, a significant therapeutic modification coincides
with a change in the "Me" appraisal of the experiencing "!"-that is, a
change of the curreat viewpoint on oneself-and this involves a
deeper · recognition and appreciation of aspects of immediate ex-
periencing which, although extremely affect laden, had been ne-
glected up to that moment (Greenberg, 1984; Safran & Greenberg,
1991; Guidano, 1987, 1988; Mahoney, 1991).
Basically, a change in the "Me" appraisal of the "I" consists of a
shifting from experiencing some aspect in one's praxis of living as
"objectively given"-and not deserving further reflection-to self-
referring and appraising it as a dynamic way of explaining and validat-
ing one's being-in-the-world, and as such, subject to further inquiry
and reflection upon its orig1n. In other words, whenever the "given" is
broken, it can be relativized and traced back to the system of selfhood
demarcations and distinctions (Habermas, 1979). Naturally, there is a
range of possible shiftings distributed across different levels of com-
plexity and structural order. However, the occurrence of any shifting
necessarily requires the parallel emergence of a more inclusive order-
ing process, which should be made available through the therapeutic
setting. For each possible shifting there is a corresponding level of
ordering process, the attainment of which makes the shifting possible.
Far from being a merely cognitive phenomenon, the emergence of
more inclusive ordering levels ("meta-cognition" or "knowing about
knowing") is a complex process of integration between sensorimotor-
ic, affective, and conceptual ingredients; therefore, its emergence into
consciousness is always matched by a sense of ambiguity resulting from
the discrepancy experienced in one's previous level of ordering pro-
cesses (Hayek, 1978; Guidano, 1987; Mahoney, 1985, 1991) .
Different degrees of change are possible, capable of triggering
reorganizations of personal experience of varying depth and articula-
A J'ost-Rationdist Framework for Cognitive Thmq1y 109

tion; as a result, the notion of "superficial" and "deep" changes in-

troduced by Arnkoff (1980) and Mahoney (1980) has become
accepted in cognitive therapy. The two types of change are not
mutually exclusive; quite the contrary, as we shall see, they may be
part of different stages in the same psychotherapeutic process, and
often a superficial change in the initial phases of the therapy may
facilitate the attainment of a deeper change in more advanced stages.
It is important to emphasize that there is no direct correlation
hetween the type of strategic intervention carried out and the quality
of change processes which occur, even though it is clear that thera-
peutic intervention has in some way triggered the process that brought
about reorganization. In other words, the therapist can only try to set
forth "conditions" capable of triggering a reorganization, but cannot
determine nor control either when clients reorganize or the final
outcome of the reorganization (Dell & Goolishian, 1981; Guidano,
1987). These "conditions" essentially consist of the production of
affect-laden events capable of modifying immediate experiencing in
such a way that the client cannot avoid recognizing and self-referring
it (change of the "Me" appraisal of the "I"). The emotional per-
turbations capable of triggering affective change events in the course
of the therapeutic process derive from two basic sources:

1. The increase in clients' comprehension of their rules of

functioning is always paralleled by an appreciable degree of
emotional modulation in which new tonalities of feelings
are likely to emerge. On the other hand, modifications in
clients' comprehension in some way derive from the explana-
tions offered by ,the therapist, and obviously, anything the
therapist says or does can be considered an explanation, the
training in the self-observation method included.
2. The structure and reciprocity of the therapeutic interperson-
al context can also trigger emotional perturbations which
facilitate the challenging of clients' current viewpoints on
themselves.

The attempt to exhaustively conceptualize the close correlation

between affective events and change processes has led me to pose the
problem in these terms (Guidano, 1991). The essential requisite
facilitating a therapeutic change appears to be the simultaneous un-
folding of two processes, the intensity and structure of which range
110 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

widely: (1) a discrepant effect (deriving from the explanations set forth
by the therapist) which is able to trigger off an appreciable modifica-
tion of the viewpoint the client entertains about him- or herself, and
(2) a consistent level of emotional involvement in the therapeutic
relationship. A deeper analysis of these processes may help to clarify
their reciprocal correlation.
The efficacy of therapeutic explanations and interpretations
depends on the degree of discrepancy perceived by clients between
them and their usual sense of themselves (Claiborn, 1982; Claiborn &
Dowd, 1985). Thus, in contrast to the traditional assumption, the
crucial effect, rather than being identified with the transmission of
more rational knowledge content, can be traced back to the emer-
gence of perturbing feelings that provoke a reappraisal of the client's
immediate experiencing. Such reappraisal, in tum, involves a mod-
ification of the current level of self-awareness, the constructive and
generative effect of which unfolds through a reordering of the con-
figuration of items contained in the client's self-image. However, even
though the availability of explanations conveying discrepant effects is
a necessary condition for activating a challenging perturbation, it is
not sufficient in itself for triggering a reorganizing effect.
An appreciable level of emotional involvement in the therapeu-
tic relationship renders the client unable to avoid facing a challenging
point of view, constraining him or her to an immediate and global
self-referent encoding that generates the perception of discrepancy. In
other words, regardless of its specific content, a challenging perspec-
tive can produce a discrepant effect only through the level of self-
referentiality that it acquires as a function of the quality of emotional
reciprocity thus far structured in the interpersonal context. As com-
mon experience shows, a message penetrates according to the quality
of ongoing interaction. Criticism from someone to whom we are
indifferent generally leaves us unperturbed-and often even has a
"paradoxically" confirming effect-whereas the same remark from a
very significant person is likely to upset us deeply.
However, the necessity for emotional involvement should not
concern just the client; the therapist's involvement in the setting
exerts a crucial role in activating in the client that condition of
unavoidability and self-referentiality previously described. Actually,
the centrality of commitment in the structure of language acts--
emphasized concomitantly by evolutionary epistemology and onto-
A Post-Rationalist Framework for Cognitive Tlwrapy 111

logical approaches to cognition (Reynolds, 1981; Olafson, 1988;

Maturana, 1978, 1988a)-has become one of the most innovative
aspects set forth in the last decade by psycholinguistics (Habermas,
1981; Winograd, 1980; Winograd & Flores, 1986):

The essential presupposition for the success of an illocutionary act

consists in the speaker's entering into a specific eng-ag-ement, so that the
h earer can rely on him. An utterance c.m count as a promise, asser-
tion, request, question or avowal, if and only if the speaker makes an
offer that he is ready to make good insofar as it is accepted hy the
hearer. The speaker must engage himself, that is, indicate that in
certain situations he will draw certain consequences for action.
(Habermas, 1979, p. 61)

The emotional involvement of the therapist in what he or she says or

does, making it evident that he or she considers him- or herself
engaged in a real relationship, represents the guarantee that the
therapist is "ready to make good an offer if only it is accepted by the
hearer"; this, in turn, makes, in the client's eyes, the possibility a
reliable one of an alternative explanation and experiencing of his or
her current problems.
The therapeutic perspective that emerges from this way of pos-
ing the problem of change thus delineates the role of the therapist as a
strate[;ically oriented perturber, that is, a professional helper who, in
pursuing the "technical" task of modifying the client's self-awareness
patterns, is extremely alert in using ongoing emotional oscillations
detected in the interpersonal therapeutic context in order to facilitate
the comprehension in the client of what is being reconstructed.
However, the structuring of the therapist's role as strategic perturber
according to the methodological rules defining scientific knowledge
will require that psychotherapeutic research be more and more focused
upon the elaboration of patterns exemplifying how the emotional
oscillations that take place during the comprehension of critical in-
formation can enhance the assimilation of new data and/or the refram-
ing of existing ones. Unfortunately, since we are still far from having
attained an exhaustive, ontological theory of mental functioning that
is able to explain the close interdependence between emotioning and
cognizing, the therapist.'s ability in using relational dynamics in order
to facilitar.e the client's change cannot but remain, for the present at
least, more an "art" than a "science."
112 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

The therapeutic approach which we shall present in the follow-

ing chapters usually involves weekly sessions. The entire strategy
consists of three main phases following in sequence:

• Phase 1: Preparing the clinical and interpersonal context.

• Phase 2: Construing the therapeutic setting.
• Phase 3: Undertaking the developmental analysis.

Psychotherapy is inherently a complex and multidirectional process

that unfolds simultaneously across many levels, so the attempt to
identify a sequence of phases where in fact there is a network of
interwoven processes is an explicatory artifice aimed at exemplifying
an\operative praxis. •
Moreover, given that an essential element of the therapeutic
strategy we are about to present is founded on a developmental,
process-oriented methodology which conceptualizes psychopathology
as a science of personal meaning (see Chapter 3), it is important to
give at least an idea of the way in which the main [Link]. undergo,
during the therapeutic process, a reorganization of their meaning
coherence. Therefore, in order to provide a unitary and systematic
treatment, we shall try to exemplify the above phases, longitudinally
reconstructing the therapeutic course of four clinical cases, each corre-
sponding to a specific [Link].
6
Preparing the Clinical and
Interpersonal Context

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

This is the stage corresponding to the initial sessions, usually the

first two or three; especially in collaborative situations this preparation
may be completed quickly, even during the first session, while in more
demanding situations, linked to a more or less passive or ambiguous
attitude on the part of the client, it may take as many as six to eight
sessions.
The outset is generally marked by the classic question: "What
problem has brought you here?" While the client is answering, as is
usually the case, by laying out his or her clinical picture, the therapist
should be in a position to formulate, as early as possible, a hypothesis
as to the possible [Link]. lying at the base of the symptomatology.
Knowing which meaning dimension the client is attempting to act in
allows the therapist co obtain an orientation as to the most effective
means of reformulating the problem being presented and to avoid the
assumption of attitudes which could be inopportune for the client,
insofar as they may oppose or be antithetical to his or her coherence.
In the cases which we have chosen to exemplify the progress of
therapeutic strategy, the situations were presented as follows.

CASE ILLUSTRATIONS

Richard, a 45-year-old writer and film director, gesticulates in a

deadpan way and moves very slowly giving a clearly depressed impres-

113
114 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

sion. He speaks with apparent difficulty as he relates that for 2 or 3

years he has realized that he has been in a state of dejection and
depression from which he feels he is not able to emerge. He is
extremely worried because he is neglecting his work and his family (he
has a wife and a 13,year,old son) from whom he feels he no longer
deserves any affection. What disheartens him most is discovering
himself to be "another person" in these last 2 or 3 years, a "weakling,"
"beaten," who gets frightened by anything, above all by his reactions.
In fact, he alternates reactions of intense desperation (from which he
cannot hold back) when faced with the most minimal failures or
disappointments (e.g., the loss of a tennis match, a friend who puts off
an appointment at the last moment) with explosions of uncontrollable
rage. He states he is not really aware at the moment of initial anger,
which is triggered by negligible opposition, for example, feeling him,
self to be contradicted while discussing a football match with a friend,
or while choosing a television program with his son. Finally, he
maintains that he is becoming an impossible person, and will therefore
end up, through nobody's fault but his own, alone and abandoned
even by those he holds dearest. He notes in passing that at times
suicide seems to him to be the only practicable way out, and he ends
his exposition in a voice almost choked by the tears he is holding
back.

Sandra, a 34,year,old company secretary, married, with a 6,

year,old son, arrives at the studio accompanied by her husband who
remains in the waiting room during the session.
About 1 year previously, she reports, returning home in her car
from work, she had an intense panic attack accompanied by tachycar,
dia and a sense of suffocation, which forced her to stop by the side of
the road in total disorientation. Having stopped, she first had the
sense of being on the point of fainting, but immediately afterwards was
overwhelmed by the fear of losing control, going into a state and being
carried off to a psychiatric emergency ward. After she had been parked
for about a quarter of an hour, the panic seemed more controllable,
and she was able to get home. From that moment, however, she has
been afraid both of going out and of staying at home alone or with just
her son, so much so that her husband takes her to and collects her
from work, and has voluntarily changed his working hours so as to
leave her alone at home as little as possible. All this, however, does
not reassure her, given that, even with her family around her, she has
Prcparinl{ the Cliniwl and fntcrpernmal Context us
a constant fear of losing control and committing rash acts (e.g., when
. . -

she has to use a knif~ in the kitchen) or giving in to uncontrollable

impulses, such as thrciwing herself from an open window, even though
she has no wish to end her life. This last aspect is what frightens her
most, and, crying, she repeats that ". . . it's as if I don't recognize
myself anymore, not having any control over myself"; she then asks
for repeated reassurances as to the "curability" of her "illness" while
referring to all kinds of pharmacological treatments she has tried
without success. Prompted by the therapist, who asks for clatification
of the period immediately preceding the onset of the disturbance, she
says that 5 months previously she h ad had an abortion (wanted by her
husband) and that in the following month her mother had suddenly
died of a heart attack in her presence. She starts crying again, saying
she still feels and will always feel the absence of her mother ". . . be-
cause it was the only pure, disinterested affection I had ... now I have
lost that, it's as if nothing else in the world can protect me. . . . "

Winnie, an 18-year-old girl attending the final year of high

school, lives at home with her parents, both clerical workers, and a
sister 3 years younger.
About 10 months previously, at the end of the summer holiday
and of a week-long flirtation, she had gone on a diet hecause, even
though slightly underweight for her size, she felt "ugly" and "fat." In
the space of about a week this had turned into an acute anorexic
reaction, with amenorrhea, motor hyperactivity, etc. There fr>llowed
visits to the family dcKtor who dispensed vitamins and the usual
advice. About a month later the situation retumed to normal, pri-
marily because of insistent pressure from her mother. Although con-
tinuing to be arnenorrheic, Winnie began eating almost regular
amounts, preferring, however, to eat alone so as to avoid being at the
table with her parents, in fact staying alone in her room for hours at a
time. From the start of the academic year, there was a sudden drop in
her performance at school; this was unbearable to her, having always
been top of the class. She continually considered dropping out of
school, but gave in to the pressure of her parents who are in favor of
her continuing at all costs. The following April (l month before
making an appointment at our Center) she suddenly experienced a
high fever (.39°C), internal tremors, gastric contractions, and nausea,
and refused food. She was forced to stay away from school for a week,
during which all the symptoms disappeared except that of nausea over
116 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

food. When she started lessons again she spent even more time in her
room and limited contact with her family to a minimum.
During the session, Winnie appears lost, as if "emptied," and
speaks almost mechanically but impeccably in terms of formal con-
struction. What leaves her most dismayed is just that sense of "being
empty" or of "not having any consistency" which is constantly accom-
panied by the fear of "not being able to feel anything anymore."
Indeed, she attributes her progressive isolation from her contemporar-
ies, which in recent months has become almost total, to the fear of
discovering that she has neither emotions nor interests.

Gregory is a 25-year-old accountant who lives with his wife, to

whom he has been married for a year. For the same period of time he
has been working in the office of his father-in-law, also an accoun-
tant.
For about 7 or 8 months he has been tormented by the presence
of "nasty ideas" on which he is forced to ruminate, at high anxiety
levels, for long periods, and which he later feels the need to discuss
with someone he can trust, namely, his wife. The "nasty ideas"
invariably concern his wife and/or his father-in-law and take the form
of "presentiments" of deadly and disfiguring diseases which one of
them may catch, or of "revelations" which destroy their moral integri-
ty (e.g., incest between father-in-law and wife, a tendency to prostitu-
tion on his wife's part). Although present now and again during the
day, these presentiments and revelations intensify to the point of
. being unbearable in the evening, when, after dinner, he relaxes in
front of the television with his wife. Telling these thoughts to his wife
is the only way of attenuating the growing horror that he may cause
these calamities just by thinking them. Nonetheless, the moment this
terror is diminished by his wife's reassurances, he is assailed by "re-
morse," which also gradually becomes unbearable, for having poisoned
his wife's life and for having irreparably damaged a "solid" marriage.
The only way of diminishing this anxiety becomes, at that point, the
taking of massive doses of tranquilizers or alcohol which soon put him
to sleep and ward off all problems. In situations where he feels calmer,
such as when he is at home with his parents, he wonders whether he
might have let slip some gossip about his wife when they were en-
gaged, and that this, amplifed by inevitable distortions if it is passed
on by his parents to the neighbors, might cause even further suffering
to his wife. Finally, the fact that the previous month his father-in-law
Preparing the Clinical and Intcrpcrnmal Context 117

had had a malignant tumor diagnosed on the skin of the nose had
thrown him into total panic, convincing him that he was reaUy able to
cause irreparable calamities to people dear to him, and this had finally
prompted him to consult a therapist.
Although obviously frightened, Gregory remains extremely con-
trolled and composed throughout his exposition; he uses with great
competence the technical terms that his various presentiments of
illness necessitate and is always careful to point out to the therapist
that his "nasty ideas" are quite independent of his will and that they
carry no resentment or intolerance toward his wife or father-in-law,
who remain the most precious relationships of his life.

Ther~ will have been no difficulty in recognizing in the above

situations a depressive [Link]. (Richard), a phobic [Link]. (San-
dra), an eating disorder [Link]. (Winnie), and finally an obsessive-
compulsive [Link]. (Gregory). Naturally, this ease of discovery is
not always the case, especially when the clinical picture is not so clear
and the therapist must rely on the invariant modalities of meaning
with which the client constructs his or her mode of self-presentation
during the session. For example, a phobic situation may present itself
atypically (e.g., a general concern about diseases) or may be masked
(e.g., a fear of urinary incontinence as a way of "objectifying" a
limitation of movement of which the client is not completely aware).
Nonetheless, the therapist can still formulate a hypothesis as to the
client's meaning organization by reconstructing from the semantic
aspects (contingent beliefs and expectations) the key syntactic rules
that give coherence to his or her arguments (need for protection and
freedom, dangerous world, etc.).
At this point, faced with the set of disturbances which the client
has described, the therapist must reach a reformulation of the problem
presented in terms that will allow operation at the experiencing/
explaining interface (self-observation method), while at the same
time excluding any aspect connected to notions of disease (external
causal attribution). The basic operation therefore consists of redefin-
ing the presented problem as "internal" (i.e., feelings inherent in
one's way of being that acquire perturbing qualities because they are
not sufficiently recognized or explained) with respect to the "external"
definition which, usually, the client experiences and exhibits (i.e.,
extraneous "symptoms" not connected to his or her way of being).
The therapist should not be concerned with the correctness or
118 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

truthfulness of the client's affirmations, thus avoiding getting into

arguments which will not modify what the client experiences, but
which may implicitly define, from the start, the interpersonal context
as competitive and purely "verbal."
On the contrary, when working toward a reformulation, the
therapist begins by defining the interpersonal context as a reciprocal
collaboration and the therapeutic relationship as a tool of exploration
for construing a comprehension which is not at the moment available.
In this way, rather than entering into the relative merit of the validity
of the contents put forward by the client, the therapist instead begins
to investigate, together with the client, their overall meaning, so
trying to construct a point of view, both alternative and involving,
which shifts the client's focus onto other aspects of him- or herself.
In other words, the therapist behaves as a strategic perturber
right from these very first phases. In fact, both reformulating the
problem in terms of "one's own feelings" rather. than of "strange
disturbances," and defining the therapeutic setting as a committed
locale for exploration and comprehension rather than merely as a
place for being reassured and provided with technical solutions, are
different from the client's usual expectations. Therefore, if the emo-
tional interactive context turns out to be adequate, the perturbing
effects of discrepant explanations are likely to modify the viewpoint
from which the client presents him- or herself. ··
In the cases that have just been presented, the process of
reformulating clinical and interpersonal contexts proceeded, in rough
outline, as follows:

While Richard was presenting his situation, the therapist lis-

tened with great attention and participation, asking now and again for
clarifications of the painful emotions experienced, but without reveal-
ing any worry or perplexity about the despairing conclusions at which
the client regularly arrived.
At the end of the exposition, the therapist noted that this
"feeling myself to be another person" seemed, at that moment, the
aspect to be gone into further, given how much it shocked and
depressed him. The therapist therefore began by asking if at other
times in the course of his 45 years he had ever felt sensations and
moods analogous to this. Richard, as if disconcerted or disoriented,
seemed not to understand the question, and growing sadder, stated
that he h ad been depressed many times in his life. The therapist then
Preparing the Clinical and Interpernmal Context 119

pointed out that he was not interested in compiling a "diagnostic

inventory" but rather in reconstructing this sense of "feeling oneself to
be another person," and that the best way to start this was to see if he
had felt it on other occasions. After a moment's reflection, Richard
noted that a couple of occasions came to mind: the first months after
going abroad against the advice of his parents at the age of 19, and
immediately after getting married at 31. In both cases he felt as if
"turned upside-down," quite different from how he had been feeling
shortly before, and he had also felt moments of great desperation and
anxiety. However, perhaps because he was younger, he then felt he
had "more guts" and will to struggle, and this had allowed him to live
through it in a way different from what was happening to him now.
Finally-and he pointed, this out particularly-they were periods of
great suffering which had then turned into big changes in hi.s life.
Indeed, after that journey abroad he never returned to the bosom of
the family, and acquire·d an autonomy and an ability to go it alone of
which he was still proud. His marriage radically changed his nomadic
habits, deeply affecting his private and professional way of life.
The therapist then pointed out how, in effect, the remembered
situations seemed to correspond to those "transformations of the sense
of self" that commonly appear in the course of individual lifespan
development; that it is a characteristic of human experience to feel
them as an "overturning of the self' which is always painful, or at least
upsetting, because of the need that we have for continuity and in-
tegrity; that most of the time we try to avoid these transformations or
fight against them because of this need; and that, finally, what he was
now feeling could well be the expression of a transformation in
progress, since such changes are not associated solely with youth or
the first phases of adulthood. Certainly, there were doubtless differ-
ences, possibly attributable to the way these changes were ex-
perienced, but these differences did not seem to be attributable only to
age. Indeed, the main difference seemed to be that while the remem-
bered situations were transformations that had gotten under way
following decisions he had made, the present transformation was
spontaneous, and it was perhaps because of this that he felt it to be
something he had been plunged into involuntarily.
It thus became evident that it was necessary to reconstruct what
was changing in him in order to understand and hence be able to do
something about the unease it was causing. The only way in which to
begin the process of reconstruction was to begin, during the week, to
120 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRlNCIPLES

focus on the form of the reactions of sudden desperation and the

explosions of uncontrollable rage (and not why they were produced),
that is, the way in which, day by day, he felt this transformation in
progress.
As a last intervention, and so as not to leave out any of the most
intense emotional tonalities touched on during the session, the ther-
apist referred to the theme of suicide which Richard had mentioned
with a choking voice. He pointed out that the theme of suicide is a
possibility that we have in contrast to other animals because of
reflexive self-consciousness, and as such belongs to the dimension of
human experience itself. It is thus not cause for alarm or shock to feel
it at the time when one is feeling particularly intense and perturbing
emotions or moods. On the contrary, instead of limiting ourselves to
the usual considerations accompanying the surfacing of this theme, it
would perhaps be more useful for the work under way to focus on the
how (which emotions and images precede it and accompany it) and
the when (in which events and circumstances it appears) of its surfac-
ing. This would allow us to understand if this suicide theme was also
one of the ways of feeling the transformation he is undergoing.
Richard's uncommon ability to immediately grasp the new as-
pects which were emerging, combined with the good emotional and
collaborative climate which had been established, made it possible for
the reformulation of the problem presented to be completed during
the first session.

In Sandra's case the reformulation took about three sessions and

schematically followed this course:
The therapist maintained an understanding and tranquilizing
attitude while Sandra explained her disturbances; he participated
without getting unduly upset in all the situations where she started to
cry, and in the end agreed that the most important aspect to be
investigated was indeed that of the,"fear oflosing control," which she
had herself brought up several times. First of all, examining with her
the events of the last year; the therapist pointed out that this fear did
not seem to crop up "at random," in a bizarre and unpredictable
manner, but instead seemed to occur within two essential experiential
domains: either situations perceived as constrictive (being alone in
the car in traffic, feeling it a "duty" to deal with the cooking when her
husband and son were present) or situations perceived as leaving her
insufficiently protected (being alone at home). Furthermore, while
Preparing the Clinical and Interpersonal Context 121

admitting that one was dealing with a disturbing mental state, the
therapist nonetheless asked for elucidation on the make-up of this
feeling of "losing control" in these situations as if it were the worst
thing that could happen to her in her life.
Her responses indicated both the importance attributed to the
theme of control as a life value ("being in control is the only way of
facing life successfully") and the fact that she exercised continual
control over what she felt, even, for example, over physical fatigue,
which in her opinion should never go beyond a certain limit or it
became alarming. AU this was so evident to her that she was not at all
surprised to hear that her fear of losing control appeared to be that of a
person who, already exercising the maximum possible control over
herself, feared the pos§ibility of having to face a further increase. In
fact, she maintained that none of this seemed at all strange to her,
even though she had never thought of it until now.
The focus shifted, then, to how this need to increase control to
maximal levels comes about, and to what makes her feel it to be ever
present and necessary. It thus became natural to take up the theme of
her mother's death and her ensuing sense of not feeling sufficiently
protected. Following rough reconstruction of this most recent period,
there emerged the role of her husband in this pervasive sense of
nonprotection. The business of the abortion had changed her ideas
about what sort of person her husband was. He now seemed totally
unreliable, given that he had preferred to lose a child rather than give
up some of his comforts. Finally, the superficial and hurried way he
behaved on the death of her mother, which followed soon afterwards,
dramatically demonstrated for her that she was alone at the mercy of
an irresponsible egoist.
All this had gradually permitted an "internal" reformulation of
the problem. In comparison with its presentation as an illness, now it
was discussed, and she agreed in this, in terms of her emotions and
attitudes toward life. Now, finally, through such reformulation it
became possible to define a corresponding self-observational setting;
this involved both reconstructing the how and the when of all her
perceptions of possible loss of control and also reconstructing the
make-up of all the senses of nonprotection which were brought on by
the verbal and nonverbal attitudes of her husband, directly observed
or inferred.
The trend of the reformulation was not as linear as it may seem,
as it was interrupted several times by requests for reassurance as to the
122 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

possibility of a cure and by more or less explicit attempts by Sandra to

divert attention to such themes as illness, medicines, etc. The thera-
pist did not refuse the assurance requested, nor criticize the requests,
but tried to use them to advance the process. Hence, while supplying
the reassurance requested, the therapist pointed out that these sudden
shiftings from talking about her own moods to talking in terms of
illness and curability showed a curious extraneous attitude toward her
own emotions which would have to be focused on and redefined just as
was being done with other aspects of the problem.

