Media Management

in the Age of
Lyndon B. Johnson
Selling Guns and Butter
Benjamin W. Quail
Media Management in the Age of Lyndon
B. Johnson
 Benjamin W. Quail

Media Management
in the Age of Lyndon
B. Johnson
Selling Guns and Butter
Benjamin W. Quail
University of Strathclyde
Glasgow, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-84945-0    ISBN 978-3-030-84946-7 (eBook)

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To Bry Jaimea, Helen, Nat, Ailsa, Loki and Maia
 Acknowledgements

A project such as this could not be completed without the understanding,

help and support of a lot of people, both academic and personal. The fol-
lowing people deserve a special mention for their kind and generous
assistance.
Bry Jaimea Mordwell—you let this work to take precedence over our
relationship with no complaints, and without you, the last several years
would have been much harder. Thank you for your ideas, your help with
the basic IT skills I lack, your second pair of eyes, for your brilliant cook-
ing, for your time and for your companionship. I am lucky to have met
you, and couldn’t have finished this without you.
Helen Quail, Dr Nathaniel Quail and Dr Ailsa Quail, for putting up
with me during the entire process. A paragraph can’t possibly convey the
assistance you’ve given me throughout my life and studies, and I can never
repay that. I couldn’t have asked for a better family. Thank you. Also
William Quail, who taught me how to make a proper cup of tea and grilled
cheese on toast—invaluable skills over the course of dozens of late nights.
I hope you would have been proud of this.
Dr Mark Ellis and Dr Manuela Williams, your assistance and advice as
my supervisors on the PhD thesis this project arose from has been invalu-
able, and I will always appreciate it.
I am grateful to the European Association of American Studies, for the
travel grant that was made available for archival research in Texas, along-
side the travel fund of the University of Strathclyde. Without these grants
I would not have been able to access many of the resources I have been
able to take advantage of. I am also indebted to the Eccles Centre for

vii
viii  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

American Studies at the British Library for awarding an Eccles Centre

Fellowship and providing a grant that enabled me to perform research at
the British Library in London.
The staff of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library in Austin,
Texas, were invaluable to the book with their knowledge of the docu-
ments contained within the library and help accessing information. A fur-
ther trip to the archives to gather additional sources unfortunately had to
be cancelled due to the outbreak of Coronavirus in 2020.
The staff of the Aviva complaints team for swapping shifts, covering
early finishes, listening to me complain about the workload, providing
encouragement and most of all for helping to keep my head out of the
clouds and on the task at hand. It means a lot.
Loki Quail, the golden retriever. Always there with a helping paw, a big
smile or a bark of encouragement. Thank you big doggo! And last but
certainly not least Maia the cat, who provided invaluable assistance during
the writing process.
 Contents

1 Introduction  1

2 Thematic Review 13

3 1963–1964: Assuming and Consolidating Power,

Campaigning for Election 69

4 1965: Guns vs. Butter—Escalation in Vietnam and the

March of the Great Society101

5 1966: Widening Credibility Gap and Sliding Popularity131

6 1967: Pacification, Charm Offensives and Further

Undermined Credibility165

7 1968: Tet, Plummeting Popularity and the Ultimate

Failure of the Johnsonian Press Strategy201

8 Conclusion225

Bibliography241

Index253

ix
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Aims
Lyndon Johnson took office at a turbulent time in American society, and
many of his actions while in office reflected this, particularly the lynchpins
of his foreign and domestic policies, dominated as they were by Vietnam
and Johnson’s Great Society series of domestic reforms respectively. These
policies would impact the United States for decades to come. After high
points in the immediate aftermath of his succession in November 1963
and his own election a year later, Johnson saw his credibility eroded as
criticism mounted and his approval ratings slid. Most scholars have attrib-
uted this decline to the ongoing Vietnam War and a lack of government
transparency when discussing the matter with the public. Taking this one
step further, it can and should be argued that Johnson’s credibility as the
president of the United States was undermined by his inability to develop
a successful strategy to put forward his domestic and foreign policies to
the satisfaction of the American public, and by his administration’s use of
a reactive, rather than a proactive, press strategy.
A “proactive” strategy should be envisaged as a coherent, well thought-­
out approach to press and public relations that considers previous state-
ments, promises, and plans for future events and issues. A “reactive”
strategy is one that fails to account for these long-term factors and only
responds to major news stories in the short term with little or no real
thought given to the lasting effects of recent or current dealings with the
press and public.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1
Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
2  B. W. QUAIL

To arrive at a conclusion the Johnson administration’s collection of

public opinion data has been thoroughly researched, and the attempts
made to use this data to reverse the ongoing slump in presidential approval
ratings after 1965.1 Central parts of this research were undertaken using
documents obtained from the LBJ Presidential Library, located at the
University of Texas in Austin. The LBJ Library contains a multitude of
documents pertaining to the president and his public image, as well as
detailed work carried out by aides and staff members on public image and
opinion.
America in the 1960s has a rich historiography, in which the presidency
and the changing fortunes of the occupant of the Oval Office are often
central. In order to gain the fullest possible understanding of the time
period and contemporary arguments surrounding Johnson’s time in
office, it has been necessary to consult wide-ranging and varied secondary
material. Disciplines other than history have contributed; for example,
reviewing the work of political scientists on public opinion and propa-
ganda—topics at the crux of the study of—has been important. This has
helped to develop a theoretical understanding of propaganda and its uses
by the Johnson administration. As such, a literature review of various
aspects of the Johnson presidency in relation to these things has been
included.
However, this rich historiography raises another problem with the
study of the Johnsonian era in American politics; with such a huge amount
of historiographical material to view, it is simply impossible for a single
historian to sift through every grain of information and opinion for a study
of this scope. With that in mind, it has been important to carefully select
the key information required and decide which aspects of the historio-
graphical material are most useful. The examples of the Great Society and
Vietnam allow for a substantial area of focus on both the president’s for-
eign and domestic policies.
A number of sources have been used. Public opinion polls taken by
government-accredited sources such as Oliver Quayle and John Kraft, are
important markers of how the Johnson administration collected public
1
 Johnson and his administration were acutely aware of the decline in the latter years of his
time in office; his polling advisor, Frederick Panzer, kept charts showing the president’s
approval rating dropping from a high of almost 80% after being sworn in to just 44% on two
occasions during Bill Moyers’s time as press secretary in 1966. See Memorandum from
Frederick Panzer to the President, 21 February 1967, Office Files of Frederick Panzer, box
402, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas, for more details.
 1 INTRODUCTION  3

opinion and insights into the views of the public on the president.
Newspaper sources such as the Washington Post and New York Times have
been consulted. As national press, they help to gauge the mood of the
country and offer valuable insights into public debate and opinion on
social matters. Several other regional and local newspapers have also been
consulted. These often carried syndicated opinion polls such as those con-
ducted by George Gallup. These polls did not always agree with those
conducted officially, and so it has been important to examine them to
juxtapose the views being given to the Johnson administration against
those broadcast by major news sources.
Opinion polls, while useful for gauging the general mood of the popu-
lace, are limited by the size and proportion of their sample. A good poll-
ster such as Gallup or Louis Harris uses an indicative sample of the
population of the country, but this is not a foolproof method of predicting
or summing up the mood of such a diverse nation as the United States.
This is perhaps best summed up in the case of George Gallup by the Dewey
vs. Truman presidential election of 1948 in which a landslide victory for
Dewey was predicted by Gallup and other major pollsters of the era. When
Truman won, public confidence in the opinion polling system was
knocked. For his part, Gallup blamed his failure to predict the result on
having ended his opinion polling prematurely, something confirmed by
his son George, Jr., in a later interview with the Los Angeles Times.2 Much
more recently in the United Kingdom, opinion polls for the 2015 UK
parliamentary election largely predicted a hung parliament between the
Labour and Conservative parties, when in fact the Conservatives won a
clear majority.3 In 2016, the same UK polls were wrong about a national
referendum on leaving the European Union; exit polls on the day showed
remain winning by 52%–48%, but the result was reversed.4 An even more
pertinent example came in the presidential election of 2016, where Donald
Trump won a victory against the heavily favoured Democratic candidate

2
 W Lester, “‘Dewey Defeats Truman’ Disaster Haunts Pollsters,” Los Angeles Times, 1
November 1998, accessed on 15 September 2017 at [Link]
nov/01/news/mn-38174.
3
 The 2015 result led to the YouGov polling agency publishing several documents online
relating to their failure to accurately predict the result of the election; for example, P Keller,
“We Got It Wrong. Why?,” YouGov, 11 May 2015, [Link]
news/2015/05/11/we-got-it-wrong-why/ accessed on 3 January 2017.
4
 YouGov on the day poll: Remain 52%, Leave 48%, YouGov, 23 June 2016, https://
[Link]/topics/politics/articles-reports/2016/06/23/yougov-day-poll.
4  B. W. QUAIL

Hillary Clinton, though this is more complex as Clinton won the popular
vote by a significant margin.5 Clearly then, opinion polls should not be
taken as an absolute marker of public opinion at any given time, and an
event of any significance can change how a public figure in the mould of
Lyndon B. Johnson is viewed. Thus, it is important to take opinion polls
as only one marker of the general mood, in conjunction with other avail-
able and appropriate sources. Newspaper and magazine articles in publica-
tions with high circulations tended to reflect and reinforce the views of
their readers. The New York Times and Washington Post are crucial in
chronicling the reporting of the day, but their role as shapers of opinion is
more questionable. Official sources detailing the research of government
agencies into public opinion on specific matters are also valuable.
With that in mind, several official sources from the Johnson Library are
crucial to take into account. Records kept by Frederick Panzer—a Johnson
aide who was tasked with collating media reports and issues, as well as
compiling reports to the president on this subject—have been extremely
helpful to the examination of the impact of media relations on Johnson’s
credibility. Preparatory material on the president’s speeches and media
engagements located in the Library’s speech and background material files
has also been invaluable. The late Harry Middleton, the director of the
Johnson Library for twenty-five years and a former speechwriter for the
president, also made himself available for interview.
The continually changing nature of Johnsonian press strategy can be
most effectively demonstrated through a sequential examination of key
events in Johnson’s presidency, an analysis of how these events pertain to
presidential-press relations and a discussion of their effects on the admin-
istration’s ongoing attempts to court the press and public. Ultimately, this
chronological view spans five chapters from 1963 to 1968 and concludes
with a thorough analysis of the findings.
The influence of print media was still wide ranging and effective during
the 1960s, particularly nationally distributed sources such as the New York
Times and Time Magazine. Where it has been possible, a wide variety of
sources from other areas such as news broadcasts, other major newspapers
like the Washington Post and some regional newspapers have been used.
George Christian, Johnson’s press secretary during his final year in office,

5
 Frank Newport, National Polling Accurately Nails Popular Vote, Gallup, 23 November 2016,
[Link]
[Link].
 1 INTRODUCTION  5

asserted that, “The press is the editorial policies of the New York Times and
the Washington Post, both potent voices on the Potomac.”6 This certainly
appears to have been true of this era, and the weight that the administra-
tion placed on the opinions expressed by these two institutions is not in
doubt. Key polling data collected by Louis Harris is not freely available to
access before the year 1970, and consequently polling data from Gallup is
used more heavily—although Harris’s memoirs do have some information
on the Johnson years that was relevant. It is worth noting that Harris Polls
tended to give the president slightly harsher results than polls by Gallup,
and therefore the generally friendlier poll results are more prevalent—
Johnson’s own view on polling tended to favour results he found more
palatable. Archival material from the Johnson Library has been used in
conjunction with documents obtained from the published Foreign
Relations of the United States series, but the vast amount of information
available from both sources has meant that careful selection has been made
from the sources most relevant to the topic.7
It is important to recognise the parameters of this work from the point
of view of the historical argument being raised, simply because of the
wide-ranging historical surveys already published on the subjects of
Johnson, Vietnam and the Great Society. Presidential-press relations need
to be reviewed from the perspective of Vietnam and the Great Society
simply because these were the most important domestic and foreign policy
objectives of the Johnson years: the butter and the guns. As the Great
Society ran into difficulty and the focus of the administration shifted to
Vietnam, the conflict will become more prevalent in the analysis. Only key
events and engagements with the press during Johnson’s tenure are dis-
cussed as it would not be possible to include every disagreement between
the administration and the media, as this would widen the scope of the
work too far. The nature of the work also requires a strong contextual
base—it was concluded that the best way to make this easier for the reader
was to include a section at the beginning of each chronological chapter,
summarising major political events of the year that the administration con-
tended with.
6
 G Christian, The President Steps Down: A Personal Memoir of the Transfer of Power (New
York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 186.
7
 The Foreign Relations series can be found online. For further information, see Foreign
Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964–1968, vols. I–XXXIV. The focus here is on vols.
I–VII, which look specifically at documents pertaining to Vietnam, although in places other
volumes have been referenced for the record.
6  B. W. QUAIL

Political historian Vaughn D. Bornet once said of Johnson, “He dared,

cared, and shared of himself, and thereby very often carried the day.” He
claimed that a leader of Johnson’s ilk is unlikely to step foot in the White
House again.8 On the other hand, authors such as Robert Caro—one of
the pre-eminent scholars of Johnson’s life before the presidency—do not
think so well of him.9 It is not the intention here to develop original argu-
ments or further the discussion regarding Lyndon B. Johnson’s character.
His presidential style and personality clearly contributed to his press strat-
egy, so some reference to these factors needs to be made, but only in rela-
tion to how they impacted on press relations and his failing credibility,
which is the ultimate focus here. As such, the four-volume biography of
Johnson by Caro is used sparingly—there is, as yet, no volume of his biog-
raphy that deals with the elected presidency of Johnson. On the other
hand, the actions of presidential aides such as the press secretaries, Pierre
Salinger, George Reedy, Bill Moyers and George Christian will be exam-
ined. Key figures such as presidential aides Joe Califano and Jack Valenti,
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and his eventual replacement
Clark Clifford, Vietnam advisors McGeorge Bundy and his brother
William, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State
George Ball among many others are important sources, though biased in
their own way, on the inner workings of the administration. Ultimately
however, the actions and declarations of President Johnson are the most
important and will form the focus of the discussion.
A review of Johnson’s presidency offers a deeper understanding of the
modern presidency; Johnson was one of the first presidents to be heavily
involved with media relations, employing experienced press secretaries
throughout his time in office. His presidency came during a period of
intense economic and cultural change in American society, and the media
was not exempt from this. New media techniques and the rise of televised
news reports were at the forefront of the changing face of the media, and
it was necessary for the White House to adapt to suit this. Johnson’s time
in office can perhaps be seen as a prototype of the modern presidency—an
institution that actively seeks information about the public to maintain a
strong image and exert political influence.

8
 V D Bornet, “Reappraising the Presidency of Lyndon B Johnson,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1990), p. 601.
9
 See, for example, R Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, Volume 1: The Path To Power (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).
 1 INTRODUCTION  7

An in-depth view of Johnson’s presidency and an examination of how

he lost credibility with the American people—if indeed this was the case—
will provide insights about the margins for success and failure in the mod-
ern White House, how the presidency seeks to operate and how this can
evolve over time. It should increase our understanding of the role of the
president, the role of propaganda in the presidency and the potential
direction of the relationship between the commander-in-chief and
his people.

Methodology
A purely empirical analysis of “the facts” would have been difficult, given
the nature of both Lyndon B. Johnson as a person and the sources avail-
able. Unlike some presidents, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, whose edito-
rial markings are very evident on surviving drafts of speeches and transcripts
of press conferences, Lyndon Johnson’s imprint on such materials in the
LBJ Archives is small. Much of his contact with aides and staff members
was completed verbally, and although mark-ups and edits from the presi-
dent exist, it is difficult to piece these together into a formal public rela-
tions strategy without significant expansion from other sources.
Accordingly, the decision was made to implement a more qualitative anal-
ysis of Johnson’s presidency, from which his intentions and ideas can be
inferred.
Ultimately, Lyndon Johnson was unable to form a proactive and
forward-­thinking strategy with which to task his advisors in dealing with
the press. This directly affected his credibility and therefore his ability to
effectively govern the country. This argument is sustained through closely
examining the changing attitudes towards press relations that emerged
from the government, in conjunction with the actual reporting of the
press and public opinion polls. This allows conclusions to be drawn as to
whether Johnson’s inability to be proactive damaged his credibility and,
indeed, whether he did act in a reactive manner for most of his time
in office.
Archival and printed official documentation was consulted at the
Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas; the Library of Congress in
Washington, DC; and the Eccles Centre of the British Library in London.
The archival component of this research has revolved around the collec-
tion of documentation that shows how the Johnson administration viewed
and reacted to the media. Oral histories collected by the library have been
8  B. W. QUAIL

used, particularly those that deal with media personalities of the time, such
as Peter Braestrup, Drew Pearson, Tom Wicker and Carroll Kilpatrick, as
well as telephone conversations that the Library has made available to
researchers in the archives and, latterly, online. The work of Michael
Beschloss, Kent Germany and others in transcribing hundreds of tele-
phone conversations from Johnson’s accession to the presidency has also
been important.10 Johnson secretly recorded hundreds if not thousands of
conversations during his time in office—Beschloss notes that he was
extremely careful who he kept informed about these recordings.11 It is
important to note, though, that Beschloss’s work only transcribes a small
proportion of the available telephone recordings from the Johnson presi-
dency, and only throughout the first two years of his presidency.12 Kent
Germany and others have transcribed more telephone conversations,
which are available through the University of Virginia’s Miller Center for
Public Affairs. In conjunction with this, the LBJ Library has released
recordings of many telephone conversations, particularly from later years
of the presidency, which have provided useful context alongside transcripts
created by Beschloss, Germany and others. Archival research has also
involved collecting some of the opinion polls commissioned by Johnson
through private pollsters such as Oliver Quayle. Finally, examples of the
speechwriting process have been collected to provide documentary
­evidence of the factors that affected the process of communicating with
the public. The Foreign Relations of the United States series has an exten-
sive collection of documents pertaining to the Vietnam War and foreign
policy objectives that take into account media strategy, and have been used
in conjunction with other archival material.

10
 Beschloss has thus far compiled two volumes of this material, collected in Taking Charge:
The Johnson White House Tapes 1963–1964, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997) and
Reaching For Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White House Tapes 1965–1965 (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2001).
11
 M R Beschloss, “Knowing What Really Happened,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol.
32, no. 4 (December 2002), p. 644.
12
 T Sullivan et al. note that on, for example, 5 August 1964, Beschloss only transcribed
two out of twenty-seven conversations. This clearly does not provide the full story of what
the president did that day, but can provide interesting analysis when combined with other
source analysis from the time and indeed the recordings themselves. For full details of the
article’s study into Johnson’s telephone conversation, see Sullivan, “Presidential Recordings
as Presidential Data: Assessing LBJ’s Presidential Persuasive Attempts,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 4 (Winter 1999), pp. 941–42.
 1 INTRODUCTION  9

The second way in which data has been collected is through third-party
contemporary sources. These include, but are not limited to, the archives
of the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers, Time Magazine’s
archives and material from other major sources of contemporary news in
the 1960s that discuss the president where they have become available.
The Department of State Bulletin is less relevant in most areas but has still
proven useful. The records of Congressional hearings have been published
and are available to view online in some cases—these have been useful, for
example, in looking at the 1966 hearings on the war.13 Third-party syndi-
cated poll data has been collected at great length. The Gallup Organisation
has published an almanac of polls that ran in syndicated newspapers, and
the third volume of this work has proven especially significant, as it con-
tains a wealth of poll information that relates to Johnson’s popularity, job
rating and the war in Vietnam under his stewardship. Other major poll
data such as the Harris Poll has been more difficult to come across, as their
records do not stretch further back than 1970, but there have been oppor-
tunities to view some of this data from archived newspaper sources.
Other, less official, contemporary primary material has been published,
and numerous witnesses and participants have published their own
accounts. Many of Johnson’s aides and staff members have released mem-
oirs, including former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, influential
domestic policy aide Joseph Califano, presidential aide and future head of
the Motion Picture Association of America Jack Valenti, press secretaries
George Reedy and George Christian, former commander of American
forces in Vietnam (MACV) General William Westmoreland and numer-
ous others.
The final way in which data has been collected has been through second-
ary material, much which was consulted in the British Library and the
Library of Congress. Biographies of Johnson, such as those by Robert Caro,
Robert Dallek, Kathleen Turner and Randall Woods, have been invaluable
in the additional information they have supplied, if not widely cited within
the work itself. The source material on Johnson’s presidency and the events
contained within it is vast, particularly about Vietnam. With that in mind, it

13
 Specifically, the 1966 hearings can be found at: Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal
Year, 1966: Vietnam: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
Senate, Eighty-ninth Congress, second session, on S. 2793, to amend further the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended: 28 January, 4, 8, 10, 17 and 18 February, 1966. As accessed on 4
February 2017 at [Link]/Record/010309694.
10  B. W. QUAIL

has been necessary to conduct a thorough investigation of the relevant

sources. A range of theoretical work on propaganda has also been collected.
It is recognised here that the extent to which Johnson’s actions can be cat-
egorised as propaganda is open to debate; nevertheless, the term is ulti-
mately appropriate, and therefore the extent to which his attempts to
propagandise major policies succeeded was key to this research. It is also
inherent to any discussion of public opinion and press relations; the onset of
mass media in the post-war era provided an opportunity for politicians like
Johnson to implement previously unseen methods of propaganda using new
communication techniques; the extent to which Johnson succeeded or
failed to take advantage of this is important to be aware of.
Information collected from primary sources was analysed in terms of its
potential impact on the media relations of the Johnson government. To
this end, private meetings between high-ranking members of the adminis-
tration such as advisors, aides, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
senior advisors to the president, and with Lyndon Johnson himself have
been used as evidence to further the argument that the government fol-
lowed a reactive strategy towards dealing with public affairs and the media.
Newspaper headlines and articles by influential members of the press, such
as James “Scotty” Reston, Stanley Karnow and Walter Lippmann, have
been used to a great extent to evidence journalistic opinion on the policies
of the administration. Johnson was severely affected by public criticism of
his actions, so it is important to the argument to show examples of this. As
well as this, the speechwriting and behind-the-scenes evidence-gathering
processes for several major addresses, particularly the president’s annual
State of the Union message to Congress, have been of great value. They
complement the chronological nature of the piece and give a sense of the
year-on-year progression of attitudes towards media contact within the
administration, as well as showing how those who were in charge of the
process approached the preparation of propaganda.
As indicated above, the evidence and collected data have been arranged
in a chronological fashion, to avoid duplication of the material. Intertwined
themes emerge in the separate chronological chapters, rather than in a dis-
jointed thematic structure. One of the key aspects of the administration was
the changing performance over time (and the political cycle) of Johnson
and his central public affairs advisors. By showing the different successive
strategies and approaches taken by the president to curry public and press
favour, it is possible to see whether he learned from his mistakes and whether
the administration was able to create an effective approach to the publicising
 1 INTRODUCTION  11

and propagandising of his domestic and foreign policies. In turn, this can
show whether an inability or difficulty in dealing with the press undermined
Johnson’s credibility and led to the creation of what newspapers termed a,
“Credibility Gap,” in the later years of Johnson’s presidency.14
It was imperative to consider potential qualitative issues that the data
raised, including difficulties in using and interpreting poll data as a guide
for the popularity of the subject. A section of the next chapter deals at
some length with the advantages and disadvantages of opinion polls and
considers theoretical aspects of the debate. However, opinion polling is a
non-definitive mark of popularity. Due to the ever-changing and difficult-­
to-­ascertain nature of public opinion, poll data is used in the context of
how it was construed by Johnson and the effect that this may have had on
his actions. Analysis of the changing nature of Johnson’s relationship with
pollsters and poll data will play an important part in the conclusions con-
cerning the administration’s inability to cultivate a proactive strategy
towards public interaction. This pertains to both Johnson’s commissioned
polls and those carried out by the likes of Gallup and Harris.
This research has been undertaken within certain defined limits. As
noted above, it is the intention to provide a critical analysis of Johnson’s
media relations and his public standing over the course of his elected presi-
dency, specifically the period between his election in November 1964 and
his withdrawal from the primary election process in March 1968. The
escalation of the Vietnam War and the pursuit of Great Society policies are
central. It is not the intention of this book to pass judgement on Johnson’s
capacity as a policymaker, generally, or to judge his character or integrity
as a politician, as others have done extensively. Rather, it offers a review of
Johnson’s abilities as a propagandist, offering insights into the Johnson
presidency and its decline in popularity, showing the mistakes that were
made as they happened and reviewing whether or not these were avoid-
able errors. The conclusion is that the Johnson administration ultimately
failed to take advantage of the media to effectively propagandise its poli-
cies. It is not argued that Johnson consistently and consciously tried to
dupe the people into supporting his policies; rather, he simply could not
effectively demonstrate and communicate them to the public, due to a
fundamental misunderstanding of how the media operated. This failure to
offer a proactive and consistent stance on important matters ultimately
played a major role in costing Johnson his credibility.

 On the credibility gap, see Chap. 5, where the evolution of the term is discussed in
14

more detail.
 CHAPTER 2

Thematic Review

Introduction
The themes of American post-war politics and media are well trodden, and
an extremely wide array of sources that discuss the relationship between
the two is available. Acknowledging that it is extremely difficult to exam-
ine the entire breadth of research in this field, particularly in the case of the
Vietnam War, which has been examined extensively by a range of scholars
from multiple fields, a review of appropriate themes and their relevance
will focus on several key areas, all of which are focused and relevant to the
topic at hand.
A review of some important works on propaganda is also required.
While the focus here is not exclusively on the propagandist tactics of the
administration, there is an aspect of Johnson’s relationship with the press
that would benefit from an understanding of how propaganda works in a
democratic society. Understanding the principles behind effective adver-
tising and communication—the selling of an idea to a large proportion of
the population—is key when looking at the credibility gap and its causes.
While this will not form the basis of extensive discussion throughout the
bulk of the text, it will underpin key concepts. The Johnson administra-
tion was guilty of failing to do this with its policies, and an understanding
of those philosophies will clarify the argument that the underlying reason
for the administration’s failure was the lack of a proactive strategy to sell
its policies in a manner that did not arouse the suspicion of the American

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 13

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
14  B. W. QUAIL

press and public. This section will discuss key arguments about the mean-
ing of propaganda, how it is effectively disseminated and the possible
effects of a failure in propaganda.
Leading on from this, a discussion of public opinion polls, the media
and government will be helpful. This research focuses quite heavily on the
Johnson administration and its reaction to both the decline in public sup-
port and media hostility towards the president, and the extent to which
this reaction was a cause or an effect of changes in public opinion. This
section will discuss how public opinion has been monitored through opin-
ion polls and how it is judged and interpreted by governments—specifi-
cally the US government and the Johnson administration, in particular.
The effects of media coverage on public opinion are discussed, and the
conclusion drawn is that the media has some power over the direction of
public sentiment that is already nascent, suggesting, in turn, the potential
limits to the extent to which there was a genuine opportunity for the
Johnson administration to sway either the media or public opinion, or
both, concerning its key policy objectives.
The final element of the literature review will be split into two sections.
The first is a brief biography of Lyndon Johnson, which is necessary in
order to understand the president’s vast experience in the Senate and how
this affected his decision-making skills and habits, as well as his interaction
with the press during this time. A discussion of the historiography of the
Vietnam War will form the second part of this section. The war has been
extensively studied by scholars and was crucial to the Johnson presidency
and the credibility gap that engulfed him. Essentially, Johnson was not
able to successfully adapt his style from the personal one that he used as a
senator—the so-called Johnson treatment—to a style that was more inclu-
sive, sounded less as if he were being prompted and was camera friendly,
such as was needed for a president who found himself facing news cameras
and journalists on a daily basis. It is therefore necessary to understand
this style.
Finally, an examination of Johnson’s personality is required. His leg-
endarily mercurial personality has been the subject of numerous works,
and it is important to take into account how influential he was on those
around him and how willing he was to be influenced, himself, and the
ways in which his own views on subjects such as the media shaped his
presidency.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  15

Propaganda
There is a rich historiography on American history and culture during the
1960s. Much has been written about propaganda, and it is imperative to
reflect on this material so that a link can be made between the theoretical
aspects of propaganda and the hard realities of life in America in the 1960s.
In order to understand how government propaganda, democracy and war
are linked it is vital to offer a definition of propaganda and explain how it
pertains to the study of war and the effects it may have on the hearts and
minds of the people that it is aimed at.
Nicholas O’Shaughnessy agrees that defining propaganda is difficult:
“It is inevitable that there will be no collective agreement about the defini-
tion of propaganda.”1 Propaganda has been described as simply “A form
of communication that attempts to achieve a response that furthers the
desired intent of the propagandist” (but, one could argue, such a state-
ment covers almost all communication).2 It is, however, important to dis-
tinguish propaganda from the wider term of communication, as not all
communication can be classed as propaganda. Aronson and Pratkanis have
described how propaganda is consumed: “Every time we turn on the radio
or television, every time we open a book, magazine or newspaper, some-
one is trying to educate us, to convince us to buy a product, to persuade
us to vote for a candidate or to subscribe to some version of what is right,
true or beautiful.”3 In its base form, then, propaganda is not simply com-
munication. It is in fact an attempt to coerce an intended audience into
thinking, believing or acting in a specific way. When applied to a combat
scenario such as the Vietnam War, it is used to boost morale both at home
and amongst combatants, and aimed at the enemy to damage their self-­
esteem and unity. In order to effectively sell propaganda, a propagandist
needs to know their audience. He or she needs to empathise with them
and their values, at some level, and understand what will make them
respond with the desired reaction; moreover, effective propaganda is
largely invisible and may be indistinguishable from regular news reports
and government messages. In this respect, the 1960s and particularly the
Johnson years are very interesting to look at from a propaganda

1
 N O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2008), p. 14.
2
 G Jowett and V O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (London: Sage, 1999), p. 1.
3
 E Aronson and A Pratkanis, Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion
(London: W H Freeman, 2000), p. 3.
16  B. W. QUAIL

perspective. As a new technological era dawned, new ways to both collect

and disseminate information became available to the administration, plac-
ing the political actors of the period at the beginning of a new era of pro-
paganda. On top of this, the Vietnam situation offered an opportunity for
the administration to propagandise the war to sell to the American people
using the relatively new medium of television and the burgeoning mass
media—going beyond simple communication to become an attempt to
influence public views on the subject of war. Jowett and O’Donnell have
made the point that propaganda in all its forms serves a purpose:
“Advertising in the capitalist system serves the same function as the poster
art of authoritarian Socialism.”4 While Soviet poster art was government
sanctioned and set out the goals of socialism in very clear, black and white
terms, advertising persuades in the capitalist world through more sugges-
tive messages praising products and those who buy them, driving sales and
pushing on the capitalist machine. In America, products are sold. In Soviet
Russia the ideology was sold by the posters, in effect, becoming the
product.
The idea of propaganda is not always well regarded for this reason—the
word has connotations of deception, and the overriding perception of
propagandists in the West is of lying politicians and a nightmarish Orwellian
vision in which governments cannot tell the truth. Edward Bernays, the
controversial publicist and author, believed “the sincere and gifted politi-
cian is able, by the instrument of propaganda, to mold and form the will
of the people.”5 Philip Taylor has commented that propaganda “obscures
our windows on the world by providing layers of distorting condensation.”6
He means that propaganda is used to cloud the mind, to tell us what we
want to hear or how to live our lives. O’Shaughnessy likewise states that
propaganda is “[t]he obverse of reason.” And rational persuasion.7
Propaganda used during war, particularly on the home front, attempts to
portray the enemy as clearly morally inferior. In the case of the United
States in Vietnam, the domestic news media portrayed a completely differ-
ent story and laid much of the blame for escalation on the American politi-
cal hierarchy. When such confusion reigns and enemies are difficult to

4
 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 10.
5
 E Bernays, Propaganda, (Brooklyn, NY: IG Publishing, 2018 [1928]) p. 75.
6
 P Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda From the Ancient World to the
Modern Era (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 1.
7
 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 17.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  17

distinguish from friends, there is little wonder that the general public
tends to see propaganda as something of a black art. O’Shaughnessy
believes that propaganda is not simply one aspect of military activity, but
that this activity itself is inherently propagandist either partially or entire-
ly.8 This plays into activity aimed at the home front during times of mili-
tary movement, such as Vietnam.
With that said, not all types of persuasion can be labelled propaganda.
In their work Age of Propaganda, Aronson and Pratkanis discuss the evo-
lution of the form of propaganda from its classical origin by quoting Paul
Linebarger (a specialist in psychological warfare): “The classical rhetorical
techniques of the ancient Greeks and Romans—which were avidly studied
by those responsible for crafting the governments of Western Europe and
America—were aimed at creating discourse that could illuminate the issue
at hand. …The end result was an education for both the audience and the
speakers.”9 Persuasion and propaganda—while strongly linked—are not
one and the same. Two people with an equal standing can engage in dis-
course and attempt to persuade the other of his or her point of view. It
then follows that propaganda normally arises from the attempt by those
with power to coerce those without power into furthering their agenda in
some other way. Examples of this can be seen in the depression of the
1930s; the dire economic situation led to desperation among many, and
“saviours” sprang up across the country to cure the ills of society. Governor
Huey Long of Louisiana and Father Charles Coughlin, an Irish-Canadian
priest, were among the first to effectively use radio to disseminate propa-
ganda to a wide audience.10 Long was particularly prolific, employing
masses of stenographers to correspond with an enormous mailing list. It
follows then that propaganda can normally be distinguished from persua-
sion; propaganda is linked with larger processes within society in which
both the speaker and the listener are invested, while persuasion is more of
an individual experience. Propaganda is mass suggestion, and this is how
it is differentiated from persuasion.
Several authors have attempted to define propaganda tactics and effects;
there is a multitude of work on its measurable effects and the extent to

8
 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 36.
9
 P A Linebarger, cited in Aronson and Pratkanis, Age of Propaganda, p. 12.
10
 There are several important biographies of Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin—
one interesting work combining their careers is A Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long,
Father Coughlin and the Great Depression (New York: Knopf, 1982).
18  B. W. QUAIL

which it has any. O’Shaughnessy feels that the measure of its impact is
“impossible to gauge and therefore permanently subject to dispute,”11 and
instead questions why propaganda can flourish even in a more educated
society, one which has been brought up amidst increasingly advanced
technology and the relatively modern innovation of the mass media.
O’Shaughnessy asks whether the propagandist is practising self-deception
as much as trying to deceive others and argues that, “We can become co-­
conspirators in our own self-deceit.”12 Propagandists offer an escape not
only for the masses, but for themselves as well. This attitude links in with
O’Shaughnessy’s views on deceit within propaganda; he argues that in
today’s cynical society it is difficult for “classic” forms of propaganda to
gain any purchase, and new, disguised forms of propaganda have risen.
O’Shaughnessy is slightly more dubious about how controllable the press
is than writers such as Ellul and Chomsky, noting that, “The press can only
ever be influenced and not controlled,”13 in a democracy. O’Shaughnessy
concludes that propaganda can be overlooked easily by historians and
believes that in twentieth-century history, “Propaganda must be under-
stood not as a peripheral aspect of history, but as a fulcrum.” He makes a
valid argument; propaganda is at the heart of political communication,
and indeed the need to influence the common people is vital in a democ-
racy for governments to continue to remain in power. By propagandising
in the “correct” manner, governments can discredit opponents, justify
wars, argue for unpopular policies and subtly influence the people under
their control. This is never more the case than during wartime, where it is
necessary to ensure that morale is kept up amongst non-combatants.
French theologian and sociologist Jacques Ellul is another such writer.
His work Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, first published in
1962, is a cornerstone in the study of the field. Ellul states that the notion
of propaganda as a manipulation of the minds of individuals is completely
wrong. “It is no longer to transform an opinion,” he opines, “but to
arouse an active and mythical belief.”14 Ellul sees the goal of modern pro-
paganda as that of making people passively participate in the same manner
as a football fan influences the players on the pitch—“Though not physi-
cally in the game [the fan] makes his presence felt psychologically by

11
 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda, p. 37.
12
 Ibid., p. 47.
13
 Ibid., p. 233.
14
 J Ellul, Propaganda (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), p. 25.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  19

r­ooting for the players, exciting them, and pushing them to outdo
themselves.”15 This makes the audience an effective twelfth man, inciting
feats of physical and mental heroics from the players with their fervour.
War propaganda acts in exactly the same way—substituting the football
field for the battlefield and the players for soldiers. In this respect then,
propaganda becomes a vital tool for armies and governments; if the people
can be mobilised to support the troops, more efficient, motivated soldiers
who take more pride in their work is the result, and with that comes a host
of benefits. Ellul believes that the viewer of propaganda does not need
intricate details; the more data is taken in, the more simplistic the picture
that is drawn by the target. In this respect, propaganda does its job by
providing a deluge of facts; swamping media and entertainment outlets
induces an almost hypnotic state, claims Ellul. His statements have left an
enduring mark on the study of the field since the publication of Propaganda
and its translation in 1965; the advent of the mass media and the new
tactics which have been employed in the meantime have lent an eerie cred-
ibility to his beliefs regarding media. The Internet and twenty-four-hour
news outlets have ensured that the deluge of information that Ellul dis-
cussed is in full effect in the Western world. While it seems unlikely that
traditional propaganda techniques would be easily swallowed even in this
climate, when taken in conjunction with O’Shaughnessy’s argument for
the existence of a more sophisticated, hidden propaganda, it is difficult to
ignore the significance of Ellul’s writings.
Noam Chomsky is another especially important author in the field of
propaganda, particularly political propaganda. He has argued on multiple
occasions that fear is the greatest weapon that governments and propagan-
dists have to spread their ideologies. This has traditionally been interpreted
in the United States as fear of Communism, a worldview that has been
seen as particularly anti-democratic in the United States. The language
used in propaganda to describe these “evils” brings to mind negative
thoughts and fearful comparisons; according to Chomsky, the language
used about the Soviet Union during the Cold War warranted intervention;
“Language that was used in the West was that the rot may spread and the
virus may infect others.”16 Chomsky argues that this fear is one of the
central tools of propaganda and vital to the propaganda model envisioned

 Ibid., p. 27.
15

 Cited in Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, p. 283.

16
20  B. W. QUAIL

by both Chomsky and Edward S. Herman.17 By instilling fear into the

population, propagandists seek to ensure that popular support will follow.
He believes that the most integral aspect of media propaganda is the intel-
lectual culture of the people in charge and has regularly discussed the
subversive nature of American democracy: “An alternative conception of
democracy is that the public should be barred from managing of their own
affairs and the means of information must be kept narrowly and rigidly
controlled.”18 Chomsky has also stated that, “Propaganda is to a democ-
racy what the bludgeon is to a totalitarian state.”19 It is clear that Chomsky
adheres to the idea of propaganda as deception or an attempt to hoodwink
the people—we have already seen the popularity of attacks such as this on
the propaganda machine. Chomsky argues that in America, a country that
has rarely seen wars fought on its own soil, it is necessary to mobilise the
people to support foreign wars: “The public sees no reason to get involved
in foreign adventures, killing, and torture. So you have to whip them
up.”20 He marks war propaganda for particular disdain, discussing the US
World War I propaganda directive thusly, “The Creel commission suc-
ceeded, within six months, in turning a pacifist population into a hysteri-
cal, war-mongering population which wanted to destroy everything
German.”21 Chomsky has been particularly scathing about America’s
actions in Vietnam, noting that during the 1960s, propaganda policies
were, “semi-open, but in a kind of indirect way,”22 and blasting the propa-
ganda activities of influential figures such as Adlai Stevenson and Dean

17
 Chomsky discusses the propaganda model in several of his works, but it was largely intro-
duced in N Chomsky and E. S. Herman, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). This was later adapted into a three-­hour
documentary film, entitled Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media. Lyndon
B Johnson’s press secretary and a prominent member of his advisory staff for much of his
presidency, Bill Moyers, interviewed Chomsky in 1988 on his World of Ideas series for the
Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). Moyers notes that Johnson considered Chomsky subver-
sive at the eight-minute mark of the interview. This interview is available to view on YouTube
in two parts, both accessed on 3 August 2017 at the Web addresses: [Link]
com/watch?v=zJU2c7YfQTE and [Link]
18
 N Chomsky, Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda (New York:
Seven Stories Press, 2002), p. 10.
19
 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
20
 Ibid., p. 30.
21
 Ibid., p. 11.
22
 N Chomsky with D Barsamian, Propaganda and the Public Mind: Conversations with
Noam Chomsky (Chicago: Pluto Press, 2001), p. 35.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  21

Rusk. It is clear that Chomsky has severe reservations about the art of
propaganda; he mistrusts the very idea of propaganda and believes that its
use undermines democracy and severely damages the legitimacy of any
government or agency involved in the process. It is unquestionably impor-
tant to maintain a level of distance and scepticism towards the use of pro-
paganda for deeply immoral or even illegal goals, and this becomes
particularly relevant when discussing the Johnson administration and the
escalation of American involvement in Vietnam. This does not, however,
suggest that all propaganda is inherently wrong or inappropriate, as
Chomsky does.
Terence Qualter’s work, Opinion Control in the Democracies, is largely
dedicated to quantifying and explaining how official propaganda is spread.
Qualter comes up with and adapts several ways of explaining how propa-
ganda can be concocted and disseminated, and believes that propaganda is
not simply the act of misleading the public, saying of World War II propa-
gandists, “When they thought it would serve their purpose they also told
the truth.”23 However, he bases his assumptions on the idea that credibil-
ity is more important than the truth—for propaganda to be truly effective,
it must seem credible, even if it is not necessarily honest in what it is say-
ing. This is a common sense approach to the topic, particularly in wartime;
as long as propaganda stays on message and does not appear ludicrous at
first glance, it has a chance of being taken seriously. Qualter explains this
view with an example: “Propaganda battles which degenerate into a slang-
ing of the opposition may be emotionally satisfying to those taking part,
but few are persuaded by being abused.”24 Qualter has thus defined pro-
paganda as, “The deliberate attempt by the few to influence the attitudes
and behaviour of the many by the manipulation of symbolic
communication.”25 He has also offered an effective typology of propa-
ganda as adapted from Oliver Thomson. These are paraphrased here and
are important to note. There is political propaganda, which embraces all
partisan propaganda on behalf of parties, and causes and includes appeals
to patriotism, nationalism and loyalty as well as the symbolic use of flags,
anthems and others—this is traditional propaganda. Economic propa-
ganda, such as propaganda designed to sell a product, includes creating
and maintaining confidence, which is an important psychological tool.

23
 T H Qualter, Opinion Control In The Democracies (London: Macmillan, 1985), p. 113.
24
 Ibid., p. 136.
25
 Ibid., p. 124.
22  B. W. QUAIL

War and military propaganda is essentially psychological warfare and can

at different times include demoralising the enemy or sustaining the moral
of allies. Diplomatic propaganda is similar, used to provoke an intended
feeling in a potential friend or foe. Didactic propaganda is the propaganda
of good citizenship; it is used to combat disease, dirt, overpopulation and
anti-social or unhealthy habits, and often used in totalitarian states.
Ideological propaganda is the promotion of the propagandist’s ideology
and is analogous to the idea of brainwashing, upsetting and rebuilding the
mind of the target. Escapist propaganda is the diverting of emotional
energies, used to redirect the attention of a population that is facing seri-
ous unrest—American political scientist Harold Lasswell, who published
Propaganda Technique in the World War in 1927, stated that catharsis was
a principal notion of propaganda used in well-developed totalitarian
nations.26
Qualter himself believes that the significance of this typology lies not in
whether it is definitive, but in how it draws attention to the broad range
of activities that now fall under the umbrella of propaganda and represent
part of the process.27 Now that propaganda is not judged simply by the
content and as much—if not more—by the process that is followed,
researchers have been able to widen the scope and develop new ways to
investigate propaganda. Qualter concludes—rightly—that while propa-
ganda carries a larger sway than was realised in the past, it is usually not as
effective as propagandists would have us believe.
Philip Taylor has contributed to the understanding of propaganda and
its history, specifically with his work Munitions of the Mind: A History of
Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Day. For his part, he
agrees with Qualter’s assertion that modern propaganda—at least in its
original form—did not intentionally lie to the public; of the British World
War I propaganda campaign, which set the modern standard, he writes
that, “Falsehoods were eschewed in the belief that they would ultimately
be exposed and thereby jeopardize the credibility of those facts that had
been released.”28 This ties in with the view of Walter Lippmann, the jour-
nalist and columnist who would later cover Lyndon Johnson’s
26
 Harold Lasswell’s work is important to note here. Power and Personality (New York:
Norton, 1976 [1st pub.1948]) remains an influential cornerstone in the study of propa-
ganda, and his early analyses of wartime propaganda were integral to the formation of pro-
paganda studies—Propaganda Technique in the World Wars is an excellent example.
27
 Qualter, Opinion Control in the Democracies, p. 128.
28
 Taylor, Munitions of the Mind, p. 3.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  23

administration in his widely published columns. Lippmann argued in 1922

that the purpose of appealing to public opinion “is not to burden every
citizen with expert opinions on all questions, but to push that burden
away from him towards the responsible administrator.”29 Taylor wonders
if propaganda plays on the faith aspect of human belief and whether this is
the reason why propaganda is at its most effective when it “preaches to the
already converted.”30 Taylor appears to be a more idealistic writer than
someone like Chomsky, who has bluntly made known his disdain for the
role of propaganda. Taylor has stated of propaganda that, “Henceforth
the only honourable course will be to stake everything on a formidable
gamble—that words are more powerful than munitions,”31 as well as cited
the need for “Peace propagandists,” and stated that, “Propaganda has the
potential to serve a constructive, civilized and peaceful purpose.”32 Taylor
recognises that we live in an age of propaganda, and that with recent pro-
paganda, image has taken over as the most important aspect of the whole
exercise, conforming to Qualter’s view on this matter.
There is a vast array of literature available to peruse on the subject of
propaganda, covering arguments both for and against the medium in
terms of costs and benefits. Many writers seem to lie somewhere in
between support and disdain and some, such as Qualter and Taylor, see
propaganda as an almost inevitable fact—something handed down from
ancient times—inherent to human nature. When propaganda is used
truthfully in such a way as to supplement a war effort or denounce anti-­
social behaviour, it can be a helpful tool, but the dangers inherent in mass
persuasion will remain. Others, in the mould of Chomsky, decry the exis-
tence of propaganda as the tool of the powerful, a way to mask political
power plays and agendas that would otherwise see politicians denounced
by the public. It is plain to see that propaganda is a demonstrably danger-
ous tool when used on an already volatile or suggestible crowd of people;
this is something that Western governments found out to their cost fol-
lowing World War II; with anti-German and anti-Japanese sentiment still
running high, it became difficult to quell what propaganda started. It is
easy to see the benefits of both sides of the propaganda debate. What is
clear is that propaganda is very much an integral part of modern warfare

29
 W Lippmann, Public Opinion, (New Brunswick, NJ; Transaction, 1998 [1922]) p. 399.
30
 Ibid., p. 8.
31
 Ibid., p. 16.
32
 Ibid., p. 324.
24  B. W. QUAIL

and domestic crisis and has been for some time. Although it may not be as
influential or far-reaching as propagandists themselves would have us
believe and indeed requires some effort on the part of the individual con-
sumer to be truly successful, it is nevertheless a force to be reckoned with
and one that should be treated with some trepidation.
There are many explanations of propaganda, and how propaganda
works, and yet it is difficult to quantify exactly how propaganda influences
a society. With that said, it is clear that propaganda is something that must
necessarily be studied and reflected upon in order to gain an understand-
ing of how governments and those in positions of authority try to influ-
ence those around them. It is thus important to come to a working
definition of propaganda. Having considered the work of those who have
studied the matter in depth, I would define propaganda as: The concerted
attempt by an influential person, or group of people, to spread a political
agenda and manipulate the opinions of a targeted group for specific purposes.
To link this back to the Johnson administration’s attempts to sell their
policies to the public, there was clearly no coherent plan to propagandise
their policies. This ultimately damaged the consistency and clarity of the
message and led to clashes between the president’s domestic reform pro-
grammes and his selling of a deeply unpopular war. Finally, one tainted the
other, and Johnson’s position as president became untenable by the end
of his first full term in office. This study is one of a president’s inability to
find a way to effectively cultivate media relationships and in essence mar-
ket his policies to the public. In this sense, there are few overt references
to propaganda in the sections that follow. Instead, the more general expla-
nation given above is assumed; Johnson’s concerted attempt to spread his
political agenda is examined in some depth.
To fully investigate the issues faced by Johnson and his administrative
staff, some of the difficulties involved in the study of propaganda need to
be confirmed. One is that it is impossible to extricate propaganda from the
circumstances that surround the propagandist; Johnson’s experiences with
the creation and selling of domestic and foreign policy are indicative of
this. Another is that, as Ellul notes, it is ultimately not possible to deter-
mine how much influence one source or another has on the hearts and
minds of the public, be it in voting for one party over another or, in this
case, lending longer-term support to the political ideology and plans of
the government and the policies that ensue.
A few further issues faced by the Johnson administration in seeking to
measure its own success are noted in the section on opinion polling, while
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  25

Johnson’s problematic relationship with the press and his attempts to

manipulate public opinion are examined in the next section on the media.

The Media
This section looks at work that discusses how the media operated in
American society in the 1960s, and, further to that, how Johnson inter-
acted with the fourth estate. In 1959, in his work, The Fourth Branch of
Government, future Johnson staff member Douglass Cater made the point
that the media, “Have a vast power to shape government,” in the very act
of selecting which information to report and which to ignore.33 “The
words that fail to get projected might as well not have occurred,” he
states.34 This works in conjunction with Altschull’s discussion on the role
of the spin-doctor or, in the case of the presidency, the press secretary:

The role of the spin-doctor is similar to that of the “sociological propagan-

dist” as described by Ellul. It is both “to hide political reality by talking
about it” and to give the public the opposite impression—“that it under-
stands everything clearly.” He or she, Ellul wrote, “Must give the public
distorted news and intentions, knowing clearly beforehand what conclu-
sions the public will draw from them.35

The idea is that in order to oversee the will of the people well, the gov-
ernment must take into account the power of the media, in essence lead-
ing to the media acting as a further set of checks and balances on top of
those already provided within the federal government of the United States.
Timothy Cook, however, disagrees with Cater and Altschull’s theories on
the press; he notes that the “expectations, rules and regulations” that limit
the branches of government do not apply to the press and wider media

33
 Cater is an important source on the media; as one of the original editors of The Reporter
magazine, he was already vastly experienced with the American media and joined the Johnson
government one month after his third book on the subject, Power in Washington (New York:
Vintage, 1964) was published. Cater’s obituary notes that he became a specialist in educa-
tion under Johnson. For more information see R McG Thomas, Jr., “Douglass Cater Is Dead
at 72; Educator and Presidential Aide,” New York Times, 16 September 1995, accessed on
17 July 2017 at [Link]
[Link].
34
 D Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 62.
35
 J H Altschull, Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy (White Plains, NY: Longman,
1995), p. 155.
26  B. W. QUAIL

groups; because they are “largely controlled by private corporations,” they

cannot therefore be a branch of government.36 Cook’s representation of
the arguments against the media’s influence is important to note and
offers an interesting and pertinent counter to the likes of Cater and
Altschull.
The question of the media’s influence on public opinion is complex and
has long been debated in a similar manner to the discussion of propa-
ganda. If Ellul’s theory holds true, and media saturation is an important
part of disseminating propaganda, then it stands to reason that the
increased media activity that took place in the 1960s would have a strong
effect on the message that was being sent to the American people and the
effectiveness of that message. Cater believed that this was the case. This
links in with Richard Neustadt’s view on presidential prestige: “[Any pres-
ident’s] prestige turns on what members of his public think they want and
think they get.”37 Neustadt’s views on presidential prestige and power are
highly relevant here. Neustadt believes that the choices a president makes
are the only means of shielding his own power and prestige that lie within
his own influence. This is interesting to note, as Neustadt therefore offers
the view that much of what determines how presidents are viewed by the
public is not within their control, whereas if the president can control
what the public believes, then he can protect his own prestige. In a sense,
this links back to the idea of propaganda as a means of control; by control-
ling the flow of information, the president can protect his own power.
Neustadt’s idea was a strong one; the process of managing how informa-
tion was disseminated was certainly vital in the case of Vietnam, in which
news media was increasingly dominated by a new and daunting challenge
for the Johnson administration: television. The administration was
required to learn to deal with news reports that sometimes ran contrary to
the official line on current events, particularly in Vietnam, and contained

36
 T E Cook, Governing The News: The News Media as a Political Institution (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 109.
37
 R Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from
Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 90. Neustadt’s work has been
among the pre-eminent scholarship on the presidency since the first edition of Presidential
Power was published in 1960. For a further critique on Neustadt’s work, in which it is theo-
rised that Neustadt can offer a solid theoretical basis for much future study on presidential
power, see M J Dickinson, “Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and Presidential Decision
Making: A Theory and Test,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2 (June 2005),
pp. 259–88.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  27

an accompanying imagery that could be far more vivid and compelling

than a newspaper report. When discussing the influence of television
media, Iyengar has noted that, “Television news shapes the American pub-
lic’s political priorities. These effects appear to be neither momentary, as
the results indicate, nor permanent, as [his work’s] time series results
reveal.” Iyengar’s studies on the matter led him to conclude that “It is one
thing to understand that American boys are fighting and dying in Vietnam;
quite another to watch them fight and die. In each case, so it is argued, the
concrete visual details matter enormously.”38 Writing twenty years after
Johnson’s presidency ended, he called television “a mature and powerful
force in American politics. In commanding attention and shaping opinion,
television is now an authority virtually without peer.”39 Because Iyengar’s
research into television as an influence on public perception took place
twenty years after Johnson’s presidency, it is difficult to completely apply
it to the conditions of the 1960s—while there is no doubt that television
became an important part of the average American’s life by the time of
Johnson’s administration, it had not yet fully gained the mass audience
that it would decades into the future. Nevertheless, there is merit in look-
ing at Iyengar’s work; by 1967, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
created their own in-house polling unit and brought influential pollsters
such as Louis Harris into the fold to legitimise their operation—the other
two major news networks—American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
and the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) quickly followed
suit.40 Broadcasters had now explicitly moved into the field of opinion
polls, something previously disseminated mainly through the syndication
of Gallup and Harris Polls in newspapers. For example, the television net-
works showed that they were becoming the dominant news source for
Americans, and this should have been a warning sign for Johnson not to
be complacent. Given this context, it is little wonder that Vietnam is
thought of as the first truly televised war; the Korean conflict was covered
in part by film cameras, but ownership of television sets increased signifi-
cantly between Korea and Vietnam, and by extension the popularity of
television news broadcasts within American households was not as

38
 S Iyengar, News That Matters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 35.
39
 Ibid., p. 133. See also D Cater and R Adler (eds.), Television as a Social Force (New York:
Praeger, 1975), which gives a contemporary viewpoint on the influence of television.
40
 T Mann and G Orren (eds.), Media Polls in American Politics (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 2.
28  B. W. QUAIL

­ ervasive as they became by the 1960s. In 1950, around 9% of house-

p
holds—3.88  million—owned a television. By 1960 this figure was
45.75 million or 87.1%, and by the time of escalation in Vietnam in 1965
more than 90% of households had a set.41 This rapid rise in ownership
precipitated a wholesale change in political communication throughout
the United States.
John Mueller, writing in 1973, disputed the idea that television was so
influential on Americans, claiming that his evidence “clearly show[s] that
whatever impact television had, it was not enough to reduce support for
the [Vietnam] war below the levels attained by the Korean War, when
television was in its infancy, until casualty levels had far surpassed those of
the earlier war.”42 Chester Pach concurs with this thesis; having written
extensively on the subject of television coverage of the Vietnam War, Pach
has concluded that Tet, “affected public policy and influenced popular
attitudes—changing minds, confirming prejudices, sowing controversy.”43
Iyengar broadly agrees; speaking specifically for audiences in the Unites
States, he felt that the evidence gathered in his studies “implies an
American public with a limited memory for last month’s news and a recur-
rent vulnerability to today’s. When television news focuses on a problem,
the public’s priorities are altered, and altered again as television news
moves on to something new.” There was, Iyengar concluded, no basis for
the “vividness hypothesis,” wherein intense images cause more of a reac-
tion at least in terms of “dramatic vignettes,” on television.44 Michael
Arlen, television columnist from the 1960s, agrees with this view in his
collection of columns, noting the superficiality of three- and five-minute
news broadcasts on television about Vietnam.45 The discussion over the
effect of television is important to note; during Johnson’s time in office
there is no question that he took the television media seriously as an influ-
ence on the people, but there is still a question as to whether this was

41
 TV History. “Number of TV Households in America: 1950-1978.” Accessed November
15, 2014. [Link] “Number of TV
Households in America 1950–1978,” The American Century, accessed June 1, 2021,
[Link]
42
 J Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), p. 167.
43
 C Pach, Jr, Tet on TV: U.S. Nightly News Reporting and Presidential Policy Making, in
C Fink, P Gassert and D Junker, 1968: The World Transformed (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), p. 81.
44
 Iyengar, News That Matters, p. 174.
45
 M J Arlen, The Living Room War (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), passim.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  29

actually the case. The facts and statistics of Johnson’s presidency tend to
concur with Arlen’s view on the superficiality of news broadcasts and
Iyengar’s sceptical outlook on their effects; while the American people
were no doubt influenced in some way by television media, the vividness
hypothesis is not a complete model for the influence of television on the
general public in this period.
On the other hand, the idea of the media having a key agenda-setting
role is important, particularly in terms of television media; agenda setting
comes from the frequency of discussion and is one way in which television
can prove influential. By regularly discussing a single issue, broadcast jour-
nalists could potentially increase that issue’s prevalence in national debates.
This is similar to media priming, in which the media attend to specific
issues and neglect others, altering the standards by which people evaluate
the news. This is discussed by Cappella and Jamieson, who discuss how
these effects can frame and explain news coverage, and how the public
reacts to certain stimulus; it is no doubt important in looking at how
Johnson approached and understood broadcast media.46
In the broader sense of opposition, Stanley Karnow felt that the press
as a single entity followed, rather than truly influenced: “The press, with
all its shortcomings, tended to follow rather than lead the U.S. public,
whose opinions were usually shaped more by such events as the tax sur-
charge or the death of a local boy than by television broadcasts and news-
paper commentaries.”47 Media and public affairs scholar Robert Entman
believes that, “Journalists cannot do much about either their vulnerability
to the political market or their inadvertent exercise of political power
through choices that slant the news.” Entman concludes that this con-
vinces many politicians that the press are against them or deliberately
biased, leading to a tendency amongst high-profile politicians to manage
news and take a cautious approach to dealing with journalists—something
that, whether based on truth or not, is important to note generally and
that directly describes Johnson’s approach to the press.48
The two views possessed by Entman and Karnow—that the press
“slants” the news or that the press “follows” public opinion—are

46
 J N Cappella and K H Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 51–52.
47
 S Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London: Century, 1983), p. 488.
48
 R Entman, Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 38.
30  B. W. QUAIL

essentially in opposite camps and ultimately sum up the arguments over

the value of press reporting as a tool to sway public opinion. Entman’s
belief that the press are agents of political influence almost by default chal-
lenges Karnow’s view that the press do not instigate change. Both of these
arguments are of equal validity, and it can be difficult to know how influ-
ential the press truly is as there is often no obvious sign of their impact on
the general public. It is important not to dismiss either summary of the
impact of press opinion, but Entman’s analysis is the more persuasive of
the two; while the press are not as influential as they would perhaps like to
be, there is little doubt that press reporting has at least some effect on those
who read or watch. Whether that is an influencing effect or a reinforcing
one, it is nevertheless important to note. Entman sums this up best when
he says, “To participate effectively in politics, the public must remain
responsive to the changing conditions portrayed (however imperfectly) in
the news. The implication is clear: democracy in the United States is sig-
nificantly affected by the performance and power of journalism.”49 In the
case of Lyndon Johnson, media reporting was of great importance. His
difficulty in understanding the media and how to successfully interact with
them to exploit their potential authority over public opinion was one of
the defining characteristics of his presidency.