With regard to Winnie, reaching a reformulation was a little

more laborious, in fact took four or five sessions, and necessitated
giving homework right from the initial phase, usually standard prac-
tice at the beginning of the second phase. Rather than describing the
course of the sessions, it is perhaps more convenient in terms of
brevity and conciseness to outline the technical problem the therapist
was faced with in working toward a reformulation, and the way used to
resolve it.
The procedure for reaching a reformulation in an eating disor-
ders problem varies according to the features of the setting (e.g.,
ambiguity, reluctance to open up), but the final objective is nearly
always more or less thtt same.
Usually, the problem is presented in terms of an "objective"
aesthetic or intellectual unacceptability deriving from a lack of will or
cognitive ability, resulting from genetic factors and thus not calling
directly into question the person's way of being (external attribution).
Without denying or contradicting the problem presented, the thera-
pist must introduce a change of perspective in which the problem
seems to consist of how to "cope with others" and, more particularly,
in which this difficulty in coping with others depends on one's over-
sensitivity to their judgments, both anticipated and reaL In this
manner, as well as reaching an "internal" reformulation, one is also
able to define a proper self-observation setting in which to begin the
therapy. One begins by focusing on everyday instances of such
hypersensitivity in order to gradually proceed with its reconstruction.
The difficulty encountered by the therapist generally involves
the emotional-interpersonal context (vagueness, reluctance toward
any defined therapeutic commitment, etc.) while, on the other hand,
it seems "technically" fairly simple to achieve one's aim. Right from
the initial sessions, in fact, such clients behave and talk in such a way
Preparing the Clinical and Interpersonal Context 123

that as soon as one reorients their attention, it immediately becomes

clear to them that they are prey to the fear of others' judgments.
With Winnie the difficulty was that while from her reports there
clearly emerged problems linked to the judgment of others (hypersen-
sitivity to "pressure" put on her by her parents, especially her mother;
refusing to "open up" with others of her own age, etc.), it was
nevertheless nearly impossible to point them out in her way of being
in the session. When faced with requests for elucidation of what she
had just said, her level of bewilderment and vagueness was such as to
allow her only to repeat, almost mechanically, explanations and
opinions long heard in the family. The moment she was asked what
she felt in those situations, or what effect they had on her, she became
even more bewildered and after a while, with some difficulty, would
come up with vague terms like "unease," "discomfort," etc., which she
could not even link to people or situations. The only aspect that
emerged was that these feelings of unease were more intense at school
than at home, even though she was unable to supply any explanation
as to why this should be so.
The therapist, then, limited himself to proposing to investigate
this apparently strange aspect, asking her to do some simple home-
work during the week: take a whole page for each school day, divide it
in half vertically, and indicate, on the left side, the trend of the
intensity of the feeling of unease, and on the right, the progress of
scholastic events and activities. This homework was gone over togeth-
er in subsequent sessions, and analyzed page by page to see if this
unease could be linked to events or activities. It immediately became
clear that the highest intensity of unease invariably coincided with
recreational activities (increase in the possibility of face-to-face in-
teractions with peers) while the lowest levels coincided with moments
in which everyone's attention "should" have been concentrated on
the lesson or teacher's questions (minimum possibility for face-to-face
exchanges). Analyzing more closely, in a later homework report, what
this reluctance for face-to-face reactions with peers might be based on,
Winnie managed to sketch out a fairly elementary explanation in
terms of fear of their judgment, which was enough to be able to carry
forward the change in perspective.
As can be seen, the therapist totally excluded the possibility
which in a more traditional view would have seemed the most im-
mediate and straightforward: beginning a "dialectical confrontation"
with Winnie and so managing to persuade her, in one session if
124 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

possible, that her real problem was the judgment of others. Firstly, the
degree of conviction would be completely aleatory in a client with this
level of vagueness and hypersensitivity to the judgment of others (and
hence also of the therapist), such that in the end, all would be
resolved by a "verbal agreement."
Finally, a change of perspective occurs only insofar as it is the
client who brings it about, while attempting to manage the discrep-
ancy he or she is forced to face. In other words, the directivity
inherent in the approach we are presenting is purely strategic and does
not lead to substituting the client's own understanding processes.

In Gregory's case, finally, the reformulation proceeded fairly

linearly and developed over two sessions which would almost seem to
be distinguishable as "thesis" and "demonstration." This happens with
a certain frequency in obsessive problems, especially if the therapist
uses, instead of contrasts, the rational ability and logical rigor of the
client.
The moment Gregory finished his exposition, the therapist
began by pointing out how from the overall trend there clearly stood
out the presence of intense emotions, complex moods, terrifying
images, etc. (and Gregory agreed with this), and that if we limited
ourselves to the reports of what actually happened, we would find
ourselves dealing with "ideas" and "ruminations." In other words,
attempting to face difficult situations in life using only ideas and
thoughts was like trying to reconstruct a mosaic with only two tiles
and no outline to go by.
It was thus necessary to begin focusing on the sequence of
images, of emotions, and of thoughts which followed one another in
critical moments (self-observational setting), while it appeared likely
that feelings and images experienced but not fully recognized by his
rational decoding might underlie his current problems ("internal"
reformulation).
Gregory followed step by step and most attentively the perspec-
tive put forward by the therapist, asking at opportune moments for
elucidation. He wanted further explanations of the interrelationships
between emotions, images, and thoughts, which he then often used to
request reassurances as to the "nonseriousness" of his state, or to
reiterate his good feelings for his wife and father-in-law. At the end of
the session, he asked what instructions he should follow in order to
focus on the critical sequences; in this way, he added, he would be
PreJ>aring the Clinical and lnu.'rf>L'rso1111l Context 125

able to better reflect during the week on this method, which seemed at
the moment to be convincing, thus putting off until the following
session the decision as to whether to commit himself to work of this
kind. The following session was that of the "demonstration": he first
asked for detailed verification as to how he had applied the in-
structions over the week, which brought with it supplementary elu-
cidations and reassurances about what we were doing. At last put at
ease, he declared that he had decided to undertake this work given
that simply "doing the exercises" during the week had made him feel a
shade better.

It is interesting to note that, in contrast to succeeding phases,

certainly longer and wore demanding, during which, however, the
therapist may "err" without too serious consequences, being in an
already established relationship, these first sessions are critical as they
do not allow of any kind of error. Indeed, any error reflects on the very
structure of the emotional-relational setting in process of formation,
and may thus have quite pervasive effects in time. Analogous to what
occurs in the formation of any significant bond, during Phase 1, there
are gradually defined-mostly implicitly, as in any affective rela-
tionship---the roles and the relational rules that will constrain the
structure of the relationship from that moment on.
7
Construing the Therapeutic Setting

This is the "central phase of therapeutic strategy, where fairly

stable and often complete remission of initial disturbances usually
occur. Schematically, it consists of two main phases, each lasting from
a minimum of 3 or 4 months to a maximum of 7 or 8, and occurring in
succession.

FOCUSING AND REORDERING

IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCING
(immediately following the first sessions, up to the
4th-8th month)

The first phase begins with a request from the therapist to put
into focus, and later to note down, the events of the week that have
been chosen as meaningful on the basis of the reformulation of the
initial problem as arrived at in preceding sessions. Analyzing these
with the therapist, the client becomes able to break down these events
using the sequence of main scenes that make them up, and thus he or
she begins the scene-analysis procedure, gradually acquiring the skills
essential for managing the self-observation method (e.g., going back
and forth in slow motion, zooming in/out). It is essential that from
this moment the therapist systematically give self-observational home-
work for the client to carry out during the week, the analysis of which
supplies a starting point for the following session. This is not simply a
matter of "keeping a diary," in which it is possible to wander from the
point and which often provides rather superficial information. Quite
the contrary, clients must be trained to differentiate between various

126
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 127

aspects of subjective experiencing until they are able to put one of

these aspects into focus and to reconstruct it from various viewpoints.
Thus, the usual homework consists of focusing on the specific self-
observational item being reconstructed at that moment with the
therapist, following its development during the week, and adding
further aspects to the reconstruction in progress. Sessions are once a
week in order to facilitate clients' more active role in their own
self-observation.
During the initial sessions it is absolutely essential that the
therapist, using the moviola setting, repeatedly instruct clients to
focus, for each scene, on the difference between immediate experienc-
ing and their explaining of it during and after the scene. Introducing
the distinction between "how" (experiencing) and "why" (explain-
ing), the therapist should point out that the "how" has to do with
subjective experiencing, both in terms of how it is made up, that is, its
ingredients (e.g., ongoing patterns of flowing imagery; multifaceted,
opposing feelings; the felt sense of self) and in terms of how it comes
about, that is, what perception of events or circumstances brought it
on.

Thus, for Richard, it was a matter of differentiating his ex-

periencing of helplessness and anger ( together with the immediate
effect this had on his current sense of self at the moment in which he
perceived it) with respect to the conclusions he drew about himself
and his life and to the memories of which he immediately became
aware. For Sandra, it was a question of focusing on her free-floating
experiences of being on the verge of losing control and/or being
insufficiently protected, differentiating them from the "logical,"
"medical," "meteorological" deductions and inferences that she used
to explain them. For Winnie, it meant focusing on her pervasive
experience of being at the mercy of others' judgments, differentiating
it from family expectations of her behavior which she had endorsed.
And for Gregory, it meant differentiating his immediately experienced
ambivalent feelings and images from the ruminations with which he
attempted to explain and control them.

Clients do not acquire this differentiation procedure easily, if for

not other reason than the fact that it is so different from their usual
manner of living and thinking about their lives. Patience is required to
carry on a work of gradual reconstruction and supplying all the expla-
128 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES
--
nations necessary, and the therapist should constantly train clients'
flexibility in shifting their viewpoint from the "why" to the "how,"
while reconstructing with them their difficulties in doing so.

Richard, for example, had no "technical" difficulty putting into

focus his subjective experiencing; his problem was differentiating
helplessness and anger from his subjective experiencing, given that
the former seemed to him to be part and parcel of the latter. For
Sandra, on the other hand, the difficulties derived from her "sensory
reading" ofsubjective experiencing, so much so that any emotional
state was perceived only in terms of neurovegetative reactions (tachy-
cardia, respiratory difficulties, etc.) immediately equated with disease.
Winnie's difficulty in focusing on subjective experiencing resulted
from her vague and continually oscillating perception of internal
states, since thoughts and words seemed to her to be more consistent
and reliable. Gregory had difficulty distinguishing thoughts from emo-
tions and ideas from images.

One usually notices that clients begin to be able to put into

practice an experiencing/explaining differentiation not only because
they apply it more or less correctly in their weekly reports, but also
because they gradually begin to extend such differentiation to other
experiential domains, so much so that at times it seems to become
their usual way of reflecting on things in general. All this is further
brought out by a greater capacity to bring critical feelings into focus;
this is accompanied, as a rule, by an increased distancing from the
immediacy of their experiencing, which further increases the focus.
Indeed, this is a suitable point at which to explain to the client that
the dynamics of emotional life have various aspects, some stable
(background ongoing emotional modulation intertwined with parallel
mood oscillations) and others episodic (prominent affective processes
matched by intensity peaks). These explanations must be accom-
panied by adequate instructions to enable them to recognize these
aspects and to focus on them.
Furthermore, the ability to differentiate between subjective and
objective viewpoints--supported and brought forward in parallel by
the therapist-gradually enables the client to see him- or herself from
without while experiencing perturbing affects. Clients can thus be-
come aware of attitudes, postures, omitted reactions, etc., which may
have escaped a preliminary focusing, and which begin to appear to
Const~uing the Therapeutic Setting 129

them in a different light than that which, in the same situation, they
had previously thought or imagined.

Richard, for example, began to notice that his uncontrolled

outbursts of anger toward others-far from being the expression of his
attitude toward living alone, to which he should have resigned him-
self-instead corresponded to exasperated reactions of protest which
went along with equally exasperated perceptions of their emotional
detachment. This was particularly evident where his wife was con-
cerned, as he sensed a cooling in their relationship (which for the
moment he preferred not to talk about); it was with her that the most
intense and uncontrollable outbursts. of rage came about.

Looking at her situation from the outside in the focusing of her

fear attacks, Sandra began to note with surprise that, rather than
being "spontaneous," her fears of losing control were "constructed," so
much so that they corresponded to real "tests of strength" to which she
deliberately submitted herself; the minute she had a moment's rest,
and with nothing in the immediate context to bring it on, she began
to imagine vividly everything she feared the most (generally, con-
stricting situations, or being abandoned by her husband) in order to
check her capacity for emotional resilience. So if, for example, she
reviewed at a glance the reports of several weeks, it immediately
became evident that the periods which should have been those of
greatest well-being (e.g., when all the family was happily together and
her husband was being solicitous toward her) were instead those in
which there occurred the highest frequency and intensity of fear
attacks. That is not all: they occurred even in situations when, feeling
unexpectedly at ease in a feared situation (e.g., alone at home or in
the car), she was amazed that she managed "paradoxically" to frighten
herself precisely because of having felt at ease. Thus it became gradu-
ally clearer to her that her panic attacks were primarily a response to a
sort of "internal logic"; that is, they were much more highly correlated
to her way of experiencing the relationship with her husband than to
his "objective" [Link] behavior.

Guided step-by-step by the therapist in her subjective/objective

shift while focusing on scenes concerning the fear of "not feeling
anything anymore" and of the judgment of others, Winnie started to
realize that these fears apparently were contrary to what she had
130 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

maintained; that is, that they were more intense at home than out-
side. In situations where she was interacting with those of her same
age group, the fear of judgment and of "not feeling" were very intense
immediately before contact with them, then faded away almost com-
pletely, allowing her to relax; these fears, however, were quite low (if
not almost absent) when she returned to her family, then while,. she
spent time at home they intensified to the point of being so pervasive
that they prevented her from engaging in any activity, (e.g., reading,
watching television, studying); usually, they reached their highest
point on going to sleep, at the time when she seemed to herself so
emptied that she felt almost evanescent. Given that at home the
pattern of her fears was distinctly correlated not just to the attitudes
adopted by her mother: but also simply to her presence, it became
clear that our work had to focus more and more on her way of
experiencing her relationship with her mother.

For a skeptical Gregory, the unusual opportunity to put into

focus feelings and free-floating sequences of images from different
points of view revealed that the majority of the "nasty ideas" over
which he ruminated were preceded by ambivalent feelings, or feelings
of opposition and/or hostility, when he was faced with his father-in-
law and/or his wife. Dealing with the former brought him up against
the intrusiveness of the man's character, which owed its strength to
experience and to professional acumen, and which would inevitably
transform Gregory into a docile, undemanding clerk, or even just
someone who "knew his place." The hostility toward his wife he
explained by saying that she never took sides with him in arguments
with his father-in-law. Thus, for example, his ruminations of an
evening were much more intense and prolonged, and concerned fairly
macabre ideas of illness, if preceded by a disagreement with his
father-in-law in which his wife encouraged him to give in, as she
usually did, if for no other reason than the respect due to age.
It also became very evident that the hostility and oppositional
tendency toward his wife were not entirely traceable to the mere
presence of an external factor (e.g., the interference of his father-in-
law), as Gregory vigorously maintained. Putting into careful focus all
the situations from which this interference could be excluded (when
they were alone on holiday or during weekends), it was clear that his
ruminations were still present, even though they seemed to follow a
slightly different course. Because of his "problems," in fact, their sex
Construing- the Therapeutic Setting- 131

life had undergone a progressive "rarefaction" (one may recall his

"falling asleep" every evening) of which his wife complained, with the
result that he felt she did not understand his suffering; indeed, pre-
cisely the fact that his wife was "so interested in sex despite my
suffering" was what frequently set off the fear of her possible inclina-
tion to prostitution. Ruminations immediately began concerning "re-
morse toward my wife" whi.c h reached the insistent and distressing
theme of "I am a wicked man, I have to leave her." At this point, only
long, drawn-out reassurances from his wife seemed able to calm him
until he "fell asleep" with the usual ritual of tranquilizers and alcohol.
It thus became evident for him as well that we were dealing with the
presence of, if nothing else, difficulties in managing domains such as
sexual intimacy, fa~e-to-face emotional exchanges, etc., none of
which surprised Gregory very much, given that he ascribed it
wholesale to his rigid religious upbringing.
In any case, while initially the problem had seemed to him to be
more "externally bound" and connected with doubts concerning atti-
tudes or concrete decisions to be made (e.g., voicing his own opinion
to his father-in-law; changing his job), as the viewpoint-shifting work
proceeded, it became clear to him that the problem might be more
"internally bound" and concern his way of managing certain im-
mediate aspects of his subjective experiencing. Thus it was that when
the therapist proposed shifting the self-observational focus in order to
reconstruct both the modality of experiencing anger, hostility, opposi-
tilm, etc., and also the modality of recognizing and self-referring
[Link], Gregory agreed to what seemed to him a logical, legitimate
decision.

At this point, which is generally reached in a range of 1 to 3

months, the client has passed, fairly firmly, from an "externally
bound" (putting up with an "objective" problem) to a more "internally
bound" attitude (the problem consists of managing one's subjective
experiencing). The focus within the "moviola" setting shifts more and
more onto the emerging discrepancy between immediate experience
and its explicit reordering, with the agreed objective of reconstructing
the actual pattern of coherence on which it depends.
It thus becomes possible, on the one hand, to further widen the
focus on perturbing feelings, reconstructing their various links with
other aspects of immediate experience, making the client pro-
gressively realize how any emotional state-besides being multifaceted
132 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

and including the experience of opposing feelings--:--is always a con,

struction that entails processes of recognition and self,referring. On
the other hand, in reconstructing the client's way of elaborating
beliefs and expectations out of ongoing immediate experience, the
boundaries begin to emerge of his or her current selUmage and the
self,deceiving patterns for maintaining it. We are here dealing with
the remaining work of this first stage, which essentially consists of
reconstructing the client's current pattern of coherence and the ways
in which its imbalance gives rise to the original problems.

With the work done so far, Richard had reached a good level of
focusing and distancing on his helplessness/anger outbursts, to the
point where they afflicted him far less and had become less frequent
and less intense. The situation with his wife appeared little changed,
however, if not worse. The alternation of outbursts of uncontrolled
anger with desperate reactions of "abandonment" had become even
more intense and repetitive. Despite the reluctance he had always
shown in talking about it, he agreed, through the force of circum,
stances, to put his experiencing of the actual interactions and ex,
changes with his wife in the "moviola" •setting.
Shifting continuously from subjective to objective viewpoint, it
became fairly clear that his outbursts of rage were replete with grudges
and accusations against her, and that these were set off whenever he
interpreted an attitude of his wife's in terms of sexual refusal. Within,
generally, a very short space of time, an abandoning reaction would
emerge, in which he felt he did not deserve his wife, leading to a kind
of ataraxic indifference, in which he would not have batted an eyelid
even if his wife had suddenly announced that she wanted a divorce.
Richard was astonished to discover that his outbursts of anger were
prevalently made up of "sexual grudges" toward his wife, given that
( and he seemed at last to have conquered his reluctance to talk about
the matter) he himself had decided more than 2 years previously to
cease any kind of sexual activity with his wife. In putting into focus
how this decision had come about, what seemed to be the critical
event emerged.
About 3 years previously, on an evening apparently like any
other, his wife had heedlessly let slip that she had had an affair with
one of her colleagues whom he knew only by sight. At the moment of
this revelation, Richard was stunned, but immediately afterwards he
exploded into such a violent rage that his wife considered calling the
Ctmstruing the Therapeutic Setting 133

police. He suddenly calmed down, took his wife into the bedroom,
and in a peremptory, contemptuous fashion forced her to give "tech-
nical" demonstrations of all the erotic situations (including her own
contribution) that had come about during every single meeting with
the other. While his intention had been to profoundly humiliate her,
he unexpectedly found himself victim of a sexual excitement he had
never known before. He thus "couldn't help" transforming all of this
into a procedure repeated every night on going to bed. Naturally, after
this had gone on for a few weeks, his wife burst into tears threatening
divorce because of "sexual incompatibility" due to his obvious perver-
sion. This led, however, to a reversal of the situation, with his wife
attributing her extramarital affair to his sexual "oddity" which she had
always intuited, ~nd which had finally come to light. Richard, mean-
while, became more and more convinced that he was despicable and
shkmefully perverted, and announced that he was willing to give up all
sexual activity between them and to allow his wife sexual freedom as
long as she withdrew her threat of divorce.
Several sessions were needed in order t~ accurately "run through
the rnoviola" his experiencing of the whole event using the scene-
analysis procedure and the subjective/objective shifting method with
which he was by now well acquainted. A picture gradually emerged
which was quite different from that which Richard had built up for
himself in the course of these 3 years.
While he felt stunned and, gradually, while he was prey to
unrestrained fury, she had lost in his eyes that image of "innocent
child," "poetically ingenuous" (she was 12 years younger than he),
which only he could have preserved intact in time, in the face of an
external reality that is quite indifferent to such sentiments. Only
when he could see her rendered submissive and humiliated by his
oppression did he realize that his wife was still, after all, "his baby";
however, he had shown himself to be a "bad father," quite incapable
of protecting her from the perils of the world. At the point when his
wife burst into tears and threatened divorce, this reversal procedure
reached its height. Richard, who felt himself "no longer worthy of
her," was ready to do anything to stay living together, although he did
not deserve it. In other words, the connecting thread in his way of
experiencing the whole situation was represented by the unexpected
alteration of the image of his wife, triggered at the moment of the
revelation, and of the succeeding modalities with which he sought to
erase and/or negate the perceived change. The "sexual perversions"
134 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

were hence seen as a basic self-deceiving pattern which, radically

altering in a negative sense his own self-image, made the image of his
wife, by contrast, appear positive once more.
It should be pointed out that during the session in which all of
this became clear to him, Richard underwent a strong emotional
reaction: he was extremely moved and quite unable to hold back his
tears, saying again and again that as an undoubted "monster," he
could never have imagined being someone who would throw blame on
himself in order to preserve the image of a loved one. With t4e benefit
of hindsight in looking back over the progress of the therapy, one can
safely say that this was one of the "key" sessions of the process, giving
rise to a significant change in his behavior, which became less re-
signed, less desperately•fixed in the role of one "abandoned for life,"
and more enterprising in carrying on the exploratory work that .had
"awakened" him.
Finally, "running everything through the moviola" from then
until now, it was evident to him that the expectation of a coup de
theatre in which his wife would come back to him, ready to accept
even his "perversion" (which, among other things, had vanished upon
the threat of divorce), had never left him, but had instead functioned
as a steady background from which he could project a possible future.
He had in fact discovered that the times of blackest desperation, when
he thought of suicide, always corresponded to those afternoons when
he "intuited" that his wife was meeting her current boyfriend, and the
resulting outbursts of anger invariably occurred when she came home
from the supposed meeting.

Sandra's greater ability to focus on perturbing feelings while

shifting the viewpoint onto herself went along with a greater ability to
recognize in the ongoing emotional states other aspects beyond the
purely "sensory" and with an increased ability in distancing from the
immediacy of her fears.
This made her realize that her panic attacks, rather than being
simply a more or less automatic response to situations perceived by her
as constrictive (being alone in the car in the midst of traffic) or
nonprotective (being alone at home), were a continual "showing
herself" that instead of being the strong woman capable of controlling
herself that she should have been, she was instead one who could lose
control at any moment, and this required the presence of a reference
figure to "keep an eye on her," this figure being her husband. It also
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 135

put her in a position to be able to begin reconstructing the multi-

faceted aspects with which she was experiencing the marital relation-
ship; such an undertaking would have been arduous, to say the least,
in preceding sessions, where she expressed herself almost exclusively
in terms of tachycardia, dyspnea, high blood pressure, etc., and the
only emotional state she seemed able to recognize was fear.
And so she agreed to begin the reconstruction by starting from
the "disappointments" with her husband which had first appeared
about a year and a half previously, and only fleetingly referred to in
preceding sessions. The critical events for her which were to be "run
through the moviola" with great accuracy were roughly as follows.
When her husband urged an abortion, or when he showed an
unusual hurry at J:ier mother's funeral, it did not strike her as being
very important, and she attributed it to the "male selfishness" her
mother had often told her about. Indeed, it was an indirect confirma-
tion that her husband, who paid little attention to "feminine sensitiv-
ity," was in fact the strong, virile decisive man she had always desired.
The important event came about a month before the first panic
attack, when quite by chance she found out that her husband had
several times boasted of being able to dominate his passions as few
other men could, having emerged unscathed some months previously
from a tumultuous sexual affair that would have overwhelmed anyone
else. Sandra immediately attributed his behavior over the abortion
and the funeral to the fact that he was completely taken up by this
affair. She felt her "pride was hurt," and that she was "challenged" by
her husband's arrogance, so much so that a month later, in order to
spite him, she had an affair with his best friend, whom she had long
found attractive. The meeting turned out to be particularly exciting
for her, to the point where she felt pleasurably perturbed. Perhaps
because of this perturbation, she began to think, while returning
home, that it would not be a good idea to continue this challenge with
her husband, as she would certainly be less able than he to control
herself, and might end up doing something stupid (like running away
with someone else) which for the rest of her life she would have to pay
for. It was in that moment that she had her first panic attack.
Going back and forth on reconstructed sequences of affect-laden
scenes according to the shifting procedure required several sessions
( eight to ten), and eventually these scenes began to take on another
appearance.
Hence, in repeatedly running through the "moviola" the scene
136 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

where she first heard about her husband's affair, it became clear to her
that it was not the "sexual betrayal" that had disillusioned her as much
as the fact that her husband had boasted of it to his friends; if while
observing herself from without she put this aspect particularly into
focus, it was clear that this "arrogance" of her husband's made him
look like an "adolescent seeking approval from his peer group." Hav-
ing always viewed her husband as an adult par excellence, she was
astonished by this new perception. It also enabled her to relate it to
her husband's way of doing other things, which she now saw in quite a
different light. His way of working was an example. The fact that her
husband continually changed his work plans, setting off on the most
disparate undertakings, often going from one sector to another di-
ametrically opposite, was for her an overpowering example of his
unshakable autonomy and initiative. Now, however, she began to see
that her husband had still not decided "what to do when he grew up,"
and in the meantime the only guaranteed salary was that from her
own work. What astonished her most, as she dwelt on this aspect,
was that this was only clear to her now, while it was something that
she was certain she had experienced at the moment of that fateful
revelation.
Going on to analyze the scenes regarding her affair with her
husband's friend, it became clear that the spite motive had played an
absolutely secondary role in the whole business. She had always felt an
intense reciprocal attraction for this man, who was independent, sure
of himself, and had attained considerable professional success. More
than once she had indulged in unrestrained fantasies, and only the
certainty that she was married to a man who was his superior "by
strength of character" had made her regard them as romantic fancies.
The perturbation she had felt during their meeting was equated by her
with the unexpected and unpleasant realization that, while her hus-
band made himself look good in front of his friends but invariably
returned to the roost, for her there was the "real" possibility of never
going back again. Suddenly seeing the home broken up and her
husband abandoned presented her with an absolutely unacceptable
picture of herself. In the female role model she had borrowed from her
mother, who all her life had put up with Sandra's often violent and
drunken father, self-sacrifice in the cause of family unity played a
cent~al role, and only a "crazy" or "irresponsible" woman would think
of endangering it. Therefore it began to be increasingly clear that the
exclusion from consciousness of the feelings inherent either in the
Construing the. Therapeutic Setting 137

perceived change in the husband's image or in the emotional involve-

ment experienced had become the essential self-deceiving mechanism
for maintaining her usual sense of self. In the final analysis, this made
even more evident the paradoxical aspect of the situation, in which
the excluded feelings could only be appraised and recognized as un-
controllable fears of being alone or losing control, which by limiting
her autonomy forced her to search for closer contact with a partner
whom she would otherwise feel she had every right to leave. It was just
this paradoxical aspect that led her to the behavior toward her hus-
band which at first sight seemed strange and contradictory. On the
one hand, the minimum physical separation from him seemed abso-
lutely intolerable for her, and, on the other, the moment he was
present, any contact with him seemed equally intolerable, and she felt
ever more constricted and irritable until she was afraid she could no
longer control herself.

While training Winnie in the "moviola" setting for reconstruct-

ing affect-laden scenes, the therapist took particular care to foster her
ability to recognize and appraise ongoing feelings and emotional states
and also gradually to focus her attention on the role played in her
unease by her fear of judgment by others (an particularly by her
mother). More than ten sessions were needed for her perception of
her internal states to become less fluctuating and uncertain, and to
lead her to a position where she was able to put into focus the emo-
tions she felt in given moments and to refer them back to what had
triggered them. Only when she seemed less lost and reluctant to
open up was it possible tt) begin reconstructing one aspect that from
the beginning had seemed critical for her, that is, her experiencing
of her relationship with her mother. The main stages marking
this process of reconstruction and reordering may be outlined as
follows.
During the process of breaking down the trend of the unease she
felt at home into the corresponding critical scenes, it emerged that the
greatest intensity of anxiety invariably corresponded either to situa-
tions in which Winnie perceived her mother's attitudes and opinions
as negative judgments or to situations in which, anticipating such
attitudes or opinions, Winnie felt she did not live up to her mother's
expectations of her. Hence, for example, the growing level of anxie-
ty while going to sleep was due to her monitoring what she had
done during the day from her mother's point of view, feeling more and
138 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

more inadequate and incompetent. At this point it was clear even to

her that this continual referral to possible expectations on the part of
her mother in order to anticipate any possible negative judgments was
substantially the basic regulator of her day.
Once she had reached the point of being able to recognize these
situations with some ease, the critical scenes were put into still sharper
focus, guiding her in observing herself both from within the scene and
from without, while going back and forth in slow motion. In this way
it became progressively more evident to her that in perceiving a
negative judgment, or feeling that she did not match up to ex-
pectations, the critical element was that Winnie immediately imagined
the possible picture her mother had of her. If after dinner, for ex-
ample, her mother, c0mmenting with others on what they had seen
on television recently, alluded, even faintly, to the theme of the
ingratitude of children, Winnie immediately felt that her mother saw
her as an egoist, incapable of genuine sentiments, and thus, in the
end, ungrateful.
Putting into sharper focus, in the "moviola" setting, the moment
in which she imagined her mother's image of her, it slowly grew
clearer to her how the perception of that image became part of the
sense of self that she felt at that moment. In other words, as soon as
she saw herself as ungrateful in her mother's eyes, she immediately
experienced herself as ungrateful. Hence Winnie was carefully trained
to capture this shifting-"how the perception of another's attitude
corresponded to the definition of a sense of self"-not only with her
mother (where the process took on obvious and recognizable forms),
but also with anyone else toward whom she felt even the minimum
fear of judgment. Until Winnie was able to grasp this aspect even in
situations which she took to be negligible, the therapist felt it would
not be wise to pass onto the next phase.
At this point, the therapist began the structuring of a self-
observational setting which would increase her flexibility with others'
perspective taking and would foster a modification of the viewpoint on
herself concomitant with a modification of her way of seeing others.
The rationale for the new procedure being undertaken was clearly and
concisely outlined. It was explained, in simple terms, that the be-
havior of others consisted substantially of information, and that this
could be read or codified either as information about oneself or as
information about others; that in the first case, one tries to draw an
image of oneself from others, taking no account of whom they may be,
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 139

while in the second case, one tries to see how others might be,
independently of we who are looking at them.
Thus, the simplest way of carrying on this new differentiation
consisted of putting into focus, "in the moviola," a critical attitude
perceived in another, and so to begin to train oneself, with the
therapist's help, to shift from one to the other viewpoint, following
this scheme:

S - PERCEIVING .A's J\EllAVIOR AS JNFClRMATION AHOUT

If c)NESELF
FUCUSINO ( )N (e.g., If A behaves that way, what about me?)
1
A. S llEIIA.V IOR F
T
l - l'ERCEIV INU '
~ .AS [Link] AS [Link] .AJ\Olff

N FJIM OR IIER
o (e.g., If A behaves that way, what about him or her?)

In this way, it became possible for Winnie to differentiate her sense of

self from her mother's behavior, searching in this behavior for data
which might give her an image of her mother as a person. For
example, the victimizing attitudes habitual of her mother which pre-
viously brought out in her only an immedate feeling of inadequacy,
now began to be seen as "relational modes" with which her mother
controlled the members of the family.
While this trend of increasing her flexibility with others' per-
spective taking was retained for the rest of the therapy, Winnie was
now in a position to reconstrnct, together with the therapist, how
disturbing the unbalancing of her perception of her mother ( which
was at the origin of the disturbances) could be.
The critical events to be broken down in their corresponding
scenes were more or less hinted at in preceding sessions, and, in rapid
succession, were as fol1ows.
Her summer flirtation of 10 months previously had been a timid
debut into love, and had ended in what was for her a "total defeat."
Although her mother had been completely opposed tn the idea, the
hoy was very important to Winnie, and even with her fear of "not
feeling enough," she would have been ready to fight to keep it going if
she had not realized at a certain point that he did not like her enough.
She consequently explained her anorexic reaction as a desperate
attempt to fit in with his aesthetic tastes. The failme of this attempt
140 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

had given her a profound sense of defeat that had "flattened" and
"emptied" her, and all this came out at school where she started
getting lower marks than usual. Her mother's immediate comment,
that "since my daughter lost her head over a good-for-nothing she
become such a moron she can't even study," was for Winnie a sudden
revelation of incontestable truth, so much so that leaving school was
the only way to avoid the humiliation of certain defeat.
Each scene was repeatedly "run through the moviola," con-
stantly maintaining, on the one hand, the differentiation between her
sense of self and her mother's behavior, and guiding her, on the other
hand, in alternating positions between who is living the scene in
person (subjective viewpoint) and who is watching the scene from
without (objective viewpoint). It was thus possible to arrive at this
kind of reordering.
At the moment of greatest friction .during this flirtation, Win-
nie's mother had applied such intense and theatrical pressure that
suddenly Winnie, for the first time in her life, had begun to doubt
whether her mother could be the "special woman" she had always
believed her to be. If from this moment on one accurately focused on
the effect that this unexpected modification of her mother's image had
on her, one immediately noticed that the sense of possibly being ugly
and fat started to come to the surface at just that time, while in the
past it had never occurred to her. It was thus clear to her as well that
calling into question, if only for a moment, the positiveness of her
image of her mother had immediately triggered a blurred and wavering
experiencing of herself appraised as a sense of emptiness and as a fear
of not feeling emotions sufficiently. The anorexic reaction, then,
turned out to be the self-deceiving mechanism for dropping the boy
and putting her mother back into her habitual role, even though this
led to being even more "externally bound" to her mother's ex-
pectations and judgments in order to define a reliable sense of self. At
this point, it was an almost immediate reaction to feel herself unable
to carry on the school year the moment she heard her mother put in
doubt her learning capabilities and scholastic ability.

The increased ability that Gregory was gradually acquiring in

putting into focus his "nasty ideas" while shifting the viewpoint on
himself went in parallel with a greater ability to differentiate between
immediate experiencing (e.g., uncontrollable feelings, images sudden-
ly coming to the surface intermingled with ambivalent feelings) and
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 141

attempts to reorder that experience "rationally" (e.g., ruminations,

rituals). Indeed, most of the time he managed to put into focus the
initial blend of intrusive images and perturbing feelings which had set
off the whole sequence of ruminations and rituals, and this had
noticeably increased his ability to distance himself from the im-
mediacy of his frightening "insights" and recurrent fears.
In comparison with the first sessions when he concentrated
exclusively on the logical thread of his ruminations, Gregory was now
able, in the scene-analysis procedure, to put much more accurately
into focus both the way he experienced the beginnings of his in-
tolerance over his marital situation, and also his search for some
impossible consistency with a self-image that would admit of not even
the slightest "shadqw" or imperfection. Indeed, if he accepted his
intolerance, he immediately felt "wicked" (and this meant he would
have to leave his wife). If, on the other hand, he assumed that such
intolerance was unfounded he immediately reassured himself as to his
presumed wickedness, but felt "impotent" before his tormenting fears.
At the "moviola" setting, it came into clear focus that the "effective
memory" of scenes in which his wife seemed to be unequivocally on
his father-in-law's side was called into question in terms of its "real"
validity, with the result that the discrimination "I am wicked"/"I feel
impotent" became even more insoluble. And so it became ever clearer
to him how the difficulty in self-referring certain aspects of subjective
experiences lay in the fact that these experiences, if recognized and
appraised, transformed themselves immediately into intolerable
doubts about himself.
Running all the scenes thus far analyzed "through the moviola,"
the work began of reconstructing his rigid all-or-none procedures for
maintaining consistency, both in the appraisal of immediate ex-
periencing and in the structuring of an acceptable self-image. Scene
by scene, the focus was directed to his way of dichotomizing subjective
experiencing into opposing and irreconcilable parts and combining
them in such a way that if there was the slightest doubt about one of
them (positive self) then the other automatically became true ("wick-
ed self"). A long time had to be spent on this aspect, putting into
focus at the "moviola" a wide variety of instances of "all-or-nothing"
procedures which, even if they appeared to be negligible, turned out
to be extremely useful in increasing his flexibility in experiencing and
self-referring.
At this point Gregory had acquired a [Link] of focusing
142 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

on his emotional states, distinguishing their opposing and antithetical

feelings, and an appreciable flexibility in self-referring them, to the
point where "feeling angry" no longer necessarily implied "feeling
wicked." Indeed, "new situations" made their appearance, such as
those where he got "openly" angry with his wife or father-in-law,
something which up to now he had scrupulously avoided. Shortly
afterwards, he was amazed to note that at the times in which he got
openly angry with his wife because of his father-in-law, he no longer
had the usual sequence of nasty ideas and macabre images. His first-
hand experience of the "rightness" of the work he had so far carried
out was an intense emotional experience which gave rise to moments
of exaltation of which he himself, usually so calm and composed, was
the first to wonder •at. This key session worked as a catalyst on all the
work done until that point, and began a consistent change in attitude
toward his original problems, which were now directly referred to his
way of experiencing his relationship with his wife.
We went on to reconstruct the "unbalancing" in such ex-
periencing which had been capable of triggering those ambivalent and
perturbing feelings that had involved him in painful ruminations in
the course of the last 7 or 8 months. The critical events, which were
broken down into their relative scenes in order to be put into focus,
turned out to be two, and were as follows:
The first had been about a year previously, at the time of his
marriage. During the engagement, Gregory had been tormented by
doubts about the advisability of getting married, with the result that
he was always putting off the date. As soon as the date had finally
been fixed, the doubts became concerned with fitting together all the
disparate details of the wedding ceremony, to the point where a couple
of days before the wedding he asked his wife for a further postpone-
ment for perfectly negligible reasons. His wife, with the irritable tone
of one on the verge of tears, reacted in a way that would admit of no
reply: "By now I don't care anymore if you don't want to get married,"
she said, "but I have no intention of making a fool of my father when
he has absolutely nothing to do with it. That means we're going to get
married on the date we've arranged and then if necessary get divorced
straight afterwards." This totally unexpected reply left Gregory rigid,
and he was immediately assailed by remorse for having humiliated and
offended his wife in what should have been a moment of joy and
happiness for her. During the first 4 or 5 months of marriage, this
"remorse" gradually increased, both because of the now evident sexual
Construing the ThcmJJcutic Setting 1.43

problems and because of the interference of his father-in-law for whom

he had started to work immediately after the marriage. One evening
after dinner, when Gregory had begun to complain to his wife about
the latest humiliation suffered at the hands of his father-in-law, she
cut him short with the same irritated tone as before, and said that the
fact that he did not get on with her father made their relationship one
of simply living together instead of a true marriage. Gregory was once
more thunderstruck and remorseful, not fully understanding what his
wife meant. Soon afterwards, while going to bed, there suddenly came
to mind the image of his father-in-law dangling from the table of a
morgue.
Repeatedly running each scene "through the moviola," and
using as leverage both qis ability to differentiate between immediate
experiencing and explicit restructuring, and also his ability to recon-
struct all the aspects of a given subjective experience, observing
himself alternately from the inside and from the outside of the scenes,
we were able to achieve the following reordering:
For the whole period of the engagement, Gregory had severe
doubts about the quality and consistency of his own involvement. He
was unsure whether it would last a lifetime, and this made him feel
that he was in, for him, the untenable position of one who endangers
the life of another for what might turn out to be just a whim. It was his
wife's behavior, that of total loving and dedication, that calmed his
fears and persuaded him that his would surely be a good, positive
marriage. A few days before the wedding, at the moment when he had
felt himself go rigid at his wife's reply, Gregory had the frightening
insight that his wife's loving behavior was neither felt nor spontane-
ous, but was part of a game of family opportunity, for which his
father-in-law wrote the rules. As was already clear to him, accepting
that insight and verifying it would have meant, in his all-or-none
logic, an unacceptable self-image. The self-deceptive mechanism for
trying to maintain the current sense of self thus consisted of denying
the reliability of what had been experienced, which in this way
became a tormenting fear he had to fight against, but which was
foreign to his "real" mode of being.
The event some months later fully confirmed the previous
insight, making him feel at the mercy of an unloving wife who took
her orders from a tyrannical father-in-law. Nevertheless, the hostility,
anger, and disappointment that were thus triggered while, on the one
hand, taking direct form by the avoidance of sexuality and the rituals
144 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

he exasperated his wife with, could, on the other, only be deceptively

self-referred as foreign ideas which suddenly dropped into his head.

At this point, usually reached in a period of a minimum of 4

months to a maximum of 8 from the beginning of the therapy, the
clients have gone through an appreciable change in their current
viewpoint on themselves, accompanied by a remarkable remission of
the disturbances which led them to therapy.
At this level, the change basically consists of a shifting from
experiencing personal "properties" (disturbances, diseases, somatic
complaints, etc.) and "traits" (fear, anger, helplessness, etc.) as con-
stitutiorn~lly "given," to appraising them as the living, ongoing dy-
namics of attributing onels own meanings to things (i.e., through the
ability of self-observing one's ways of identifying and ordering mean-
ingful events, of maintaining one's self image, of structuring affective
relationships). This shifting of the client's point of view on him- or
herself brings about a reordering of immediate experiencing matched
by a first level of restructuring of the range of perceivable emotions; he
or she can recognize and self-refer feelings that were previously ne-
glected or excluded from consciousness, as well as being able to
experience many nuances in the same feeling tonality.
Above all, the client is now able to focus on more complex
emotional states and to perceive the connection between different
feelings and affects, such as the concurrent relationships between
attachment, fear, and anger. As we have been able to see, in fact, in
the course of the work done in this part, one meets an "implicit"
reformulation of the original problem, in the sense that clients be-
come progressively more able to realize and reconstruct how current
critical emotional states are interwoven with a perceived imbalance in
an affective relationship experienced as essential to their present life
structure.
The second part therefore starts out by putting into focus the
reformulation reached, and making it explicit in terms of the client's
self-referent organization, that is, in which way patterns of personal
meaning allow the structuring of affectional ties capable of maintain-
ing the perceived coherence of one's current sense of self. Further
widening the focus of exploration and comprehension in the self-
observational setting, one thus begins to analyze the client's "affec-
tional style," reconstructing with him or her the recurrent patterns
underlying its unity and continuity.
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 145

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE CLIENT'S

AFFECTIVE STYLE
(lasting from 3 to 7 months, i.e., from the 4th-
8th month to the 7th-15th month of therapy)

As we have already seen in the discussion of our clients, the

essential affective imbalance capable of triggering emotional dis-
turbances usually coincides with a rather abrupt change in the image
of the significant figure, whether this is the result of events lived
through (disappointments, unforeseen revelations, etc.) or of a muta-
tion of perspective within the client as a result of his or her personal
growth (as is the cas~, for example, with Winnie).
Indeed, the structured image of an attachment figure, through
the intermodal coordination of sensory-motor-affective modules,
brings about a quality of immediate experiencing ("I") specifically
appraised and recognized as one's "real" self ("Me"). In this sense, the
change perceived in a significant other's image is matched by a specific
"l"/"Me" discrepancy: on the one hand, the experienced interruption
in one's ongoing patterns of immediate experience is paralleled by a
distressing psychophysiological modulation perceived as an unbearable
challenge to one's conscious sense of self; on the other hand, through
restricted and distorted explicit reordering processes (exclusion, self-
deception, etc. ) distressing feelings can be appraised and attibuted to
external causes without calling into question the coherence of the
self-image thus far structured.
At this juncture, the therapist should make explicit the reform-
ulation of the original problem which has taken place implicitly
during the work done up to now, highlighting the correlation between
perceived imbalance and the change in the partner's image. Further
reconstruction through the "moviola" of the chronological trend of
the emergence of the perturbations makes the client realize that the
surfacing of perturbing feelings is in parallel with the change in the
perception of the partner. Thus, while it becomes more and more
apparent that the original problem coincides with the exclusion and
the self-deceptive reordering of challenging feelings triggered by a
major affective oscillation, it is also necessary to shift the focus onto
how the client constructs the image of an attachment figure consistent
with the sense of self, and with which mechanisms he or she tries to
cope with any discrepancies that may occur. Deepening the self-
146 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRlNCIPIES

observation method and reconstructing the self-referent organization

exhibited by clients in structuring their affectional bonds thus become
the only ways to reconstruct and reorder such mechanisms.
The reconstruction of affective style takes up the entire second
part and begins with a detailed analysis of the client's affective history
conducted by successively developing the following aspects:
L Variables (developmental context, personal attitudes, social
network) that underlay the "sentimental debut" and the ways in which
it was experienced, appraised, and self-referred. The importance of
the sentimental debut derives from the fact that it corresponds to a
kind of "dress rehearsal" of the career in loving which is just begin-
ning. The ways in which this rehearsal is carried on permits a glimpse
at the set of basic ingredients which will be part of the affective style;
in addition, the perceived outcome of the rehearsal in the client's
eyes, will influence the way in which those ingredients will recombine
to give rise to a more specific and defined affective style.
2. The sequence of meaningful relationships that have taken
place since the debut, enabling the client to reconstruct the criteria of
significance through which he or she is able to differentiate between
meaningful and nonmeaningful relationships. Such criteria permit us
to highlight which patterns of assortative mating turn out to be most
consistent with the bonding style which has been gradually structured.
3. The way in which each meaningful relationship was formed,
maintained, and broken, and the ways in which they were ex-
perienced, appraised, and self-referred. In this way, it is possible to
reveal the coherence exhibited by the client's affective style, that is,
how this style is able to produce recurrent emotional experiences
which can stabilize and sometimes also further develop his or her
current sense of self.
The sequences of significant scenes characterizing each relation-
ship are then repeatedly "passed through the moviola," working with
the client's ability both to differentiate between immediate experienc-
ing and explicit restructuring, and to reconstruct the different aspects
of a given subjective experience, observing him- or herself alternately
from inside and from outside the scene.

The affect-laden events that characterized Richard's affective

history-reconstructed by developing the above points-were distrib-
uted roughly as follows:
His first love affair occurred when he was about 17, during a
period in which, dedicated to the literature and study of cinema, he
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 147

led a solitary life apart from his fellows, who nicknamed him "the
brown bear'' not only because of his solitary habits, but also because of
his very black, very thick hair. She, a little older, spent a lot of her
time with the peer group. He had indulged in unbridled fantasies
about her but never showed anything openly, indeed was somewhat
bashful, especially in her presence. It was she, her curiosity aroused by
his air of being "different" and "intellectual," who took the initiative
of being around him more, and then, without much in the way of
preamble and to his amazement, asked him directly if they could "start
dating." Richard's disbelief transformed almost immediately into a
feeling of elation matched by a sense of being exclusively chosen-a
feeling he could barely hide, making himself look even more awkward
and clumsy. This. state of exaltation, however, lasted a very short
time, as it soon seemed impossible that this could have really hap-
pened to him, and he immediately closed himself up again in his usual
retiring, detached manner. The affair lasted only a week, as he found
it hard to tolerate her ironic little comments about his being a "bear"
or "clumsy," and disliked seeing her enjoying herself with her friends,
something which he felt she did not do with him. And so, one
afternoon, Richard suddenly had an outburst of uncontrollable rage
for some neglible reason he could not even remember, with the result
that she went off and never talked to him again, just giving him a
nod whenever they happened to meet. Richard had a very in tense
and prolonged depressive reaction which kept him for months shut
up in his room almost in a stupor. After nearly a year, he slowly
began to feel the desire to start doing something again, and in order
not to end up in the same environment which had caused so much
"trouble," he decided to go abroad, despite the opposition of his
parents.
After leaving home, Richard led a somewhat adventurous life
which gave him the opportunity to have relationships with many
women, even though, he reported, after the experience of his first
love, he always had difficulty in effectively involving himself in an
affair. There were two relationships he indicated as being meaningful:
the first lasted from the age of 25 to 29, and the second was with his
wife, which started when he was 32. The criteria which permitted the
identification of these two relationships as significant were basically
reducible to two: having the feeling of being unconditionally chosen
by the partner, and feeling a sense of total reliability on the part of the
other, deriving from the fact that the latter had left what appeared to
be a more advantageous life sryle in order to be with him.
148 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

At the age of 25 he was living abroad, where, after finishing a

course in film directing, he had begun working professionally with
some success; it was what he called the "best moment of my life," in
which he felt he was the leader of his working group and felt he shone
in social situations, where he was also much sought after, even though
he still had a tendency to lead a rather retiring existence. The affair
with this woman, 2 years older than he and from a fairly well-to-do
and well-known family, started in a decidedly passionate manner
when, during what seemed like a banal flirtation, she suddenly de-
cided to leave her family and live with him. Richard accepted the
situation as a fait accompli, with little enthusiasm, maintaining that it
was impossible and destined to vanish like a soap bubble in a short
space of time. Little 1-,y little, however, his habits changed, and he
dedicated less and less time to work and study, reaching the point
where this relationship became the central element of his life struc-
ture, even though he appraised all this as just "responding to
elementary good manners imposed by living with another person." For
a couple of years this situation continued, Richard living it as if under
a spell; he appraised every moment as if it marked the end, only to
realize a moment later that there was further confirmation that he was
her choice, from the way she fought back against the pressure from her
-family, who had decided at all costs to make her break off this affair.
At the end of the second year the situation suddenly cooled; she
became vague and elusive, held her own less and less against her
family, and after a short space of time packed her bags and went back
to them. For some days, Richard suffered deep depression, when all of
a sudden he realized, as if the spell had finally broken, that it was
precisely his passive attitude, that of being "condemned and awaiting
the verdict," which had caused her to leave. He then started a
desperate chase that lasted for 2 years, continually running after her
and blaming himself for anything and everything if only they could
start again, and which finished only when he received a definitive
warning from the family lawyer.
The beginning of his love affair with his wife at the age of 32
happened in a different evolutionary context. Richard returned for
good to his own country, where he made a brilliant start as a television
director. The outcome of his previous affair increased his difficulty in
involving himself in further relationships, and emphasized the futility
of overwhelming intense affaifs, bringing about the feeling that his life
as a bachelor was coming to an end and that he ''had to get his head
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 149

together." His future wife, who was 12 years younger than he, was one of
his students, who, after being in a state of ecstatic adoration for about a
year, finally decided to ask him if there was any chance of their getting
together. Richard did not consider it an obstacle that he felt neither
passion nor enthusiasm; indeed it looked to him like a situation offered by
fate to enable him to start living just like everybody else. During the first
year of marriage, however, he felt progressively more disappointed by his
wife, whose immediacy and ingenuousness began to look more and more
like immaturity. When she became pregnant, he went into an intense
depressive crisis, which, as had emerged in the first sessions, was char,
acterized by a disturbing sense of ''feeling like another person." He came
out of it with the perspective that from that moment on, his life must be
centered on Qis wife and child, that is, on his "two children," as if to say
that he had changed from being a bachelor to being a widower with two
children. As a consequence he changed his life commitment, putting his
career as television director, which had been his only objective, into
second place.
Repeatedly "passing through the moviola" the reconstructed
sequence of critical events on the basis of the by now well-established
scene-analysis procedure, the essential ingredients on which the self,
organization of his affective style was based became clear to him.
In the first place, the centrality of the experience of loss leapt
into view as the connecting theme running through his whole way of
structuring affective relationships. Thus, the anticipated perception of
loss appeared as the ordering element of how a relationship was
started, as emerges from the first experience (it seeming impossible
that this should actually be happening to him), and the affair started
at age 25 (his feeling that her decision was a "soap bubble"), and also
his relationship with his wife, in which the "absence" of emotional
reciprocity (lack of enthusiasm and passion) had been the very condi,
tion permitting the formation of the relationship. The explicit requi,
site of perceiving himself as the "object of choice" on the part of the
partner emphasized, furthermore, that Richard felt it was he himself
who was the "cause" of this impending loss ("internal" causal attibu-
tion). It was precisely his pervasive sense of unlovableness which led
him to categorically exclude the possibility of taking the initiative in
any courting situation, even when he felt that there was mutual
attraction.
The trend of each relationship proceeded in a manner similar to
its inception; here too, in .fact, the continuous anticipation of loss
150 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

seemed to give him a key for reading the trend of things ("made fun of
and mistreated" in his first experience, "condemned and awaiting the
verdict" at 25, "widower" in his marriage), confirming and stabilizing
his ongoing sense of being-in-the-world (that of being alone, aban-
doned, inexorably separated from life and others). At the same time,
his minimizing of the life changes that accompanied his relationships
by attributing them to external factors such as "good manners" or the
"childishness" of his wife corresponded to a systematic failure to
acknowledge, through self-deceptive mechanisms, the range and in-
tensity of his own emotional involvement; besides, in a world in
which loss is experienced as certain and inevitable, "not being
attached to anybody" could not but appear to him as the most effective
way of reducing the intensity of disruptive feelings from detachments,
rejections, and so on, which he assumed must regularly occur.
Finally, the experience of loss unmistakably marked all the
crises and break-ups of his affective relationships. In the first place, it
was invariably the partner who took the initiative to end it, and
Richard passively "suffered" an abandonment which to him was the
definitive confirmation of what he had always felt, despite the fact
that he had more than once realized how he himself had brought
about this abandonment ( the outburst of rage on the first occasion,
the passive attitude held during the cohabitation started when he was
25, treating his wife from the start as a "retarded child"). Once the
break-up had happened, the excessive increase of the sense of his own
negativity and unlovableness was the only way to recover a more
active role, supplying an explanation of what had happened which
would be sufficiently consistent for him, and would at the same time
allow him to struggle to recover what had been lost. The episode of
"sexual perversion" with his wife, which had played an important part
in the first part of the work, was where this attitude stood out most
clearly.