The Media, Press Secretary and the Presidency

There was a significant shift in the twentieth century in how the media
interacted with the presidency. A brief review of how this has evolved helps
our understanding of the Johnson administration and allows us to contex-
tualise the relationship between Johnson and the press. Most importantly,
the development of techniques to deal with press relations evolved and
advanced over the course of the century. As mass media became more
entrenched in popular society, and journalism became more intrusive, it
was necessary for each administration to work to cultivate their own rela-
tionships. As a result, the responsibilities of communications staff only
increased over time. This section will briefly review some of the more
interesting and relevant presidential-press relations and how they com-
pared to the environment Johnson cultivated. As many of his staff transi-
tioned into the Johnson presidency and the differences between the two
are referenced throughout this work, John F. Kennedy’s performance is

49
 Entman, Democracy Without Citizens, p. 88.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  31

not discussed here. In Johnson’s time, the idea of press management had
become firmly ensconced within the White House’s remit, and Johnson’s
first press secretary—Pierre Salinger—was the ninth person to occupy the
role in its modern form, working for both Johnson and Kennedy.
The first such secretary in the modern era, Stephen Early, had revolu-
tionised the idea of public relations within the White House. He carefully
stage-managed press events for President Franklin D. Roosevelt to ensure
his encroaching health issues were not on display and maintained a strong
relationship with the pressmen he saw daily. Early set the tone of the rela-
tionship between press and president for the course of much of the rest of
the century. The press saw him as an “authentic public figure,” and nick-
named him “Steady Steve,” because of his easy manner and dependabili-
ty.50 Early was commended for his treatment of the press. His biographer
Linda Lotridge Levin noted, “He was determined to have no favourites,
to release no news scoops to one reporter without releasing it to all the
reporters at the same time.” However, she also affirms, “Neither Roosevelt
nor Early could have imagined the scope and dominance of the news
media in today’s society.”51 Early took office during a time where it was
easier to stage manage appearances, release information favourable to the
president and manipulate press views accordingly. Betty Houchin Winfield
has written extensively on Roosevelt’s relationship with the press and con-
cluded that he used press conferences well and did not use the previous
standard of written question requests, allowing for a more organic style of
press conference.52 Winfield expanded on her thesis with a book, FDR and
the News Media, which discussed Roosevelt’s views on the press and links
in with his use of Early as press secretary. This differentiated him from his
predecessors and set the modern template for presidential-press relations.53
Roosevelt ultimately had a much more favourable press environment than
his successors, as mass media through radio was still in its infancy and no

50
 W Klein, All the Presidents’ Spokesmen: Spinning the News  – White House Press
Secretaries from Franklin D.  Roosevelt to George W.  Bush, (New York City: Praeger,
2008) p. 14.
51
 L L Levin, The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. Early, America’s First Modern
Press Secretary, (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 2008) p. 447.
52
 B H Winfield, “Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Efforts to Influence the News during His First
Term Press Conferences.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1981): 189–99. Accessed
July 2, 2021. [Link]
53
 B H Winfield, FDR and the News Media: Contentious Relations, Belated Respect,
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990).
32  B. W. QUAIL

real television coverage existed throughout his time in office. However,

there can be no doubt that he possessed considerable skill in managing the
media presence within the White House, and his appointment of Stephen
Early to manage press duties shows this.
As mass media became prominent, the role of the press secretary
changed significantly. Harry Truman, who took over from Roosevelt on
his death in 1945, faced many of the same challenges as his predecessor
even as the media landscape began to move towards a more homogenised,
large-scale enterprise in the early 1950s. However, Truman was not as suc-
cessful at dealing with the press during his time in office and was hit by a
succession of difficulties particularly towards the end of his term. By the
end of his time in office, Mitchell notes his performance in Gallup Polls
was as low as 23% approval, with public dissatisfaction aimed at poor
American performance in the Korean War, allegations of communism
within the government whipped up by the Red Scare of the early Cold
War and charges of corruption within the media. Franklin K. Mitchell
further argues that 67% of newspaper editors in the United States gave
editorial endorsement to the Republican challenger, Dwight Eisenhower.54
Truman had issues with reporters and editors throughout his presidency,
as Mitchell claims the press won a victory against presidential power in
1952, as the Supreme Court affirmed a decision in the case of Youngstown
Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer redressed Truman’s argument that “The President
of the United States has very great inherent powers to meet great national
emergencies. Until those emergencies are a President cannot say specifi-
cally what he would do or would not do.”55 Truman ultimately found
himself as an example of how press relationships can go wrong, and Towle
agrees that his approval ratings declined sharply after his first year in
office.56 This theme of president against press was repeated throughout
the rest of the century, as presidents found themselves pitted against the
press as adversaries.
The presidency of Richard Nixon came directly after Johnson, and as a
result he had to battle against many of the issues Johnson did—the advent
of mass media, large-scale national news coverage in both written media

54
 F D Mitchell, Harry S. Truman and the News Media, (Columbia, Missouri: University
of Missouri Press, 1998) p. 242.
55
 Ibid., pp. 79–80.
56
 M J Towle, Out of Touch: The Presidency and Public Opinion, (College Station, Texas:
Texas A&M University Press, 2004) p. 31.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  33

and on television. Prior to the Watergate Scandal, members of the press

and political pundits praised Press Secretary Ron Ziegler for being “very
authoritative and maddening to the reporter whose job was to know what
was going on behind closed corridors and offices.”57 However, the
Watergate Scandal must loom large in any evaluation of Nixon’s dealings
with the press. Zeigler himself paid a heavy price for remaining loyal to his
president in that he was accused of lying. This destroyed his credibility.
Ultimately, Nixon made many mistakes in dealing with the press through-
out his time in office, naming several prominent newspaper staff on his
infamous list of enemies and generally providing misleading, bullish com-
ments whenever asked about subjects he did not want to discuss. This
mirrored Johnson’s inability to create an effective, open press strategy in
many ways.
Mark Hertsgaard’s work on Ronald Reagan paints a less adversarial
picture than many of his predecessors. Hertsgaard makes a convincing
argument that Reagan was “spared from genuinely adversarial coverage,”
throughout his time in office, despite numerous occasions from which
negative coverage should have sprung.58 Hertsgaard believes Reagan’s
popularity, and indeed perceptions of Reagan’s popularity which may not
have been strictly accurate, was largely to blame for this. The press did not
wish to rock the boat and potentially lose readers or viewers. He takes his
thesis even further, making the case that “while the press shaped mass
opinion, it reflected elite opinion; indeed, it effectively functioned as a
mechanism by which the latter was transformed, albeit imperfectly, into
the former.”59 This links back to the previous argument about the agency
of the press, and whether or not news agencies can truly shape public
opinion; Hertsgaard offers the Reagan presidency as proof that it does
not. This is not necessarily a regular occurrence, and the author ensures
that this is articulated by noting the particular corporate interests of
Reagan may have aligned with the aims of mass media corporations which
were beginning to form during the 1980s.
This represented a new, and dangerous, partnership between mass
media not as truth bringer or investigator, but as a pawn of elite interests
beholden to corporate goals. This is not necessarily wholly relevant to the

57
 Klein, All the Presidents’ Spokesmen, p. 123.
58
 M Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan Presidency, (New York City:
Farrar, Straus & Giroux; 1988) p. 348.
59
 Ibid., p. 347.
34  B. W. QUAIL

Johnson era, but it is worth noting. Johnson himself owned media inter-
ests in the state of Texas, and much has been made of his friendships with
the likes of Katherine Graham, who took ownership of the Washington
Post company following the death of her husband. However, the relation-
ship between president and media took on a more antagonistic nature
during Johnson’s time in office than Hertsgaard argues happened during
Reagan’s presidency. Reagan showed his ability to manipulate press inter-
ests and an understanding of television media, which had matured in the
years between 1968 and 1980 and stabilised as the popular medium of
choice for Americans, whereas Johnson did not. The relationship between
president and press under Johnson was much more fraught.
Each of these presidents developed strategies to deal with the press and
manage their public image. Roosevelt used the expertise of his staff to
manage his public opinion. Truman attempted to use something of an
iron fist to expand presidential power and limit press freedoms but was
unsuccessful. Richard Nixon had issues with his own credibility which
were brought to the fore during the protracted Watergate Scandal. Ronald
Reagan carefully managed his public image, and his administration was
able to leverage shared interests with mass media corporations and knowl-
edge of how the television industry operated at the onset of the 1980s to
his considerable advantage. Each man experienced the adversarial nature
of presidential-press relations to some extent throughout his time in office.
President Bill Clinton’s first press secretary Dee-Dee Myers offered a
particularly clear explanation of the general relationship between presi-
dent, press secretary and media: “the relationship between the White
House and the press corps writ large [emphasis author’s] is adversarial.
They want to know stuff we don’t want to tell them.”60 This became more
obvious during Johnson’s tenure, as he cultivated a contentious and dif-
ficult relationship not only with the press, but also at times within his own
relationship with his various press secretaries. The press accused Johnson
of being too secretive and unwilling to release information, particularly
about the war, while Johnson clashed with his staff over what, and how, to
release information.

60
 D Myers in W Klein, All the Presidents’ Spokesmen, p. xii.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  35

The Media and the Johnson Presidency

Lyndon Johnson did not have an easy relationship with the press. Bill
Moyers described an almost Jekyll and Hyde association: “One day he
would tell me to let them all in—‘I want to see them.’ The next day he’d
say ‘I don’t want to see the S.O.B.s.’”61 Kathleen Turner’s work on
Johnson’s media relations during his time in office has been greatly influ-
ential; her research into the issues faced by both Johnson and the press
during the formation and continuation of their difficult working relation-
ship has been invaluable to the conclusions drawn about Johnson’s reac-
tive strategy. Turner describes at great length the difficulties that Johnson
faced in his dealings with the press: “He was particularly uncertain of the
appropriate responses in an age in which informing the people depended
to such a large extent on media—channels with which he was uncomfort-
able and interpreters with whom he often did not agree.”62 Johnson could
not adapt his persona and strategy to the rigours of the presidency; whereas
his time in the Senate was spent dealing largely with singular members of
the press and media establishment, where Johnson could work his legend-
ary powers of persuasion with consummate ease and professionalism; he
was never able to adapt this to a larger scale to deal with press conferences
and the more direct contact that he needed to have with the mass media
in his new position. This was one of the reasons that Johnson developed a
reactive strategy that ultimately hampered his credibility and undermined
his presidency. Turner concludes that Johnson’s relationship with the
press is tragic and that, “As a story of communication failure, its implica-
tions for contemporary American life are profound.”63 It is indeed a trag-
edy that Johnson ultimately found himself unable to communicate
effectively with the press, and there is a further explanation as to why this
was the case and where the failure in Johnson’s methods lay. Turner’s
lengthy description of the Johnsonian failure to communicate with the
press is undoubtedly influential but does not go into detail about the reac-
tive nature of the strategies that Johnson employed to cope with mount-
ing criticism. Miller and Sigelman argue that while the advent of mass
media and large-scale press coverage through both newspaper and

61
 Moyers quoted in W Klein, All the President’s Spokesmen, (New York City, NY: Praeger,
2008) p. 62.
62
 K J Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War: Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1985), p. 252.
63
 Ibid., p. 254.
36  B. W. QUAIL

t­elevision in the 1960s led to the homogenisation of Johnson’s political

statements, the president and his staff did make an attempt to vary the
content of these to “accord with the predisposition of his audience.” They
argue that for Johnson, as for his successors, the audience that he spoke to
was in essence part of the message he wished to put across; by tailoring his
political commitments to certain audiences he was able to aim statements
directly at Hanoi, or to Congress, or even to the unruly White House
press corps.64 Johnson certainly made an attempt to tailor his speeches—in
fact there is evidence from the Johnson archives that this is the case as his
speechwriters worked on addresses towards many different aspects of soci-
ety. It does however argue that Johnson was not necessarily successful in
using these public engagements to put forward a proactive and cohesive
strategy towards either Vietnam or his domestic policies, ultimately under-
mining his credibility with the majority of Americans.
Much has been written of Johnson’s relationship with the media in the
biographies that have been produced on his presidency by the likes of
Robert Caro and Robert Dallek. However, several of Johnson’s contem-
poraries including two of Johnson’s press secretaries have written at length
about their time dealing with his media relations. His final press secretary,
George Christian, has written about the last year of Johnson’s presidency,
while his second appointment, George Reedy, has written about his own
time in the position during 1964 and 1965. Both men believe that Johnson
gave particular attention to the media; Christian writes that “Lyndon
Johnson absorbed news and current events like a blotter. During the day
he listened to as many radio newscasts as he could. And in the Oval Office
the Associated Press and United Press International teletypes clacked away
until he retired to the Mansion late at night… Almost always he was well
ahead of his staff on fast-breaking news.”65 Reedy makes a telling point
when he describes Johnson as regarding the political process, “entirely in
terms of popularity.”66 Reedy felt that one of Johnson’s core beliefs was
that information should be correctly arranged in order to serve a purpose
and in doing so may have identified one of the defining reasons behind the
credibility gap; for a man who wanted to arrange information in such a

64
 L W Miller and L Sigelman, “Is The Audience the Message? A Note on LBJ’s Vietnam
Statements,” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring 1978), pp. 71–80.
65
 G Christian, The President Steps Down (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 7.
66
 G Reedy, Lyndon B Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews & McMeel, 1982), p. 5.
The emphasis is Reedy’s.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  37

way as to vindicate his choices and decisions, Johnson found it difficult to

deal with a hostile press who were not interested in his definition of infor-
mation. Reedy clarifies that Johnson thought of journalists as critics, first
and foremost, rather than spreaders of information. He also notes how,
“Of all the LBJ weaknesses, perhaps the most important was his inability
to understand the press.”67 The pollster Louis Harris agreed with this
summary, and believed that Johnson, “simply was not a reader of the
press,” and was prone to react to events in a “most personalized way.”68
The president’s press secretaries are important to this research; their
actions directly affected Johnson’s perception amongst both newsmen and
the general public; it is difficult to make a judgement over how effective
each individual secretary that Johnson employed was, but Towle notes
that their success or failure depended greatly on Johnson’s faith in each
man; he believes that the president placed less faith in George Reedy and
more in Bill Moyers and George Christian, leading to the latter two men
being more palatable to the press than Reedy.69 Doris Kearns offers a
slightly differing summary of Johnson’s ability with the media; she believed
that the technological innovations available to him opened up a wealth of
opportunities, from taping his own television appearances to speaking
with the Soviet Premier at a moment’s notice.70 Kearns believed that
Johnson made an attempt to take advantage of these advances, but while
there is no doubt that he used the medium of television more than previ-
ous leaders, there is a serious question as to whether Johnson was able to
take advantage of the platform to put forward his agenda in an effective
and proactive manner.
The writings of Johnson’s aides on the matter of press interaction are
important to note; Johnson’s key aide Jack Valenti perhaps sums up the
administration’s view of the press and their objectives in the opening sen-
tences of his discussion of press relations in his account of working at the
White House. “Every day the press and the president meet as adversaries,”
he noted, “Hundreds of newsmen, monitoring the White House, sight
along their barrel the vision of presidential ineptitude implanted in the

67
 Ibid., p. 50.
68
 L Harris, The Anguish of Change (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), pp. 16, 24.
69
 M J Towle, “On Behalf of the President: Four Factors Affecting the Success of the
Presidential Press Secretary,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring
1997), p. 307.
70
 D Kearns, Lyndon Johnson & The American Dream (London: Andre Deutsch,
1976), p. 400.
38  B. W. QUAIL

crosshairs.”71 Valenti’s view of the media—much like Johnson’s own opin-

ion by the end of his time in office—was that the media was out to ruin
the administration using whatever means were necessary. Townsend
Hoopes, who worked as an assistant secretary of defence under Robert
McNamara, used several newspaper articles from 1967 and 1968, to cre-
ate a damning indictment of the administration’s reaction to press scru-
tiny; he claimed that “The president’s reaction to this critical broadside
was to wrap himself in the mantle of War Leader and stand forth as
defender of the faith.”72 Stanley Karnow extends this back to 1966, claim-
ing that, as criticism mounted, “Johnson surrounded himself with con-
gressional loyalists.”73 Doris Kearns agrees with this view; she notes that,
“Under siege, his operational style closed in and insulated him within the
White House, where discussion was confined to those who offered no
disagreement.”74 Neustadt and May also note the testimony of an unnamed
aide: “It was Johnson’s custom,” the aide noted, “to reach a decision
inwardly and then organize the process for making that decision appear the
result of consultation and debate.”75 One of Johnson’s National Security
Council staff members, Chester Cooper, noted a similar tendency in the
president: “It suited his purpose and his style to give the impression that
he was engaging in a lengthy and thorough appraisal in which all points of
view were advanced and weighed.”76 Sam Houston Johnson, the presi-
dent’s brother, notes a story in which Johnson sacked George Reedy on
the spot following an erroneously issued press release, before having him
re-hired hours later.77

71
 J Valenti, A Very Human President (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), p. 206.
72
 T Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: David McKay, 1969), p. 100.
73
 Karnow, Vietnam, p. 484.
74
 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson & The American Dream, p. 319.
75
 R Neustadt and E May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (New
York: Free Press, 1988), p. 79.
76
 C L Cooper, The Lost Crusade: The Full Story of American Involvement in Vietnam, from
Roosevelt to Nixon (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1971) p. 292. Chester Cooper’s member-
ship of the National Security Council is confirmed in Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage
Point (New York: Henry Holt, 1971) p. 126. Cooper’s obituary in the New York Times notes
that he was “a backstage player in many of the most critical negotiations of the cold war,”
during his time in government during the 1950s and 1960s. See M Fox, “Chester Cooper,
88, A Player in Diplomacy for Two Decades, is Dead,” New York Times, 7 November 2005,
accessed on 1 October 2017 at [Link]
chester-­[Link]?mcubz=0&_r=0.
77
 S H Johnson, My Brother Lyndon (Spokane, WA: Cowles, 1970) p. 153.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  39

Entman notes that some of the issues Johnson and his aides imagined
within the press may have had some grounding in fact: “Even under the
best circumstances, presidents’ control over news slant is limited. They
remain at the mercy of production biases, unexpected events, and unlucky
timing, all of which can give the news a negative tilt.”78 While this is an
interesting and undoubtedly true phenomenon, Johnson’s siege mentality
needs to be investigated further. His negative and mistrustful view of the
press led him into difficulty; because he felt that he could not trust the
people responsible for disseminating information, he did not reveal impor-
tant information to them because of his fear of negative press. This led to
the administration being unable to formulate a strong, effective and, most
importantly, proactive strategy that could be used continuously through-
out the presidency. However, as has been noted by several of Johnson’s
close advisors and those who have commented on his presidency, the
administration tended to overestimate the influence that the press had on
public opinion. This echoes the difficulties that the administration also
faced when interpreting opinion polls.

Opinion Polls
In any attempt to understand the American presidency and how it reacts
to crises, an analysis of the role of the media and the measuring of public
opinion is vital. This section will look at work that has been done on opin-
ion polls, such as The Superpollsters by David W. Moore, and apply this to
the Johnson administration. It will also examine literature that pertains
directly to Johnson’s use of polling data, and particularly LBJ and the Polls
by Bruce Altschuler.79
Edward Bernays describes public opinion as “a term describing an ill-­
defined, mercurial and changeable group of individual judgments.”80 It
stands to reason that the best way to measure such a wide-ranging set of

78
 Entman, Democracy Without Citizens, p. 74.
79
 Moore’s work on polling is particularly interesting to note; as a former editor of The
Gallup Poll, he has a number of insights on the process of polling and how it can affect the
national psyche. Altschuler’s work on LBJ and the polls is a vital text in the study of Johnson’s
attitudes towards public opinion and provides both analysis and anecdotal evidence as to how
poll data was collected, manipulated and dealt with inside the Johnson administration. See B
Altschuler, LBJ and the Polls, (Gainesville, Florida: University Press of Florida, 1991).
80
 E Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion, (Greenwood, WI: Suzeteo Enterprises, 2019
[1923]) p. 35.
40  B. W. QUAIL

views is to take a poll. However, opinion polls, themselves, are a disputed

measure of actual popularity and are not wholly accurate in and of them-
selves. The difficulty of predicting political results and trends was well
known even in the 1960s; Herbst notes that policymakers and journalists
were wary of polls since the late 1930s and 1940s—early on, the Literary
Digest Poll, which spectacularly failed to predict Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
landslide victory in 1936 (it forecast that FDR would gain 43% and
Landon 57% of the vote), damaged the legitimacy of the art.81
The first and most important question to be asked about the political
polls, then, is how effective they are. Louis Harris, creator of the influen-
tial Harris Poll that began national syndication in 1963, once boasted that
he worked for over 240 political campaigns between 1956 and 1963 and
said of himself, “I elected one President, one prime minister, about 28
governors and maybe close to 60 U.S. Senators.”82 According to Moore,
the official figures show that Harris worked on 45 elected senators’ cam-
paigns. Harris was particularly defensive about the role that polling could
play in the election process; Altschull quotes him as saying that “Polling
results can influence election results by as many as four points.” Richard
Wirthlin, a pollster for Ronald Reagan, agreed with this summary as late
as the 1980s.83 George Gallup, for his part, felt that polling was intended
to help people decide who to vote for and “credited the mass media with
distributing the polling information the public needed if it were to make
those wise decisions in the voting booth.”84
Altschull notes that the point of polling is “not to find facts but create
images and thereby shape opinion.”85 He further states that in his opinion,
“It is not the media that shape public opinion. It is rather the holders of
power who shape public opinion by using the media as their agents. If the
media were to attempt to move public opinion into a position contrary to
what is desired by the holders of power, the power holders would counter-
attack.” This opinion holds some weight, as Johnson did indeed attack his
critics with some ferocity, both through his press secretaries and through
his own personal association with influential reporters and editors. The

81
 S Herbst, Numbered Voices: How Opinion Polling Has Shaped American Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 90–91.
82
 D W Moore, The Superpollsters (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1995), p. 78.
83
 J H Altschull, Agents of Power: The Media and Public Policy (White Plains, NY: Longman,
1995), p. 46.
84
 Ibid., p. 167.
85
 Ibid., p. 168.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  41

fact remains, however, that by the end of his presidency, approval ratings
declined by a vast amount and his critics were as loud as ever in both the
print and visual media. With that in mind, the question must be asked:
how could Johnson have launched an effective counterattack towards his
critics? The answer does not necessarily lie in the president’s interactions
with the media. Stanley Karnow, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his work in
Vietnam, believed that journalists—particularly those working in televi-
sion like Walter Cronkite—lagged behind the American people and their
attitudes, “reflecting, rather than shaping.”86 This debate about influence
or reflection is equally applicable to the discourse on opinion polls. Do
they, too, primarily reflect, rather than shape, the attitudes of the American
people? The answer would seem obvious—that they do, after all, reflect
the views of the mass of respondents. This is the reason why Peter Miller
feels that, “journalists must become polling experts,” as they, too, are
heavily involved in both reflecting and shaping the perceptions of
the public.
The question of how polling on the same subject can give large differ-
entials in the results is a pertinent one. In some cases, question wording
can affect the answers that are given. For example, John Mueller notes
that three 1967 polls on Lyndon Johnson’s credibility claimed that
64–70% of the people polled thought Johnson was not being honest with
the public.87 In contrast, the Gallup Poll published on 10 May 1967 noted
that 49% of those polled would prefer Johnson to be chosen as the
Democratic Party nominee for the 1968 presidential election, against 37%
who opposed his selection.88 A third set of polls saw the president’s
approval rating drop below 40% for the first time in August. These three
different polling scores reflect the differences in the questions being asked
about different aspects of Johnson’s effectiveness and standing, despite
the basic similarities contained within attempts to gauge Johnson’s popu-
larity. Moore recounts a story of George Gallup’s early poll work, in which
a sample of respondents were asked a question in two different ways. The
experiment, as Moore relates, “demonstrated the tendency for people to
say yes when asked about unfamiliar issues, a phenomenon commonly

86
 Karnow, Vietnam, A History, p. 548.
87
 Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, p. 167.
88
 G Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971 (New York: Random House,
1972), p. 2063.
42  B. W. QUAIL

referred to these days as ‘response acquiescence.’”89 Mann and Orren

explain their own conclusions on this matter as follows:

The range of acceptable polling methods remains wide enough to permit

many legitimate variations in techniques and, consequently, in results. This
is so even though political pollsters have every incentive to see that their
results are as close as possible to the outcome on election day. The prolifera-
tion of national polls makes the identification of quirky results, flukes and
blips much easier and quicker than normally. However, the sophisticated
observer needs to be aware of the subtle differences between equally well-­
conducted polls that can still lead to discrepancies in results.90

The bias and the differences mentioned by Mann and Orren were no
doubt significant when it came to the Johnson administration and their
response to polling. By the latter years of Johnson’s time in office, the
government would regularly argue that the wording of Gallup and Harris
Polls was negative and conducive to increasing the credibility gap, arguing
that Johnson had less of an active role in causing this gap than those who
reported on him. This also brings into question how the political opinions
or personal motives of the pollsters influence the results of polls. Harris in
particular was known to work for political campaigns as well as having his
duties with the syndicated polls; Moore notes that he was pulled from his
contract to do polling work for CBS in 1967 and replaced with Warren
Mitofsky, the first director of the network’s election and survey unit.91
There is also the difficulty of summarising public opinion on multiple
issues. The best method of discerning between the opinions of different
groups of the population—differentiating between gender, race, social cir-
cumstance and the myriad groups that make up the population of a coun-
try—and particularly the United States, is hotly disputed. Mueller sums up
his passage on the matter by noting, “Public opinion on very many issues
can scarcely be said to exist.”92 Indeed, Susan Herbst agrees with this sum-
marisation; she wrote in 1993 that, “Public opinion simply does not exist.
Citizens are rarely interested or educated enough to articulate informed

89
 V O Key, Jr., “Permissive Consensus,” in Mann and Orren (eds.), Media Polls in
American Politics, p. 326.
90
 Mann and Orren (eds.), Media Polls in American Politics, pp. 105–106.
91
 Moore, The Superpollsters, p.  254; Mann and Orren (eds.), Media Polls in American
Politics, p. 89.
92
 Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, p. 265.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  43

opinions.”93 Mueller also states that his work “at points becomes a manual
on how to prove almost any attitudes with public opinion data.”94 It is
clearly difficult to interpret and predict public opinion, and many of the
negative views that are attached to both the relevance and accuracy of poll-
ing are indicators of this. It should be said, however, that several authors
have noted the importance of public opinion polls—not necessarily as a
scientific indication of public sentiment, but as a marker for current views
on a given situation. Moore has said that, “Polling can, indeed, provide a
continuous monitoring of the elusive pulse of democracy,”95 while
E. J. Dionne, Jr., has stated, “Polls can explode journalistic prejudices and
preconceptions. They can answer legitimate questions that could not oth-
erwise be answered. Done well they can provide a complex view of how
citizens reason, separately and together, about public problems.”96
Traugott and Means have argued that “There is little consensus on the
manner in which the media’s use of polls influences people, but there is
also little doubt that it has an effect.”97 John Geer has raised the argument
that the very existence of polling has caused a shift, making the argument
that polls have fundamentally changed the kind of information available to
politicians. “Surveys, despite their flaws, represent a significant improve-
ment in the quality of information available to politicians.” As well as this,
“The concept of public opinion itself has shifted with the onset of survey
research.”98 Finally, Mann and Orren have raised another benefit of opin-
ion polls: “Reporters consequently always need to question conventional
wisdom, and polls can be a useful tool for doing this. They give reporters
a way to test the riveting anecdote and dramatic personal experience that
are the workhorses of traditional journalism.”99
It stands to reason then that while opinion polls are difficult, unwieldy
tools in gauging actual levels of public opinion on a given subject, they do

93
 Herbst, Numbered Voices, p. 46.
94
 Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, p. 265.
95
 Moore, The Superpollsters, p. 357.
96
 E J Dionne, Jr., “The Illusion of Technique: The Impact of Polls on Reporters and
Democracy,” in Mann and Orren (eds.), Media Polls in American Politics, p. 166.
97
 M Traugott and J Means, “Problems of Character: Was it the Candidate or the Press,”
in P Lavrakas, M Traugott and P Miller (eds.), Presidential Polls and the News Media
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), pp. 196–97.
98
 J Geer, From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic Leadership (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 50.
99
 Mann and Orren (eds.), Media Polls in American Politics, pp. 5–6.
44  B. W. QUAIL

have their place in the arena of serious political thought. Rather than as a
definitive measure of the public view, they are instead a starting point for
discussion on presidential output and of the reaction that followed from
the Johnson administration once polls were published. Susan Herbst has
attempted to summarise the actual impact of opinion polls, noting that the
New York Times published 380 opinion polls over three years: “The large
number of polls in the media has shaped the character of contemporary
journalism in the United States.”100 She concludes, “Even though opinion
polls are valuable to political candidates, journalists, and presidents—both
instrumentally and symbolically—their impact on political expression has
not been as dramatic as early pollsters once hoped.”101 Moore’s argument
is certainly the more persuasive of the two. Herbst is surely correct in
arguing that opinion polls may not be the most accurate marker of public
opinion, itself, but they are certainly important factors in the ways in
which each federal administration has formed its view of, and reacted to,
widespread public sentiment; as such they are certainly worthy of further
study here.
Johnson’s own use of opinion polls is of particular interest and is in fact
key in observing the way in which his personality led him to react to
reports of sliding popularity and how this affected his objectives, and caus-
ing him to be swayed by the polls, rather than develop and carry out a
singular, proactive strategy.

Polling and the Johnson Presidency

There are several seminal accounts of Johnson’s time in office, and it is
important to discuss the merits of these works and how they relate to the
subject of his rhetoric. As well as this, there are several key debates sur-
rounding Johnson and his foreign and domestic policies that should be
addressed.
Johnson’s use of poll data was revolutionary in terms of presidential
interaction with the medium; John Geer notes that Johnson and his pre-
decessor, John F. Kennedy, “clearly signalled the beginning of a new era.
These chief executives were the first to integrate survey research into the
daily operations of the White House.”102 He goes on to confirm that

100
 Herbst, Numbered Voices, p. 115.
101
 Ibid., p. 175.
102
 Geer, From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls, p. 84.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  45

Johnson commissioned 130 private polls from pollsters such as Oliver

Quayle during his time as president, while also receiving regular poll data
from staff members such as Bill Moyers, one of his press secretaries.
Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro note, regarding the Johnson admin-
istration’s monitoring of public opinion:

The White House became a veritable warehouse stocked with the latest pub-
lic opinion data… The regular flow of these private opinion surveys into the
White House provided data on the president’s popularity as well as on pub-
lic preferences for policy issues and for candidates in congressional and
gubernatorial races.103

Jacobs and Shapiro’s description fits in well with the objectives of this
piece; with the knowledge that Johnson did indeed focus on details of his
popularity, we can see connections with the likes of Reedy, who, as we
have seen, believed that Johnson’s belief in his ability to read the press was
wildly misguided. While Johnson worked hard to keep up with the views
of the public and press through public opinion polls, his inability to under-
stand how to influence these things led to a largely reactive, rather than
proactive stance. The end result here was that the administration took a
short-term view on difficult situations, rather than one that took into
account the larger future. Jacobs’s further work on the subject notes that
Johnson used Oliver Quayle as a personal pollster for the majority of his
presidency, switching briefly to John Kraft and Joseph Napolitan when his
confidence in Quayle’s reporting faltered in the final year of his presidency.
Jacobs and Burns’s research on Johnson’s opinion polling through Quayle
shows that from the beginning of his poll work on Vietnam in 1965,
Quayle dutifully reported to the White House that public opinion was
badly split and that the president’s “middle ground approach” was strongly
opposed. They believe that Johnson used Quayle’s polling to form a
strategy of diversion to refocus public opinion onto more popular pro-
grammes and policy positions. White House officials could see with
increasing clarity as the war dragged on that it was essential to emphasise
more hopeful headlines and draw attention to the government’s successes
in Congress. By not taking a proactive stance on doing this, the

 Jacobs and Shapiro quoted in ibid., p. 84.

103
46  B. W. QUAIL

administration failed to move beyond simply reacting to crises, which ulti-

mately undermined their credibility.104
Perhaps the most obviously important work on LBJ that pertains to this
subject is Bruce Altschuler’s LBJ and the Polls. Altschuler discusses the
limitations in the polling techniques of the time, noting that when he
wanted a quick measure of public reaction to a specific event, Johnson
“Had to sacrifice depth and reliability.” According to Altschuler, Oliver
Quayle’s polls and methods made analysing sub-groups and thorough
questioning of subjects, “Difficult, if not impossible.”105 This critique of
polling methods which were the best available at the time compares them
with more advanced recent methods of computerised polling. Altschuler
makes it clear that, as discussed, the Johnson administration placed a lot of
faith in polling and public opinion indicators. When discussing the Great
Society and domestic reforms, Altschuler argues that, particularly during
the early years of Johnson’s presidency when his popularity was high, he
was able to use opinion polls to grant him a mandate to implement
change—if public opinion was in his favour then Johnson felt he was in the
right and pushed his plans forward.106 He used official opinion polls that
did not delve too deeply into subjects. These allowed him to forge ahead
without becoming involved in niggling discussions over what information
could be extrapolated from polls. By keeping things simple, he was able to
draw simple conclusions and use these to influence policy.
Ultimately, Altschuler’s work on LBJ is important to take into consid-
eration. He points out that while Johnson did take opinion polls seriously,
he was also quick to dismiss poll information that did not agree with his
own interpretation of events or objectives for the future, quoting the poll-
ster Harris, “Johnson was the truest believers of polls, but only when they
tended to support what he was doing.”107 This is significant to note and
links in with one of the most important arguments about the Johnson
presidency. Johnson and his associates had the tendency to push ahead
with their own agenda and blindly ignore evidence which went contrary to
this, be it opinion polls, news reports or any opposing hard facts. LBJ and
the Polls puts across the idea that LBJ’s manner of polling worked well as
104
 L Jacobs & M Burns, “The Second Face of the Public Presidency: Presidential Polling
and the Shift from Policy to Personality Polling,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no.
3 (Fall 2004), p. 545.
105
 B Altschuler, LBJ and the Polls (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1990) p. 100.
106
 Ibid., p. 36.
107
 Ibid., LBJ and the Polls, p. 2.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  47

long as he was popular, but would prove problematic when he approached

the boundaries of popular consensus. As we have already seen, question
wording can indeed provide differing results; Johnson jumped on this as
his popularity waned to justify the reasons for the slide; crooked pollsters
were to blame for his waning popularity, and the administration was not at
fault. This is an argument that ties in closely with the idea that Johnson
was unable to develop a long-term strategy for dealing with the press. His
inability to comprehend that the press could report negatively on the
incumbent president meant that he did not have a back-up plan for when
things went wrong, and his personality was such that he took any adverse
coverage as a personal slight, something that the press corps picked up on
very early on.108
Altschuler’s work has been noted by historians of LBJ and those who
work specifically in the field of the media. Susan Herbst has noted that
Johnson made special efforts to publicise Quayle data that contradicted
the likes of Harris and Gallup.109 John Geer notes that, “Many scholars
have argued, however, that politicians must often become leaders rather
than followers, since the public may be wrong in its judgement about
some issues or it may not be informed on the matter.”110 He further states
that Johnson tried to do this: “The President, with his mandate in hand,
tried to alter what the public considered important issues.”111 Rottinghaus
asserts that although much of the scholarly work on Johnson argues that
he was not attentive to public opinion during his time in office, particu-
larly with regard to Vietnam, his own research on the White House reac-
tion to incoming public mail shows that the administration was much
more attentive to public opinion. This was especially true of correspon-
dence that favoured escalation and prosecution of the war, and Rottinghaus
argues that there was a significant and direct effect on the president’s
mind-set and decision-making on the matter.112 Rottinghaus’s initial
assumption that Johnson was extremely attentive of public opinion that

108
 This is mentioned in a contemporary account of presidential press strategies; see J E
Pollard, The Presidents and the Press, Truman to Johnson (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs
Press, 1964), p. 120.
109
 Herbst, Numbered Voices, pp. 159–60.
110
 Geer, From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls, p. 7.
111
 Ibid., p. 92.
112
 B Rottinghaus, “Following the “Mail Hawks”: Alternative Measures of Public Opinion
on Vietnam in the Johnson White House,” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 71, no. 3 (Autumn
2007), p. 387.
48  B. W. QUAIL

went against his policy goals and objectives should be disputed, especially
regarding Vietnam. While he was inherently distrustful of the media and
public opinion polls that fell within the auspices of media control such as
the Gallup and Harris Polls, it seems much more in keeping with Johnson’s
behaviour that he simply agreed with any public opinion information that
echoed his own thoughts and feelings on a given situation.
Ultimately, the opinion polling that Johnson lauded in the early part of
his time in office became his enemy in the later years of his presidency. As
will be shown, his aides were not helpful in this regard—they would focus
on bemoaning question wordings instead of the bigger picture (Johnson’s
data collector Fred Panzer would criticise Gallup’s lack of emphasis on
positive results and argue that “dramatic Johnson gains were buried under
a lead about Nelson Rockefeller”).113 The administration’s use of opinion
polls in times of good fortune differed immensely from how Johnson and
his staff distanced themselves from the polls when they said what he did
not want to hear. This can partly be attributed to Johnson’s style of leader-
ship, the already well-documented ease with which he took offence, and
partly to the ways in which his staff complied.

Lyndon B. Johnson: The President

Altschuler and those cited in the previous section focus largely on opinion
polls and the actions that Johnson took in relation to them. While it is
important to comment on the administration’s attitudes towards the
extensive polling that was carried out and his views on the media, it is
essential to look at what has been written about other aspects of Johnson’s
presidency and how the behaviour of journalists affected his rhetoric and
actions towards the press.114
113
 Nelson Rockefeller was then Republican governor of New York; cited in Altschuler, LBJ
and the Polls, p. 71.
114
 A strong bibliographic review of the literature available on Lyndon Johnson’s life by
Kent Germany documents many of the major works published before 2009. See K. B. Germany,
“Historians and the Many Lyndon Johnsons: A Review Essay,” Journal of Southern History,
vol. 75, no. 4 (November 2009), pp. 1001–28. Germany is also responsible for collected
editions of transcribed telephone calls from the Johnson era, which is available for use
through the Miller Center at the University of Virginia. For more information on this, see
K B Germany, M Holland & R D Johnson (eds), The Presidential Recordings: Lyndon
B. Johnson – The Kennedy Assassination and the Transfer of Power November 1963–January
1964 (New York City: W W Norton & Co, 2005), K B Germany, R D Johnson, G A McKee,
M Holland & D Shreve, The Presidential Recordings: Lyndon B Johnson – Towards the Great
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  49

Several writers have discussed Lyndon Johnson’s presidency in great

depth. Robert Dallek’s biography focuses on his time in office and con-
cludes that Johnson presided over “the worst foreign policy disaster in the
country’s history,” in the Vietnam War.115 Dallek does concede Johnson’s
domestic legacy is strong: “Who among us would agree to return to the
segregated world of the 1950s and early 1960s?”116 Monroe Billington
agrees with this, arguing that Johnson’s domestic policy aims came from
the religious beliefs that were imposed on him from childhood, though
there is some question as to whether Johnson himself was a religious
man.117 Dallek’s work is an important analysis of Johnson’s presidency; his
analysis of the president’s waning popularity and his description of
Johnson’s battles with the press are as important as his explanations of
many of the policies that were enacted and decisions that were taken by
the administration. Robert Caro’s biographical series on Johnson is of
great importance to any piece of further critical writing on his life; at the
time of writing, the fifth volume of his series has not been completed,
meaning that Caro’s work ends with Johnson’s ascension to the presi-
dency in 1963. Accordingly, Caro does not feature heavily in this discus-
sion of Johnson’s presidency and his media strategy during that time, but
is significant regarding Johnson’s early years and the development of his
personal style in politics—Caro’s meticulously researched history of
Johnson’s life gives a rare insight into the mind of the president. Caro
notes that even in his early days Johnson “possessed a lash for a tongue”
and a gift for “finding a person’s most sensitive point, and striking it, over
and over again.”118 Caro discusses Johnson’s rise at great length, ­beginning

Society: February 1, 1964–May 31, 1964 (New York City: W W Norton & Co, 2007) and K B
Germany, G A McKee & D C Carter, The Presidential Recordings: Lyndon B Johnson – Mississippi
Burning and the Passage of the Civil Rights Act: June 1, 1964–July 4, 1964 (New York City:
W W Norton & Co, 2011)
115
 R Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson: Portrait of a President, 2 vols. (New York: Penguin, 2004)
p.  375. Dallek’s work is available in both a larger two-volume set and an abridged single
volume. While both have been consulted, the abridged copy has been used for the purposes
of citations, as it is more concise.
116
 Ibid., p. 374.
117
 Johnson attended churches of different denominations during his presidency. See M
Billington, “The Religion of a Politician,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3
(Summer 1987), pp. 519–30, for more details on how Johnson’s spiritual upbringing may
have affected his decision-making.
118
 R Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, vol. 2: Means of Ascent (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1992), p. 57.
50  B. W. QUAIL

with his apprenticeship in Washington under President Franklin Roosevelt.

This period helped shape Johnson’s political views—but he also notes
Johnson’s duplicitous nature by commenting on the rapid change in
Johnson’s politics following Roosevelt’s death: “Before the paint had
faded on the billboards proclaiming his loyalty to Franklin D, Lyndon B
had turned against him.”119 Caro also notes Johnson’s time as a congress-
man and quotes fellow Congressman James Van Zandt (D-Pennsylvania),
who summed up Johnson’s style of political operation: “Johnson kept
asking for favors, and he simply didn’t have that many to give in return.”120
Caro does believe that Johnson knew how to work the press during his
years in the US Senate; his gift for leaking to the press was “obviously
natural, instinctive, innate.”121
Certainly, Johnson continued this practice of leaking—Clark Clifford
noted later that “he was a major source of information to the press—as the
saying goes, ‘The ship of state is the only vessel that leaks from the top,’”
but the president would eventually develop an almost pathological hatred
of leaks from other people.122 With that said, McGeorge Bundy remem-
bered in 1969 that, “The poor innocent [Johnson] probably still thinks if
he’d only had better staff officers, he could have traced all leaks.”123 In his
final volume to date, Caro touches on the notion of Johnson’s fear of fail-
ure, noting that it “all but paralyzed him in his attempt to reach for the
presidency,” prior to 1963, “no matter how deep his yearning for the
office.”124 All of the points raised by Caro are important aspects of
Johnson’s personality that were carried through into the presidency; as
such, his work on Johnson’s path to power is of great importance in show-
ing how Johnson’s persona was moulded by his experiences and how he
would react to external pressures during his presidency. Nevertheless,
Germany has noted a tendency to criticise Caro’s work for reducing

119
 R Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, vol. 1: The Path To Power (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1982), p. 768.
120
 Caro, Years of Lyndon Johnson vol. 2, p. 130.
121
 R Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, vol. 3: Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2003), p. 325.
122
 C Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 430.
123
 Transcript, McGeorge Bundy Oral History Interview I, 30 January 1969, by Paige E
Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library, p. 11.
124
 R Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson vol. 4: The Passage of Power (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2012), p. 602.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  51

Johnson to a caricature, and he notes that Caro himself appears to be

extremely critical of what he sees as Johnson’s duplicitous personality.125
Several of Johnson’s close aides and administrative staff have discussed
in memoirs their time serving under him and the biggest issues facing the
government. Horace Busby once claimed that, “Johnson could make a
grown man angry just by the way he said hello, if he wanted to, if that was
his purpose.”126 Significantly, Joseph Califano, Eric Goldman and Jack
Valenti, key members of staff, have talked about the experiences they had
while working for him. Califano recounts his experiences as Johnson’s
tenure wore on. He notes that by 1966, Johnson was “showing his frus-
tration at being diverted from pursuit of the domestic ambitions,”127
which were recently announced. Goldman, a former special advisor to
Johnson who left office in 1966, took a similar view: “The President
assumed that foreign policy was something you had, like measles, and got
over with as quickly as possible.”128 It is interesting to note that both
Goldman and Califano were on Johnson’s staff in the White House, and
both offer the view that Johnson was not as committed to Vietnam as oth-
ers have suggested. Goldman goes as far as to say that Johnson was an
“Extraordinarily gifted” president, but “The wrong man from the wrong
place at the wrong time under the wrong circumstances.”129 Valenti, for
his part, was somewhat sympathetic to the circumstances surrounding the
president’s foreign policy activities in his memoirs, refusing to explicitly
condemn the president for any of his decisions with regard to Vietnam.130
The main theory being put forward is that Johnson was not able to
reconcile his foreign and domestic policies. It is therefore of some signifi-
cance that several close observers of the president believe Johnson’s con-
centration shifted significantly towards foreign policy from his initial goals
for domestic reform, even though he was by nature a domestically focused
president first and foremost. Johnson found himself pulled away from his
preferred focus in favour of an unpopular war, jeopardising the Great

125
 Germany, “Historians and the Many Lyndon Johnsons,” p. 1017.
126
 Transcript, Horace Busby Oral History Interview VIII, 2 April 1989, by M L Gillette,
Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 17.
127
 J A Califano, Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon B Johnson: The White House Years
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), p. 121.
128
 E F Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson (London: MacDonald, 1969), pp. 527–28.
129
 Goldman, The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson, p. 535.
130
 J Valenti, This Time, This Place: My Life In War, The White House and Hollywood (New
York: Three Rivers Press, 2007), passim.
52  B. W. QUAIL

Society as funds earmarked for domestic programmes were funnelled into

Vietnam. This guns or butter argument over which of the two was more
important has been put forward by the likes of political and intelligence
historian Thomas Powers as a reason why the Great Society failed; Powers
notes that the war “not only absorbed the energies of the administration,
but cast doubt on everything it did.”131 Gen. William C. Westmoreland,
commander of the armed forces, felt that the opposite was true. He
believed that Johnson’s strategy of guns and butter actually caused issues
with his Vietnam strategy; this is in interesting contrast to much of the
literature put forward by scholars of the Johnson presidency such as
Vaughn D. Bornet, who feel that the Great Society suffered the most.132
There cannot be any doubt that both of Johnson’s policies suffered due to
his attempts to balance the war and the Great Society. Although his advi-
sors and on-the-ground leaders in each sphere were fully committed to the
government’s objectives, Johnson’s own inability to find a way to recon-
cile and rationalise his strategies domestically and abroad to the public and
press in a consistent, complementary and proactive manner was the most
important reason why both policies faltered. In other words, they dam-
aged each other and weakened the president.
While looking at the recollections of Johnson’s close associates, there
are some aspects of Johnson’s presidency that should be noted, specifically
the relations between Johnson and his staff, which had a significant bear-
ing on how they—and he—approached media relations. Opposing views
emerge on Johnson’s treatment of staff. Press accounts largely charged
Johnson with having a particularly cruel and driving management style,
expecting his staff to work the long hours he did and tolerating little
opposition from within the ranks of the administration, whereas the
response from several former staff members is strikingly at odds with both
press assumptions and some other insider accounts. George Ball believed
that the president was his “only friendly listener,” to the dissenting view
he offered the administration on Vietnam, while aide Townsend Hoopes
(initially based in the Pentagon and then undersecretary of the Air Force
from 1967 to 1969) described Johnson as being “strongly allergic to

131
 T Powers, The War At Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964–1968 (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1973) p. 93.
132
 For Westmoreland’s testimony, see W C Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1976) p. 411.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  53

opposition.”133 Jack Valenti defended Johnson passionately in a speech to

the American Advertising Federation, for which he was mocked roundly
in the press, but did not regret it in his memoirs.134 He also noted that the
way Johnson set up his staff led to the White House being “a house of
equals, all of whom had ample access to the president and all of whom
were involved in decision making meetings.”135 Valenti was a staunch
Johnson supporter, and as such his views on Johnson’s flaws must be taken
alongside other accounts, but there is no question of his value as a primary
source for the inner workings of the Johnson bureaucracy. Arthur
Schlesinger, the historian who worked in the Kennedy administration, fell
in with those who felt that Johnson was difficult to work with. He quoted
Reedy, who once facetiously remarked, “The wise senator enters cau-
tiously, dressed in his Sunday best and with a respectful, almost pious look
on his face.”136 Schlesinger was particularly critical, not only of Johnson,
but of the presidency’s modern role in American politics in his work The
Imperial Presidency. He believed that Johnson’s achievement with the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 was to give the president autonomy to
use the military as he or she sees fit, removing Congressional approval and
increasing the autonomy of the presidency so as to be more akin to that of
a king, something that Schlesinger felt was not acceptable and against the
initial ideals of the Founding Fathers. Schlesinger notes that Johnson and
Richard Nixon after him were directly responsible for a public loss of faith
in the workings of American government. While there is an argument for
identifying Johnson as an imperial president due to the large majority in
the Senate and House he was able to build during his early years as presi-
dent, it would be wrong to say that there were no checks or balances to his
power. After the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, support for his foreign policy
actions would never again be so strong, and as we will see, over the course
of his time in office, public and political faith in Johnson eroded to the
point where his continued leadership was no longer a tenable option. As
such, while Schlesinger’s views are important and valid in many respects,
it is difficult to see how the Johnson presidency could truly be described
as an imperial one.

133
 G Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York: W.  W. Norton, 1982),
p. 430, and Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention, p. 90.
134
 Valenti, This Time, This Place, pp. 175–76.
135
 Ibid., pp. 173–74.
136
 A Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (New York: Andre Deutsch, 1974), p. 181.
54  B. W. QUAIL

Neustadt and May for their part felt that Johnson was a master of notic-
ing patterns and behaviour in others, “using placement and psychology to
probe personalities and trying to master them.” They confirm this by
quoting Johnson himself: “I never feel really comfortable with a man
unless I have his pecker in my pocket.”137 Burke and Greenstein point out
that Johnson’s advisors tested the limits of hyperbole with their characteri-
sations of the president.138 Joseph Califano’s description of the president
is a clear example of this, as he described Johnson’s mercurial personality:

Brave and brutal, compassionate and cruel, incredibly intelligent and infuri-
atingly insensitive, with a shrewd and uncanny instinct for the jugular of his
allies and adversaries. He could be altruistic and petty, caring and crude,
generous and petulant, bluntly honest and calculatingly devious—all within
the same few minutes.139

A number of these descriptions point to a man who brooked no criti-

cism, and indeed, this has been the verdict of the likes of Hoopes. A sta-
tistical analysis of Johnson’s interactions over the first two years of his
presidency has been conducted by James Best and is interesting to note; it
determines that Johnson hugely relied on trusted advisors such as Defense
Secretary McNamara, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and
Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The analysis concludes that over time,
Johnson’s interactions became more concentrated: “In December 1965
only 72 people accounted for 81 percent of Johnson’s interactions com-
pared with 106 people who accounted for 68 percent of his interactions in
December 1963.”140 Ultimately, the anecdotal evidence provided by for-
mer Johnson staffers such as Townsend Hoopes is backed up by a statisti-
cal analysis of the president’s interactions with those around him. It paints
the picture of a man who became more withdrawn from the world around
him as his popularity began to fail. This lends credence to the idea that the
administration became more adversarial towards perceived threats from
the press, more inward looking and more possessive of a siege mentality
wherein they convinced themselves of their own righteousness. Certainly,

137
 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, p. 205.
138
 J P Burke and F I Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954
and 1965 (London: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989), p. 239.
139
 Califano, The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon B Johnson, p. 10.
140
 J J Best, “Who Talked To the President When? A Study of Lyndon B Johnson,” Political
Science Quarterly, vol. 103, no 3 (Autumn 1988), p. 541.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  55

Johnson thrived on securing agreement from all parties involved in the

decision-making process. It would be easy to suggest as a result that, as a
man who struggled deeply with criticism, Johnson filled his staff positions
with like-minded individuals who would tell him what he wanted to hear.
This would certainly explain why his staff closed ranks when difficulties
arose with the war and public opinion slumped, but is contradicted by the
likes of George Ball, who calls this portrait “two dimensional” and notes
that Johnson always spoke to him with courtesy.141 Drew Pearson, who
worked as a journalist in Washington for several decades, felt Johnson
took criticism in his stride and became more open to ideas as the years
progressed.142 The fact remains, however, that by 1968 many of the presi-
dent’s staff from the early days had moved on—Ball included.
Ultimately, Johnson was indeed a consensus politician, who certainly
demanded the respect and hard work of those around him, but those who
worked with him have questioned the suggestion that he did not react well
to criticism from his own staff. The belief of people like Cooper, Neustadt
and May that Johnson made up his mind either during or before going
through the motions of debate (rather than as a consequence of debate)
seems the most likely of all the opinions offered as to how he made deci-
sions. As a consensus politician, the president thrived on agreement, but it
had to be around a policy or approach that Johnson himself already made
a decision on, and he could not tolerate dissent. The assumption made
here is more in line with Cooper, Neustadt and May—that Johnson
appeared to go through the rigours of reasoned debate with his aides and
staff members, but once his mind was made up on matters of policy, there
was nothing anyone could do or say to change it.143 This colours the dis-
cussion of Johnson’s actions somewhat. While it is possible to criticise
those in the administration who advised him on Vietnam such as McGeorge
Bundy and Robert McNamara, and those who advised him on public
affairs such as his four press secretaries—Salinger, Reedy, Moyers and

141
 Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 429.
142
 Oral history transcript, Drew Pearson, interview 1 (I), 4/10/1969, by Joe B. Frantz,
LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed December 12, 2020, https://
[Link]/item/oh-pearsond-19690410-1-74-99.
143
 This assumption is made in line with the previous discussion of the likes of Townsend
Hoopes and his belief that Johnson ultimately did not tolerate dissension. While George Ball,
Jack Valenti and others close to the president have insisted that he engaged in reasoned
debate with staff, it is difficult to argue with the discussion put forward by Hoopes, and
scholars of Johnson such as Caro, Dallek and Kearns.
56  B. W. QUAIL

Christian—the final analysis must hold Johnson the most responsible for
his actions.

Vietnam
The Vietnam conflict is one of the most divisive and widely discussed wars
in the history of the United States, and Johnson’s role is one of the most
intensely discussed elements. Charles DeBenedetti states that, “For
Americans, the Vietnam War was most extraordinary in that it was not so
much a fight against enemies abroad as it was an internal struggle over
their own national identity.”144 In order to best look at relations between
the Johnson administration, the press and the public during the war, it is
important first to cast a critical eye over the war, itself, and the historiog-
raphy on Vietnam.
Johnson’s role in the escalation of events in Vietnam has been hotly
disputed. Some point to the role of his advisors in accelerating the conflict;
indeed, Ezra Siff notes that Johnson exhibited indecision and doubts over
the path of escalation, something not shared by his Vietnam advisors.145
Siff notes the influence that long-serving Senator Richard Russell (D.—
Georgia) had on Johnson and that of his own defence advisors such as
McGeorge Bundy. In contrast, Bundy’s biographer, Goldstein, refutes
Siff’s assertion that Johnson’s advisors were certain of their course: “The
historical record demonstrates that during his years as national security
advisor Bundy was never confident that the United States could achieve a
battlefield victory in Vietnam.”146 Goldstein, however, contradicts himself
when he asserts that Bundy believed that “coercion would prevail.”147
Robert McNamara—the long-running secretary of defence who served
under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson—also contests the thesis that
Johnson’s advisors were especially at fault for passing on poor strategies,
adding his belief that a lack of organisation from top to bottom was
to blame:

144
 C DeBenedetti, “Lyndon Johnson and the Antiwar Opposition,” in R A Divine (ed.),
The Johnson Years, Volume Two: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 1987), p. 23.
145
 E Siff, Why the Senate Slept: The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America’s
Vietnam War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), p. 49.
146
 G M Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam
(New York: Henry Holt, 2008), p. 232.
147
 Ibid., p. 226.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  57

With the president, the secretaries of state and defense, the national security
adviser, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and their associates dividing their
attention over a host of complex and demanding issues, some of our short-
comings—in particular our failure to debate systematically the most funda-
mental issues—could have been predicted.148

McNamara’s summary of events is that the fault for escalation in

Vietnam lay with everyone, not only with Johnson or only with his advi-
sors. Robert Dallek refutes this and states that Johnson was in Vietnam for
selfish reasons. He believes that to have admitted failure on an issue as big
as Vietnam, and to have become the only American president to lose a
war, was “too jarring,” to his self-image as a leader who could get things
done.149 H.  R. McMaster agrees with this analysis, summarising that
President Johnson and his principal military and civilian advisors commit-
ted disastrous errors in judgement: “The failures were many and reinforc-
ing: arrogance, weakness, lying in the pursuit of self interest, and, above
all, the abdication of responsibility to the American people.”150 David
Barrett believes that throughout his presidency, Johnson displayed certain
common traits concerning his Vietnam deliberations, one of them being
his “insistence on wrapping his advisory deliberations in a shroud of
secrecy.” Barrett does not believe that he had a static system of receiving
advice, but that he chose to see “more or fewer advisors with significant or
no formal status and representing a narrower or wider range of opinion,”
depending on how the war was going.151
A final argument considered here over how America became lodged in
the quagmire of Vietnam is that Johnson was in many ways locked into a
course of action when he assumed the presidency. American personnel
were present in the country before Johnson came into office and Kennedy
stressed the importance of containing Vietnamese communism before and
during his tenure in the White House. However, David Kaiser has noted
that Johnson’s foreign policy differed from Kennedy’s in such a way that

148
 Robert McNamara with B Van De Mark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of
Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 332.
149
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 376.
150
 H R McMaster, H R McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert
McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (London: Harper
Collins, 1997), p. 120.
151
 D Barrett, Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and his Vietnam Advisors (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1993), pp. 167–68.
58  B. W. QUAIL

it would inevitably lead to escalation. Where Kennedy paid as much, if not

more, attention to the wider context—maintaining strategic allies, improv-
ing US relations with developing nations and holding discussions with the
Soviet Union on matters of mutual concern—Johnson’s approach was
much more direct. Kennedy, believes Kaiser, would not have made a deci-
sion that would isolate him and his country from America’s allies, some-
thing which escalation was always in danger of doing. Johnson saw no
benefit to be made from what he thought would be an imitation of the
Allies’ appeasement policies of the 1930s.152 Neil Sheehan appears to chal-
lenge this by stating that Johnson, “Persevered in Kennedy’s commit-
ment,” when he embarked on full-scale war in Vietnam.153 Michael Hunt
recognises that Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy
were all material contributors to the Vietnam situation, but concludes
that, ultimately, it was Johnson’s embarking on an undeclared war that
would “Prove a disaster to his presidency, to his country and to the coun-
tries of Indochina.”154 Bernstein believes that Johnson’s personality was at
fault, noting that Clark Clifford, another close observer, wrote that
Johnson personalised the actions of the Vietcong, while Kennedy viewed
Vietnam through a more detached lens. Bernstein concludes that, “The
sources of Johnson’s decisions to commit U.S. forces in Vietnam and to
refuse to pull them out are found in his personality, and in his personal
history.”155
An important aspect of the Vietnam War in the context of this study is
the debate that raged over the course of Johnson’s presidency over whether
the war was justified. Schlesinger feels that the decision to Americanise
what Kennedy called “their war” was a momentous decision with no prec-
edent.156 Levy contends that dissenters believed America was using her
power and standpoint in the world in such a way that was, “inconsistent
with the principles, the values, the ethical standards of the American

152
 D Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 484–86.
153
 N Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1989), p. 11.
154
 M H Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam 1945–1968
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), p. 108.
155
 I Bernstein, Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), p. 329.
156
 Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency, pp. 178–79.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  59

people.”157 Early anti-war opposition and protest was, according to

DeBenedetti, subject to, “widespread popular contempt,” and Johnson
wondered why opposition was not overwhelmed by waves of popular
anger.158 Pulitzer prize-winning Vietnam journalist David Halberstam
noted as early as 1964, “Few Americans who have served in Vietnam can
stomach” the idea of withdrawal, and at least during the early stages of the
war, public opinion seemed to back the president.159 “DeBenedetti’s view
on anti-war protests is noteworthy; he believes that Johnson did not
develop any sort of strategy to deal with—or even a proper understanding
of—those who opposed his policies in Vietnam. His approach to critics on
Vietnam was disjointed and inconsistent, and varied depending on who
was espousing the criticism.160 This is supported by Halberstam, who con-
cluded early on that, “Mr Johnson is a fire chief with too many blazes to
put out, and too little time to worry about spots where at the moment
there is only a little smoke—where the status quo is now tolerable to the
United States but intolerable to the population of that country.”161
DeBenedetti concludes that the debate that overshadowed Lyndon
Johnson for much of his tenure in the White House was simply a frame-
work from which Americans argued about American commitments and
that the war always had to be about a larger purpose than Vietnam alone.
Other authors have disagreed about the effectiveness and popularity of the
anti-war protestors; J. J. Gustainis, for example, has noted that while some
claim a victory for anti-war protests because their goal, American with-
drawal, was—eventually—achieved, “The American public rejected the
anti-war protestors’ argument that the war was immoral and unjustified.”
The protests were not unified under one leader and were quite disorgan-
ised. Eventually, concludes Gustainis, average Americans in the Vietnam
period were suspicious of protest, and “The prevailing attitudes of the
mass public would have provided formidable obstacles on the path to
peace.”162

157
 D W Levy, The Debate Over Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1991), p. 46.
158
 C DeBenedetti, “Lyndon Johnson and the Antiwar Opposition,” p. 27.
159
 D Halberstam, The Making of a Quagmire (London: Bodley Head, 1965), p. 315.
160
 Ibid., p. 33.
161
 Ibid., p. 318.
162
 J J Gustainis, American Rhetoric and the Vietnam War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993),
pp. 121–22.
60  B. W. QUAIL

The likes of Senator J. William Fulbright, whose 1966 work, The

Arrogance of Power, denounced American involvement in Vietnam, were
extremely critical of the fallout from Vietnam in the East, the West and,
most importantly, at home. Fulbright argued that the war “has diverted
our energies from the Great society program which began so promisingly”
and criticised Johnson’s “Guns and Butter” argument that America could
thrive while fighting in South East Asia. Douglass Cater noted in an inter-
view that Fulbright was unable to compartmentalise the foreign and
domestic policy goals of the Johnson government at this time and quoted
him as disparaging education legislation by saying, “What the hell do I
care? The war in Vietnam is killing everything anyway.”163 In his work
Fulbright discussed the “facile assumption” that the money could be
raised to focus on the Great Society whilst the government was also spend-
ing billions of dollars on financing a foreign war. He concluded that the
war was indicative of the burgeoning expansionism of the United States
and argued that, if this continues unabated, “Vietnam will have had a
mighty and tragic fallout.”164 Fulbright’s input is vital to note—while in
August 1964 he was quick to sponsor the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
which gave the president the power to escalate the Vietnam conflict, he
soon became one of the most powerful and influential anti-war figures in
the Senate. Fulbright’s early support for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
has been critiqued by William Berman, who states that Fulbright knew
that something was going on that he was not privy to and “should have
been more critical than he was.” The senator decided to give his support
to the resolution anyway, partially because of his fear of Barry Goldwater
being elected in the forthcoming elections.165
Fulbright’s views tapped into a large undercurrent of American society
that was uneasy about waging war so far away and did not feel comfortable
supporting Johnson’s escalation in Vietnam. Fulbright’s argument also
connected with one of the most important debates that surrounded
Johnson as president—the aforementioned guns or butter argument. As
we will see, the credibility gap that began to open following escalation was
one of the most significant factors in Johnson’s declining popularity. The
163
 Transcript, Douglass Cater Oral History Interview III, 26 May 1974, by Joe B Frantz,
Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 20.
164
 J W Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (New York: Jonathan Cape, 1966), pp. 131–38.
165
 W Berman, William Fulbright and the Vietnam War (Kent, OH: Kent State University
Press, 1988), p. 25. For more discussion of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the election
of Barry Goldwater, see the next chapter.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  61

idea that America could essentially fight a war on two fronts—a literal war
against the Viet Cong and the metaphorical war on poverty and injustice
at home—was not easy to sell even under the best of conditions.
There is a section of Vietnam literature that charges the press with
severely damaging morale amongst Americans involved in the war, from
the frontline all the way up to the White House. The commander of
American forces in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, wrote in
his memoirs that after the Tet Offensive in 1968, “Press and television had
created an aura not of victory but of defeat, which, coupled with the vocal
anti-war elements, profoundly influenced timid officials in Washington.”166
Mark Moyar criticises the impact of award-winning journalists such as
David Halberstam, Neil Sheehan and Stanley Karnow, arguing that they
“inadvertently caused enormous damage to the American effort in South
Vietnam.” He further claims that as the war went on, “they avoided
reporting on American military heroism in the belief that reports of
American valor would increase support for the war in the United States.”167
This plays into the belief that media influenced, rather than followed, pub-
lic opinion, while it is clear that there is some impact Moyar’s conclusions
suggest that a much larger Robert Elegant is critical of the media’s involve-
ment during Vietnam; he believes that the media provided the “primary
battlefield” and notes that, “The political pressures built up by the media…
made it quite impossible for Washington to maintain even the minimal
material and moral support that would have enabled the Saigon regime to
continue effective resistance.”168 Nevertheless, even he concludes that
reporting on the war was mainly factual and holds up when reviewed. In
contrast to this view, Peter Braestrup argues that the media’s reporting,
with particular reference to the Tet Offensive, was “an extreme case” and
that it “veered widely from reality.”169 He concludes that television net-
works NBC and CBS appeared to be having “a contest over who could
shout the same words more loudly.”170 In a similar vein, traditional
­government wartime propaganda has been characterised as “half-hearted”

166
 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 410.
167
 M Moyar, “Halberstam’s History,” National Review, 5 July 2007, accessed on 24 June
2017 at [Link]
168
 R Elegant, “How to Lose a War: Reflections of a Foreign Correspondent,” in G Sevy
(ed.), The American Experience in Vietnam: A Reader (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1989), pp. 138–39.
169
 P Braestrup, “An Extreme Case,” in Sevy (ed.), American Experience in Vietnam, p. 153.
170
 Ibid., p. 161.
62  B. W. QUAIL

by many who have looked into the matter. Bornet, who uses those very
words, argues that, “Old rationales for combat proved to be threadbare in
the age of television.”171 He argues that the government’s own attempts
to communicate through film (Why Vietnam?, 1965) were ineffective and
the president received no help from Hollywood in the way that World War
II saw dozens of proactive and productive propaganda films, save for the,
“almost counter-productive,” and unbelievably patriotic Green Berets,
released in 1968.172
David Halberstam noted in 1964 that, “What is more difficult to adjust
to is America’s indifference and ignorance, and so, many people coming
back from Vietnam go through a period of bitterness during which they
prefer the company of those who have been in Vietnam and know the
country and care about it.”173 His analysis offers an interesting third view
of the public perception of Vietnam in the earliest days of the conflict;
rather than divided into hawks and doves, it was dominated by a simple
ignorance of the facts of the situation. Mark Moyar confirms the validity
of this analysis of the early days of the war, quoting Senator Russell telling
Johnson, “I don’t think the people of this country know much about
Vietnam, and I think they care a hell of a lot less.”174 In support of this
point, John Mueller commented in 1973 that, “The Vietnam War had no
independent impact on President Johnson’s popularity.”175 Berinsky offers
a differing view, claiming that public opinion of the war became polarised,
and this effect increased steadily between 1964 and 1968.176
The idea that the American people were ignorant on the specifics of the
war is worthy of note, but it would be wrong to suggest that the war had
no effect on Johnson’s popularity. Polls released by the likes of Louis
Harris and George Gallup throughout the period of Johnson’s presidency
showed that there were serious issues with Johnson’s handling of the war,

171
 V D Bornet, The Presidency of Lyndon B Johnson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1983), p. 265.
172
 Film reels of several propaganda films are available for view online. One notable example
is a 1965 production entitled Why Vietnam?, which has been uploaded to YouTube by the
United States Department of Defense. [Link]
watch?v=IZZykUr_LLQ.
173
 Halberstam, Making of A Quagmire, pp. 310–11.
174
 M Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), p. 292.
175
 Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, p. 240.
176
 A J Berinsky, In Time of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 115.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  63

and the credibility gap that arose as a result of the disconnect between
Johnson’s statements about Vietnam and his actions severely impacted on
his popularity. Berinsky is correct to suggest that public opinion on the
war became more polarised as Johnson’s tenure went on, a finding given
more weight by Rottinghaus’s previously mentioned work on “mail
hawks.”177 This certainly had an effect on Johnson’s popularity.
Johnson’s public opinion strategy in Vietnam is a critical factor in any
review of his presidency or how effective he was in the role of Commander
in Chief; his failure to commit to a long-term strategy worked in conjunc-
tion with the issues that have been raised in this section regarding the
conduct of the government during the war. A picture emerges in which
the polarisation of American society during the period of Vietnam grew
from the way in which Johnson’s fundamental mistrust of the media and
sources within the media contributed to his loss of credibility. This worked
in conjunction with the administration’s actions towards the Great Society
reform—reforms which were proposed by the president and which were
then impacted heavily by the rapidly escalating war.