In Sandra's case, the critical events of her affective history,

reconstructed by developing in succession the usual points, gave rise
to the following profile:
Her debut occurred when she was around 16--17, in the midst of
various difficulties deriving from the familial developmental context.
Her father, besides being emotionally absent from the family, ex-
ercised firm control over his daughter, as if she were some kind of
inept fool quite incapable of taking care of herself and thus prey to any
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 151

man who happened to pass by. It was therefore almost impossible to go

out when she had time off from studying; parties were forbidden, as
were trips or any other occasion for spending time with her peers. The
only friends admitted to the house were the few young women who
had passed through the screening examination of her father. Her
mother, even though not agreeing with her husband, whose continual
irascibility and violence she had to suffer, was nonetheless relieved
that Sandra was safe from the perils of the world and from the traps
laid by men, which she described continually in the afternoons they
spent alone in the house. Sandra, therefore, although feeling a strong
attraction to and curiosity about boys, was very frightened both by the
idea of the inevitable clashes with her father, and by the thought that,
alone, she might not know how to cope with all the dangers and
unknowns that lurked inside boys. The chance was offered her by a
female school friend whom she much admired and who, outside the
home, was her constant point of reference. This friend, while telling
her that there was a boy in the class who like her very much, warmly
commended him, several times emphasizing that he was a reliable boy
whom one could trust. Sandra felt reassured, as if she were being
"entrusted to good hands" by a dependable authority, and this made
her want to brave any paternal reactions without delay. This romance,
"remote-controlled" at the start, went on for some months. At first,
having someone look after her reassured her about her fear of having
rows with her father, and made her feel calm and independent from
her family. Soon afterward, however, it slowly dawned on her that his
solicitous manner was due to a jealousy that was leading him to
control any attitudes she had toward her peers. She started "to feel
suffocated" when she was at school, and after various qualms and
hesitations, abruptly put a stop to this relationship.
With university life first, and later with work, Sandra was able
to free herself, partly at least, from family control. She had had a
number of relationships with boys and had hence been able to gain
experience for herself of the hidden snares of the male world. Her first
experience had taught her that one must always seek to gain control of
the situation in order not be subject to others, as had happened in her
family and with her first boyfriend. So it was always she who made and
broke relationships, agilely extricating herself from numerous brief
liaisons which she gave no importance to, going from one to the
next with apparent nonchalance and self-confidence. The two rela-
tionships which, because of the length of time they lasted and the
152 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

involvement felt, seemed to her to be meaningful were, firstly, from

the age of 21 to 23, and secondly, with her present husband, begun at
the age of 25. Reconstructing the aspects that these two relationships
had in common, and which differentiated them from nonmeaningful
ones, her criteria of meaningfulness appeared to be fairly clear: first of
all, the partner had to be a strong man, reassuring and authoritative;
secondly, although leaning on him umeservedly for support, she
nevertheless had to feel that it was she who had control of the
relationship. It was exactly this "struggle for control" which seemed at
first glance to directly coincide with the level of passion and emotion-
al activation felt in the relationship.
At 21, Sandra was a brilliant woman who had put all the fears
and uncertainties of the time of her first experience behind her and
who seemed perfectly gratified by her success with the men who
seemed to be constantly "at her feet." She, on the one hand, by
playing the seductress, kept them "in her orbit" without conceding
much, and, on the other, treated them with a haughty air, bored by
the fact that she never met a man who could "hold his ground" against
her. He, 2 or 3 years older than she, was someone Sandra felt very
attracted to and curious about, given that, unlike . the others, he
seemed immune to her charms. Sandra did everything she could to be
at the social events he attended, using her entire seductive repertoire.
He, however, feigned such indifference that she perceived it as pro-
vocation and hence as a signal of interest. This situation of skirmish-
ing at a distance reached its height when he, coming out into the
open, asked her out. Sandra accepted with her usual haughty air, but
he did not show up. What should then have been a "settling of
accounts" when she, absolutely furious but apparently impassive, went
to his house to demand an explanation, instead became an awesome
sexual encounter which was the start of their affair. The trend of this
relationship, always somewhat tormented, passed through various
phases in the course of 2 years before concluding. The first few months
seemed to be a continuation of the initial skirmish. Sandra held her
ground against his insolence and sarcasm, maintaining situations with
other men and giving the general impression that she coulcf leave him
for another any time. She was, however, fascinated by his strong,
indomitable temperament, so that, despite his apparent unreliability,
with no one else did she feel so secure as she did with him. After 5 or 6
months he suddenly changed, and, becoming more and more
solicitous and assiduous, asked her for more of her time and involve-
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 153

ment. For Sandra, this was equivalent to a sign of victory which left
her overjoyed for a coµple of months. However, as it gradually began
to become clear that his involvement was real, she got a tremendous
fright when she suddenly realized that if this affair were to take a
"serious" turn, she would no longer be able to do without the security
that he transmitted to her. There then began a long phase in which
Sandra, precariously poised between the fear of not being able to do
without him and that of being alone, started to impose increasing
control over her emotions (avoiding intercourse, not reaching ~rgasm,
etc.) and eluded his control (not answering the phone, not showing
up for dates, etc.), giving rise to an interminable series of quarrels,
arguments, clarifications, and so on. The situation reached its height
when he, becoming more and more exasperated, started losing all
control in their quarr~ls, getting drunk and speaking disjointedly.
Sandra was horrified to discover that this indomitable man was really a
weakling who could not have offered support or protection to anyone.
This made her feel progressively stronger, so that during yet another
quarrel, she managed to end the situation once and for all. Returning
home, however, she felt she had suddenly lost all points of reference.
She experienced a moment of bewilderment which turned into a sense
of panic so acute that the only way out seemed to be to have herself
taken to the emergency department of the nearest hospital. Once she
had recovered a degree of control she telephoned her trusted girl
friend ( the one who had commended her first boyfriend), and as soon
as she had accompanied her home, the episode seemed to be closed.
At the age of 25, the "butterfly" period of youth appeared to be
1
by now in second place, and Sandra had started to work with a sense
of commitment and responsibility, leading a much more regular life.
The previous experience had put her on guard against what she called
"contorted people," referring to this last boyfriend, and she hoped for
a more tranquil relationship which, as well as guaranteeing the sup~
port she felt necessary, would also leave her time and energy to invest
in her career.
Her husband was 7 or 8 years older than she, and they had met
by chance at work. She was very attracted to him, both because of his
strong, decisive ways and because of the imperturbable calm he
showed in all things. Although living with another woman, he started
a rapid courtship, and Sandra, feeling that his already existing
relationship guaranteed that things could not get too serious, wound
up by accepting what seemed to her just a brief flirtation. After a few
154 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

months, however, he brusquely ended his cohabitation and became

increasingly solicitous. Sandra once again found herself in a precarious
balance between the fear of not being able to let go of him and that of
being alone, even though the situation now seemed quite different.
The readiness with which her husband had allowed Sandra to control
every aspect of his life and the calm he showed at all her extravagances
seemed to give her all the nece'ssary guarantees that this would be the
right marriage for her. But the more he pressed her for an answer, the
more she was unable to decide; this indecision might have gone on for
some time had she not become pregnant. It was far simpler to make
such an important decision once it became a necessity. Once married,
although there were moments of tension because of Sandra's in,
sistence over her independence, which her husband let pass with his
usual calm, the menage was fairly tranquil until the emergence of her
first panic attack; from that moment on, the structure of the relation,
ship rather abruptly changed, as Sandra could not be alone and
required the continual presence of her husband.
Passing the sequence of critical scenes several times "through
the moviola" and making use of the ability, which Sandra had by now
developed, to reconstruct her subjective experiences by shifting alter,
nately between subjective and objective points of view, it was possible
to point out to her the invariant aspects underlying the organization of
her affective style.
The connecting thread running through this organization ap,
peared to be centered on a sense of attachment appraised as a need for
protection and experienced in antithetical correlation with an equally
strong need for freedom and independence. Thus, from the moment of
her first love, the sense of feeling protected by a reference figure
appeared to be the necessary condition for beginning a relationship.
However, as soon as this sense of protection went beyond a certain
limit of emotional activation corresponding to the pressure of the
partner to intensify the relationship (the "jealousy" of her first boy,
friend), the feeling of being limited in her physical and emotional
world immediately became the trigger which brought about the break,
up of the situation. The commitment to control which emerged from
the first experience thus seemed to give her the possibility of better
modulating and attenuating the current levels of involvement, corre,
spondingly dampening the fears of constriction and loss of in,
dependence. And indeed, as becomes clearer from her relationship at
the age of 21, the only cue available for appraising such a complex way
C onstruing the Thera1,mti.c Setting 1.55

of experiencing affectivity was fear, which indiscriminately marked

hoth the heginning of the involvement (fe,~r of losing independence)
and the heginning of a disengagement (fear of heing alone). In this
sense it seemed clear that a competitive interaction, like that which
she had at 21, was transformed for her into a setting which "from
without" allowed her more control over her involvement, at the same
time permitting her to increase at will the level of emotional activa-
tion without running the risk of being "dropped." On the other hand,
the tormented conclusion of the affair she had hegun at 21 made clear,
in her eyes, that a competitive setting, on its own, was no longer able
to guarantee "a relationship without ties," so that only the "external
control" guaranteed hy the fact that the partner had another tie
seemed to attenuate, Sandra's competitiveness, without, however,
quenching it entirely (e.g., quarrels about independence, difficulty of
making a decision about marriage proportional to his insistence). This
need for outside control was also evident in the possibility, provided
by the "unexpected" pregnancy, of finally being able to decide to tie
herself to someone.
Finally, feelings linked to a disengagement or to an increased
emotional detachment [Link] to become partly recognizable due to a
concomitant change of image nf the partner from "strong" to "weak"
(which is what happened in her relationship at the age of 21 and in that
with her husband, as we have seen above). The emotions linked to a
greater involvement in a situation instead seemed to be less recognizable
and could be experienced only as an uncontrollable fear of losing control
over herself, the most evident situation being that with her husband, in
which she had reacted to his detachment (discovery of betrayal) by
obliging him to stay in continual contact with her (and thus putting
herself in a siuiation of greater involvement); however, it was almost
impossible for her at the outset of therapy to trace what she felt to the
emotional reciprocity going on with her husband.

As we have seen, for Winnie the affective relationship ex-

perienced as essential in her present life structure was the relationship
with her mother. So in this case one was not dealing so much with
analyzing a "sentimental career," which in practice had yet to begin,
as with reconstructing the current self-organization of her affective
style from the way in which she had structured her relationship with
her mother. As the reformulation of the original problem, underraken
in the work done so far, gradually clarified, it became clearer for
156 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

Winnie that what should be reconstructed was the way in which she
had structured a relationship with her mother which did not allow
even the slightest reappraisal of her image.
For Winnie the current trend of the relationship with her
mother had started when she was 15, from the beginning of high
school. During the 3 years of middle school she felt able to cope with
her mother, even to the point of having furious rows with her. By
mutual agreement it was therefore decided to begin to analyze her
experiencing of her relationship with her mother starting from the
middle school period (age 12 on), in order to be able to reconstruct
the way in which such experiencing had later changed. The critical
events, broken down into corresponding scenes, would be "put
through the moviola" several times; they were arranged, roughly
speaking, as follows:
Her mother had always presented herself as an exemplary
woman in her roles of wife and mother, continually complaining that
her husband and daughters did not have the feelings, strength of will,
and ability equal to her own. With this continual attitude of pointing
out the "negativity" of the other members of the family with respect to
her "positivity," her mother several times emphasized that they all
weighed heavily on her shoulders, with the result that she had always
sacrificed herself for those who did not deserve it. Everyone in the
family had always accepted this formulation of things and had put
themselves out, in the hope not so much of meeting the mother's
expectations (which seemed impossible) as, if nothing else, of not
disappointing her too much and thus managing to alleviate the weight
of a sacrifice made inevitable by their incompetence.
For Winnie, everything started to change when she was 12, at
the beginning of middle school. Not that she cast her mother's
sacrificial role into doubt, but she had simply begun all of a sudden to
appraise the atmosphere at home as suffocating and felt oppressed. So
she began to react to her mother's criticisms, at first with spirited
protests which ended up with "tears of guilt" in her room, and then,
gradually, with real clashes in which Winnie alternated tears with
fury. If one broadened the focus of exploration in order to include
other experiential domains, one could clearly see how this changed
attitude toward her mother went in parallel with other changes which
had come about in the meantime.
Winnie went to middle school late because of years lost due to
illness in elementary school, so this change coincided with a true
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 157

"change of world" which did not derive simply from the increased
complexity of scholastic level and the consequently greater diligence
required. In the first place, Winnie spent almost her whole day at
school as her mother, to lighten the load of bringing up the family on
her own, expected her daughter to do her homework at school. This
had put her into closer contact with the world of her peers, which
seemed different and fascinating. Secondly, with her literature mis-
tress, whom Winnie esteemed greatly and considered exceptional, she
had from the beginning established an affectionate and cordial
relationship. This teacher, once lessons were over, stayed behind to
talk to Winnie in the garden and showing herself to be always very
understanding, stimulated her interests and curiosity, encouraging her
to follow them. up. While this relationship became more permanent
and friendly, Winnie found herself facing totally new experiences; she
was not a little amazed to feel herself to be understood instead of
criticized in the daily rows that she was having with her mother. So
while the family atmosphere continued to be more and more suffocat-
ing, school had become the only place in which Winnie felt at ease, to
the point where she awaited the arrival of Sunday with anxiety. In this
way, her teacher eventually became transformed for Winnie into an
absolute model of reference, so that for the whole period of middle
school she tried to be like her in all things, even taking on her most
banal attitudes and gestures.
When, at 15, at the end of middle school, she changed schools
and started high school, the trend of things at home had not changed;
on the contrary, the rows with her mother had increased because of
the new exigencies of adolescence which Winnie now claimed. The
situation came brusquely to a head, however, one afternoon when
during one of the usual rows, her mother, absolutely beside herself,
threatened to shut her up in a boarding school known for its severity
until she was of age. Winnie was terrified both by the seriousness of
the threat and by the fact that her mother, usually so composed, had
lost control of herself in that way. She immediately felt that in this
struggle of hers, which all of a sudden seemed senseless to her, she
must have done something irreparable; she felt "defeated" and "nulli-
fied," and bursting into tears, implored her mother to forgive her,
declaring herself ready to do anything as long as she did so. Shortly
afterwards it was finished, and no more mention was made of boarding
school. However, from that moment Winnie began more and more
often to feel "empty" and incapable of feeling sensations, and, in
158 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

parallel, her attitude toward her mother changed radically. Winnie no

longer reacted to her criticisms, ,but changed into a girl dedicated to
study and to the family, as if being thought of as her mother's right
hand had become her only ambition. From then on, save the momen-
tary disagreement over her brief flirtation during the summer when she
was 17, the relationship with her mother stayed within these lines.
Passing the individual scenes "through the moviola" several
times and relying on the ability that Winnie now had both to differen-
tiate between the sense of self and the behavior of others, and to see
herself in the same scene from the inside and from the outside, it was
possible to show how it had progressively become unbearable for her to
experience any reappraisal of her mother's perceived image.
The point of departµre in the scene-analysis procedure was that
of reconstructing the role played in the affective domain by an aspect
which had seemed notable to Winnie from preceding work, that is,
the "externally bound" attitude of mirroring herself in others' behavior
to be abl~ to self-refer and recognize her immediate experiencing. In
this way it began to become clear to her that such an attitude was
inherent in her way of structuring affective relationships.
On the one hand, perceiving the other as an absolute model was
the essential criterion for a person to be experienced as significant; on
the other, being attuned with and adhering to his or her perceived
expectations was the essential way to feel herself involved in an
exclusive relationship while at the same time experiencing a definite
sense of herself. Focusing particularly on this aspect, going back and
forth in the sequence of critical scenes, it became fairly straightfor-
ward to emphasize how her sense of self ch~nged radically according to
whether the reference model was represented by her mother or by her
teacher.
Secondly, it seemed essential that in her "existential horizon"
there should always be an absolute model of reference available and
that the changes taking place within her (need for more autonomy
from her mother and sharing more in the world of her peers) eventual-
ly coincided with the passage from one reference model to another.
Indeed, if one reconstructed the period in which she was able to stand
up to her mother, it soon became evident that this corresponded to
the period in which she experienced the privileged relationship with
her teacher. Continuing to focus on this period, it became easy to see
that her distancing herself from a model did not consist so much of
modifying her way of representing it, but rather of trying to substitute
Construing the Thcra/Jcutic Setting 159

it almost mech,mically from "outside" with another that at the time

seemed to her more valid. In fact, if one reconstructed her subjective
experience during the rows of the middle school period, one could see
that there was no trace of criticism of her mother's way of doing things
which she still considered valid. What was happening in her was
simply that she was trying to oppose, as a test of strength, the image,
attitudes, and opinions of her teacher against her mother's way of
doing things. In this test of strength she slowly felt herself losing from
the moment that she changed school and the relationship with her
teacher, no longer a daily matter, became progressively redimen-
sioned.
It then became equally clear what had happened on that famous
afternoon in which, all of a sudden, she had felt defeated and nullified
and which she immediately attributed to some intrinsic incompetence
(as her mother had always said). Being no longer able to oppose the
image of her teacher t('i that of her mother she suddenly felt as if she
were deprived of any possible identity, and this, more than the threat
<lf boarding school, had frightened her to death. At that point, only
an even more unconditional adherence to the model represented by
her mother-who, apart from anything else, was the only one avail-
able to her-could enable her to glimpse a possible way out of that
sense of indefiniteness of self which she appraised as intolerable. All
this naturally brought with it a whole range of self-deceptive mech-
anisms which seemed to guarantee the possibility of recognizing her-
self in an absolute reference model, but which in actual fact further
diminished the possibility of reaching a stable and definite sense of
self. On the one hand, the more she exerted herself to exclude feelings
and opinions that could interfere with her attunement to her mother's
expectations, the more intense and pervasive became the sense of
0

emptiness and the fear of not feeling any emotions. On the other
hand, every time (as in the period of her summer flirtation) the
experiencing of a change in the mother's image circumvented her
deceptive self-referring, its emerging into consciousness could only be
appraised as an absolutely unbearable calling into question of herself.
It should finally be pointed out that while the reconstruction of
her affective style proceeded, passing the sequence of critical scenes
"through the mo viola," there was carried on, in parallel, a reframing
of these same scenes in which the image of her mother as a person was
reconstructed, using Winnie's new ability to differentiate her mother's
behavior from her own sense of self. This reframing was marked by a
160 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

consistent reappraisal of the image of the mother whose "being a

victim of others' inadequacy" seemed more and more to Winnie to be
a mask through which the mother managed to manipulate all the
members of the family without ever coming out into the open with her
need for control and power in relationships.

The affect-laden events that characterized Gregory's affective

history-reconstructed according to the usual points in order-gave
rise to the following picture:
Following a difficult puberty studded with various dilemmas as
to the rightness or otherwise of sexual impulses (erotic fantasies,
masturbation, etc.), Gregory went through adolescence fairly secluded
from his peers, as only being with the family seemed to lift him out of
the various doubts pervading him. His sentimental debut took place at
the age of 19-20 and coincided with the first time Gregory spent a
summer holiday at camp with some people of his own age. They got to
know the other boys and girls from neighboring tents and Gregory
found himself more and more frequently in the company of two very
active and enterprising sisters who involved him in nearly all their
enterprises. At first, Gregory accepted their invitations somewhat
timidly and awkwardly so as not to disappoint them, then he gradually
began to feel at ease because of their vivacity and spontaneity, so that
he realized, and was disoriented by it, that he felt something for them
which was perhaps more than just simple liking. In a state of growing
tension, Gregory felt, for a moment, that he was absolutely unable to
control his sexual impulses, feeling himself pervaded by the usual
tormenting doubts about himself (wicked/nonwicked, etc.). He
seemed to recover a margin of control over this intolerable sense of
perhaps being a despicable person, as he gradually persuaded himself
that the only way to be "serious" and "perfect" was to choose which of
the two sisters seemed the "right" one in terms of strength of feeling
and human values. The result was that the more he weighed the pros
and cons, the more uncertain he felt, and if he tried to call on the
sisters for help, explaining his doubts, he was overwhelmed by a wave
of hilarity and joking that left him even more diffident and anxious.
The situation came to a head one morning as he was explaining his
usual doubts to one of the sisters, seeking reassurance and con-
firmation; at first she pretended to be listening, and then, jumping
over to him, kissed him passionately and then ran away laughing
herself helpless. Gregory felt betrayed and cheated, and became even
Construing the Therapeutic Setting 161

colder and more detached. Another reason for chis behavior was that
the sudden kiss had produced unforeseen sensations in him which
once again evoked doubts about himself. Fortunately, his holiday soon
finished and Gregory, returning to his usual, reassuring daily life, soon
classified the experience as an anomaly attributable to the promiscuity
inherent in such situations-which from now on he would assiduously
avoid.
After this experience, Gregory threw himself into his studies,
and his relationship with girls consisted of brief flirtations which
started out full of ideals and noble values and which immediately
disappointed him because of their sensual charge, leaving him still
more wary and diffident. Reviewing his sentimental career as a whole,
two meaningful relationships could be identified: the first from 21 to
22, and the second with his wife, begun at 23. The criteria for
meaningfulness recognizable in both situations were that the partner
should be much more exuberant and spontaneous in her emotivity
than him, and moreover that such emotivity, combined with other
gifts, should be capable of arousing in him total commitment, devoid
of all imperfection or uncertainty.
In the first relationship, at age 21-22, he had met the girl at
university and had immediately been attracted by her vitality and ease
of manner, and so he gradually became more assiduous, courting her
in a very veiled and embarrassed way. This would probably have
followed the course of his flirtations, which he began enthusiastically
and quickly grew cold, had she not presented him with a fait accompli
by saying in front of everyone that they were dating. Gregory felt at
that moment quite unable to react given that, on the one hand, he
appraised it as an exalting confirmation of her interest, but, on the
other hand, he also felt it as a weight that had fallen on him and
which he would have to bear. For the moment, the exalting aspect
seemed to hold sway and he decided that this was a "joyous weight"
and accepted being launched into a relationship. Slowly, however,
the weight, though joyous, began to weigh heavier, so that he started
to progressively detach himself, reflecting and ruminating over the
best way to end the situation. All his ruminating came to a halt,
however, when faced with the fact that breaking off the relationship
would mean making her suffer, as she always seemed so enthusiastic
and involved. In this way, surrounded by doubts and long silences
when they were together, the relationship dragged on for nearly a
year, until she, exasperated, decided to break off what by now seemed
162 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

to her an irretrievable situation. Gregory was not too upset by her

departure, nor by what she had said when she broke up with him;
indeed, many times he had imagined this as a possible way things
might go, and this all seemed to him perfectly understandable. He
therefore promised himself once more to be cautious and prudent in
his search for the right situation.
The occasion when he met his wife, at university once again,
had been preceded by a very brief summer flirtation with an English
girl who for a moment had seemed to him to correspond completely to
his ideal woman; the disappointment had then so embittered him that
he dismissed the importance of everything he had believed until that
moment, and had shelved the matter.
Gregory had been att<racted by her emotional temperament, at
once lively and reassuring, and by the uncommon intelligence he had
glimpsed in his wife; thus, little by little it became clear that this could
finally be the relationship that he had been looking for, so much so
that, contrary to his usual habits, it was he who took the initiative to
start this relationship.
However, as the relationship was taking a more involving tum,
largely because of his wife's enthusiasm and enterprise, Gregory began
to have pervasive and tormenting doubts as to whether the right
woman was in fact his wife or the English girl, who had suddenly
reappeared from memory. Months of uncertainty followed, during
which he continually ruminated on the comparison between the two
while thrown into doubt about setting out, despite himself, on a path
which might in the end prove to be the wrong one. His wife's
reassurances grew more attentive and solicitous, and her family
showed themselves to be ready to welcome him among them, so these
doubts, at a certain point, began to wane. It therefore seemed the
obvious thing to everybody when during the engagement party, his
father-in-law, who was of the same profession that Gregory was soon
to start, proposed that he join his firm as soon as he graduated. The
tranquility thus achieved lasted only briefly. As we saw in the first part
of this chapter, as the date of the wedding drew near, Gregory began
to have innumerable doubts about the ceremony, the dates, and so on,
which, following his wife's ultimatum, led to the frightening insight of
possibly being the unwitting victim of someone else's game of opportu-
nity.
Passing the individual scenes "through the moviola" and relying
on the ability, which Gregory now possessed, to differentiate between
Construing the Thcru1Jcutic Setting 163

experiencing and explaining, as well as that of being able to recon-

struct the multifaceted aspects of ongoing feelings while observing
himself from within and from without, it was possible to reconstruct
the invariants underlying his way of structuring affective relation-
ships.
His difficulty in recognizing complex emotions became clear to
him, especially unfolding ones (e.g., a progressive engagement or an
emerging disengagement). This is what happened, although with
different intensity, in his first experience and in his relationship with
his wife; in the second relationship, where the involvement felt hy
him was somewhat reduced, the doubts and fears had concerned,
through his anticipatory rnminations, the management and control of
the emotions which separation might have evoked.
Focusing on individual scenes, it became clear that this difficul-
ty depended on the assumption that emotions behaved with the same
unequivocality and coherence as thoughts; in fact the moment he
appraised the slightest contrasting aspect in his feelings, this, with
the coherence of his "all-or-nothing" logic, was immediately experi-
enced as something calling both himself and the relationship into
question. Thus, even the smallest displeasure he felt immediately
meant that the partner was not the right one, and that he had yet
again made a mistake. If, therefore, he found himself in some flir-
tation with no commitment, he let it drop and was left feeling dis-
appointed; in an already established relationship, however, the dis-
pleasure, if not immediately "erased" and deprived of all validity,
gave rise to doubts and uncertainties which protracted into contin-
ual ruminating.
Finally, it was e4ually evident that this difficulty in self-referring
feelings and emotions was linked to the continual worry of maintain-
ing an image of himself which was acceptable in terms of his extremely
rigid ethical and moral principles. Focusing on individual scenes, the
continuity of these self-deceptive mechanisms became, even in his
eyes, ever dearer: the causal external attribution with which he
explained the trend of his flirtations (e.g. , promiscuity); or the break-
up of his relationships (e.g., his second relationship) which allowed
him to shelve everything without having to revise his image of him-
self; or, finally, the avoidance of direct self-referral of "negative"
feelings, such as resentment or hostility toward his wife, with the
result (as seen in the first part of the chapter) of excessively multiply-
ing his mminations and doubts about himself.
164 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