The Great Society

The Great Society was an integral aspect of Johnson’s presidency, the
foundation of the administration’s domestic policy plans. In 1965 an
incredible eighty-three out of eighty-five of his recommended measures
were passed into law, and at this stage during his time in office, Johnson
had a higher percentage of legislation passed through Congress than any
other president before or after him, something that can be directly attrib-
uted to the Great Society reforms. These included but were not limited to
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting
Rights Act of 1965, Immigration Act of 1965, the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Higher Education Act of 1965, the
1965 Medicare and Medicaid amendments to the Social Security Act, the
Model Cities Act of 1966 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968—legislation
coming under the banner of the Great Society passed throughout his ten-
ure in office. These reforms aimed to end poverty in the United States,
increase funding towards the arts and medical care, and put a stop to racial
injustice. It is important to place the Great Society in the context of the
events that surrounded it. Because it was made up of a series of smaller

 Rottinghaus, “Following the “Mail Hawks,” p. 390.

177
64  B. W. QUAIL

pieces of legislation, it is sometimes easy to overlook the overarching aim.

Sylvia Ellis quotes Endicott Peabody, former governor of Massachusetts,
as telling Johnson he had “done too much,” which is to argue that none
of the monumental achievements of the Great Society stood out simply
because of the scale of the legislation passed under the administration.178
Much has been written about the Great Society in the context of America
in the 1960s, and on the Great Society, when measured against Johnson’s
other defining policy, waging the war in Vietnam. It is sometimes difficult
to detach the Great Society from Johnson himself, and the ultimate failure
of much of the programme is generally argued to be because of funds
being diverted to Vietnam as the war continued to escalate. As such, this
section will examine the treatment meted out to the Great Society by
those who wrote about Johnson with that programme to the forefront.
There has been much debate over whether the Great Society actually
caused any kind of change for the better overall; Paul Conkin has con-
cluded, “By any number of moral perspectives, our society was not so
great either in 1963 or in 1968.”179 Bornet feels that failure is not easily
agreed upon, and that by the 1980s there were dramatic changes for both
better and worse. He concludes that Johnson’s measures were certainly
integral to this change.180 It has also been pointed out that, from a public
relations perspective, Johnson did not give many major addresses on some
of the most important aspects of the Great Society. The fact that he gave
no speeches on the economy over an eighteen-month period that encom-
passed a large chunk of his “War on Poverty” is important to note and
something Brace and Hinckley discuss in their work on modern presidents
and opinion polls.181 Johnson himself worried at great length about the
effect that war would have on his project, and Arthur Schlesinger agreed,
claiming in 1967, “Lyndon Johnson was on his way to a place in history
as a great president for his vision of a Great Society; but the Great Society
is now, except for a few token gestures, dead.”182 John Chancellor, who

178
 S Ellis, Freedom’s Pragmatist: Lyndon Johnson and Civil Rights (Gainesville: University
Press of Florida, 2013), p. 268.
179
 P W Conkin, Big Daddy from the Pedernales: Lyndon Baines Johnson (Boston: Twayne,
1986), p. 242.
180
 Bornet, The Presidency of Lyndon B Johnson, p. 250.
181
 P Brace and B Hinckley, Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents
(New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 190.
182
 A Schlesinger, The Bitter Heritage: Vietnam and American Democracy 1941–1966
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1967), p. 55.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  65

worked as the director of the Voice of America government funded news

broadcaster between 1965 and 1967, viewed the entanglement of the
Great Society and Vietnam as being good news for American propagan-
dists. “It was one of the unconscious by-products of his administration
that a propagandist was able legitimately to point up some of the positive
things we were doing here at home. And I think in the long run this con-
tributed to an image about the United State which was…about as good as
we could get.”183
Michael Beschloss claims in his notes to Reaching for Glory that there
was a significant backlash against the Great Society in 1966, as the mid-
term elections saw large Republican gains. The future Republican presi-
dent, Richard Nixon, predicted, “We’re going to kill them in ’68.”184
Randall Woods claims in his biography of Johnson that, “the Great Society
was proving an ironic success, elevating the poor into working class and
the working class into the middle class, accelerating the trend that began
after World War II and pushing the country further to the right.”185
Robert Dallek feels that, “Johnson’s domestic record is ultimately a study
in paradox,” explaining, “His strength as a president partly rested on his
affinity for doing big things… His grandiosity led him to promise more
than he could ever possibly deliver.”186 Kearns seems to agree with this
summary; she felt that Johnson’s descriptions of his programmes “often
failed to distinguish between expectations and established realities.”187
Johnson himself would point to the 1964 election results as his mandate
for the Great Society; Harris agrees that, “Johnson not only felt such
social welfare extension was right, but also that this was precisely what the
voters had in mind when they elected him over Barry Goldwater.”188 Clark
Clifford, who replaced McNamara as secretary of defence in 1968, agreed
with this summary; the landslide victory freed Johnson from “the con-
straints of an inherited presidency.”189 These insights, often by people who

183
 Transcript, John Chancellor Oral History Interview I, 25 April 1969, by Dorothy Pierce
McSweeny, Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 17.
184
 Cited in Michael Beschloss’s second volume of secret call transcripts from Johnson’s
presidency, Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White House Tapes, 1964–65 (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 426.
185
 Woods, LBJ, p. 876.
186
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 375.
187
 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson & The American Dream, p. 219.
188
 Harris, The Anguish of Change, p. 249.
189
 Clifford, Counsel to the President, p. 402.
66  B. W. QUAIL

for a time were close to Kennedy or Johnson, paint the latter as someone
who genuinely believed in the Great Society and tried to use the presi-
dency to do what was right. However, authors such as F. M. Kail disagree
with this thesis and paint Johnson as a pragmatist and a populist, who
looked to implement Great Society policies more out of concern for his
own prestige and political legacy than a desire to actually help people who
needed Medicare, anti-poverty programmes or civil rights legislation.190
There is no argument on Johnson’s agenda; Neustadt and May cer-
tainly believe that this is the case and that domestic policy took precedence
over everything else in Johnson’s early presidency.191 However, much of
the literature on the Johnson presidency notes the shift that occurred as
escalation in Vietnam continued, and the Great Society fell by the wayside.
Those writing in the immediate aftermath of Johnson’s humiliation at Tet
and the advance notice he gave of his departure from office found that the
Great Society was ruined by his pursuit of American supremacy in
Southeast Asia. Tom Wicker thought in 1968 that the president threw
away “the fruits of his great victory for some unattainable goal, as Roosevelt
had done in trying to pack the Supreme Court.”192 This is indicative of
several scholarly views on the matter; Irving Bernstein called Johnson’s
idea of a country that could, “do both,” war and peace, “an empty prom-
ise.” Bernstein concludes that the president’s “preference for guns over
butter would bring calamity to Lyndon Johnson and to the United
States.”193 Donald Kettl has argued that Johnson battled for the Great
Society in the face of a widening war and was, “A President caught in his
dreams, unable to control his destiny, and in the end he was destroyed by
this conflict.”194 In this case, there is something of a split; the likes of
Bernstein appear to believe that Johnson was more focused on Vietnam,
while Kettl is in the school that believes that Johnson was much more
interested in domestic policy reform, and previous quotations from

190
 F M Kail, What Washington Said: Administration Rhetoric and the Vietnam War (New
York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 194.
191
 Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, p. 77.
192
 T Wicker, JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics (New York: Penguin
Books, 1970 [1st pub. 1968]). Wicker’s work as a reporter during the 1960s for the New
York Times places him in an important position to review the actions of both Kennedy and
Johnson.
193
 Bernstein, Guns or Butter, p. 542.
194
 D F Kettl, “The Economic Education of Lyndon Johnson: Guns, Butter, and Taxes,”
in Divine, ed., Johnson Years, vol. 2, p. 74.
 2  THEMATIC REVIEW  67

Califano and Eric Goldman further illustrate this point. Johnson’s frustra-
tion over being diverted from his domestic ambitions was beginning to
show as early as 1966, and Goldman’s belief that Johnson thought of
foreign policy as one of the worst aspects of the leadership role he inher-
ited is telling.195 It is true that Johnson’s rhetoric regarding domestic
reforms was sometimes lost to concerns over Vietnam; for example, notes
Bornet, an important announcement on crime in February 1968 received
far less attention than it deserved, because of tension over the rapidly
developing Tet Offensive and the media coverage it was receiving.196

Conclusion
The objective of this literature review was to view several aspects of the
Johnson administration, as well as outlining the theoretical basis of several
concepts that are important in the discussion of Johnson’s media relations
strategy. This has included factors that determine the effectiveness of pro-
paganda, the impact of the media in public opinion, and the ways in which
and the extent to which polls can be used as true indications of the public’s
views. Johnson’s presidency was profoundly influenced by his interactions
with the media and public opinion polling, and his difficulties in both
respects are noted. In this section, Johnson’s presidency has also begun to
be evaluated, along with the policies that he enacted—in particular those
involved in the Great Society and Vietnam, through an overview of
Johnson scholarship.
Ultimately, the argument being proposed is that Johnson’s ultimate
failure lay in the “selling” of his strategies, rather than in the strategies,
themselves. Ellis sums Johnson up as “a complex, multidimensional figure
who was a committed pragmatist with an ‘all things to all men’ character.”197
This summary is not in dispute; Johnson was indeed a consummate prag-
matist who succeeded in politics in no small part due to his ability to think
on the spot and react to events in the correct way. The following chapters
will put forward the argument that this was not the case when it came to
dealing with the press and controlling the flow of information through the
195
 Califano’s beliefs and Goldman’s quote “The President assumed that foreign policy was
something you had, like measles, and got over with as quickly as possible,” are previously
noted, from Califano, The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon B Johnson, p. 121, and Goldman,
The Tragedy of Lyndon B Johnson, pp. 527–28.
196
 Bornet, The Presidency of Lyndon B Johnson, p. 248.
197
 Ellis, Freedom’s Pragmatist, p. 262.
68  B. W. QUAIL

White House. Johnson failed to construct an effective strategy to manage

press and public interaction and control his presidential image, and his
pragmatic nature was ultimately more of a hindrance than an asset in this
respect, even as it allowed for his success in other areas, such as the passage
of civil rights legislation. The inability to do this was a direct contributor
to the failure of his credibility, and it has been important to show the views
of other authors and commentators who have already offered their inter-
pretations as to why his presidency failed. The consensus, offered by a
wide variety of authors cited in this review, is that Johnson simply could
not have his guns and his butter—that the president put too much into
Vietnam and the Great Society suffered as a result. The truth seems to be
a variation on this summarisation; the major failing was that the president
could not—and, in several cases, would not—accurately convey to the
American people the true goals and objectives behind these policies.
Johnson’s inability to do this cost him the invaluable quality of appearing
to have integrity—a quality that he successfully projected early in his presi-
dency. Ultimately, this undermined his leadership and severely diminished
the benefit that he intended his domestic programme should bring to the
United States.
It is clear to see that the president did not fully understand the media’s
characteristics, leanings and functions in a capitalist Western democracy.
He was unable to propagandise his policies as a result. Despite Caro’s
assertion that he was a master of leaking information to the press, the
president never truly understood how to manipulate the media and use
them to sell his strategies and goals in the way he had been able to during
his time in Congress and the Senate. Leaking alone does not prove exper-
tise, and the president clearly failed to find a way to proactively sell his
policies to an increasingly sceptical press and public, which meant that by
the definition of propaganda offered at the beginning of this chapter he
failed to manipulate the opinions of his targeted group.
 CHAPTER 3

1963–1964: Assuming and Consolidating

Power, Campaigning for Election

In November 1963, Lyndon Johnson had the presidency unexpectedly

thrust upon him following the assassination of his predecessor, John
F. Kennedy. He would go to be elected himself the following year. In his
memoirs, Johnson’s press secretary George Reedy proclaimed that,
“Lyndon B Johnson was a far better president in the period when he was
filling out the Kennedy term than when he occupied the White House in
his own right.”1 It is from this year that the foundations of Johnson’s
campaigns and strategies were being built, and two of the most important
aspects of this project saw their beginnings in 1964.
The Great Society was categorised and introduced by Johnson prior to
the start of the 1964 presidential election campaign. Tensions continued to
escalate in Vietnam following the disputed Gulf of Tonkin incident and
subsequent resolution passed through Congress in August. These instances,
alongside the election campaign that would dominate the latter stages of the
year, ensured 1964 was a vital year in Johnson’s presidency especially given
the forced transition of power from Kennedy to at the end of 1963.
Alongside the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, several important presiden-
tial addresses such as the State of the Union message in January and a
commencement speech at the University of Michigan in May, and an elec-
tion campaign against the Republican Barry Goldwater in November con-
sumed much of the administration’s time in the latter half of the year.

1
 G Reedy, Lyndon B Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews and McMeel, 1982), p. 135.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 69

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
70  B. W. QUAIL

How this information was relayed to the public had a major impact on
Johnson’s relationship with the press and public opinion.
Lyndon Johnson was no stranger to political division during his time in
Washington, and this certainly did not change when he entered the White
House. The transition from Kennedy to Johnson was a potentially slippery
one—Kathleen Turner agrees that the president would later “Come under
fire,” for his actions on 22 November 1963,2 and Johnson himself would
later say that, “For millions of Americans I was still illegitimate… a pre-
tender to the throne, an illegal usurper.”3 His predecessor, the popular
and more media-savvy John F.  Kennedy, was assassinated in office, and
Johnson was sworn in as president on Air Force One, on the way to
Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland. The speed of his succession to the
presidency could have attracted large-scale criticism. Johnson’s political
profile as “Master of the Senate”4 was that of a shrewd politician, who was
not above manipulation and bullying to further his own agenda, and it
would not have been out of the question for this image to be invoked in
contemporary reviews of his actions on the day. Indeed, many did not
know what to make of Johnson as the new president; as Zeitz agrees, the
question was whether Johnson was a pragmatist who remained an ardent
New Deal supporter from his early days in government, or was he a hard-­
line southerner ready to betray Kennedy’s political plans?5 However, given
the circumstances of the event and the fact that Kennedy’s assassination
happened in Johnson’s home state, he realised the need for swift action
and that he should remove himself from Texas in case there was still some
threat against his own person. He also felt that there was a need to be
decisive and not allow a break in the leadership of the country. This is
evidenced by his call to the treasurer of the Democratic National
Committee, Richard Maguire, just hours after being sworn in: “We’re in

2
 K J Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War: Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988), p. 40.
3
 As recounted to biographer Doris Kearns in Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American
Dream (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976), p. 170. This biography is an important primary
source of material on Johnson’s thoughts, beliefs and explanations of his actions in office.
4
 This term has been used by multiple authors to describe Johnson’s political ascent in the
Senate—most notably as the title of vol. 3 of Robert A Caro’s biographical series on Johnson.
For more information, see R A Caro, Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon B Johnson
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).
5
 J Zeitz, Building the Great Society: Inside Lyndon Johnson’s White House, (New York:
Viking, 2018) p. 14.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  71

the same family,” said Johnson, “and one thing I know he would want us
to do is to carry on—be effective—and that’s what we’re going to do.”6
This exemplifies the swift, decisive and proactive opening to his presi-
dency—he was rightly convinced of the need to offer stability to a country
which was stunned over the sudden and violent loss of John F. Kennedy
and which was on the verge of being thrown into turmoil. Even this first
act was a potentially divisive one; his rush to assume leadership could have
been seen by some—noted by Turner—as proof of Johnson’s thirst for
power, the consummate politician eager to assume what he felt was his
rightful place. Others agreed that his decision was correct; such was the
alarm caused by his predecessor’s assassination it was necessary for Johnson
to assert control over the situation and assuage the mounting panic.
Despite some dissenting voices, Johnson maintained a 79% approval rating
in December 1963 according to pollster George Gallup.7 This is impor-
tant to note—notwithstanding the feelings of some commentators, and
indeed Johnson’s own musings, he held a strong sway with the public in
the immediate aftermath of the Kennedy assassination—far from being
seen as an illegal usurper, he was in fact a credible replacement for his
fallen predecessor at an absolutely vital time for the nation. In the first
months of his time in office, however, he would endure several challenges,
not least from the press.
His early relationship with the press, according to Turner, was one that
was fraught with difficulty. Johnson eschewed Kennedy’s well-organised
and planned press conferences in favour of chaotic and disorganised events
and short notice conferences; this caused general difficulty for the White
House press corps that threatened to turn on him from the beginning of
his time in office. One trip that was so chaotic, the Air Force One pilots
did not know where they were flying to until Johnson had boarded the
plane.8 As Johnson was ultimately in charge of scheduling, the blame fell
on him for not informing staff and the press of his schedule. As early as 1

6
 Telephone call from Johnson to Richard Maguire, 9.10  pm, 22 November 1963.
Transcript from M R Beschloss, Taking Charge: The Johnson White House Tapes, 1963–1964
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 21.
7
 Memorandum from Fred Panzer to B Marvel, 12 September 1967, Office Files of
Frederick Panzer, box 405, p. 1, Lyndon B Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter referred
to as LBJ Library].
8
 Oral history transcript, Carroll Kilpatrick, interview 1 (I), 5/5/1971, by Joe B. Frantz,
LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021, https://
[Link]/item/oh-kilpatrickc-19710505-1-78-100.
72  B. W. QUAIL

December 1963, Johnson called Walter Lippmann, a veteran columnist

for the Washington Post, whose career had begun during the presidency of
Woodrow Wilson, to organise a meeting and “bum a drink” from the
newspaperman.9 He also conducted an extended conversation with the
president of the Washington Post Company, Katherine Graham, an old
associate of Johnson, in which he cleverly asked Graham to call out politi-
cians who were against civil rights legislation and blocking a vote on the
matter: “Front page. In and out. Individuals, needed to be targeted.”10 In
December, Johnson made an early attempt to manipulate members of the
press. He argued to White House reporters that it would be impossible for
the next annual budget to be under $100 billion, with stories from major
news outlets confirming it was expected to go over this amount.11 The
final announced budget was $97.9 billion, upsetting the misled journal-
ists.12 Johnson’s attempt to make himself look strong and exceed expecta-
tions worked in some respects, but it marked him as untrustworthy and
immediately created a problem with credibility for the president among
the White House press corps.
From these three examples Johnson’s strategy was clearly aggressive; he
held press conferences while walking across the White House lawn, or
during barbecues at his Texas ranch, creating logistical difficulties for
reporters who were expected to follow the president and be present for
impromptu press events. The administration was also immediately con-
cerned with unsanctioned leaks. A recorded phone conversation between
Johnson and Bill Moyers in February 1964 discussed reports of White

9
 Telephone call from Johnson to Walter Lippmann, 5.46  pm, 1 December 1963.
Transcript in Beschloss, Taking Charge, p. 80.
10
 Telephone call from Johnson to Katherine Graham, 11.10  am, 2 December 1963.
Transcript in Beschloss, Taking Charge, pp. 81–85.
11
 For an example, see Bernard D.  Nossiter, Johnson Budget Expected to Go Over
$100 Billion: Cuts Predicted in Deficit and Spending Rise, Washington Post, 4 December
1963, p. A1. Carrol Kilpatrick discusses his displeasure at feeling as though he had been had
in an oral history interview from 1971; Oral history transcript, Carroll Kilpatrick, interview
2 (II), 5/24/1982, by Ted Gittinger, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library,
accessed January 24, 2021, [Link]
2-09-06.
12
 Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965. Online
by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project [Link]
[Link]/node/240227.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  73

House aides offering information to the likes of columnist Drew Pearson.13

Partly as a result of Johnson’s behaviour, Turner believes that as early as
the spring of 1964, he, “Already experienced a honeymoon, a falling out,
and a reconciliation with the press.”14 White House journalist Helen
Thomas seems to dispute this, claiming that Johnson actually had “a big
honeymoon. He had a long one,” but from looking at the evidence on
offer, particularly the Time reporting from April, it would seem that there
were indeed some difficulties between president and press in the early
months.15 This early turmoil is important to note and comment on; for all
of the good press Johnson received following his assumption of the presi-
dency the previous November, it was important that he continued to
court the press and maintain a positive public profile moving through his
first year in office. This was particularly true given that an election loomed
in the latter stages of 1964.
This is an early example of one of Johnson’s marked variances from the
Kennedy style, one that would eventually hinder him. Where Kennedy was
a polished, media-savvy Easterner who seemed at ease in front of the cam-
era, Johnson was none of these things. He was a Southerner and a
Westerner; more at home in a small crowd and less comfortable in front of
a camera, rather uneasy at the idea of forming relationships with journal-
ists and notoriously thin skinned. An infamous incident in 1965 saw
Johnson call up CBS President Frank Stanton following a negative report
from Vietnam correspondent Morley Safer, telling Stanton, “Yesterday,
your boys shat on the American flag,” and asking if the network was
“Trying to fuck me?”16 This is indicative of Johnson’s inability to keep a
lid on his relationship with the press; reports that he disagreed with would
often be met with angry tirades. Johnson and Stanton were actually much
closer than his tirade would suggest, and the president was in regular com-
munication with him at various times throughout his presidency; in

13
 Telephone conversation # 2251, sound recording, LBJ and BILL MOYERS, 2/8/1964,
11:25  AM, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ
Presidential Library, accessed December 12, 2020, [Link]
tel-02251.
14
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 70. Kathleen Turner has written extensively on
LBJ’s relationship with the press, particularly in relation to Vietnam.
15
 Transcript, Helen Thomas Oral History Interview I, 19 April 1977, by Joe B Franz,
Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 18.
16
 Halberstam’s anecdote in The Powers That Be (1979), cited in Mitchell K Hall (ed.),
Vietnam War Era: People and Perspectives (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2009), p. 140.
74  B. W. QUAIL

February 1964, they discussed LBJ’s idea that the New York Herald
Tribune was trying to get him discredited and discussed the possibility of
leaking by the Johnson staff.17
Regardless of his personal feelings, this kind of behaviour towards jour-
nalists and the sense of paranoia concerning leaks were unbecoming of a
president, even one known for his “earthy” Texas upbringing and lan-
guage. Early in his tenure Johnson showed a distinct inability to adapt to
both the office and the pressures that came with it—George Ball remarked
in his memoirs that the press felt he had, “Little skill at concealing often
crass political motives and methods.”18 This inability to adapt would be
instrumental in the tremendous downturn in credibility that the president
would later endure. For now, however—during his first six months in
office—the president enjoyed a certain amount of leeway with the press.
While the White House press corps grumbled over Johnson’s poor sched-
uling and ill-timed conferences, he still received largely positive statements
from the media, who seemed to heed his calls for national unity in the
early weeks of his time in power. His personal intervention headed off a
railroad strike in April, and his proclamation of success was strong, pro-
voking positive coverage and a good reaction in the opinion polls pub-
lished in ensuing weeks.19 Johnson previously scored a 73% approval rating
from George Gallup on 11 March,20 while a presidential trial heat—a prac-
tice poll carried out by the Gallup pollsters in which the sitting president
was put up against potential candidates from the other political party—on
18 March saw him winning over both Richard Nixon and Henry Cabot
Lodge Jr. with 68% of the popular vote. A Harris Poll conducted for
Newsweek and released on 7 April showed Johnson being preferred over
any Republican candidate—particularly Lodge Jr., who he led by 52% to

17
 Telephone call from Johnson to Frank Stanton, 6 February 1964. Transcript in Beschloss,
Taking Charge, pp. 222–26.
18
 Numerous authors have referred to Johnson’s Texan style of speech and language, and
the president was known to be occasionally vulgar particularly in private or when discussing
institutions such as the press. Ball’s description of Johnson’s earthy qualities is taken from
The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 319.
19
 This issue made headlines in 1964—see, for example, J D Pomfret, “The Railroad
Settlement: A Triumph for Mediation,” New York Times, 27 April 1964, accessed on 3
August 2017 at [Link]
triumph-­­[Link]?mcubz=0.
20
 G Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1869—it is important to note that while the date of the
poll’s publication is several weeks after the incident, polling took place within days of the
address—between 28 February and 4 March.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  75

33%.21 The discrepancy in poll results is likely to be due to the differing

methods and sample groups used by Gallup and Harris; Harris Polls
tended to be less friendly to Johnson, although still extremely heartening
at this point. This early goodwill and success did not, however, make him
immune to potentially dangerous media coverage; a Time report on 10
April entitled, “You’re Fun, Mr. President,” described a car ride with
Johnson in which he flouted the Texas speed limit and drove with a cup of
beer in one hand. An infamous quote from the article from one passenger:
“That’s the closest [Speaker of the House of Representatives] John
McCormack has come to the White House yet,”22 exemplified the reac-
tion to the story of an irresponsible president going wild just months after
the death of his predecessor. The Associated Press ran a story on 11 April
showing off Johnson’s good-humoured “clowning” with reporters and
his cabinet from the previous day.23 Parts of the press were less amused,
and Johnson was rebuked in some quarters. Time, a publication of some
stature, published a letter from Republican gubernatorial contender Jack
Crichton, rebutting its assertion that Johnson’s great ally in Texas politics
Governor John Connally had no serious opposition.24 As editorials chas-
tised Johnson for his recklessness, his reaction, according to Turner, was
to move away from joking with newsmen and “retreat into presidential
dignity,”25 eschewing his enjoyment of presidential power, at least in pub-
lic, and attempting dissuade public opinion from the idea of an unintelli-
gent and buffoonish Texan occupying the Oval Office. Johnson’s private
reaction was to criticise the White House press to George Reedy, saying in
a telephone call; “This crowd here—you’ve got to understand that they’re
not the masters of the White House. They’re just the servants and we give
them what we want to give them.”26 Another story, which cast Johnson in
a poor light, was that of his alleged abuse of his pet beagle. On 27 April,
21
 Associated Press, “Poll Shows Lodge Ahead of Nixon,” Minneapolis Star, 7 April
1964, p. 7.
22
 Time, 10 April, 1964, p. 24. With no vice president, following Johnson’s succession to
the presidency, the speaker was next in line to the Presidency.
23
 Associated Press, “Chief Clowns With Newsmen and Cabinet,” La Crosse (WI) Tribune,
11 April 1964, p. 1.
24
 Crichton’s letter, reading simply, “Sir: Your statement that Governor Connally faces no
meaningful Republican opposition [May 15] is in error,” was printed in Time, 29 May
1964, p. 15.
25
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 68.
26
 Telephone call from Johnson to George Reedy, 7 April 1964, 11.50 am. Transcript in
Beschloss, Taking Charge, pp. 307–308.
76  B. W. QUAIL

Johnson lifted the dog, named Him, up by the ears. The image appeared
in newspapers across America alongside an article by Doug Cornell of the
Associated Press, which invited widespread criticism from animal rights
campaigners. Johnson was indignant, asking Reedy what the “son of a
bitch,” Cornell looked like and demanding that the White House give
him, “The silent treatment,” for a while.27 These are further examples of
Johnson’s private mistrust of the press, which was nascent even in the early
months of his presidency and which would never leave him. In fact, the
Washington Post correspondent to the White House, Carroll Kilpatrick,
later claimed Johnson railed against several members of the press for being
“Eastern Establishment,” during his first few months in office. Kilpatrick
said that no matter how much the reporters remonstrated Johnson would
not be moved on his opinion, even when it was pointed out that Kilpatrick
himself was from Alabama, and other influential newsmen like the New
York Times’ Tom Wicker was from North Carolina.28
Nevertheless, these stories came just prior to Johnson’s first great
announcement of his tenure, the unveiling of the Great Society, and the
president did not see any fallout in terms of his polled public opinion.
George Gallup’s Presidential Trial Heat poll from 13 May was nothing if
not decisively pro-Johnson29 and was undoubtedly buoying news for the
president, undermining the criticisms that were levelled at him. In the
early part of the year, then, Johnson experienced a rocky relationship with
the press—and Turner’s analogy of a honeymoon period following his
assumption of power followed by a quick falling out and then reconcilia-
tion in the early part of 1964 is perhaps the most accurate way to describe
his troubles. On this occasion, he was able to find strategies to overcome
the issues that started to grow between him and the press corps. His deci-
sion in April to remain strictly presidential would have far-reaching conse-
quences, however, and his temperamental attitude towards the journalistic
profession remained intact. This ensured that any strategies he put into
place were an exercise in short termism; he scored a victory in terms of
positive press coverage in the early part of 1964, but the underlying issue

27
 Telephone call from Johnson to George Reedy, 28 April 1964, 7.07 pm. Transcript from
M R Beschloss, Taking Charge, pp. 329–30.
28
 Oral history transcript, Carroll Kilpatrick, interview 1 (I), 5/5/1971, by Joe B. Frantz,
LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021, https://
[Link]/item/oh-kilpatrickc-19710505-1-78-100.
29
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, pp. 1879–80.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  77

of his fundamental mistrust of the fifth estate still remained and Johnson
did not seem to want to deal with this.
In the political arena, the first year of Johnson’s presidency saw him
push forward with several of President Kennedy’s policy objectives in an
attempt to stabilise the country and build a platform for his own election
at the end of 1964. Principally, he was instrumental in the passing of civil
rights legislation, which formed one of the cornerstones of his most
important domestic policy push—the Great Society. The last weeks of
1963 and the first half of 1964 were essentially spent trying to bring a
sense of balance to the troubled nation; it was important to ensure the
growth of previous years would not be threatened by Kennedy’s death.
The president’s State of the Union address in January 1964 was a sombre
affair in this regard. He emphasised civil rights legislation and asked that
the plans of John Kennedy be put in motion, “Not because of our sorrow
or sympathy, but because they are right.”30 Johnson further evoked
Kennedy’s legacy by asking Americans to fulfil Kennedy’s “Great faith,” in
them by working for “A world free of hate.” He outlined several of the
policies that would become key aspects of the Great Society. The war on
poverty was announced, something which would become a recurring
theme throughout the year and indeed the presidency as a whole, by call-
ing Americans to arms and stating that “The richest nation on Earth can
afford to win” the battle. There was another call to arms on the subject of
race—Johnson reminded the country that American soldiers of all races
stood together in Berlin and Vietnam, and asked why they could not do
so at home. This was an important speech, coming at the start of an elec-
tion year. It was vital for Johnson to maintain his connection with Kennedy
and his assassination, while also commencing the process of breaking out
of his predecessor’s shadow—to do any less would be to undermine his
credibility as a leader in the upcoming elections.
This was not the only reason that it was imperative for the president to
give a strong State of the Union address. As the nation continued to grieve
for his fallen predecessor only weeks after his death, Johnson had to show
that the nation was moving forward and could continue to do so under his
leadership. While it was necessary to show deference to Kennedy, and
politically prudent to do so, given that Kennedy’s advisors and staff still

30
 L B Johnson, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” 8 January,
1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
[Link]
78  B. W. QUAIL

populated the White House,31 it was also important to show that Johnson
was the man to lead the country forward. In fact it had been crucial for the
administration’s early months to keep as many Kennedy staffers as possi-
ble, as continuity would be important in convincing the public to remain
loyal to the Democrats.
Johnson’s early attempt to keep on Kennedy staff was largely successful.
Consistency with staff was key to this goal and ensuring the Kennedy mes-
sage; the “New Frontier” of domestic and foreign reforms remained in the
public consciousness. This would be partially folded into Johnson’s own
series of reforms, particularly the civil rights aspect of his Great Society
programme. However, there were some notable departures from Kennedy
loyalists. Ted Sorensen, one of Kennedy’s chief speechwriters and an
important target for Johnson as a potential White House staffer, left in
February—shattered by the president’s assassination and having problems
adapting to the new regime. Arthur Schlesinger, the historian and intel-
lectual who would later write extensively about the Kennedy presidency,
left the administration in January. Kennedy’s press secretary Pierre Salinger
lasted a little longer, but ultimately left the administration in March 1964
and ran unsuccessfully against George Murphy for a California senate seat
in November—the only Democratic seat to flip to the Republicans amid a
Johnson landslide across the country. Most importantly, Robert Kennedy
stayed on until September, leaving to run for senate in New York after it
became clear he would not be Johnson’s vice president. This ensured
immediate continuity for Johnson in terms of keeping familiarity with the
Kennedy family.
At the start of an election year it was necessary to leave a good impres-
sion on the public early, something to build on in the coming months as
campaigning would begin. In a telephone conversation with the colum-
nist, Drew Pearson, Johnson noted that he received “Eighty one applauses,
in 2900 words,” and that, “It was a twenty five minute speech, and it took
forty one, because of the applauses.”32 In his own head, this amounted to
vindication of his ideas and plans as well as his commitment to continuing
Kennedy’s policies, and he felt that this gave him a remit to continue
31
 Significantly, Robert Kennedy had remained in his post as Attorney General and would
do until he ran for Senate later in the year, and other figures such as Press Secretary Pierre
Salinger had stayed on to assist the incoming president. Salinger would leave office in March
1964, to be replaced by George Reedy.
32
 Telephone call from Johnson to Drew Pearson, 8 January 1964. Transcript in Beschloss,
Taking Charge, p. 153.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  79

f­orward and implement these throughout the rest of 1964. The press, for
their part, agreed. Walter Lippmann reported the next day that, “In style
and in substance the President’s message is an intimate and personal dis-
play of the political gifts for which Lyndon Johnson is celebrated.”33 By
the end of March, the pollster Louis Harris noted in his syndicated col-
umn that, “Johnson has been enjoying the best of all political worlds,”
when discussing the popularity of the president in the South, but noted
that Johnson would need to give assurances to many African American
voters from that area.34 Johnson would attempt to do exactly this, most
notably by initiating the Great Society, his grand scheme to leave his mark
on the office of the presidency and better the lives of the American people.
The first six months of 1964 were most notable for the launch of the
Great Society programme and the way in which the administration instilled
it in the public consciousness. The first speech to incorporate elements of
this objective was given in Chicago on 23 April, at a fundraising dinner for
the Democratic Club of Cook County, where Johnson called for America
to build, “A Great Society of the highest order.”35 This speech was well
received by the party and enhanced the president’s credibility, even with
bitter political rivals such as Attorney General Robert Kennedy. He
watched the speech on television and said, “That was terrific,”36 to Johnson
during a telephone call later that evening. Johnson began to pepper his
speeches with talk of the Great Society, mentioning it once again at an
address given the University of Ohio in Athens on 7 May 1964. The presi-
dent was clearly gearing up for an election campaign. In Athens, he dis-
cussed the problems facing America—disease and poverty, needless killing
and bills that he wanted to put through but were being debated by
Congress at the time—the Appalachian Bill, the Poverty Bill and the Civil
Rights Bill, all of which made it through the process and became law.
Johnson concluded this speech by asking Americans to help him to build

33
 W Lippmann, syndicated Washington Post column, in Philadelphia Inquirer, 9 January
1964, p. 27.
34
 L Harris, “The Harris Poll: Johnson Rates High With Negroes, Southern Whites,”
Pocono Record [Stroudsburg], 28 January 1964.
35
 L B Johnson, “Remarks in Chicago at a Fundraising Dinner of the Democratic Club of
Cook County,” 23 April, 1964. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, eds., The American
Presidency Project. [Link]
36
 Telephone call from Johnson to Robert Kennedy, 23 April 1964, 10.50 pm. Transcript
in Beschloss, Taking Charge, pp. 326–27.
80  B. W. QUAIL

the Great Society.37 This was an important speech, introducing into public
view one of the expressions for which he would become known through-
out the rest of his presidency. Johnson’s next interaction with university
students would bring his next proclamation regarding the Great Society,
at his more famous address in Michigan two weeks later.
Johnson used the term again during a speech to graduating students at
the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, on 22 May 1964. For the first
time Johnson set forward at length in public his domestic intentions and
goals for his presidency and brought them all under the umbrella of a
single name. This speech kicked off an ultimately very successful election
campaign that centred on the Great Society, urging the American people
to go, “All the way with LBJ.”38 Johnson used this speech to call on
Americans to use the prosperous era they were going through to their
advantage; the post-war boom had still not subsided, and the call from the
government was for “Quality, not quantity.”39 He elaborated on what he
envisioned the Great Society to be and the three areas that most embodied
his ideals: the classroom, the cities and the countryside. Further reforms
to the educational system were mentioned. He discussed pollution, the
need to ensure that America’s countryside is not spoiled and his hope that
the United States would remain a beautiful nation. Statistics were given
about overpopulation of urban areas, and how this trend would continue
to grow—Johnson stated the need for America’s cities to become great
once more. The early 1960s saw unprecedented growth in American
industry, and Johnson wanted to use this to both his and the country’s
advantage.
Philip Taylor calls propaganda a “process for the sowing, germination
and cultivation of ideas,”40 and it can clearly be argued that this descrip-
tion applies to Johnson’s Great Society speeches. Johnson attempted to
position himself as an honest and hardworking American interested in
helping the people by building his Great Society. By sloganising his

37
 L B Johnson, “Remarks in Athens at Ohio University,” 7 May, 1964. Online by Gerhard
Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. [Link]
edu/ws/?pid=26225.
38
 LBJ’s campaign slogan in 1964 was spread throughout the country—a simple slogan
which encouraged Americans to help him follow through on his intentions. Buttons were a
strong example of this.
39
 I Unger, The Best of Intentions: The Triumphs and Failures of the Great Society Under
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon (New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 17.
40
 P Taylor, Munitions of the Mind (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 2.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  81

c­ ampaign promise, he drew himself in with previous presidents who were

associated with their own ideals and public works programmes: John
Kennedy’s “New Frontier,” Franklin Roosevelt’s “New Deal” and even
Woodrow Wilson’s “New Freedom” had all become important campaign
mottos, and the Great Society was the president’s attempt to join his pre-
decessors. Roosevelt’s New Deal was particularly influential on Johnson,
who came up through the political ranks during Roosevelt’s time in office
and was considered to have been an ardent “New Dealer.” It was impor-
tant for Johnson to have a strong campaign slogan of his own, especially
at this period in time—with the importance of television in politics increas-
ing, it was vital for Johnson to be able to say and do the right thing when-
ever he was in the spotlight. In this case, Johnson was able to capture the
public’s imagination with his proclamation. One reaction to an early draft
sent in to the White House proclaimed that the un-named reader, “Got
into the Michigan speech—and couldn’t stop.”41
Even in the early days of his presidency, Johnson relied on a strong
writing team to evoke the imagery he wanted to put across in his speeches.
In Ann Arbor’s case, a lot of work was put into the words he would say.
The University of Michigan, itself, provided suggestions and background
information,42 as did Jim Fitzpatrick of the Young Citizens for Johnson
group.43 The speech was clearly being taken seriously by the administra-
tion. Behind the scenes, a large team of aides digested the background
information and thoughts of younger Democrats to come up with some-
thing that would appeal to the voting youth. Speechwriter Richard
Goodwin coined the phrase, “Great Society,” and Jack Valenti, a senior
aide, suggested that it be put to use. As a short, snappy phrase that would
be endearing to the public and comparable to other democratic presidents
and their own policies, the Great Society was a great propaganda tool.

41
 Memo from unnamed source to Jack Valenti, “Remarks at the University of Michigan”
file, undated, Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 106, LBJ Library.
42
 This material referenced previous years’ speeches and activity at the University, none of
which made it into the final draft. Memorandum from Michael Radock to Bill Moyers, 8 May
1964, “Remarks at the University of Michigan” file, Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box
106, LBJ Library.
43
 Fitzpatrick’s contribution was to strongly urge the president to use the speech as a plat-
form to promote Youth Volunteer provisions of the Poverty Bill. This was overlooked in
favour of a more general call to arms against poverty. Memorandum to Jack Valenti and Bill
Moyers from Jim Fitzpatrick, 12 May 1964, “Remarks at the University of Michigan” file,
Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 106, LBJ Library.
82  B. W. QUAIL

Johnson wanted something that could elevate him in the eyes of the peo-
ple and make them see him in the same way as they saw his political hero,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and the Great Society was something that could be
compared to FDR’s “New Deal” of the 1930s.
Johnson knew what he wanted from his speechwriters and generally
trusted that they would provide him with strong, newsworthy, speeches.
Vaughn Bornet agrees that his influence is at the heart of the speeches
written for him: “Richard Goodwin’s edited words and the brainstorming
of task forces cannot be added together to equal the inner reaches of
Johnson’s mind, emotions and soul.”44 It was vital, particularly at this
stage with an election campaign looming, for Johnson to be earnest,
believable and strong without the aid of others, and the evocative and
emotive language used throughout both speeches were supposed to
invoke, “A special moment in time when many things seemed possible.”45
The speech at Ann Arbor seemed to go a long way to achieving that goal;
support for the president appeared to be high in the immediate aftermath
of the event. A “Presidential Trial Heat,” poll published by Gallup on 13
May and researched in late April, three weeks after the Ann Arbor address,
showed respondents choosing Johnson over Governor George Wallace of
Alabama at a rate of 84% to Wallace’s 9%. Gallup’s breakdown of the
results even indicates that Republican respondents vastly preferred
Johnson.46 While it looks damning for Wallace, this statistic must be
treated with apprehension—the elections were still more than six months
away, and George Wallace was far from the strongest of Johnson’s poten-
tial opponents—but still indicates the popularity of the man in the weeks
immediately following the unveiling of the Great Society. For a moment,
the polls made it seem that Johnson had managed to cross the political
lines and create a partisan series of reforms. His political record over the
next year would back up this assertion; most of his policies would pass
with little or no opposition, and he was unmatched by previous presidents
in this regard.
At this stage then, Johnson still carried a sturdy sense of gravitas. He
received some of the strongest approval ratings ever seen in a president
and made a clear statement of intent to lead the United States into further

44
 V D Bornet, The Presidency of Lyndon B Johnson (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1983), p. 102.
45
 Unger, The Best of Intentions, p. 19.
46
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, pp. 1879–80.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  83

prosperity. The death of John Kennedy and Johnson’s subsequent decisive

actions engendered a wave of goodwill in the American public that did no
harm to his chances of election in 1964. This is backed up by the public
opinion polls that were carried out on a monthly basis by the newspaper
pollster George Gallup. Gallup was a pioneer in public opinion polling,
and his polls were nationally syndicated in several large newspapers such as
the New York Times. Throughout 1964, these polls favoured Johnson—
when he gave his State of the Union Address in January, the Gallup Poll
showed him carrying the highest approval rating he would ever receive;
80% approval and just 5% disapproval from the random sample audience.47
By the time of his speeches in Athens and Ann Arbor, this dropped to 75%,
with 11% outright disapproving of his policies.48 The opinion poll results
continued to slowly slide for the rest of the year—a lower 69% approved
of Johnson by December, with an 18% disapproval rate.49 This number
would eventually be shown on a graph created by Louis Harris, showing
the decline of Johnson’s popularity moving into 1967.
It is interesting that Johnson’s approval rate was sliding even before the
United States entered Vietnam—this was largely the trend throughout the
presidency, and it was only towards the middle of 1968 that the slipping
popularity rates arrested. This is not uncommon however—B. H. Sparrow
notes that instances of high presidential approval rates are actually rela-
tively rare; he feels that this shows that the media are complicit in the
president’s ability to speak for the public with his actions.50 It is widely
held that the war was one of the main reasons for Johnson’s fall in approval.
While this is certainly the case, it is also clear that there were other reasons
for the beginning of the decline. Johnson was not John Kennedy—his
image and politics were wildly different from his predecessor, and as
Johnson moved away from the Kennedy administration’s goals and began
to implement his own over the course of the year, his popularity naturally
began to fall. Where Kennedy had the charm and charisma needed to
appeal to the voting public in the new age of television, Johnson insisted

47
 Memo to Fred Panzer from B Marvel, 12 September 1967, Office Files of Frederick
Panzer, box 405, LBJ Library, p. 1.
48
 Ibid.
49
 L Harris, “Decline of Johnson’s Popularity,” New York Times, 8 October 1967, copy in
Office Files of Frederick Panzer, box 403, LBJ Library.
50
 B H Sparrow, “Who Speaks for the People? The President, the Press, and Public Opinion
in the United States,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4 (December 2008), p. 589.
84  B. W. QUAIL

on maintaining a rigidity and what he took to be a, “Presidential air,”51

especially following the disastrous Time coverage of April. This did not
actually help his standing with the public, especially as his approval fell
much more drastically in the latter years of his presidency.
As it was, Johnson’s ratings fell at a slow, but steady, rate following his
entry into the Oval Office, and certain things must be noted about the
early slide. Clearly, an 80% approval rating would be impossible to keep up
indefinitely for any elected official. This is the kind of consensus that is
simply unheard of in American politics, and Johnson’s initial approval rat-
ings were sky high as a result of the forced transition from vice president.52
His early push for stability and harmony temporarily unified Americans,
and it simply could not last forever. Overall, this was an expected change
as the realities of the two-party political system set in following the appeal
for unity after Kennedy’s assassination, and Americans slowly returned to
their political allegiances. Johnson’s big ideas and rabble-rousing talk of
eliminating social problems such as poverty and disease was undoubtedly
exciting and won him a lot of support. However, the more conservative
members of the voting public would certainly have been put off by his
plans to use federal power on projects such as the Appalachian Bill, and
this may also have contributed to the slight decline in his popularity. The
kind of voters who remained sceptical of the New Deal and its benefits
certainly did not appreciate Johnson, whose ideas took their lead from
Franklin Roosevelt’s foundation and whose presidency embodied New
Deal liberalism. Over the next four years, his approval would slump as low

51
 Several commentators have noted the difficulty that often beset the president in his
public appearances. His aides spent a lot of time beseeching him to show more of himself and
less of what he thought the public wanted. Drew Pearson, a columnist and newspaperman
active since 1925, noted in 1969, “He was trying too hard. On television if you’re not able
to relax you’re no good at it. He was better at it when he carried the microphone around on
a neck chain.” See Transcript, Drew Pearson Oral History Interview I, 10 April 1969, by Joe
B. Frantz, Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 14. This will be discussed in further detail
in later chapters.
52
 There is more precedent for presidents who endure tragedy remaining popular with the
polling public—George W. Bush saw a spike in approval after the 9/11 attacks as his rating
jumped from 51% to 90%. It would not sink back to 51% for several years, and he averaged a
Gallup approval rating of 62% in his first term. See Gallup, Presidential Approval Ratings—
George W.  Bush, Gallup Company, [Link]
approval-­[Link].
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  85

as 40% in the Gallup Polls53 and spark a crisis behind the scenes of his
administration.
Nevertheless, his first year in power saw Johnson hold impeccable pub-
lic approval and a high amount of credibility in the eyes of the public—
that much is clear. Johnson continued to be a strong and credible presence
in domestic politics; his early intimations on his plans for office and the
decisive way in which he assumed control of the presidency from John
Kennedy were apparently working in his favour. His next challenge would
be to maintain his popularity and credibility through to the November
presidential elections, whilst dealing with domestic and foreign issues such
as the Gulf of Tonkin problem of early August.
The disputed Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which North Vietnamese
forces allegedly attacked two American vessels patrolling international
waters off the coast of North Vietnam, would lead to a resolution being
passed into law on 7 August, which allowed the president to act with
impunity on the matter of Vietnam and send troops into the country with-
out declaring war. A brief discussion of the Gulf of Tonkin incident is
necessary; while the questions over the credibility of official accounts from
the area largely proved the government’s version of events to be false in
later years, the fallout from this decision would create vocal and high-­
profile opponents of the US response. Johnson himself would later note to
George Ball that, “Those dumb, stupid sailors were just shootin’ at flying
fish!”54 Regardless of the veracity of the events of the Gulf of Tonkin inci-
dent, it is important to discuss the immediate fallout of the event, namely
the South East Asia Resolution, commonly known as the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution. This would serve as the basis for escalation of the Vietnam
War, from supporting the South Vietnamese to outright US-led war in
the region.
The resolution was pushed through by LBJ and announced to the pub-
lic in a televised speech on 4 August, before it was passed. He called an
impromptu press conference the previous day to update reporters on the
state of play in the Gulf of Tonkin, noting that additional forces had been
sent to the gulf, “with the objective not only of driving off the force but

53
 A Gallup Poll published on 26 November 1967 showed Johnson’s approval rating at
41%. His popularity in the East was all that kept him above an overall sub-40% rating at this
time. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2091.
54
 Ball, The Past Has A Pattern, p. 379.
86  B. W. QUAIL

of destroying it.”55 The resolution almost unilaterally gave Johnson the

authority to use conventional military force in Southeast Asia without an
official declaration of war, essentially allowing the United States to infor-
mally conduct a war against the North Vietnamese without officially being
involved in a conflict. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed with few crit-
ics in the first instance—Senators Wayne Morse (D-Oregon) and Ernest
Gruening (D-Alaska) were the only representatives not to vote in favour
of the resolution, leading to its passage with 88 votes out of 90, and the
House of Representatives did not see a single congressman vote against it.
M. A. Ball reports that Johnson’s televised announcement of the attack at
11.36 pm on 4 August “dramatized the decision makers’ explanation of
the event, reporting action taken and underlining the need for a congres-
sional resolution.”56 That day was a confusing series of events, which saw
the president’s speech delayed from 9 pm for over two hours as he was
advised to wait until US retaliatory bombings had begun before making
his announcement. The administration was already distancing itself from
the consequences of their actions, reports Ball—Rusk commented that,
“They [The North Vietnamese] bring it on themselves.” Ball concludes
that with regard to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the president and his
advisors created a “Linguistic cocoon,” which “Protected them from dif-
ferent versions of the event and from evidence and arguments which ran
counter to their interpretations.”57 This is a theme that would become
prevalent as the administration ran on throughout the 1960s—in this case,
the administration, Johnson and key advisors appear to have used rhetoric
to convince themselves that their course of action was correct. Regardless
both of opposition from Morse and Gruening and of the consequences of
their actions, Johnson and his policy makers decided to push forward with
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which would become more important as
his tenure wore on. Ball’s argument, that Johnson and his advisors used an
ostensibly innocuous event to their advantage with the use of language
and emotion to draw in the listening public, is important to note here.
What is described is an early example of members of the administration
essentially burying their head in the sand, and moving forward with a
strategy that they felt was for the best, without properly consulting with

55
 Department of State Bulletin, 24 August 1964, p. 259.
56
 M A Ball, “Revisiting the Gulf of Tonkin Crisis: An Analysis of the Private Communication
of President Johnson and his Advisors,” Discourse and Society, vol. 2, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 286.
57
 Ibid., p. 288.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  87

the public and other important sources. At best, it shows an alarmingly

short-term viewpoint from the president of the consequences of his
actions, something that would become a theme as his term in office con-
tinued. However, it is worth mentioning that the events of the Gulf of
Tonkin incident happened in quick succession, and it is difficult to tell
from the official documentation how much information was relayed to
Johnson and his close advisors. A telephone conversation between
Secretary of Defense McNamara and Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 4
August noted that the information they received suggested three uniden-
tified boats and three unidentified aircraft approaching US ships, along-
side reported torpedo fire.58 It would later be revealed, as per Johnson’s
comments about flying fish, that this was incorrect information. It is
therefore easy to understand how difficult decision-making was for
Johnson and his staff.
With that said, the events of early August were also an example of
Johnson using circumstances to his advantage to push through legislation
without any significant opposition, both in the emotive language that he
used to stir up the people around him and more importantly in the lan-
guage he used to describe the event to the nation. His discussion of the
matter at Syracuse University on 5 August was littered with such terms as
“Wilful and systematic aggression”59 and repeated his televised remarks
from 4 August in which he discussed, “Aggression by terror.”60 This emo-
tive language galvanised opinion against North Vietnam and allowed
Johnson to move forward with the blessing of the public. Mitchell Lerner
believes that the blame for public ignorance in Vietnam during this time
should be laid at the feet of the American people, arguing that, “Americans
were too preoccupied with domestic problems to pay close attention to
Johnson’s statements about a small Asian nation which many had never

58
 Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Defense (McNamara), Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964–1968,
Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, doc. 275, 4 August 1964.
59
 L B Johnson, “Radio and Television Report to the American People Following Renewed
Aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin,” 4 August 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John
T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project. [Link]
ws/?pid=26418.
60
 L B Johnson, “Remarks on Vietnam at Syracuse University,” 5 August 1965, Recording
accessed online on 1 October 2017 from the Miller Center at [Link]
presidency/presidential-speeches/august-5-1964-remarks-vietnam-syracuse-university.
88  B. W. QUAIL

even heard of.”61 This is an example of Johnson using the credibility and
popularity that he attained at this stage in his career to further his foreign
policy goals and a proactive strategy towards maintaining a strong public
image in the run up to the election. Ball describes the administration’s
wish for a congressional resolution; Johnson and his advisors prepared for
the moment, having a draft speech and resolution made before events
forced their hand. Senator Gruening later wrote, “Can we, therefore, con-
clude that the ‘Unprovoked’ attack against United States naval vessels in
the Gulf of Tonkin was anticipated more than two months before it took
place?”62 Gruening made the point that Johnson and his advisors knew
what path they wanted to take, and though his question was aimed at the
validity of the reports themselves, it also asks the question of whether
Johnson was always committed to the path of escalation that he would
eventually take. Gruening concluded that he was, and this is backed up by
Kathleen Turner who notes that the perfect time to push such a resolution
through Congress is immediately following “Attempts to torpedo an
American naval vessel.”63 However, regardless of criticism from the two
senators, the Gulf of Tonkin incident was a perfect propaganda victory, at
least in the immediate aftermath of the event. Even Senator Gruening
himself later admitted that the decision to escalate was played down to the
public: “With consummate public relations skill, even as an experienced
magician diverts the attention of the audience away from where the action
is taking place.”64 Johnson successfully managed to manoeuvre through
what could have become a tricky situation at an important time for the
president. A contemporary account of the Gulf of Tonkin incident written
several years after Johnson left office concluded that, “The people had
been angered by Hanoi’s audacity and pleased by the President’s
response.”65 Ultimately, McMaster’s summary of the situation, that
Johnson, “succeeded in creating the illusion that the decisions to attack
North Vietnam were alternatives to war rather than the war itself,” is the
most telling one when it comes to the public opinion side of the Vietnam

61
 M Lerner, “Vietnam and the 1964 Election: A Defense of Lyndon Johnson,” Presidential
Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4, (Fall 1995), p. 764.
62
 E Gruening and H Beaser, Vietnam Folly (New York: National Press, 1968), p. 250.
63
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 84.
64
 Gruening and Beaser, Vietnam Folly, p. 240.
65
 T Powers, The War At Home (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1973), p. 14.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  89

conflict.66 The resolution may have been an exercise in short-term think-

ing and would cause Johnson problems in later years, but for now the
president could mark the potentially dangerous situation as a victory for
his image.
The resolution itself would have far-reaching consequences—as noted,
it allowed the president to take action on a much larger scale in Vietnam,
essentially opening up the floor for the escalation into all-out war that
would happen over the next twelve months. This culminated in Johnson’s
1965 speech at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, which
announced the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam from mili-
tary advice and support to a more direct involvement with the South
Vietnamese army and their war against the North. Hotly disputed by
Senators Morse and Gruening, the resolution would only increase in
notoriety as the war went on. F. M. Kail has called the period of the resolu-
tion’s drafting, “The most spectacular events in Vietnam in 1964.”67 The
Gulf of Tonkin incident saw one piece of long-term thinking from the
administration; a weekly summary of the public’s view on Vietnam began
on 6 August and would not end until December 1968. This summary was
circulated around Johnson’s top advisors and the president himself and
showed “the subject and disposition” of mail sent to the White House.68
It is also important to note that the Gulf of Tonkin brought Vietnam into
view at a vital point in the political year—as the presidential election cam-
paign was moving towards a conclusion.
It was important for Johnson to remain firmly in control of the situa-
tion, while at the same time abdicating himself from the responsibility of
taking a country into a foreign war just before the American people were
to vote on his future in the Oval Office. He smartly televised his press
conference announcing the retaliatory bombings at 11.36  pm on 5
August. As previously touched upon, this was partially done for

66
 H R McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam (London: Harper Collins, 1997), p. 326. A general
in the United States Army who has since served as an advisor to President Donald Trump,
McMaster also levels harsh criticism at the ranking Joint Chiefs of Staff for not providing a
successful or decisive plan of action for Vietnam, either to pacify the Viet Cong or to win the
conflict against the North Vietnamese.
67
 F. M. Kail, What Washington Said (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 184.
68
 This is described in detail in B Rottinghaus, “Following the “Mail Hawks”: Alternative
Measures of Public Opinion on Vietnam in the Johnson White House,” Public Opinion
Quarterly, vol. 71, no. 3 (Autumn 2007), p. 370.
90  B. W. QUAIL

operational reasons; it was important not to divulge the location of

American troops to a live audience until it was no longer possible to stop
their mobilisation. However, the timing was also important in that many
fewer people would see the speech and therefore fewer people would
notice the ramifications of his words—he could have waited until the fol-
lowing day to make the announcement but chose not to for this reason.69
This is an example of an intelligent public relations strategy that the
administration employed during 1964; it was clear that this action had the
potential to cause disruption, and this tactic, while simple, ensured a
smaller and more receptive audience for the president’s announcement.
The approach seemed to work; there was little negative reaction in the
press—the New York Times noted on August 6 that Johnson had made it
clear he did not want a wider war and said, “the President himself has
enunciated…firmness, a firmness whose mission is peace.”70
It is interesting that the defining media coverage of the event was one
of support towards Johnson; the potential for misuse of executive power
was strong with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution—the president could now
unilaterally escalate the situation in Vietnam as he saw fit. Two Gallup
Polls conducted between 6 and 11 August and published several weeks
later predicted that not only would Johnson take 65% of the vote against
his Republican opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona),71 but
that 71% of those polled thought he was “Handling affairs in Vietnam as
well as could be expected,” with only 13% of the respondents feeling that
he was doing badly.72 Given that these polls were taken during the period
that the Gulf of Tonkin discussions were ongoing and the event was fresh
in the national consciousness, it is fair to say that Johnson still held a
remarkably strong approval rating—alongside positive coverage of the
event. It is clear that his tactics worked. At this point of the year he was still
a strong, decisive and, most importantly, credible leader to the general
public. As the election campaign moved forward, it would be prudent for
the president to continue to look strong and credible in front of the
nation. Ultimately, however, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was, “a search
for the quick fix,” and no amount of shrewd selling to the public could

69
 See J Galloway, The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson
University Press, 1970), p. 69.
70
 “Wider War,” New York Times, 6 August 1964, p. 28.
71
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, pp. 1898–99.
72
 Ibid., p. 1899.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  91

change the fact that when escalation did inevitably occur, the Johnson
administration left itself open to accusations of having misled the public
about its intentions in Vietnam.73
Johnson’s campaign strategy for the 1964 election merits discussion; as
Johnson’s difficult relationship with the press was continuing and the
rhetoric of the Great Society began to permeate the public consciousness,
it was important for him to continue his momentum into a strong election
campaign. His re-election was rarely in doubt; Gallup Polls throughout
the year pitted him against the various possible candidates, examples
including Richard Nixon, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. and Barry Goldwater,
and he never dropped below 60% of the popular vote.74 Eventually,
Goldwater was chosen by the Republican Party to oppose Johnson.
Goldwater was a hard-line candidate, who ran as a law-and-order candi-
date, emphasising the need for stronger policing at home and a much
tougher stance on Vietnam. Johnson outmanoeuvred Goldwater at every
turn and began working early to ensure that Goldwater’s credibility would
not rival his own. On 5 June, he ordered Richard Goodwin to remove any
trace of Goldwater from a speech he was due to make to the International
Ladies Garment Workers Union in New  York, citing his reason as not
wanting to build his opponent up.75 This refusal to even acknowledge
Goldwater—the final speech made no mention of the man, reminiscent of
FDR’s virtual silence on Alf Landon’s candidacy in 193676—showed the
Johnson campaign was not willing to come up against the Goldwater cam-
paign in a war of words. Johnson himself wisely looked to keep away from
making comments that could be deemed as childish against his presiden-
tial opponent. In another example of Johnson’s ability to politically out-
class his opponent, race riots that occurred in Harlem in July were a
potentially tricky situation for the president to handle and something that
Goldwater could have exploited to his advantage as the law-and-order
presidential candidate. In order to head off the danger, Johnson invited
Goldwater to a meeting at the White House and planted a reporter at the
event to ask him if he planned to use the subsequent meeting to broker an

73
 Unnamed Johnson advisor, quoted in Galloway, The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, p. 99.
74
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, pp. 1880–2010.
75
 Telephone call from Johnson to Richard Goodwin, 5 June 1964, 12.58 pm. Transcript
in Beschloss, Taking Charge, p. 384.
76
 Lyndon B Johnson, “Remarks in New York City to Members of the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union,” 6 June, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley,
The American Presidency Project. [Link]
92  B. W. QUAIL

agreement with Goldwater not to exploit the sensitive issue of race in the
coming elections. Johnson responded affirmatively, and Goldwater was
effectively backed into a corner, with no choice but to agree to the deal.77
This was a strong example of Johnson’s shrewd political ability. He used
skills honed from decades of experience in the Senate to ensure that
Goldwater could not take advantage of an area that was identified as
potentially weak for the incumbent president. However, planting a
reporter to ask a pre-set question was not a tactic that Johnson could use
regularly; given both his relationship with the press at large and the danger
inherent in manipulating a journalist to political ends, being caught doing
this would have greatly damaged his credibility.
The president also had to find a way to deal with enemies in his own
party, particularly Bobby Kennedy. Worried about the Kennedy family
retaining their influence on his presidency and knowing Kennedy was
interested in the open position of vice president, Johnson needed a way to
remove him from consideration for the role while not arousing public
suspicion that he had moved tactically against the popular and sympathetic
Kennedy family. This was done with some skill. At Clark Clifford’s sugges-
tion, Johnson simply announced that he was not going to consider any
member of his cabinet—including the Attorney General—for the role of
vice president on 30 July. This resolved the problem for Johnson while not
singling out Kennedy for a personal rejection of his ambition.78 However,
Johnson was unable to leave this victory without some measure of gloat-
ing. This cost him significant political capital within the Democratic Party
and made a permanent enemy of Kennedy. Inviting reporters from the
New York Times, New York Herald Tribune and New York Post for an off-­
the-­record chat in the White House, Johnson explained in some depth his
decision-making process, but crucially told the story of the meeting in a
manner that was deeply disrespectful to Kennedy and made fun of his reac-
tion and mannerisms.79 The New  York Times’ immediate reaction to
Johnson’s cabinet announcement was to speculate that Johnson needed to
move quickly to nip speculation about Kennedy in the bud due to his toxic
reputation among Southern Democrats. Kennedy had used his position to
77
 See Powers, The War At Home, p. 19.
78
 The story of Clifford’s meeting with Johnson is recounted in some detail in A J
Langguth, Our Vietnam: The War 1954–1975 (New York: Simon and Schuster; 2000)
pp.  297–99 and R Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Time 1961–1975,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998) p. 142.
79
 Dallek, Flawed Giant, p. 142.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  93

advocate strongly for civil rights protestors in the South and shield them
from prosecution as much as possible. A. J. Langguth quotes a Harris Poll
showing 33% of Southern Democrats would not vote for a ticket with
Kennedy on it as a result of this.80 It was a shrewd political decision then,
for Johnson to move out from the shadow of the Kennedy family by cut-
ting Robert off. However, the bitter comments made to newspapermen
confirmed to both them and Kennedy that the capacity for spite and dou-
ble dealing existed within the administration. This did not in itself contrib-
ute to any gap in the president’s credibility, but it was an entirely avoidable
episode that added to the growing list of issues from earlier in the year.
For now, however, the campaign focused on picking a vice presidential
candidate—Hubert Humphrey (D-Minnesota) became the frontrunner
and ultimately took on the role at the Democratic National Convention in
August. Johnson’s campaign also focused on painting the Goldwater
efforts as dangerous and extremist. Privately, Johnson had denounced
Goldwater’s rhetoric as “vicious,” and “violent” in a call to Bill Moyers
and directed him to work on a more balanced statement for release to the
public.81 However, efforts by the administration to assassinate Goldwater’s
character were wide ranging. The infamous “Daisy” advert, aired just once
by the campaign on 7 September, showed a young girl counting to ten
followed immediately by a countdown to zero as the camera zoomed in on
the girl’s face, ending in a nuclear explosion. President Johnson’s voice,
misquoting the poet W. H. Auden, proclaimed that, “These are the stakes;
to make a world in which all God’s children can live, or go into the dark.
We must either love each other, or we must die.”82 This advert was a land-
mark in both political and advertising history—one of the first examples
what would later become a standard practice of smearing the opponent via
television advertisements. Johnson successfully tapped into the fears of the
electorate over Goldwater’s hard-line stance on Vietnam; the advert asked
the question of whether the people trusted the Republican with the full
power of America’s nuclear arsenal. The thesis on propaganda of French

80
 Langguth, Our Vietnam, p. 297.
81
 Telephone conversation # 4268, sound recording, LBJ and BILL MOYERS,
7/17/1964, 6:26  PM, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and
Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed February 04, 2021, [Link]
org/item/tel-04268.
82
 See advertisement on YouTube, accessed on 3 August 2017, at [Link]
com/watch?v=9Id_r6pNsus. In the poem, September 1, 1939, Auden wrote, “…We must
love one another or die. …”
94  B. W. QUAIL

philosopher, theologian and resistance fighter, Jacques Ellul is especially

relevant here.83 In order to function correctly, propaganda needs to have a
base in the popular culture of society; it works best when throwing simple
information quickly at the user. In this case, the easy-to-understand ideo-
logical statement being made was that Barry Goldwater made an unsuit-
able candidate for the presidency because he was a dangerous extremist
who could not be trusted with the power that was inherent to the office.
The advert, and subsequent adverts, pointed to Johnson as the candi-
date of peace, and the Johnson campaign went further, accusing Goldwater
of inconsistency, particularly in terms of war. One commercial claimed that
Goldwater said he would “Drop a low yield atomic bomb on the Chinese
supply lines in North Vietnam,”84 which, when taken with the “Daisy”
advert, is clearly supposed to indicate the instability of Goldwater and his
dangerous tactics. The closing statement for each advert was, “The stakes
are too high to stay at home”85; this was clearly intended to juxtapose
Johnson’s peace against Goldwater’s supposed militancy and push a high
voter turnout for the president. Johnson became the man of peace, the
candidate who would not escalate commitment in Vietnam and who
would work to keep American soldiers from being deployed halfway across
the world in the name of political idealism. The difficulties faced by the
candidate in this regard were pointed out as early as 9 January by Walter
Lippmann—he believed that Goldwater “did not relish” his placement as
the more extreme candidate, but further argued that, “Senator Goldwater
would… transform the party of Lincoln into the party of white suprema-
cists. He would transform the party of Theodore Roosevelt into an Anti-­
Progressive Party of uncontrolled and unregulated businessmen, each
man for himself.”86 Ultimately, Goldwater’s own divisive beliefs were as
much his undoing as Johnson’s well-fought presidential campaign.
J. J. Matthews notes that Goldwater’s “unrestrained style and uncompro-
mising philosophy,” as well as his “inept management of foreign policy
during the campaign,” caused significant problems for his camp, but there

83
 J Ellul, Propaganda (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 165–66.
84
 Transcript in W L Benoit, Seeing Spots: A Functional Analysis of Presidential Television
Advertisements (New York: Praeger, 1999), p. 41.
85
 Transcripts of several Johnson advertisements, each ending with this slogan, ibid.,
pp. 35–51.
86
 W Lippmann, “Goldwater Runs Against His Own Party,” Courier-Journal (Louisville,
KY), 9 January, 1964, p. 6.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  95

can be no doubt that the tactics used by Johnson—especially the “Daisy”

advert—were very effective in bolstering support for an LBJ presidency.87
On 21 October, Johnson commented that, “We are not about to send
American boys nine or ten thousand miles away from home to do what
Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves.”88 Like many of his actions
in 1964, this statement would come back to haunt him following his elec-
tion. As early as 13 August a draft memorandum from the president’s
national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, discussed “the necessity of
prompt retaliation especially for attacks on our own forces.” A memoran-
dum the following day from General Wheeler, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, advised that even more serious measures might be required
due to the seriousness of the situation in South Vietnam.89
For the moment, Johnson’s campaign was working exceptionally well.
Gallup Polls released on the same day as the “American boys” quote indi-
cated that Johnson held 63% of the voting public,90 with 6% of people
undecided. A final presidential trial heat on 2 November showed Johnson
coming in with 64% of the vote against 7% undecided91—Goldwater
appeared to lose popularity in the final week before the election, partially
to Johnson and partially to indecision.92 Johnson’s credibility as a leader
was strong going into the election on 3 November; Goldwater was painted
as a poor choice and a potentially unsafe person to hold the highest office
in the land, and Johnson was riding high on the wave of popular opinion.
A landslide majority would elect him president in his own right, sweeping
the Republican Party aside and ensuring the complete success of the tran-
sition that began almost a year previously, from John Kennedy’s under-
study to a popular leader in his own right.

87
 J J Matthews, “To Defeat A Maverick: The Goldwater Candidacy Revisited, 1963–1964,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 4, (Fall 1997), p. 673.
88
 Lyndon B Johnson, “Remarks in Memorial Hall, Akron University,” 21 October, 1964.
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://
[Link]/ws/?pid=26635.
89
 See Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant For National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to the President, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964, doc. 313, 13 August
1964, p. 673 and T Powers, The War At Home (New York: Grossman, 1973), p. 316.
90
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1906.
91
 Ibid., p. 1907.
92
 The polling for the final survey carried out several days after Johnson’s proclamation of
21 October provides a barometer of the effect that this had on his already abnormally high
poll ratings.
96  B. W. QUAIL

Nevertheless, Johnson’s strategy again showed signs of short-term

thinking. In looking for a way to win the election quickly and decisively,
he and his staff pushed against Goldwater’s law-and-order phraseology
and positioned himself as the candidate of peace. As we have already seen,
the Johnson administration knew that the Vietnam War was likely to esca-
late; his officials’ actions in drafting a resolution that allowed them to initi-
ate offensive actions in the country months before Tonkin shows this
much Johnson seemed to be reticent about the idea of escalation in
Vietnam, and George Ball—who served as one of the few doves in
Johnson’s staff meetings93—wrote of this: “President Johnson… was as
anxious as Kennedy to avoid an irreversible embroilment. At every stage,
he moved reluctantly—pushed by events and the well-meant prodding of
the same men who counselled President Kennedy.”94 Ball argued that the
need for consensus politics meant that Johnson wanted his backroom staff
wholly in agreement before moving forward. This is disputed by some of
Johnson’s former staff members—former National Security staff member
Chester Cooper believes that Johnson would make up his mind even as he
went through the motions of debate, essentially rendering continued dis-
cussion moot. In the case of Vietnam, this was especially relevant. Cooper
believed that, “It suited his purpose and style to give the impression that
he was engaging in a lengthy and thorough appraisal in which all points of
view were advanced and weighed.”95 The reality is most likely to be some-
where between the two; Johnson was hypersensitive to criticism and
wanted people to respect, believe in and agree with him, leading to his
push for consensus, but he also had a tendency to want to forge ahead
with his own ideas, something which would become clearer as his presi-
dency developed. For the time being, however, he at least gave the sense
of wanting to engage debate, even as key advisors such as Robert
McNamara recommended escalating the war—as secretary of defence,
McNamara felt it was necessary to show American strength and avoid a

93
 Stanley Karnow notes that Ball later resigned. See Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London:
Century, 1983, p. 506.
94
 Ball, The Past Has A Pattern, p. 379.
95
 C L Cooper, The Lost Crusade: The Full Story of U.S.  Involvement in Vietnam, From
Roosevelt to Nixon (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1971), p. 285.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  97

potential military confrontation with the major communist powers in

Beijing and Moscow.96
Clearly, with all of this going on in the background, it was a wildly
short-sighted public relations policy to denounce Goldwater for intending
to escalate the war even while advisory staff as important as McNamara
counselled for an increased presence in Vietnam. Courtney Brown sug-
gests that new voters played a significant role in the landslide election and
notes that while most areas of the United States were able to get behind
Johnson; the Deep South did not, suggesting that voters in that part of
the country did not resolve the “electoral dilemma,” posed by Johnson
and Goldwater.97 On the face of it, Johnson’s strategy in the election was
strong and brought hugely successful early results alongside the largest
winning margin in electoral history in the presidential election. Johnson’s
campaign was ultimately successful, and the president easily remained in
office once the results were in. As strong as the campaign was, it showed
little foresight in terms of the potential for escalation in Vietnam even as
Johnson and his advisors knew that escalation was likely if not inevitable
and even became counter-productive in the way that it lay the foundations
for the credibility gap which would threaten to destroy his integrity in
later years.
It is important however to note that Goldwater was not completely
unsuccessful in his campaign. William Berman points out that he won
27 million votes and took five states against the unprecedented strength of
Johnson’s campaign, sowing the seeds of later challenges to consensus
politics and the Great Society.98 Goldwater was a small-government
Republican, and his campaign was indicative of a new wave of American
anti-communist, pro-religious conservatism of the type that Senator
Joseph McCarthy had successfully taken advantage of in the 1950s and
that Richard Nixon would eventually use to propel himself into office at

96
 McNamara further discusses the reasons for his support of gradualisation and escalation
in an oral history interview with the Lyndon B. Johnson Library. Transcript, R McNamara
Oral History Interview I, 8 January 1975, by Walt R Rostow, p.  27, Internet Copy, LBJ
Library.
97
 C Brown, “Nonlinear Transformation in a Landslide: Johnson and Goldwater in 1964,”
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 37, no. 2 (May 1993), p. 609.
98
 W Berman, America’s Right Turn: From Nixon to Clinton (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1998 [1994]), p. 5.
98  B. W. QUAIL

the end of Johnson’s term in the White House.99 The 1964 election con-
stituted what E. and M. Black have termed a “Great White Switch,” in
voting patterns in the southern states as Goldwater easily bested Johnson
in the region, and they further note that since 1964 more whites have
voted for Republican candidates in every election, although they also note
that the most significant shift in alignment to the Republican party did not
occur until Ronald Reagan’s presidency sixteen years later.100 Certainly,
ominous signs of resurgence in conservative views at a grassroots level
would become more common as Johnson’s elected presidency wore on,
but it is difficult to measure what, if any, effect the Johnson administration
had on the continued rise of conservatism over the course of the rest of the
decade, just as it is difficult to ascertain exactly what effect this had on the
administration’s attempts to reach out to the public and deal with the
press during the 1960s.
As 1964 drew to a close, the president had every right to bask in the
success of his election win. The margin was the largest in US election his-
tory—16 million votes separated him and Barry Goldwater, and Johnson
could now drive forward with his domestic mandate, sure that a consensus
was built. The Gallup Poll registered Johnson’s approval rating at 69% on
18 December,101 and in a less political poll he finished as the winner of
Gallup’s Most Admired Man, which was released on 30 December,102
ahead of former President Dwight Eisenhower, Winston Churchill and
Martin Luther King Jr. On the face of things, Johnson’s year was an excel-
lent one—his handling of the election campaign, the introduction of the
Great Society and the support that this enjoyed, and his recovery from
some initially sceptical press reporting were all been great achievements.
Johnson was certainly a credible choice to lead the nation at this point, but
the underlying issues had already begun to show themselves. Despite
enjoying some respectable headlines throughout the year, Johnson’s dis-
trust of the press—and the press corps’ opinion of him—remained largely
unchanged since the early portion of the year. While he changed his strat-
egy towards press conferences and courting the press, there remained an

99
 For an interesting and informative view on the transformation of anti-communist though
during the immediate postwar era, see J L Himmelstein, To the Right: The Transformation of
American Conservatism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 33–38.
100
 E Black & M Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard
University Press, 2003), p. 205.
101
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1911.
102
 Ibid., p. 1912.
 3  1963–1964: ASSUMING AND CONSOLIDATING POWER, CAMPAIGNING…  99

underlying view from some sections that the president was an attention-­
hungry Texan buffoon. McNamara describes the “ridicule,” which
Johnson received for turning the White House Lights off to underline his
commitment to increasing governmental efficiency and expenditure.103
Pushing through the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was hailed as a political
victory, a successful plan several months in the making, which would make
it possible for the president to order strikes against North Vietnam more
readily. Johnson’s handling of the November elections was strong from a
short-term point of view—an easy dismantling of Goldwater with well-­
timed and damaging assaults on his character. But Johnson did not take
on board the ultimate cost of Vietnam and the risks involved in allowing
the public to perceive in his campaign a costly and awkward commitment
to keep the peace in Vietnam. The long-term viability of Johnson’s strat-
egy was in doubt, even as he chastised Goldwater with the “Daisy” advert
as a dangerous man or even an extremist, who would escalate tensions in
South East Asia and commit American troops to areas where they were
not required. Discussions over the growing need to do exactly that in
Vietnam were already happening behind the scenes in the Johnson admin-
istration. While it would not have been prudent for Johnson to reveal
intimate discussions of strategy to the public, it was equally poor strategy
for him to contradict Goldwater’s assertions so vehemently while the pos-
sibility of escalation remained on the table. This could only lead to severe
criticism from members of the public who were against escalation and
their counterparts in the press. This short-term strategy towards the media
and public statements would continue throughout the presidency, and this
view of Johnson’s first year in power shows that the seeds had been sewn
for problems with legitimacy and strategy further down the line. The fol-
lowing year would see Johnson’s elected presidency begin in earnest as the
Great Society began to take shape and as the escalation that was threat-
ened in Vietnam for so long finally occurred.

 McNamara oral history interview 1, p. 22.

103
 CHAPTER 4

1965: Guns vs. Butter—Escalation

in Vietnam and the March of the Great
Society

The year 1965 would prove to be pivotal for Johnson, particularly in terms
of his perception of the press and their role within his administration. With
his election campaign out of the way and his term in office for the next
four years assured, the president was now able to move ahead with his own
policies. The year 1965 was to be the time of the Great Society, and
Johnson’s main goal this term was to push through the legislation that he
had promised since coming into office—Medicare and Medicaid, the anti-­
poverty bill and others were all to be passed this year, and Johnson’s
domestic legacy would hinge on how well the Great Society worked. The
shadow of Vietnam hung over the administration, however, and the Pleiku
attacks of February that led to escalation would prove to be the beginning
of one of the most divisive conflicts in the history of America. Johnson
would announce the escalation of the conflict in April, and the first mili-
tary drafts took place in the following months. Anti-war tension escalated
throughout 1965 and culminated in the self-immolation of two men in
November. Overall, 1965 would be a tipping point for Johnson and a year
in which he could not allow the escalating events to move ahead of his
ability to deal with them.
The State of the Union address in 1965 was of tremendous impor-
tance; it was Johnson’s first major address since the election, and he
needed to ensure that he struck a presidential tone, as well as outlining his
plans for the coming year, without causing his poll levels to drop and a loss

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 101

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
102  B. W. QUAIL

in public confidence. Presidential aide Bill Moyers oversaw collecting data

from the various departments along with their suggestions as to important
information for the president to deliver to the nation. For example,
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall pushed for a paragraph on the
environmental legacy that the Johnson administration wanted to forge.
Udall’s suggested wording1 is present, though modified, in the final
speech. Johnson’s advisors and speechwriters worked hard to strike a bal-
ance between foreign issues; specifically, the ongoing American involve-
ment in Vietnam and the domestic plans that involved the Great Society.
The speechwriting staff members were also keenly aware that their efforts
would be vetted by several departments before anything was finalised.2 A
memorandum sent from long-serving Johnson aide Horace Busby to the
speechwriter Richard Goodwin on the address discussed the importance
of striking a “Johnsonian tone”3 from the beginning of the speech and
stressed that as a consensus politician Johnson should be looking for “an
applause line” to bring observers to his side quickly. This should be noted;
as previously discussed, Johnson was developing a style of interacting with
both the media and the public that had been moulded partially from his
bruising fights with the press in the first few months of the presidency in
1964. He wanted to ensure that the crowd was alongside him from the
moment he started speaking, and to this end even had one of his assistants,
Juanita Roberts, record the length of applause that he received for each
point that he made during the speech.4
Domestically, Busby looked for Goodwin to include a sweeping state-
ment, which would sum up the president’s goals, and would be both easy

1
 Memorandum from Stewart Udall to Bill Moyers, 2 January 1965, “Annual Message to
Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box no. 136,
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library [LBJ Library], Austin, Texas.
2
 An undated draft of the speech sent from Richard Goodwin to the president at the LBJ
ranch indicates this—Goodwin left the speech at a high word count so that others could add
and remove facts as they pleased. Located in memorandum from Richard Goodwin to
President Johnson, undated, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,”
Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box no. 136, LBJ Library.
3
 Memorandum from Horace Busby to Richard Goodwin, undated, Statements of Lyndon
B Johnson, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” box no. 136, LBJ
Library, p. 1.
4
 Memorandum from Willie Day to Johnson, 4 January 1965, “Annual Message to
Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box no. 136, LBJ
Library—this memorandum was sent alongside a copy of the text of the address showing
each area of stoppage and the length of applause.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  103

to understand and underline how well the country had flourished in recent
years. This would help Johnson’s popularity by underlining the commit-
ments that were being made to the Great Society. A phrase similar to what
was outlined in the memorandum made it into the final draft; Johnson
would discuss how “Our flourishing progress has been marked by price
stability that is unequalled in the world.”5 Overall, Busby felt that the mes-
sage should not offer a final declaration of the president’s plans but would
offer instead “glimpses and hints into the future,”6 staying true to the
campaign promises of 1964, but also allowing for Johnson and his people
time to work out the specifics of each Great Society plan as and when nec-
essary. This was an intelligent public relations strategy; becoming too
involved in the minutiae of the Great Society risked alienating the American
public, something that Johnson could not afford to do at this early stage.
On Vietnam, national security advisor McGeorge Bundy counselled a
firm stance. His congratulatory memorandum to Bill Moyers on the day
of the address stated that he was very happy with what had been written,
but that the section on Vietnam was “the most dispensable paragraph.”7
His memorandum to the president on the same day suggested that the
secretary of defence, on the other hand, was worried that the statements
being drafted were too heavy handed on the subject of intervention.
Bundy thought McNamara was worried that if stronger actions in Vietnam
were not intended, then Johnson might regret the stance he was taking
and wanted to ensure that the president was given both points of view.8
The number of people who were asked to read drafts of this address is
important to note; it is indicative of Johnson’s consensus style of politics
and his wish, at this point in the presidency, to be inclusive and open about
his goals. Moyers was instrumental in bringing the speech together and
sent a request to over forty government departments in November;
responses and appeals from areas as diverse as the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission were stored

5
 Lyndon B Johnson: “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 4
January, 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley, The American Presidency
Project. [Link]
6
 Memorandum from Busby to Goodwin, op cit, p. 3.
7
 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to Bill Moyers, 4 January 1965, “Annual Message
to Congress on the State of the Union,” box no. 136, LBJ Library.
8
 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, Statements of Lyndon B
Johnson, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” box no. 136, LBJ
Library.
104  B. W. QUAIL

away and used by Moyers and the speechwriting team as and when need-
ed.9 Moyers was also able to satisfy Johnson’s need for emotive language
to galvanise public opinion—a request from the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW) to change the word “poison” to
“polluting”10 in the national agenda section of the speech was roundly
denied, as it was felt the imagery generated by the original wording was
much more likely to engender support for the president’s public works
plans.11 As much as it was important for Johnson’s ideal of consensus poli-
tics to gain as much information as possible for the State of the Union
address, it was also vital to give the public a strong indication of where the
president wanted to take his policies over the coming year. As his first
address since the election—coming even before his inauguration, which
would take place the following week—Johnson had to give a strong per-
formance, and his aides ensured that he was provided with this reassur-
ance. Playing to Johnson’s mistrust of the press and the previous difficulties
between the two camps, the White House produced a spot check of news-
paper reports on the address on the day after it was released. Choice quo-
tations from twenty-six local and national newspapers, including the New
York Post, claimed that, “Mr Johnson not only described a vision, he out-
lined concrete goals. They represent, he acknowledged, an agenda, not
detailed proposals.” The Miami News declared, “The American people
last night saw the full scope of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society
for the first time.”12
Johnson needed to have press coverage reported to him for the same
reason that he needed to have his applause recorded; as a president who
was not yet secure in his place amongst his peers, and who was still

9
 Undated 50-page document, “State of the Union Suggestions,” in Statements of Lyndon
B Johnson, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” box no. 136, LBJ
Library.
10
 The president said, “I propose that we increase the beauty of America and end the poi-
soning of our rivers and the air that we breathe.” From Annual Message to the Congress on
the State of the Union, op cit.
11
 A memorandum from HEW sent to Bill Moyers on 2 January with several recommenda-
tions has simply been marked “No” on this point. See Memorandum from Secretary of
Department of Health, Education and Welfare to Honorable Bill D Moyers, 2 January 1965,
“Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson,
box no. 135, LBJ Library.
12
 Dispatch #291: “Editorial Support for President Johnson’s State of the Union Address
is Widespread,” with “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements
of Lyndon B Johnson, box 135, LBJ Library.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  105

privately struggling against the shadow of the Kennedy family, it was

important for him to be able to see the acknowledgement of those around
him, particularly from areas of the press who were critical of him in previ-
ous months. Johnson’s insecurity is further underlined by a memorandum
that was passed to the president from his secretary, Dorothy Territo, sev-
eral days after the State of the Union; it detailed New York Times reporting
of each annual address since 1933, noting where the paper had discussed
details of reaction from spectators. Notably, Johnson’s seventy-nine inter-
ruptions for applause was easily the highest number, eclipsing the fifty-­
seven interruptions received by Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953.13 This is
further indicative of Johnson’s almost compulsive need to know that he
was being well received and indicates the extent of his difficulty in accept-
ing critical newspaper articles and the challenges faced in bringing the
press with him to support the administration’s agenda.
The State of the Union was something of a propaganda victory for
Johnson with which to bring in the New Year. The New  York Times
reported that his decision to move the address to 9 pm represented a
strong understanding of government and current affairs, and allowed him
to increase his audience by twofold or even more.14 The report also
strongly congratulated the president on his ability to address the camera,
and therefore the people, who it was important to reach out to. He was
able to show his policies off to the people without being bogged down by
specific aspects of any one of his many campaigns. He managed to give the
impression of a coherent programme of reforms through which he wanted
to use to push the country forward into the latter half of the decade and
beyond. The Associated Press released an article, syndicated nationally,
containing a statement from press secretary George Reedy, who noted
that the president received “an unusually large number” of telegrams and
described Johnson as being “gratified” with the response to his message.15
The St. Louis Post-Dispatch released an article that claimed the president
was praised by congressional representatives from both parties. Though it
noted Republican concerns over the cost of the programme, Speaker of
the House John W. McCormack (D-Massachusetts) was quoted as calling

13
 Memorandum from Dorothy Territo to President Johnson, 9 January 1965, “Annual
Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” 4 January 1965, box no. 136, LBJ Library.
14
 J Gould, “TV: Johnson Talk at Night Welcomed,” New York Times, 5 January
1965, p. 67.
15
 Associated Press, “Telegrams Pour In,” Fresno Bee (Fresno, CA), 5 January 1965, p. 4B.
106  B. W. QUAIL

the speech, “truly a great message,” and House Republican leader Gerald
Ford (R-Michigan) believed that, “the ultimate goals set forth in the
President’s address are the goals of all Americans.”16 A poll released by
George Gallup on 21 February, conducted several weeks after the State of
the Union address between 28 January and 2 February, cited Johnson’s
character and experience as the most likeable qualities of the man, with his
policies on poverty, Medicare and civil rights all scoring comparatively
high on the list.17
The State of the Union address played its part in these ratings; Johnson’s
manner had been well received by the public and the mandate he put for-
ward, which took the Kennedy policies he ran with in 1964 and made
them into his own, was well received. Only 4% of Gallup Poll respondents
felt that Johnson wanted to spend too much, and only 7% were unhappy
with his handling of the civil rights bill, which was well within tolerance
for a country that had experienced as much racial turmoil as the United
States in recent years. Louis Harris published a poll on January 18 arguing
Johnson had actually increased his share of approval since he took office in
1963, comparing a 69% approval rating with 63% in November 1963.
Nevertheless, Harris ominously noted in his syndicated column that the
number of people with negative views actually increased from 4% to 27%
in this time, and 8% of negative commenters remarked that Johnson lacked
integrity—the largest negative aspect of his personality.18 With positive
press on his side and a strong public opinion base on which to build,
Johnson held his credibility through this address. The strategies of his
administration paid off—as Busby suggested, he set goals without being
too specific, and the organisation of Moyers helped to deliver an impres-
sive speech which combined rhetoric and forward planning to set forward
the agenda for 1965. This is an effective example of what Johnson was
able to achieve when he and his administration were able to come up with
a proactive, well-reasoned and intuitive strategy for dealing with a public
occasion. Having utilised his staff to the best of their abilities and having
listened to the ideas of key members of the administration, Johnson was
given a mandate to move forward with his plans by the reaction to his

16
 Post-Dispatch Wire Services, “State of Union Speech’s Goals Widely Praised by
Lawmakers,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch (St. Louis, MO), 5 January 1965, p. 2A.
17
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1925.
18
 L Harris, “President Gaining in Public Approval,” Los Angeles Times, 18 January
1965, p. 20.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  107

second State of the Union address. With this mandate in hand, Johnson
moved on to his next public engagement: the inaugural address of his
elected presidency on 20 January.
The president’s inaugural address was strongly influenced by
Ambassador Chester Bowles, who had been posted to New Delhi by the
president. Having been asked to draft a few words for the speech, Bowles’s
most important contribution was thematic. He instilled the ideals of
change and progress into the speech,19 and while the text was altered
wholesale from the draft sent to Moyers on 24 December,20 that theme is
still visible in the final speech; change is discussed extensively by the presi-
dent, particularly around the Great Society. Johnson stated, “I do not
believe that the Great Society is the ordered, changeless, and sterile bat-
talion of the ants. It is the excitement of becoming—always becoming,
trying, probing, falling, resting, and trying again—but always trying and
always gaining.”21
Once again, the president allowed numerous people to work on this
address; at the same time Ambassador Bowles was creating a draft, Jack
Valenti was also working on an early version that was sent to the president
on 28 December.22 Like the State of the Union, it was important that this
address to the nation was well thought-out. As the first address of the
elected president, the speech had to be a strong piece of literature that
succinctly summed up the ideals that Johnson was hoping to exemplify in
the coming years. By delegating the task of drafting the speech to several
trusted staffers, Johnson was able to choose aspects of each discourse that
he liked and discard those that did not suit his goals; Bowles’s theme of
change was taken, with the latter’s language discarded, and Valenti’s draft
was built on this. The theme of change was to be stressed, and it was
essential for the language of the speech to be right. To that end, and as the

19
 See memorandum from Bill Moyers thanking Bowles for this: Memorandum from Bill
D Moyers to Chester Bowles, 18 January 1965, “The President’s Inaugural Address,”
Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 137, LBJ Library.
20
 Memorandum and draft speech text from Chester Bowles to Bill Moyers, 24 December
1964, “The President’s Inaugural Address,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 137,
LBJ Library.
21
 Lyndon B Johnson, “The President’s Inaugural Address,” 20 January 1965. Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. [Link]
[Link]/ws/?pid=26985.
22
 Memorandum from Jack Valenti to the President, 28 December 1964, “The President’s
Inaugural Address,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 137, LBJ Library.
108  B. W. QUAIL

time of the address grew nearer, McGeorge Bundy suggested once again
putting the “[w]holly fair and unprejudiced”23 Bill Moyers at the head of
the speechwriting team. This was to edit final changes and balance any
potential issues out amongst the writers, and advocate strong language
and a “Johnsonian” tone against potential press criticism of the president’s
goals. It is notable that Bundy mentions in his memorandum that the
reporter Scotty Reston contacted the administration looking for news on
what he termed, “New isolationism.” The administration still had issues
with journalists whom they felt were prying for information, and Bundy’s
suggestion of a strong rhetorical response—termed as “taking out an
insurance against criticism,” in the memorandum—is telling. Johnson
needed to ensure positive press from this speech, and it was also important
that the United States’ strategy on Vietnam was not questioned. Although
Vietnam was not mentioned by name, the inaugural address was clear on
Johnson’s intentions in this respect: “If American lives must end,” he pro-
claimed, “and American treasure be spilled, in countries that we barely
know, then that is the price that change has demanded of conviction and
of our enduring covenant.”24 This was the insurance Bundy spoke of; this
sentence is a tacit warning of things to come in Vietnam, the implication
being that bloodshed in the name of freedom was inevitable, and by tying
it into the theme of change that was also encompassing domestic policies
and the Great Society, Johnson bound the two together irrevocably. This
was, however, an example of the short-sighted public relations strategy
that began during the election campaign; where previously Johnson
denounced Barry Goldwater as a dangerous interventionist in Vietnam, he
was now priming the country to accept exactly that—escalation and fur-
ther intervention in South East Asia. McGeorge Bundy met with the presi-
dent and took notes about their discussion on escalation; LBJ himself
remarked that he was sceptical of the view that escalation would help
morale. Undersecretary of State George Ball pushed for diplomatic efforts
to be increased, but there was no doubt that escalation was a very real pos-
sibility, if not a probability, by this point, and Johnson’s vehemently argued
anti-escalation stance of 1964 looked foolish in light of this.
Nevertheless, the inaugural address was well received, drawing praise
from those in government and from newspaper columnists across the

23
 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to the President, 19 January 1965, “The
President’s Inaugural Address,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 137, LBJ Library.
24
 The President’s Inaugural Address, 20 January 1965.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  109

country; Reston, writing for the New York Times, focused on the pomp
and ceremony of the event the following day. He claimed that, “America
is still young enough to hope and dream and believe. The rest of the
world… probably accept Lyndon Johnson’s promise.”25 Reston likened
Johnson’s speech to that of previous presidential inaugurations, a similar-
ity Johnson himself took note of in the State of the Union address. Tom
Wicker, syndicated for the New York Times, noted that the president
“obviously enjoyed himself,” in an article reprinted across the country.26
Just as in the case of the State of the Union address, Johnson ostensibly
did himself no harm with the inaugural address; the president received a
personal telegram from his fellow Texan Senator Ralph Yarborough
(D-Texas), which gushed, “Your fellow Texans have a special pride in this
inauguration.”27 Coming as closely together as they did, the two speeches
share a common theme; the ideals of hope and clarity, of moving forward
as a country and fighting off the negativity which threatened to encroach
on the nation’s psyche. These were not unusual themes for an incoming
president, especially one who enjoyed as much goodwill as Johnson did at
the end of 1964, and the goodwill he received certainly boosted his con-
fidence moving further into the year. However, it is important to note that
the president himself brought together foreign and domestic politics in his
inaugural address. From a short-term point of view, it was necessary to
stand firm in the face of potential escalation in Vietnam, particularly given
that the potential for escalation was high following the discussion of the
National Security Council and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964.
Certainly, the Harris Poll of 22 February showed that 83% of respondents
backed Johnson in ordering retaliatory bombings against North Vietnam—
Johnson’s popularity was strong following his performance at the State of
the Union and inaugural address.28 However, in the long run throwing
the idea of American soldiers fighting and dying in far-away countries
together with the hopes and dreams of the Great Society could only end

25
 J Reston, “Paradox and Reason: President Blends Religion and Politics in a Strong
Appeal for Faith and Unity,” New York Times, 21 January 1965, p. 17.
26
 T Wicker, “LBJ Vows Conquest of Misery, Begins Full Term as 36th US President,”
Arizona Daily Star, 21 January 1965, p. 1.
27
 Telegram from Ralph Yarborough to President Johnson, 20 January 1965, “The
President’s Inaugural Address,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson Collection, box 137, LBJ
Library.
28
 L Harris, “Harris Survey: Most Back Johnson on Viet Reprisals,” Los Angeles Times, 22
February 1965, p. 5
110  B. W. QUAIL

in disaster. This was a short-term strategy designed to help Johnson

­maintain popularity at the moment of the address. Events would soon
force his hand in Vietnam.
For now, however, the public still supported Johnson’s Vietnam tactics.
A Gallup Poll published on 16 February agreed with Harris, if not as con-
clusively, claiming that 67% of respondents who were aware of events in
Vietnam approved of Johnson’s actions.29 Both the Gallup and Harris
polls were special reports that gauged reaction to the events of the attacks
on Camp Holloway in Pleiku, Vietnam, on 6 February. This attack marked
the first time that American soldiers were the focus of North Vietnamese
attacks, rather than a secondary target. Johnson’s reaction was one of
anger; as Kathleen Turner argues, Johnson viewed Vietnam as a peripheral
issue, but this did not mean he was not concerned about the area, or the
implications of increasing violence to his own popularity. The killing of the
eight American soldiers at Pleiku represented an attack on a group of men
who were still officially employed in an advisory capacity, who were not at
war with the North Vietnamese. That they were now under attack infuri-
ated Johnson.30 He convened a meeting of the National Security Council,
where it was decided to initiate a retaliatory airstrike.31 Johnson was kept
abreast of these attacks by Cyrus Vance, McNamara’s Deputy Defense
Secretary, who called him in the early hours. Johnson requested that
Vance, “keep calling… when you get anything”32—he knew the gravity of
the situation and needed to be aware of what was going on. Johnson’s
need to be constantly updated on matters he considered urgent was well
documented—he previously admonished George Ball for not keeping him
in the loop: “I don’t care a fuck that it was three in the morning; I want
to know what’s being done whatever time of night it may be.”33 It was
therefore not prudent for one of Johnson’s advisors to leave the president
out of their decision-making if he or she wanted to avoid the wrath of the

29
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1925.
30
 On the Pleiku attacks and subsequent National Security Council meeting, see K J Turner,
Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 111–13.
31
 For a partial transcript of this meeting, see Summary Notes of the 545th Meeting of the
National Security council, Foreign Relations of the United States [ FRUS], 1964–1968, vol. II,
Vietnam, January–June 1965, doc. 76, 6 February 1965, p. 156.
32
 For partial transcripts of the president’s multiple conversations with Vance in the early
morning of 7 February, see M R Beschloss, Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White
House Tapes 1964–1965 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001) pp. 172–74.
33
 G Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982) p. 429.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  111

president, and his need to be at the top of the decision-making tree in all
situations was apparent. As it was, the National Security Council met once
more on 7 February, where a statement to be read to the press on the
strikes was approved and issued to George Reedy to action.34 The New York
Times printed the story on 8 February, alongside the pledge from the Gulf
of Tonkin incident repeated by Johnson when he announced the repri-
sals—that America would seek no wider war.35 Smaller newspapers carried
Associated Press reports of the story, with the Tallahassee Democrat in
Tallahassee, Florida, capturing the mood of the nation in its editorial, “It
was Time to Strike Back.” The editorial summed up widespread feeling on
Pleiku: “We are inclined to agree with those critics who say that such
timidity only breeds boldness to a bully and wins nothing in the end” and
ended by noting, “we are proud that President Johnson ordered,” retalia-
tory bombings.36 The mood was clearly one of large-scale support for
retaliation against Vietnam, but this did not necessarily mean large-scale
support for further escalation. Yet again, Johnson used a short-term solu-
tion to plaster over tensions in Vietnam by committing to his earlier peace-
ful path in the post-retaliation statement, a path that was becoming more
tenuous by the day. Privately, Johnson already knew that ground troops
would be necessary and discussions on the matter were ongoing; on 26
February, he admitted to McNamara, “I’m scared to death of putting
ground forces in, but I’m more frightened about losing a bunch of planes
from lack of security.”37 It is appropriate that the same journalist who
reported on Pleiku—Tom Wicker—discussed in a book review just the
previous day how Johnson seemed to function as his own press secretary.
“He is as accessible and as talkative as a President could be,” asserted
Wicker, “yet no honest reporter ever leaves a news conference believing
that he has learned a single fact that the President did not want him to
know to begin with.”38

34
 As described in Summary notes of the 546th Meeting of the National Security Council,
transcribed by Bromley Smith, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965 doc.
80, 7 February 1965, p. 167.
35
 T Wicker, “Capital is Tense – But President Asserts Nation Still Opposes Widening of
War,” New York Times, 8 February 1965, p. 1.
36
 “It Was Time to Strike Back,” Tallahassee Democrat (Tallahassee, FL), 8 February
1965, p. 4.
37
 Telephone call, Robert McNamara to President Johnson, 26 February 1965, in M R
Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, pp. 193–95.
38
 T Wicker, “The Bully Pulpit,” New York Times, 7 February 1965, p. 104.
112  B. W. QUAIL

The American public, with their 67% Gallup approval rating, would
stand behind Johnson and his decision-making in Pleiku, but it is impor-
tant to remember that the press already made a note of Johnson’s evasive
attitude in press conferences and his continuing gripes with the press corps
coverage of both himself and the situation in Vietnam. Johnson told a
reporter at a press conference in November, “Some people are speculating
and taking positions that I would think are somewhat premature,”39 and
certainly contributed to an uneasy atmosphere around the White House
after Pleiku. Once again, the president’s credibility was at stake, and as
Bundy noted in a lengthy memorandum to Johnson on 7 February, “The
events of the last twenty-four hours have produced a practicable point of
departure,”40 for increased reprisals in Vietnam. It was time for the presi-
dent to act, to both increase American military presence in the country
and to remove US dependants and non-military personnel from harm’s
way to prepare for escalation. To that end, Bundy and a group of staff who
had been observing the situation in Vietnam also prepared a plan of action
to introduce escalation. Bundy would proceed to outline a speech for the
president, which would explain his actions in Vietnam and announce an
escalation of the conflict to the nation. The president pushed back on the
idea of the speech, suggesting that the Secretary of state or UN ambassa-
dor Adlai Stevenson handle all public duties.41 This is another example of
the president’s short-term outlook on public relations, which hindered his
ability to reach out to the American public. By requesting that one of his
subordinates take charge of the Vietnam situation, at a crucial juncture, he
risked proving previous press fears that he was unfit to deal with foreign
relations—Johnson’s preferred focus was always on domestic policy, and
this was picked up on early by the press. The problem was compounded
by Bundy’s agreement with Johnson; his memorandum to the president
went on to state, “there is real gain in keeping you out of the immediate
military aspect of the matter at this stage.”42

39
 Public Papers of the Presidents, quoted in Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 117.
40
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965 doc.
84, 7 February 1965, p. 175.
41
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965 doc.
124, 16 February 1965, p. 283.
42
 Ibid.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  113

In the end, Bundy’s proposed February speech never happened. This

failure to commit to a frank and open discussion of the administration’s
Vietnam policies would retrospectively make the president look weaker;
respected commentators from the press such as Walter Lippmann began to
push him on his goals in Southeast Asia, and his credibility on foreign
policy was endangered when he did take the decision to escalate. It would
take the president over a month to respond to his critics; the landmark
speech that was given at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland,
on 7 April would therefore become one of the most important foreign
policy speeches of Johnson’s time in office. It would publicly show for the
first time the reactive strategy he was employing over the question of
Vietnam since the election campaign of 1964.
Johnson plainly needed to make a statement on American involvement
in Vietnam, and the Johns Hopkins address became a vital piece of his
strategy to placate the grumbling of the press and of his own backroom
staff who agitated for a full disclosure of the president’s policy. It was clear
to the likes of Bundy and Moyers that somebody had to clarify the admin-
istration’s position, even if it was not Johnson himself, but all efforts to
persuade the president were rebuffed. Now, the president accepted an
invitation to speak at Johns Hopkins and wanted to make a statement;
McGeorge Bundy and George Reedy recommended announcing the
speech several days beforehand in a memorandum to Johnson and aimed
for a 9 pm timeslot on television to maximise the potential audience.43
Johnson’s issues with the press were ongoing at this time; Johnson’s for-
mer friend and syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop accused him of wiretap-
ping his phone and in turn Johnson accused Alsop of going through the
menopause and, “going crazy,” to his Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach and Bundy.44 As well as this, the influential columnist Scotty
Reston added to the wiretapping issue—a Pentagon official informed him
that the FBI had tapped his son, Dick.45 To make up for the difficulties
that Johnson was having with press correspondents, the administration
strongly courted Walter Lippmann, who previously claimed, “There is no

43
 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, 5 April 1965, “Address at
Johns Hopkins University,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 143, LBJ Library.
44
 For more information, see telephone call from Nicholas Katzenbach to President
Johnson, 29 March 1965, at 18:24, and telephone call from McGeorge Bundy to President
Johnson, 30 March, at 09:12, in M R Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, pp. 251–60.
45
 See LBJ’s conversation with Nicholas Katzenbach, cited above, which turned into a
three-way phone call with Bill Moyers, who provided details of his discussion with Reston.
114  B. W. QUAIL

tolerable alternative [in Vietnam] except a negotiated truce.” This was

done by having Johnson go to lunch with him in mid-March and subse-
quently inviting him to the White House to discuss the Johns Hopkins
speech before allowing him to read a draft the day before it was to be
given, on 6 April. Lippmann reportedly approved of the speech.46 It was
important for columnists like Lippmann to be onside with the speech.
Johnson had complained about his reporting to Bill Moyers in a telephone
call on 10 March, arguing a recent Lippmann column accusing him of
refusing to debate the course of American action in Vietnam was wrong,
even unfair. “He doesn’t understand,” said Johnson, “that we’re debating
it every night.”47 Johnson had talked Lippmann up in a previous conversa-
tion with James Wechsler, the editor of the editorials page at the New York
Post. “The man who makes the most contact with me is Walter Lippmann,”
Johnson told him, while criticising the press in general; Wechsler ulti-
mately apologised during the call for not doing enough research on a
column Johnson was unhappy about.48
Jack Valenti also noted that the president brought in several media fig-
ures, Charlie Mohr, Muriel Dobbins, Doug Cornell and “an unidentified
pressman,” and read them a copy of the speech the night before it was
given.49 Turner argues that in his dealings with Lippmann on the Johns
Hopkins address, Johnson afforded him, and other members of the press,
the same privileges as he did key senators such as Mike Mansfield
(D-Montana) and J.  William Fulbright (D-Arkansas), highlighting the
importance he placed on the role of the press in putting his remarks across
to the public. It is difficult to argue with this summary; Johnson finally
recognised the need to act and that he would need aid from the press to
put his views across in a manner that retained his credibility with the

46
 For Lippmann’s words, along with an account of the White House’s attempt to court his
good favour, see Turner’s chapter on the evolution of the Johns Hopkins address, in Lyndon
Johnson’s Dual War, pp. 111–33.
47
 Telephone conversation # 7051, sound recording, LBJ and BILL MOYERS,
3/10/1965, 9:40AM, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and
Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 21, 2021, [Link]
org/item/tel-07051.
48
 Telephone conversation # 7018, sound recording, LBJ and JAMES “JIMMY”
WECHSLER, 3/4/1965, 11:16AM, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations
and Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed February 04, 2021, [Link]
[Link]/item/tel-07018.
49
 Valenti’s notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech, “Address at Johns Hopkins University,”
Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 143, LBJ Library.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  115

l­argest majority of the people. The potential for bad press was obvious;
making a dramatic speech on foreign policy would undoubtedly leave
some section of the American people disaffected, either the hawks who
implored the president to take a harder stance on Vietnam or the doves
who advocated withdrawal. To this end, it was quite proactive of Johnson
to bring the press on board during the writing stages of the speech.
However, this did not completely mask the fact that the administration
was organising the speech in a reactive environment, moving late and play-
ing catch-up on the events that surrounded them.
It was quickly realised that several student groups were planning to
picket the speech; one of Johnson’s personal secret service agents, Rufus
Youngblood, sent a memorandum on the day of the speech detailing their
intended actions and advising how the president would avoid coming into
contact with them.50 The press and student protestors were not the only
groups Johnson was having difficulty with; the entire proposed speech was
called into question by the demand for a ceasefire issued by Canadian
Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson on 2 April during a speech at Temple
University in Philadelphia. According to Burke and Greenstein, Pearson’s
remarks on the war “incensed”51 Johnson and caused him to tell aides that
the Johns Hopkins speech was cancelled. This is backed up by Jack
Valenti’s typed notes on the speechwriting process for Johns Hopkins.52
The president’s volatile temper and thin skin were once again jeopardising
an important public relations moment, and his reaction to Pearson’s com-
ments was extreme. This is a prime example of Johnson’s reactive nature,
as his anger caused him to react strongly to Pearson’s views and change
plans in the blink of an eye, although Valenti did note that, while the presi-
dent called off the speech, he left the time open in his diary.53 This would
imply that Johnson never truly intended to call off the speech, but wanted
to send a statement that he would not tolerate dissension in the ranks of
his own advisors. Pearson’s comments were evidently not taken lightly.
Ultimately, the Johns Hopkins speech itself was a well-rehearsed exer-
cise in the rapidly developing Johnsonian style. At Johnson’s request,54

50
 Memorandum from Rufus Youngblood, 7 April 1965, “Address at Johns Hopkins
University,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 143, LBJ Library.
51
 F Burke et  al., How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam in 1954 and 1965
(London: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989), p. 187.
52
 Valenti’s Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech.
53
 Ibid.
54
 Ibid.
116  B. W. QUAIL

Valenti inserted a piece about his going to bed at night; Johnson asked
himself each night if he had done enough for his country. Stories such as
this could not seem to have come from the mind of a speechwriter;
Johnson needed to have a personal touch. He wanted the people to know
that the words were his and that the story was his. To this end, a second
tale regarding the electrification of the Texas hill country, something
Johnson took great pride in, was also added. Similar anecdotes were added
to speeches throughout his time in office at his own asking, in an attempt
to reflect his already established earthy quality. The speech reflected the
carrot and stick approach, which has been discussed as a hallmark of the
Johnson presidency by Kathleen Turner, Hinckley and Brace,55 among
others. The president’s stick in this case was the aggression of North
Vietnam. The carrot was the “billion dollar investment,”56 in the form of
the Mekong River Project, aid and medicine that America was offering so
long as the North Vietnamese ceased aggression. Valenti returned the
billion-dollar offer to the speech draft following its removal by the State
Department.57 It satisfied Johnson’s desire for newsworthy headlines in
his speeches and reflected what the president believed was a magnanimous
gesture to be offered to the North Vietnamese; it amounted to a bribe to
stop aggression, something which was pounced on by Republicans in the
headlines of the following day.58 Nevertheless, the president’s carrot,
offered to the North Vietnamese, was taken up by large sections of the
press. An editorial by Max Frankel in the New York Times on 8 April dis-
cussed how the clamour from those around the administration for public
negotiations with North Vietnam “has especially disturbed those officials
who have been trying to regain for President Johnson some of the stature,
sympathy and respect that President Kennedy enjoyed around the
world.”59 The Times editorial went on to say that, “the country can take

55
 P Brace and B Hinckley, Follow the Leader: Opinion Polls and the Modern Presidents (New
York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 137.
56
 L B Johnson, “Address at Johns Hopkins University: “Peace Without Conquest,”” 7
April 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
[Link]
57
 Valenti’s Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech.
58
 United Press International, “Democrats Hail Johnson’s Talk, G.O.P Sees Move to Buy
Peace,” New York Times, 8 April 1965, p. 17.
59
 M Frankel, “Johnson’s Speech Viewed as Bid to World Opinion,” New York Times, 8
April 1965, p. 1.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  117

pride,”60 in the Johns Hopkins address. The president was rightly on a

high; the press reaction from outlets such as the Times and Newsweek was
exactly what he has been looking for, but still he ruminated on negative
feedback to Tex Goldschmidt, who worked with Valenti and Richard
Goodwin on the Mekong River Project.61 “I got a bunch of mean wires
who are raising hell from all over the country,”62 he complained to
Goldschmidt. Nevertheless, large sections of the press were satisfied and
former president Eisenhower called to congratulate Johnson on the speech
later that evening.63 Reaction from the government branches was also
strong; Senators Morse and Gruening, who voted against the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, were predictably strong against further action in
Vietnam, but a report drafted by Bundy for the president noted that of the
fifteen senators who remarked on Johns Hopkins, these two staunchly
anti-war men were the only negative commenters. In the House, only two
of twelve congressmen who spoke out were against the speech, although
Bundy pointed out that one of them, Congressman Thomas Pelly
(R-Washington), only disputed the aid package and was happy with the
clarification of the American position on Vietnam. The other, Bo Callaway
(R-Georgia), raised the spectre of the paper tiger argument, suggesting
that Johnson’s policy changed from one of strength to “Buying
friendship.”64 Regardless of this dissension, the reaction from the House
and the Senate was strongly in favour of the speech. Yuravlivker notes that
Johnson’s rhetoric achieved exactly what he wanted: “framing reality in
such a way as to preclude rational discussion and debate.”65 The president
was looking for a mandate to proceed in Vietnam and felt that the reaction
gave this to the administration.
Gallup Polls taken two weeks after Johns Hopkins and published on 2
May saw Johnson’s popularity at 67%,66 while a further poll taken at the

60
 Ibid., p. 17.
61
 Valenti’s Notes on the Johns Hopkins Speech.
62
 Telephone call from Arthur “Tex” Goldschmidt to President Johnson, 8 April 1965,
10:27, cited in Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, pp. 271–72.
63
 Telephone call from Dwight D Eisenhower to President Johnson, 8 April 1965, 17:58,
cited in Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, pp. 273–74.
64
 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, 10 April 1965, “Address
at Johns Hopkins University,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 143, LBJ Library.
65
 D Yuravlivker, “Peace Without Conquest; Lyndon Johnson’s Speech of April 7 1965,”
Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 3, (September 2006) p. 466.
66
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1936.
118  B. W. QUAIL

same time and published on 16 May suggested that 52% of people thought
Vietnam policy was being handled as well as could be expected, with 27%
feeling that affairs were being handled badly.67 It seemed like Johnson’s
hard work was paying off; although anti-war demonstrations at Johns
Hopkins were loud and signalled intent from those who opposed Vietnam
policy, the majority of the population actually showed hawkish tendencies
when asked for their views on the matter, something that sat well with the
president’s current actions and with Johnson’s own views on the subject.
Johnson’s popularity levels were still strong, and the proclamation on
Vietnam seemed to have done no harm. But Johnson still showed a short-­
term, reactive vision that belied his public opinion victories. As recently as
1 April Johnson approved further escalations to troop levels in Vietnam,68
and it was only a matter of time before he would need to announce the
vastly unpopular draft system to the public. He announced the escalation
after a delay and following months of proclamations to the contrary. He
also knew that more was planned and that a large number of American
soldiers would be needed to avoid a resounding defeat in Vietnam.
A memorandum from CIA Director John McCone to Johnson from 17
March concluded that both he and Robert McNamara agreed that the
military situation “degraded considerably”69 since the end of 1964, and
Bundy warned the president to caution the people that America faced a
long struggle in Vietnam.70 Even Johnson himself bemoaned the troop
situation to his wife on 7 March—“I can’t get out, and I can’t finish it
with what I have got. And I don’t know what the hell to do!”71 However,
the public knew none of this. Johnson’s statement masked the need for
military action and escalation behind offers of help and support; his carrot
and stick approach was now foreshadowing the gap that would later
emerge in his credibility in the coming years. While it is clearly not pru-
dent for a leader to reveal classified administration discussions to the p
­ ublic

67
 Ibid., p. 1940.
68
 McGeorge Bundy and Central Intelligence Agency Director John McCone took sepa-
rate notes of a meeting on 1 April which approved this; see Memorandum from Director of
Central Intelligence McCone to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carter),
FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June 1965 doc. 230, 1 April 1965, p. 513.
69
 Memorandum For The Record, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. II, Vietnam, January–June
1965, doc. 206, 17 March 1965, p. 459.
70
 Bundy quoted in S Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (London: Century, 1983), p. 414.
71
 Lady Bird Johnson’s Tape Recorded Diary, 7 March 1965, quoted in Beschloss,
Reaching For Glory, p. 216.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  119

and Johnson evidently felt that he would be giving away too much if he
did discuss the terms of escalation, it is also not prudent to wilfully mislead
the public. Johnson outlined the reasons why America was in Vietnam; he
did not discuss the impending escalation of combat there, and it is partially
because of this glaring omission that the draft announcement of 28 July
caused widespread unrest. Troop increases would continue as the year
went on. Rottinghaus has argued that the president did not necessarily fail
to react to public opinion at this time, but that the magnitude of hawkish
communication being sent to the White House reinforced his belief that
he was in the right and his popularity was still strong. This may have been
true in 1965, but Johnson’s continued reliance on the public opinion
apparatus moving forward would again show a lack of foresight as his
popularity slid quickly in the following two years.72
The president’s policy of gradual escalation was also a hindrance;
Johnson was a consensus politician. He wanted people to agree with him
and always at least made it look like he encouraged full and frank debates
on his policy making before making any kind of announcement. This is
why George Ball was allowed to express private dissent over Vietnam
issues to Johnson during his time working as the undersecretary for Robert
McNamara, the secretary of defence. This style worked very well in domes-
tic politics and policy, where Johnson’s strengths lay and he had made his
name. In the foreign policy arena, consensus politics meant that Johnson
looked to be dithering over important issues. The Vietnam working group
he created after his election was described by Stanley Karnow as a “bureau-
cratic layer cake,” which he felt suited Johnson as it, “offered him the
chance to create unanimity.” The problem, surmises Karnow, was that, “in
the end, the final choices were to be his—and his alone.”73 Johnson had to
take responsibility for escalation in Vietnam, but instead hid behind stage-­
managed press conferences and tried to manipulate the public’s image of
the war and American objectives in Vietnam. The tactics he used so skil-
fully to defuse the impact of Vietnam on his election campaign could not
last forever; in the short term, it was easy to pull the wool over the eyes of
the people. However, Johnson and his advisors did not have a long-term
plan to reconcile what was going on in the background with the public

72
 B Rottinghaus, “Following the Mail Hawks: Alternative Measures of Public Opinion on
Vietnam in the Johnson White House,” Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 71, no. 3 (Autumn
2007), pp. 367–91.
73
 Karnow, Vietnam: A History, p. 403.
120  B. W. QUAIL

statements that were being made. This would ultimately prove to be the
downfall of both the foreign and domestic policies that the president
worked so hard to implement. For now, however, the Great Society and
Vietnam remained as separate entities, and it was to his preferred domestic
scene that Johnson wanted to return in the summer of 1965. However,
Vietnam was already beginning to cut into the president’s domestic affairs.
Despite the magnitude of his record of success in passing legislation as
a politician, Johnson was not having an easy time passing his domestic
reforms; certainly, it had been more difficult than he would have hoped
for. Liberals argued that his civil rights bill did not go far enough; conser-
vatives felt it went too far. Civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King
Jr felt that Johnson was pushing his poverty reforms over civil rights legis-
lation and campaigned in Selma, Alabama, in the early months of 1965 to
push for a bill that would guarantee the vote for black citizens in the
South. The Selma campaign was of particular consternation to Johnson,
who spoke with King on 15 January to try and bring him onside with the
Great Society plans: “Let’s us try to get health, and education, and pov-
erty through the first ninety days,”74 he implored, but the protest went on.
Johnson was dealing with Dr King’s arrest in Selma at the same time as the
Pleiku attacks in Vietnam. The day before Pleiku on 5 February Johnson
had a conversation with Katzenbach in which he noted that he expected,
“Quid pro quos,” from King, hoping he would relax his pressure for an
immediate voting rights bill in exchange for public support given in a press
conference the previous day.75 This is an example of the difficulties faced
by the administration in forming a proactive, inclusive strategy; in the first
three months of Johnson’s elected leadership domestic and the foreign
policy issues were already clashing and causing much consternation for the
president. As well as this, the political landscape of the 1960s was pushing
and pulling Johnson in several directions. For every Martin Luther King
pushing civil rights legislation there was a Senator Richard B.  Russell
(D-Georgia) trying to block progress on this front, and the issue of hawks
and doves was already becoming a difficult one in terms of the esca-
lating war.