It is clear that in a work of reconstruction of this nature more

effective results in triggering a change in the client's current viewpoint
on him- or herself are related to the therapist's knowledge of the
dynamics of various organizations of personal meaning ([Link].).
On the one hand, knowing that any P. M. Org., when ex-
periencing an affective imbalance, is characterized by specific distress-
ing feelings as well as by equally specific self-deceiving patterns orients
the therapist in understanding the difficulties emerging from deepen-
ing self-observation and in shifting the focus toward those patterns of
coherence not accessible to the client.
On the other hand, knowing how any [Link]. unfolds
through lifespan development helps the therapist formulate hypoth-
eses both about the nature of the imbalance that has occurred and
about its effects on the corresponding existential period, and con-
sequently to elaborate strategies more effective in reordering disrup-
tive feelings. Hence, there is undoubtedly a different intensity and
quality to disturbing emotions produced by the unbalancing of a
relationship already established in one's life structure (Richard and
Sandra) with respect to one which still seems to be in the initial stages
(Gregory). All this is even more apparent in Winnie's case, where the
elaboration of a strategy required from the therapist the knowledge of
the difficulty of emotional distancing from parents usually exhibited
during adolescence by eating-disorders-prone subjects; that is, know-
ing how an unbalancing in the relationship with the mother could be
matched by a lack of emotional detachment and sense of autonomy
from that figure, it becomes possible to plan the reconstruction of the
rela-tionship with the mother in such a way as to facilitate the
relativization of her figure which turned out to still be at the beginning
stage.
Finally, going back and forth through critical events with the
usual scene-analysis procedure during the whole reconstruction of an
affective style (varying between a minimum of 3 to a maximum of 7
months) brings about a gradual reordering of immediate experiences
paralleled by a reframing of these same events. This, in tum, triggers
off a further appreciable change in the client's viewpoint on him- or
herself (change in the "Me" appraisal of the "I").
At this stage it consists of a shifting from experiencing the
repetitiveness of affective events as "given as such" to appraising it as a
self-organized procedure aimed at maintaining one's perceived sense of
self through the ongoing production of recurrent feelings and emo-
Construing th.: Thernpcutic Setting 165

tional tonalities consistent with the experiencing of one's continuity

and uniqueness. This change in the "Me" appraisal of the "I" is
matched by the emergence of a second level of restmcturing of the
range of perceivable emotions: on the one hand, the client can
recognize and appreciate how different emotional states combine and
recombine themselves when going through an affectional bond, just as
the perception of a significant other comes to regulate his or her
self-perception; on the other hand, he or she is now able to experience
how these recombinations and perceptions of significant others unfold
through a personal meaning coherence whose traces are now recogniz-
able from early developmental periods on.
As well as being accompanied by a practically total disappear-
ance of the original disturbances, a change in the viewpoint of oneself
of this kind brings the emergence of new levels of abstract self-
referring in ordering past and present experiences, and a different
attitude toward reality with the discovery of new experiential do-
mains. It may thus be understandable that more than 50% of clients
prefer to stop at this point of the treatment, maintaining a relation-
ship with the therapist through check-up sessions which gradually
decrease in frequency (e.g. , first once a month, then every 2 or 3,
then every 5 or 6, and so on) and cease altogether, generally speaking,
in the space of 2 or 3 years. It is clear that the therapist should have no
qualms about the client stopping at this point in the work; indeed,
there does not exist an unequivocal way in which things should unfold
(including the therapy being carried out) and the client remains, in
the final analysis, the only one who can decide what is the best way for
him or her to proceed along his or her life trajectory.
8
Undertaking the
Developmental Analysis

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The third phase lasts between a minimum of 3 to a maximum of

6 months, and thus takes place in the second year of therapy. This
phase begins when clients are interested in continuing personal ex-
ploration despite the disappearance of the disturbances that were
troubling them. Generally it is only necessary to clarify the work of
self-observation which they are preparing to undertake. At this point,
it is clear to clients that their goal is to reconstruct the way in which
their developmental pathway led them to structure that personal
meaning which became so clear in their eyes during the completion of
the second phase.
The first step consists of reconstructing the client's developmen-
tal history in order to identify the significant events to be broken
down into their corresponding scenes which will subsequently be
passed "through the moviola" repeatedly. This is certainly not a simple
matter for the therapist, and not ,only because memories of the past,
despite their importance, are often vague, imprecise, and superim-
posed on one another. The main difficulty is that the client usually
endorses a version of his or her past history which has been "tidying
itself up" over the years with ad hoc explanations that appear to be in
keeping with a specific image of oneself, although it has been undergo-
ing modification during the second phase of therapy.
Despite the different characteristics depending on the type of
meaning organization, what one finds, almost invariably, is that the

166
U11dcrtaki11g the Dcvclo1nnental Analysis 167

affect-laden attachment memories, deceptively appraised and self-

referred, are characterized by explanations which are discrepant with
the experiencing that such memories trigger off. Given that the
explanations appear to he more consistent with their perceived coher-
ence, clients usually assume that "the facts" are identified with the
explanations rather than with their experiencing. Making continual
reference to the experiencing/explaining differentiation during the
reconstruction allows the therapist to recognize the significant dis-
crepant scenes to he reordered and at the same time to make what the
client had taken for granted seem different. Therefore, rather than by
the insistence with which certain topics are presented or the motives
adduced ("explaining"), the events to be considered significant should
instead be identified by th~ type of emotional resonance they give rise
to ("experiencing") and by the way in which the client manages to
recognize and self-refer it. In this way, the memories which appear to
he significant are those which, regardless of the "obviousness" or
"banality" (lf their content, arouse "discrepant" sensations and emo-
tions, that is, those for which the client cannot give what he or she
feels is an exhaustive explanation. Once again, therefore, it is knowl-
edge of the stages of development characterizing the self-organization
of personal meaning dimensions, added to the knowledge of the
specific deceptive ways with which the client self-refers immediate
experiencing, that guides the therapist in identifying the significant
events on which to focus.
Therefore, starting from the very earliest memories of life that it
is possible to recall, one proceeds with a thorough gathering of affect-
laden events, analyzing in succession the trend of the main matura-
tional stages, that is, infancy and preschool years (from Oto 6); childhood
(from around 7 to 12-13); adolescence and youth (from 13 to 20-21)
(see Appendix),
The interdependence between attachment and selfhood pro-
cesses ( and the way in which this interdependence regulates the
interplay between emotional differentiation and cognitive growth)
is the developmental thread which provides the self-observational
focus in going back and forth in the sequence of affect-laden
scenes. Thus, for each scene, one puts into focus both the sequence of
interactions contain~ therein in order to reconstruct the attachment
patterns in progress, and the subjective experience of the child in
order t6 reconstruct the sense of self and of the world appraised at that
moment.
168 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

The scene-analysis procedure essentially remains the same as in

the preceding phases, with the only difference that, making use of the
client's advanced skills in the self-observational method, the recon-
struction of a significant experience at a certain age may be carried out
while further broadening the continuous shifting between subjective
and objective viewpoints. Indeed, once the subjective viewpoint with
which an event was experienced has been reconstructed, it can be
matched against two different objective viewpoints:

L How one would see him- or herself from without with the
"eyes" of that same age (thus being able to reconstruct with
greater thoroughness the sensations felt and the consequent
discoveries which were at the time held to have been made).
2. How one sees now from without while focusing on that age,
reconstructing with "eyes of the present" (i.e. , from the
changed viewpoint which has emerged in the preceding
phase) the discoveries which, from those sensations, one now
thinks one made then.

As the focus of the exploration gradually deepens, the self-

observation viewpoints increase, and it is precisely this continuous
and alternating shifting between viewpoints throughout the develop-
mental analysis that allows the client's flexibility to increase to the
point where it triggers further changes in his or her current viewpoint
on him- or herself.
In describing the developmental analysis of our clients, we shall
describe only the salient moments of the reconstruction under way, that
is, those in which the client experienced an intense emotional activation
in focusing on certain events and those in which there came about a
reframing of memories which were particularly critical in the develop-
ment of personal meaning. It is as well to bear in mind, however, that the
therapeutic efficacy of any developmental analysis depends not only on
the reframing of critical memories (undoubtedly essential), but also on
the amount of time spent on the methodical and repetitive going back
and forth in order to increase the client's flexibility.

CASE ILLUSTRATIONS

Richard was able to trace that sense of sadness which had always
accompanied him to his earliest memories of life, going back to 2 or 3
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 169

years of age. He attributed his sadness to the fact this his parents had
had him at a fairly late age, when they had already resigned them-
selves to not having children and to leading an existence without
pretensions or excitement, in the company of a much older house-
keeper who looked after them. His first images of life were of "grey
surroundings" and "gloomy atmospheres" in which there moved old
people whom he appraised as "lifeless" and entirely detached from his
child's world. In these first years, it was not possible to trace any image
of his interacting with other people, whether playing games with other
children or with adults. His most tranquil moments were those spent
alone in the garden, whereas in contact with his parents he was always
perturbed by their economic vicissitudes, which they talked about
continually," The clearest memory of this time was when he was 4, and
concerned his father, who, leaning toward him and with a worried
look on his face, said, "How are we going to be able to give you a
future with the situation we're in?" This was a memory that still
perturbed him deeply, so much so that every time he talked about it,
his voice was broken by tears. It was the first time that it had become
clear to him that his birth had turned out to be an unbearable burden
for his parents, who otherwise would have been able to lead a peaceful
life undisturbed by life's troubles.
Focusing on all the scenes with his mother or with his father,
one was struck by the total lack of any moment whatever of emotional
contact or effusion with his parents. Richard attributed this to his
parents being taken up hy "far more important things than slobbering
over their son." Indeed, with his birth they had had to intensify their
work which proceeded in the midst of difficulties and uncertainties,
and, in addition, he had been, from the start, a "sickly" child, and as
such, a continual source of worry which eventually and inevitably
took the place of carefree moments of affection which might otherwise
have been possible.
Because of his delicate health, he was forced to forgo nursery
school and put off the long-awaited moment of meeting his peers until
the beginning of school. However, just before the beginning of pri-
mary school, the family doctor found that he had a "weak heart" and
dissuaded his parents from sending him to school. Consequently,
during the primary school years, Richard stayed at home to study,
aided by an elderly retired teacher who came wearily to him every day
with the sole obvious aim of adding to a somewhat meager pension.
This additional unforeseen expense naturally worsened the already
precarious family budget, and Richard appraised this as his weighing
170 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

even further on his old and tired parents who surely deserved quite a
different son. He appraised this particularly with his father, a figure
who aroused tenderness and respect at the same time as being seen as
always "unreachable" and taken up with worries of which he was
largely the cause. It was above all for his father (whom he referred to
affectionately as "my Old Man") that he had decided to make as much
effort as possible in his studies in order to be able in that way to repay
him, at least in part, for all the troubles he had unwittingly brought
into the home. Richard asserted that he did not much feel the effects
of those years of isolation and lack of amusement because of this total
commitment to his studies, which gave him a sense of being one of the
family. When at the age of 11 he took the exams for entry to middle
school, he came out top, and received a cash prize which he proudly
presented to his father with the sense of finally having "earned" his
place in the family.
However, toward the age of 12, his "weakness of the heart"
seemed to have been overcome, and his parents, stressing that this was
yet another sacrifice, decided to send him to a fairly renowned board-
ing school where he would be able to obviate the inevitable lacunae of
private study. Although he made an effort not to give anything away,
Richard appraised the imminent separation from his parents with a
deep sense of desperation and with the pervasive anxiety that he
would perhaps not see them again. At the moment of getting on the
train, his mother in saying goodbye embraced and kissed him for the
first time; the moment he realized that this had never happened
before, Richard had the confirmation that this was a matter of defini-
tive, irreversible separation, and burst into uncontrollable tears, de-
spite his father's repeatedly urging him to "be a man."
Initially, installing himself in his new surroundings was ex-
tremely difficult. He arrived in college with the reputation of being
"clever" but "different" and "sickly," which did not put him in a good
light with his fellows; and also the impact with this world, which in
comparison to home seemed so complex, had been so sudden that
Richard, unequipped with even the most elementary norms of social
behavior, felt clumsy and awkward and mostly kept to himself. So, as
he realized with dismay that he would have to go it alone anyway, he
involved himself more and more in his studies and immersed himself
in literature, which allowed him to "live parallel lives in books."
Although remaining at the top scholastically, he gradually man-
aged to make himself appreciated and accepted by his peers, eventual-
UnJcrwking the Dcvcl0Jm1cntal An«lysL, 171

ly becoming an indisputable leader. This period from age 13 to 15

corresponded to a period of well-being that Richard had never felt
[Link], and of discoveries he had never imagined. Fmrn contact with
his peers he had discovered he had qualities that others appreciated
and that it was therefore possible for him to feel differently about
himself from how he felt at home. From the occasional contact with
the families of his peers who came to visit (and at whom he gazed
through astonished eyes) he had discovered, with even more wonder,
a whole way of heing and of seeing rhe world which was different from
that experienced at home.
From age 15 to 17, Richard, continuing in his role as leader,
suddenly started to do less well at school, something he could not
explain even as an adplt except by attributing it to a "reawakening of
the senses" which he hegan to feel overwhelmingly during that period.
When his father, on his rare visits, treated him coldly as if he were a
"degenerate," Richard felt a mixture of humiliation, remorse, and rage
which threw him into the blackest despair for weeks afterwards.
The situation came to a head when he was nearly 18 and his
father withdrew him from his boarding school in order to send him to
another one which was much stricter and more rigorous. Richard at
first felt despair at the news , and then suddenly had an attack of fury
he had never imagined possible. In the grip of uncontrollable turmoil
he refused to go to college or even to continue with school and shut
himself up in his room, immersing himself as much as possible in the
literature that had become his "real life."
There followed a year of tension and despair. From that mo-
1nent, his father did not speak to him again and spoke of him in the
past as if he were dead, even though he silently consented to the fact
that "unknown to him," the mother sent food and a little money to his
room. Richard could not understand how his father could behave as if
he did not exist and now felt a sense of "cosmic" solitude, when as a
child he had felt merely a burden. He also felt that all his attempts to
be different had been useless folly, and that the only thing that might
have mattered, "making an effort for the Old Man's sake," had turned
out to be a colossal failure for which he alone, as usual, was responsi-
ble. So, at the age of 19 or 20, when after his disappointing first love
experience it seemed that nothing justified his continuing presence
there, he decided to play to the full his role as degenerate son and
abandoned his family amilbt general opposition. As now hecame
clear, this role had allowed him for years to daydream ahout the day
172 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

when as a famous director he would return ·home welcomed with

affection, recognition, and his father's apologies. The fact that both
his parents died when he was still a long way from establishing himself
as a director confirmed for him that he had been a disgrace for them,
and that he might also be a disgrace for all those who loved him.
Repeatedly passing "through the moviola" the ensemble of
affect-laden scenes, it was a fairly straightforward matter to recon-
struct the gradual self-organization of Richard's depressive meaning,
while at the same time reordering his appraisal of the past.
For Richard it was clear that, from the first stages of life, solitude
and the sense of affective loss (i.e. , not deserving the affection and
attention of his .parents because of having "ruined" their life) repre-
sented the connecting thread along which his entire history had
unfolded. What was less clear was how the attachment dynamics
influenced all this and the role played by his parents. As is entirely
characteristic in the process of encoding and assembling memories by
helpless children (see Chapter 3), Richard had the tendency to
minimize the experience of distressing affect (the almost total isola-
tion of childhood was not considered particularly stressing) as well as
the tendency to dismiss the importance of the relationship with his
parents as a source of comfort or support ("they had more important
things to think about") . Moreover, it was just this tendency to reduce
or exclude the perceived level of affect which made it possible for
certain memories to be accompanied by feelings which, not meeting
with adequate appraisal and self-referring, still had a perturbing effect.
The memory belonging to the age of 4, which still made him cry
whenever he talked about it, was particularly indicative in this sense,
and passing it "through the moviola" several times was for Richard an
intense emotional experience accompanied by various discoveries
about himself and his parents. If while working with the experiencing/
explaining differentiation, at which Richard was by now proficient,
one "took seriously" the sense of helplessness, that is, that as im-
mediate experience this was the fact to be explained, the perspective
with which to put the scene into focus became: What attitude of the
father had made it possible that helplessness should become for him
the · most suitable "reading"? Shifting continuously in seeing from
within and without (from both objective viewpoints) both himself and
his father, it became clear that what had struck him most about his
father's attitude was his "making him a participant in the problems of
the household, as if he were an adult" which he had appraised as a
Underwking the Devdo/Jmentul Anlllysis 173

crushing responsibility; the "weight," therefore, was that of not being

able to be a child, experienced as the impossibility of having (i.e.,
loss) the protection, affection, and attention due to a child. More-
over, if the focus was broadened, running up and down the whol.e
sequence of critical images of childhood, one saw how this theme of
"not deserving the affection due to children," confirmed moment by
moment by the total lack of affection on the part of his parents, was
being articulated; on the one hand, protecting his parents from the
"disgrace" which he represented allowed him, at the time, to recover
at least in part some reciprocal affection, while leaving open the
possibility that "making a big effort for his folks" would one day fully
recover this affection (inversion of the parent-child relationship). On
the other hand, he was ,able to look after himself efficiently in situa-
tions which would be difficult for any other child, such as that of
pursuing his studies alone during his childhood and still managing to
come out on top (self-caring and compulsive self-reliance). Moreover,
as these different aspects began to tie up, it became clearer for Richard
that his parents' behavior-attribution of heavy responsibility coupled
with the lack of emotional support needed to deal with it-rather than
depending on their advanced age, instead corresponded to a rigid
strategy of upbringing which allowed them to have complete control
over him with the minimum of emotional investment (so-called "pa-
rental affectionless control") . In order for a strategy of this nature to
maintain its efficacy over the years with the minimum of effort, it was
necessary that the moment any responsibility had been fulfilled, an-
other was immediately presented which required even more effort and
devotion. When Richard thought he had managed to "earn a place in
the home" with the brilliant exam results for admission to middle
school, he suddenly found himself alone on a train to boarding school,
an event which seemed more than he could handle. In this way, the
experience of never having been able to attain a secure emotional ·
attachment had slowly become the central aspect of his "world," and
loneliness, anger, a sense of unlovableness, and so on, the specific
ways of recognizing and self-referring his "being-in-it." Thus, the
experiencing of helplessness, anger, etc., besides providing the con-
tinuity of his patterns of self-perception, was also a generative way of
structuring new experiential domains, such as, for example, studying,
the passion for literature, the construction of a repertoire of social
skills, and so on.
If one shifted the focus onto his "fall" in school results between
174 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

the ages of 15 and 17, it became clear that, first, his discoveries about
himself had begun to distinguish those themes and interests which
would subsequently be developed, first in his life as a journalist and
then as a director, and second, the discovery that another world from
that of home was possible, which, as well as arousing resentment and
anger toward his father, had brought him to feel more and more that
devotion or commitment as such were useless effort. It was clear to
him during those years that the exaggerated effort should have been
aimed at feeling differently from how he felt at home, and even if
working as a director seemed an unattainable goal, managing to try
and go it alone seemed far more praiseworthy and more able to
reconcile him with the world at large. It seemed to him that the sense
of despair and humiliation he felt in the face of the coldness of his
father was the price to pay to his Old Man in order to deserve the way
he had chosen to follow, and that the Old Man would in the end have
understood and appreciated his son's interests.
Faced with the sudden decision to change boarding schools, he
felt he had lost everything, the present world he believed he had
conquered and the old world he believed he belonged to, and that he
had become a stranger to his father. As his anger gradually di-
minished, the despair became so intense as to make him feel he could
only mitigate it by suicide or a complete withdrawal from the world.
If one ran the subsequent period "through the moviola," it
became evident to him, first, that his father's attitude, pretending he
did not know how to support him, was none other than a power
maneuver to bring him back under control; second, it seemed clear to
him that he had appraised this separation as a real abandonment,
similar to what he felt with his wife, and in the same way, excessively
intensifying the sense of his negativity, he had tried to maintain in
some way an emotional tie to his "Old Man." The role of the "de-
generate" son, in fact, making him feel he was the only person
responsible for what had happened, permitted him to maintain the
image of his father intact, thus preserving emotional reciprocity with
him, and at the same time being able to fight with all his strength to
restore a full relationship with him, as is demonstrated in exemplary
fashion by his fantasy of "the prodigal son."
It was precisely at this point that Richard realized how feeling
himself to be the only one responsible for the separation which had for
so many years existed between himself and his father had prevented
him from realizing that, although his father had always had news of
Urulertaking- the Developmental Analysis 175

him and knew where he was living, not once did he seek him out in all
those years, not even taking the trouble to utilize all those various
circumstantial reasons which would not have altered his (the father's)
role of the "offended party." The dismay he felt at never having
noticed something so blindingly obvious diminished gradually as
Richard realized that, in order co maintain his image of his father, he
could not allow himself to see the obvious. It became clear to him that
his father had always felt him to be an extraneous intrusion, and that
only that viewpoint could explain the absence of even the most
elemental paternal feelings, which usually arise spontaneously.
This sudden realization and the consequent change in perspec-
tive of his father corresponded to a fairly intense emotional situation,
so much so that at Jhe end of the session, Richard could not hold back
his tears, tears which had begun submissively with the usual sense of
irreparable loss (in this case, of having wasted his life for a person who
had never felt him to be his son) and which gradually became a sense
of being deeply moved and exalted in feeling himself released from
that sense of solitude and personal min which had as its base the
certainty that he had always made the only people who loved him
suffer.

Sandra had always maintained that her fear of being alone or of

losing control had "fallen from the sky" onto her when she was already
grown up. This had always made her think, in agreement with the
general opinion at home, that these fears therefore depended on some
sort of "constitutional fragility" which had gradually emerged toward
puberty and adolescence. In fact she had led a carefree and "idyllic"
childhood, in touch with nature, as her parents were farmers who
worked in a small valley in the South where there was no electricity
and where life had remained in an almost natural state.
Her first images of life evoked a sense of serenity and tranquility
and mostly concerned the farm on which they lived (and which was
shared with her paternal grandparents by whom she had been much
indulged) and the attentions and solicitations of her mother, her main
emotional figure of reference, given that her father was always out in
the fields.
Indeed, one memory, dated at 3 or 4 years of age, that seemed to
stand out from the others concerned her mother. It was a summer
afternoon and she was out in the fields with her mother on one of
those occasions (threshing, or whatever) in which all the women of
176 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

the village came out to help the men. In the important scene, Sandra
was near her mother who, in order not to bore her, was making her
little dolls out of earth which broke as soon as she, Sandra, took them
in her hands, at which her mother, with the patience of a saint,
immediately began to make her another one, although reproached by
her father, who would have preferred that she spend more time on her
work. Sandra gradually felt the sense of protection and affection that
surrounded her diminish, giving way to a rising tide of irritation and
anger that frightened her enormously, so that she burst into tears,
clinging to her mother's skirts. She seemed somewhat perturbed in
reporting this memory, and explained the irritation and anger with
the fact that her mother did not know how to make earth dolls that
did not [Link]. Clinging to her mother's skirts in tears she
attributed to the fright she got in feeling herself to be so ungrateful in
the face of such affection.
When she was 5 it was decided to send her to nursery school in a
village a few miles away and to which her grandfather had offered to
take her every day. The first day, Sandra felt herself a little out of
place and frightened, and never left her teacher's side. Although she
had anxiously awaited the moment, on returning she made no men-
tion of this to her grandfather, as he would have reported it to her
father whose brusque ways she feared. She held it all in until they got
home and ran straight to her mother saying that she did not want to go
to nursery school anymore. Her mother reassured her and then con-
fronted her husband and father-in-law and got them to agree that her
daughter should stop going to nursery school.
This episode marked for Sandra the beginning of a "complicity"
with her mother which was to last until the latter's death and which
always gave her the sense of being a privileged child, more loved and
understood than others. She, for her part, and especially from that
moment, had always taken her mother's side in the frequent argu-
ments with her father, irascible and often drunk, considering her a
"victim" who had always suffered the oppression of her husband in
order not to deprive her daughter of an assured future.
At the age of 6, her first day at school, at that same village a few
miles away, turned out to be far more tolerable than nursery school. In
the first place, her mother had continually reassured her during the
intervening year, and then, for the first week her mother accompanied
her to school, spending the rest of the morning in the village; Sandra
thus had time to get to know her teacher and classmates while her
mother was still "at hand."
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 177

During primary school, the idyllic atmosphere of the preceding

period gradually began to break up due to ever more frequent quarrels
between her parents over work and the possibility of moving to the
city, which her mother was against. During the more intense argu-
ments, Sandra was seized by panic thinking that her mother might die
any moment, so that she often eventually felt ill, and the quarrel was
then interrupted, usually with her father, overcome by her mother's
reproaches, leaving the house, banging the door behind him. Another
element which contributed to the break-up of the previous atmo-
sphere were the occasional disagreements between herself and her
mother which left her upset, and feeling herself to be the ungrateful
daughter. These arguments usually happened when Sandra went to
play in her grandmother's garden, leaving her mother alone with the
housework. Her mother at first scolded her, warning her about her
vivacity and restlessness, and often saying that the only time she had
been "good" was when "she had been in her tummy." She then went
into a sulk for hours, which to Sandra seemed interminable. One day,
when she was 9, during one of these interminable sulks, she felt the
impulse to secretly take her father's revolver, slip away again into the
garden next door, and aim it at her sleeping grandfather, in order to
"test herself" to see whether she was able to control something danger-
ous.
At the end of primary school, when she was 10, after many
arguments, her father got his way and they moved to the city. Seeing
the resignation and sadness on her mother's face, Sandra again had
the sense of panic that her mother might suddenly die and that she
would find herself facing the unknown alone with a father whom she
feared. The impact with the city and with middle school was worse
than she had imagined in preceding weeks. First of all, she had never
seen such a big school with so many teachers and pupils, and this
made her feel not a little out of her depth. And then going to school
seemed an interminable journey, with traffic jams, tram lines, traffic
lights, and so on, all of which often gave her a feeling of some kind of
vortex. The first few months in the city were thus months of fear,
during which she only felt safe and sheltered in the afternoons at
home with her mother. Then, bit by bit, she got to know her teachers
and classmates, s6 that by the end of the year she felt much more at
ease.
Sandra remembered quite vividly that morning in class at the
age of 12, when she experienced her first menstruation, as menarche
had been a tremendous fright for her. She had h ad no idea what was
178 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

about to happen to her, given that her mother had not even touched
upon "certain" subjects, and she herself had withdrawn whenever she
had heard her peers discussing them. When she suddenly realized she
was wet with blood, she immediately panicked, afraid she might die at
any moment. She took no notice of what her teachers or classmates
said and demanded to be taken home immediately to her mother, who
was the only person she could trust.
The onset of menstruation changed the dimensions of life in
which Sandra had lived up till that point. Her mother, while never
touching on delicate subjects, had emphasized the control she should
exercise over herself now that she was no longer a child, but Sandra
never really understood what should be controlled. Furthermore, her
father, who, apart from the arguments with her mother, for years had
been a figure absent from family life, had suddenly taken on the role of
"sexual controller" of his daughter whom he saw as being lost in the
human jungle that he pictured the city to be. As has already been seen
in her affective history, there thus began that long period of isolation
and continual clashes with her father-a period in which she had been
able to experience for herself what it might have meant for her mother
to have had to put up with such a man all her life. Thus, every time
she managed to escape her father's control by tricking him, she had
the sense that she could instead have held her own against him, and in
so doing felt she was "redeeming" her mother as well, who had
surrendered only for love of Sandra.
Repeatedly passing "through the moviola" the sequence of criti-
cal scenes, Sandra arrived at an appreciable reappraisal of her past
history as the developmental organization of her phobic meaning
gradually became clear to her.
Sandra, although feeling that her perturbing emotions and fears
were in some way linked to her relationship with her mother, was not
able, however, to glimpse any connection other than the fact that
contact with her mother alleviated them. As for the rest, the connect-
ing thread of the whole history consisted of an indirect inhibition of
her exploratory behavior and autonomy which was implicitly actuated
through the attentions and solicitations of a mother who was, more-
over, much loved. It was precisely this indirectness which had made it
impossible right from the beginning for Sandra to refer the perturbing
experiences to parental behavior and attitudes, nor could she recog-
nize them and appraise them as emotional qualities inherent in her
subjective experience.
UnJertakini; the Developmental Analy.1i.1 179