74
 Telephone call between President Johnson and Martin Luther King, 15 January 1965,
12:06, in Beschloss, Reaching For Glory, pp. 161–63.
75
 Telephone call from Nick Katzenbach to President Johnson, 5 February 1965, 15:00, in
Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, pp. 171–72.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  121

The Voting Rights Act was announced on 15 March, with a memorable

performance by Johnson in which he famously stated, “We shall
overcome,”76 galvanising the civil rights movement. Johnson’s pleasure in
the moment came from the record high viewership of the speech; ninety-­
three million reportedly watched the announcement, as he noted in a con-
versation with the mayor of Chicago Richard Daley, who called with his
congratulations.77 The New York Times reported that he was interrupted
thirty-six times for bursts of applause and standing ovations,78 a statistic
which undoubtedly was of keen interest to Johnson. The speech was
clearly a particularly strong example of Johnson’s oratory skills, and it is
worth noting that in a Gallup Poll taken prior to events in Selma only 3%
of people felt that the president was unfair towards blacks in America;
fewer than thought he was unfair against whites.79 By May, however, 29%
of people still felt that America’s treatment of racial minorities was one of
the three largest problems facing the country.80 Johnson was still seen by
Gallup’s poll respondents as a fair and strong leader, but there was clearly
an appetite for further change, something that the Great Society needed
to work towards as the year progressed.
The year 1965 also saw the passage of the Medicare bill, on 30 July.
Johnson had been working to push the bill through since the previous
year, when he announced it. In a phone call in September 1964 to Senator
Clinton D. Anderson (D-New Mexico), Johnson discussed a “disaster”
when the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee went back
on a deal to support the bill.81 He discussed problems with passing the bill
as early as 1 October with Hubert Humphrey: “I don’t know whether we
can pass it next year or not.”82 This was therefore a major victory for
Johnson and his administration; alongside poverty and racial equality,

76
 Lyndon B. Johnson, “Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise,” 15
March 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley, The American Presidency
Project. [Link]
77
 Telephone call from Richard J Daley to President Johnson, 16 March 1965, 10:03, in
Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, p. 228.
78
 T Wicker, “Nation Hears Him: President, in TV Talk, Pledges, “We Shall Overcome,””
New York Times, 16 March 1965, p. 1.
79
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1931.
80
 Ibid., p. 1939.
81
 Telephone call between President Johnson and Clinton Anderson, 24 September 1964,
20:50, in Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, pp. 41–42.
82
 Telephone call between President Johnson and Hubert Humphrey, 1 October 1964,
21:46, in Beschloss, Reaching for Glory, pp. 43–46.
122  B. W. QUAIL

medical care was one of the cornerstones of the Great Society programme.
Medicare made the front page of the following day’s New York Times, with
quotes from Johnson proclaiming, “No longer will older Americans be
denied the healing miracle of modern medicine.”83 The next week, Time
printed a list of Johnson’s achievements in office so far, noting, “The 98th
Congress—under Lyndon Johnson’s prodding—has compiled a truly
astonishing record of accomplishment.”84 Moving quickly forward, the
Voting Rights Act was signed on 6 August. Further to his speech on 15
March, Johnson noted that the act was “nothing less than granting every
American Negro his freedom to enter the mainstream of American life.”85
As well as this, Johnson still held a 65% approval rating in Gallup’s pub-
lished poll of 4 August, compiled in July.86 Despite this goodwill from the
public, and the incredible run of form that Johnson had in passing legisla-
tion that culminated in the signing of the Medicare bill and the Voting
Rights Act, the administration was aware of problems in disseminating
information that could severely affect the president.
Even though there were several wins for the administration on the
domestic front, there was a growing discontent in the press about the
president’s lack of forthright conversation on Vietnam. Joseph Alsop’s
weekly syndicated column, released the day after the signing of the
Medicare bill, skirted around domestic success despite mentioning domes-
tic policy in the column’s title. Alsop focused almost completely on the
decision taken on 28 July to send forty-four combat battalions to South
Vietnam and said Johnson revealed “rock bottom minimum” about the
administration’s Vietnam policy. Regarding the precise situation in
Vietnam, he claimed, “No one can tell from his press conference.” Alsop
concluded that Johnson visibly longed to go back to the “domestic mira-
cle working which he so much enjoys.”87 In response to similar press cov-
erage, Douglass Cater, a former journalist who served as a special assistant
to the president on health, education and welfare, called a meeting of
several important advisors and administration staff, including McGeorge

83
 J D Morris, “President Signs Medicare Bill,” New York Times, 31 July 1965, p. 1.
84
 “Nation: The Legislative Scorecard,” Time, 6 August 1965, p. 18.
85
 Lyndon B Johnson, “Remarks on the Signing of the Voting Rights Act, 6 August 1965,”
full transcript and video file available from the Miller Center at the University of Virginia and
online at [Link]
86
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1955.
87
 J Alsop, “Home Front Ever Present in Johnson Viet Policy,” Salt Lake Tribune, 31 July
1965, p. 34.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  123

Bundy and Joe Califano, on 3 August in the White House staff mess hall.
An in-depth discussion of the problems faced by the administration fol-
lowed. Cater noted that, with the exception of ex-president Eisenhower,
“We don’t seem to have the elder statesmen anymore,” as well as noting
that newscasters now performed a different function from the likes of Ed
Murrow and Elmer Davis, who, “quieten us and give us perspective.”
Clearly, Cater recognised the changing nature of journalism and news
reporting in the 1960s. Importantly, Assistant Secretary of State for Public
Affairs James L. Greenfield followed this conversation up by pointing out
what he saw as an information problem. He noted that:

First, we are always meeting the crisis of the moment. In practice, there is
little time to think about the long term or the philosophical. We only plug
holes and run as fast as we can to stay even. Second, we seem to be obsessed
by Vietnam. Foreigners especially believe that the President thinks of noth-
ing else but Vietnam. This is not a healthy image.88

Greenfield, who was previously Time’s chief diplomatic correspondent,

had much to say on the problem, much of it accurate.89 He also noted that
the administration should “[t]ry to do something about this curious busi-
ness involving newsmen who say ‘the American people don’t know what’s
going on.’”90 The group agreed that the war constituted a completely new
type of conflict and that coverage was going to increase as time went on.
Greenfield recognised the dissonance that was at play between the admin-
istration’s dealings with the public and what was going on in the back-
ground, and identified that the administration was constantly playing
catch-up and was not making attempts to get out in front of potential
issues, something that this chapter has sought to explore in depth. This
exchange shows that some inside the administration made the connection
to something that would become a long-term problem, particularly as
problems began to increase both in Vietnam and at home. A reactive per-
spective on press coverage was being pursued as opposed to a proactive

88
 Memorandum for the Record, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December
1965, doc. 105, 3 August 1965, p. 296.
89
 Greenfield returned to the press when his stint at the White House ended in 1966, and
in 1971 was one of the New York Times editors responsible for releasing the Pentagon
Papers—a top secret study conducted by Secretary of Defense McNamara on Vietnam.
90
 Memorandum for the Record, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December
1965 doc. 105, 3 August 1965, p. 297.
124  B. W. QUAIL

approach. The pitfalls of reacting to events were obvious even at that time;
the administration struggled to keep up with events, and this led to
Johnson doing exactly what Greenfield described—plugging the holes and
running as fast as he could to catch the next one. A follow-up meeting
from the next day went into further detail on several of the points raised,
including the idea of Vietnam being an unprecedented situation, but no
further mention of Greenfield’s point about long-term thinking was
made.91 This is important to note—it was not discussed in any Vietnam
meetings in the immediate aftermath of this conversation, showing that if
nothing else, Greenfield was not taken seriously when he brought it up. As
it was, the administration’s inability to anticipate and head off potential
crises in the court of public opinion would ultimately prove to be its undo-
ing as a gap in credibility began to open in the following months and years.
The outcome of the press coverage meetings was that, first, Moyers
asked for memoranda to be prepared for the president with ideas on what
should be done to expedite the information dissemination process in
Saigon and Washington. Second, Califano indicated to Dean Rusk on 9
August that Johnson wanted to put Barry Zorthian, who was present at
the second meeting, in charge of all press briefings coming out of Vietnam
in order to increase his prestige with both the press and the public, and
make him, “the Bill Moyers of Saigon.”92 Journalists who would make
their professional names in Vietnam, such as David Halberstam, Stanley
Karnow and Neil Sheehan, questioned Zorthian’s briefings to the press,
which quickly became known as “Five O’clock Follies,” amongst those
who attended them. Zorthian, himself, later lamented, “In Vietnam, we
reached a stage where the government’s word was questioned until proven
true, whereas in the past it had been the government’s word is valid until
proven to be wrong.”93 Clearly, nobody had taken the warning of James
Greenfield on board, and this would become more obvious as the Johnson
presidency moved into 1966 and beyond.
For now, however, Johnson still enjoyed strong poll ratings and was
working hard to pass his domestic legislation. Lady Bird Johnson noted in
her daily diary on 27 August, “Whatever the strains and tensions and
91
 Memorandum of Conversation, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December
1965, doc. 117, p. 322.
92
 Ibid., p. 323.
93
 B Zorthian, quoted by D Martin in “Barry Zorthian, U.S. Diplomat in Vietnam, Dies at
90,” New York Times, 5 January 2011, accessed online on 15 May 2017 at [Link]
[Link]/2011/01/06/world/asia/[Link]?_r=0.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  125

distresses of the day in Washington had been, they were not noticeable in
Lyndon’s manner. He was like a man riding on a crest of achievement and
success.”94 A Time article on Press Secretary Bill Moyers in October noted
that when he took over in July, “Johnson’s relations with the press had
never been worse,” but noted that thus far he looked like a strong appoint-
ment on Johnson’s behalf and an example of the administration taking the
time to understand and placate the press.95 A health scare in the latter part
of the year saw Johnson admitted to the Naval Medical Center in Bethesda,
Maryland, in October—an issue with his gall bladder required an opera-
tion, and this was announced to the public on 5 October.96 Johnson wor-
ried that his convalescence might alarm the American people; Time noted
that he organised a news conference from the medical centre to allay these
potential fears and put himself on display for around fifty journalists.97
As 1965 drew to a close, Johnson remained popular. His Gallup Poll
approval ratings remained at 66% in November,98 and 62% in December,99
a minor fall. On 21 November, a published poll stated that 64% of respon-
dents agreed that American forces should be in Vietnam.100 However, the
signs of domestic unrest were also there. The Watts, Los Angeles, race
riots of August saw Johnson cut himself off from his advisors; Joe Califano
exceeded his authority to give “Presidential approval” for the US Army to
step in and help maintain order in Watts.101 Lady Bird Johnson showed the
characteristic Johnsonian siege mentality by pre-emptively denouncing the
media following the president’s response: “I hope a lot of people heard
him because he’s going to get the blame for letting [blacks] go too far, too
fast.”102 Protests against the Vietnam War continued to the end of the
year; on two occasions in November demonstrators set fire to themselves

94
 Lady Bird Johnson, quoted in Beschloss, Reaching For Glory, p. 418.
95
 “The Administration: L.B.J.’s Young Man In Charge of Everything,” Time, 29 October
1965, p. 16.
96
 For full details of the announcement, see the transcript of the announcement made to
the public; L B. Johnson, “Statement by the President Announcing That He Would Undergo
Surgery,” 5 October 1965. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American
Presidency Project. [Link]
97
 Time, 22 October 1965, p. 21.
98
 Gallup, The Gallup Polls, pp. 1968–69.
99
 Ibid., p. 1977.
100
 Ibid., p. 1971.
101
 Califano, quoted in Beschloss, Reaching For Glory, p. 420.
102
 Lady Bird Johnson’s Tape Recorded Diary, 15 August 1965, quoted in Beschloss,
Reaching For Glory, p. 421.
126  B. W. QUAIL

to protest American action in Vietnam. The death of Quaker Norman

Morrison in front of the Pentagon made the front page of the New York
Times on 3 November,103 and that of Catholic Worker Roger Allen LaPorte
outside the United Nations Building was reported on 9 November.104 A
third woman, Celene Jankowski, self-immolated in her home in South
Bend, Indiana, on the same day.105 The Associated Press quoted LaPorte
as saying he set himself alight “as a religious action,” to protest the war.106
It is, however, worth noting that the war was now polarising American
society; in the weeks before the two men committed suicide, a thirty-two-­
feet-long telegram was sent to the White House with the signatures of
2057 students and faculty members from the University of Michigan. This
is notable because the University of Michigan was the birthplace of the
teach-in, a form of academic protest against Vietnam. Time reported the
participants of one such protest at the University of Wisconsin, Madison,
negatively as “A ragtag collection of the unshaven and unscrubbed,”
showing support for the administration tacitly.107 However, with protests
on the war beginning to mount, discussion began to turn to the potential
for a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, and inevitably how this
would affect Johnson’s stature with the US public.
McGeorge Bundy sent a memorandum from Undersecretary of Defense
George Ball to the president on 17 November and again on 27 November
detailing the advantages of calling a temporary halt to offensive actions in
Vietnam. Bundy noted that a recent article published in Look Magazine
strengthened negative views on the administration’s push for peace and
that such a decision must be looked at from this point of view.108 There is
little evidence as to the veracity of Bundy’s view; it is hardly possible to

103
 “War Critic Burns Himself to Death Outside Pentagon,” New York Times, 3 November
1965, p. 1.
104
 T Buckley, “Man, 22, Immolates Himself in Antiwar Protest at U.N.,” New York Times,
10 November 1965, p. 1.
105
 Associated Press, “Indiana Woman, Worried About War, Found with Clothing Afire,”
Rushville Republican (Rushville, IN), p. 2. Mrs. Jankowski’s husband reported in the article
that his wife was, “deeply concerned about the Viet Nam situation,” and had suggested they
both self-immolate.
106
 Associated Press, “Pacifist Fights for Life After Protest,” Burlington Free Press
(Burlington, VT), 10 November 1965, p. 1.
107
 “Protests – And Now the Vietnik,” Time, 22 October 1965, p. 25A.
108
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December 1965,
doc. 208, p. 583.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  127

look at the effects of a single article, but it was nevertheless taken into
account by Johnson following the memorandum’s receipt, and certainly
confirms the administration’s bias against perceived negativity in the press.
Bundy’s view on the Look article exemplifies some of the earliest seeds of
the siege mentality that would form within the Johnson staff against the
press in later years. Bundy believed that a pause “will strengthen your
hand both at home and abroad as a determined man of peace facing a very
tough course in 1966” and noted, “We have a great interest in proving
our own good faith as peace lovers.” Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara was also for the pause; Ball noted in his memorandum that the
secretary recommended that the possibilities of pausing the bombing of
North Vietnam needed to be explored. From a public relations stand-
point, this was a strong move and had been correctly identified as such by
Bundy. It was vital for Johnson to show that he was willing to negotiate to
end the war, and by pausing the bombing he would also help to appease
some of the anti-war protests that had been gathering in momentum.
The deaths of Morrison and LaPorte received extensive media coverage
at the start of November, and coverage on the war from the likes of Joseph
Alsop was critical of predicted massive rises in spending on defence in the
following year’s budget on 25 November. It was claimed that the increase
in spending was at the heart of successful government pressure on alu-
minium and copper prices, a victory that was celebrated with what Alsop
noted was “widespread excitement.” Alsop’s criticism made a connection
between the government intervention on economic matters with events in
Vietnam; Alsop’s article foreshadowed the difficulty in balancing military
spending with domestic programmes; he noted that “[t]he real thing to
fear is the ceiling on non-military spending which may well be imposed.
The urban crisis, for example, very obviously demands an enormous aug-
mentation of the existing program of federal aid to schools in deprived
neighborhoods. It will be regrettable, though perhaps unavoidable, if such
obvious needs cannot be promptly met.”109 This prediction would be pre-
scient in the later years of the administration as the urban crisis deterio-
rated into race riots across the country.
As it was the administration were keenly aware of what the future held
in Vietnam in terms of troop losses. McNamara predicted on 30 November
1965 that by early 1967 over 1000 soldiers would be killed in action in

109
 J Alsop, “Spending Ceiling May Cause Crisis,” Salina Journal (Salina, KS), 25
November 1965, p. 5.
128  B. W. QUAIL

Vietnam every month.110 This had the potential to cause a propaganda

problem for the man who just over a year earlier noted that he was not
about to send American boys 10,000 miles away from home to do what
Asian boys should be doing for themselves.111 This was a short-sighted
view not just of the potential conflict, but of the potential for losing cred-
ibility with the electorate; just twelve months after his “man of peace”
stance against the hard-line Barry Goldwater, Johnson found himself
embroiled in what was increasingly looking like a long-term war with a
high human cost.
For his part Bundy continued to push the idea of a pause to Johnson,
noting on 4 December that favourable consensus was growing in the
administration for the tactic, which was “the best single way of keeping it
clear that Johnson is for peace, while Ho [Chi Minh] is for war.”112
Johnson pushed for more information on the pause from McNamara and
Bundy at a meeting in Texas on 7 December.113 It would be wrong to say
that a December bombing pause was universally favoured, however; the
Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously opposed halting bombing, and Joe
Califano sent the president a message on 13 December to confirm his own
opposition to such an action, although he conceded that a “dramatic
peace gesture” was necessary.114 While it is not out of the ordinary to see
differences in opinion within an administration, it is notable that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the highest and most important military figures in the
country, strongly disagreed with the State Department and with
McNamara. It is therefore easy to see how Johnson found himself in dif-
ficulty. There is a dearth of documents indicating Johnson’s official posi-
tion during these negotiations, but he noted in a telephone conversation
about the length of the pause with General Maxwell Taylor on 17

110
 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, FRUS,
1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December 1965, document 212, 30 November
1965, p. 592.
111
 See Chap. 2 for full details of the context of this statement.
112
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Bundy) to President Johnson, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December 1965,
doc. 215, 4 December 1965, p. 600.
113
 McGeorge Bundy, Personal Notes of Meeting with President Johnson, LBJ Ranch,
Texas, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December 1965, document 223, 7
December 1965, pp. 619–20.
114
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Califano) to President Johnson,
FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December 1965, doc. 228, 13 December
1965, p. 638.
 4  1965: GUNS VS. BUTTER—ESCALATION IN VIETNAM AND THE MARCH…  129

December, “the man on the street feels that we have not done enough on
the political side.”115 He also noted that in a recent Gallup Poll 43% of
people thought US political efforts in Vietnam had been inadequate.116
Tellingly, Johnson confessed to Taylor that he could feel the ice slipping
from under him domestically because of Vietnam and that this would be a
major factor in 1966 midterm elections—something that did indeed come
to pass the following year.
After weeks of discussions, the bombing pause eventually began on
Christmas Eve and would last until the end of January. Both Johnson and
the key members of his administration were clearly keenly aware of the
likelihood of further problems with public image at the end of 1965.
While the president still held a strong approval rating at the end of the
year,117 the signs of popular dissent were growing and the short-term strat-
egies that Johnson used to win the elections in 1964 were beginning to
create a credibility gap. Spragens has noted that in his analysis, Johnson
made a good attempt at fostering media relations during his early presi-
dency and that the credibility gap term was a poor reflection of the work
that was done, but the analysis of this chapter shows that this was not the
case.118 Most notably, his denunciation of Barry Goldwater as a pro-war
candidate even while his administration drafted and enacted the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution, which allowed America to go to war, would soon
come back to haunt him. His apparently reactive strategy towards press
criticism and the apparent inability of both the president and his inner
circle to create an effective press management strategy would come
increasingly under the microscope.
Of 1965 it can be reasonably concluded that while Johnson’s credibility
with the wider public did not decline, his standing amongst journalists
did, and the seeds of his long-term decline in credibility with the wider
American people were certainly sown by his failure to develop a strong,
proactive press strategy. His administration’s reactive tendencies had been
picked up on internally by the likes of James Greenfield and externally by

115
 Telephone call between President Johnson and General Maxwell Taylor, 17 December
1965 at 20:56, LBJ Library published telephone recordings, [Link]
watch?v=mYXediz8gek (It is not clear where Taylor got this information.).
116
 A copy of this poll can be found in Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1976.
117
 Gallup Poll taking ending on 16 December had Johnson at an overall job rating of 62%,
with 22% disapproving. Found in Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1977.
118
 W C Spragens, “The Myth of the Johnson ‘Credibility Gap,’” Presidential Studies
Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 4 (Fall 1980), p. 629.
130  B. W. QUAIL

key members of the press and were not been acted upon by the president
or any of his close advisors. Ultimately, Johnson’s performance in 1965
was strong on paper—his popularity, as judged by the pollsters, remained
strong and he enjoyed the support of his party moving into 1966, but as
we have seen, the overarching strategy of the administration was to react,
rather than act first, and this would cause problems in 1966.
 CHAPTER 5

1966: Widening Credibility Gap and Sliding

Popularity

Johnson’s approval ratings at the end of 1965 were undoubtedly high, but
1966 was to be a crucial year in terms of his continuing popularity and
there was a strong need for a cohesive public relations strategy that encom-
passed the entirety of the domestic and foreign policy issues the president
had to deal with. As a whole 1966 was to be a watershed year for the
administration; the bombing halt that was announced towards the end of
the previous year would end on 31 January, leading to renewed criticism
of the administration. Johnson would face growing reports of a “credibil-
ity gap” from the media for the first time. While this phrase was used in
1965 it really began to build momentum as 1966 dawned—the issue
became such a talking point that the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations led by Johnson’s former ally in the Democratic Party, Senator
J. William Fulbright [D-Arkansas], called several members of the adminis-
tration to testify in front of them. Johnson attended several important
conferences and events in 1966—most important were the Honolulu con-
ference with senior officials on Vietnam in February and a whirlwind tour
of Asia and surrounding countries such as Australia in October and
November. Johnson also dealt with rising public unrest over domestic
policies, particularly economic policies. The administration had to navi-
gate several changes in personnel, as key advisors such as McGeorge Bundy
and Jack Valenti moved on to become president of the Ford Foundation
and head of the Motion Picture Association of America, respectively.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 131

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
132  B. W. QUAIL

The problems that were building for Johnson in the second half of
1965 did not cease and the administration did not pause for breath; no
government receives a blank slate at the beginning of a new year, and this
was certainly the case in the winter of 1965/66. Vietnam was on the
minds of many Johnson advisors, and 3 January saw the press release of
Defense Secretary Dean Rusk’s “14 points,” a plan to sue for peace with
the North Vietnamese during the bombing halt.1 McGeorge Bundy noted
in a memorandum to Johnson that morning that a “reaction of affirmative
interest” was developing; he strongly suggested that the administration
push the fourteen points as a solid basis for peace talks and “challenge”
anyone who disagreed. Bundy’s choice of language is interesting; he dis-
cusses challenging the media and notes that Rusk’s points had “only
begun” to receive the attention they deserved.2 This is indicative of the
Johnson administration’s attitude towards the media, particularly in terms
of the Vietnam War at the start of 1966. A defensive stance was assumed
even before the media had the time to fully react to the news, showing the
nature of the Johnson administration as it moved more quickly towards a
more besieged, wary stance in general. While Bundy noted that the atten-
tion was positive, he also warned that a firm position should be taken on
the matter. Evidence of short-term thinking resurfaces here; the adminis-
tration should have worked out its public position on the fourteen points
and how they fitted with current foreign policy towards Vietnam before
releasing them. That this was not, or does not appear to have been, put
into effect highlights the constantly changing nature of the Johnsonian
relationship with the press and is indicative of a major failing by the admin-
istration to arrive at an effective press strategy and stick with it.
Johnson himself noted poll results in a National Security Council
(NSC) meeting on 5 January, which showed that “73% of the American
people wanted us to increase our diplomatic efforts” in Vietnam.3 Johnson

1
 For Rusk’s Fourteen Points, see Paper by Secretary of State Rusk, Appendix A, in Foreign
Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December 1965,
doc. 247, 28 December 1965.
2
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
[M.  Bundy] to President Johnson, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, doc. 2, 3
January 1966, p. 5.
3
 B. Smith, Summary Notes of the 555th Meeting of the National Security Council, “Peace
Offensive Regarding Vietnam,” FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, 5 January 1966,
p.  19. Johnson does not explicitly state where these results came from, or when the poll
was taken.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  133

does not go into detail on this poll, but his willingness to point to opinion
poll data is further evidence of short-term thinking. By using poll data in
this way, Johnson showed that he was sensitive to changing public opinion
and seemed to be willing to change his strategy based on the shifting goal-
posts of measured public opinion, with all of the difficulties that entailed.
The unreliable and constantly shifting nature of the public’s view meant
that basing strategy on something so difficult to quantify was a potentially
dangerous and short-sighted move on the part of the president. Such vigi-
lance can actually work to the advantage of a candidate for political office,
especially in an election situation. Clark Clifford noted in his memoirs that
Johnson and his team “Worked constantly on tactics, speeches and strat-
egy” during the 1964 election, and this strategy allowed Johnson to main-
tain his high approval levels for some time. However, by 1966 the idea of
a credibility gap, within which Johnson was portrayed as having misled or
withheld information from the press and public concerning Vietnam,
began to gather steam, and this was partly because of his tendency to chase
favourable reportage and opinion poll results.4
By withholding information from the public, Johnson ensured his
short-term future and good opinion poll ratings temporarily, but yet again
did not appear to be thinking with a long-term strategy in mind. Johnson
pointed out in the NSC meeting that Rusk had been to “200 conferences”
in the previous year to try to kick-start negotiations; this cannot be tracked
and proven, but if true, this was not heavily publicised by the administra-
tion, showing a lack of foresight from Johnson and his press office. It is
more likely that the number was exaggerated by Johnson for effect—Rusk
was undoubtedly a motivated individual, but this would have been an
impossible task, though Johnson did claim in a telephone call to Drew
Pearson on 10 January that, “We had 226 meetings this year, with various
countries including the ones we thought were most capable of being help-
ful.” Johnson suggested newsmen such as Joseph Alsop were upset by his
actions in the call, to Pearson’s encouragement.5 This irritation at the
assessment of his actions was further highlighted by his assertion in a
meeting with foreign policy advisors later in the same day, in which he was

4
 C Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 398.
5
 Telephone conversation # 9470, sound recording, LBJ and DREW PEARSON,
1/10/1966, 11:55  AM, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and
Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021, [Link]
org/item/tel-09470.
134  B. W. QUAIL

recorded saying “Lippmann, Alsop, etc. All these fellows will be spreading
their judgment.”6 Johnson’s struggle to remain objective on matters of
press sensitivity was on clear display.
Finally, Bundy warned in his communication that attention would turn
to the State of the Union Address to be given at the end of the week. This
was being taken seriously by all involved; Special Assistant to the President
Joe Califano was hard at work collecting information from all areas of the
government for ideas to flesh out the address, taking over the job handled
by Bill Moyers the previous year. A letter sent in Johnson’s name requested
the assistance of the heads of departments and agencies “in developing
and perfecting imaginative programs which will maintain our security,
continue our prosperity, and improve the quality of life for all.”7
It was well noted by the team of writers and researchers who worked on
the State of the Union Address that discussion on Vietnam was important;
nobody wanted further anti-draft protests and unrest like what had been
seen in 1965. There was some concern in the speechwriting team over
Johnson’s reputation as an international statesman—Walt Rostow stated
this in blunt terms during a conversation with Bundy and Califano on the
speech, and to this end, it was decided by Jack Valenti that a slogan was
needed to sum up US goals in South East Asia.8 Something was needed
that would do for foreign policy what the Great Society had done for
domestic legislation. Valenti called this a “Meaningful handle” and hoped
that it would galvanise American public opinion behind Johnson’s future
foreign policy decision-making.9 Bundy emphasised the need for the
speech to be precise in its weighting; it was vital that Johnson not focus
too hard on Vietnam or his detractors would accuse him of ignoring
domestic issues in favour of an unpopular war. Bundy suggested that “75%
foreign policy against 25% domestic policy would be significant” and
strongly advised that the president not “Pause and wait upon Vietnam,”
something which was echoed by the attendees of Valenti’s meeting on the

6
 Folder, “[January 10, 1966—1:10 p.m. Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors on
Bombing Pause],” Meeting Notes Files, Box 1, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January
24, 2021, [Link]
7
 Memorandum from the President to the Heads of Departments and Agencies, undated,
p.  1, Statements of Lyndon B Johnson Collection, box 136, Lyndon B Johnson Library,
Austin, Texas [LBJ Library].
8
 For Rostow’s comments, see Memorandum from W. W. Rostow to McGeorge Bundy
and Joseph Califano, 3 November 1965, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the
Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 177, LBJ Library, p. 1.
9
 Jack Valenti, Meeting on Foreign Policy Section, State of the Union Message, 13
November 1965, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of
Lyndon B Johnson, box 177, LBJ Library [Valenti’s Meeting Notes].
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  135

foreign policy section of the address.10 It was, however, necessary for a

high percentage of the address to be focused on the war. Whether Johnson
liked it or not, it was now among the largest issues in American society,
and any reticence on his part to address this fact would most likely have
been taken as a point of weakness by the growing number of detractors,
on both the “hawk” and “dove” sides of the war.
Johnson was being pulled in two directions by the pro- and anti-war
campaigns; one of the difficulties in creating and following through with
a coherent and comprehensive strategy during this time was the sheer
weight of opposition which would be encountered, regardless of what
position was taken. Johnson could not please everyone, and the adminis-
tration had difficulty in coming to a conclusion on the best public rela-
tions strategy when there were so many conflicting opinions being aired in
the mainstream press. This was highlighted by the speechwriting process
for the 1966 State of the Union Address, which was ongoing until the last
minute; speechwriter Richard Goodwin enquired in a memorandum to
Johnson two days before the speech as to whether the president “Finally”
signed off on the foreign section.11 The final speech would see Johnson
forcefully reminded of how important the conflict in South East Asia was,
while also delivering a fairly stark message to all the listening parties: hawks
and doves, politicians, press and public. He began the concluding section
of the speech, “But over it all—wealth, and promise, and expectation—lies
our troubling awareness of American men at war tonight.” Both he and
his administration were keenly aware of the importance of a strong mes-
sage on Vietnam in the first key address of 1966.12
Discussions between the president and key staff members such as Bundy
and Undersecretary of State George Ball on the wording of the speech
with regard to US contact with Hanoi were still in progress as late as
2.25 pm on the day of the speech—12 January.13 Some in the administra-
tion were still wary of potential hostility, and several of the speechwriters

10
 McGeorge Bundy, quoted in Valenti’s Meeting Notes.
11
 Memorandum for the President from Richard Goodwin, 10 January 1966, “Annual
Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box
177, p. 1, LBJ Library.
12
 L B Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 12 January
1966, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1966, Book I (Washington, DC:
United States Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 12.
13
 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Under
Secretary of State (Ball), FRUS, 1964–1968 vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, document 19, 12
January 1966, pp. 56–57.
136  B. W. QUAIL

were reluctant to address criticism, particularly Valenti, who led the cre-
ation of the foreign policy section. On 7 January, he criticised a draft of
the speech sent from Bundy: “On page 7 there is a paragraph about our
peace offensive not being a propaganda trick. Don’t you think that by
surfacing this criticism, we lend a little credence to it?”14 This is an exam-
ple of the administration’s tendency to avoid critical lines of thought, even
though it was aware of them—as we have repeatedly seen throughout his
presidency. Rather than addressing critics, Johnson often raged at them in
private and simply stopped speaking to members of the press who person-
ally offended him. His brother Sam Houston Johnson, who acquired a
reputation for being able to deal with Lyndon’s mercurial temper,
describes several incidents during which the president reacted badly to
press criticism for what he, himself, saw as innocuous transgressions, such
as swimming naked in the White House pool.15 Sam’s language—discuss-
ing “snob” reporters—underscores his agreement with Lyndon’s sum-
mary of the press and their intentions (or, at least, that he recognised that
it was important to his brother that he agrees with him). As a commenta-
tor on Lyndon Johnson’s affairs during his presidency, Sam Johnson is
clearly a biased source, but the insights he offered show very clearly the
siege mentality that Lyndon Johnson adopted dealing with the press. The
arguments propagated by authors such as Kathleen Turner, Mark
Updegrove and Robert Dallek that Johnson could not handle the press
and treated them as a political actor, rather than a separate entity, are not
without foundation. Sam Johnson’s words are confirmed by James Edward
Pollard, a longstanding observer of this area of American politics, who
noted as early as 1964 that Johnson’s sensitivity to criticism had been
picked up on by the press.16 Tom Wicker viewed the president as being
more difficult to obtain private meeting time with after 1965: “the first

14
 Memorandum from Jack Valenti to McGeorge Bundy, 7 January 1966, “Annual Message
to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 177, LBJ
Library, p. 1.
15
 S H Johnson, My Brother Lyndon (Spokane: Cowles, 1967), pp. 192–96.
16
 J E Pollard, The Presidents and the Press: Truman to Johnson (Washington, D.C.:
Public Affairs Press, 1967). Chapter 9 deals with Johnson’s transition to president and his
sensitivity is noted on more than one occasion. Pollard had published his first analysis of the
relationship between the press and the presidency in 1947. See J E. Pollard, The Presidents
and the Press (New York: Macmillan, 1947). Turner frequently mentions Johnson’s sensitiv-
ity in Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War. Dallek and Updegrove also mention his difficulties in
dealing with press criticism, if less frequently, in their biographies of the president.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  137

year he was in office…he was not difficult to see at all,” he claimed. “Even
in 1965, he was not terribly hard to see on a private basis.”17 As the admin-
istration withdrew into itself, meaningful one-on-one time with the presi-
dent became more scarce for the White House press corps.
Kathleen Turner has similarly noted that Johnson’s State of the Union
Address was the first of his presidency to emphasise foreign affairs over
domestic issues and points out Lady Bird Johnson’s comments following
the speech that the audience were not enamoured with her husband’s
message.18 Lady Bird also noted the speech had to be cut from 7000 to
4000 words and that she watched “in vain” for approval from old friends
such as Senators Richard Russell, (D-Georgia), John McLellan
(D-Arkansas) and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana).19
Russell Baker for the New York Times gave a humorous but valid criticism
that the timing of the speech showed Johnson was out of touch with the
regular American, as he wrote “One of President Johnson’s worst mistakes
has been his decision to force State of the Union messages on prime-time
television audiences.”20 The overall reaction to the speech was tepid and
exemplified by E. W. Kenworthy’s reporting in the New York Times of the
Republican Party’s mixed reaction to Johnson’s plans.21 Despite this, and
as the name of the article—“G. O. P. Backs President on Vietnam”—sug-
gests, the Republicans supported the president on his Vietnam stance, and
this was a victory for Johnson. It is also worth noting that the newspaper’s
editorial was comprehensively in favour of the speech, concluding, “This
is a good message, now it is up to the Legislature to act on it.”22 Good
press such as this would become exceedingly rare as the year progressed
and Johnson’s opinion polls began to slide, but the State of the Union
message seemed to have achieved its goal in the meantime. With that said,
the address was difficult to review in the immediate aftermath of its
17
 Oral history transcript, Thomas G. Wicker, interview 1 (I), 6/16/1970, by Joe
B. Frantz, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021,
[Link]
18
 Lady Bird Johnson, quoted in Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 154.
19
 Audio diary and annotated transcript, Lady Bird Johnson, 1/12/1966 (Wednesday),
Lady Bird Johnson’s White House Diary Collection, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed
January 24, 2021, [Link]
20
 R Baker, Observer: Unwelcome Intruder in Prime Time, New York Times, 13 January
1966, p. 24.
21
 E. W. Kenworthy, “G.O.P. Backs President on Vietnam,” New York Times, 13 January
1966, p. 14.
22
 “The State of the Union,” New York Times, 13 January 1966, p. 24.
138  B. W. QUAIL

delivery; only by considering how well Johnson followed through on his

statement can it be fully evaluated as a strong or weak piece of rhetoric. As
the rest of the year progressed, it would become clear that the State of the
Union was not as strong and influential as initially hoped. Johnson’s slid-
ing popularity can be attributed to a number of factors throughout the
year, not the least of which was the consistently poor and reactive strategy
towards Vietnam that would become prominent within weeks of the State
of the Union speech.
The administration moved quickly to mitigate some of the domestic
criticism they faced—Sargent Shriver, who had been working in two roles
as Director of the Peace Corps and Director of the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO), was removed from the former role at Johnson’s
request, something he announced on 17 January.23 Johnson claimed this
was done due to unprecedented growth in the Peace Corps and the
demands of the OEO role on Shriver. However, Shriver’s claim that
“nobody had much advance notice” and the timing of the announcement
certainly suggest the administration were looking to underscore their
commitment to the anti-poverty programme, a lynchpin of the Great
Society, in response to concerns over the Vietnam budget.24 Shriver him-
self had close connections to the Kennedy family—being married to John
and Robert’s sister Eunice—and had worked hard as the director of the
Office of Economic Opportunity, which oversaw the War on Poverty and
had been created by Shriver himself in 1964. This was an astute move, but
as Carroll Kilpatrick of the Washington Post pointed out, one that came in
response to criticism from Republican commentators, who argued that
Shriver had mismanaged the War on Poverty from the beginning.25 For his
part, Shriver was genuinely concerned with anti-poverty legislation and
the public service he was carrying out; his future son-in-law Arnold
Schwarzenegger relayed his lifelong commitment to this when he chal-
lenged the actor to use his fame to bring “a spotlight” to social issues.26

23
 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks Upon Announcing Appointments in the Peace Corps and
in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Online by Gerhard Peters and John
T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project [Link]
node/238400.
24
 Oral history transcript, R. Sargent Shriver, interview 5 (V), 11/29/1990, by Michael
L. Gillette, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021,
[Link]
25
 C Kilpatrick, LBJ Limits Shriver to Poverty Job, Washington Post, 18 January 1966, p. A1.
26
 A Schwarzenegger, Total Recall, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2012), p. 376.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  139

Shriver himself would later proclaim “extraordinarily pleased” with some

of the achievements of the OEO.27
Vietnam took centre stage during the first month of 1966; as much as
the president wanted to concentrate on the Great Society, he found him-
self bogged down by the bombing halt, and the groups of both hawks and
doves who disagreed with his actions. The halt was extended to 31 January,
which attracted criticism from hawks, particularly in government, while
the eventual decision to resume bombing at the end of January drew criti-
cism from high-profile doves, particularly in the written press. Two articles
in the New York Times exemplify the situation. The first was from 9 January
in which Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato was reported to have urged the
Ambassador-at-Large Averell Harriman to continue the bombing halt
while Japan approached the Soviet Union with peace terms.28 The second
article, from 23 January, was “a virtual plea” from US Chief of Staff of the
Army (and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Gen. Earle
G. Wheeler, to bring the bombing halt to an end and resume the assault
on North Vietnam. Wheeler asserted in congressional testimony: “If you
stop bombing North Vietnam, in effect you throw one of your blue chips
for negotiation over your shoulder.”29 With such vastly mixed messages
from politicians and military experts from both within America and from
the watching international community, it is not surprising that public
opinion in the United States was deeply divided. While it is true that
Johnson did not have an adequate proactive approach towards press
reporting of the Vietnam situation, it is perhaps more difficult to place the
blame for this specifically on his own head. The confused nature of
American public opinion on Vietnam is even further shown by the letters
chosen for publication by Time on 14 January 1966. In consecutive letters
the magazine’s choice of Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of US
forces in Vietnam, as Man of the Year for 1965 was called “[T]he greatest
tribute anyone has paid our men fighting in Viet Nam… Time’s thank you
to the men dying for our lives,” and “outrageous and offensive to all who

27
 Oral history transcript, R. Sargent Shriver, interview 5 (V), 11/29/1990, by Michael
L. Gillette, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021,
[Link]
28
 Emerson Chaplin, “Sato Now Urging U.S. Extend Pause,” New York Times, 9 January
1966, p. 2.
29
 Jack Raymond, “Wheeler Favors Further Bombing of North Vietnam,” New York Times,
23 January, 1966, p. 1.
140  B. W. QUAIL

work and pray for peace.”30 It is clear that by 1966, the issue of Vietnam
deeply divided the national consciousness of the United States and that
Johnson did not know how to react.
Johnson’s speech confirming the end of the bombing pause on 31
January was broadcast to the American public on the same day.31 James
“Scotty” Reston, whom Johnson previously trusted to write pro-­
government stories, but was no longer “In Johnson’s pocket,” as
Democratic political advisor James Rowe put it, wrote an article express-
ing his feelings on the resumption of bombing in North Vietnam.32 “What
evidence is there,” asked Reston, “that raising the level of violence will do
any better now than it has done in the past?”33 This was the kind of article
that Johnson found borderline unpatriotic in its questioning of the
American government—Reston would publish a similar article later in the
year that angered the president to the point of asking an aide to call Reston
up and make him aware that Johnson found him “Dishonest and
untruthful.”34 The resumption of bombing was indicative of the kind of
decision that Johnson had to make regularly with regard to Vietnam, deci-
sions which would undoubtedly alienate a group of either hawks or doves.
Without a coherent, decisive media strategy, he was unable to properly
articulate his actions, and this contributed to the nosedive that his popu-
larity would take as 1966 wore on. Reston’s article and Johnson’s reaction
to it illustrate this point and show how the president struggled to accept
that there would most likely be criticism of his actions, making it difficult
to have a clear enough head to strategise against unfavourable press cover-
age. Turner argues that Johnson’s thin skin and inability to take the pres-
sure of criticism was one of the biggest factors in his difficulties with the
press, while Sam Houston Johnson turned this around, believing that the
press were unnecessarily harsh on his brother. The truth is somewhere

30
 P J Molay and Y Krasna, “Letters to the Editor,” Time, 14 January 1966, p. 17. The
Man of the Year cover appeared on the 7 January 1966 issue, with a full article detailing the
reasoning behind the award.
31
 A full transcript, video and audio recording of this message is in the University of
Virginia’s Miller Center’s Presidency Project archives, and online at [Link]
org/president/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-5936.
32
 Memorandum from Rowe to Johnson, undated, in Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual
War, p. 117.
33
 J Reston, “The Bombing Decision: More U.S. Troops in Vietnam Foreseen, But Not
Attacks on Hanoi or Haiphong,” New York Times, 1 February 1966, p. 42 .
34
 Quoted in Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 168.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  141

between these polar opposites. It is true that Johnson was not media
friendly and had difficulty accepting bad press; it is also true that the press
found it difficult to work with Johnson, which led to negative publicity.
The first months of 1966 reinforced the lines that was drawn since Johnson
took the presidency; with public opinion beginning to free fall, the press
were given more free rein than ever to go after Johnson.
Johnson directed Dean Rusk to tell the press very little regarding the
bombing resumption as January progressed; in a meeting of key advisors
on 20 January, the almost verbatim notes show that he asked that Rusk tell
the press: “It’s been 26 days since cease bombing. Harriman has been to
11 Capitals. Goldberg and I, too, plus 113 nations. We know we’ve done
everything we can do and should do to talk rather than fight. Adequate
time to reply—nothing encouraging—we don’t want to mislead American
public.”35 He added that he would like to see headlines in the following
day’s papers proclaiming that “The peace jig is up,” and he gave away his
mistrust of the press by commenting, “We don’t have to say everything we
know to newspapers.” Because this was a meeting of key, trusted staff
members, such as Valenti, Moyers and Rusk, the president was able to give
vent to anger to some degree about issues with the press without being
seriously challenged. Several of his staffers agreed with his point of view,
including Jack Valenti; “every day,” Valenti once admonished, “the presi-
dent uneasily imagines himself in danger of ambush by nosy newsmen
who ought to be praising him instead of criticizing him.”36 Only George
Ball would argue against the bombing resumption, forwarding two papers
to the president following this meeting which argued that resuming
bombing against North Vietnam has the dual impact of increasing the
likelihood of escalation and failing to induce Hanoi to commit to discus-
sions and cease their own aggression.
In the discussions about resumption that followed this meeting, Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy had the presi-
dent’s ear, and he urged a prompt resumption of the bombing. Bundy
acknowledged the positives of waiting, then argued that doves would talk
of delay but “always oppose any resumption” that the Republicans would
make headway with their own criticisms of Johnson’s administration if he
appeared to dither on bombing. Moreover, waiting further would cause

35
 Notes of Meeting, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, doc. 32, January
1966, p. 99.
36
 J Valenti, A Very Human President (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), p. 206.
142  B. W. QUAIL

problems for the troops already on the ground.37 Bundy’s thesis ran
entirely counter to Ball’s arguments, and Johnson eventually took Bundy’s
advice; the bombing of North Vietnam resumed on 31 January and was
announced in a broadcast by Johnson from the White House at 10 am. He
concluded with the comment that Secretary Rusk was to meet with the
press to brief them and give the country “and the entire world a thorough
and comprehensive account of all of the diplomatic efforts conducted in
these last five weeks in our continuing policy of peace and freedom for
South Vietnam.”38
Johnson’s press relations focused on what had already been done
behind the scenes to facilitate peace in Vietnam. The press were informed
of efforts that were made over the previous 37 days of paused bombing to
reach out to the Viet Cong leader Ho Chi Minh and begin talks; in the
meeting on 20 January, Johnson mentioned speaking to 113 nations and
the visit of Averell Harriman to 11 capitals in an information-seeking
capacity. While the efforts to bring the North Vietnamese to the table
were no doubt valiant, the important note is that they were not publicised
until after the fact. Johnson kept the public in the dark as to what the
Americans were doing to promote peace. A mere paragraph of the presi-
dent’s State of the Union Address was devoted to the post-bombing pause
peace campaign, and even this mentioned both “Public statements and
private communications,” which could only have given the impression of
a president keeping secrets from the electorate.
Johnson’s style of dealing with those around him on a “need to know”
basis was no longer working as well as in his years in the Senate; he was no
longer able to withhold information as he saw fit, and he had not yet
adapted his strategy to avoid the opening of a credibility gap by 1966.
Such accusations were further confounded by an admission from Press
Secretary Moyers that he had planted questions in the president’s press
conferences since he took office in 1965. Moyers was speaking on an

37
 The arguments for and against were summed up in a memorandum from Bundy to
Johnson on 24 January. See Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, 24 January 1966, FRUS, 1964–1968,
Vietnam, 1966, vol. IV, doc. 39, p. 125.
38
 L B Johnson, Statement by The President Announcing the Resumption of Air Strikes on
North Vietnam, 31 January 1966, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, p. 39.
A full transcript, video and audio recording of this message is in the University of Virginia’s
Miller Center’s Presidency Project archives, and online at [Link]
dent/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-5936.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  143

episode of The President’s Men, on the public broadcast channel National

Education Television (NET), a precursor to the modern Public Broadcasting
System (PBS).39 Moyers argued that he had only performed this action a
few times but was roundly criticised for his admission. The humourist Art
Buchwald said in his Washington Post column that “as the problems
President Johnson faces become more complex, more questions are going
to have to be planted, and eventually there will be no time left for ques-
tions that the reporters have thought up themselves.”40 Moyers further
claimed to receive reports from any special assistant who had spoken to the
press, “just to be kept informed as press secretary.”41 The New York Times
elaborated on his response, as Moyers said “It takes two to tango,” when
asked about his statement admitting to planting a reporter the previous
August.42 Moyers’s issues with the press in January grew however—an
article from 13 January that Johnson believed came from Carroll Kilpatrick
argued that Moyers never liked his job, was looking for a successor after
just seven months in the role, and that the difficulties inherent with the
role were not helped by his errant superior, who “sometimes says no when
he means no and that he sometimes says yes when he means yes.”43 This
prompted a telephone call between Moyers and President Johnson, where
Moyers affirmed his allegiance to the president by saying he was there
“until the end.” For his part, Johnson expressed his anger at the press yet
again. “This credibility thing is being forced on you by evil men,” he
claimed, referring to the press corps.44 Johnson’s quiet anger at Moyers’s
situation engendered the siege mentality the administration found itself
developing as questions grew over the credibility not just of Johnson, but
of his senior White House staff as well.

39
 “The President’s Men; 6; Bill Moyers.” 1966-01-09. Library of Congress, American
Archive of Public Broadcasting (GBH and the Library of Congress), Boston, MA and
Washington, DC. Web. January 25, 2021.
40
 A Buchwald, Capitol Punishment…Spontaneous Press Conference, Washington Post, 18
January 1966, p. A15.
41
 W Chapman, Who Called the White House? Washington Post, 12 January 1966, p. A1.
42
 J D Pomfret, White House Aide Describes New Economies, 12 January 1966, New York
Times, p. 14.
43
 Moyers Is Looking for a Successor After 7 Months in Job He Never Liked: Moyers Fed
Up With Job, Wants Out, Washington Post, 13 January 1966, pp. A1-2.
44
 Telephone conversation # 9489, sound recording, LBJ and BILL MOYERS,
1/13/1966, 1:27  AM, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and
Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021, [Link]
org/item/tel-09489.
144  B. W. QUAIL

This was not helped by other staff members he surrounded himself

with, particularly the likes of McGeorge Bundy, who appeared to be
equally mistrustful of the press and its motives and who, in times of crisis,
looked inwards to try to resolve internal problems rather than trying to
foster a two-way communication channel with the administration’s critics.
It was important at this critical juncture in Johnson’s presidency that he be
open and honest with the press and address the criticisms which began in
earnest over his secretive style. Once again, however, the opening month
of 1966 saw Johnson and his advisors regress into his mistrust of the
fourth estate, and this would only hamper him in the coming months. Not
only that, but the tactics of the administration yet again showed a reactive
element; rather than advertise and sell the efforts of their attempts to bring
the North Vietnamese to the table, only the fruitless results of this effort
were shown to the public. A proactive approach to this scenario may have
mitigated much of the criticism that was levelled at Johnson from both the
media and the public regarding his guarded nature. By once again falling
into the trap of using a reactive strategy towards media coverage, the
administration did not give itself a chance to pre-emptively move against
its critics and opened itself up to scathing criticism for its handling of the
ceasefire, both at the time and later in the presidency, as pressure began to
mount concerning Johnson’s handling of the war.
In terms of the war, the next big issue on Johnson’s mind was the
Honolulu conference in early February. On 31 January, Jack Valenti wrote
a memorandum to Johnson overtly suggesting the use of the Honolulu
conference as a place to make a good impression on the world’s media;
point five of his six-point message stated:

But most important, the President could appear with [South Vietnamese]
Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky and stress the political, economic and
social future of South Vietnam once the fighting has stopped. Perhaps eco-
nomic news could be announced here—some specifics on the Mekong River
project—housing projects—land reform—such a meeting could serve as a
focal point for showing how bright the future for South Vietnam could
be—and indeed a future for all of Southeast Asia.45

45
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Valenti) to President Johnson,
FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam 1966, doc. 58, 31 January 1966, p. 194.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  145

Clearly then, the president’s staff saw Honolulu as an opportunity to

make an impression on the world and to promote the Johnsonian vision
for Vietnam in a post-war climate. It was also important, on the day that
the bombing resumption was announced, to have a contingency plan in
place to ensure that public opinion was not significantly affected by the
news of renewed hostilities in Vietnam. Valenti also suggested writing to
the Pope and briefing members of the cabinet in order to increase visibility
and transparency over the course of action in Vietnam; notably Valenti
commented that, “As Senator Clinton P. Anderson [D-New Mexico] told
me, there are many Senators and Congressmen who have not had the
opportunity to hear the briefings of Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.46
That Anderson, who was an important member of the Democratic Party,
was not up to speed on the plans of the president and the decision to
resume bombing before the public announcement is interesting to note;
Johnson favoured secrecy, not only with the press and public, but also
with key members of his own party. Karnow notes that he surrounded
himself with congressional loyalists increasingly during 1966 and beyond,
implying strongly that those who were not with the president were sys-
tematically set aside as pressure and criticism began to mount and were
removed from the administration’s decision-making processes.47
Despite Valenti’s suggestion, Johnson appeared to have other ideas. He
called Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 3 February and stated that he did
not “want any other human to know this… but I think I would like to go
out to Honolulu on Saturday night with you and Bob [McNamara].” He
observed that this trip would be “Just the most secret thing that we can
have in the State Department.”48 This is yet another example of Johnson’s
preference for secrecy; his intention was as stated by Valenti; to go to
Honolulu himself to discuss matters of Vietnam, but rather than do as his
aide suggested and use the occasion to his advantage and court the world’s
media, he apparently did not want it publicised that he was going to do
this. Notably on the same day, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
decided to hold televised hearings on Johnson’s request in the budget for
$400 million in supplementary foreign aid funds for Vietnam. Five men
were interviewed: Agency for International Development Administrator

46
 Memorandum from Valenti to Johnson, 31 January 1966.
47
 S Karnow, Vietnam: A History (London: Century, 1983), p. 484.
48
 Telephone conversation between President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, 3
February 1966, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam 1966, doc. 63, pp. 203–204.
146  B. W. QUAIL

David Bell on 4 February, General James Gavin on 8 February, former

Ambassador George Kennan on 10 February, General Maxwell Taylor on
17 February and Dean Rusk on 18 February.49 Johnson noted after the
first day of hearings to Postmaster General (and Democratic Party strate-
gist) Larry F. O’Brien that this was “A very, very disastrous break.”50 He
noted that Senators Mike Mansfield [D-Montana] and J. William Fulbright
[D-Arkansas], in particular, “Could kill all of our legislation.”51 Mansfield
was the Majority Leader and carried some power within the Senate. The
Honolulu conference and Congressional Hearings on the war would now
become the most important aspects of Vietnam from a public relations
point of view for Johnson; it became important for him to make a strong
statement about his views on Vietnam and exert as much influence as pos-
sible while Congress held its hearings. Fulbright, the chair of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, completed his break from Johnson’s
political side that began following the adoption of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and would in the same year publish his harshly critical work on
Vietnam, The Arrogance of Power. Fulbright felt duped over Johnson’s
manipulation of him during the Gulf of Tonkin crisis and had by now
adopted an anti-war stance. Mansfield for his part was also against conflict
in Vietnam.52 The committee membership also included Senator Wayne
Morse [D-Oregon], one of only two senators (the other was Ernest
Gruening [D-Alaska]) to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, who
was staunchly anti-war throughout the escalating conflict.53 The

49
 The testimony of these men can be found in several places; a video recording of Taylor’s
testimony is available for view via C-Span, with a further video of Rusk’s appearance before
the committee also available. Transcripts of all interviews are available in the work The
Vietnam Hearings: The Complete Statements of Dean Rusk, James M Gavin, George F Kennan,
Maxwell D Taylor with extensive excerpts from their testimonies, (New York: Vintage
Books, 1966).
50
 Telephone conversation cited in Editor’s Note, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam
1966, doc. 64, 5 February 1966, p. 207.
51
 A full transcript of the conversation between LBJ and O’Brien is available on YouTube,
courtesy of the LBJ Presidential Library at the following location; [Link]
com/watch?v=N5Hs3bERos8.
52
 On events that soured the Fulbright-Johnson relationship, see discussion of the Gulf of
Tonkin Crisis in Chap. 2.
53
 On the testimony of the five men, with supporting documents and the list of Committee
members, see Supplemental foreign assistance, fiscal year, 1966: Vietnam: hearings before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-ninth Congress, second session, on
S. 2793, to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended : 28 January, 4, 8,
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  147

committee members were able to take strength from the growing unease
over the war in the Senate. With figures such as Mansfield showing their
lack of support it was clear that Fulbright and Morse felt confident enough
in receiving support from their colleagues in the Senate to investigate the
Johnson administration’s actions in Vietnam to conduct a public hearing
on the matter.
Johnson was certainly keenly aware of the antagonising forces within
the committee, and it now became vitally important to head them off in
the arena of public opinion. Turner notes that Fulbright was seeking to
have his own concerns about Vietnam heard by the nation at large, and
while the committee was unsuccessful in having the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution repealed, its hearings did bring Senate discontent to the fore
and solidify much of the dissent that was brewing politically against
Johnson’s war policies.54 If the hearings solidified Senate discontent, the
White House response was to speed up its attempts to spread the Vietnam
War message to press and public. The soon-to-depart McGeorge Bundy
and Vice President Humphrey were sent to defend the president’s policies
on Meet the Press, a national television show aired by the National
Broadcasting Company (NBC) since 1947, in which politicians took ques-
tions from members of the press and other commentators.55 But, once
again, we find Johnson’s press strategy failing in terms of the administra-
tion’s response. Johnson was unable to address questions that the press
were already asking, as were the public. With the committee hearings, as
with many other major challenges to Johnson’s authority during this
period, the administration simply did not have a proactive method of deal-
ing with the questions of critics. The administration found themselves
answering serious questions about their actions in Vietnam; the hearings
had clear potential to damage the integrity and credibility of the

10, 17 and 18 February, 1966. As accessed on 4 February 2017 at [Link]/

Record/010309694.
54
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, pp. 155–57 discusses the effect of the congressional
hearings on Johnson.
55
 McGeorge Bundy left in early 1966 to become president of the Ford Foundation.
Gordon Goldstein’s biography on Bundy, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path
to War in Vietnam (New York: Holt, 2009), is an excellent account of his life in the Johnson
administration; for a further account of the lives of McGeorge and his brother William, see
Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy: Brothers in Arms (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1999). Bundy’s exit is also mentioned by Turner in Lyndon
Johnson’s Dual War p. 157; the full interview with Humphrey and Bundy is available from
the Library of Congress.
148  B. W. QUAIL

government. Johnson seemed to have no other plan of action than to deal

with the actions of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations after the
potential damage was done in the hearings—this once again showed a
reactive attitude from Johnson. A proactive approach could have seen
Johnson moving out in front of the likes of Fulbright with a strong plan
of action for Vietnam or even update on the progress of the war, but this
did not happen. Johnson’s proclamation that “the tide is turning” in the
war came at a dinner in New  York City during which he received the
National Freedom Award—six days after the Committee interviewed
Dean Rusk—was a feeble attempt to draw attention from the hearings.
Scotty Reston wrote in the New York Times on 25 February that the
speech was a symbol of the “tragedy” of his leadership; he noted that
Johnson’s remarks were full of contradictions and that the president
“looked troubled and sounded harried in New York.”56 Once again the
Johnsonian mistrust of his enemies and disinclination to reveal informa-
tion to the public was causing him problems. In his discussion with
O’Brien on 5 February, Johnson intimated that Rusk needed to work hard
in a discussion with Fulbright not to reveal information, noting that,
“What you get into, in these open sessions on military matters, is if you
give them information on the boys out there you endanger them, if you
don’t you’re not responsive.”57 Once again, this is a fundamental marker
of Johnson’s mistrust of his enemies. This statement, much like several
previously mentioned, shows how Johnson’s world view appeared to be
shifting to a siege mentality wherein the press and the public and sceptical
politicians became the enemy, with the administration fighting against
what they saw as an erroneous public perception propagated by an
unfriendly press. Johnson’s speech implies that regardless of what he did,
there was no chance of winning universal approval; while this is true, it
shows that Johnson could not make a ­decisive move for fear of losing
more of the consensus he was now struggling to hold together.
Despite the further solidification of this attitude, Johnson was aware of
the need to make changes and work to improve his public profile in the
early part of the year. On 17 March Senator Everett Dirksen [R-Illinois]

56
 J Reston, “New York: President Johnson’s Dreams,” New York Times, 25 February
1966, p. 30.
57
 Telephone conversation between LBJ and L F O’Brien, 5 February 1966, at 8.27 am,
provided by LBJ Library; accessed on 4 May 2017 at [Link]
watch?v=N5Hs3bERos8.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  149

and Congressman Gerald Ford [R-Michigan], the House Minority Leader,

used the term “credibility gap” (a play on the so-called missile gap Cold
War coinage by John F. Kennedy in the late 1950s) to describe the admin-
istration’s economic actions; the term would soon become common to
describe Johnson’s actions towards Vietnam. Dirksen advised the press
that the GOP “did not invent the term credibility gap, but I guess we’re
going to use it a little.”58 To address criticisms about the credibility of
information passed on by the administration and to mitigate the departure
of key staff member McGeorge Bundy who became president of the Ford
Foundation, Johnson appointed two special assistants in Robert Kintner
and Walt Rostow. The appointments were announced to the public via the
president’s weekly press conference on 31 March. Kintner, a former exec-
utive with NBC, brought to the table what Johnson termed as “Wide
experience in public affairs, journalism, and executive management.”59 As
a broadcaster and journalist, Kintner was exactly the kind of man Johnson
needed to advise him on press strategies. It was notable that the adminis-
tration had not previously spent time courting television and network
executives to provide expertise to the government. Johnson’s final press
secretary George Christian would later claim when asked about whether
the administration typically retained television experts that there were
“different people at different times.” He believed Johnson relied on the
external expertise of contacts in the industry, rather than looking explicitly
for experts within his staff.60
Rostow moved up to the president’s advisory staff from the Department
of State to advise on foreign policy, while Kintner was announced as being
more aimed at domestic affairs. Rostow saw himself as more of a

58
 J D Morris, “G.O.P. Chiefs Score Use of Statistics,” New York Times, 18 March 1966,
p. 22. The “gap” device was used widely in this period. Kennedy also caused the term “mus-
cle gap” to be used after noting a disparity between the athleticism of American youth and
that of the USA’s allies and enemies. See John F.  Kennedy, “The Soft American,” Sports
Illustrated, 26 December 1960, at [Link]
20-%[Link] and J M De Oca, “The ‘Muscle Gap’: Physical
Education and US Fears of Depleted Masculinity, 1954–1963,” in S Wagg and D L Andrews
(eds.), East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 123–48.
59
 See President’s News Conference of 31 March 1966, LBJ’s Remarks on Vietnam, box
108, LBJ Library. Also available in the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States series.
60
 Oral history transcript, George E. Christian, interview 6 (VI), 9/17/1979, by David
Culbert, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 21, 2021,
[Link]
150  B. W. QUAIL

counsellor to the president than an advisor on national security and has

been criticised in later years for skewing the flow of information that the
president received.61 At the same press conference, Johnson ominously
answered a reporter’s question on Vietnam: “I think that there is a very
adequate free flow of information out there, and everything that is
reported to this Government in that field is pretty well known to you.”62
In a private memorandum sent to senior cabinet members, Johnson also
directed that Robert W. Komer be designated as special assistant to the
president. He was described as “Blowtorch Bob,” by South Vietnam
ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr; the writer of his obituary called him
“a point man in the United States’ star-crossed campaign to win hearts
and minds in Vietnam” and claimed arguing with him was “like having a
flamethrower aimed at the seat of one’s pants” and noted that he pos-
sessed a “near religious faith in the power of facts and statistics,” to win in
Vietnam.63 Komer’s main job would be the “co-ordination and supervi-
sion in Washington of U.S. non-military programs for peaceful construc-
tion relating to Vietnam.” Johnson also pointed out that Komer had a
special interest in the progress of new initiatives to “attack” hunger, igno-
rance and disease in Southeast Asia.64 Komer noted in his files that his
appointment was the work of senior staff members Joe Califano and Bill
Moyers, who had “worn down” members of the State Department who
wanted to fit this job to their own conception of American action in
Vietnam.65
This exchange shows two major issues with Johnsonian policy on
Vietnam. First, in not announcing Komer’s new job role alongside the
new appointments in his press conference, Lyndon Johnson missed a spar-
kling opportunity to advertise the good that was being done in Vietnam

61
 For an in-depth analysis on Rostow’s performance as National Security Advisor, and the
advisory process under his supervision, see K V Mulcahy, “Walt Rostow as National Security
Advisor, 1966–1969,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2 (Spring 1995),
pp.  223–36, and K V Mulcahy, “Rethinking Groupthink: Walt Rostow and the National
Security Advisory Process in the Johnson Administration,” Presidential Studies Quarterly,
vol. 25, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237–50.
62
 President’s News Conference of 31 March 1966.
63
 T Weiner, “Robert Komer, 78, Figure In Vietnam, Dies,” New York Times, 12 April
2000, accessed online on 3 February 2017 at [Link]
world/[Link].
64
 National Security Action Memorandum no. 343, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam,
1966, doc. 102, 28 March 1966, pp. 302–303.
65
 R Komer, quoted in K J Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 109.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  151

and show that a cohesive strategy for rebuilding the country and improv-
ing infrastructure was being put into place, something which would in
turn help the United States’ exit strategy when the war came to a conclu-
sion and boost confidence in the administration’s ability to end the war
and deliver information to the public on progress in Southeast Asia.
Komer’s belief in the power of facts and statistics is important to note—it
may have been prudent to have him work with Barry Zorthian, the almost
legendary presenter of the “5 o’clock follies” news briefings in Vietnam,
using some of those statistics. It seems that nobody, from Johnson down
to his lower staff members, thought that this would be a way to boost
opinion ratings or help press relations, and this shows the entire adminis-
tration to be out of touch with public sentiment on the matter. A Gallup
Poll taken in mid-February 1966 and published early March put the presi-
dent’s approval rating on Vietnam at 50%.66 The president’s own job rat-
ing came in at 54%—a reasonable rating, but still far below what Johnson
previously enjoyed. It should be noted that approval ratings and job rat-
ings do not necessarily mean the same thing; an approval rating measures
popularity, while the job rating was intended to measure how well the
public thought Johnson was performing in his role. A further poll pub-
lished on 30 March showed improvement—Johnson’s job rating came in
at 58%, so perhaps the administration saw no reason to be alarmed.67 But
this is another case of a decidedly short-term strategy that was quickly
becoming normal for Johnson and his staff. By not announcing an appoint-
ment such as this there was no retort when the already vocal criticisms of
his Vietnam policy became more widespread, and he could not seem to
understand why pointing to information that was suppressed, whether by
design or not, did not placate his critics. The second problem with this
communication is that it shows division within the administration; hawks
in the administration such as Walt Rostow were very clearly not in favour
of the pacification and rebuilding job that Komer had been appointed to
do and the fact that they needed to be “worn down,” as Komer put it,
shows that this was the case. In fact, Rusk, himself, stated his concerns and
objections in telephone calls with Califano and Moyers in the preceding
days.68 Without unity in the veteran staff members of the administration,

66
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1993.
67
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 1998.
68
 Komer is quoted extensively in Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, pp. 107–109.
152  B. W. QUAIL

the task of selling a war to the people of the United States became an
impossible one.
The president also instructed Rusk, McNamara, Walt Rostow, Moyers
and Jack Valenti that he wanted to “Invite publishers and editors to state
dinners—and have them in earlier to lunch with the President and Rusk
and McNamara.”69 In the background, a draft scenario prepared by the
Department of Defense noted that, “the political situation is in ‘terminal
sickness’ and even the military prognosis is of an escalating stalemate.”70
The argument that the Johnson administration knew of the basic futility
of the war is not being contested, but it is still important to note it and this
document is proof that the administration were made aware at an early
stage that the war was likely to drag on for an extended period of time.
Notably, the New York Times reported just days earlier that the administra-
tion suspended all congressional trips to South Vietnam amid concerns
over the weakening political situation in the area at the time, “[d]ampen-
ing optimism” over the course of the war.71 In terms of public relations,
the administration should have moved quickly to quell fears while acknowl-
edging the possibility of a longer war. Not doing this contributed to the
credibility gap idea that had already been exploited by Everett Dirksen and
opened the Johnson administration up to further criticism down the line
as it became clear that the public were misled on the likely duration of the
war. This is further illustrated by newspaper reports of public unrest in the
United States at the political situation in South Vietnam, which began to
filter out of the country during spring. On 27 May, the New York Times
reported that the United States cultural centre and library was sacked and
burned by Buddhist students protesting against American support for the
South Vietnamese Prime Minister, Nguyen Cao Ky. The report noted that
the centre’s director—Albert Ball—was more resigned than shocked when
notified of the imminent attack, giving the impression to the readership of
the Times that such an event was not uncommon against American forces

69
 Notes of meeting, Washington, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam 1966, document
109, 2 April 1966, p. 316.
70
 Draft Scenario Prepared in the Department of Defense, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV,
Vietnam 1966, doc. 114, 5 April 1966, pp. 327–28.
71
 J W Finney, “U.S. Defers Trips by Congressmen to South Vietnam,” New York Times, 2
April 1966, p. 1, 3.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  153

in South Vietnam and undoubtedly helping to turn the mood against the
war in some readers.72
As criticism about the war increased, domestic matters once again took
centre stage as the 1966 mid-term elections required the administration to
begin to develop a strategy to ensure that Great Society plans were not
foiled by a swing to the Republicans. On 11 May, a document by Kintner
was sent to the president. Johnson previously approved an outline of plans
that would improve “the quality and coordination of Cabinet and sub-­
Cabinet speakers throughout the [mid-term election] campaign.”73 It was
vitally important for Johnson’s domestic plans to ensure a Democratic
victory in the mid-term elections; any strong Republican gains would
jeopardise the easy movement that Great Society programmes previously
enjoyed through the American political system. The document came with
a tick box asking Johnson to approve the draft remarks for a cabinet meet-
ing the following Tuesday—there is no evidence that Johnson signed off
on this. The document discusses in great detail important recent addresses
that potential campaign speakers should have knowledge of in both
domestic and foreign policy terms: notably the Honolulu conference of
February and the president’s request to resume bombing on 31 January
and the Medical Assistance Program of 31 March and the Medicare
Extension Bill signing of 8 April.74
At the end of 1965, Gallup Polls conducted in December showed the
president’s approval rating on matters relating to the situation in Vietnam
at 56%.75 This was still a strong showing, given the conflicting news report-
age discussed earlier in this chapter, especially that which surrounding the
bombing pause. By the middle of 1966, the mood in the United States
had shifted rapidly. A Harris Poll published in early June announced that
the public were getting more hostile over Vietnam—Harris felt that his
poll findings reflected not an increase in the dove position, but increased
militancy amongst the people and “a get it over with attitude,” and further
noted that “critics of Mr Johnson who argue that the escalation of the war

72
 R W Apple, Jr., “Buddhist Students Wreck American Center in Hue,” New York Times,
27 May 1966, p. 1, 4. A UPI (United Press International) story titled “USIA Sacked By
Students in Viet Nam,” Henderson Times-News (Henderson, NC) on 26 May 1966, p. 1,
notes that this very building had been destroyed twice in two years.
73
 Memorandum from Kintner to President Johnson, 11 May 1966, Office Files of
Frederick Panzer, box 120, LBJ Library, p. 1.
74
 Ibid., p. 7.
75
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, 8 January 1966, p. 1982.
154  B. W. QUAIL

in Viet Nam has been the wrong emphasis in the wrong place at the wrong
time have not convinced American public opinion that the issue is as sim-
ple as that.”76 In August opinion polls favouring the president were hard
to come by. A published Gallup Poll on 24 August showed Vietnam
approval as down to 43%, with 39% now outright disapproving of the
president’s actions on the matter.77 This indicated a significant slip as
Johnson’s approval ratings now sat below 50% and would continue to do
so on a regular basis for the rest of his presidency. Johnson was well known
for carrying favourable opinion polls in his pocket and showing them to
those who might question his policies; these were quickly becoming
harder and harder for his staff to find.78 However, Vietnam cannot be
solely blamed for slipping job ratings. Hayes Redmon, who was dealing
with the archiving and notification of the president when it came to poll
results, received a memorandum from Bill Moyers on 24 August on poll-
ing in Florida; it notes that only a small proportion of “A good job” were
shown to Johnson; several points of interest did not find their way to him.
Redmon’s job was described by Robert M. Eisinger as relaying polls such
as this to Moyers, who would “usually send a memo to President Johnson,”
for his night reading.79
The president’s domestic policies now drew a lower favourable rating
than his Vietnam actions; Moyers was able to explain this as Florida voters’
upset over the pace of civil rights developments in the South.80 This mem-
orandum is an example of the difficulty in which the administration found
itself in during the latter months of 1966; an inconsistent and reactive
press strategy meant that almost 20% of voters in the Florida polls were
unable to express opinions on recent American bombings in Hanoi and
Haiphong, while 37% were outright unfavourable. Once again, Moyers
had to step in to try and mitigate the president’s declining popularity by
trying to point out that few other US leaders discussed in polling results

76
 L Harris, “Public Getting More Hostile Over Viet Nam,” Winona Daily News (Winona,
MN), 14 June 1966, p. 5.
77
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2024.
78
 R Dallek mentions Johnson’s penchant for doing this several times in Lyndon B Johnson:
Portrait of a President (New York: Penguin, 2004), notably on p. 232.
79
 R M Eisinger, The Evolution of Presidential Polling (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), p. 57.
80
 Memorandum from Bill Moyers to Hayes Redmon, 24 August 1966, Office Files of
Frederick Panzer, box 340, LBJ Library, p. 1.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  155

“could be called popular,”81 including the likes of Vice President Hubert

Humphrey and John Kennedy. The president’s civil rights legislation was
quickly alienating voters in the southern states; Moyers’s belief was cer-
tainly that this is why Florida voters were not warming to the president,
and it was always going to be a struggle for Johnson to pressure the South
into accepting civil rights legislation; for all of the big speeches about tol-
erance and equality that preceded the signing of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the administration did not target
the hardest to reach voters in states such as Alabama, and while this is
understandable and perhaps even expected in the wake of the large-scale
support for these bills in the North, the likes of Moyers obviously felt that
LBJ was feeling the wrath of white, Southern voters in opinion polls com-
ing out of the South.
As the mid-term elections grew closer, the mood in the Democratic
Party was that Vietnam was liable to hurt the party, if not specific party
members, going forward. Senator Mike Mansfield sent Johnson details of
a meeting between several important Democratic senators, including
Richard Russell Jr. [D-Georgia], Fulbright, Ralph Yarborough [D-Texas],
who served alongside LBJ as a representative from Texas before the latter
became vice president in 1961, and Chief Majority Whip Russell B. Long
[D-Louisiana].82 Some of those present agreed that broadcasts from CBS
(Columbia Broadcasting Service) journalist Eric Sevareid and ABC
(American Broadcasting Corporation) newsman Bill Lawrence had been
“very revealing… and suggest we have not, heretofore, been getting a
complete and accurate picture of what has been happening in Vietnam.”
While the group were mixed on whether or not to pull out of Vietnam,
Mansfield’s summary of the political implications discussed was unani-
mously agreed with; the Democratic Party was being hurt, and would
continue to be so if the war dragged on, and people were no longer fol-
lowing the president with enthusiasm due to doubt over American objec-
tives that was caused by the reactive and unclear relationship that developed
between the president and the press, and the war was hampering the

81
 Ibid., p. 2.
82
 It is also worth noting that Yarborough had been involved in a long-running feud with
Johnson’s great Texan political ally, Governor John Connally. Richard Russell was a long-
standing senator from Georgia with close ties to Johnson; Russell B. Long was the son of
Huey Long, himself a former Louisiana governor and senator, and one of only two sitting
US senators to be assassinated. All of these men had strong political pedigrees.
156  B. W. QUAIL

domestic programmes of the administration. Mansfield concluded that

Vietnam was now a worse situation than the Korean War.83
This meeting again illustrates several issues with the Johnsonian strat-
egy of being secretive over the war; with elections coming up it was clear
that important members of Congress were not informed about their own
president’s motives and goals in Vietnam. Much like the fallout from his
public strategy, the president now faced criticism from within his own
party over the credibility of the facts given out about the war, from more
individuals than had opposed his previous plans and from outside the
Committee on Foreign Relations. Johnsonian allies such as his political
mentor, Richard B. Russell, found themselves with no information from
the president on the war. With all of this having been said, Johnson took
the opportunity on 14 August to announce to the waiting media that, “a
communist military takeover in South Vietnam is no longer just improb-
able… it is impossible,” while recounting a long conversation with General
Westmoreland the previous evening.84 However, Westmoreland, for his
part, was evasive when asked whether his forces could begin to withdraw
as early as 1968—this illustrates even further the lack of connection
between Johnson’s statements and the reality of the situation.85 Johnson
aimed another shot at the press in remarks on the war made to the Navy
League in Manchester, New Hampshire, on 20 August, noting on the
subject of South Vietnamese elections, “I hope the press media will see
that these activities are put in a goldfish bowl so that all of our people can
observe the tactics the [Viet Cong] resort to—in assassinations, in terror,
in infiltrations, in the massacres—in order to keep people from having a
chance to vote in an election.”86 The barbed comment is clear; Johnson
felt that too much negative press commentary was being given to the war
and wanted to see what he felt was a more patriotic and, in his eyes, unbi-
ased commentary about the enemy. As the election campaign continued,
McNamara discussed a termination of bombing in North Vietnam, but

83
 Memorandum from Senator Mike Mansfield to President Johnson, FRUS 1964–1968,
vol. IV, Vietnam 1966, doc. 166, 29 June 1966, p. 464.
84
 “President Johnson and General Westmoreland Meet to Discuss the Situation in Viet-­
Nam,” [no author] Department of State Bulletin, vol. 55, 5 September 1966, p. 335.
85
 “General Westmoreland’s News Conference,” Department of State Bulletin, vol. 55, 5
September 1966, p. 336.
86
 “Our Objective in Vietnam:” Address by President Johnson made before the Navy
League at Manchester, N.H., transcript in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. 55, 12
September 1966, p. 368.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  157

noted that this should wait until after the election, for fear of a negative
backlash.87
Domestically, the president was suffering from the increasing inflation
that became evident in the US economy, partially as a result of military
spending in Vietnam. The 16 September issue of Time noted that the
president finally requested emergency action on the economy from
Congress and contended that his critics charged that he should have acted
sooner; many did not like Johnson’s actions, some of which included of a
temporary suspension of tax incentives and accelerated depreciation allow-
ances for business investment in new equipment and construction.88 The
article noted that Senator Gerald Ford called the actions “belated fire
fighting” and that holding back on Great Society programmes was now
expected given that the president had vowed to cut federal spending by
$3 billion. This was a blow to the Great Society, and given that spending
on Vietnam put a significant strain on the economy, the criticism levied at
him by leading Democrats that the war was now affecting domestic pro-
grammes certainly rang true.
Evidence that the administration was disorganised and reactive in terms
of press and public opinion management can be found in the memoran-
dum that Moyers sent to Johnson on 30 September; the president’s press
secretary stated that there was no true organisation on the part of the
administration in terms of military affairs. “We have no one high official of
the government,” he chided, “who spends full time on the war.”89 The
lack of a stiff hierarchy in military affairs is significant to note. It shows a
lack of forward planning on behalf of the administration, in that none of
Johnson’s aides were assigned to work specifically on the war and the fact
that staff members were assigned to several projects at once meant a lack
of focus, which in turn led to reactive strategies not only in terms of public
affairs, but in many aspects of government—it is difficult to be proactive
when administration staff are working on multiple things at once. Jack
Valenti put this down to Johnson’s obsessive need for information and
noted that by 9 am on any given morning the president’s special assistants

87
 Telephone conversation between Secretary of Defense McNamara and President
Johnson, 5.30 pm, transcript in “Editorial Note,” FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam 1966,
doc. 240, 19 September 1966, p. 648.
88
 “The Economy: Action at Last,” Time, 16 September 1966, p. 33.
89
 Memorandum from the President’s Press Secretary (Moyers) to President Johnson,
FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV Vietnam 1966, document 250, 30 September, pp. 677–78.
158  B. W. QUAIL

had instructions on any special projects they were working on.90 Valenti’s
argument shows that the president lacked focus on many issues, often
demanding a lot from his staff. Moyers noted that the administration was
fighting a “part time war,” something that was also true of Johnson’s
battles with the press. While Valenti noted that the President often used
his lunch hour to try to cultivate favourable relationships with Washington
reporters, and Johnson evidently held an obsession with knowing what
reporters were writing about him, he simply reacted to the information he
gathered, rather than use it to build a more sensible approach to
the media.91
In a Gallup Poll published on 30 September, less than 50% of the polled
audience felt that Johnson made the correct decision in sending troops
into Vietnam, while 16% showed no opinion; this was a much more sig-
nificant shortfall in the approval numbers than previous polls, and the
consensus Johnson looked for—and received—in his early days was clearly
no longer in effect.
With the mid-term elections weeks away, Johnson and his key Vietnam
advisors flew to Manila for a conference on the war and the direction it was
to take. The difficulty faced by Johnson was that there was no prognosis
for a speedy end to the war, something which he could not disseminate
publicly without backtracking on previous statements. The Joint Chiefs of
Staffs agreed on 14 October that “we cannot predict with confidence that
the war can be brought to an end in two years” and advised Secretary
McNamara that for psychological reasons the administration should pre-
pare openly for a “long term, sustained military effort.”92 The president
and his press secretary, Moyers, were evidently not expecting much from
the conference, Johnson noting in a meeting of the National Security
Council on 15 October, the same day he signed a bill to create the United
States Department of Transport, that, “The conference will probably
accomplish little,” and Moyers that, “We should play down any expecta-
tion that a hard peace proposal will come out of the conference.”93
Clearly the need to play down the idea of a long-running ground war
was necessary, with less than a month to go before the vitally important
90
 J Valenti, A Very Human President (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), p. 127.
91
 Ibid., pp. 130–31.
92
 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, FRUS
1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam 1966, doc. 269, 14 October 1966, p. 739.
93
 B Smith, Summary Notes of the 565th Meeting of the National Security Council, FRUS
1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, doc. 272, 15 October 1966, p. 753.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  159

mid-term elections. However, once again Johnson and Moyers’s state-

ments were indicative of an attempt to withhold vital information from
the press and public. Once again this was a short-term strategy geared
towards the election cycle of the United States, which could not be sus-
tained for long afterwards given the need for increased troop numbers.
The president once more opened himself up to accusations of a credibility
gap through an inability to commit to a long-term press strategy. He yet
again betrayed his distrust of the press in a meeting with South Vietnamese
Premier Ky on 23 October, noting in his parting words: “Don’t let the
newspapermen divide us.”94 The conference itself was organised over two
days: 24 and 25 October. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs John T. McNaughton felt the conference went well, not-
ing “I think we got what we wanted,”95 while General Westmoreland
noted his surprise at the provision in the final communiqué for the United
States to withdraw troops within six months following the cessation of
North Vietnamese hostility.96
International reaction to the conference was wholly negative; Soviet
reaction was predictably hostile and French President Charles De Gaulle
was quoted in the New York Times as saying, “We find it totally detestable
that a small country should be bombed by a very big one.”97 The same
article doubted the public opinion boost Johnson was hoping for would
materialise. It noted that the president had not been well received every-
where he went during the Manila conference and ensuing two week tour
of Southeast Asia and Australia. The president’s car was attacked with
paint during his time in Australia in protest over Australian troops sup-
porting the American war effort—this action did not pique the anger of
the American public, unlike previous protests against President Eisenhower
in Tokyo, Japan, and Senator Richard Nixon [R-California] in Caracas,

94
 Notes of Meeting, Manila, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam 1966, doc. 280, 23
October 1966, p. 770.
95
 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
(McNaughton) to Secretary of Defense McNamara, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam,
1966, doc. 284, 26 October 1966, p. 783.
96
 Telegram from the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(Westmoreland), to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), FRUS 1964–1968, vol.
IV, Vietnam, 1966, doc. 286, 27 October 1966, p. 786.
97
 “The President’s Journey,” New York Times, 30 October 1966, p. 188.
160  B. W. QUAIL

Venezuela.98 The article further explained problematic results of opinion

polls on Johnson’s Vietnam actions by noting that “Almost all politicians
and political analysts believe that most of the American people are neither
hawks nor doves but—above all—want to see the war in Vietnam honour-
ably ended as soon as possible.”99 Clearly the trip had not been the ratings
booster that Johnson was looking for in the immediate run up to the
November election, and his insistence that American troops could leave
within six months of hostilities ceasing, pending North Vietnamese co-­
operation, was a smokescreen for the probability of a protracted ground
war. By putting the onus on Ho Chi Minh to cease hostilities, Johnson
was attempting to remove the blame from himself and his administration
for the increasingly lengthy war.
When the mid-term elections eventually came round in November, the
Democrats maintained their majority, meaning that Johnson still had the
ability to push through legislation for the Great Society and anything else
which demanded his attention. But as the New York Times pointed out in
a front-page story the day after Election Day, Republican gains were
strong and unexpected.100 Forty-seven seats in the House were gained in
more than thirty states, and Tom Wicker’s article summed up the atmo-
sphere by noting that in particular the re-election of Senator John Tower
[R-Texas] over Johnson associate John Connally was a blow to the pres-
tige of the president, who backed Connally in the run up to the elec-
tion.101 The Democrats lost three seats in the Senate, in Oregon, Tennessee
and Illinois, where the incumbent Senator Paul Douglas lost to his
Republican rival Charles Percy. This was a small loss, given that the
Democrats still held a healthy majority, but it was significant. By December,
the president’s sliding popularity was clear. George Gallup’s syndicated
poll showed the president’s approval rating at 48%, with 37% of polled
98
 For newsreel footage from British media sources of anti-US and anti-Eisenhower pro-
tests in Tokyo during his visit in 1960, see [Link]
eisenhower-­demonstrations-in-tokyo/query/Tokyo and footage of then Vice President
Nixon’s car being attacked in 1958 by Venezuelans protesting US Cold War policy at
[Link] Both sources accessed on 30
May 2017.
99
 “The President’s Journey – Meanwhile, Back in the States,” New York Times, 30 October
1966, p. 188.
100
 Notably, this election saw the entry of future President Ronald Reagan into Republican
politics, securing the governorship of California.
101
 T Wicker, “Republicans Stronger Than Was Expected In Off Year Vote,” New York
Times, 9 November 1966, p. 1, 25.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  161

voters outright disapproving of the way he was handling his job. Of those
polled 40% disapproved of the way Vietnam was being handled, while a
massive 44% regarded the Great Society programme unfavourably, com-
pared with just 32% who were happy with the domestic policies.102 Louis
Harris’s summary was even harsher—a press release on 30 November by
the Harris through the Washington Post Company contradicted Gallup’s
claims that the Asian trip boosted his popularity from October’s record
lows—the Harris Poll concluded that 43% of people approved of the way
Johnson was handling the presidency, with only 41% approving of his civil
rights programmes and 35% agreeing with his economic statements.103
This slump in approval over domestic issues is likely to have been because
of the effects of inflation on the American economy over the course of the
previous year; as previously mentioned, the president had been forced to
announce he would cut spending by $3 billion in order to curb out-of-­
control inflation and the Great Society programme was seen as a big
spending government programme that significantly contributed to this
emerging crisis. What this poll also shows is that, contrary to the adminis-
tration’s belief and the belief of some contemporary authors about
Johnson, public confidence in the Great Society was not necessarily nega-
tively impacted by Vietnam in 1966; while the president held a slim overall
lead in his Vietnam job rating at 44% approval versus 40% disapproval, his
domestic policy rating was already beginning to look lopsided. Sloan
believes that while Johnson cannot be absolved of blame for the failure to
make the necessary changes to taxation in 1965 and 1966, divisions
between his economic advisors on the best course of action and their fail-
ure to push the issue with him can partially mitigate his hesitation.104
Nevertheless, this is a clear failure by Johnson to be proactive in his domes-
tic policy making, and the reaction to this was, once again, criticism and
the undermining of his credibility as a leader.
With all this firmly in mind, the Johnson administration began to plan
for 1967 in the closing weeks of the year. Aides scrambled to begin the
process of writing the following year’s State of the Union Address, and an
extensive memorandum of the goals of 1967 was bookended by a final
102
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2038.
103
 United Press International, “Confidence in Johnson at Low Point,” Daily Herald
(Provo, UT), 6 December 1966, p. 4.
104
 J W Sloan, “President Johnson, The Council of Economic Advisers, and the Failure to
Raise Taxes in 1966 and 1967,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 1985),
pp. 97–98.
162  B. W. QUAIL

target of mounting, “a major information campaign to inform both the

US electorate and world opinion of the realities in Vietnam, finding ways
to measure progress.”105 Evidently the administration was aware of slip-
ping poll scores and the public opinion issues caused by the credibility
gap, and quickly needed to take steps to resolve this situation. The short-­
term nature of the administration’s thinking with regard to media rela-
tions now led to an outright credibility gap, and Johnson’s statements in
Manila, declaring a potential withdrawal within six months of hostilities
ceasing, did not help matters when in fact the president was preparing to
dig in for a lengthy conflict.
Matters were not helped in the final days of the year as New York Times
assistant editor Harrison E. Salisbury began a series of damaging dis-
patches from Vietnam, accusing the United States of indiscriminately
bombing civilian areas. His article on 27 December was entitled, “U.S. raids
batter two towns,” and noted that a textile factory in the civilian area of
Namdinh was bombed “nineteen times.” Salisbury contended that the
assaults on Namdinh were “supposed to be an object lesson to show
Hanoi what United States air power could accomplish if it were directed
more powerfully to North Vietnam’s capital.”106 In the same issue, Neil
Sheehan—an influential writer on Vietnam in his own right—reported
that Washington officials were made to acknowledge that American pilots
“accidentally” struck civilian areas, but the Department of Defense “issued
a statement re-emphasizing that it was United States policy to attack only
military targets in the North.”107 In his final news conference of 1966, on
31 December, the beleaguered president could only repeat the party line
that had been reported by Sheehan the previous week. When asked in the
same conference about General Westmoreland’s assertion that the war
would last several years, Johnson was evasive, stating, “I don’t think any-
one can say with any precision when the peace conference will come.” The
president was also asked outright whether he felt he was “doing things
wrong.” Johnson was resolute: “I know of no major decision that I have
made that I would strike from the statute books tomorrow or would

105
 Draft National Security Memorandum, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. IV, Vietnam, 1966, doc.
336, 10 December 1966, p. 923.
106
 H E Salisbury, “U.S. Raids Batter Two Towns,” New York Times, 27 December 1966,
pp. 1–3.
107
 N Sheehan, “Washington Concedes Bombs Hit Civilian Areas in North Vietnam,” New
York Times, 27 December 1966, p. 1, 3.
 5  1966: WIDENING CREDIBILITY GAP AND SLIDING POPULARITY  163

rewrite.”108 But the implication of the question was clear. Due to his
administration’s inability to create a proactive and consistent strategy of
disseminating information to the press and the public, Lyndon Johnson
found himself with a critical image problem, and moving forward into
1967, it was now vitally important that he and his advisors find a way to
resolve the credibility gap.

108
 For a transcript of the president’s 31 December 1966 Press Conference see American
Presidency Project at [Link]
 CHAPTER 6

1967: Pacification, Charm Offensives

and Further Undermined Credibility

The end of 1966 had been difficult for Johnson and his administration.
Harrison Salisbury’s dispatches from North Vietnam had capped off a period
during which the president had to cope with sliding approval, criticism of his
handling of domestic affairs and mounting fears over the way things were
going in Vietnam. The administration came into 1967 hoping for a reversal
in fortunes, but this was not to be the case. Dallek believed Johnson’s trou-
bles with Vietnam led to his being “irrational and repressive” towards oppo-
nents.1 This was certainly true, and the press bore the full brunt of Johnson’s
legendary temper at different points throughout the year. Public confidence
had continued on a long and ultimately terminal slide, as confidence in the
president would never again reach the highs of late 1963 and 1964.
Gallup Polls published towards the end of the year underlined the slip
in public confidence. On 4 December 1966, Johnson’s overall approval
sat at 48%, and crucially, his Great Society was no longer popular or well
regarded. About 44% of poll respondents held an unfavourable opinion on
domestic policy, compared to 32% who still believed the Great Society was
working. Views about Johnson’s Vietnam policy were becoming more
negative, with only 43% coming out in favour of his work in the region.2

1
 R Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961–73, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press; 1998) p. 443.
2
 G.  Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971 (New York: Random House,
1972), p. 2038.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 165

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
166  B. W. QUAIL

Louis Harris noted in his syndicated column on 9 January that confidence

in Congress tumbled by 17 percentage points to 54% since the previous
year and that President Johnson carried a 43% positive rating in terms of
the public’s faith in him, lining up even more pessimistically than Gallup’s
poll ratings of the previous month.3 Positive public statements, such as a
letter to Time Magazine from a veteran in November 1966 bemoaning
that, “A major portion of the Viet Nam news failure lies with editors at
home,”4 were becoming few and far between, although in contrast the
president did take the top placement in Gallup’s “Most admired man” poll
for 1966, published on New Year’s Day.5
As numbers slid, distrust towards the press became the prevailing mood
amongst some administration staffers. On 1 January, General Maxwell
Taylor, special advisor on Vietnam, sent a memorandum to the president
noting that he was “struck by the lack of public discussion of the very real
problems involved in a settlement and hence the lack of preparation of
public opinion for their appearance and for the conduct of our
government in coping with them.”6 Evidently, the fact that the public was
not aware of what was going on behind the scenes was not lost on Taylor,
who went on to advise, “We need to be sure of our own government posi-
tion on these and similar points and prepare our people in advance for the
courses of action which we are likely to take—courses which many of our
people will find unreasonably harsh.”7
It is notable that Taylor requested his position as special consultant be
terminated on 3 January—he was denied and stopped from being the lat-
est in a series of notable departures from the administration over the previ-
ous year. This was to be the most important year yet in terms of the
President’s communication with the press and his management of public
opinion. As Taylor intimated on New Year’s Day, the war in Vietnam was
at a crucial point. Importantly, the polls issued by George Gallup warned

3
 L Harris, “Public Confidence in Congress Tumbles,” Albuquerque Journal (Albuquerque,
NM), 9 January 1967, p. 2.
4
 P G Colloton, “Letter to the Editor,” Time, 4 November 1966, p. 19.
5
 Ominously, these results saw Republican Senator Everett Dirksen (R-Illinois), Richard
Nixon and Republican Governors George Romney of Michigan and Ronald Reagan of
California take up spots in the top ten, a potential warning to the president that the Republican
Party was resurging in the eyes of the public. See Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2043.
6
 Paper Prepared by the President’s Special Consultant (Taylor), 1 January 1967, Foreign
Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, 1 January 1967,
pp. 1–2.
7
 Ibid., p. 2.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  167

of the Great Society’s waning popularity. It was now vital that the presi-
dent and his administration move quickly to address the credibility gap
that became so prominent in 1966 and to try to bring the public back on
side with both domestic and foreign policies. In his biography of the presi-
dent, Dallek noted that in the early stages of 1967 he was keenly aware of
his slipping poll ratings and popularity, but felt as Taylor did that a consis-
tent stance on Vietnam would provide a boost to his popularity and
quickly pull him out of the slump that he found himself in.8
The first chance for Johnson to try and advertise a unified, consistent
stance on foreign and domestic concerns in 1967 was, as always, his State
of the Union address on 10 January. As with the previous year Joe Califano
assumed the responsibility of collating information from various depart-
ments and task forces to find talking points and opinions. A memorandum
from 20 October 1966 saw him looking for input even on the subject of
alleviating airport congestion.9 The administration desperately wanted to
find positive stories for Johnson to report to the public during the
address.10 A committee of several key aides was set up by Bill Moyers,
including Harry McPherson, Douglass Cater, John Roche, Hayes
Redmon, Robert Hardesty, Will Sparks and Ben Wattenberg, to write the
speech.11 This core group would meet over the next month to come up
with points for the January speech to address the key public opinion issues
that the administration would have to overcome. A memorandum from
Redmon to Moyers on 2 December relayed several preliminary thoughts,
including Walt Rostow’s belief that the administration was in a “period of
transition both at home and abroad.”12 He argued that the theme of the
speech should be seeking new partnerships and advocated a balanced

8
 R Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson: Portrait of a President (New York: Penguin Books,
2004), p. 273.
9
 A memorandum from Califano mentioned that the request was comparable to that of the
previous year. See Memorandum from Califano to the President, 7 November 1966, “Annual
Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box
267, Lyndon B Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [LBJ Library].
10
 Ibid.
11
 The list was sent in a memorandum from speechwriter Robert Kintner to Charles
Maguire asking him to speak to other key presidential staff: Memorandum from Kintner to
Maguire, 8 December 1966, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,”
Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 225, LBJ Library.
12
 Memorandum from Hayes Redmon to Bill Moyers “RE: State of the Union Message,”
2 December 1966, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of
Lyndon B Johnson, box 225, LBJ Library, p. 1.
168  B. W. QUAIL

approach to domestic and international affairs. Aware Johnson now faced

a raft of criticisms that would need to be overcome, Moyers listed them as
follows:

1. “That he is a promoter.
2. That he oversells his programs (more rhetoric than action?)
3. That he is too program oriented
4. That he lacks charisma and the qualities of leadership
5. The feeling that our society is spinning out of control and that the
President cannot deal with the situation.”13

This was a damning critique from a man who was one of the president’s
closest allies and as press secretary dealt with public affairs for Johnson for
some time. Moyers was keenly aware of the growing credibility gap and
the plummeting approval ratings the administration was suffering. Several
of these criticisms plagued the president since the earliest days of the
administration, particularly his reputation as a self-promoter and consum-
mate politician who lacked charisma, particularly compared to John
Kennedy. Moyers even went as far as to say that the president could be
beaten if an election were held at that time, calling the 1967 State of the
Union, “the beginning of the ’68 campaign.”14 Clearly the administration
were aware of the public image problems that were more prevalent than
ever even if the president was not. Moyers’s critique of Johnson’s popular-
ity was particularly damning when considering his position in the centre of
White House public relations. That he would leave his position within one
month of the State of the Union is certainly significant—Moyers’s rela-
tionship with the president was deteriorating. Former network executive
Robert Kintner for his part agreed, mentioning that there was a growing
criticism of the president’s inability to effectively manage his programmes.
Furthermore, Harry McPherson brought up the spectre of the credibility
gap once again, noting that it was now “drastic.”15 Califano, in charge of
research into the speech, noted that the American people would be
“stunned by the size of the budget,” and “we run the risk of creating a still
higher level of unfulfilled expectations.”16

13
 Ibid., p. 2.
14
 Ibid., p. 3.
15
 Ibid., p. 4.
16
 Ibid., p. 5.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  169

Clearly, those around the president were worried about the image that
was being presented to the people. They knew something was needed to
ensure the president did not overextend himself and lend more credence
to the damaging reports that became more widespread in 1966. The lack
of foresight shown in the previous years of the administration was now at
a critical point, and it was vital that Johnson and his team increased focus
on public image and restoring the president’s credibility. Moyers was
aware of the need for organisation, sending memorandums to the presi-
dent at his ranch on 19 and 23 December regarding a first draft of the
speech, noting the draft was ready several weeks earlier than the previous
year.17 This indicated the writing team, particularly Moyers, felt this speech
was of vital importance to Johnson’s continued credibility with the elec-
torate. Another member of the State of the Union task force, Will Sparks,
sent remarks to Moyers as early as 5 December in which he stated com-
munication problems were down partially to the fact that “Much of the
country is still learning to understand his personal style and rhetoric.”18
If Moyers’s comments exemplified the administration facing up to its
issues, Sparks’s views were the antithesis. Sparks represents sections of the
administration stubbornly and almost ignorantly burying their heads in
the sand. By blaming his inability to connect with the electorate on the
general public for their misunderstanding, Johnson became the victim of
ignorance, rather than a politician who could not in turn understand the
people and was suffering accordingly. Instead of being proactive in further
attempts to engage critics, the likes of Sparks buckled down and continued
with a defensive, reactive approach to external criticism, which could
intensify the defensive, reactive media strategy they had developed over
the course of the past few years.
While his team worked on the speech, Johnson retired to his ranch.
Moyers noted that if the president were to stay in Texas over Christmas he
would need to go to Texas himself to work on the address further.19 This

17
 Confidential Memorandum from Bill Moyers to the President, 19 December 1966,
“Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson,
box 227, LBJ Library.
18
 Memorandum from Will Sparks to Bill Moyers, 5 December 1966, “Annual Message to
Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 227, LBJ
Library.
19
 Confidential Memorandum from Bill Moyers to the President, 23 December 1966,
“Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson,
box 227, LBJ Library.
170  B. W. QUAIL

raised the question of how seriously the president took this speech, which
came at a vital point for his public image. Was this another case of Johnson’s
inability to determine the tide of public opinion and work with his team to
come up with a solution, or did he simply trust the men he surrounded
himself with to come up with a draft that would satisfy what he believed
to be important? The majority of Johnson’s staff took the view if they
worked for him, they were trusted to get on with the work without being
micromanaged, with many absolutely believing in the goals of the admin-
istration during their time in office. Colleagues, such as George Ball and
the recently departed McGeorge Bundy, simply kept dissent private and
away from the listening press. Bundy’s biographer Gordon M. Goldstein
noted, “Bundy could not cloak the antipathy he felt for Johnson’s meth-
ods,” but concluded, “he held a reverence for the presidency.”20 Evidently,
despite this, Johnson did not feel that he had to keep a tight leash on his
writing staff during the process of writing what would become one of his
most important engagements with the American public during his time in
office. Further to this, Johnson was well aware of the importance of his
image moving forward into 1967. His wife Lady Bird noted that the
Christmas cheer seemed further away than ever during the festive period
of 1966 as he brooded over what courses of action must be taken over the
coming months. She discussed in her diary the ugly stories that were pre-
sented by the news over the departure of Bill Moyers from the administra-
tion in December.21
Planning for the televised address was more important than ever as
White House knew the three networks would run reaction shows follow-
ing the speech. A memorandum was sent to Johnson the day before the
speech advising of possible reactions to its timing, by Cabinet secretary
Robert Kintner, a former president of both the American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). He
strongly recommended that the Democratic Congressional Leadership be
prepared to give comment on any televised reaction show, with Kintner
recommending Speaker of the House John McCormack (D-Massachusetts)

20
 G M Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam
(New York: Henry Holt, 2008), p. 219.
21
 Lady Bird Johnson (C T Johnson), A White House Diary (New York: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1970), p. 460. She noted in her entry for 5 January 1967 (p. 469), “A miasma of
trouble hangs over everything.”
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  171

be available specifically.22 Specifically, he warned that the Republican lead-

ership would be preparing an immediate rebuttal of the president’s
address.23 The administration knew they would need to immediately and
strongly defend the address from Republican attacks, and as someone who
was heavily involved in television production Kintner was keenly aware of
the need to use any available television time to the administration’s advan-
tage. That this was still being discussed less than forty-eight hours before
the speech itself is indicative of the lack of foresight of the administration
when it came to television and media broadcasting. It was vital for the
strategy of how to react to the inevitable Republican challenge to Johnson’s
speech to be prepared ahead of time, and the administration simply was
not ready. Once again, there was no foresight to develop a proactive
approach to media management, despite the clear concerns of individuals
such as Moyers in the preceding weeks.
The speech itself had a strong message. Johnson described a “Testing
time,” for the American people and asked whether the United States pos-
sessed the “staying power,” to keep fighting in Vietnam. He argued that
while the objectives in Vietnam seemed ambiguous, it was important to
continue the fight.24 The president to make a strong statement about
Vietnam while also giving the people a message about the now faltering
Great Society programme. As late as 9 January speechwriter Harry
McPherson commented to Bill Moyers in a memo that “The list of domes-
tic problems is awfully long now. I fear it may strike people as an act of
showmanship.”25 The domestic problems he mentioned have been sum-
marised by biographers and historians of the time such as Robert Dallek,
who noted that amongst other things, summer rioting had become an
almost annual occurrence under Johnson, and crime increased at six times

22
 McCormack was staunchly anti-communist and, like Johnson, had been a New Deal
politician during the Roosevelt years. He was first elected to the House of Representatives in
1928 and, as Speaker, would have made a compelling ally for the Johnson administration in
any televised debate.
23
 Memorandum from R E Kintner to the President, 10.30 am, 9 January 1967, “Annual
Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box
227, LBJ Library.
24
 A full copy of Johnson’s State of the Union speech is available at the LBJ Library website,
accessed at [Link]
25
 Memorandum from Harry McPherson to Bill Moyers, 9 January 1967, “Annual Message
to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box no. 225, LBJ
Library.
172  B. W. QUAIL

the normal rate under the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies.26 These
facts were not lost on the administration, much less on Johnson himself.
Ultimately Johnson made a clear statement about the importance of the
Great Society, arguing, “We all have a stake in this Great Society—in its
economic growth, in reduction of civil strife—a great stake in good
government.”27 Notably, this was the only time in the long speech where
the Great Society was mentioned by name, contrasting with five mentions
the previous year and an entire section dedicated to building up the reform
package in 1965.28
The expected negative reaction to the speech was immediate. The
Chicago Tribune’s headline on 11 January read, “Lyndon Asks 6% War
Tax: Puts Budget at Record 135 Billions,” and the lead story began with
criticisms from the Republican Party.29 House minority leader Gerald Ford
called the president’s projected programmes “A fiscal mess,” and Senate
minority leader Everett Dirksen, “expressed reservations about Johnson’s
surtax proposal at a press conference.”30 The New York Times article by
Max Frankel was kinder to the president, but still reported that Johnson
“Acknowledged the criticisms of Great Society programs by governors
and mayors” and discussed “failure as well as success.”31 Several major
newspapers ran with headlines advertising the president’s request to
increase taxes. Although the requested tax increase was one of the most
obvious effects of the State of the Union on the general public, it appeared
no discussion was had over how to mitigate this: further evidence of the
laissez faire attitude Johnson held towards public relations tactics.

26
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 278.
27
 Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union. Online
by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project [Link]
[Link]/node/238176.
28
 Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union Online
by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project [Link]
[Link]/node/241819 and Lyndon B.  Johnson, Annual Message to the
Congress on the State of the Union. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The
American Presidency Project [Link]
29
 “Lyndon Asks 6% War Tax; Puts Budget at Record $135 Billions,” Chicago Tribune, 11
January 1967, p. 1.
30
 K Sims, “Higher Social Security Benefits Urged in State of Union Talk,” Chicago
Tribune, 11 January 1967, p. 1.
31
 M Frankel, “Johnson Asks a 6% Surcharge on Taxes for Vietnam War and Poverty
Programs,” New York Times, 11 January 1967, p. 17.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  173

Despite the negative press, the administration found favourable reports

in the media; Gerald Grant of the Washington Post was satisfied by the
emphasis given to domestic programmes, while Mike McManus of Time
was “extremely enthusiastic.”32 James Reston’s editorial the following
Sunday discussed Johnson’s credentials as a reformer, and he believed that
he was “not trying to follow but to transform the New Deal.”33 Reston
concluded positively that Johnson was still an innovator—this constituted
solid praise for the president’s speech, and while he was still polarising crit-
ics, the content of the speech was sound; a proactive approach towards
reform and an aggressive plan for the budget were certainly impressive
to some.
The divisive nature of the speech and the changing and chaotic land-
scape of the Johnson administration caused issues in gaining traction with
a solid and proactive press strategy. Notably, the administration was expe-
riencing a period of particularly high turnover. The departure of Press
Secretary Bill Moyers from his role as press secretary, around the time of
the State of the Union address, was a large blow for the president in terms
of his image, especially with high-profile figures such as Maxwell Taylor
also looking for a way out. A Time article from just after Moyers’s appoint-
ment noted the skills he brought to the table, but he left under a cloud, a
rift having developed between him and Johnson over the president’s por-
trayal in the media. At any rate, Moyers was not the only recent casualty in
Johnson’s close backroom staff. Jack Valenti, the speechwriter and strong
pro-Johnson voice who was ridiculed by the Press for noting in a speech
to the American Advertising Association that he “slept more soundly at
night knowing that Lyndon B Johnson is my President,” accepted the role
of head of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) in May
1966. He noted that he was “disconnecting from the most substantive
job” he would ever have.34 On top of this, National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy left to become the president of the Ford Foundation
in 1966.
The administrative casualties were now piling up. A lack of consistency
in the advisory roles would only hinder the president’s attempts to devise
32
 K J Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1985), p. 171.
33
 J Reston, “Washington: Johnson and the Age of Reform,” New York Times, 15 January
1967, p. 235.
34
 J Valenti, This Time, This Place: My Life in War, the White House and Hollywood (New
York: Three Rivers Press, 2007), p. 278.
174  B. W. QUAIL

a clear and consistent strategy for any of his most pressing issues, let alone
develop a tactic to handle his ongoing image problems. Dallek noted that
some aides to Johnson felt Moyers did not do enough to stop the credibil-
ity gap from growing; his predecessor George Reedy put it strongest when
he said that, “It was no accident that the President’s popularity started to
fall very abruptly as soon as Bill took over.” The siege mentality continued
to grow; a fallen ally of Johnson’s was turned on and blamed by Johnson
loyalists for many of the problems the president found himself with in
early 1967. Dallek rightly believed that Moyers was not the ultimate cause
of the credibility gap that opened up over the course of Johnson’s time in
office. The president’s own tendency to favour secrecy over an open public
discourse undoubtedly “stood at the center,” of the widening gap between
private goings on and public statements. This ambiguity led to the defen-
sive and reactive stance that the administration took on many issues dis-
cussed in the press.
As he brought in the fourth Press Secretary of his tenure—George
Christian—the president had to deal with sliding popularity ratings, re-­
appointing important staff roles and dealing with dissent from staffers
such as Douglass Cater. Turner notes Cater was upset with his public
image of being Johnson’s “hatchet man.”35 Christian served as press sec-
retary for Johnson’s Texas ally and State Governor John Connally, and
possessed a reputation for honesty and integrity, according to George
Reedy. He earned the sarcastic nickname, “Ol’ Blabbermouth,” from the
White House Press Corps for his low-profile nature and tendency to dou-
ble check facts before releasing them, but Turner notes that he “also
gained the respect and confidence of the correspondents, several of whom
praised him as Johnson’s best press secretary.”36
Taking advantage of his low key reputation and knowledge of the role
of press secretary at a state level, appointing Christian would prove to be
a shrewd manoeuvre for Johnson going forward. Respected by the press
more than Moyers, Christian gave an air of authority to press conferences
that was not previously present. While this could—and should—be called
a reactive move, occurring only following the departure of another key
member of staff, it was certainly a positive decision in terms of future pub-
lic affairs and the relationships with press and public. However, the

35
 On Cater’s displeasure, see Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 175.
36
 Ibid. Reedy’s opinions on his two predecessors are noted alongside the White House
correspondents’ opinions on Christian.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  175

changing nature of the president’s backroom staff made it exceptionally

difficult to create a coherent and proactive media strategy; from Pierre
Salinger through George Reedy and Bill Moyers and ending with Christian,
Johnson used four different press secretaries, each with wildly different
views and methods on how to work with the White House Press Corps
and the wider media. Johnson could not hope to focus on a singular strat-
egy with such behind-the-scenes turmoil, and this was undoubtedly an
important factor in the administration’s inability to properly focus on the
press and public relations.
Despite the media’s reaction to domestic issues in the State of the
Union address, by the turn of 1967 it was clear that war matters had over-
taken domestic politics in Johnson’s mind. Admiral Thomas Moorer, chief
of naval operations, said that by 1967, Johnson complained that Vietnam
was the only subject people wanted to talk to him about, but that when-
ever he was alone with the president, Johnson would inevitably turn the
conversation back to the war.37 The administration continued to find itself
caught in the middle of hawks and doves in both the political and public
arenas, and the publicisation of the Marigold Affair would prove to be
another test to the president’s credibility. In November 1966, the
American government attempted, through intermediaries in communist
Poland, to bring North Vietnam to the diplomatic table and instigate
talks, but the insistence of the administration on continuing bombing led
to Hanoi pulling out of any proposed discussion. The Polish intermediar-
ies were not shy in their private recriminations of the Johnson administra-
tion’s actions in December; Polish diplomat Jerzy Michalowski described
the bombing as “A stupid and irresponsible act.”38 A memorandum from
Dean Rusk to Johnson on 3 January confirmed that, “Hanoi believed our
bombing, particularly of 13–14 December, showed clearly that we were
not in good faith in seeking talks.”39 The Marigold situation was suffi-
ciently important to the government that it affected public statements; in
a top secret meeting with the leaders of the Senate, minority leader Everett
Dirksen (R-Illinois) and majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana),
Johnson noted that the “fragile hope” of negotiations “could be destroyed

37
 Moorer, quoted in Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 271.
38
 Michalowski, quoted in J. G. Hershberg, Marigold: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 529.
39
 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson, 3 January 1967,
FRUS, Vietnam 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 4, January 3 1967, p. 11.
176  B. W. QUAIL

by two things; first, by a loss of secrecy; second, by public statements or

actions which were too soft or too hard.”40 The Polish were so incensed
by the Johnson administration’s actions during Marigold to hamper the
possibility of talks with the North Vietnamese that they began to discuss
the matter with sympathetic governments in Canada and France, and with
the Secretary General of the United Nations, U. Thant. With such a large
amount of chatter going through diplomatic channels, it was inevitable
that a leak would eventually appear in the press; a “short, sketchy” story
by Robert H. Estabrook in the Washington Post on 2 February described
the Polish frustration over Hanoi’s attitude following the bombings, but
clearly showed his source’s view that “The Americans bungled it.”41 This
was a potential disaster for Johnson, after the bluster of his State of the
Union speech and repeated insistence that he wanted peace. The idea that
a presidential decision to bomb Hanoi decisively ended a real chance at
peace talks would be a killer blow to the administration. This was brought
up by Arthur Goldberg on 2 February, as he noted that “Our public
record… will need bolstering, for it appears the record is being rather
badly clouded by [the] Polish version of how our mid-December bomb-
ings interfered with what they conceive to be a very promising chance of
talks with Hanoi.”42
Gallup’s poll of 14 February showed that 40% of people now outright
disapproved of the way Johnson was handling the situation in Vietnam,
and the sliding approval ratings now became critical.43 On the same day,
Johnson told Carroll Kilpatrick of the Washington Post that he was not
about to name Ramsay Clark as the new Attorney General, only to offi-
cially nominate him for the role two weeks later.44 After spending some

40
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,
FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. V Vietnam 1967, doc. 19, 18 January 1967, p.  41. Mansfield
opposed the Vietnam War for much of his time in office, but favoured Johnson’s domestic
policies. Dirksen, on the other hand, was a staunch supporter of the war and appeared on
many political television shows as a Republican representative.
41
 R H Estabrook, quoted in J.G. Hershberg, Marigold, p. 549.
42
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson,
FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, doc. 35, 4 February 1967, pp. 81–82.
43
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2105.
44
 Johnson’s conversation with Kilpatrick can be found at Telephone conversation # 11543,
sound recording, LBJ and CARROLL KILPATRICK, 2/14/1967, 7:30 PM, Recordings
and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed
January 24, 2021, [Link] while the eventual nomi-
nation can be found at Lyndon B.  Johnson, The President’s Remarks to the Press Upon
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  177

time trying to deflect attention from the article, the administration was
given a boost when the New York Times picked up an article from the
Associated Press and published it on the front page with the headline,
“4-Month U.S. Bid Ignored by Hanoi.” This was termed as a “lengthy,
sympathetic account” of the Marigold negotiations by Associated Press
journalist John M. Hightower, in which he claimed Ho Chi Minh’s public
declaration that he exchanged letters with Johnson “astonished and greatly
discouraged United States leaders,” who in turn believed this was proof
the North Vietnamese were turning their backs on peace moves.45 During
off-the-record conversations over several months, Rusk was pushed for
information, and the secretary ultimately became an important contribu-
tor to much of Hightower’s fact checking and writing process.46 Hershberg
notes that this led to something of a paradox in press coverage on the war
from the two largest newspapers in the country—the traditionally conser-
vative, hawkish Washington Post hinted at Washington’s failure to take a
chance to open negotiations, while the generally more dovish New York
Times splashed across its front page an administration approved response
which several journalists, including Estabrook, felt was a whitewash.47 It is
not clear whether or not Johnson himself signed off on the leak, but what
this does show is twofold.
First, it is an example of the administration—in particular Dean Rusk—
formulating a response to what could have been a major issue and cultivat-
ing a relationship with members of the press—in this case John
Hightower—to use to the advantage of the president. This is a strategy
which was sorely lacking in Johnson’s own belligerent dealings with the
press over the preceding years. His crass methods never truly moved
beyond his time in the Senate, and even by 1967 he was difficult to pin
down, regularly scheduling last-minute press conferences to wrong-foot
journalists, but the people around him were becoming more adept at how
they dealt with press intrusion. It was noted that Hightower “ferretted
out two thirds of the story himself,” but the decision had been taken to

Announcing His Intention To Nominate Ramsey Clark as Attorney General. Online by

Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project [Link]
[Link]/node/237669.
45
 John M.  Hightower, 4 Month U.S.  Bid Ignored by Hanoi, New York Times, 9 May
1967, p. 1, 16.
46
 Rusk courted the journalist and invited him to submit drafts for the Secretary to “tidy
up.” The process is described in Hershberg, Marigold, pp. 589–90.
47
 Ibid., p. 591.
178  B. W. QUAIL

leak the story on their own terms and ensure the administration gained
some favourable press coverage.48 That it was picked up so strongly by the
New York Times was somewhat serendipitous.
Second, the episode shows the benefits that an organised press strategy
can have. The first damaging reports came out in February, and it took a
significant amount of time for the government to gain favourable coverage
in the press following the printing of this story in May. However, it was
important to take time and be use initiative to ensure the government
span a consistent line on the Marigold Affair; such was its potential to
cause credibility problems. The end result was the president’s approval
ratings saw a small increase over the early part of 1967, thanks in part to a
solid and consistent line on Vietnam, exemplified by the Marigold press
strategy.
Vietnam was, however, only one aspect of the beleaguered president’s
problems in the early months of 1967. The budget outlined during the
State of the Union address shone a spotlight on the increasing inflation
that the United States was experiencing, and domestic spending was in
large part down to the Great Society. For a country that experienced unri-
valled economic growth since World War II ended, which was a difficult
situation. The inflation issue caused a period of extended domestic pres-
sure for Johnson and his administration. Dallek notes that it was not a
business slowdown and growing unemployment that undermined
Johnson’s credibility as a promoter of prosperity, but an increase in the
gross national product and in jobs—particularly during June and
October—which caused inflation to begin to run away from the adminis-
tration’s control. Dallek further believes that, “Despite a campaign of
public education,” with the idea of promoting his stance on domestic
budget cuts, “the President made little headway in convincing either
reluctant house members or the mass of Americans that he was right.”49 In
a news conference on 3 August, the president was asked several questions
about the economy; he was short when asked what his reaction to
Republican requests for him to create a new budget with no further taxa-
tion, responding that he had already given his reaction. He noted when
asked that, “Most of the responsible businesspeople,” agreed with the idea
of a tax increase, but also said that, “We will have a lot of speeches on

48
 Ibid., p. 593.
49
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, pp. 274–75.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  179

nonessential expenditures.”50 These were vague responses that did not

fully answer the question, in other words reactive replies with little sub-
stance or forethought behind them. The following day, John D. Morris
writing for the New York Times noted that, “Congress scrutinized President
Johnson’s tax increase program with a mix of resignation, pain and
hostility.”51 Time noted on 11 August that the president’s idea of the busi-
nessmen of the country agreeing to the tax increase was not necessarily
correct, given that, “until a month ago the Administration was predicting
that the surcharge would amount to no more than 6%.”52 Once more,
Lyndon Johnson’s propensity for keeping secrets from the American pub-
lic—businessman and layman alike—was put under the microscope by a
major publisher. Yet again, the inability to take a coherent line on a subject
and stick to it cost Johnson some credibility in the arena of public opinion.
While it is true that Johnson was looking to take a more consistent line on
public affairs in 1967, Dallek once again makes the point that Johnson
privately felt he would have to “cut reform programs to the bone,” but
publicly, “Johnson’s strategy was to pump as hard as ever for antipoverty
and Great Society programs.”53 Admittedly, Johnson found himself in a
difficult political spot; to announce sweeping cuts to his own reform pro-
grammes of the previous three years would be to commit political suicide
and allow Republican naysayers such as Richard Nixon or New  York
Governor Nelson Rockefeller a massive victory to take forward into the
1968 elections.
Johnson’s own rhetoric backed him into a corner, and now that domes-
tic concerns were creeping into view, it was becoming more difficult than
ever for the president to keep his Great Society dream afloat in the eyes of
the public. Douglass Cater noted in an oral history interview in 1974 that
by 1967, “he was really having to go to the mat on the surcharge busi-
ness,” indicating the difficulty that Johnson was having by this point in
convincing Congress of his financial endeavours.54 By August, Louis

50
 L B Johnson, “The President’s News Conference on the Tax Message,” 3 August 1967.
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://
[Link]/ws/?pid=28373.
51
 J D Morris, “Johnson asks for 10% Surcharge on Personal and Business Taxes, 45,000
More Men to go to Vietnam,” New York Times, 4 August 1967, p. 1.
52
 “The Nation: The Economy,” Time, 11 August 1966, p. 10.
53
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 275.
54
 Transcript, Douglass Cater Oral History Interview III, 26 May 1974, by Joe B. Frantz,
Internet Copy, LBJ Library, p. 12.
180  B. W. QUAIL

Harris announced the unpopularity of Johnson’s measures by noting that,

“The guaranteed annual wage and the ‘negative income tax’—both arouse
more opposition than support among the American public.”55 This diffi-
culty and the unfavourable press coverage that followed it, caused by a
mixture of circumstances and an inconsistent government line, undoubt-
edly hurt the president’s credibility and public image during the middle
months of 1967. While it is true that any president would have struggled
to control the rising inflation inherent in the United States, Johnson’s
strategy towards releasing information—to keep his views on necessary
cuts away from prying ears—certainly did not help his case.
Fiscal problems were not the only issues that Johnson had to deal with
on the home front. Criticism was mounting from African Americans who
felt that they were being marginalised by the president in favour of a frivo-
lous war thousands of miles away. On 4 April, Dr Martin Luther King Jr.
publicly denounced the war and drew parallels between the struggle in
Vietnam and the struggle for racial equality domestically. King noted that
the war was responsible for the halting of important domestic programmes,
saying that he was “increasingly compelled to see the war as an enemy of
the poor and to attack it as such.”56 King spoke for many in the black com-
munity; increasingly, African Americans felt that focus on the war was
removing focus on their domestic issues, which were still very much ongo-
ing—many of them began to round on the administration for not follow-
ing through on what had been promised by the Great Society. One
high-profile example of this was the heavyweight boxer and sports person-
ality Muhammad Ali, who refused to be drafted and tellingly responded to
criticisms in a televised interview by noting, “I ain’t got no quarrel with
the Viet Cong. They ain’t never called me nigger.”57
It was clear that racial tensions were still building in the United States
by 1967; as previously noted Dallek has made the point that race riots
were becoming more regular in the inner city areas, and 1967 was to be
no different; Tampa, Florida, saw a riot on 11 June, and some of the
worst rioting in US history to date occurred in July. Newark, New Jersey,

55
 L Harris, “Harris Survey: Salary Plan, Negative Tax Have Opposition,” Winona Daily
News (Winona, MN), 7 August 1967, p. 7.
56
 M L King, Jr, “Beyond Vietnam: A Time To Break The Silence,” Delivered 4 April
1967, Riverside Church, New  York City, speech and transcript available at American
Rhetoric, [Link]
57
 For Ali’s statement see YouTube, accessed 23 August 2017 at the web address; https://
[Link]/watch?v=vd9aIamXjQI.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  181

saw riots on 11 and 12 July, while a battle in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was

ended by police intervention on 30 July. If the Watts riots of 1964 were
bad, the Newark riots were worse; 26 were killed, 1500 were injured and
much of inner city Newark was burned out by the end of the fighting.58
An official memorandum sent by Joe Califano noted that, “This is going
to be a very difficult situation when it comes out in a day or so” and wor-
ried about rewarding rioters for their actions in the official response to
the fighting.59 It is worth noting that Johnson has ticked “Yes,” to
Califano’s suggestion of taking a “quiet look” at poverty and racial pro-
grammes being enacted in New Jersey at the time, in order to be more
informed about possible reactions. It is not clear if he approved Califano’s
second suggestion of appointing Attorney General Ramsay Clarke as the
official point of contact for the Newark riot—possibly preferring to con-
trol the situation himself in an attempt to appear more authoritative and
as he termed it, presidential.
By far the worst of the summer rioting occurred in Detroit, on 23 July.
A Time correspondent claimed that he felt in more danger covering
Detroit than he did during his last assignment, in Vietnam.60 Pictures
filled the 4 August edition of Time, as Johnson reluctantly called in federal
troops to act alongside the National Guard and quell fierce fighting in the
centre of Detroit. Detroit Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh was quoted by the
New York Times as having taken, “strong exception,” to the White House’s
hesitancy in issuing the order to send in federal troops.61 Michigan gover-
nor George Romney was quoted as saying that the rioting area “Looked
like a city that had been bombed.”62 The criticism of Cavanagh was
reported to the nation alongside Romney’s summarisation of the state of
play in Detroit, which did nothing to enhance the president’s reputation
as the possibility that he delayed his reaction and indirectly helped to
worsen the ugly scenes in Detroit. Cyrus Vance, who acted as Johnson’s
man on the ground in the city, would later refute this argument in an oral
history interview; the president delayed for thirty minutes in order to pre-
pare a statement to give to the country, but in the meantime advised Vance

58
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 281.
59
 Memorandum from Joe Califano to the President, 15 July, 1967, “File HU2/st23-
­st32,” White House Central Files HU2/ST30, box 26, LBJ Library.
60
 “Letter from the Publisher,” Time, 4 August 1967, p. 11.
61
 G Roberts, “U.S.  Troops Sent into Detroit, 19 Dead; Johnson Decries Riots; New
Outbreak in East Harlem,” New York Times, 24 July, p. 1.
62
 G Romney, quoted in “The Nation: Politics – After Detroit,” Time, 4 August 1967, p. 18.
182  B. W. QUAIL

to “go ahead and make all the necessary preparations so they could move
as rapidly as possible.”63
Vance’s later rebuttal did nothing to help the president’s credibility at
the time. The New York Times, reporting on 24 July, noted one rioter’s cry
of “I was in Korea too. I’m 42 and I can’t get a job.”64 This echoed Martin
Luther King’s criticisms of the war from April and typified much of the
complaint of African Americans; despite serving their country, it was still
prohibitively difficult for them to integrate with American society. For his
part, Johnson felt that African American riots were embarrassing and
undermined what he saw as his commitment to African American rights;
on 27 July he hastily announced the Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, headed by Otto Kerner, the governor of Illinois. In the
announcement speech he vented some of his frustrations to the world:
“There is no American right to loot stores, or to burn buildings, or to fire
rifles from the rooftops. That is crime—and crime must be dealt with
forcefully, and swiftly, and certainly under law.”65 Evidently Johnson was
perturbed, something which became more evident as the situation contin-
ued to unfold. “This problem has built up over decades,” Johnson
explained to Newsweek correspondent Mel Elfin, John Steele of Time and
Jack Sutherland of U.S. News, “It is not going to be solved in a few days.”66
The New York Times reported on 28 July, the day after Johnson announced
the Advisory Commission’s inception, that urban problems “need to be
attacked with at least the same free-spending determination that the
Administration and Congress so far have reserved for the war in Vietnam.”67
The following day, an editorial begged the president not to “use the com-
mission as an excuse for delay in the exertion of forceful Presidential lead-
ership to promote programs that could and should be initiated or enlarged
immediately.”68 Once again, the credibility of the president was
63
 Transcript, Cyrus R.  Vance Oral History Interview I, 3 November 1969, by Paige
E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library, p. 27.
64
 Associated Press, “Detroit is Swept by Rioting and Fires, Romney Calls in Guard,” New
York Times, 24 July 1967, p. 1, 15.
65
 L B Johnson, “The President’s Address to the Nation on Civil Disorders,” 27 July 1967.
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://
[Link]/ws/?pid=28368.
66
 Folder, “[July–August 1967 Meetings with Correspondents],” Meeting Notes Files,
Box 3, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed February 03, 2021, [Link]
item/mtgnotes-b3-f35.
67
 “Sickness of the Cities,” New York Times, 28 July 1967, p. 23.
68
 “Crisis in the Cities,” New York Times, 29 July 1967, p. 18.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  183

undermined; the riots from poor black Americans directly weakened both
the war on poverty and the civil rights legislation that Johnson worked so
hard in the early months of his presidency to pass, and he was well aware
of it. The question of whether all the legislation had improved the quality
of life for many people was now being asked.
Johnson’s strategy towards the press was stretched by the crisis in the
cities during the summer of 1967, but it was not entirely the fault of the
administration. Confused reports coming in from areas like Newark and
Detroit made decision-making extremely difficult, but the need for con-
sensus crippled the president, who seemed unable to make a decisive
movement which would prove his strength in a crisis, preferring instead to
take, as Califano put it, a “quiet look” at programmes to see what could
be done in private. This accurately illustrates the failure of Johnsonian
press strategy and one of the reasons that the credibility gap became so
pronounced over the preceding eighteen months. With all this ongoing,
the presidential focus remained on Vietnam; by mid-1967, Johnson found
his public image in real trouble.
The president’s strategy of maintaining a consistent line on Vietnam
had not worked, and by the end of summer, domestic concerns further
eroded Johnson’s standing with the public. It is true that circumstances
did not assist Johnson in his attempts at consistency in 1967; race riots
undermined his commitment to civil rights, and inflation threatened his
commitment to the Great Society as a whole; the calls for a new budget
backed the administration into a corner, and once again it became clear
that a siege mentality was taking hold. The president was at a low ebb, and
his opinion polls reflected this. On 29 July, Gallup’s poll showed that only
33% approved of the president’s current stance on Vietnam.69 On 13
August, Johnson’s job rating as measured by Gallup dropped to 39%—this
was a record low, and when compared to his poll ratings of 70% and more
during late 1963 and early 1964, his reputation plummeted in the eyes of
those surveyed. In August, Esquire published a story that laid bare the
darkest aspects of the president’s character, taking advantage of apparent
leaks within the administration to paint a picture of the president as having
dual personalities: the public “Presidential” Johnson and the Machiavellian
private man who delighted in cruelty and browbeat officials into quitting
their posts. The article accused Johnson of “overdrawing from his

69
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2074.
184  B. W. QUAIL

credibility account”70 and noted that, “White House reporters groan

inwardly when they see one of Johnson’s humility bits coming, for they
have glimpsed the hard man beneath the mush.”71 The Esquire article took
its lead from the previous discussions on Johnson’s actions throughout
1967; crises in his handling of both domestic affairs and Vietnam policy
showed his secretive nature in a very public light and further widened the
credibility gap; the failure of the administration to find a strategy to com-
bat this in the press only worsened matters.
It was clear then that the president needed to do something about his
public image quickly, and it was decided that he would televise an address
to the National Legislative Conference in San Antonio on 29 September.
Kathleen Turner, who has written extensively on the speechwriting pro-
cess and Johnson’s difficulty with the media, notes that the development
of this speech “became the testing ground within the White House over
public handling of the topic of Vietnam.”72 In fact it was more than that.
It was Lyndon Johnson’s chance to show that he was committed to a
strong, coherent line on the war which held no secrets from the public and
would set the administration up to continue a consistent, open and proac-
tive approach to public relations that would stand not only Johnson, but
the Democratic Party, in good stead moving into an election year. The
administration’s stance on Vietnam was being questioned more than
ever—several journalists had asked Johnson about bombing pauses in
September alone, eliciting evasive responses from the president. He
deflected the issue back to Ho Chi Minh and North Vietnam by repeating
the line given to the Christian Science Monitor’s Erwin Canham; the
United States would stop the bombing if Ho Chi Minh would commit to
“productive discussions.”73 A further meeting with Max Frankel on 15
September saw the New York Times journalist asking Johnson outright
why a “strong man” like him was having trouble inspiring the people. In
response, Johnson belligerently blamed his enemies: the Republicans, fac-
tionalism among the Democrats and The New York Times. Johnson said
the paper played a “leading part” in prejudicing people against him, and
editors wouldn’t use the words “President Johnson” in a positive story. “I
70
 J Deakin, “The Dark Side of L.B.J.,” Esquire Magazine, August 1967, p. 136.
71
 Ibid., p. 45.
72
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 194.
73
 Folder, “[September 1967 Meetings with Correspondents],” Meeting Notes Files, Box
3, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed February 03, 2021, [Link]
item/mtgnotes-b3-f36.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  185

told Scotty Reston at a meeting two months after my election,” com-

plained Johnson, “that it wouldn’t be long before my geography and par-
entage catches up with me in the minds of these people.” He stated his
displeasure with the reportage of Times in no uncertain terms, referring
back to Harrison Salisbury’s dispatches from the turn of the year, and that
he didn’t think the press reported him fairly. He bullishly, but wrongly,
claimed that criticism didn’t bother him.74
Johnson’s confidence to Frankel belied the fervour with which the
administration was working to court positive public opinion, starting with
San Antonio. As with Johnson’s other major addresses, several writers
worked on different drafts of the speech; speechwriter Harry McPherson
noted that a “Rostow-Katzenbach-Nitze-Busby” version of his draft omit-
ted a key point—that no simple phrase could alleviate the doubt of the
American people over Vietnam.75 McPherson argued that this “is skirting
the most obvious political truth about the situation.” He further argued
that the new draft, with a more standardised explanation of the war, “has
all been heard so many times before.”76 McPherson was scathing about
the second draft. Johnson appears to have taken McPherson’s advice; he
noted in his address that, “There are many sincere and patriotic Americans
who harbor doubts about sustaining the commitment that three Presidents
and half a million of our young men have made.”77 However, Johnson
rebuffed this view by quoting his predecessors, Kennedy and Eisenhower,
in their arguments for remaining in Vietnam, as well as referring to com-
mitments made to the United States’ allies in the Pacific region: Australia,

74
 From a file entitled “Notes of the Meeting of the President with Max Frankel, of the
New York Times. The meeting lasted for eighty-five minutes, and Johnson ended it by claim-
ing once again that his Texan roots were the reason people didn’t like him. The speech is
included here: Folder, “[September 1967 Meetings with Correspondents],” Meeting Notes
Files, Box 3, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed February 03, 2021, [Link]
[Link]/item/mtgnotes-b3-f36.
75
 The writers identified are National Security Assistant Walt W Rostow, Undersecretary of
State Nicholas Katzenbach, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Nitze and speechwriter and aide
Horace Busby.
76
 Memorandum from Harry McPherson to the President, 28 September 1967, “Address
on Vietnam Before the National Legislative Conference, San Antonio, Texas,” Statements of
Lyndon B Johnson, box 252, LBJ Library
77
 L B Johnson, “Address on Vietnam Before the National Legislative Conference, San
Antonio, Texas,” 29 September, 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The
American Presidency Project. [Link]
186  B. W. QUAIL

New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.78 The South
Vietnamese commitment to democracy was underscored by the president,
who argued there was a “positive move toward constitutional govern-
ment,” and that South Vietnam was keeping to a political schedule agreed
the previous year. Johnson argued that wavering on Vietnam risked a
Southeast Asia “dominated by Communist power,” which in turn risked a
devastating third world war. He argued—to applause from the watching
crowd—that he wanted to reduce the danger “for our children and for our
grandchildren.” An update on the administration’s attempts to sue for
peace was provided; Johnson made clear that it was Hanoi’s choice to
continue the war, not the fault of America, claiming Hanoi was no better
judge of American character than Nazi and Stalinist propagandists. He
confirmed the American desire for peace not on Hanoi’s terms before
concluding that, “we must not mislead the enemy. Let him not think that
debate and dissent will produce wavering and withdrawal. For I can assure
you they won’t. Let him not think that protests will produce surrender.
Because they won’t. Let him not think that he will wait us out. For he
won’t.” This was a strong statement, well delivered and emotive. The
president was more persuasive than he had previously been in front of a
large audience, as Johnson put forward his case for remaining at last.79
Positive responses to the speech were immediately sent to the president
when they arrived—annotation on the document indicates that Johnson
saw a review from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earle
Wheeler who telephoned the White House to call the speech

78
 In truth, even the United States’ staunchest Pacific allies had their reservations about the
war. Clark Clifford and Maxwell Taylor had been dispatched to Southeast Asia, Australia and
New Zealand to enquire about further troop commitments in mid-1967. Only after two
months of deliberations and the direct intervention of both Johnson and Prime Minister
Holt would Australia authorise a third and final combat battalion of 8000 troops, doubling
their commitment. Johnson was not impressed, telling Minister for External Affairs Paul
Hasluck it was “not enough” and that “If our effort in Vietnam was proportional to the
present Australian commitment we would have no more than 100,000 men there.” For more
information on this meeting and the impact of the Clifford-Taylor mission to Australia, see
Paul Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, (Sydney, Australia: HarperCollins, 2007)
pp  331–34. Interestingly, Johnson himself remained staunchly defensive of the Clifford-­
Taylor mission, telling Max Frankel on 15 September that “History will show it one of the
most successful missions.”
79
 The speech was transcribed and recorded on video, and a copy of this can be viewed
through the Miller Center’s online archive of audio-visual source material; [Link]
[Link]/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-29-1967-speech-vietnam.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  187

“magnificent.”80 Morton Mintz, writing for the Washington Post, noted

the president’s “cautionary note against the dangers of debate and dis-
sent” at home.81 Pleasingly for Johnson, the article made a point of noting
that the president was stopped six times during the speech for applause.
The journalist Lyle Denniston noted that prior to San Antonio, “It has
never been completely clear,” what Johnson was looking for from the
North Vietnamese to begin peace talks.82 Setting down a marker for a
proactive and energetic stance towards media relations going forward was
paramount by this point in Johnson’s tenure, and by and large the speech
succeeded in impressing critics, if not converting them to Johnson’s line
of thinking. Not everyone was happy with the San Antonio address how-
ever; Max Frankel writing for the New York Times noted that Johnson
“invariably stimulates a discussion that raises as many questions as he tried
to answer,” with the speech. Frankel did however note that the White
House realised, “the lines of communication on the home front are now
the most important ones of the war.”83 This was a vital understanding for
Johnson, who fought with the press for years and struggled to reconcile
their treatment of him with his thoughts on how the president should be
treated—as his press secretary George Christian remembered. The San
Antonio address kicked off a real effort by the administration to court
public opinion, particularly on the subject of Vietnam, and in the context
of improving the beleaguered president’s public image was an impor-
tant event.
The need for proactive media and public strategies was strong; despite
a good showing in San Antonio the polls published by Gallup were not
especially friendly for Johnson, and anti-war sentiment continued to bub-
ble in the country. Unrest came to a head in October when 100,000 pro-
testors marched on the capitol on 21 October. Posters advertised the
planned schedule, and the White House planned for the potential violence