The memory from when she was 3-4 years old particularly
highlighted this aspect if one put into focus this scene and "took
seriously" the irritation and ,mger as the "facts" to be explained, and
tried to make her change perspective in seeing them, through a
continuous shifting between subjective and objective viewpoints.
Thus, while she tried to reconstruct the scene from the outside, trying
to insert it in the entire social situation in progress, she recalled how
those situations in which the whole village turned out in the fields
always became joyous occasions for the children who found they could
all play together near the adults who were working. As she was talking
about this she fell silent, suddenly realizing how in forcing her to play
with the earth dolls which she was patiently making, her mother had
managed to keep her near her, making it impossible for her to go and
play with the other children. Gradually, after the first few moments of
bewilderment, as the scene started to become clear to her in this
perspective, Sandra had a strong emotional reaction: visibly anxious
and pale, she said she felt faint and wanted to lie down. She recovered
after a few minutes and said that for the moment she did not wish to
dwell on this episode and wanted instead to be reassured about the
moment of "feeling unwell" she had just experienced. From the fol-
lowing session on, however, it was evident that considerable change
had come about in her perspective on the past, so that in passing the
other significant scenes "through the moviola," she was soon able to
trace the same connecting thread which she had suddenly seen during
that stressful emotional experience.
Thus, in the episode of the nursery school at the age of S, she
was now in a position to see bow the tendency to keep her daughter
with her at home had made it possible for her mother to "take
literally" what were perhaps the common complaints of a child the
first time she goes away from home. In the same way, she now realized
that her mother's continual reassurances during the whole year before
going to school and her mother's availability in staying near the
school, in giving her an assiduous sense of protection also gave her,
implicitly, the image of an extremely dangerous world in which being
alone meant being defenseless.
Furthermore, it slowly become evident to her that the im-
possibility of referring perturbing feelings to her mother's behavior had
forced them to be experienced as localized in. the physical aspects of
the self, and this, in tum, bad gradually lead to a "sensorial" decoding
of any emotional modulation.
180 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

Any novelty (school, city, menstruation, etc.) could only be

appraised as fear, which had become the most easily recognizable
emotional modulation in her range of perceivable emotions. Such
sensorial decoding was particularly evident whenever she was strug,
gling with intense sensations deriving from attachment relationships.
Thus the fear of suddenly losing a protective base seemed the only way
to appraise any possible modification of her mother's availability
(clashes with her father, seeing her sad and disheartened when they
were moving house, etc.). At the same time, the "feeling unwell" to
which such panic attacks frequently gave rise were in perfect harmony
with the protective code at home which attributed absolute priority to
anything to do with illness (and in fact her feeling unwell instantly put
a stop to any quarrel going on at the time).
Passing them repeatedly through the "moviola," those situations
appeared particularly important where she felt contrasting feelings in
an attachment relationship, such as a threat of "emotional separation"
(her mother's sulks, her own fear of distancing herself from her
mother, etc.) together with a "sense of constriction" (feeling herself to
be at the mercy of her mother's sulks, being constrained to stay near
her in order to feel protected, etc.). It was in these circumstances that
there emerged both her fear of losing control and the need to test
herself in order to control her fear (as exemplified by the episode of
the pistol). In this sense, the scene in the fields at the age of 3 or 4
became more and more significant in her eyes, given that it coincided
with the first fear of losing control of which she had any trace.
If, from the onset- of menstruation, one focused on the whole
period of isolation and of the clashes with her father, it became clear
to her that taking on the role of the one who redeemed her mother
from an unhappy marriage, suffered only because of love for her
daughter, was the way of maintaining, although shifting its level, that
complicity with her mother which continued to give her a sense of
privilege and protection. At the same time, "standing up to her
father" had served her as a "bench test" to sharpen her controlling,
competitive style which would then emerge fully in her subsequent
dealings with men.
Finally, about three quarters of the way through developmental
analysis, there occurred another particularly intense emotional situa,
tion (although not at the same level as the one that came about while
working on her memory of when she was 3-4 years old) which
coincided with Sandra's "discovery" of how her mother had probably
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 181

felt the same fears as she had all her life. Indeed, she suddenly realized
that she could recall no circumstances when her mother had been
alone at home, or gone somewhere on her own. She clearly recalled,
for example, that even during her first week at elementary school
when her mother had come with her to the nearby village, she had
always brought someone with her (cousin, mother-in-law, or whatev-
er) to avoid being alone in a small village where everyone had known
her all her life. This discovery was no small matter for Sandra, as it
automatically called into question one of the mainstays of her de-
velopmental history, that is: her mother had never left her husband
because of love for her daughter. Now it seemed evident that this
"putting up with a marriage" was simply the name that her mother had
given to her fear oJ finding herself having to face the world alone. It is
interesting to note that as this change in her mother's image was
taking place, Sandra seemed in parallel to see the world in a less
threatening and alarming way, and indeed at just that time, during a
holiday period, she decided to take an intercontinental flight with her
husband, while a few months previously, the simple possibility of
having to take a plane would have left her in despair.

In the case of Winnie, who was still in a developmental stage,

analyzing her past history meant further deepening the self-observa-
tional level reached in the preceding work, reconstructing, the organ-
[Link], over the years, of her way of drawing out a sense of self
through the attunement to the perceived expectations of a significant
figure.
For Winnie it was her incompetence and lack of will that had
made her prefer, for as long as she could remember, to "identify
herself' in others. The family was involved insofar as it had always
supplied her with a safe, cushioned environment in which her way of
doing things could be complied with.
Her family had indeed always been considered a model for the
whole neighborhood, both because of her parents' behavior, totally
dedicated to work and to their daughters, who lacked for nothing, and
also because of the always affectionate and harmonious family atmo-
sphere. Moreover, this had been true since her parents were engaged
and passed for a model couple for all the other young people, given the
quality and harmony of their affection. Apart from some small dis-
agreements taking place just before the marriage, which she had heard
about from other sources, her parents appeared to be a model couple
182 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

and for their daughters they wished the good fortune of having a
marriage like their own.
The very first images of life appear to be fairly toned down and
not accompanied by any particular sensations; they concerned the
house, the figures of her parents, and a nanny, with whom Winnie
remembered she always played with joy and who went away when
Winnie was 4.
Two memories that appeared to be of a certain import both went
back to the age of 3. The first, before the birth of her sister, was one of
her few memories of physical contact with her father, where he,
holding her in his arms, continually pretended to throw her in the air.
Winnie, having done this before, knew very well that it was a game
and laughed blissfully until she saw the worried face of her mother who
was looking at her and telling her to stop. Suddenly she felt frightened
to death, burst into unrestrainable tears, and wanted to get down. The
other memory took place some months after the birth of her sister,
whom Winnie had received with joy, thinking of a possible playmate
in the games she and Nanny played. One afternoon she was next to
her mother who was feeding the baby, and driven by the desire to
make herself noticed by her little sister who was intent on her feeding-
bottle, she took a chocolate from the table and pretended to give it to
her. Her mother inveighed against her, saying that what drove her to
do this was the desire to harm her sister because she was wildly jealous
of her. Winnie stood as if turned to stone in discovering herself to be
so bad and malicious, so much so that she was afraid of herself and did
not dare leave her mother, who in the meantime had carried on
feeding the baby as if nothing had happened.
At the age of 4, Winnie was a very composed, sensible girl, of
whom her mother would talk proudly to friends who came to visit.
This was when Nanny had to return to her village, and Winnie was
very distressed by it. She remembered, however, that while Nanny
embraced her, weeping dreadfully, she was very embarrassed and did
not really know what was going on "as grown-ups never cry, and
children, when they cry, stop at once."
The rare moments in which she lost a little of her habitual
composure were when she complained that her mother never came to
fetch her from the nursery, but instead sent a friend whom Winnie
had to call Aunty. Winnie wanted to be like the other children, but to
her protests her mother promptly replied that she was "an egotist" and
"ungrateful," and Winnie, immediately feeling herself to be in-
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 183

adequate, no longer knew for what "real" reason she had made her
request.
When she was 5, her maternal grandmother died unexpectedly,
and her mother, despite having been very attached to her, dealt with
all the necessary details without tears or an atmosphere of grief, so that
Winnie was not in the least perturbed by it. The only thing which
frightened her to death, so that she burst into tears, losing her
habitual control, was seeing her father embracing her mother. This
was something not habitual with them and for a moment she had
thought that he might harm or even kill her.
On the other hand, while never explicitly saying bad things
about him but extolling his virtues as a tireless worker, her mother
between the lines, tended to negatively redefine her husband's way of
being, hinting that she was the model to follow. This had always been
clear to Winnie, so that when she was 5, she felt like ice when for
Carnival she asked her mother for a "Zorro" costume she really liked,
and her mother replied angrily that she did not really like it at all and
was only trying to look like her father. At that moment she again felt
overcome by a pervasive sense of uncertainty, no longer knowing
whether she really liked Zorro or wanted to spite her mother.
Going to school was prepared for with exhaustive recommenda-
tions to always be the most polite, the top of the class, and so on, and
concluded with her mother personally taking her to school and in-
troducing her to the teacher as if she were a little genius, imploring
Winnie not to make her look bad. Thus primary school became
torture for Winnie, who had at all costs to be at the top of the class,
while all the time she felt on the point of being overwhelmed by the
responsibility for not making her mother look bad. Apart from spend-
ing all afternoon studying, which for Winnie was a nightmare, she
also had to undergo checks on her homework which her mother made
at the end of the day, and in which often, heedless of the fact that
Winnie knew the material perfectly well, her mother made her rewrite
everything again and again until the handwriting was impeccable.
At the end of primary school, Winnie began menstruating for
the first time one morning at school and excitedly ran home to tell her
mother, sure that she too would be excited and they would celebrate.
Winnie started to recount with great emphasis what had happened to
her mother, who was doing the ironing. As she slowly realized that her
mother had not even raised her eyes from her ironing, she began to
feel as if she were turning to stone and fell silent. Her mother, without
184 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

raising eyes or making any comment, then told her to fetch some more
clothes from the kitchen.
It was from then that Winnie dated the emotional distancing
and resentment that she began to feel toward her mother and which
soon afterwards, at the start of middle school, would lead into the
period of dramatic quarrels which we have seen in connection with
her affective history.
Passing the affect-laden scenes "through the moviola" several
times, Winnie arrived at a reappraisal both of her past history and of
her mother's image, reconstructing the developmental organization of
her "externally bound" attitude.
As has been seen through the preceding work, Winnie was well
aware by now how hei;. relationship with her mother had become a
"mirror" for her wherein she could recognize her internal states, but
without it being at all clear to her what role her mother as a person
might have played in all this. Besides, if the emergence of the early
experience of being demarcated from other people had been interfered
with from the beginning, any distancing from a significant and in-
trusive attachment figure became impossible, and the consequent
blurred and wavering experiencing of self can only be appraised as
something "constitutively" given.
Thus, the first memory, from when she was 3, was taken by
Winnie as an example of how her inconsistency and passing from joy
to tears on the basis of an opinion expressed by another was something
born with her. On the other hand, if this was thoroughly focused on,
trying both to make her take up an external viewpoint and to make
her differentiate the sense of self from her mother's behavior-seeing
the latter in the perspective of drawing out an image of her mother as a
person- . -a 'Yhole series of new data began to present itself to her.
What struck her as most confusing was the reason for which her
mother had spoken to her, a 3-year-old, and not to her father, who
should have been the natural decision maker as to the running of the
family and the upbringing of the children. If one continued to make
her focus on this aspect with "eyes of the present," there began to
emerge the ambiguity of the communicative style of her family which
she was by now beginning to recognize. It now seemed dear to her
that her mother, while asserting the opposite, did not in fact consider
her husband capable of the role of father, and without explicitly saying
so, demanded from Winnie absolute emotional complicity in exclud-
ing him from that role-without, moreover, taking into account the
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 185

mood that her daughter may have been in at that moment. She was
able to see that finding herself at the center of a camouflaged and
ambiguous situation in which she could take no position was thus
what must have thrown her into a panic, rather than any possible
danger in the game itself.
On the other hand, focusing on her second memory from when
whe was 3, while she was near her mother who was feeding the baby,
it seemed clear to Winnie that her mother did not take into account
her feelings and intentions but consistently anticipated and redefined
them, thus preventing her from developing emotions and opinions on
her own. The consequent pervasive sense of indefiniteness and un-
reliability in recognizing immediate experiencing eventually made her
more reliant on external frames of reference. Thus the scene with
Nanny when she was 4 now gave her an image of herself as a child so
engaged in adhering to standards of life which had been presented to
her that she was incapable of recognizing and appreciating what had
surely been one of the most authentic and spontaneous emotional
situations of her childhood. In addition, it became ever more clear to
her that, as her composure and "sensibleness" increased, in the at-
tempt to meet up to her mother's perceived expectations, so the
possibility of recognizing spontaneous emotions and attitudes both in
herself and in others progressively diminished, as was also illustrated
by her reaction to her father who "unexpectedly" embraced her
mother.
Given Winnie's young age, hers was a still recent past in which
memories retained the vividness and emotional resonance which
wanes in adulthood, and as such were easier to reconstruct. Therefore,
while one was proceeding with the focusing on childhood (for her,
practically "late news"), Winnie was more and more able to recognize,
in all the critical scenes, that invariant element which had always
characterized her experiencing of her relationship with her mother:
that of never having had the sense of being a person unto herself with
her own views and emotions. This blurred sense of self (which now
made her see in another light her feeling of emptiness and her fear of
not being able to feel enough) derived from the way in which she had
experienced and appraised the variable combinations of the two basic
attitudes that her mother had always had toward her, that is: that of
anticipating and redefining her intentions and emotions ( the episode
of the chocolate, of "Zorro," etc.) and that of the disconfirmation
both indirect (making her rewrite her homework, ignoring the fact
186 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

that she already khew the material) and direct (illustrated by the
menstruation episode).
Furthermore, in [Link], Winnie's image of her mother was
undergoing modification. Already during the preceding phase of ther-
apy, Winnie no longer believed that her mother was an absolute
model of perfection to which she should correspond at all costs. This
change in perspective had made her see the "victimizing" attitudes of
her mother as "relational tricks" with which to manipulate the mem-
bers of the family in such a way as to have control of the running of
the family. Winnie, however, while understanding that these atti-
tudes of her mother's could not be ends in themselves, had never been
able to make out a link with possible existential problems that her
mother as a person may have had. During reconstruction of past
history, however, it became clearer that, behind the facade, there
must be something that was not working with her parents as a couple.
The episode when she was 5, when she was frightened at seeing her
father embrace her-mother, had made her reflect and had emphasized
for her that her parents had never had between them even the most
trivial affection which is normally seen between couples. The contin-
ual negative light in which her father was put and the immediate
jealousy her mother showed whenever her daughters expressed tastes
or preferences that might give evidence of an attachment to their
father, all bore out for her the sensation of a profound schism between
them which had never appeared in any visible fashion.
It was then that there suddenly came to mind, with a clarity that
astonished her, the rumors that she had heard through other people
(cousins, cleaners, etc.) many years before about the "disagreements"
her parents had had just before their marriage. Her mother in extremis,
and to avoid being seen in a bad light by everyone, had succeeded in
forcing the father-who was involved with another woman-to give
up his plans to call off the wedding. Turning their daughters against
him and excluding him from the family without once referring to the
fundamental problem was thus what had allowed her mother to not
make her defeat explicit and at the same time to take revenge on a
man who, having refused her, had felt constrained to face up to the
commitments he had made.
Intuiting her mother's secret considerably changed Winnie's
attitude toward her; she no longer felt resentment toward her, and
instead came to view her as a troubled woman who, in a very simplis-
tic fashion, had attempted to resolve all her problems by selling a
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 187

perfect image of herself which could not be called into question. It was
therefore no longer surprising or upsetting for Winnie to realize that
her mother would probably go on all her life criticizing her daughters'
eating behavior, romantic affairs, school results, etc., but by now she
was sure that this was her mother's problem.

For Gregory, it had always been an effort to "feel worthy" of the

abnegation and devotion which his parents had spent on the family
and children, forgoing all the other aspects of life. This did not
depend on some "latent" rebellion or unwillingness on his part, but
rather on the fact that there had always been "something" in him,
which could not be precisely defined, but which he had to be on
constant guard against.
His parents, fervent Catholics, had always considered religious
commitment to be at the center of their lives. The decision to start a
family had been for them the equivalent of embracing the religious
life, and, as in a convent, everything in the home was subject to rules,
prayers, etc., given that religious and moral education of the children
(Gregory had a brother 3 years older than he) was the first considera-
tion. Not content, however, with such a commitment, his parents,
who were fairly well-off, did all they could in countless benefit and aid
activities on religious committees, parish councils, etc. The father, a
magistrate, had always been a little absent emotionally from family
life, and his presence at home, at least for the children, consisted of
philosophical and religious explanations of moral values and of com-
ments on passages from the Bible, which he expected should be
known by heart by the children. His mother, a totally uneffusive
woman of firm principles-Gregory did not remember one embrace or
kiss of hers-until the eve of the wedding had been undecided as to
whether she should become a nun, and had always considered the
condition of married woman as an. expedient renunciation of a superi-
or spiritual life. With the children, she therefore had an attitude
which more or less ran like this: "I have forgone sainthood in order to
live with you; you must repay me for this by being stainless and
without sin."
The first images of life concerned, on the one hand, playing
alone in various parts of the house, accompanied by a sense of serenity
and tranquility; on the other, they concerned his mother who,
meteor-like, would every so often interrupt his games (because they
were noisy, because it was prayer time, etc.), leaving Gregory with a
188 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

feeling of personal "unpleasantness" which stayed with him for a long

time. Of this period (about the age of 3) he remembered a particular
occasion, perhaps the only one, in which his mother, instead of
interrupting him as usual, started to play with him. Gregory for the
moment was astonished beyond words, but did not have to time to feel
content, as he suddenly felt as if he were being "made fun of" and this
immediately produced that same sense of unpleasantness, which made
him stop playing despite his mother's insistence that they continue.
The occasions of greater contact with his mother when he was 3 or 4
were in early afternoon, when she withdrew with him to tell him
stories from the Bible, adapted as fables; in these circumstances,
Gregory again felt, after the first few minutes, an unexpected sense of
irritation which imrpediately became transformed into that unpleasant
sense of self, which lasted for most of the afternoon. Gregory was not
sent to nursery school because it was considered superfluous, and he
therefore spent most of his time at home with his mother, as his
brother was at school most of the day; however, his mother was always
busy and spent the minimum amount of time with him necessary for
ethical and religious education. Gregory had always experienced this
period in a somewhat contrasting fashion, given that, on the one
hand, he felt so alone that "time never passed," but, on the other, he
did not have the freedom of movement of a child alone because he felt
he was always in his mother's "sight"; she, although busy, did not let
him out of her sight for a m9ment and was ever ready to call him to
her.
About the age of 4 or 5, there was a significant memory because,
among other reasons, it featured his father. Gregory had been abso-
lutely forbidden to look out of the window, even though there was no
particular cause for alarm as they lived almost at ground level, and the
windows, too high for him to reach, were also barred. One afternoon,
trusting perhaps in a moment's "inattention" on the part of his father,
who was in the living room with him, Gregory looked out for a
moment to watch the children playing in the courtyard underneath,
which, despite all the warnings, had always held a great attraction for
him. His father jumped out of his armchair, and with a riding-whip in
hand, followed him all around the living room until, in a comer and
under the threat of the whip, Gregory had to kneel and recite a mea
culpa on the misdeed in front of the family, who had in the meantime
rushed in. This moral punishment or "humiliation" (as Gregory called
it) seemed to be the essential ingredient in the upbringing strategy of
Undertakin~ the Developmental Analysis 189

his father who missed no chance to administer it, both to him and to
his brother, as a reaction to transgressions which often appeared
negligible even to an unindulgent eye, such as his mother's.
To the age of 5 there belongs a memory that was meaningful to
Gregory as it represented the first time that there emerged what he
called the "doubt of the solipsism" which had for some years frightened
him very much. It was perhaps the first time he had been alone in the
courtyard underneath and looked at the trees and the people at the
windows. Suddenly he had the powerful sensation that everything he
could see-including other people and himself-might be just an
image in his mind, that is, an invention which did not correspond to
reality. The sense of bewilderment and panic was so intense that it
drove him immediately back into the house under the watchful eye of
his mother.
Although long looked forward to, the first day at school at the
age of 6 turned out to be a somewhat disconcerting experience. As the
school was only a few hundred meters away, Gregory, after the usual
countless warnings, was sent to school alone, and as soon as he arrived
had a moment of complete disorientation and "felt lost" in the midst
of so many children. He recovered after a moment, but could not
understand the mechanism by which children were assigned to classes,
and so, in accordance with his logic of the moment, he joined a class
which had just formed. The result was that for the rest of the morning
he wandered from class to class and at a certain point wondered if
there was any end to them; when finally he managed to find the class
he was assigned to, thanks to the intervention of teachers and jani-
tors, he found himself feeling quite lost and a little ashamed in the
midst of his classmates who had already got to know each other and
who looked at him amusedly. This theme of shame and feeling lost in
class and at school remained a constant for the whole time Gregory
was at primary school, and only gradually began to fade with the
beginning of middle school. Indeed, up to the age of 11, he had been
obliged to wear his elder brother's clothes, and this, added to his
feeling awkward in group situations and clumsy at games, accentuated
his sense of personal unpleasantness.
At primary school, Gregory was a sensible child, more mature
than his age, and although he still felt awkward with his classmates,
he was much respected by them and admired for his knowledge and
scholastic performance. However, as he matured and his moral educa-
[Link] became more rigid and intransigent, the norms and prohibitions
190 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

multiplied, but so did the capability for more autonomous reasoning

and the possibilities for amusement (cinema, television, peers, etc.),
with the result that his doubts also multiplied as to what was sin and
what was not. When he was 7 or 8, these doubts often tormented him
in the afternoons while he was studying in his room, to the point
where he at times felt a sense of being a despicable person who would
swear just for the pleasure of doing so. At this point, there appeared in
his mind, as on a screen, a phrase so vulgarly blasphemous that it
terrified him; however, he immediately worked out the system of
adding a question mark to the phrase the moment it appeared, and
immediately afterwards would loudly reply inside himeself, "No! No!"
These religious dilemmas, even though accompanied by fre-
quent confessions to the [Link], remained more or less under control
during primary school and the beginning of middle school, until, at
the beginning of his last year at middle school, they started to in-
tensify progressively. Already the passage to middle school, where he
had found himself in mixed classes for the first time, had perturbed
and disoriented him not a little, revealing to him the existence of
sensations and impulses he knew nothing about. To this was added the
discovery of masturbation which perturbed and upset him even more.
One afternoon, at the age of 13, he was talking, perhaps a little
distractedly, to his mother and in gesticulating inadvertently touched
one of her breasts. His mother instantly struck him a sound blow,
crushed him with a contemptuous look, and hissing "filthy pig" at
him, went indignantly back to the kitchen and did not speak to him
for 2 weeks. Gregory was instantly sure that he was absolutely unable
to control those sensations and impulses which he already mistrusted,
and felt with an almost uncontrollable anguish a nullifying sense of
personal despicableness. For over 2 years, the need to continually test
and retest himself about his moral scruples became more frequent and
tormenting. He locked himself away for hours, forcing himself into a
self-analysis as exhausting as it was insufficient, so that it finished by
his going to confession every day, despite the priest's attempts to
dissuade him.
From the age of 15-16 on, Gregory seemed to establish an
equilibrium .through an almost "ascetic" ethical and moral commit-
ment which had allowed him to avoid all possible opportunities for
amusement that might evoke unforeseen sensations and emotions. As
will be remembered, this was the period leading up to his first roman-
tic experience, which took place, in fact, the first time that he had
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 191

decided to loosen the ''monk-like" constraints he had been placing on

himself for some time.
The individual scenes were passed "through the moviola" sever-
al times, and, because of Gregory's acquired ability to differentiate
experiencing and explaining, as well as that of reconstructing the
multifaceted aspects of feelings by shifting alternately between sub-
jective and objective viewpoints, it was possible to reconstruct the
developmental organization of his obsessive meaning, while reorder-
ing at the same time his view of the past.
As we have seen, ambivalent patterns of attachment-where an
explicit facade of absolute devotion and concern was simultaneously
intertwined with implicit rejecting attitudes-had been, from the
beginning, an integral part of the perceived existential situation. In
this way, it had always been nearly impossible for Gregory to refer to
the attitude of his parents the consequent antithetical feelings about
himself, so that these could only be experienced as something that was
part of him. In focusing, therefore, the key point consisted precisely of
taking this perturbing sense of unpleasantness of himself not as "some-
thing given" but as a "fact" that had to be explained, and thus find a
different perspective with which to look at the critical scenes by
shifting continuously between different self-observational viewpoints.
As he began to put into focus, in this way, the images of his
relationship with his mother during his preschool years, Gregory easily
realized that his oscillations between opposing feelings (serenity/
tranquility vs. annoyance/irritation) were constantly correlated with
experiencing his mother's attitude as "available"-she was always with
him ("She likes me/I'm a 'positive' boy")-and simultaneously as "not
available"~she was noneffusive and inattentive to his feelings and
needs ("She dislikes me/I'm a 'negative' boy"). In particular, the
memory from when he was 3, when she started to play with him,
turned out to be highly significant in clarifying this aspect for him. In
fact, his wonder at her availability was immediately mismatched by
the perception of her total lack of spontaneity in playing with him,
triggering anger and hostility feelings ("she's just making fun of me")
which could have been appraised only as a pervasive unacceptability
of his way of being (e.g., his sense of personal unpleasantness). It is
important to emphasize that seeing himself and his mother in this
perspective evoked a notable emotional activation in Gregory. He
noticed this himself from his attitude, more controlled and embar-
rassed than usual, and from the need he often had to clarify (to the
192 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRJNCIPLES

therapist and to himself) that none of this excluded his continuing to

feel "positive" sentiments toward his mother.
The episode with his father, occurring when he was 4. or 5,
while showing him another variant of the same kind of ambivalent
attachment, also made clear for him that the demand for obedience
actually corresponded to a request for an absolute, unconditional
adherence to norms to be respected as such (being forbidden to look
out of the window, which had nothing to do with concrete reasons of
safety); the absoluteness of the request excluded any curiosity and
impulsiveness, so that any transgression was punished by the "nullify-
ing" of any spontaneous behavior so typical for children ("humilia-
tion"). Moreover, it seemed ever more evident to him that his parents
had always considered him a "miniature adult," holding superfluous
what for a child is indispensable, such as contact with peers-the ban
on taking part in their games in the courtyard, the decision not to
send him to nursery school, etc.-to the point of requiring from him
behavior beyond the ability of a child of his age (how to orient oneself
alone in the confusion of the first day at school).
Of particular importance was the episode that occurred when he
was 5, during which there surfaced the "solipsistic doubt" which
Gregory had always seen as a brilliant example of the fact that there
was something in him which had to be guarded against. As he
repeatedly focused on the scene from an objective viewpoint (with
both the eyes of the past and those of the present), he was able to
notice that intense sensations of bewilderment and panic were the way
in which he appraised an ambivalent and antithetical sense of self.
That is, the structuring of a psychophysiological modulation charac-
terized by abrupt and recurrent oscillations between opposing feelings
went in parallel with the emergence of split patterns of self-
recognition which, being mutually exclusive, interfered with a unitary
self-experiencing.
It then began to be clear to him that the only way of controlling
the ambivalen<;e of his subjective experiencing had been to prioritize
the emerging possibilities offered by concrete cognitive abilities,
which as well as facilitating the adherence to ethical norms, also
seemed to guarantee him a nonambivalent understanding. Already in
the episode of his first day at school, at the age of 6, it was evident that
his selective inattention to the emotional modulation provided by
immediate experiencing (need for help and support by adults present)
led him to trust that "reasoning"-he should have been able to find
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 193

the class by himself. Thus, as he slowly managed to control the

ongoing emotional modulation to the point where he could exclude it,
the contrasting and ambivalent feelings which his parental upbringing
evoked in him became appraisable only as doubts which called into
question his adherence to an order of absolute rules, and thus the
acceptability of his sense of self.
It was precisely his adherence to rationality and logic that
enabled him to avoid those intolerable sensations of disunity and
inconsistency (the "solipsistic doubts") given that the application in
his tests and retests of the "all-or-nothing" procedure ("If I am not
impeccable then I am surely despicable") guaranteed that he felt a
unitary and consistent sense of self, whether positive or negative. The
expedient of putting a question mark at the end of the blasphemous
phrase-so that an affirmation became a "hypothetical" question-
made him smile with something between amusement and embarrass-
ment as he was reflecting on it while viewing it in slow motion. It was
clearer and clearer to him, in fact, that, already at that time, his
rationality was based almost exclusively on the pure and simple formal
adherence to logical procedures, rather than on the consistency of the
contents.
Finally, putting into focus the scene from when he was 13, it
became evident to him that in that afternoon the behavior of his
mother had confirmed for him, with no hope of appeal, what he had
always perceived in the relationship with her: that he was capable of
being so unworthy and despicable as to disappoint and cause suffering
to precisely those people who had dedicated their lives to him. The
succeeding 2 years spent in tests and retests, even in their limiting
pervasiveness, helped him to find an equilibrium which at first seemed
impossible. Shutting himself up in his room among his books, and his
devotion in church, were admired at home, and this made him feel
less criticized and hence less despicable; in addition, his exaggerated
control of even the most banal "suspicious" sensations had progressive-
ly refined for him the procedure of perceiving an acceptable sense of
self through the more or less complete exclusion of his emotional life.
However, the ascetic, isolated life arrived at in this way was held in
a somewhat precarious balance, inevitably destined to topple the
moment he started a sentimental career. As we have seen, having
to test and retest every sensation that an engagement evoked in him
in order to be sure of the quality and rightness of his feelings, as well
as calling into question that acceptability of the self at which he
194 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

had arrived after so much effort, would also eventually result in a series
of disappointments and anxieties in his romantic relationships.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In contrast to the preceding phases, in which one is working on

experiences which-being current or originating for the most part in
the recent past-are more vivid and richer in detail and thus more
easily reconstructible, in a developmental analysis, one is working
with much vaguer material, poor in detail, and, above all, ex-
perienced much more as something taken absolutely for granted and
not deserving, therefQre, any further reflection and explanation. We
are thus dealing with a somewhat more exacting phase, both for the
therapist, who must have a certain ability in assessing critical memo-
ries and in setting the self-observational contexts capable of being
reordered, and for the client, who finds him, or herself in the particu-
lar emotional condition of experiencing a changing perspective
toward emotional schemata and cognitive patterns closely interwoven
with his or her sense of continuity and sameness.
Making clients repeatedly go back and forth throughout their
developmental history is, undoubtedly, the self-observational process
that triggers the most important reordering of critical immediate
experiences. This process results in a reframing of the memory of those
events and also a high level of distancing and decentering from
recurrent affective tonalities which are an integral part of ongoing
patterns of self-perception. It is moreover possible to distinguish differ-
ent structural levels of memory reframing from equally different levels
of reordering and emotional activation.
A first level of reframing consists of attaining a more exhaustive
comprehension of a vague but intriguing memory, with no con-
comitant change in the perspective with which the scene is currently
perceived. In other words, there is a reordering of data within the same
frame which allows a better focusing on a whole series of details, but
which leaves the affective tonality triggered by the scene unaltered.
This is the type of reframing that comes about most commonly during
developmental analysis, the utility of which essentially lies in facilitat-
ing the refrarnings of a higher level; they do not otherwise have a
remarkable therapeutic value.
A second type of reframing results from a change in the perspec-
Undertaking the Devclo/Jmcntal Analysis 195

tive endorsed on a scene up to that point; it consists of a reordering of

the whole memory frame which makes possible the emergence of new
data; it is matched by a reorganization of the affective tonality usually
triggered by the scene. This is what happened with Richard's memory
from the age of 4 when his father was worried about providing for him;
that of Sandra when she was 3 or 4 about the earth dolls her mother
made; Winnie's memory from age 3 when her father played at pretend-
ing to throw her in the air; and so on. We are dealing with a type of
reframing which is notably effective therapeutically and which is
almost invariably accompanied by a fairly considerable emotional
activation, as exemplified by Sandra's reaction as she focused on the
scene of the earth dolls.
A third type of reframing results from the recombination between
whole sets of already reordered memory frames which makes possible
the emergence of aspects of self and of one's own past of which clients
are totally unaware. This is what happened when Richard suddenly
realized that his father had "never sought him out"; when Sandra
"discovered" the similarity between her fears and her mother's; when
Winnie intuited the "secret" that her mother had always tried to hide.
This is the most effective kind of reframing for proceeding with that
modification of viewpoint of oneself that the client began at the start
of developmental analysis.
The emotional modulation continuously provided both by going
back and forth through the past and also by reframing processes
triggers a parallel reordering of basic effective themes, in which the
increased distancing from critical emotional dimensions is matched by
their recombination with the new tonalities of the feelings which have
emerged (third level of emotional restructuring).
One may therefore say that at the developmental level, the
change in the "Me" appraisal of the "I" consists of shifting from
experiencing one's praxis of living as something "given" to appraising
it as the basic, self-organized pattern of coherence that consistently
orders past and present experiences in such a way that a recognizable
continuity results. Hence, with the change that comes about during
the first half of the second phase, emotional disturbances, rather than
as "given," are appraised as "co-products" of one's way of experiencing
affect. With the change that takes place at the end of the second half,
the same thing happens for the affective style, the recognized coher-
ence of which is increasingly experienced as the unfolding of one's
personal meaning. With developmental analysis, what is no longer
196 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

taken for granted is exactly that personal meaning which comes to be

experienced as the lifelong process of scaffolding the coherence of
one's being-in-the-world.
As developmental analysis is gradually reaching completion, the
therapist begins to prepare the setting with which to conclude the
therapeutic work carried out. Usually the aspects which one needs to
deal with in this preparatory work are the following:
The client's greater awareness of his or her own level of func-
tioning reached by changing the viewpoint of oneself and one's own
history is invariably accompanied by a whole series of contrasting
emotions which give rise to a fairly typkal sense of ambiguity. On the
one hand, he or she feels a sense of security deriving from experienc-
ing oneself as the actwe protagonist of one's own praxis of living; on
the other, however, he or she also feels a sense of disappointment
deriving from feeling that one's praxis of living, as it was being defined
step by step, came out differently from what was expected. In other
words, if at the beginning of therapy all the problems depended on the
fact that one does not know who one is, at the end the main problem
becomes precisely that one does know.
Clients at this stage, even though in different ways and with
different expressions, show a certain intolerance toward their own way
of being, which often comes to be-experienced as the source of all
future problems. Rather than trying to guess, "shooting in the dark,"
or developing forecasts of varying degrees of detail from which to
derive rules of behavior to be applied, the most efficacious method for
dealing with this stage is to allow the client to put into focus the
dynamics and coherence of his or her personal meaning through other
viewpoints, beyond that which seems to be perturbing at the moment.
Thus, if in running over the connecting thread of the whole past
history, one reconstructs how through it the client has nevertheless
managed to transform difficult existential conditions into situations of
personal growth, it becomes possible to highlight the idea that the
orthogenetic directionality of a developmental pathway corresponds
simply to a generative and original way of ordering experience.
Right from the opening exchanges, moreover, the therapist,
both with the self-observational method and his or her personal
attitudes and behavior, has always given particular care to construing
and developing the viewpoint which says that there is no objective,
unequivocal mode of organizing experience which can be identified as
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 197

"valid" as opposed to "erroneous." The client then begins to notice

that his or her personal meaning is both the necessary constraint for
"having-a-world" and also corresponds at the same time to his or her
degree of liberty in that world, given that it defines neither the
possible ways of "being-in-it" nor the forms which experience may
assume through them. This is what Saint-Exupery (1942/1979) meant
many years ago when he said, in his simple and direct style, that
"freedom and constraint are two aspects of the same necessity, the
necessity of being the man you are and not another. You are free to be
that man, but not another."
Thus, a "depressive" personal meaning simply brings forth a
possible world in which the experience of loss is the generative
dimension for dis~overing cognitive and emotional domains, without
defining whether, in unfolding such a dimension, the subject will
become, for example, an original writer with an intense and full
emotional life or whether he or she will become a drunk, of varying
degrees of desperation, who will spend his or her days in solitude. It
will now seem more and more evident that one's own way of being,
rather than an inescapable existential situation, is instead the inescap-
able underlying condition for structuring a variety of possible ex-
istential dimensions.
· As it becomes clear that the exploratory work undertaken
together is drawing to a conclusion, the therapist should gradually
construct a setting for preparing and facilitating the client's disengage-
ment from the therapeutic context.
"Technically" speaking, the problem consists of transforming
the therapeutic relationship into one of supervision, as if the client
were a fledgling therapist who occasionally submits to a more expert
colleague the developments of the case being followed, with me sole
difference that the case under consideration is the client's own. In this
way, the sessions begin to progressively thin out, becoming one every
2 months, one every 3 or 4 months, and so on, until they stop
completely, just as in the case of a therapist under supervision who at a
certain point feels able to continue alone. This kind of procedure does
not usually create any important difficulties. Firstly, most clients have
already realized that me merapeutic work has reached its culmination,
beyond which it would become more and more repetitive, and,
secondly, the "self-observational training" followed during the therapy
has implicitly prepared the client for the role of "therapist under
198 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

supervision" and thus he or she is not at all surprised when the

moment comes to take on this role explicitly.
However, even though it has been prepared and facilitated in
this way, it should be remembered that a disengagement from a
therapeutic context still corresponds to an emotional separation with-
in an interpersonal relationship which has for a long time held two
people in close contact. It is therefore almost inevitable that at this
stage there should emerge, more or less explicitly, a series of emotions
(an alternation of opposing and collaborative attitudes, etc.) which
are an integral part of the way in which emotional detachments or
separations are developed (see Chapter 4). Rather than taking them as
"resistances" and simply attempting to diminish their scope, the ther-
apist should instead use them, both in order to clarify further aspects
of the client's bonding style, as well as to renegotiate the reciprocal
roles and the relational rules their relationship will follow while the
current transformation proceeds.

APPENDIX: GUIDELINES FOR .THE

RECONSTRUCTION OF A
DEVELOPMENTAL HISTORY

• Preliminary gathering of data concerning family structure at the

moment of birth (members, ages, jobs).
• Profile of mother and father as individual "characters" (attitudes,
emotional temperament, hobbies, social skills, roles in the family) and as
a "couple" (how parents and sociofamilial network tell how they met,
the engagement, level of openness and mutual support between parents,
etc.).

The aim of a developmental history is to reconstruct the sequences of

crucial events that have given rise to the opinions, explanations, and mean-
ings to which the client refers when recounting a given period of his or
her past history. As a useful general method, begin with a general reconstruc-
tion of the course of life in the corresponding developmental period, and
then proceed to focus on specific domains. Within each domain there should
then be identified the affect-laden events that deserve reconstruction and re-
ordering in the moviola setting. The areas of inquiry within each develop-
mental state that merit exploration in depth are, in broad outline, the
following:
Urulertakini the Developmental Analysis 199

Infancy and Preschool Years (0---6 Years Old)

Detailed Gathering of Earliest Available Memories

• Focus on how parents are depicted, other family members, the

home, the outside world, etc.
• Detailed focus on the emotional tonalities connected to each image.

Reconstruction of the Course of Family Life

in the Preschool Period

• Degree of presence/absence of parental figures, type of emotional

atmosphere generated by their presence or absence, usual attinides of parents
(such as the level of effusion and emotional support which could be expected
from them, types of wai:oings and advice, rules and [Link], etc., that
were transmitted explicitly and implicitly by their attitudes and behavior).
• What kind of child people said the client was, and what sense of self
this provoked; what games, stories, or fairy tales were favorites.
• Type of participation and role the family had in the social network
(how being with others was presented; opportunities, or otherwise, of spend-
ing time with other children, etc.). Type of family reaction to concurrent
events (loss, separation, moving house, money problems, etc.) .

Quality of EmotioTlfll Reciprocity and Attachment in the

Relationship with Each Parent Reconstructable through
Affect-Laden Interactions with Them

• Predictability and control on the child's part during affect-laden

interactions with parent.
• Feeling tones and emotions evoked in affect-laden interactions with
parent and the modality with which it was possible to express them.
• Type of immediate experiencing of self accompanying those feeling
tones and emotions.
• Developm~nt of exploratory behavior and the ability to cope with
transitory separations when going off to nursery school and at the beginning
of primary school (reactions to detachment from the home, to the presence of
other children and of teachers, etc.).

Childhood (6--11 Years Old)

Reconstruction of the Child's Life Structure during

Elementary School

• At school: Relationship with children of the same age and the role
taken in class and in. the broader school group. Progress of scholastic perfor-
200 PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC PRINCIPLES

mance and any ups and downs it may have suffered during the elementary
stage.
• In the family: How the typical week went, organization of free time
(games with parents, other children, etc.) and of time given over to study
and to adherence to the norms of upbringing and family routine.
• Attitude of parents toward scholastic performance (expectations,
attributions of success or failure, etc.) and toward norms and values to be
respected, expressed both directly (through advice and warnings, incentives,
chidings, etc.) and indirectly (by describing the merits and demerits of other
children of the same age and of other people).
• Attitude of parents and repercussions in family life in the face of
concurrent events such as separation, death in the family, money problems,
and marriage crises.

Emotional Reciprocit; and the Quality of Attachment

• Reconstruction of the parents' image perceived by the child through

either "direct" (analysis of affect-laden interactions with the father or
mother) or "indirect" (how the father or mother is described when he or she
is absent; quality of mother-father relationship; parents' observable interac-
tion with the family's social network) data.
• Reconstruction of the relationship between parents' expectations
expressed as strategies of upbringing, effusive attitudes, etc. ("how one felt
seen through their eyes") and the child's expectations expressed by taking
stances, oppositional attitudes and behavior, demands for autonomy, etc.
("how the child would have liked to be seen by them"); the effect that such a
relationship had on the child's immediate experiencing of self.

Early Adolescence and Puberty (ll-14/15 Years Old)

Reconstruction of the Modifications in Life Structure

Resulting from Environmental and Maturational Changes

• Going on to middle school and consequent changes in the demands

of the scholastic and familial network.
• Pubertal maturation and psychosexual development (bodily transfor-
mation and acceptability of own image, attitude to sexuality, place in own
age group, etc.).

Influence of Family Attachment on the Ongoing

Self-Re01ganization

• Quality of the relationship with the parent of the same sex and his or
her readiness to serve as a possible model of adulthood linked to his or her
own gender role.
Undertaking the Developmental Analysis 201

• Quality of the relationship with the parent of the opposite sex and
his or her readiness to serve as a "bench test" in appraising the lovableness of
one's sexual role.
• Reorganization of family attachment after sexual maturation and any
modifications in the perceived images of parents.

Late Adolescence and Youth (15-20 Years Old)

Reconstruction of the Cognitive-Emotional Separation

from Parents

• Main experiential domains in which "emotional separation" from

parents was followed through, that is, "knowledge dimension" (cultural,
0

political, etc.) and "emotional dimension" (identification with peer group,

first love affair, etc.).
• Reconstruction of the oscillations between emotional separation
(affirmations of autonomy) and emotional reapproach (demands for protec-
tion, recognition, etc.).

Relativization of Parents' Images and Its Effects

on the Experience and Appraisal of Self

• Structure and attribution of the perceived change of parents' images

(disappointment, lack of protection, loss, etc.).
• Self-referring and appraising the perceived change of attachment
figures (self-competence and lovableness, self-esteem and life-programming,
etc.).
9
Concluding Remarks

The major obstacle in promoting the advancement of psy-

chotherapy as a science can be traced to the prevalent trend of
considering both clinical research and therapeutic work as exclusively
"applied" fields quite distinct from basic theoretical work (Forsyth &
Strong, 1986; Glasser, 1982; Lambert, 1989; Sommer, 1982; Stone,
1984). However, this distinction between basic and applied research,
according to which the former deals with "theory" and the latter with
"facts," has been losing value in recent years as people have realized
that every observation is a process of differentiation of "events" from a
background of a priori hypotheses and assumptions and, consequently,
that "without theory there are no observable facts" (Lakatos, 1974;
Popper, 1972, 1982; Weimer, 1979). It has thus become evident that
applied research is none other than a method for advancing that same
theoretical research which is the basis f<_?r any progress in scientific
knowledge.
This disconnection from basic theorizing has meant that thera-
pists have long been too technologically oriented, as if testing and
validating a set of techniques were the only "serious" occupation for a
clinical psychologist. The ensuing identification of "therapy" with
"technique," which tacitly stems from this belief, has inevitably ren-
dered psychotherapeutic research theoretically simplistic and situa-
tionally bound. First, the emphasis on application has encouraged
therapists to look for immediate relevance to their testing in their
available data, consequently neglecting important theoretical con-
structions set forth by convergent disciplines ( evolutionary epistemol-
ogy, systems theory, etc.). Second, their testing methods have focused

202
( ;,mducling Remarks

only on the immediate therapeutic setting, in atte1npting to answer

the question: "Does technique X work better than technique Y?" thus
considering only limited aspects of attitudes, cognitive abilities, and
emotional processing.
If asked for an opinion regarding their scant interest in theory,
therapists generally protect themselves by saying that theories arc of
no use to their clients; this would seem obvious, given that the latter
have other interests at stake and other work to do. The problem, in
actual fact, is that theories assist therapists in setting what the client
says or feels within the broader Llimension of human experience, and
hence also in allowing the planning of an intervention which is
neither tritely reassuring nor pretentiously pedagogic.
Thi.s. situation has resulted in an ever-widening gap between the
simplistic concepts therapists hold regarding human behavior
(hedonistic determinism, rational supremacy, etc.) and the complex-
ity of the existential crises that their clients portray, with the result
that the former are not able to heed the contrasting and nmltifaceted
subjective experiencing brought to them by the latter.
As we have attempted to outline in the first part of this work,
the point of departure of any consistent psychological theorizing
should be this: understanding is not separable from human existence,
so that to exist means literally to know. Hence, rather than being the
"impartial" process of [Link] a "given" reality more or less val-
idly, knowing is the ontological process of constructing a world able to
make the ongoing experience of the ordering subject consistent.
If it were clearer that humans are not "philosophers" driven by
the desire to find, in any fashion, a "valid" truth, one would perhaps
be less astounded by the contrasting, ambiguous feelings with which
humans experience the increasing complexity of self-awareness which
they come up against during their lifespan. Knowing oneself, indeed,
essentially means being able to manage the effect derived from being
oneself in the face of the growing clarity with which one perceives the
irreversibility of one's own life, and this brings with it the activation of
complex emotions (ambiguity, sense of the absurd, etc.) which, al-
though not found in clinical psychology textbooks, arc nonetheless
essen tial ingredients of present human experience. The inversion of
perspective brought about by seeing consciousness from the viewpoint
of he or she who possesses it is well expressed in the following .
aphorism of Cioran (1981), which is, as usual, most incisive:
204 CONCLUDING REMARKS

"What is truth?" is a fundamental question. But it becomes of little

moment compared to the other question: "How can life be borne?" Yet
even this pales into insignificance when placed side by side with: "How
is one to bear oneself?" Here is the key question, to which no one is
able to give us an answer. (p. 145)

However vividly and urgently he or she may feel it, not even a
therapist is able to supply any conclusive response to that kind of
question; it is important, however, that he or she is able to trace what
the client experiences as a life-limiting idiosyncracy back to a fun-
damental theme of our praxis of living, highlighting the fact that the
insolubility of this dilemma is part of the essential tension with which
we experience selfhood, and which constantly urges us beyond the
horizon of our immediate personal experience. Thus, instead of hastily
disposing of a seemingly "irrational" question, given the insolubility of
the answer, and leaving the client alone with his or her existential
anguish, the therapist may share it. By participating in it and in-
tensifying the quality of reciprocal involvement with the client, the
therapist assumes an emotional stance implicitly showing that solidar-
ity and affective cohesion between people may together constitute a
way of being able to coexist with the dilemma of our existence.
If, furthermore, we consider that, like all primates, our exis-
tence unfolds within an intersubjective dimension, and that we can
thus only know ourselves in relation to others, the centrality that love
and affectivity have in human experience becomes obvious. On the
one hand, given that the trends of attachment relationships regulate
right from the start the intensity and quality of other emotions (fear,
anger, etc.) which modulate their approach-avoidance dynamics,
love and affectivity become the central "organizers" of the individual's
way of self-experiencing and self-referring (lovableness, self-esteem,
etc.). And, given the regulatory role that a significant other's image
exerts on ongoing patterns of self-perception, love and affectivity
maintain their central role throughout lifespan by scaffolding the
relevance of life events and by triggering life crises, and consequent
reorganization .of personal experience.
Finally, both the ontological nature of knowing and the central
role exerted by love and affectivity should become part of a systems/
process-oriented approach to the development of different patterns of
meaning dimensions ([Link]. ). Indeed, if ontologically the human
Concludin1; Remarks 205

way of being-in-the-world is by seeking and creating meaning (cf.