80
 Note to the President, 30 September 1967, “Address on Vietnam Before the National
Legislative conference, San Antonio, Texas,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 252,
LBJ Library.
81
 M Mintz, “LBJ Insists Hanoi Bars Peace; Defends Policy on Vietnam,” Washington Post,
30 September 1967, clipping in “Address on Vietnam Before the National Legislative
Conference, San Antonio, Texas,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 252, LBJ Library.
82
 L Denniston, “LBJ Hints at Cut In Price For Ending Bombing of North,” Washington
Star, 30 September 1967, clipping in “Address on Vietnam Before the National Legislative
Conference, San Antonio, Texas,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box 252, LBJ Library.
83
 M Frankel, “Johnson’s Credibility,” New York Times, 2 October 1967, p. 2.
188  B. W. QUAIL

that such a large protest on such a controversial subject could bring. The
protest moved on towards the Pentagon, where hundreds of protestors
were arrested. For his part, Johnson strongly re-stated his commitment to
Vietnam in the press.84 An editorial in the New York Times lambasted the
protestors; “How many of them,” it asked, “really dislike Johnson enough
to pull the voting booth lever for a Republican in 1968?”85 This repre-
sented a win for Johnson despite growing resentment towards the war in
Vietnam, but the president knew that more must be done, noting in a
meeting on 23 October that, “We’ve almost lost the war in the last two
months in the court of public opinion. These demonstrators and others
are trying to show that we need somebody else to take over this country.”
Johnson concluded that, “We’ve got to do something about public
opinion.”86 The large-scale demonstration of October was the culmina-
tion of Johnson’s Vietnam strategy throughout 1967; the president finally
tried to take a consistent stance on Vietnam, as noted by Dallek, but
this failed.
Following the demonstration, polls related to Vietnam remained as
dreary as his August ratings, with 46% of respondents to the 25 October
poll thought that the United States had made a mistake in entering
Vietnam compared with 44% who believed that America was right. About
49% of respondents believed that Nixon would beat Johnson if an imme-
diate election were called on 22 October, and only 21% thought that a
Democratic president was in a better position to end the war than a
Republican on 8 October.87 Despite this, however, poll results were
improving on the whole, thanks in no small part to a more cohesive and
prominent press strategy, as outlined in the planning for the president’s
San Antonio speech, as well as a negative reaction to the protests of late
October. On 2 November, Walt Rostow sent a memorandum to Johnson
asking him to consider, “how can we increase public understanding and
support,” for the administration’s course in Vietnam, prior to his meeting
with several important advisors from both within the administration and
out with. These “Wise Men” meetings of 1 and 2 November were attended
by several important figures in the Johnson administration and policy
84
 M Frankel, “Johnson Affirms Vietnam Policies Despite Protest,” New York Times, 24
October 1967, p. 1.
85
 R Baker, “Observer: Dove Antics,” New York Times, 24 October 1967, p. 45.
86
 Notes of Meeting, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vietnam, vol. V, 1967, doc. 363, 23 October
1967, p. 875.
87
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, pp. 2085–87.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  189

makers from previous governments such as Harry Truman’s Secretary of

State Dean Acheson, and ambassadors Charles Bohlen and W. Averell
Harriman. The meetings are important behind-the-scenes markers for
how the administration intended to pursue a cohesive public opinion
strategy for the last two months of 1967 and moving forward. Ostensibly
planning meetings for the course of the Vietnam war, the first meeting on
1 November did not include Johnson; he was present for the second meet-
ing the following day. It was noted by Secretary Rusk on 1 November that
North Vietnamese focus was shifting towards the American politics, while
retired General Omar Bradley and the lawyer and advisor Arthur Dean
discussed presenting a case for Vietnam to the public that would unify the
country.88 This was brought up in the meeting with Johnson the following
day; Dean Acheson and former advisor McGeorge Bundy noted to the
president that public opinion was more concerned with casualty reports
than news on the bombing programme in Vietnam; Bundy in particular
noted that, “what is eroding public support are the battles and death and
dangers to the sons of mothers and fathers with no picture of a result
in sight.”
Bundy had the view, like Johnson, that the newsmen of New  York
could not be swayed into support. He urged the president to emphasise
“the ‘light at the end of the tunnel’ instead of the battles, deaths and
danger.”89 This is yet another marker of the distrust of press activity by the
administration; while Bundy was no longer technically a part of the
Johnson team, he had nonetheless been involved in discussions through-
out the early escalation of the war in 1965 and 1966. He echoed the view
that the press was irrevocably against Johnson, and his statement on the
matters indicates the siege mentality of the administration when it came to
press relations. Dean Rusk backed up this mentality with his note on pub-
lic opinion polls: “one of the problems in polling of public opinion on the
popularity of the war is the way the questions are phrased,” he was noted
as contributing. The implicit accusation is that pollsters like Louis Harris
and George Gallup worded questions in such a way as to elicit a negative
reaction from those polled; Rusk said that he was sure that the president
would respond, “Hell no,” should he be asked if he was happy about the

88
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, in
FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 376, 2 November 1967, pp. 949–50.
89
 L Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam, (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1991) p. 91.
190  B. W. QUAIL

war. The idea that pollsters were asking leading questions is a further sym-
bol of the distrust of negative commentators by the administration, though
not necessarily outside the realms of possibility. The meeting with advisors
was, as Johnson put it, to see if the current course in Vietnam was correct
and if not, how it could be modified, but members of the administration
seemingly could not look inward enough to sense any problems, prefer-
ring to place some or all the blame on external forces such as the press or
pollsters. Even Johnson kicked off the meeting by noting his concern over
the lack of journalistic support for US policies: “if a bomb accidentally kills
two civilians in North Vietnam it makes banner headlines. However, they
can log mortar shells into the Palace grounds in Saigon and there are no
editorial complaints against it.”90
Johnson and the administration were taking public relations very seri-
ously. From the Wise Men meetings, the administration planned to move
forward with more public engagements, having recognised the need to
proactively defend their policies. Berman argues that this “Big Sell” was
“more than just self-deception by the principal players involved in policy
making; it was an active effort by the government to convince the American
Congress and the American people that progress was being made,” even
beyond what had actually been achieved.91 It was of clear significance that
the president engage the nation on the subject of Vietnam in the latter
stages of the year, but how best to do this was hotly debated within the
administration; a document sent to Johnson from McNamara on 1
November argued that continuing on the current course would not be
enough to convince the public of movement towards success by the end of
1968. Writing the day before a large meeting between the president and
his Vietnam advisory staff, McNamara requested that the president adopt
a policy of “stabilization” and recommended a pause in the bombing of
Vietnam to occur before the end of the calendar year.92 General Maxwell
Taylor notably suggested organising a continuous nationwide campaign
noting that, “Television is our best weapon as it is with the opposition.”93
Johnson-nominated Supreme Court Judge Abe Fortas believed that pub-
lic opinion “is a fickle thing and a changeable thing,” Clark Clifford
90
 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant (Jones) to President Johnson, in FRUS,
1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 377, 2 November 1967, p. 955.
91
 Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War, p. 115.
92
 Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, in
FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 375, 1 November 1967, p. 944.
93
 FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 377, p. 955.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  191

warned that on Vietnam, “No matter what [public relations action]

accomplishes, this will not be a popular war” and cited American involve-
ment in other wars such as the World Wars and the Revolutionary Wars as
wars which were not popular during their time. Fortas in particular would
follow up his views with a strongly worded memorandum to Johnson on
5 November denouncing McNamara’s opinions on public opinion. “We
should not assume,” he asserted, “that the American public are unwilling
to sustain an indefinitely prolonged war.” He argued that from the stand-
point of public opinion Johnson should continue with his course and
assume that the public were supportive until they “make it impossible for
this administration to do what it considers to be right in the national inter-
est,” through Congress or the polls. He also noted, “Our duty is to do
what we consider right—not what we consider the ‘American peo-
ple’ want.”94
Fortas’s view has been explicitly stated here to underline the fact that
Johnson had to deal with a mass of differing advice when contemplating
his strategy towards the public at this stage in his presidency; Fortas was
appointed to the Supreme Court in 1965 by Johnson and was one of his
close advisors outside of the executive branch, but here he argued vehe-
mently against McNamara’s draft comments on Vietnam of 1 November.
Where the Secretary of Defense was pessimistic about the president’s
chances of winning over the public and in turn being able to continue the
war, the Supreme Court justice argued that not only was it not a given that
public support was truly waning, but that it did not truly matter. For a
president who always thrived on consensus politics, this was a testing
atmosphere for Johnson and, when taken alongside his distrust of press
motives and coverage, made it difficult for him to make a decision that
would be received well by everyone around him. Johnson’s solution to
this particular issue was simple; McNamara was nominated to become
president of the World Bank on 21 November and left his post by the fol-
lowing April as the latest and, alongside Bill Moyers, one of the most high-­
profile Johnson staff to leave office. Stories circulated that McNamara was
struggling under his workload and the pressure of his position, but his
departure was not well received by the press; the White House’s initial
silence on the war betrays a return to their inconsistent press strategy and
reactive stance; the New York Times pointed this out on 29 November, just

94
 Memorandum from the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (Fortas) to President
Johnson, in FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 387, 5 November 1967, p. 991.
192  B. W. QUAIL

after the announcement. The sub-headline noted that the White House
was silent on why he had been moved on, and Neil Sheehan speculated
that a rift opened up between the president and McNamara with the latter
unable to “voice essential doubts,” over Vietnam.95 James Reston, in the
same edition, contended that, “everybody gets something, but not quite
what he wanted; McNamara is on his way out, but not quite, and will still
have his hand on the brake,” of further escalation in Vietnam.96 The
McNamara dispute came during a concerted effort by Johnson to experi-
ment with press relations and work to bring the press back on side, and
represented a significant step back; confusion reigned over reporting, and
without official word from the White House as to why the decision was
taken to nominate McNamara to the World Bank, speculation was bound
to occur.
It was by now no longer enough for Johnson to send his staff to engage
with television reporters. A co-ordinated public relations effort, “repre-
sented a deeper public commitment to a specific theory of victory,” namely
that the United States was not fighting an endless war, and while Vietnam
was now a war of attrition, victory would be assured thanks to the superi-
ority in numbers and hardware of the US Army.97 To begin with, General
Westmoreland was flown home from his station as the leader of MACV in
Vietnam to participate in interviews and public relations exercises; as he
first stepped off the plane on American soil, he remarked that he had never
been more optimistic about the prospects for success.98 Westmoreland
would appear on the TV show “Meet the Press” to defend the administra-
tion’s policy on Vietnam and showcase his own positive predictions about
the way the war was going. Relying on Westmoreland’s persona was
important for this public relations push; the General was generally not
inclined to exaggerate for political effect, and his optimistic tone when
interacting with the press and the public caused them to take his predic-
tions seriously. This worked well for the administration; Westmoreland
lent an air of trustworthiness on the matter of Vietnam that Johnson
lacked since the opening of the credibility gap almost two years prior.

95
 N Sheehan, “Shift of McNamara Raises Speculation of Rift on War,” New York Times, 29
November 1967, p. 1.
96
 J Reston, “Washington: Why McNamara? And Why Now?” New York Times, 29
November 1967, p. 46.
97
 J Rovnor, Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 75.
98
 W Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday), p. 269.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  193

Gregory Daddis believes that Westmoreland’s actions in 1967—particu-

larly speeches that he gave in April to the Associated Press’s annual editors
luncheon and a joint session of Congress that roused legislators to “enthu-
siastic cheers,” won no converts to the pro-war view. Daddis cites Tom
Wicker’s view that Johnson was trading on Westmoreland’s reputation.
He also notes that the public relations campaigns of 1967 fell short in
convincing the American people of the war’s legitimacy and defining the
parameters of the conflict to the public.99 There is certainly some truth to
Daddis’s view—the simple fact was that after an extended period of time
muddying the waters on Vietnam, the administration’s attempts to set out
a forthright and proactive plan for managing public expectation seemed
like too little, too late. Nevertheless, this was an important change in the
attitude of the Johnson public relations strategy at a crucial time in the
war. Alongside the General, US Ambassador to South Vietnam Ellsworth
Bunker was brought in to deal with some press relations. As a hawk on the
war, Bunker succeeded Henry Cabot Lodge Jr as ambassador in April, and
Lodge himself suggested in the Wise Men’s meeting of 2 November that
Bunker be given a lot of publicity work when he returned to report later
that month.100 McGeorge Bundy noted in a memorandum to Johnson on
10 November that he felt, “we have tried too hard to convert public opin-
ion by statistics and by spectacular visits,” but “public discontent with the
war is now wide and deep,” indicating that Bundy felt previous attempts
by the administration to court public opinion while he served in the
administration failed.101
An early November meeting between the president, Secretaries Rusk
and McNamara, General Earle Wheeler, CIA Director Richard Helms,
Walt Rostow and George Christian was devoted entirely to discussing the
potential merits of Rusk and McNamara appearing on a televised 19

99
 G Daddis, “Johnson, Westmoreland and the “Selling” of Vietnam,” New York Times, 9
May 2017, accessed on 10 August 2017 at [Link]
ion/[Link]?rref=collection%2Ftimestopi
c%2FJohnson%2C%20Lyndon%20B.&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&regio
n=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=7&pgtype=collection
On Daddis’s research into William Westmoreland as a strategist, see Daddis, Westmoreland’s
War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
100
 FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 377.
101
 Memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. V,
Vietnam 1967, doc. 393, 10 November 1967, pp. 1010–12.
194  B. W. QUAIL

December “year-end wrap-up,” for CBS.102 Christian reported that

Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland would appear on the
show “Meet the Press” the following Sunday, which was an important
marker for the new focus on press relations, giving the two important
airtime to push the positive view of Vietnam. Johnson underlined the new
focus at the end of the meeting, noting, “We need to get a better story to
the American people.” Westmoreland and Bunker’s “Meet the Press”
interview went ahead on 19 November, and the pair gave a very positive
spin on the situation in Vietnam. Bunker noted that the administrations
was constantly looking for ways to open negotiations, while Westmoreland
praised the confident attitude of the South Vietnamese people, as well as
Americans involved in the war.103 Reporting for the New York Times the
following day, Peter Grose noted that Westmoreland and Bunker foresaw
a reduction in the American role in the war if current progress contin-
ued.104 It is worth noting however that the same edition of the newspaper
contained statements from Governor George Romney—kicking off his
campaign for the Republican presidential nomination—and the chairman
of New York’s Council against Poverty—the Reverend Carl H. McCall—
denouncing the president’s methods both domestically and in Vietnam.105
James Reston further justified the decision to send Bunker and
Westmoreland to “Meet the Press” in his column for the New York Times;
the influential columnist wrote that “They have been effective witnesses
because they are serious, attractive and well informed men—as good as
anything we have in the military and diplomatic services of the United
States,” summarising that they made persuasive points and that any
remaining questions on progress in Vietnam is “not because anybody
questions the sincerity or even the evidence” of the two men.106

102
 Notes of Meeting, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam 1967, 15 November 1967, doc.
400, p. 1030.
103
 Meet the Press: America’s Press Conference of the Air, 19 November 1967, transcript
accessed on 6 June 2017 and available at [Link]
westmoreland_petraeus/.
104
 P Grose, “War of Attrition Called Effective by Westmoreland: He and Bunker Foresee
a Reduction in U.S. Role if Progress Continues,” New York Times, 20 November 1967, p. 1.
105
 For coverage of Romney see A Ripley, “Romney says President Made ‘Colossal Mistake’
on Vietnam,” New York Times, 20 November 1967, p. 28. For McCall’s statement, see P
Kihss, “McCall Says Johnson Falters on Antipoverty Aid,” ibid., p. 37.
106
 J Reston, “Washington: Why Westmoreland and Bunker Are Optimistic,” New York
Times, 22 November 1967, p. 46.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  195

This represented a win for the administration’s focus on Vietnam; while

Reston and indeed public sentiment remained unconvinced by Johnson’s
own rhetoric on the war and the United States’ chances of success, Bunker
and Westmoreland provided a trustworthy and solid basis for moving for-
ward, something that the Johnsonian public affairs strategy previously
failed to provide. Clark Clifford noted in his memoirs, “At the time,
Westmoreland’s briefings and predictions impressed almost everyone,
including me.”107 For his part, Westmoreland believed his most important
address during his November press tour was at an address to the National
Press Club on 21 November.108 “It is significant,” noted Westmoreland in
this speech, “that the enemy has not won a major battle in over a year.”
The General’s optimism was spelled out for the National Press Club when
he noted, “I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was
winning, today he is certainly losing.”109 This garnered further positive
press attention; Neil Sheehan’s article on the matter was on the front page
of the following day’s New York Times.110 However, Johnson was aware
that the press was still sceptical regarding much of the information coming
from Vietnam; he noted in a meeting with Bunker, Westmoreland and
others in a meeting prior to the National Press Club address that the press
believed they were lying about official casualty lists.111 Evidently, the worry
over press motives had not left Johnson or members of the
administration.
As has been noted, Bunker and Westmoreland could not completely
achieve the Johnson objective of improving public relations with the
administration. Ultimately, it was time for Johnson himself to take the
matter into his own hands on Vietnam. While Westmoreland and Bunker
were doing good work in putting forward the administration’s agenda for
going forward in the war, Johnson took the offensive in a televised press
conference on 17 November. He defended his policies passionately, using
a lapel microphone to move in between the journalists and attendees. The
Johnsonian distrust of the press came to the fore; he may well have been

107
 C Clifford, Counsel to the President (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 453.
108
 Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 234.
109
 For the text of Gen. Westmoreland’s speech, see American Foreign Policy: Current
Documents 1967 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Public Affairs, 1969), pp. 1034–38.
110
 N Sheehan, “Westmoreland Sure of Victory: Calls Dak To Battle Start of ‘Great Defeat’
for Foe,” New York Times, 22 November 1967, p. 1.
111
 Notes of Meeting, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. V, Vietnam, 1967, doc. 409, 21 November,
p. 1051.
196  B. W. QUAIL

directing a swipe at the press when he answered a question on dissent: “I

do think that some people are irresponsible, make untrue statements, and
ought to be cautious and careful when they are dealing with the problem
involving their men at the front.”112 Gone was the stoic, “Presidential,”
style of the previous four years and in its place was something more akin
to his days in the Senate; James Reston described the conference as, “as
effective a performance as has been seen at a White House news confer-
ence in years.”113 Praised across the political spectrum by friends and foes
alike, this new style was a vast departure from the Johnson of old. While
not everyone was convinced—Reston elaborated in his column that, “He
is trying desperately now to carry his case on the war to the nation.”
However, the general consensus was that the conference was strong—
even Republican Senator Richard Nixon’s advisors thought that the con-
ference showed “the real LBJ rather than the pious hypocrite we’ve
become accustomed to.”114 The press conference of 17 November was a
high point: a calculated and strong performance which showed that a pro-
active approach to answering questions that relied on the traditional
Johnsonian style could still win the president more admirers. That he
refused to follow up the press conference at the following engagement
shows the inability of his administration to tie Johnson down to a cohesive
and permanent strategy. For Johnson, the instinct to remain stoic and—as
he saw it—presidential during public engagements was too strong; he
returned to the almost wooden style of dictating press conferences that
was not appealing to journalists. Following this, the president made
nationally televised remarks on Vietnam at the American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) conference
on 12 December. The previous day he railed against press leaks from the
administration about his travel plans to Christian and claimed the AFL “is
always leaking some such,” to him as well.115

112
 L B Johnson, “The President’s News Conference,” 17 November 1967. Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. [Link]
[Link]/ws/?pid=28555.
113
 J Reston, “Washington: President Johnson’s First Four Years,” New York Times, 19
November, p. 216.
114
 W Glavin, adviser to Richard Nixon, quoted in Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual
War, p. 204.
115
 Telephone conversation # 12506, sound recording, LBJ and GEORGE CHRISTIAN,
12/11/1967, time unknown, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  197

Another set piece of the Johnson public relations tour took place on 18
December, when he agreed to a taped “Conversation with the President,”
in which he answered the questions of journalists in a conversational style
at a taped interview. He emphasised his views on dissent and discussed
issues of foreign and domestic policy with several journalists.116 Following
this, Johnson set off on a whirlwind world tour, ostensibly to attend the
funeral of Australian Prime Minister Harold Holt. The Prime Minister had
become lost at sea while swimming, and his body had not been recovered.
Johnson had spoken personally with Holt’s press secretary Tony Eggleton
about planning for his attendance.117 Secretary Rusk saw in his memorial
service an opportunity for informal discussion and the presentation of a
united front on Vietnam from America’s pacific allies, issuing a telegram
requesting the heads of government from several countries also attend.118
Johnson also visited South Vietnam, Thailand and the Vatican, where he
made his case for the American bombing of Vietnam to Pope Paul VI,
who in turn agreed “to be as helpful as he could,” in seeking the return of
US prisoners of war.119
Turner notes that the tour did nothing to help the president’s standing
with the press, quoting the Washington Post’s Carroll Kilpatrick as saying,
“The President is driving staff and press unmercifully. There have been
two heart attacks already because of the unrelenting pace. Press facilities
have been sub-standard throughout, no advance notice; in some cases an

Meetings, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 21, 2021, [Link]

org/item/tel-12506.
116
 For the discussion, with audio and video, see the University of Virginia’s Miller Center’s
transcript, accessed on 4 May 2017 at [Link]
speeches/speech-5921.
117
 T Frame, The Life and Death of Harold Holt, (2005, Allen & Unwin) p. 262.
118
 President Park of South Korea, President Marcos of the Philippines, President Thieu of
South Vietnam, Prime Minister Thanom of Thailand, General Suharto of Indonesia, Prime
Minister Holyoake of New Zealand and Prime Minister Sato of Japan were all summoned.
Notably, only Sato and Suharto did not attend, sending vice-president of the Liberal Party
Kawashima and foreign minister Adam Malik in their stead. Sato’s office sent their apologies
to the president. See Folder, “Australia: President’s Trip to the Holt Funeral, Memos and
Misc. Cables, Dec. 1967,” International Meetings and Travel Files, NSF, Box 20, LBJ
Presidential Library, accessed December 11, 2020, [Link]
imt-­b20-f05 for Rusk’s cable and T Frame, The Life and Death of Harold Holt, p. 265 for
the list of attendees.
119
 Folder, “Australia: President’s Trip to the Holt Funeral, Memos and Misc. Cables, Dec.
1967,” International Meetings and Travel Files, NSF, Box 20, LBJ Presidential Library,
accessed December 11, 2020, [Link]
198  B. W. QUAIL

obvious and deliberate attempt to mislead the press about destinations.”120

In fact, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William
Bundy had to issue an apology to the press attaché for the arduous sched-
ule, blaming a lack of notice from the Australian government and the need
for enhanced security in Thailand and Vietnam.121 Johnson’s trip served
two purposes: the first was a sincere gesture to attend the memorial of a
man he had befriended over the course of Holt’s premiership, while the
second was a more obviously cynical attempt to drum up support from
both allied governments and the American public at large by putting on a
united front with like-minded governments from around the world, par-
ticularly from the Pacific area.122
A document summarising press response sent from Fred Panzer to
George Christian noted negative columns from the New York Times writer
Tom Wicker and others as “The anti-LBJ clacque,” showcasing the admin-
istration’s ever-growing contempt for negative press stories. Wicker him-
self criticised LBJ for “not showing his more human, relaxed side,” while
syndicated columnist Joseph Kraft argued that Johnson’s public overesti-
mation of American grief over Holt’s death undermined his credibility
further.123 Evidently, despite the attempts to court the press and public
throughout November and December, the old Johnsonian distrust of the
press resurfaced, and the only proactive thing about his circumnavigation
of the globe in December was his attempt at secrecy towards the press
corps following him, undermining the efforts of the previous two months.
As the year drew to a close, the president was still embattled by Vietnam,
and the gloom was not helped by an inconsistent press strategy

120
 C Kirkpatrick, quoted in Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 210.
121
 William Bundy, Background Briefing (President’s Trip Around The World), Folder,
“Australia: President’s Trip to the Holt Funeral, Memos and Misc. Cables, Dec. 1967,”
International Meetings and Travel Files, NSF, Box 20, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed
December 11, 2020, [Link]
122
 It is worth noting that in an article on presidential travel and approval ratings, Darcy
and Richman found no correlation between the two, lending credence to the view that
Johnson’s tour saw little material benefit while putting an additional strain on his already
fraught relationship with the likes of Kirkpatrick and the White House press. R E Darcy and
A Richman, “Presidential Travel and Public Opinion,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol.
18, no. 1 (Winter 1988), pp. 85–90.
123
 Memorandum from Fred Panzer to George Christian, Folder: Australia: President’s
Trip to the Holt Funeral, Memos and Misc. Cables, Dec. 1967,” International Meetings and
Travel Files, NSF, Box 20, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed December 11, 2020, https://
[Link]/item/nsf-imt-b20-f05, p. 3.
 6  1967: PACIFICATION, CHARM OFFENSIVES AND FURTHER UNDERMINED…  199

throughout the year. However, the administration faced significant prob-

lems out with their own inability to promote a strong and coherent line on
foreign and domestic policy issues. Rising inflation and violent race riots
caused concern that the president had lost his consensus and was unable
to control the country, causing his mid-year ratings to plummet and leave
the credibility gap wide open. To mitigate this, the late year public rela-
tions campaign finally saw the beginnings of a cohesive strategy towards
the press, but even at this most vital point Johnson himself could not
decide on his approach to media matters; as James Reston put it after the
17 November press conference, “He is experimenting a great deal now
with new techniques.”124 The use of Westmoreland and Bunker to give
their positive impressions on Vietnam was, however, an important marker
of how the president wished to move on in 1968 and a sign of a strong
media strategy for the following year. The final Gallup Poll of the year,
published on 31 December, put Lyndon Johnson’s approval rating at
46%.125 The signs of recovery from the slump of August were no doubt
there for the president, and his campaign of the later year undoubtedly
showed a positive side to the administration, but it would be important to
consolidate and build on this in 1968.

124
 J Reston, “President Johnson’s First Four Years,” New York Times, 18 November
1967, p. 216.
125
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2096.
 CHAPTER 7

1968: Tet, Plummeting Popularity

and the Ultimate Failure of the Johnsonian
Press Strategy

The year 1968 was shaping up to be a pivotal one for both the Johnson
administration and for America as a whole. Later termed “The Year the
Dream Died,” by veteran journalist Jules Witcover,1 the country had much
to deal with. On 23 January, a week before the Tet Offensive began,
North Korea seized the USS Pueblo, claiming ship violated its territorial
waters. The crew would not be released until 11 December. In March,
LBJ announced a bombing halt and removed himself from the race for the
presidency, declaring that he would refuse his party’s nomination. Political
unrest was underlined by two high-profile assassinations; civil rights activ-
ist Martin Luther King Jr. was shot by James Earl Ray on 4 April, just a
week before President Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 on 11
April, and Senator Robert Kennedy (D-New York) was targeted for his
views on Israel by the assassin Sirhan Sirhan, dying on 6 June. Kennedy
and Johnson were not on good terms since the latter declined to name
Kennedy as his running mate in 1964. The economic unrest and public
dissatisfaction with the war exploded into violence following King’s death,
and again as demonstrators picketed the Democratic National Convention
in August—a well-publicised incident involving security officers, and
reporters Dan Rather and Walter Cronkite created further publicity issues
for the Democrats. On 31 October, Johnson announced a complete

1
 J Witcover, The Year the Dream Died: Revisiting 1968 in America (New York: Warner
Books, 1997), p. 1.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 201

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
202  B. W. QUAIL

cessation of all air, naval and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam was
to start the following day. The following week, Richard Nixon became the
president elect, defeating Johnson’s vice president, Hubert Humphrey,
and giving a clear indication of negative public opinion on the Johnson
administration’s progress. However, the final break between Johnson, the
press and public opinion came with his 31 March announcement remov-
ing his name from contention. The focus of this section is on the events
leading up to this declaration, but some due consideration is needed for
events after the fact as the administration looked towards the November
elections.
Having plummeted in the polls, the administration rallied in the final
months of 1967 with a strong and cohesive public relations strategy that
targeted fears over Vietnam and the length of the war. A front-page report
in the New York Times on New Year’s Day was positive about the White
House press secretary, George Christian. Reviewing his recent perfor-
mance on The Nation, Columbia Broadcasting Service’s (CBS) television
show, Max Frankel said that Christian was “unflappable,” but also believed
that his three predecessors were “driven to varying degrees of despair.”2
The article noted Christian’s impact since taking on the role of press sec-
retary: “Mr. Christian came to the White House with a fresh eye and
applied an outsider’s judgement to the low state of relations between the
President and the press.”3 Johnson himself credited Christian with aiding
his relationship with the press and was overall complimentary of Christian’s
performance. Johnson’s relationship with the press was never a mutually
friendly one: the press, and particularly the White House press corps, did
not approve of Johnson’s erratic behaviour towards press conferences and
contact with journalists. This, when combined with his administration’s
previous inability to form a proactive press strategy, had been severely
disruptive to the administration and certainly contributed to the siege
mentality that many members of the administration have been described
as feeling against those who were critical of Johnson and his policies.
That Christian, described by Max Frankel as an “outsider,” came in and
assisted Johnson in his press relations in the months since his appointment
was an important positive step. Nevertheless, the question of the credibil-
ity gap still remained, and members of the press were still deeply

2
 M Frankel, “Johnson’s Press Secretary is Unflappable as Ever,” New York Times, 1
January 1968, p. 1.
3
 Ibid., p. 6.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  203

distrustful of Johnson and his proclamations on the war, as Peter Braestrup

claimed.4 Johnson was awarded Time’s Man of the Year award, although
the compliment was somewhat insincere; the president was depicted as
Shakespeare’s King Lear on the cover. The analogy of a king descending
into madness and isolation was not a kind one, nor was the description of
the article that followed. “It was sometimes hard to tell whether the ran-
cor aroused by Johnson stemmed from his policies or his personality,” one
stinging comment read. The article included a compilation of political
cartoons, each more negative than the last, and a graph showing the presi-
dent’s falling popularity.5 The article further noted that he “allowed the
Democratic National Committee’s once smooth machinery to rust,” but
concluded that Johnson was not dead in the water yet. “The greatest
Presidents,” it was said, “are those who have emerged during periods of
severe strain, domestic or foreign. Johnson still has a chance to stand
among them.”6 The negative view of Johnson put forward in the article
was reinforced in a letter to Time two weeks later; Carol McCabe from
Chicago stated, “I believe a leader has an obligation of letting his followers
know where he is leading them.”7 The damaging assessment aired by
McCabe—a student, according to the letter’s sign off—echoed the senti-
ments of many critics of the Johnson administration. As successful as the
public relations campaign of late 1967 was, there was still work to be done
in restoring the president’s faltering image and narrowing the credibility
gap. For this, a proactive press strategy would be needed.
Despite dissenting views such as McCabe’s response to Johnson’s nom-
ination as Time’s Man of the Year, his standing in public opinion recovered
slightly. With his public persona on the precipice in terms of newspaper
and magazine coverage, Johnson announced in his 1 January press confer-
ence that, “We are very hopeful we can make advances towards peace,”
before the end of the calendar year when asked by a journalist.8 He also
had to deal with the fallout of his meeting with Pope Paul VI at the end of
his tour of the previous year; Newsweek described it as being, “Less than

4
 Transcript, Peter Braestrup Oral History I, 1 March 1982, T Gittinger, p. 16, Internet
Copy, LBJ Library.
5
 “Man of the Year,” Time, 5 January 1968, pp. 16–18.
6
 Ibid., p. 22.
7
 Ibid., p. 7.
8
 L B Johnson, “The President’s News Conference at the LBJ Ranch,” 1 January 1968.
Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://
[Link]/ws/?pid=28693.
204  B. W. QUAIL

cordial,” but Johnson denied this, describing such claims as “just made
out of cloth.” He responded, “We told them it was just completely
untrue.”9 Alongside this critical line of questioning, the first Gallup Poll of
the year noted that 49% of respondents now disapproved of the way
Johnson was handling the situation in Vietnam.10 His personal standing
was not strong, either, although it had been lower during parts of 1967—a
poll taken amongst respondents between 4 and 9 January showed a 48%
approval rating for the president, almost 10% higher than his lows of the
previous August.11 Fred Panzer, who was in charge of keeping track of
public opinion, informed Johnson at the start of the year that he was look-
ing to “cultivate” Louis Harris, whose polling was used by CBS, and sent
him a book containing presidential speeches. Harris’s favourable response
to this saw him meet with Governor John Connally, Johnson’s friend in
Texas, to discuss poll results and receive an invitation to a White House
dinner.12 Interestingly, the syndicated Harris Poll on 8 January was much
more friendly towards the president; Harris maintained that:

Only two months after a Harris survey showed that all four of the leading
Republican presidential contenders could defeat President Johnson, a spe-
cial survey now shows Mr. Johnson riding a new crest of popularity that
would make him the favourite if the election were held now.13

Harris showed Johnson leading over Governors George Wallace and

George Romney, and former Vice President Richard Nixon, and in a dead
heat with New York’s governor, Nelson Rockefeller. While the president’s
polling situation was still mixed, this was to be expected given the polaris-
ing effect of Vietnam on the United States; there were clear signs of recov-
ery in public faith in the administration following the concerted effort to
appeal to public sentiment at the end of 1967. In order to continue the
improvement, it was now vital for the president to build on the previous
months’ work with his State of the Union speech.

9
 Ibid.
10
 G Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971 (New York: Random House,
1972), p. 2099.
11
 Ibid., p. 2103.
12
 Panzer’s courting of Harris is mentioned by B Altschuler in LBJ and the Polls (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1990), p. 77.
13
 L Harris, “Harris Survey: LBJ Rebounds to Lead GOP Contenders,” Winona Daily
News (Winona, MN), 8 January 1968, p. 4.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  205

As with previous State of the Union addresses, the speechwriting pro-

cess began several months earlier and continued until the day of 17 January
when the president would address Congress. A memorandum sent by
Henry Owen, who worked under Walt Rostow in the State Department’s
policy planning staff, on 29 November 1967 picked up on the administra-
tion’s tendency to allow journalistic pressure. Marked, “Where Do We Go
From Here,” Owen’s note announced that, “The Administration is taking
the offensive,” and directed several points which Johnson could poten-
tially include in his speech to drive this message home.14 That it was neces-
sary to point out that the administration was no longer on the defensive
speaks volumes about prior public affairs strategies. In a memorandum
forwarded by Joe Califano to speechwriter Harry McPherson on 16
December, domestic policy staffer Fred Bohen said that the mood of the
nation was “somber,” with “bitterness, unhappiness, tension and impa-
tience.” He felt the speech would be judged on the frankness with which
Johnson addressed the nation’s problems and the clarity of his vision for
the future.15 Evidently, White House Chief of Staff Califano agreed with
this summary, ensuring that McPherson—who had been integral to the
crafting of the 1967 State of the Union speech—saw the memorandum,
which provided numerous ideas for writing the speech. Bohen’s dramatic
summary of the mood of the nation was equally indicative of the mood of
many within the administration by this point in time.16 As with previous
State of the Union addresses, suggestions were taken from a variety of dif-
ferent sources, both within and outside the administration; Betsy Levin,
special assistant to Arthur Goldberg at the United Nations, gave several
ideas on domestic policy concerns.17 Congressman Donald J. Irwin

14
 Confidential Memorandum from H Owen [no recipient specified], “Where Do We Go
From Here?”, 29 November 1967, “Annual Message To Congress on the State of the
Union,” Statements of Lyndon Baines Johnson, box 260, Lyndon B Johnson Library,
Austin, Texas [LBJ Library].
15
 Memorandum from Fred Bohen to Joseph A Califano, 1 December 1967 (Forwarded
to Harry McPherson on 16 December 1967), “Annual Message to Congress on the State of
the Union,” Statements of Lyndon Baines Johnson, box 260, LBJ Library.
16
 In his memoirs, Nicholas Katzenbach noted, “Nineteen sixty-eight was my eighth con-
secutive year in government and it was by far the most depressing and frustrating year for
me—and I think for many others as well.” See N DeB Katzenbach, Some Of It Was Fun:
Working with RFK and LBJ (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), p. 277 and passim.
17
 Memorandum from Betsy Levin to Don Furtado, forwarded to Joseph A. Califano on
12 December 1967, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements
of Lyndon B Johnson, box 260, LBJ Library.
206  B. W. QUAIL

(D-Michigan) wrote to the president to “urge” him to include a note on

the International Education Act of 1966 and its need for funding.18 Staff
members such as Ben Wattenberg and Harry McPherson were also heavily
involved in the drafting of the speech, itself.
On 13 January, four days before the State of the Union address, Robert
Kintner sent a thirteen-page memorandum to Johnson stating his views
on the speech. His extensive experience of the television industry was on
full display, and he felt Johnson had chosen the best possible time to tele-
vise the speech to reach the largest potential audience. The speech was as
important to the formation of public impressions as the first Kennedy-­
Nixon debate in 1960, he claimed, and advised that “the President must
prepare for the talk as any actor would rehearse.”19 He also advised that in
terms of television performance, “the public wants to see Lyndon
B. Johnson as he is,” and advised on a natural delivery that emphasised
sacrificing last-minute changes for a speech that Johnson knew by heart,
something that was never the case with previous addresses.20 The
Johnsonian method leaned heavily on multiple speechwriters working on
drafts of the speech sometimes until the hours before the speech was to be
given. The importance of the speech was not lost on Kintner, who was a
key advisor on the subject of television; Johnson utilised Kintner’s experi-
ence as former president of the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC)
since he joined the president’s advisory staff in 1966.
Kintner used his involvement in the industry to point out some of the
errors of previous years; for example, Bill Moyers had given the text of the
1967 speech to the media, “between 7:30pm and 8:00pm,” losing print-
ing of the text in early editions of newspapers in the Eastern Time Zone,
particularly New York, for a speech that went to air at 9.33 pm.21 Kintner

18
 Memorandum from Donald J Irwin to President Lyndon B Johnson, 20 December
1967, “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon
Baines Johnson, box 260, LBJ Library.
19
 Memorandum from Kintner to President Johnson, 13 January 1968, “Annual Message
to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon Baines Johnson, box 260,
LBJ Library, p. 2.
20
 Ibid., p. 3. Kintner also advised (p. 4) that Johnson should work with a professional “if”
he decided to run in the 1968 election.
21
 The 9 pm time of the speech is noted in Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Message to the
Congress on the State of the Union,” 10 January 1967. Online by Gerhard Peters and John
T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project. [Link]
ws/?pid=28338. Kintner recommended later in the memo that the text be released to news-
papers, magazines and broadcasters no later than 6:00 pm.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  207

also noted that editors were “beside themselves with anger,” at the chaotic
nature of the press contact from the administration.22 This parallels the
new attitude of the government since the San Antonio speech; the delay
by Moyers could be attributed to the administration wanting to keep the
text of the speech from falling into the hands of critics or a simple lack of
regard for the press on Johnson’s part or even both of these. As Kintner
pointed out, whether it was intentional or not angering the press did not
help the administration in any way. The memo did help to reinforce the
siege mentality and negative view of the media within the administration;
Kintner believed that CBS offered the Republican Party an hour after the
speech to air their—probably negative—views to the nation. This strength-
ened the Johnsonian belief that the press were looking for ways to dis-
credit him.
Johnson was advised by Kintner to practise the speech with close advi-
sors to ensure that he could recite it from memory and give a good televi-
sion performance; a memorandum from Elizabeth Carpenter, press
secretary and staff director for Lady Bird Johnson, suggests that he did
indeed deliver the speech to her. Carpenter previously worked for Johnson
when he was vice president and began her list of corrections by noting
that, “You deliver it better than adequately but you could do it superbly,”
agreeing with Kintner’s suggestion of practice.23 The administration did
not heed Kintner’s advice that last-minute re-writes should be sacrificed;
Cater sent a message to Johnson on 16 January strongly advising that he
let McPherson add another 400 words to the draft.24 A redraft of one por-
tion was sent to Johnson by Califano at 10:10 am on the day of the speech;
the chaotic nature of Johnsonian speechwriting remained unchanged.25

22
 Memorandum from Kintner to Johnson, p. 5.
23
 Memorandum from Liz Carpenter to the President, 16 January 1968 (mis-labelled as 16
November), “Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of
Lyndon B Johnson, box 260, LBJ Library. Carpenter was a journalist and public speaker in
her own right, and contributed to some of Johnson’s speeches. She also created the “White
House Humor Group,” who, Robert Schlesinger notes, would meet in her office every week
or so, “sip scotch and try to come up with jokes for Johnson’s upcoming speeches.” See R
Schlesinger, White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2008), p. 177.
24
 Memorandum from Douglass Cater to the President, 16 January 1968, in Statements of
Lyndon B Johnson, box 260, 17 January 1968, LBJ Library.
25
 Memorandum from Joe Califano to the President, 17 January 1968, at 10:10am,
“Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson,
box 260, LBJ Library.
208  B. W. QUAIL

Califano apparently worked through the night at the president’s behest,

sending a draft at 2 am on the morning of the speech reflecting Johnson’s
requested changes and giving a word count.26 Johnson himself agonised
until the last minute over whether to include a passage announcing his
withdrawal from seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party for pres-
ident in the forthcoming elections; he decided against it on this occasion,
although he claimed to his biographer Doris Kearns that he asked his aide
Horace Busby to write an additional section to the end of the State of the
Union address making such an announcement. Kearns notes that his
explanation of why he did not act on this—that he forgot the paper with
the text—is unconvincing.27 In his informal memoirs, dictated to Kearns,
he elaborated that he would not have read the statement regardless. “I was
asking the Congress that night for a heavy and demanding program,” he
stated. “To couple such a request with a statement that I was not going to
run for President might suggest to various people that I was not willing to
fight for what I was asking.”28 Much has been made of whether Johnson
really intended to step down from the presidency before his position
became untenable; the purpose of mentioning this is not to question his
intention but to show the difficulty that anyone involved in preparing the
address faced; without the full co-operation of their leader, it was impos-
sible for speechwriters to construct a cohesive message. Johnson did not
mention this to anyone but trusted advisors and confidants such as George
Christian and Lady Bird. The secrecy shown by Johnson was in this case
extreme in nature. The difficulty of composing an important speech at
such an important time under these conditions is evident from this. It
would not be possible to continue the strong and proactive approach
towards Johnson’s public profile that was taken in the final months of
1967 if he retreated into his previous, more secretive, habits.
The State of the Union address began, predictably, with a discussion of
Vietnam. Johnson noted that the North’s strategy rested on the “hope
that America’s will to persevere can be broken” and confirmed his

26
 Memorandum from Joe Califano to the President, 17 January 1968, at 2:00am, “Annual
Message to Congress on the State of the Union,” Statements of Lyndon B Johnson, box
263, LBJ Library.
27
 D Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (London: Harper and Row,
1976), p. 343.
28
 L B Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Henry Holt, 1971), p. 430. Turner also
notes this exchange in Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 213, and Johnson’s difficulties at the
beginning of 1968.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  209

commitment to the formula he outlined in his address at San Antonio in

September. Unlike in previous State of the Union speeches, he moved
swiftly on to discuss other pressing matters of foreign policy. In terms of
domestic affairs, Johnson outlined the issues faced by America in the pre-
vious year that damaged his credibility, including rapid inflation and inner
city rioting, and affirmed his commitment to resolving the issues. He con-
cluded by stating that many of the problems faced by America could be
solved by the country’s bicentennial year in 1976 and summed up the
State of the Union as, “seeking, building, tested many times in this past
year—and always equal to the test.”29 As Johnson himself later stated,
large-­scale requests were made of Congress; $2.1 billion was proposed for
a “manpower program,” with $1 billion for the Model Cities programme
which would “help meet the crisis in the cities of America.” Large-scale
housing programmes and a child health programme to provide health ser-
vices for new mothers and their children were also requested.
Unsurprisingly, headlines the following day focused on the massive
budget required for Johnson’s requests; the New York Times ran with the
$186 billion figure Johnson eventually quoted.30 An editorial the same day
commented, “the money has drained into Vietnam that should have nur-
tured [the Great Society’s] beginnings and transformed them into sturdy
accomplishments.”31 Writing on the speech, James Reston was less than
impressed, calling it “something less than a triumph. It was a good politi-
cal road map for 1968, but it did nothing to remove the restlessness it
deplored.”32 The Associated Press reported that “key members” of
Congress were already looking to cut the budget that Johnson proposed
and quoted Representative Frank T. Bow (R-Ohio) as saying33 he expected
strong support for a resolution to cut spending by $10 billion. Time noted
in their 26 January edition that Lyndon Johnson was “interrupted by
applause 53 times during his State of the Union address,” but this was no

29
 L B. Johnson: “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 17 January,
1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.  Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
[Link]
30
 H Smith, “Johnson’s Budget $186  billion: Wants Gold Reserve Freed; Seeks an
Assurance by Hanoi,” New York Times, 28 January 1968, p. 1.
31
 “The State of the Union,” New York Times, 18 January 1968, p. 38.
32
 J Reston, “Washington: ‘Why Then, This Restlessness,’” New York Times, 19 January
1968, p. 46.
33
 Associated Press, “Key Solons Would Slice More From ‘Tight Budget,’” Bridgeport Post
(Bridgeport, CT), 18 January 1968, p. 50.
210  B. W. QUAIL

compliment, as the article continued, “the cheers were mostly perfunctory

and remarkably partisan.”34 Picking up on the Johnsonian method of last-­
minute additions to the speech, Time printed an anecdote about the hours
before the address:

Five hours before the scheduled delivery of the speech on a nationwide tele-
vision hookup, Johnson announced to those in his oval office: ‘I’m not
going to let anyone put anything else in this. All you want to do is add
words, and I’m trying to cut words.35

Again, a major nationwide publication was pointing out the difficult

and chaotic nature of the Johnsonian speechwriting process. Embarrassingly
for the president, Time noted that “some 250 of the 535 members of the
House and Senate” did not attend the address. While there are no figures
for the attendances of previous addresses, the fact that a major publication
pointed out that such a large number of representatives were not there is
striking. Regarding Vietnam, much of the damage was done. The pollster
Louis Harris has noted from his experience with opinion polls and the
American public that “By the end of 1967, a majority of people were pre-
pared to level two withering personal criticisms of President Johnson: ‘He
has not been honest with the people on Vietnam,” and ‘He has raised false
hopes for the war too often.’”36 Ultimately, the latter criticism would
prove to be prescient; the public relations campaign of 1967 that was
pushed so hard by the president and spearheaded by positive press reports
from General Westmoreland and Ambassador Bunker would come crash-
ing down less than two weeks after the State of the Union address as the
Tet Offensive began.
Before this, however, the USS Pueblo incident threatened to cause the
administration a severe headache. The crew of the Navy ship (one of
whom died) was seized by North Korea and charged with encroaching on
that country’s sovereign waters. An editorial in the following day’s New
York Times noted that:

If the American vessel did penetrate North Korean waters—as American

ships were tardily acknowledged to have penetrated waters claimed by North

34
 “The Cities: The Crucible,” Time, 26 January 1968, p. 11.
35
 “The Presidency: Bar Grease,” Time, 26 January 1968, p. 13.
36
 L Harris, The Anguish of Change (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), p. 60.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  211

Vietnam prior to the Tonkin incidents—the United States Government

must bear at least a share of the responsibility for what has happened.37

The editorial further condemned the administration for allowing a ves-

sel, “presumably crammed with sensitive intelligence equipment,” to fall
into hostile hands. Time included on its 2 February front cover a picture
of the Pueblo’s skipper—Lloyd Bucher—and noted in its editorial that offi-
cial sources on the matter were almost impossible to come by—yet another
example of the Johnson administration’s tendency to react—or in this case
not react—to news as it broke.38 The magazine’s commentary noted that
the Pueblo incident represented, “an abrupt object lesson to Americans
that the world’s greatest power can be roundly and resoundingly put
down by the most miniscule of foes.”39 Evidently, the overwhelming con-
clusion drawn by the media in the days following the seizure of the Pueblo
was that the situation was something of an embarrassment for the Johnson
administration. A meeting on 24 January between several of the presi-
dent’s key advisors saw George Christian raise the question of how to deal
with the press. As with previous crises, the reaction of the administration
was to withdraw; the minutes of the meetings noted that “it was suggested
that [Christian] saw the capture of the Pueblo…was being closely studied
prior to the President’s decision on his course of action.”40 A meeting later
that day saw Secretary Rusk discuss the use of the UN Security Council to
engage with public feeling on the matter.41 Clark Clifford repeated this
view to the president the following day, noting that the government did
not want to send in planes, or this would become public knowledge and
engender further critical press reporting.42 The suggestion to move
through the United Nations was evidently taken up as the United States
sent messages to the North Koreans through a United Nations contact to
set up face-to-face discussions on the matter of the Pueblo.43 While the

37
 “The Pueblo Incident,” New York Times, 24 January 1968, p. 44.
38
 J R Shepley, “Letter from The Publisher,” Time, 26 January 1968, p. 9.
39
 “The War,” Time, 26 January 1968, p. 13.
40
 Summary Minutes of Meeting, 24 January 1968 [10:30–11:45am], in FRUS 1964–1968,
vol. XXIX, Part I, Korea, doc. 217.
41
 Minutes on Meeting, 24 January [6pm], in FRUS 1964–1968, vol. XXIX, Part I, Korea,
doc. 220.
42
 Notes of Meeting, 25 January 1968, in FRUS 1964–1968, vol. XXIX, Part I, Korea,
doc. 226.
43
 Editorial Note, in FRUS 1964–1968, vol. XXIX, Part I, Korea, doc. 247.
212  B. W. QUAIL

issues surrounding the Pueblo do not necessarily relate to Vietnam, the

incident was an embarrassing one for the Johnson administration in any
context; the Pueblo was a “spy ship,” carrying sensitive information, and,
as noted by the New York Times, should not have been allowed to fall into
communist hands. It was a failure on the part of the government’s foreign
and defence policies, and by remaining tight-lipped on the matter, as
reported by Time, the administration once again retreated into the old
Johnsonian tactic of press distrust and secrecy. The incident therefore rep-
resented another indictment of Johnson’s ability in the field of foreign
policy and diplomacy (the crew was released after being held for eleven
months; the ship remains in North Korean hands to this day). As it was,
attention from the Pueblo’s capture was quickly diverted, as the Viet Cong
began the Tet Offensive on 30 January.
Even as 1967 drew to a close, key advisors to Johnson believed that the
war would be won and America would prevail, given time. Figures such as
Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow and the Joint chiefs of Staff appeared to be in
agreement on this.44 The Tet Offensive blindsided many in the administra-
tion and drastically changed the prevailing mood on the war. The diffi-
culty faced in early January was that of pushing for negotiations—Johnson’s
‘Special Consultant’ John Roche noted in a memorandum to the presi-
dent on 18 November, “We are getting butchered in the press for ‘over-­
caution’ vis-à-vis negotiations”.45 Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower
noted in a discussion with General Andrew Goodpaster that “TV coverage
of bases that are hit by mortar fire is damaging to our people’s understand-
ing of the war.”46 In Vietnam, meanwhile, Westmoreland had misgivings
about the observation of the annual truce that was declared for the Tet
Lunar New Year celebrations and argued with Washington over for how
long—if at all—any truce should be honoured.47 In a telegram to General
Wheeler on 22 January he noted, “The bulk of our evidence suggests that
the enemy is conducting a short term surge effort, possibly designed to

44
 On the Wise Men’s meeting, see previous chapter and C Page, U. S. Official Propaganda
During the Vietnam War, 1965–1973: The Limits of Persuasion (London: Bloomsbury,
1998), p. 36.
45
 Memorandum from the President’s Special Consultant (Roche) to President Johnson,
January 18 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968, doc. 17.
46
 Memorandum for the Record, 18 January 1968, in FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam,
January–August 1968, doc. 20.
47
 R E Ford, Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise (London: Frank Cass & Co, 1995),
pp. 102–103.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  213

improve his chances of gaining his ends through political means.”48

Johnson stated in a meeting with the Democratic leadership on 23 January
that reports showed a “full scale” attack on the airstrip at Khe Sanh, near
the Demilitarized Zone, alongside attacks on other areas and violence in
South Vietnamese capital Saigon.49 Nevertheless, the holiday ceasefire
began, and the North Vietnamese strategy came into effect. Masses of
troops attacked seven cities in northern areas of South Vietnam in the
early hours of 30 January, and twenty-four hours later further attacks
began throughout South Vietnam, including a particularly audacious
assault on Saigon and the beginnings of a siege at the former imperial capi-
tal Hue, where some of the most brutal combat of the war would be seen
over a three-week period. In all, around 85,000 North Vietnamese fight-
ers attacked, hitting sixty-four district capitals and dozens of smaller towns.
The fighting very quickly took its toll on the home front, as death rates
reached up to 500 per week during the worst times and a Gallup Poll
taken in March reflected badly on the Johnson administration; only 36%
agreed with his conduct during his presidency, and fewer still, 26%, agreed
with his conduct over the course of the Vietnam conflict.50 The Tet
Offensive lasted until the last few days in March, by which point President
Johnson’s credibility as the leader of the country had been completely
eroded by headlines and articles from newspapers such as the Wall Street
Journal, which suggested that the “Whole Vietnam effort may be
doomed.”51 As early as 1 February a TV network special for NBC largely
condemned the military response to Tet, with the presenter Robert
Goralski concluding that, “The communists may not be winning the war,
as the Pentagon claims, but they certainly don’t seem to be losing it
either,” while Jeff Gralnick reporting for CBS stated that Tet was “The
exact opposite of what American leaders have, for months, been leading us
to expect.”52

48
 Details of Westmoreland’s telegram were discussed at the President’s weekly Tuesday
lunch with National Security advisory staff, notes of which are found in Notes of Meeting,
23 January 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968, doc. 23.
49
 Notes of meeting, 22 January 1968, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam, January–
August 1968, doc. 22.
50
 Page, U.S. Official Propaganda During the Vietnam War, p. 5.
51
 Ibid.
52
 P Braestrup, Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted
the Crisis of Tet 1968  in Vietnam and Washington (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1983), p. 133.
214  B. W. QUAIL

With that single sentence, Gralnick managed to pinpoint the problems

already present in US government propaganda efforts in the run-up to
Tet. Larry Berman concurs with this, arguing, “Tet juxtaposed with the
optimism of November showed up LBJ’s public relations campaign for
what it was.”53 While simultaneously ignoring signs of unrest and tactical
change from the Viet Cong, Washington professed to the general public
that an end was in sight and that the war could soon be over. When the
Offensive happened, the public was shocked at the actions of the North
Vietnamese, but the biggest reaction was against the war hawks who stood
up just months earlier to insist that an attack like this simply could not
happen. Images soon began to pour out of Vietnam following the
Offensive. A now infamous image of South Vietnamese Brigadier General
Nguyen Ngoc Loan shooting a captured and bound Viet Cong in the
head won its photographer a Pulitzer Prize, but it would be an understate-
ment to say that it did not help Johnson’s war effort. The photographer—
Eddie Adams of the Associated Press—would later express his regret over
the image. The idea that it had done more harm than good to the war
effort, “long dismayed Mr. Adams, who accepted Brig. Gen. Loan’s con-
tention that the man he shot murdered a friend of his, a South Vietnamese
army colonel, as well as the colonel’s wife and six children.”54 Similarly, an
image of American embassy official George Jacobsen leaning from a win-
dow of the US embassy in Saigon with a pistol in hand did not allay
American fears—Gustainis agrees that “The myth of Viet Cong decline
leading to imminent American victory was effectively undermined.”55
Again, television and film media completely humiliated the American
government and their efforts to subdue anti-war sentiment. The picture of
Nguyen Ngoc Loan in particular was an example of how effectively a sin-
gle picture could be used as propaganda, in this case against Johnson’s
goals in Vietnam. The administration had no strategy for combating the
flood of uncensored information that found its way into the American
news media following Tet. To drive the point home even further to the
president, another NBC Special on 10 March contrasted Johnson’s and
Westmoreland’s assertions of the previous autumn with images of the
53
 Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War, p. 138.
54
 A Grunberg, “Eddie Adams, Journalist Who Showed Violence of Vietnam, Dies at 71,”
New York Times, 20 September 2004, accessed on 5 June 2017 at [Link]
com/2004/09/20/arts/eddie-adams-journalist-who-showed-violence-of-vietnam-­
[Link]?_r=0.
55
 Gustainis, American Rhetoric in the Vietnam War, pp. 43–44.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  215

brutality of Tet, questioning the validity of the statements by the

commander-­in-chief and his top general, shattering their credibility and
concluding, “The war, as the Johnson administration defined it, is
being lost.”56
The immediate aftermath of the Tet Offensive saw the government
position in shambles; Westmoreland was abruptly pulled from Vietnam to
be moved upstairs as the army’s chief of staff on 22 March.57 The fallout
of Tet also effectively killed Johnson’s hopes of running for the presidency
again in November 1968—while public opinion was gradually turning
against him for some time, it was clear by the end of the March 1968 that
a watershed moment had passed. Journalist Peter Braestrup would later
say that, “Johnson knew something was coming and still didn’t tell the
people.”58 And while the tide did not completely turn against the war,
Johnson was no longer trusted to lead the way. Eugene McCarthy almost
unseated Johnson in the New Hampshire primary: an unheard of feat
against an incumbent President. Robert Kennedy announced his own can-
didacy, using his popularity to appropriate the anti-war and civil rights
causes and inflict a potentially huge embarrassment on Johnson—so that
relinquishing his claim on the presidency suddenly seemed to Johnson the
only way to keep the country together. The Tet Offensive made Johnson’s
propaganda look outdated and hopelessly out of touch with reality; he and
Westmoreland were effectively felled by their involvement with the 1967
drive to inform the public that the war was close to an end. When faced
with an offensive that ruined their credibility, both men were given no
choice but to relinquish their respective commands. Faith in the US gov-
ernment was greatly shaken by Tet.
The impact of the Tet Offensive going forward was great. Skirmishes
and battles under the Tet banner continued throughout 1968—related
fighting was still going on as late as September. As we have seen, the
Offensive caused a massive backlash against the previous propaganda put
out by Johnson’s government. As time went on, this continued. Vietnam
Veterans Against War (VVAW), a movement of former combatants cam-
paigning for peace, grew, and some veterans signed up following their
experiences. Westmoreland’s rhetoric in the immediate aftermath did not

56
 D Halberstam, quoted in Gustainis, American Rhetoric in the Vietnam War, p. 45.
57
 N Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1989), p. 720.
58
 P Braestrup Oral History I, p. 16.
216  B. W. QUAIL

help; veteran William Crandell joined VVAW after hearing the General
describe Tet as a “Great American victory.”59 As the year progressed, issues
within the United States took precedence over Vietnam in news reporting
at times; Martin Luther King Jr’s assassination in April and Robert
Kennedy’s two months later were just two of the unsettling stories which
filled the newspapers. H. B. Franklin goes further than some in assessing
what Tet did to America; he signals that it transformed the burgeoning
anti-war movement into an anti-imperialist movement. The anti-war paper
Viet-Report used Tet to re-appraise other US sponsored conflicts such as
those in Latin America, asking, “How many American boys will have to
die before analysts decide to re-appraise Latin American history?”60
Neil Sheehan has stated that, “Americans watched the country they
were supposed to be rescuing being burned down and blown apart on
television—in color.”61John Hellman has viewed the reaction to Tet as a
natural one in a war with no defined enemy, goal or a convincing explana-
tion as to how the conflict fitted in with Americans’ view of themselves;
“Johnson had attempted to fight a terrible, long war without the tangible
elements of myth—a vivid villain, an identifiable grail, a convincing expla-
nation of how unfolding events fit the larger mythic pattern.”62 Tet opened
the eyes of a lot of Americans and showed them exactly what kind of war
was being fought—while it was not necessarily even a victory for the Viet
Cong, it served to break down important psychological barriers on the
home front, achieving what the North Vietnamese wanted, unsettling the
general American population—and while most did not actively join the
burgeoning anti-war movement immediately following the events of early
1968, a change occurred. Newspapers now habitually reported in negative
terms, in stark contrast to the optimism purveyed by official sources in late
1967. The mood shifted, and enthusiasm from the public would continue
to spiral and wane as stories continued to leak about Tet over the follow-
ing months and years.
As the Tet Offensive continued to cause issues, Johnson’s position as
leader of the Democratic Party became untenable. Senator Eugene

59
 A E Hunt, The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War (New York:
New York University Press, 1999), p. 19.
60
 Quoted in H B Franklin, Vietnam and Other Fantasies (Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 2000), p. 104.
61
 Sheehan, Bright, Shining Lie, p. 718.
62
 J Hellman, American Myth: Legacy of Vietnam (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), p. 93.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  217

McCarthy (D-Minnesota) announced his intention to run as a counter

candidate to Johnson in several of the party’s presidential primaries.
McCarthy was not a serious option, but saw himself as a counter to the
hawkish administration, and wanted the chance to air his views on the war
and pressure other Democrats into adopting an anti-war stance. For the
first primary in New Hampshire on 12 March, McCarthy poured his
resources into campaigning. His strategy paid off, as he won 42% of the
vote to Johnson’s 49%.63 The New York Times reported the figure at
“Around 40%” in its headline the following day and noted that Johnson
“turned back a strong challenge,” from McCarthy. Following this, Robert
Kennedy announced his own campaign for the nomination, attempting to
capitalise on the perceived weakness of the president following a difficult
night for the administration in New Hampshire. Kennedy was a popular
figure in the Democratic Party, having been associated with his brother
during the latter’s presidency. As well as this, Johnson and Kennedy were
not on good terms. Faced with two strong challenges to his presidency,
Johnson had a decision to make. His health was beginning to fail, and
several scares throughout his presidency caused him to take stock of the
situation. Nevertheless, the Johnson campaign continued into New
Hampshire, and therefore the question remains as to his intentions for the
November election. It is important to acknowledge this discussion when
looking at Johnson’s media strategies; if he had decided early to withdraw
from the race, he once again kept everyone in the dark over his choice.
With such unrest in the background, the administration scrambled to
address the situation that Tet caused in Vietnam. On 10 March, Neil
Sheehan and Hedrick Smith published a leaked account of the debates
going on within the administration on troop levels. Johnson, who treated
leaks with the utmost contempt, was incensed. Walt Rostow noted in a
memorandum on the day of the leak that he regarded it as “the product of
dangerous insubordination.”64 Ultimately, the leak showed up yet another
problem with the administration; while it would clearly be unwise to pub-
licise internal dissension, the fact that a source within the administration
was willing to leak information to the press in such a manner was a

63
 W Weaver, Jr, “M’Carthy[sic] Gets About 40%, Johnson and Nixon On Top In New
Hampshire Voting,” New York Times, 13 March 1968, p. 1.
64
 Information Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson, 10 March 1968, in FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam, January-August 1968,
doc. 116.
218  B. W. QUAIL

worrying sign for Johnson, who now risked being alienated from key staff
members as well as the press. Memorandums in the days following the
article’s publication spoke of the need to clear administration staffers of
being party to the leak before allowing them access to information on the
war. Once again, the siege mentality and reactive tendencies kicked in;
Rostow’s denunciation stressed the importance of a quick reaction by the
president, but the notes in the file suggest that there was some knowledge
within the State Department that such a leak would occur. That this was
not communicated to the president and no record exists to show that it
was discussed by any of his senior aides is indicative of a real problem in
the administration by this point; a lack of communication between all lev-
els and no strategy to combat any potential leaks harmed Johnson’s ability
to communicate effectively with the media and, by extension, with
the public.
At the suggestion of Dean Acheson, one of the still-influential bi-­
partisan “Wise Men” who shaped American thinking about the Cold War,
a working group was to be formed to address questions on where to go
with Vietnam policy; chief among them was, “What progress did we
make—and fail to make—in the period between mid-1965 and 1968?”65
The administration was keenly aware of the need to address criticism and
also to ensure that the South Vietnamese were aware of the domestic situ-
ation; South Vietnamese ambassador Bùi Diêm ̃ met with Johnson on 18
March and agreed to underline to his superiors “the mood in the United
States and the rising tide of criticism against American involvement” in the
war.66 In the wake of the New Hampshire primary results and Kennedy’s
announcement, this was vital. A meeting between Johnson and senior
Vietnam advisors on 15 March showed the difficulty in announcing troop
increases to the public; 98,000 men were to be called up by the army, and
Johnson wondered aloud if it would be better to “not announce when
they went to Vietnam until after they arrived,” showing clearly that the
lessons of 1967 had not been learned.67