Smith, 1978a, 1985), then it is possible-within the intersubjective
dimension constraining the invariance of human experience--:to
identify a set of different personal meaning dimensions, in the same
way, as it were, that it is possible to identify different physical con-
stitutions within the morphological invariance of the human body.
An ontological approach to personality and psychopathology ought to
lead to a "science of personal meaning" with an inherent grammar of
composition and recombination which will allow us to set out the
different patterns of organized coherence that people exhibit in their
search for meaning. This is absolutely not another way of pigeon-
holing the client with a static "diagnostic label" right from the start, as
is the case when adopting the descriptive nosography endorsed by the
DSM-III-R, that is, when using the lists of critical beliefs supposed to
be specific of anxiety, depression, etc. Quite the contrary, adherence
to a process-oriented model of personal meaning development, ren-
dering the therapist less externally bound to actual problems, would
instead allow him or her to use them in order to foster new levels of
comprehension, thus allowing the client's self-organizing processes to
influence the therapeutic strategy.
Adopting less technical language than that used in the theoreti-
cal section, and closer to that used in everyday work with clients, in
the clinical framework of the second part of this book we have tried to
exemplify how a cognitive therapy can be nonpersuasive and situa-
tionally bound to the attainment of self-control to the extent to which
it can construct a strategy of intervention on the basis of more complex
theorizing about human functioning. In concluding these notes, we think
it will be helpful to take particular notice of two aspects:
The framework presented is not a technique; rather it is a strategy
whose therapeutic efficacy is founded on an explanatory principle of
human functioning-that is, on increasing clients' flexibility in as-
suming alternately different points of view of themselves through the
self-observation method, bringing about a parallel increase in levels of
self-complexity matched by a more adequate self-appraisal and decod-
ing of immediate experience (Lane & Schwarz, 1987; Linville, 1985,
1987; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Rosenberg & Gara, 1985).
Apart from the exposition of the essential aspects of the self-
observation method, we do not think it appropriate to illustrate
"techniques" in order to demonstrate the rationale, to guide the client
206 CONCLUDING REMARKS

in going back and forth in slow motion, etc. In the first place, all this,
apart from being of little help, might give the misleading impression
that it is a presentation of yet another set of therapeutic techniques
whose efficacy has to be proved. Secondly, a systems/process-oriented
therapist does not consider the achievement of a change in the client's
viewpoint on him- or herself ~s a matter of choosing a set of specific
techniques; on the contrary, the therapist is free to use any technique,
whether already existing or invented on the spot, which allows him or
her to develop the strategy of increasing the client's self-flexibility. In
other words, as Mahoney succinctly put it several years ago:

·. . . techniques are ritualized methods of communication which ac-

quire different meanings depending on their derivative contexts.... If
0

one views the search for increasingly effective techniques as basically

one of identifying more powerful messengers, one may begin to wonder
whether contemporary clinical research has begun to confuse the
message with the messenger. The gist of this last point is that tech-
niques might be more adequately construed as tools subservient to a
larger and more elusive endeavor. They offer a valuable assistance in
structuring and communicating some therapeutic messages, but they
should not be confused with the latter. (1981, pp. 269-270)

To carry on a process-oriented strategy, both the construction of an

adequate emotional context and proper timing are essential.
The construction of an interpersonal setting endowed with an
adequate level of emotional involvement essentially depends on how
far the therapist is prepared to forgo a guarantee of "objectivity" and of
being able to provide the correct and definitive response to every one
of the client's questions. Even if not supported by consistent scientific
arguments, such pedagogic behavior turns out to be somewhat per-
sistent even in therapists who seek to follow nonpersuasive methods
precisely because, by limiting emotional involvement, the therapist
feels more protected, as is well emphasized in this well-known passage
from Gadamer:

The claim to understand the other person in advance performs the

function of keeping the claim of the other person at a distance. We are
familiar with this from the educative relationship, an authoritative
form of welfare work. (1979, p. 323)

The story turns out quite differently the moment the therapist
abandons the role of the outside objective observer and accepts the
Concluding Remarks 207

idea that any knowledge is "participatory" and based on the reciprocal

negotiation of a mutual agreement rather than on a mere transmission
of data. While he or she will inevitably become more involved in
construing the therapeutic setting, the therapist will at the same time
become even more aware of the influence that his or her emotional
aspects exert on the course of the relationship, and, therefore, on the
definition of therapeutic reality itself. That is, the therapist is forced
to take into account his or her own emotional oscillations which
accompany and modulate his or her ongoing perception and un-
derstanding of the client's problem. But such oscillations, though
triggered by the interaction with the client, inform not so much about
the latter's functioning as about the therapist him- or herself. In other
words, as therapists,renounce the role of "trustees of objectivity" and
enter into the game of self-referentiality, then behind any order they
perceive, they cannot but grasp the contour of their own image, and
this, besides enhancing self-awareness, also enhances their involve-
ment in the relationship.
Finally, a process-oriented strategy is a progressive, step-like
ascension in levels of ordering experience which are more and more
structured and integrated, and it is thus essential that in order to be
effective it should progress in accordance with proper timing; that is,
before proceeding to the construction of a new level of self-ohserva-
tion and self-ordering, the therapist must be sure that the client has
achieved stability at the preceding level. Let us take as an example the
developmental history, even though the same argument also applies to
preceding stages; the client's ability in focusing on the past from a new
level of self-appraisal and self-referring interwoven with the growing
awareness of his or her functioning is the crucial variable allowing
the reconstruction of the past to be carried out with an appreciable
level of reordering. In other words, if one were not able to use as a ful-
crum the fact that the client already has another point of view of
him- or herself, one would arrive at a mere "biographical account"
rather than at a developmental analysis, which would not just be
useless but actually harmful, because it would inevitably end up by
confirming and legitimizing the habitual version endorsed by the
client.
The emphasis given to the role that awareness plays in the
progress and quality of transformations taking place during lifespan
may give rise to the question of whether this emphasis substantially
corresponds to making awareness the legitimate heir of rationality.
208 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This in turn would correspond, in practice, to a therapeutic attitude

characterized by the excessive induction of awareness as such, pro-
posed as a panacea. If nothing else, this is at least a possible "right
way" of bringing one back to oneself. Forgoing the role of impartial,
"objective" observer, together with a methodology of system/process
investigation, allows us to dispel this doubt, bringing to light the way
in which awareness is linked to a whole series of problems.
In the first place, the detailed analysis of the modifications of
the level of awareness triggered by a therapeutic setting of this kind
makes it clear that awareness is simply one of the ways in which a
system constructs an image of itself in order to increase the viability of
its ordering processes. This image is regulated by the same auto-
referential logic on which the whole system is based (i.e., personal
meaning) and hence does not correspond to a "right'' or "true" image
of the self-indicative, that is, of that which the system is in itself-
but rather to the image necessary for maintaining internal coherence,
thereby making less evident the contradictions and discrepancies of
personal experience. In a word, auto-analysis does not bring about the
elaboration of a kind of "objective self," seen from outside as being
more or: less reliable, insofar as it corresponds to a continuing process
of readjustment and recomposition of the data, aimed primarily at
stabilizing the current sense of self and possibly at articulating it
further. It is thus clear that as the number and complexity of the data
on hand increase, there will be an increase also in the number of
contradictions and discrepancies which will become apparent in the
attempt to recompose these data consistently with one's own per-
ceived continuity and coherence. This may give us a hint as to how to
understand the contrasting effects which often develop with time, on
both the cognitive and emotional levels, after arriving at a consistent
modification of the habitual level of awareness of the client.
At the cognitive level, the focusing on other aspects of the self,
along with the reorganization of the perception of reality that this
normally brings with it, reveals new critical domains of experience,
making lifespan development appear as a continual "problematic shift-
ing," in which to every increase of knowledge there corresponds the
emergence of new areas of ignorance.
As far as the emotional level is concerned, the burgeoning of
new levels of awareness is paralleled, almost invariably, by the growth
of the sense of ambiguity in experiencing self and the world, linked in
various ways to the emergence of complex emotions such as boredom,
Concluding Remarks 209

sense of the absurd, existential futility, etc. Fernando Pessoa, one of

the contemporary poets who has most faithfully recorded this aspect,
succeeds in providing an immediate sense of this with a phrase which
many people would subscribe to if they had to explain the effect felt
when faced with a "sudden" awareness of the trend of their life: "Each
of us is more than one, is manifold, is a prolixity of oneself' (1982, p.
38). It is still unclear how the increase in awareness facilitates the
burgeoning of such emotions, even though it seems evident that this
phenomenon is in some way correlated with the diminishing of the
sense of immediacy in experiencing self and the world at the very
moment such experiencing, entering consciousness, becomes the ob-
ject of attention.
It thus becomes ,evident that one must proceed with caution in
bringing forward a strategy directed toward modifying habitual levels
of awareness. The therapist should try to work only on those areas of
experience which have shown themselves to be critical on the bqsis of
a previous reconstruction of the basic themes of the client's personal
meaning, refraining from an exaggerated intervention in other do-
mains despite the fact that one's own conception of life might seem
better and l!lore suitable than those exhibited by the client. More-
over, within these same critical domains, one would be well advised
not to proceed indiscriminately with the pursuit of awareness as such,
but, quite the contrary, to be ready to grasp the minimum level of
modification of viewpoint which can trigger in clients their own
reorganization of problematic experience. It follows that all this im-
plies on the part of the therapist the awareness of demarcation be-
tween his or her own conception of self and the evolutionary dynam-
ics, autonomous and coherent, of the personal meaning of clients.
The therapist's awareness, on the other hand, become another
problem which I should like to note in passing in concluding these
reflections. In recent years, because of the progressive decline in the
role of privileged, impartial observer, a whole series of studies has
flourished regarding the therapist as a person (cf. Guy, 1987). One is
here dealing with longitudinal studies in which, apart from the im-
plied motivations for undertaking the career of therapist, there is the
attempt to focus particularly on the effects on the person which may
be brought about by the full-time practice of the profession. From the
greater part of the data one may deduce that the most perturbing
emotions and moods are connecred, even in therapists, to an in-
discriminate increase in awareness; such :m increase would seem to he
210 CONCLUDING REMARKS

an integral part of psychotherapeutic work, just as being a painter

involves bronchitis due to inhaling chemical vapors. We are dealing,
furthermore, with an awareness derived from a rather particular
dynamic. On the one hand, in fact, the therapist enters into contact
with a boundless quantity of human experiences and histories which
cannot be translated into other than a deeper consciousness of life and
of his or her reactions when faced with it; on the other hand,
however, the awareness drawn in this way is "vicarious"; that is, rather
than on directly lived experience, it is based on experience derived
from the life of others and as such is more susceptible of intensifying
the emergence of complex and ambiguous emotions. In addition, the
radical transformation of the observer-observed relationship involves
the therapist even more, forcing him or her to take on a continual,
and often urgent, self-referent attitude, absolutely unforeseeable until
a few years ago. In this sense, the problem of the "awareness of the
therapist"--of how to ~regulate it so that it does not reach critical
levels and of how to intervene if it does---is an entirely unexplored
frontier, crossing over which we find ourselves up against "the other
face" of the therapeutic process. This could clarify for us many of the
unsolved queries over which we ruminate concerning the "only face"
that we know.
It is precisely these contrasting and unresolved aspects which, at
this stage in my personal evolution as a therapist, reveal to me the
interdependence between change and awareness as a critical "in-
terface" in understanding the structure of human experience; the
detailed study of such an interface could reveal to us aspects, un-
foreseeable today, which may lead to a lev_el, of ontological theorizing
that will make that which we have sought to present in this book seem
commonplace. This is what I hope will happen in the course of the
next few years.
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 Index

Abandonment, 132, 150, 174 Agoraphobia, 94

Ahstract reflection, JO, .31 - .32, 65-66 "AU-or-nothing" feelings, 54, 141,
Acting out, .3 7 163, 193
Adaptation, .3, 9, 10, 26, 95 Ambivalence, 52-53, 54, 191, 192
Adolescence, .38, 167 Anger, 22, 2.3, 37, 101
anachment processes in, 7l and attachment, 24, 79
early, 200 controlling, 38
and eating disorders, 164 and motor activation, 39 -40
late, 201 and rejection, 35
reflexive abstraction in, .30, 4.3, 66 unconcrollahle, 114, 120, 171
relationship with parents in, 200- and withdrawal, 174
201 Anorexia, 48, 49; see also Eating dis-
Adulthood, 82-89 orders organization
honding in, 74- 77 case iUustration of, 115
critical periods in, 86 Anxiety, 59, 94, 116
Affcctional style, 144-165 separation, 170
Affective-emotional system, 6, 73 Approach-avoidance dynamics, 18,
and attachment figure, 20, 21. 72 68, 78, 81, 102, 204
hodily modifications of, 43 Arousal oscillation, 21, 22, 23-24,
and change, 96, 109-110 42 -43, 207
controlling, 43-45, 55-56 Assessment, 100- 108
interaction of with cognition, 25 direct versus indirect: data in, 102
manipulation of, 29-.30, 38 self-observation as, 1.03-108
negative, 99 Attachment, 18-22, .'34 -.35, 45, 72-
and personal relationships; see 81, 204
Attachment in adolescence, 71
and self-perception, 2.3, 72 ambivalent pattern~ of, 191-192
suppression of, 51, 53-54, 172 distorted, 28
Affective-motoric response, 18, 23, double-bind, 51, 54
39-40, 5.3, 68 flexibility in, 89
Aging, 85, 86 and inhibition, 41

2.31
232 INDEX

Attachment (cont.) Cioran, E. M., 20.3- 204

memories, 167, 180, 199 Cognitive restructuring, 6- 7
and parental rejection, 3.5 Cognitive therapy, 9.3; see also Ther-
and separation, 42 apist
style, 76- 77; sec also Affectional assessment procedure in, 100- 108
style checkup sessions in, 165
Attachment figure, 18-21, 36, 41, and evolutionary epistemology, 8, 95
72-81, 145, 157, 201 methodology of, 97-98
enmeshed relationship with, 46 persua~ion in, 93 - 94
internalizing, 20, 73 phases of, 112
loss of; see Separation postulates of, .3
in Personal Meaning Organizations, and self-observation, 97-98, 100,
75 103-108
Attributional style, 34, 4 7-48, 49 termination of, 165, 197-198
Autonomy, 50, 137 ~ therapeutic relationship in, 95, 98,
Avoidance, 21-22, 3.5-36 110
and loneliness, 36 traditional, 93, 123
as reduction of painful emotions, 28, Cognitive-behavioral [Link], 94
38 Coherence, 34, 84, 208
and rejecting parents, 23, 26, 35 of appearance, 49
Awareness, 65-66, 69- 70, 207-210 meaning, 59, 97
reconstructing, 132
search for, 24, .31
B
stabilization of, 26, 28, 30
Bereavement, 80 systemic, 61- 6.3
Body image, 49, 115, 200 C,,ncreteness-abstracmess continuum,
Bonding 62-63
in [Link], 74- 77 Consciou~ness, 32, 34
affectional, 146, 165; see also Affec- feelings versus cognition in, 68
tional style; Attachment individual, 87
inLmt.-caregiver, 17 m,mipulation of, 49
Bulimia, 48; see also Eating disorders Continuity, sense of, 22, 26-27, 208;
organization see also Script theory
in separation, 80
Control; see also [Link]
C fear of losing, 120-121, 180
Change, therapeutic, 108-109, 134, need for, .37, 39, 42, 5.3-56, 121,
164-165 151-152
and self-awareness, 97, 98 parental, 173, 174, 186
sources of, 109 testing, 177 , 180
Childhood, 167, 199-200; see also De- and victimizing attitude, 186
velopmental history, case illus- Correspondence principle, .3
trations of
early, .38
D
excluding procedures in, 29-30
self-perception in, 29 Deception, for controlling rela-
stages of; see Maturational stages tionships, 29
[ndex 233

Decision making, 55 progressive directionality of, 84

Depression, 58, 62-64, 114, I 18 roots of in developmental history,
Depressive organization, 35-40, 59, 181-187
63, 75, 99, 197 Emotional reciprocity, 75- 76, 81,
affectional style in, 146- 150 110, 149
alternation of feelings in, 40 with parents, 199-200
and attachment figure, 75, 76 Empathic attunement, 20, 28
case illustration of, 113-114, 118- Enmeshment, 46
120, 127, 128, 129, 132-134, Envinmment
146-150, 168-175 infant's modulation of, 18
memory reframing in, 195 and intersubjectivity, 16
progressive directionality of, 84 perceived as dangerous, 41-43
roots of in developmental history, primacy of, 3
168-175 and self-organization, 9, 18, 34
Developmentafhistory, 167-201, 207 Evolutionary epistemology, 8
aim of, 198 Excluding procedures, 29-10, 35, 43
case illustrations of, 168-194 Experiencing, versus explaining, 5- 7,
guidelines for reconstructing, 198- IJ, 167, 172
201
Diagnostic and Statistical Mariual of
Mental Disorders (3rd e<l., rev.;
F
DSM-III-R), 56-57, 99, 205 Facial recognition, 10, l 1
Disconnection, of affect, 29-30, .36 in infants, 18
Discrepancy Father-daughter relationship, 150-
in experiencing/explaining, 167 151, 176, 178
perception of, 24, 71, 79-80, l 10, Father-son relationship, 1.68-175,
131 188-189
Divorce, 80 Fear, 22, 23, 25
Dlmhting as affectional style, 155
in childhood, 189, 190, 192-193 of negative judgments, 99, 107-
in obsessive-compulsive organiza- 108, 123, IJ8
tion, 161-162, 189, 192-193 in phobic organization, 43, 120-
systematic, 55 l2l, 130, 155
of strangers, 22
of uncontrollability, 52, 120-121,
E
155
Eating disorders organization, 45-50, Feelings; see Affective-emotional
59, 64 system
affectional style in, 50, 155-160 Flexibility, 89, 105-106
and attachment figure, 75, 76
attributional style in, 48
G
case illustration of, 115-116, 122-
124, 127, 128, 129-lJ0, 137- Gadamer, H. G., 69, 74, 82, 206
140, 155-160, 181-187 Grief, .36
hypersensitivity in, 107, 122-123, in depressive organization, 99
124 and separation, 76, 77, 79-81,
memory reframing in, 159, 195 89
234 INDEX

H Knowledge, 4, 33, 59
analyzing, 3
Habermas, J., 111
evolutionary approach to, 8
Helplessness, 37, 39-40, 79, 172
and lifespan [Link], 9-10
Homework
and mental health/disorder, 61
in eating disorders organization, 1.22,
processing, 61-62
123
self-observational, 126-127
Hostility, 130 L
La Rochefoucauld, Fran~ois de, 76
I Language, 11-13, 110- 111
and evolution, 11-13
Imitation
and meaning, 13-14
by infants, 18
and praxis of living, 5, 6
by parents, 19 •
Learned helplessness, 39
Infancy, 16-23, 167
Lerner, R. M., 77
developmental history of, 199
Level of ordering process, 108, 144,
experience of loss in, 36
207
social recognition in, 18
Lifespan development, 9-10, 85-86,
imitation in, 18
99
intersubjectivity in, 18-20
and attachments, 72- 74
overprotection in, 41
and depressive style, 40
self-esteem in, 3 7
and quest for meaning, 14
Infant - caregiver bonds, 17
as reorganization of personal mean-
Information processing, 3, 138-139
ing, 60, 65
diversion from, 30, 35
and self-organization, 16
lntersubjectivity, 10-12, 16, 24, 31,
and sense of one's uniqueness, 56
72, 204-205
and temporal order, 85
in infants, 18- 20
Loneliness, 36, 37, 43, 75
Intimacy, 49-50
Loss, feelings of, 36, 40, 63, 84, 99,
Intrauterine learning, 17
150, 172
as affectional style, 149
J anticipation of, 38, 149
physical versus emotional, 80
Judgment, hypersensitivity to, 107- in separation, 79-81
108, 122, 124, 137 Love, 72, 76, 88-89, 146; see also
Attachment
K
Knowing, 5, 31, 108, 203, 204 M
and change, 60 Mahoney, M. J., 206
evolutionary approach to, 8-9 Masturbation, 190
feeling as, '96 Maturana, H., 4, 5, 12, 88
and meaning, 32 Maturational stages, 26-27, 34, 167;
and self-organization, 9-10 see also Adolescence; Child-
as self-referential process, 25 hood; Infancy; Preschool years
viability of, versus validity, 9 and social referencing, 20-21
Index 235

Meaning Overcontrnlling, 43, 44

brnic categories of, 25, 31 in eating disorders, 49, 76
coherence, 59, 71, 165
development of, 168
p
personal, 32-13, 60, 99; see also
Personal Meaning Organization Panic attacks, 94, 114, 129, 134,
quest for, 13-15, 33 180
Menstruation, 178, 183 Parental affectionless control, 173
Mental health, 60-62 Parental/caregiver behavior, 4 5-46,
Meta-cognition, 108 50-51; see [Link] Attachment fig-
Metaphor, 2 7 ure
Mother-daughter relationship Perceptions, self-other, 10, 16, 19,
in eating disorders, 123, 13 7 -138, 23, 24, 106
140, 156-157, 159, 1,82-185 and facial recognition, 10, 11
in phohic organization, I 76-177, Perfectionism, 47, 48-49
179 nonspecific, 54
Mother-son relationship, 188, 191- Personal Meaning Organization
192, 193 ([Link].), 33-64, 84-85,
"Moviola technique," 103-104, 107, 107, 164, 204-205; see also
127 Depressive organization; Eating
disorders organization; Ohses-
sive-compulsive organization;
N
Phobic organization
Negativity, 54 case illustrations of, 113 -117, l18-
Neurosis, 60-62 125, 127-163, 168-194
Nuclear scenes, 25, 26, 37, 42, 47, hypersensitivity in, 107 -108
52 and lifespan development, 65, 164
self-deception in, 70, 164; see also
Self-deception
0
and self-regulation, 65
Ohesity, 48, 49; see also Eating disor- systemic coherence in, 61-62, 65,
ders organization 84
Ohject permanence; see Continuity, types of, 34
sense of Persuasion, in cognitive therapy, 93-
Ohsessive-compulsive organization, 94, 123
50-56, 59, 64 Pessoa, Fernando, 209
affectional style in, 160-163 Phohic organization, 41-45, 59, 64,
and attachment figure, 75, 76 99
case illustration of, 116-117, 124- affectional style in, 150-155
125, 127, 128, 130-IJl, 140- and attachment figure, 75, 76
144, 160-163, 187-194 case illustration of, 114-115, 120-
causal attrihution in, 53 122, 127, 128, 129, 134-137,
progressive directionality in, 84 150-155, 175-181
mots of in developmental history, memory reframing in, 195
187-194 progressive directionality of, 84
verhal/analytical processing in, 50- roots of in developmental history,
51, 52, 53-54 175-181
236 INDEX

Physical appearance, and sense of self, Self, sense of, 23-24, 27-28, 74, 87,
28; see also Body image; Facial 105-107; see also Self-image
recognition blurred, 140, 185
Pirandello, Luigi, l, 50 challenge to, 145
Praxis of living, 4- 7, 12, 95-96 coherence in, 144, 145
and therapeutic change, 108, 195- and physical appearance, 28
196 stabilization of, 23
Preschool years, 28, 30, 38, 167 transformation of, 119
developmental history of, 199 Self-deception, 70, 145
Primate cognition, 10, 11, 21 in adolescence, 30
Puberty, 200-201 in affectional sryle, 150, 159, 163
Psycholinguistics, 111 in childhood, 29, 38, 43
Psychopathology, developmental, 57, regulating role of, 71, 132, 134,
59, 112 136, 140
Psychosis, 61-64 Self-esteem, 32, 34
Psychotherapy, 100, 112 and control of perceived negativity,
applied versus theoretical, 202-203 37
and opposing self-images, 54
and perfectionism, 47, 49
R
Self-identity, 9, 15, 17
Rationality, 95, 193, 207 Self-image
Reality, perception of, 4, 27, 38, 95 and attachment figure, 46, 47
changes in, 60 based on verbal primacy, 52
in depressive meaning, 39 in eating disorders, 48, 49
Reciprociry patterns, 22-24, 26 negative, 37, 39
in depressive organization, 35-36 and self-deception, 132, 143
in eating disorders organization, 45 - split in, 54, 71
46 Self-individuation, 10-11, 13, 22-
in obsessive-compulsive organiza- 23
tion, 50-51 Self-nonself differentiation, 16, 19,
in phobic organization, 42-44 106
Religious dilemmas, 190 Self-observation method, 103-108,
Reordering, personal, 71, 74, 97, 100, 126, 145, 168, 194, 205
145, 164 homework, 126-127
Resistances, 102-103, 198 viewpoints in, 168-205
Ritter, W., 6, 100-101 Self-organization, 8-10, 15, 34; see
Ruminations, 116, 130-131, 161-163 also Personal Meaning Organiza-
tion
in infants, 17-18
s and stages of development, 167
Saint-Exupery, Antoine de, 197 Self-perception
Scene-analysis procedure, 103-105, and avoidant attachment, 26, 36
107, 126, 164, 168 in childhood, 23, 38
Schizophrenia, 62-64 in. infants, 23, 28, 36
Schrag, C. 0., 12-13 Self-recognition, 37, 46
Script theory, 25-27 Self-referent ordering; see Self-
and maturational stages, 26-27, 34 organization
Index Ll7

Self-regulation, .39, 65-66, 7I, 132, emotional involvement of, 110-1 l 1,

134, 136, 140 204, 207
Self-reliance, compulsive, 3 7, l Tl in first phase of therapy, 125
Semantic memory, 67 and psychotherapeutic theory, 204
versus episodic, 105 and reformulation of problem pre-
Sensorial decoding, 179-180 sented, 117-125, 144, 145
Separation, 76, 77- 82, 174 role of, 111, 196-197, 206-207,
adolescent-parental, 78, 201 209
anxiety, 170 and termination of therapy, 165
from therapy, 198
Sexual maturation, 200-201
Sexual problems, IJ0-131, IJ2-IJ3,
u
135-136, 142-143 Understanding; see Knowing
Shame, ., 8, 189 "
Smith , M. A., 13-14
Social network index, 72 V
Social referencing, 20-21, .31-.32 Verbal/analytical processing, 50-51,
Somatic complaints, 4.3, 44, 71 52
Stereotyped behavior, 53, 71
Suicide, 120
[Link], A., 89 w
Systemic coherence, [Link] of, 62; Washoe, 11
see also Coherence Wdmer, W. B., 8
Withdrawal, 37, 174
T
y
Temporal order, 85- 86
Therapeutic relationship, 95, 98, 125 Youth; sec Adolescence
emotional involvement in, 110
Therapist
attitude of, 98-99, 100
z
awareness in , 209 - 210 Zambrano, M., 91
continued from front/lap

In Part II, he constructs his post-rationalist

framework for cognitive therapy with discussions
of the therapist's attitude, assessment procedures,
self-observation method, and the structure and
dynamics of therapeutic change. Case illustra-
tions demonstrate how the practitioner, whom he
views as "a strategically oriented perturber," can
prepare the clinical and interpersonal context;
focus and reorder immediate experiencing; and
help the patient reconstruct his or her affective
style.

An outstanding work by a master theoretician

and clinician, this volume offers provocative new
insights into the construct of the self powerfully
combined with straightforward guidance for
implementing the theory in practice. As such, it is
must reading for the researcher and practitioner
alike . Students in the field not only will glean a
deeper understanding of the human psyche, but
also will benefit from exposure to Guidano's
great passion and optimism for what can be
accomplished in the therapeutic encounter.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

A Founding Member of the Italian Association
for Cognitive Behavioral Therapies, Vittorio F.
Guidano, M.D., founded the Rome Center for
Cognitive Therapy and has served as Staff
Psychiatrist since 1978. From 1976 to 1986 he
was an Assistant Professor of Psychotherapy and
Psychopathology at the University of Rome,
School of Medicine. Co-author of Cognitive
ProceJJU and Emotwnal DiaorderJ (with G . Liotti)
and author of Compl.e.-r:ity of the Self, Guidano is
also a member of the Association for Advance-
ment of Behavior Therapy.

Cover duign by Naomi Heep

Also from Vittorio F. Guidono

COMPLEXITY OF THE SELF

A Developmental Approach to Psychopathology and Therapy
Vittorio F. Guidano
"Thi.J hook derved (l<I an interface between cognitive pdychofogy and the clinical
approach and repruentd not only a we/ul working tool hut auo a dtimufating
object of reflectwn for anyone who i.J involved in redearch. "
- Journal of Clinical PJychiatry
"GuiJano :, work i.J amhitww, 6roaJ, and creative anJ often dparkied with clinical
denJitivity and inJight. " - Contemporary Pdyc~ofogy
Focusing primarily on the eating disorders, phobias, obsessive- ·
compulsive patterns, and depression, Guidano illustrates how early
developmental experiences and ongoing psychological processes may
collude to perpetuate dysfunctional patterns and personal distress.
248 PAGES, ISBN 0-89862-012-0, CAT. #2012, $30.00

In Paperback!
COGNITIVE PROCESSES AND EMOTIONAL DISORDERS
A Structural Approach to Psychotherapy
V. F. Guidano and G . Liotti
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empirically attuned, and clinicaffy (l<ltute, it integrate., important informatwn
from diverde dOUrced. It i.J a contrwutwn that not only i,mpartd in/ormatwn hut
auo dtimufated one to think 6eyonJ what i.J written, proviJin_q an invaluable
<1ource of clinical innovatwn and re<1earch hypothe,1u "
- Contemporary Pt1ychofogy
Drawing on the insights of Piaget, Popper, Kuhn, Bandura, Beck, and
Bowlby, this masterful integration of science, scholarship, and practice
shows how cognitions underlie an individual's ability to change and
respond to new experiences.
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