65
 Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in
Texas, 16 March 1968, in FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968,
doc. 135.
66
 Memorandum for the Record, 19 March 1968, in FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam,
January–August 1968, doc. 140.
67
 Editorial Note (Meeting between the President and his advisors), 15 March 1968, in
FRUS 1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968, doc. 130.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  219

George Christian suggested linking the announcement with the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee’s recent discussion with Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, but Johnson dismissed this out of hand.68 The president was,
however, painfully aware of the problems Tet caused in public opinion and
so were the people around him. A telegram from Arthur Goldberg—US
ambassador to the United Nations—to the Department of State noted,
“Recent developments in our country have demonstrated that there is
grave concern among the American public whether the course we have set
in our Vietnam policy is right.”69 Goldberg felt strongly that a push
towards negotiations based on the formula set forth by Johnson in his San
Antonio speech the previous year was the best way forward. Dean Rusk
and Clark Clifford debated whether this would be an effective strategy;
Clifford advised against this and recommended forming the president’s
committee of senior advisors to discuss the matter again—while the Wise
Men unanimously supported the war in 1967, a lot had taken place since
then. Nick Katzenbach noted that the Wise Men’s second meeting, which
followed these discussions, was “a genuine turning point.” Katzenbach
wrote in his memoirs that “their unanimity was shattered” and that their
general shift against the war since Tet, “was a blow to LBJ, and to some
extent to Rusk and Rostow as well.”70 Johnson was a consensus politician,
something which has been noted by both his subordinates—such as Under
Secretary of the Air Force Townsend Hoopes, who noted that, “Johnson
was strongly allergic to opposition within the bosom of his official family,”
and by political commentators of the time such as Stanley Karnow, who
noted that, “the bureaucratic layer cake suited Johnson.”71 The president
always looked for his advisors to be in agreement over the best course of
action, particularly in Vietnam.
Overall, Tet and the difficult few weeks that followed severely damaged
Johnson, his administration and the Democratic Party as a whole.
According to Dallek, the president had been considering his options for
some time and thought very seriously about not running for a second
term in 1968. Dallek notes that Johnson ordered a “secret actuarial study”

68
 Dean Rusk appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to answer ques-
tions on the war on 12 March 1966.
69
 Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, in FRUS
1964–1968, vol. VI, Vietnam, January–August 1968, doc. 131.
70
 Katzenbach, Some of it Was Fun, pp. 274–75.
71
 S Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (London: Century, 1983) p. 403. Hoopes quoted in The
Limits of Intervention (London: D McKay & Co, 1969), p. 90.
220  B. W. QUAIL

to be prepared on his life expectancy in late 1967 to assess, “his own belief
that his family history made it unlikely he’d survive a second term.”72
Johnson’s poll results fluctuated rapidly as a result of Tet. A Gallup Poll
published on 10 March had shown 49% of respondents felt that entering
Vietnam was a mistake compared to 41% that did not.73 Johnson’s own
job rating sat at 41% in an 18 February poll conducted during the early
days of Tet.74 This sank to 36% in a poll published on the day he announced
he would not run for re-election, 31 March.75 As noted above Johnson
considered inserting the withdrawal into his State of the Union speech,
but decided against it at the last minute. Dallek believes this was because
“he relished the thought of beating liberal opponents, especially Kennedy,
and winning vindication from voters.”76 Both Dallek and Doris Kearns
note that Johnson was bullish in the lead up to his withdrawal. Johnson’s
address to the National Farmers’ Union in Minneapolis on 17 March was
a fiery defence of his position—Kearns noted that his fists pounded the
lectern as he spoke.77 This however was Johnson’s propensity to mislead
taking centre stage yet again; he did not want anyone beyond a few close
allies to know that he was giving serious consideration to giving up the
nomination. Health reasons played a part. Johnson had taken ill several
times during the course of his presidency and was scared that he would
become incapacitated while in office, but so did his significant slide in polls
released by Gallup and Louis Harris since the beginning of the year.
There have been arguments over whether the president always planned
to remove himself from office at the end of his first term; certainly he dis-
cussed the matter with his wife.78 This was once again indicative of
Johnson’s credibility issues; while Johnson insisted in later years that he
never intended to run in 1968, Kathleen Turner believes that even in the
run-up to his withdrawal, Johnson was still undecided, largely because he
72
 R Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson: Portrait of a President (New York: Penguin Books,
2004), p. 328.
73
 Gallup, The Gallup Poll, p. 2109.
74
 Ibid., p. 2106.
75
 Ibid., p. 2113.
76
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 330.
77
 D Kearns, Lyndon Johnson & The American Dream (New York: Harper & Row,
1976), p. 339.
78
 Johnson, A White House Diary, pp.  642–47. A note dated “Late August, 1964”
(pp. 191–92), describes a conversation between Johnson and his wife in which he discussed
not taking the nomination for the previous election. Lady Bird wrote a letter to Johnson
imploring him to move on with his campaign. She did not repeat this advice in 1968.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  221

was a man who “prized keeping his options open.”79 Johnson’s health was
indeed beginning to fail, and several scares throughout his presidency
caused him to take stock of the situation. In fact, Johnson’s health had
been steadily faltering as the demands of his presidency increased over
time, and several health scares did not help his own prognosis; Robert
E. Gilbert has noted that, “Johnson often was ill and in pain during the
tumultuous years of his presidency,” and this certainly affected his outlook
for a second term.80 Nevertheless, the Johnson campaign continued into
New Hampshire, and therefore the question remains as to his intentions
for the November election. It is important to acknowledge this discussion
when looking at Johnson’s media strategies; by keeping the debate over
whether he should run for re-election secret, he risked returning to the
reactive and belligerent strategy that helped to increase the credibility gap
in the preceding years.
The 31 March address to the nation was mentioned by Lady Bird
Johnson in her diary—she noted that his speech “was not yet firm. There
were still revisions to be made and people to see.”81 Dallek believes that
Johnson did not convince himself to withdraw on the afternoon of 31
March.82 As one of the most important addresses that the president gave—
six weeks after the Tet Offensive and at a critical time for the nation—the
speech, and indeed Johnson’s own intentions were still apparently in flux
just hours before its delivery. Once again, the Johnsonian speechwriting
plan was to revise and edit until as close to the event as possible. A proac-
tive approach to media management was difficult to pull together in this
sort of atmosphere; constant revisions meant constant reactions, and the
result was inevitably a speech that reacted to recent events rather than
truly looked forward to the future. The speech itself was an impassioned
plea for peace in Vietnam; Kearns notes that, “He spoke gravely, gently;
gone was the undertone of sarcasm, and the appearance of piety.”83 Abigail
Q. McCarthy, whose husband Eugene had delivered such a blow to the
Johnson administration in the New Hampshire primary, was among those
who contacted the president to communicate shock, telling him, “I don’t

79
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 233.
80
 R E Gilbert, “The Political Effects of Presidential Illness: The Case of Lyndon
B. Johnson,” Political Psychology, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1995), p. 775. Johnson would
die in January 1973, just as a second term in office would have ended.
81
 Johnson, A White House Diary, entry for 31 March 1968, p. 642.
82
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 332.
83
 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, p. 348.
222  B. W. QUAIL

see how you could’ve done this.”84 However, the New York Times editorial
summed up the shock of the announcement in a less favourable light for
Johnson in the 1 April edition:

Mr Johnson’s renunciation—unexpected though it was—reflects the pro-

found malaise that the people in every part of the country are experiencing
as a direct result of the divisions over the Vietnam War, increasingly embit-
tered race relations and a dangerously haphazard internal and exter-
nal economy.85

This quote ultimately underscores the Johnsonian predilection for reac-

tive media management; in his defeat Johnson was a reflection of the
mood, not a trailblazer. His ultimate failure to manage the media came
from his administration’s inability to construct a proactive, cohesive strat-
egy to combat negative media reports.
The embittered race relations discussed by the editorial was proven
accurate three days later as Martin Luther King, Jr.—a passionate anti-­
Vietnam campaigner alongside the civil rights movement he spear-
headed—was assassinated by James Earl Ray in Memphis. King’s death,
“both demoralized and energized the President,” claims Dallek.86 Riots
across the country followed, but Johnson used the momentum gained by
the murder to pass his Fair Housing Bill, signing it into law on 11 April.
The malaise was deepened on 5 June, when Robert Kennedy—who
entered the race for the Presidency following the New Hampshire primary
results—became the second sitting senator in US history after Huey Long
of Louisiana in 1935 to be assassinated in office. Katzenbach described the
feeling of “total despair” at the killing.87 For his part, Johnson attended
the funeral, but kept out of the way of the Kennedy family, and media
attention was largely diverted away from him in favour of coverage of the
assassination at this time. In fact, Turner notes that, “The press’s attitudes
toward Johnson also relaxed to a degree after his 31 March
announcement.”88 This was largely down to the fact that the political

84
 A recording of the call between Mrs McCarthy and Johnson can be found courtesy of
the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, at [Link]
the-miller-center-at-uva/31-march-1968-johnson-and-abigail-mccarthy.
85
 “I Will Not Accept,” New York Times, 1 April 1968, p. 44.
86
 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 334.
87
 Katzenbach, Some of It Was Fun, p. 284.
88
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 249.
 7  1968: TET, PLUMMETING POPULARITY AND THE ULTIMATE FAILURE…  223

c­ andidates for the November elections would not take centre stage; for the
Democrats, Vice President Humphrey, Senators McCarthy and Robert
Kennedy fought for the nomination; Kennedy had taken a decisive victory
in California hours before his assassination.
The year 1968 was ultimately a pivotal year not only for the Johnson
administration, but for the United States. The competition for the
Democratic nomination was hard fought between hawks and doves, and
became an unwelcome post-script in the administration’s relations with
the press. The Democratic National Convention in Chicago, in August,
was a disaster for the Democrats on many levels, and Johnson had his part
to play in this. As issues with Vietnam deeply divided the senators voting
on who Johnson’s successor as presidential nominee should be, harsh
police treatment of protestors outside the building provided disastrous
coverage of the party as a whole. Johnson turned sixty the day before the
convention started, on 27 August. Johnson told the media that his only
correspondent was Walter Cronkite, reporting for CBS News. This was
not true. As Longley states, Johnson in fact had sent W. Marvin Watson to
act as his eyes and ears, and in fact operated an elaborate system of com-
munication to try and influence events at the conference—this was not
lost on the press, either in Chicago or with Johnson in Austin, Texas, and
simply provided a final confirmation of his lack of credibility.89
Johnson could not be there himself because of the antagonistic
crowds—the New York Times front-page headline on 29 August pro-
claimed “Police Battle Demonstrators in Streets,” as Russell Baker’s satiri-
cal column noted: “enough people are going to survive Chicago to make
the world safe for Richard Nixon.”90 Humphrey would gain the nomina-
tion at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, infamous for
riotous scenes that created further publicity issues, not just for Johnson,
but for the Democrats as a whole. An editorial on 30 August by James
Reston argued that Humphrey needed a ceasefire within the Democratic
Party as much as Johnson did in Vietnam.91 Another editorial on the same
page decried police actions towards the newsmen and peaceful demonstra-
tors. The disarray was evident, law and order became a campaign issue and

89
 K Longley, LBJ’s 1968: Power, Politics and the Presidency in America’s Year of Upheaval,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) p. 220.
90
 R Baker, Observer: The Brave Boys in Chicago, New York Times, 29 August 1968, p. 34.
91
 J Reston, Chicago: Humphrey and the Politics of Power, New York Times, 30 August
1968, p. 32.
224  B. W. QUAIL

Humphrey narrowly lost the election to Richard Nixon once America

went to the polls in November.
The year 1968 ultimately saw the final demise of Johnson’s administra-
tion. A rallying end to 1967 was brought crashing down by the reality of
the war in Vietnam, and the Tet Offensive both eroded public confidence
in the president and “drained Johnson’s resources beyond endurance.”92
The administration showed several times in 1968 that they had not learned
from previous mistakes, adopting reactive stances to flashpoint issues in
the press. The tight-lipped stance on the Pueblo incident showed an inabil-
ity to quickly construct a credible and cohesive public statement. The Tet
Offensive, itself, brought the administration’s own statements from 1967
into disrepute and turned the credibility gap into a credibility chasm.
While the blame for this cannot be entirely placed on the door of the
administration, there is evidence that the president and his staff knew that
the war would not be won quickly, and the Tet Offensive certainly showed
this to the public. Even when announcing his decision to refuse the
Democratic nomination for the presidency, Johnson continued to keep his
intentions secret even from the vast majority of his advisors. While this can
partially be attributed to indecision on the part of the president, and par-
tially to the justified fear of a press leak, there can be no disputing that
habitual secrecy within the administration was not conducive to a proac-
tive and strong strategy when it came to press relations and managing
both public opinion and expectations. Jamieson feels that Johnson’s rhet-
oric in 1968 following his withdrawal was geared at both passing on the
presidency to a Democratic candidate of his choosing and securing an
acceptable end to the war in Vietnam, but believes he managed to accom-
plish neither of these things, noting that Johnson in fact succeeding in
causing further disunity within the Democratic party.93 This fact is argu-
able, as Johnson did support his vice president Hubert Humphrey in his
successful attempt to win the Democratic nomination, but ultimately, the
difficulties the administration experienced in Johnson’s final year can be
attributed directly to the credibility gap and led to Johnson’s position
becoming completely untenable in March 1968.

 Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 331.

92

 P E Jamieson, “Seeing the Lyndon B Johnson Presidency Through the March 31, 1968,
93

Withdrawal Speech,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1 (March 1999), p. 148.
 CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that Lyndon Johnson and his administration

showed great political skill during their time in the White House. The
volume—and importance—of legislation passed was second to none, and
the president was able to transition his political ability from his previous
roles in Senate and Congress to the executive office he found himself in.
Accounts of the Johnson White House from authors like Joshua Zeitz
illuminate this in great detail.1 However, the administration’s media strat-
egy showed reactive characteristics that severely damaged his credibility
with the public and with members of the press. The question that has to
be asked is this:
Was Lyndon B Johnson’s credibility as the president of the United States
undermined by his inability to develop a strategy to reconcile his domestic and
foreign policies to the American public and his administration’s use of a reac-
tive, rather than a proactive, press strategy?
By taking a chronological perspective on events, the objective here has
been to show the evolution of Johnsonian media relations and objectives,
and indeed the lack of change that occurred over the period of his presi-
dency. There is no question that Johnson’s credibility was eroded during
his time in office and that the administration’s less-than-honest line on

1
 Zeitz’ work Building the Great Society: Inside Lyndon Johnson’s White House is a com-
pelling account of the political ability Johnson was able to harness. See J Zeitz, Building the
Great Society: Inside Lyndon Johnson’s White House (New York: Viking, 2018).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 225

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
226  B. W. QUAIL

Vietnam was a major factor. However, questions remain as to why the

president and his advisory staff chose to be so misleading over the course
of several years, when it was so clearly harmful to Johnson’s public image.
This section will reflect on the most important facets of Johnson’s press
strategy as discussed in the previous chapters: his relationship with the
press; the administration’s inability to proactively develop strategies to
deal with important issues, particularly when dealing with the Great
Society and Vietnam; the effect of Johnson’s own personality on both of
these points and, lastly, whether external factors ultimately had more of an
impact on Johnson’s credibility than the failings of his administration.
A brief final note on press relations is also needed. Over the course of
his time in office, Johnson was consistently at odds with the press, and this
is certainly one of the important reasons for the difficulties that he faced
in ensuring favourable press coverage. Kathleen Turner’s study of
Johnson’s relationship with the press—Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War—
includes numerous examples of the president’s difficulty with both indi-
vidual members of the press and with the White House staff as a whole;
she describes the rocky relationship that existed between Johnson and key
press correspondents even before he was elected in 1964. This did not
improve as time went on; Time’s article describing Johnson’s drink-driving
antics from April 1964 was indicative of several distinctly un-presidential
stories that convinced Johnson both of the need to stay—as he termed
it—presidential at all speaking commitments and official engagements,
and of the general untrustworthy nature of journalists. However, this
attempt to remain presidential backfired on Johnson as well—his stiff style
and the stilted nature of his addresses were regularly criticised by com-
mentators. When he did change this in 1967—during the public relations
campaign mounted by the administration in the autumn—he received rave
reviews from the likes of James Reston in the New York Times, but he
could not maintain his new, more personable style and quickly retreated
into the disappointing comfort of his previous appearances. Even in the
post-presidency years this remained a problem for Johnson; his biographer
Doris Kearns commented on the writing process of his memoirs:

The moment a formal interview began, he stiffened; the moment it was over,
he relaxed, had Lady Bird join him, and expanded colorfully on the subject he
had just discussed with dull rhetoric. Yet, if we ever tried to incorporate our
notes from these informal sessions into the draft, he took them out, insisting
that this was a presidential memoir and had to be written in a stately fashion.2

2
 D Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (London: Deutsch, 1976), p. 14.
 8 CONCLUSION  227

This sums up Johnson’s difficulty in appealing to both the press and the
wider public—Randall B. Woods quotes the president as saying, “What do
you think this is, the tale of an uneducated cowboy? It’s a presidential
memoir, damn it, and I’ve got to come out looking like a statesman, not
some backwoods politician.”3 This is not to say that the administration
simply ignored the press; in fact Johnson was incredibly sensitive to the
quickly changing face of the news and ensured not only he was set up to
receive news at any given moment, but his staff were as well; George
Christian notes that he made sure that his key people could see all three
networks and receive input from any major news agency at any time.4
Ultimately, Turner notes three major reasons for the problems that
Johnson had with the press. There was a question of personal consider-
ation—White House reporters particularly felt that, “Johnson ought to
recognize the fact that they were human beings with private lives and
personal needs.” Then there was professional courtesy—“press confer-
ences conducted in the Oval Office, while walking around the South Lawn
or during barbecues at the LBJ ranch made it difficult for reporters to
cover the president as they thought they were entitled to.”5 Finally, there
were the economic concerns of media institutions who expected the
administration’s co-operation in their own profit-making ventures. It was
easy to be critical of a president who was un-cooperative with the objec-
tives of major news outlets. Turner’s findings are not in dispute and are
supported by a multitude of influential commentators on the Johnson
presidency, as well as some members of his staff in their memoirs.6
Johnson’s disregard for the media and the difficult relationship this engen-
dered is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the eventual deterioration of
his credibility over the course of his time in office. Woods notes that
Johnson left office largely estranged from the media, his taped interview

3
 R B Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 881.
4
 Oral history transcript, George E.  Christian, interview 6 (VI), 9/17/1979, by David
Culbert, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 21, 2021,
[Link]
5
 K J Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), pp. 9–11.
6
 Among others, journalist and later historian of the Vietnam War Stanley Karnow charged
that Johnson increased the credibility gap with his anti-newspaper tirades in public and pri-
vate, while Johnson staffer Townsend Hoopes was scathing in his memoirs about Johnson’s
inability to separate the personal from the political when it came to coverage. See Karnow,
Vietnam: A History (London: Century, 1983), p. 414, and Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention
(London: D McKay & Co, 1969), p. 240.
228  B. W. QUAIL

with the journalist Mel Stuart summing up bad feeling fostered through-
out his time in the White House: “There are people who write with great
authority about the president and the presidency who have never been in
this room,” Johnson chided.7
Much of the scholarly work on Johnson’s relationship with the press is
correct; he distrusted many of the more influential members of the press
corps and found it difficult to do business with them. George Reedy sums
this up best: “He [Johnson] regarded public discussion as dangerous to
the conduct of government and looked for an operation which diverted
press attention from disruptive issues and focused on his achievements.”8
His experiences with the press from his days in the Senate did him no
good as the leader of the country; Johnson struggled with the increased
scrutiny from the media that naturally came with the amplified visibility of
the role—as Johnson’s biographer Kearns notes, in the Senate during
Johnson’s era the important members of the press depended on face-to-­
face meetings, where Johnson excelled. In the office of the president, at
the dawn of a new age of intense media coverage, press conferences and a
less personal style were required, and Johnson could not adapt to this. He
did not deal well with criticism, and this hampered his ability to react
rationally to bad press; Frank Stanton, former president of the Columbia
Broadcasting System and a friend of Johnson, noted in a later interview
that he felt Johnson, “paid too much attention to what one correspondent
wrote from the field.”9 Stanton acknowledged that Johnson was not able
to set aside temporary criticism in favour of achieving his larger goals. “In
the end,” notes Kearns, “he was fatally vulnerable to the sound instincts of
public opinion.”10 George Christian disagrees that Johnson was too
guarded, though he too agrees Johnson’s need to control and dominate
all aspects of the presidency was a fatal flaw in terms of press relations,
claiming “He wanted his stamp on everything in the government, virtu-
ally, and so when you take credit you are also going to receive some
blame.”11

7
 R B Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006), p. 877.
8
 G Reedy, Lyndon B Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews & McMeel, 1982), p. 68.
9
 Transcript, Frank Stanton Oral History Interview III, 26 August 1987, M L Gillette,
p. 6, Internet Copy, Lyndon B Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas [LBJ Library].
10
 Kearns, Lyndon Johnson & The American Dream, p. 129.
11
 Oral history transcript, George E. Christian, interview 6 (VI), 9/17/1979, by David
Culbert, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 21, 2021,
[Link]
 8 CONCLUSION  229

Reactive Strategy
Johnson’s issues with the press are important to note when looking at his
reactive strategy. By consistently reacting to poor press coverage, particu-
larly from the more influential columnists such as James Reston of the
New York Times, Johnson was unable to find a coherent manner of dealing
with the hostile press, particularly on the subject of Vietnam. Because of
this constant reaction, members of the administration continually found
their public statements were coming second to the reporting of the press,
and this led to the creation and extension of the credibility gap over the
course of Johnson’s presidency. Ultimately, this gap would define the
Johnson presidency and ruin his standing as a politician for the remainder
of his life. The gap was the manifestation of the administration’s inability
to define its own strategy and the reactive stance that it continued to take
towards press and public negativity. This was noted by some of Johnson’s
staff, with Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs James L. Greenfield
being the most significant.12 Greenfield’s comments prove that within the
administration there was at least some awareness that this was an issue.
Greenfield would leave office soon after this input—in March 1966—to
take up a position with the New York Times. Nevertheless, Johnson’s atti-
tude towards the press was not the only reason for the credibility gap, and
subsequent loss of leverage.
The administration became something of an echo chamber as the siege
mentality of constant defence against press criticism set in. Even in later
years some staff members felt Johnson received unfair treatment from the
press; Liz Carpenter remarked, “what I’ve always resented is [reporters]
ran around keeping statistics on the number of LBJ acres, when they
didn’t run around [U.S. Ambassador Averell] Harriman’s house or [John
and Robert] Kennedy’s house counting the paintings.”13 Dean Rusk
would later comment about the internal affairs of the White House, “it
was my impression that there was much less dissent than the newspapers
were reflecting.”14 There are numerous examples from the latter half of
Johnson’s time in office of influential White House staffers criticising press

12
 The quote is given in its entirety in Chapter 3 (1965). Memorandum for the Record,
FRUS 1964–1968, vol. III, Vietnam, June–December 1965, doc. 105.
13
 Transcript, Elizabeth [Liz] Carpenter Oral History Interview V, 2 February 1971, by
Joe B Frantz, Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 21.
14
 Transcript, Dean Rusk Oral History Interview II, 26 September 1969, by Paige
E. Mulhollan, Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 26.
230  B. W. QUAIL

tactics, or opinion polls; Rusk’s 1967 note complaining about the effect of
the way in which opinion polls were worded was not entirely false, but was
also revealing.15 While there can be no question that the wording of a
question can indeed implicitly influence the answers given, it is clear that
this was a case of the administration clutching at straws while trying to
react to negative public opinion reviews. Reports of White House aides
sending Johnson “a nine page collection of compliments from the media
since his first days in office” show even further the desperate attempts by
Johnson and his staff to fight against what they perceived as an over-
whelming tide of negative public opinion.16
The administration’s withdrawal inside itself in the latter half of the
presidency coincided with the most dramatic increases in the credibility
gap, and the terminal slide in the president’s approval ratings tracked by
the major American opinion pollsters, particularly George Gallup and
Louis Harris. Johnson believed that negative public opinion was shaped
by negative journalism; as we have seen, there is an argument over whether
or not this is the case. Karnow, an award-winning journalist in his own
right, believes that journalism reflected the public view and contradicts
Johnson’s theories on the role of the press as shaping and moulding opin-
ion. The truth is somewhere in the middle. Journalism may not truly
shape public opinion, but it certainly perpetuates it; in this case, critical
journalism helped fuel existing public distrust of Johnson and his
statements.

The Johnson Personality

Throughout the secondary literature available on the president, two ideas
of Lyndon Johnson become clear. One, employed by authors such as
Robert Caro, sees him as a political pragmatist and ultimate politician,
who bullied and cajoled and enjoyed the power he was afforded as a presi-
dent who tried to bring in the Great Society more to leave his own stamp
on the office than anything else. The other, employed to an extent by
biographers such as Dallek and Turner, sees him as someone genuinely
interested in doing good, preserving the prestige of the office and moving
the country forward, who was mired in Vietnam and could not get out.

15
 Rusk’s comments were made on 2 November 1967; see Chap. 5.
16
 Turner, Lyndon Johnson’s Dual War, p. 212.
 8 CONCLUSION  231

Johnson was ultimately both of these things in equal measure. It would

never have been possible for the president’s advisors to truly keep his per-
sonality in check, because he was simply too mercurial. This caused issues
when it came to creating a public persona for Johnson, who was not used
to the spotlight of the country’s press when he assumed office and was no
more comfortable with it when he left the White House.
Dealing with Johnson’s views on the media was incredibly difficult for
his advisors; Reedy thought that he took great delight in “newspaper and
television coverage growing out of stunts,” something that led to widely
reported errors of judgement. These included revealing his gall bladder
scar in front of a room of journalists—just one example of the myriad dif-
ficulties that Johnson’s attitude brought on his press secretaries. Johnson’s
fear of being regarded as un-presidential by press corps members was not
completely unfounded—Carroll Kilpatrick believed that people enjoyed
laughing at stories about Johnson’s table manners and other “colorful”
behaviour, whether they were true or not.17 However, he ultimately went
too far in the other direction, refusing to take on board advice on public
image given by his close advisors. The difficulty that he had in listening to
the advice he was given by his close allies is summed up by former Assistant
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, who worked with Johnson and
the Kennedy brothers, when he described Johnson’s propensity for “mis-
remembering” facts and ideas: “Over time I became convinced that, for
whatever reason, this was how he remembered it and he was not con-
sciously lying.”18 Indeed, Kennedy’s shadow loomed large over Johnson’s
entire presidency; Paul Henggeler notes that even in retirement, Johnson
attempted to imbue his legacy with the Kennedy mystique, arguing:
“From January 1969, when he relinquished the presidency to Richard
Nixon, until his death four years later, Johnson regularly depicted himself
as John Kennedy’s surrogate.”19
The question over how much Johnson allowed debate to flow within
his administration has been the cause of great scholarly debate. Johnson’s
time in office did not really fit the mould of what Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr

17
 Oral history transcript, Carroll Kilpatrick, interview 1 (I), 5/5/1971, by Joe B. Frantz,
LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021, https://
[Link]/item/oh-kilpatrickc-19710505-1-78-100.
18
 N DeB Katzenbach, Some of It Was Fun: Working With LBJ And RFK (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2008), pp. 208–209.
19
 P R Henggeler, In His Steps: Lyndon Johnson and the Kennedy Mystique (Chicago:
Ivan R. Dee, 1991) p. 251
232  B. W. QUAIL

has described as an “Imperial Presidency,” but the extent to which he

invited genuine debate within his administration is certainly questionable.
Johnson, himself, claimed, “I have never considered any important deci-
sion irrevocable until it has been announced and acted upon.” This point
is also asserted by George Reedy, who claimed in an interview that
“[Johnson] had this absolute fetish about keeping his options open. If he
made up his mind to appoint somebody to a job and the announcement
came out before the official appointment was made, that guy lost the
job.”20 If this interpretation is true, then it is easy to see why Johnson’s
issues with the media escalated so heavily; misleading journalists, second-­
guessing them and avoiding the release of information until the last min-
ute created a situation in which it was only natural that even the most
staunchly pro-Johnson reporters would eventually become disgruntled at
their treatment. Neil Sheehan, Chester Cooper and others have all argued,
however, that Johnson simply went through the motions of debate, hav-
ing already made up his mind on many important topics.21
The scale of the criticism that Johnson endured certainly had an effect
on the president—Johnson did not deal well with criticism and generally
carried the belied that any criticism of the president—especially during
wartime—was tantamount to treason. This meant that he increasingly
viewed the press with outright suspicion, and as a consequence his govern-
ment increasingly withdrew as commitments in Vietnam increased and
criticism grew. Tom Wicker, who covered Johnson for the New York Times
through much of the presidency, viewed Johnson’s opinion of the press as
“not necessarily unjustified,” but unfortunate nonetheless. His mind-set
hardened very quickly after he took over the presidency, as he became
convinced by the press, “that the public had been convinced that he was a
crude bumpkin.” Ultimately Wicker summed up Johnson’s largest prob-
lem: “President Johnson never quite realized, somehow, that he couldn’t
make things so, that weren’t so.”22 His personality did not assist him in
making guided, well round decisions on how to approach press relations.

20
 Transcript, George E Reedy Oral History Interview XXVI, 16 November 1990, by M L
Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library Online, p. 4.
21
 Johnson, quoted in D M Barrett, “The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His
Advisers, and the 1965 Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War,” Political Science Quarterly,
vol. 103, no. 4 (Winter 1988–1989), p. 663.
22
 Oral history transcript, Thomas G. Wicker, interview 1 (I), 6/16/1970, by Joe
B. Frantz, LBJ Library Oral Histories, LBJ Presidential Library, accessed January 24, 2021,
[Link]
 8 CONCLUSION  233

For the purposes of his media communications, it seems likely that

Johnson’s mistrust of the press led him to make decisions, sometimes
against the advice of experienced staff members who worked within the
media. Stewart Alsop noted, “something he never understood: that it was
a reporter’s job to write what he could find out, and if he wrote it accu-
rately it was no attack on the president. He was infuriated with the report-
ers for writing what he didn’t want to have them write, but the government
of our system doesn’t work that way.”23 This did not help his ability to
construct a cohesive and efficient press strategy, as he was then constantly
reacting to recent stories, leaks and other events and attempting to inform
his own views on how best to deal with the media at any time.

New Technology, External Interference

and Balancing Domestic and Foreign Policy

One of the most important issues in politics during the 1960s was the
onset of new technology—in many ways Johnson was one of the first pres-
idents who had to deal with an influx of media outlets and attention.
Kearns has noted that, in his case, “the resources technology provides are
often illusory, substituting the sense of control for real control…exaggera-
tion of the president’s personal powers…is an inevitable source of frustra-
tion as the president’s actions invariably fall short of expectations,
producing a destructive cycle for the man, the office, and the nation.”24
Kearns’s belief was that technology could not help the president control
such major issues as a foreign war and was ultimately a negative influence
on the administration. Television was a newly affordable medium to mil-
lions of Americans, who were beamed harrowing images from Vietnam as
Johnson’s tenure went on. They listened to scathing editorials from the
likes of Walter Cronkite during Tet, whom Karnow called “the nation’s
most reliable journalistic personality.”25 It has been argued that television
was not an effective marker of changing public opinion; even before the
end of the war, John Mueller criticised the influence of television, noting

23
 Transcript, Stewart Alsop, Oral History Interview I, July 15 1969 by Paige E Mulhollan,
p. 4, Online, LBJ Library.
24
 D Kearns, “Lyndon Johnson’s Political Personality,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 91,
no. 3 (Autumn 1976), p. 409.
25
 Karnow, Vietnam, p. 547.
234  B. W. QUAIL

poll data showing that even with increased television coverage it took lon-
ger for Vietnam to dip heavily in support than the Korean War did.26
However, the facts tend to dispute this argument somewhat. While it is
true that public opinion did not always reflect what was being shown on
television, it is clear that television was an important factor, alongside the
press, in changing the way in which war was reported to the public. It was
no longer the prerogative of official propaganda to show what was going
on in the front lines; for the first time, embedded reporters such as David
Halberstam were able to show exactly what was happening and how the
front line was faring. It would not be a stretch to suggest that television
reporting during the Tet Offensive polarised the mood of hawks and
doves, and ultimately had a hand in changing the course of the war by
encouraging the likes of Walter Cronkite put forward the belief that, for
the first time, Vietnam appeared to be unwinnable. With this in mind, it
must be said that the Johnson administration did not adapt well to this
shift in media power. The president, “famously addicted to television” as
Zeitz notes, simply did not understand how to bend it to his will.27
The Johnson presidency can be characterised by the difficulties of the
time period that it presided over. The 1960s was a turbulent era that the
most skilful political operator would have undoubtedly found trouble-
some. After taking over from his murdered predecessor, Johnson’s time in
office saw the assassinations of civil rights leaders Malcolm X. and Martin
Luther King, Jr, and notably his political rival Robert Kennedy. Civil rights
protests saw Johnson torn between two polarised factions of American
society; on the one hand, the traditional southern white man, to whom
Democrat politicians from Texas appealed and epitomised by Johnson’s
long-time political ally and southern conservative, Richard B. Russell
(D-Georgia), and on the other, the younger generation of reformers and
activists represented by King and even Malcolm X. It was inevitable that
Johnson would alienate one of these diametrically opposed factions, and
the president’s commitment to the civil rights policies of his predecessor
ensured that this was the case. Rioting increased under the Johnson
administration, culminating in one of the worst inner-city riots in history
in Detroit in 1967, and led to the 1968 Democratic Convention in

26
 J Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), p. 167. The full
quote is in the literature review.
27
 J Zeitz, Building the Great Society: Inside Lyndon Johnson’s White House, (New York:
Random House, 2018) p. 17.
 8 CONCLUSION  235

Chicago being held under flashpoint circumstances. Secretary of Defense

Robert McNamara perhaps summed up the difficulties Johnson faced in
balancing his policies in an anecdote from 1966 in his memoirs. Following
Johnson’s approval of an expanded troop commitment to Vietnam in July
1965, he refused to approve almost $10 billion in additional spending on
Vietnam in the next fiscal year, in an attempt to preserve the Great Society.
At the same time, McNamara notes, National Security aides William
Bundy and Douglass Cater urged him to “educate the public… and to
gain their support.” Johnson refused their advice. He did not accept that
criticism of the president by the likes of King placed the administration
firmly within a growing military industrial complex and furthered the idea
that the president was simply a tool used to increase and prioritise military
spending and development over social and economic programmes. This
manifested as the guns vs. butter argument, wherein Johnson was forced
to choose which was more important: the Great Society or a great escala-
tion of the Vietnam conflict. In many respects, this argument is a framing
device to discuss the extent of the administration’s involvement in the
growing military industrial complex. It was not necessarily discussed in
this manner during Johnson’s time in office, but is certainly substantiated
by King’s belief of dealing with domestic matters over a foreign war.28
McNamara believed that Johnson “felt trapped between two bitter choices:
subterfuge versus the twin dangers of escalatory pressure and the loss of
his social programs.”29 McNamara’s urging to educate the public would
have certainly mitigated some of the criticisms that Johnson elicited in
later years, especially the credibility gap. Jacobs and Shapiro agree with
this summary: “Manipulative use of information asymmetries, as occurred
during Vietnam, invariably results in inflated expectations. In contrast, full
and honest discussions by policy makers can lower public expectations and
28
 King noted in his “Beyond Vietnam” speech: “There is at the outset a very obvious and
almost facile connection between the war in Vietnam and the struggle I have been waging in
America… It seemed as if there was a real promise of hope for the poor, both black and
white, through the Poverty Program…Then came the build-up in Vietnam and I watched
this program broken and eviscerated as if it were some idle political plaything of a society
gone mad on war.” He also notes that he was compelled to see the war as an enemy of the
poor and to “attack it as such.” For more information, see Dr. M L King Jr., “Beyond
Vietnam,” April 4 1967, Riverside Church, New York City, full transcript accessed at http://
[Link]/special_features/speeches_speech_king01.html.
29
 McNamara relates this story in his memoir, R McNamara with B Van De Mark, In
Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1995),
pp. 205–206.
236  B. W. QUAIL

force citizens to weigh competing considerations…something that the

Vietnam War called for.”30 The problems that Johnson faced in domestic
society were partly of his own making, as he funnelled funds that were
verbally promised to his Great Society programmes into the war, but there
can be no doubt that the difficulty of the political landscape of the United
States in the 1960s also hampered him greatly.
Johnson’s own medical issues also hurt him, in terms of both press
reaction to his health scares and whether or not he would be healthy
enough to seek the Democratic nomination for the 1968 elections. Gilbert
notes that Johnson’s health was bad enough during his time in office to
necessitate cover-ups that were participated in by medical staff, to avoid
publication—one more example of the president’s propensity for mislead-
ing the public, albeit one that proved necessary to avoid public panic so
soon after the death in office of an American president.31 By early 1968,
Lady Bird Johnson’s diary spoke of the Johnson family and their concerns
over Lyndon’s continuing good health: “he feels older and more tired
than he did ten years ago, or five years ago. And what of the next five
years? Suppose he runs and wins? Would he be able to carry the load in a
way that… the country deserves?”32 Indeed, arguments have been made
that Johnson’s health was the direct reason for his withdrawal, rather than
the credibility gap and mounting crises both domestically and abroad.
Johnson, himself, made this argument in his post-presidential work, The
Vantage Point.33
There can be no argument that Johnson’s mounting medical issues
were a significant factor on his decision to withdraw, and there is other
evidence within the diary of Lady Bird Johnson that this is the case. We
have seen that Johnson’s personality was such that he may well have been
tempted to continue in the election even as his chances of winning
30
 L R Jacobs and R Y Shapiro, “Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion:
Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 3
(September 1999), p. 615.
31
 On Gilbert’s study into Johnson’s medical issues, in which he concludes that Johnson
was a “tormented” leader, see R E Gilbert, “The Political Effects of Presidential Illness: The
Case of Lyndon B Johnson,” Political Psychology, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1995),
pp. 761–76.
32
 Lady Bird Johnson (C T Johnson), A White House Diary (New York: Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1970), p. 612.
33
 In his partial memoir, Johnson discussed his decision to withdraw: for example, Chapter
22, “Headlines and History,” in Lyndon B Johnson, The Vantage Point (New York: Henry
Holt, 1971), p. 532 and passim.
 8 CONCLUSION  237

dwindled. Instead, the driving argument being made here must be that
regardless of the reasons Johnson gave for his decision, the president’s
credibility had been eroded too far to have a realistic hope of victory and
that this was due to his inability to preside over a strong and proactive
media strategy.

Summary
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency saw a great shift in the balance of domestic
politics in the United States. While there was great merit to many of his
domestic aspirations the erosion of his own credibility damaged the stand-
ing of the Democratic Party and ensured that the Republicans swept back
into office in 1968. The Democrats saw only one president—Jimmy
Carter—elected between 1968 and 1992 following Johnson’s presidency
and four of the subsequent five presidents were Republicans: Richard
Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. The failure
of the Great Society and subsequent inflation crisis caused in part by
spending on domestic concerns and Vietnam were influential on a general
upswing in conservatism, and although it should not be argued that the
Johnson administration was wholly responsible for this, there is at least
some evidence to suggest that a grassroots rise in conservatism happened
under Johnson’s watch.34 The legacy of the administration was to usher in
an era of suspicion and mistrust of the presidency, which would ultimately
culminate in the Watergate Scandal under his successor Nixon.
Robert Dallek perhaps best summed up the Johnson presidency when
he said, “Whatever impulse future historians may have to pigeonhole
Johnson as a near great, average, or failed President, I am confident that a
close review of his time in office will leave them reluctant to put a single
stamp on his term.”35 This is certainly true. Johnson is incredibly difficult
to categorise as a president, with possibly the best description of his imme-
diate legacy coming from Newsweek columnist Charles Roberts, following
his death in 1973:

34
 The hard core of conservatism can be seen in the results of the 1964 election when
compared to 1968—while Johnson ultimately won the race against Barry Goldwater with
ease, the base of Goldwater’s Republican support would grow in subsequent years until it
gained parity with the more liberal Democratic Party in 1968, and far surpassed it in 1972.
35
 R Dallek, Lyndon B Johnson, p. 377.
238  B. W. QUAIL

He leaves office a man whose epitaph will some day defy the confines of even
a Texas-size tombstone: the most militant civil-rights advocate ever to
occupy the White House, reviled by negro militants; a Southerner scorned
by Southerners as a turncoat; a liberal despised by liberals despite the fact he
achieved most of what they sought for thirty years; a friend of education
rejected by intellectuals; a compromiser who could not compromise a war
ten thousand miles away; a consensus-seeker who in the clutch abandoned
his consensus rather than his convictions; a power hungry partisan politician
who, in the end, shunned power and partisanship to achieve national unity.36

There is no question that Lyndon Johnson is an important president,

and his achievements with Medicare, civil rights legislation and anti-­
poverty acts were monumental. His influence on the presidency and poli-
tics in the years following his time in office should not be underestimated.
What he was not, however, was a man who could use the press to his
advantage. Johnson presided over an era of changing attitudes and a more
open and technologically advanced press than had existed in America prior
to the 1960s. As we have seen, he consistently showed a short-term, reac-
tive strategy towards dealing with press coverage and sliding approval rat-
ings, and with each reaction and each ill-thought-out response to political
problems, he created further issues for himself as his presidency went on.
This was evident in his planning for the 1964 election, when he positioned
himself as the anti-war candidate against Barry Goldwater’s hard-line
views, even while he knew that escalation in Vietnam was assured. It was
apparent in 1965, when James Greenfield criticised the administration for
only meeting the crisis of the moment and not looking further ahead. It
was clear in 1966, when the press openly reported on the credibility gap
between Johnson and the people. By the time the administration took
note and conducted what might be termed as a public relations offensive
in late 1967, it was too late. In their assessments of how well the country
was doing, they failed to look forward and see what reports already told
them; the Tet Offensive of January 1968 was already being foreshadowed
by enemy actions. Tet shattered the goodwill that Johnson earned with his
most proactive strategy and permanently ruined his credibility with the
American people. While there is undoubtedly an argument to be made

36
 Newsweek obituary, quoted by Clark Clifford in Counsel to the President (New York:
Random House, 1991), p. 385. On Johnson’s obituaries and their content, see E W Chester,
“Lyndon Baines Johnson, an American ‘King Lear’: A Critical Evaluation of His Newspaper
Obituaries,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 21, no. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 319–31.
 8 CONCLUSION  239

that external circumstances and the political volatility of the 1960s had an
effect on how proactive the president could be in his press dealings, the
administration failed to effectively organise a strategy to propagandise the
policies of the presidency, and ultimately that failure lay chiefly with
Lyndon B. Johnson, himself.
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 Index1

A Aronson, Elliot, 15, 15n3, 17, 17n9

Acheson, Dean, 189, 218 Associated Press, 36, 75, 75n21,
Adams, Eddie, 214 75n23, 105, 105n15, 111, 126,
Advisory Commission on Civil 126n105, 126n106, 177,
Disorders, 182 182n64, 193, 209, 209n33, 214
Ali, Muhammad, 180 Atomic Energy Commission, 103
Alsop, Joseph, 113, 122, 122n87, Auden, Wysten Hugh, 93
127, 127n109, 133, 134,
233, 233n23
Altschuler, Bruce, 39, 39n79, 46–48, B
46n105, 48n113, 204n12 Baker, Russell, 137, 223
Altschull, Joshua Herbert, 25, 25n35, Ball, Albert, 152
26, 40, 40n83 Ball, George, 6, 52, 55, 55n143, 74,
American Broadcasting Corporation, 85, 96, 108, 110, 119, 126, 127,
27, 73n16, 155, 170 135, 141, 170
American Federation of Labor and Ball, M, 86, 88
Congress of Industrial Barrett, David, 57
Organizations, 196 Bell, David, 146
Anderson, Clinton, 121, 121n81, 145 Berinsky, A J, 62
Anti-poverty bill, 101 Berman, W, 60
Arlen, Michael, 28, 28n45, 29 Bernstein, Irving, 58, 66

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 253

Switzerland AG 2021
B. W. Quail, Media Management in the Age of Lyndon B. Johnson,
[Link]
254  INDEX

Beschloss, Michael, 8, 8n10, 8n11, Busby, Horace, 51, 51n126, 102,

8n12, 65, 65n184, 71n6, 72n9, 102n3, 103, 103n6, 106, 185,
72n10, 74n17, 75n26, 76n27, 185n75, 208
78n32, 79n36, 91n75, 110n32, Bush, George H W, 237
111n37, 113n44, 117n62, Bush, George W., 84n52
117n63, 118n71, 120n74,
120n75, 121n77, 121n81,
121n82, 125n94, C
125n101, 125n102 Califano, Joseph, 6, 9, 51, 51n127,
Billington, M, 49 54, 54n139, 67, 67n195,
Bohen, Fred, 205, 205n15 123–125, 125n101, 128,
Bohlen, Charles, 189 128n114, 134, 134n8, 150, 151,
Bornet, Vaughn, 6, 6n8, 52, 62, 167, 167n9, 168, 181, 181n59,
62n171, 64, 64n180, 67, 183, 205, 205n15, 205n17, 207,
67n196, 82, 82n44 207n25, 208, 208n26
Bowles, Chester, 107, Callaway, Bo, 117
107n19, 107n20 Canham, Erwin, 184
Brace, P, 64, 64n181, 116, 116n55 Cappella, Joseph, 29
Bradley, Omar, 189 Caro, Robert, 6, 9, 36, 49, 68, 230
Braestrup, Peter, 8, 61, 61n169, Carpenter, Elizabeth, 207
203, 203n4, 213n52, Cater, Douglass, 25, 25n33, 25n34,
215, 215n58 26, 27n39, 60, 60n163, 122,
Brown, Courtney, 97 123, 167, 174, 174n35, 179,
Bucher, Lloyd, 211 179n54, 207, 207n24, 235
Buchwald, Art, 143 Chancellor, John, 64
Bundy, McGeorge, 6, 50, 50n123, Chicago Tribune, 172
54–56, 56n146, 95, 103, 103n7, Chomsky, Noam, 18–21, 20n17,
103n8, 108, 108n23, 112, 113, 20n18, 20n22, 23
113n43, 113n44, 117, 117n64, Christian, George, 4, 6, 9, 36, 37,
118, 118n68, 122–123, 149, 174, 175, 187, 193, 196,
126–128, 128n113, 131, 132, 198, 198n123, 202, 208, 211,
134, 134n8, 135n10, 136, 218, 227
136n14, 141, 142, 144, 147, Christian Science Monitor, 184
147n55, 149, 170, 170n20, 173, Churchill, Winston, 98
189, 193, 193n101 Civil Rights Act, 49n114, 155, 201
Bundy, William, vii, 6, 52, 60, Clark, Ramsay, 176
60n165, 61, 131, 139, 146, Clifford, Clark, 6, 50, 50n122, 58, 65,
147n55, 193n99, 198, 65n189, 133, 133n4, 186n78,
198n121, 235 190, 195, 195n107, 211,
Bunker, Ellsworth, 193–195, 219, 238n36
194n104, 194n106, 199, 210 Clifford-Taylor Mission to Southeast
Burke, John, 54 Asia and the Pacific, 186n78
  INDEX  255

Clinton, Bill, 34 Department of Health, Education and

Clinton, Hillary, 4 Welfare, 104
Columbia Broadcasting Department of State Bulletin, 9,
Service, 223 86n55, 156n84, 156n85,
Columbia Broadcasting System, 27, 156n86
42, 61, 73, 155, 194, 202, 204, Dewey, Thomas E, 3, 3n2
207, 213, 228 Dionne Jr, Eugene, 43
Connally, John, 75, 155n82, 160, Dirksen, Everett, 148, 152, 166n5,
174, 204 172, 175
Cooper, Chester, 38, 38n76, 55, 96, Dobbins, Muriel, 114
96n95, 232 Douglas, Paul, 160
Cornell, Doug, 76, 114
Coughlin, Father Charles, 17
Credibility Gap, 11, E
129n118, 131–163 Eggleton, Tony, 197
Creel Commission, 20 Eisenhower, Dwight, 32, 58, 98, 105,
Crichton, Jack, 75 117, 117n63, 123, 159, 160n98,
Cronkite, Walter, 41, 201, 223, 185, 212
233, 234 Eisinger, Robert M, 154
Elegant, Robert, 61
Elfin, Mel, 182
D Ellis, Sylvia, 64
Daddis, Gregory, 193 Ellul, Jacques, 18, 18n14, 19, 24–26,
"Daisy" Advert, 93–95, 99 94, 94n83
Daley, Richard, 121, 121n77 Entman, Robert, 29, 29n48, 30,
Dallek, Robert, 9, 36, 49, 49n115, 30n49, 39, 39n78
55n143, 57, 57n149, 65, Estabrook, Robert H., 176,
65n186, 136, 136n16, 154n78, 176n41, 177
167, 167n8, 171, 172n26, 174,
175n37, 178–180, 178n49,
179n53, 181n58, 188, 219–222, F
220n72, 220n76, 221n82, Fitzpatrick, Jim, 81
222n86, 224n92, 230, Ford, Gerald, 106, 149, 157, 172, 237
237, 237n35 Ford Foundation, 131, 147n55,
Davis, Elmer, 123 149, 173
Dean, Arthur, 189 Fortas, Abe, 190, 191, 191n94
DeBenedetti, Charles, 59 Frankel, Max, 116, 116n59, 172,
Democratic National 172n31, 184, 185, 187, 187n83,
Convention, 223 188n84, 202, 202n2
Denniston, Lyle, 187 Fulbright, James William, 60, 60n164,
Department of Defense, 62n172, 152, 60n165, 114, 131, 146–148,
152n70, 162 146n52, 155
256  INDEX

G Greenfield, James, 123, 123n89, 124,

Gallup, George, 3, 11, 40, 41, 62, 71, 129, 229, 238
74, 76, 83, 106, 160, 166, Greenstein, F, 54
189, 230 Grose, Peter, 194
Gallup Poll, 27, 39n79, 41, 41n88, Gruening, Ernest, 86, 88, 88n62,
74, 74n20, 76n29, 82n46, 83, 88n64, 89, 117, 146
85, 85n53, 90, 90n71, 91, Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 53, 56n145,
91n74, 95, 95n90, 98, 98n101, 60, 60n165, 69, 85–90, 86n56,
106, 106n17, 110, 110n29, 117, 87n59, 90n69, 91n73, 96, 99,
117n66, 121, 121n79, 122n86, 109, 111, 117, 129, 146,
125, 129, 129n116, 129n117, 146n52, 147, 211
151, 151n66, 151n67, 153,
153n75, 154, 154n77, 158,
161n102, 165, 165n2, 166n5, H
176n43, 183n69, 188n87, 199, Halberstam, David, 59, 59n159, 61,
199n125, 204, 204n10, 213, 61n167, 62, 62n173, 73n16,
220, 220n73 124, 215n56, 234
Geer, John, 43, 47 Hanoi, 36, 88, 135, 140n33, 141,
Germany, Kent, 8, 48n114 154, 162, 175–177, 177n45,
Gilbert, Robert, 221, 221n80, 186, 187n81, 209n30
236, 236n31 Hardesty, Robert, 167
Goldberg, Arthur, 141, 176, 177, Harriman, Averell, 139, 141, 142,
205, 219 189, 229
Goldman, Eric, 51, 67 Harris, Louis, 3, 5, 9, 11, 27, 37,
Goldschmidt, Tex, 117, 117n62 37n68, 40, 42, 46–48, 62, 65,
Goldstein, G, 56 65n188, 74, 75, 79, 79n34, 83,
Goldwater, Barry, 60, 60n165, 65, 69, 83n49, 106, 106n18, 109,
90–99, 94n86, 95n87, 97n97, 109n28, 110, 153, 154n76, 161,
108, 128, 129, 237n34, 238 166, 166n3, 179–180, 180n55,
Goodpaster, Andrew, 212 189, 204, 204n12, 204n13, 210,
Goodwin, Richard, 81, 82, 91, 91n75, 210n36, 220, 230
102, 102n2, 102n3, 103n6, 117, Herbst, Susan, 40, 40n81, 42, 43n93,
135, 135n11 44, 44n100, 47, 47n109
Goralski, Robert, 213 Herman, Edward, 20, 20n17
Graham, Katherine, 72, 72n10 Hertsgaard, Mark, 33
Gralnick, Jeff, 213 Hightower, John M., 177
Grant, Gerald, 173 Hinckley, B, 64, 64n181,
Great Society, 1, 2, 5, 11, 46, 49n114, 116, 116n55
51–52, 60, 63–69, 76, 77, 79–82, Holt, Harold, 186n78, 197, 197n117,
80n39, 91, 97–99, 101–130, 197n118, 197n119, 198,
134, 139, 153, 157, 160, 165, 198n121, 198n123
167, 171, 172, 178, 180, 183, Honolulu Conference, 131,
209, 226, 230, 235, 237 144–146, 153
  INDEX  257

Hoopes, Townsend, 38, 38n72, 52, 72n10, 74n17, 74n18, 75n22,

53n133, 54, 55n143, 219, 75n26, 76n27, 77n30, 78n32,
219n71, 227n6 79n34, 79n35, 79n36, 80n37,
Hue, 213 80n39, 81n41, 81n42, 81n43,
Humphrey, Hubert, 121, 121n82, 82n44, 83n49, 85n53, 86n56,
147, 147n55, 155, 202, 223, 224 87n59, 87n60, 89n68, 91n73,
Hunt, Michael, 58 91n75, 91n76, 94n85, 95n88,
95n92, 97n96, 97n97, 101–122,
102n1, 102n2, 102n3, 102n4,
I 103n5, 103n8, 104n9, 104n11,
Irwin, Donald, 205 104n12, 105n13, 105n14,
Iyengar, Shanto, 27–29, 107n19, 107n20, 107n21,
27n38, 28n44 107n22, 108n23, 109n27,
109n28, 111n37, 112n40,
112n41, 113n43, 113n44,
J 114n49, 115n50, 116n56,
Jacobs, Lawrence, 45, 45n103, 116n58, 116n59, 117n62,
46n104, 235, 236n30 117n63, 117n64, 118n71,
Jacobsen, George, 214 119n72, 120n74, 120n75,
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, 29 121n76, 121n77, 121n81,
Jankowski, Celene, 126 121n82, 122n85, 122n87,
Johns Hopkins University, 59n157, 124–142, 125n94, 125n96,
89, 97n98, 113–115, 113n43, 125n102, 126n108, 128n110,
114n46, 114n49, 115n50, 128n112, 128n113, 128n114,
115n52, 116n56, 116n57, 117, 129n115, 129n117, 129n118,
117n61, 117n64, 118 132n2, 132n3, 134n7, 134n8,
Johnson, Lady Bird, 118n71, 124, 134n9, 135n11, 135n12,
125, 125n94, 125n102, 137, 135n13, 136n14, 136n15,
137n18, 137n19, 170, 170n21, 136n16, 137n18, 140n32,
207, 208, 220n78, 221, 226, 142n37, 142n38, 144–162,
236, 236n32 144n45, 145n46, 145n48,
Johnson, Lyndon B, 1–11, 2n1, 6n8, 146n52, 147n54, 147n55,
8n10, 8n12, 13–15, 20n17, 21, 148n56, 150n61, 153n73,
24–29, 25n33, 35–42, 36n66, 154n78, 155n82, 156n83,
38n76, 38n77, 39n79, 44–60, 156n84, 156n86, 157n87,
47n108, 47n112, 48–49n114, 157n89, 161n103, 161n104,
49n115, 49n117, 51n127, 165–199, 167n8, 167n9,
54n139, 54n140, 55n143, 167n11, 167n12, 169n17,
56n144, 57n149, 58n152, 169n18, 169n19, 170n21,
62–99, 62n171, 64n179, 171n22, 171n23, 171n24,
64n180, 65n184, 65n186, 171n25, 172n26, 172n31,
66n194, 67n195, 67n196, 69n1, 173n33, 175n37, 175n39,
70n3, 70n4, 71n6, 71n7, 72n9, 176n40, 176n42, 178n49,
258  INDEX

179n50, 179n51, 179n53, 208n27, 220, 220n77, 221,

181n58, 181n61, 182n65, 221n83, 226, 226n2, 228,
185n76, 185n77, 187n80, 228n10, 233, 233n24
187n81, 187n82, 187n83, Kennedy, Eunice, 138
188n84, 189n88, 190n90, Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 30, 44, 53,
190n92, 191n94, 193n99, 56–58, 66, 69–71, 73, 77, 78,
193n101, 194n105, 196n112, 81, 83, 85, 95, 106, 116, 138,
196n113, 198n122, 199n124, 149, 155, 168, 172, 206, 229
201–222, 202n2, 203n8, Kennedy, Robert Francis, 79, 138,
205n14, 205n15, 205n17, 201, 215–218, 220, 222, 223,
206n18, 206n19, 206n20, 229, 234
206n21, 207n22, 207n23, Kerner, Otto, 182
207n24, 207n25, 208n26, Kettl, Donald, 66
208n28, 209n29, 209n30, Khe Sanh, 213
212n45, 217n63, 217n64, Kilpatrick, Carroll, 8, 71n8, 72n11,
218n65, 220n72, 220n76, 76, 76n28, 138, 138n25, 143,
220n78, 221n80, 221n81, 176, 176n44, 197, 231, 231n17
221n82, 222n84, 222n86, King, Rev. Dr. Martin Luther, 98,
224–239, 224n92, 224n93, 120, 182, 201, 216, 222,
227n6, 228n8, 228n9, 232n21, 234, 235
236n31, 236n32, 236n33, Kintner, Robert, 149, 153, 153n73,
237n34, 237n35, 238n36 167n11, 168, 170, 171, 171n23,
Johnson, Sam Houston, 38, 136, 140 206, 206n19, 206n20, 206n21,
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10, 89n66, 95, 207, 207n22
128, 139, 158n92, 159n96, 186 Komer, Robert, 150, 150n63,
Jowett, Garth, 15n2, 16, 16n4, 19n16 150n65, 151, 151n68
Korean War, 27
Kraft, John, 2, 45, 198
K Ky, Nguyen Cao, 144, 152, 159
Kaiser, David, 57
Karnow, Stanley, 10, 29, 29n47, 30,
38, 38n73, 41, 41n86, 61, L
96n93, 118n70, 119, 119n73, Landon, Alf, 40, 91
124, 145, 145n47, 219, 219n71, LaPorte, Roger Allen, 126, 127
227n6, 230, 233, 233n25 Lasswell, Harold, 22
Katzenbach, Nicholas, 6, 113, Lawrence, Bill, 155
113n44, 113n45, 120, 120n75, Lincoln, Abraham, 94
185, 185n75, 205n16, 219, Linebarger, Paul, 17
219n70, 222, 222n87, Lippmann, Walter, 10, 72, 72n9, 79,
231, 231n18 94, 94n86, 113, 114,
Kearns, Doris, 37, 37n70, 38, 38n74, 114n46, 134
55n143, 65, 65n187, 70n3, 208, Loan, Nguyen Ngoc, 214
  INDEX  259

Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr, 74, 75n21, May, Ernest, 66

91, 150, 193 McCall, Carl, 194
Long, Huey, 17, 222 McCarthy, Abigail, 221
Long, Russell, 155 McCarthy, Eugene, 215–217, 223
Longley, Kyle, 223 McCarthy, Joseph, 97
Look Magazine, 126 McCone, John, 118
Los Angeles Times, 3, 3n2, McCormack, John, 75, 105,
106n18, 109n28 170, 171n22
Lyndon Johnson, 1, 6n9, 7, 8n10, 10, McLellan, John, 137
14, 30, 35n62, 36, 37n70, McManus, Mike, 173
38n74, 41, 48n114, 49, 49n118, McMaster, Herbert, 57, 88, 89n66
50n119, 50n120, 50n121, McNamara, Robert, 6, 9, 38, 54–57,
50n124, 51n128, 51n129, 57n148, 65, 87, 87n58, 89n66,
56n144, 57n151, 58n154, 96, 97, 97n96, 99, 99n103, 103,
58n155, 59, 59n158, 64, 110, 111, 111n37, 118, 119,
64n178, 65n184, 65n187, 66, 123n89, 127, 128, 128n110,
66n194, 69, 70, 70n2, 70n3, 145, 152, 156, 157n87, 158,
73n14, 75n25, 79, 88n61, 158n92, 159n95, 190–193,
88n63, 89n66, 104, 109, 190n92, 192n95, 192n96,
110n30, 110n32, 112n39, 235, 235n29
114n46, 117n65, 122, 136, McNaughton, John, 159
136n16, 137n18, 140n32, McPherson, Harry, 167, 168, 171,
140n34, 147n54, 147n55, 150, 171n25, 185, 185n76,
150n65, 151n68, 163, 173n32, 205–207, 205n15
174n35, 179, 184, 184n72, Medicaid, 63, 101
196n114, 198n120, 199, Medical Assistance Program, 153
208n27, 208n28, 209, 220n77, Medicare, 63, 66, 101, 106, 121, 122,
221n79, 221n83, 222n88, 225, 122n83, 153, 238
226, 226n2, 227n5, 228n10, Meet the Nation, 202
230, 230n16, 232n21, 233n24, Meet the Press, 147, 194, 194n103
236n30, 237, 238 Mekong River Project, 116, 144
Miami News, 104
Michalowski, Ambassador,
M 175, 175n38
Maguire, Richard, 70 Middleton, Harry, 4
Manila Conference, 158, 159, Miller, Lawrence, 35
159n94, 162 Miller, Peter, 41
Mann, Thomas, 42, 43 Minh, Ho Chi, 128, 142, 160,
Mansfield, Mike, 114, 137, 146, 147, 177, 184
155, 156, 156n83, 175, 176n40 Mitchell, Franklin, 32
Marigold Affair, 175–178, 175n38, Mitofsky, Warren, 42
176n41, 177n46 Mohr, Charlie, 114
260  INDEX

Moore, David, 39, 43, 44 The New York Times, 3–5, 9, 25n33,

Moorer, Adm. Thomas, 175, 175n37 38n76, 44, 74n19, 83, 83n49,
Morrison, Norman, 126, 127 90, 90n70, 105, 105n14, 109,
Morse, Wayne, 86, 89, 117, 109n25, 111, 111n35, 111n38,
146, 147 116, 116n58, 116n59, 121,
Motion Picture Association of 121n78, 122, 122n83, 123n89,
America, 9, 131, 173 124n93, 126, 126n103,
Moyar, Mark, 61, 62 126n104, 137, 137n21, 137n22,
Moyers, Bill, 2n1, 6, 20n17, 37, 45, 139, 139n28, 139n29, 140n33,
55, 72, 81n42, 81n43, 102–104, 143, 148, 148n56, 149n58,
102n1, 103n7, 104n11, 150n63, 152, 152n71, 153n72,
106–108, 107n19, 107n20, 113, 159, 159n97, 160, 160n99,
113n45, 114, 124, 125, 134, 160n101, 162, 162n106,
141–143, 150–152, 154, 162n107, 172, 172n31, 173n33,
154n80, 155, 157–159, 157n89, 177–179, 179n51, 181, 181n61,
167–171, 167n12, 169n17, 182, 182n64, 182n67, 182n68,
169n18, 169n19, 171n25, 184, 187, 187n83, 188, 188n84,
173–175, 191, 206, 207 188n85, 191, 192n95, 192n96,
Mueller, John, 28, 28n42, 41–43, 193n99, 194, 194n104,
41n87, 42n92, 43n94, 62, 194n105, 194n106, 195,
62n175, 233, 234n26 195n110, 196n113, 198,
Murrow, Ed, 123 199n124, 202, 202n2, 209,
Myers, Dee-Dee, 34 209n30, 209n31, 209n32, 210,
211n37, 212, 214n54, 217,
217n63, 222, 222n85, 226, 229
N Nixon, Richard, 53, 65, 74, 91, 97,
Namdinh, 162 159, 166n5, 179, 196, 196n114,
National Broadcasting Company, 202, 204, 237
27, 61, 147, 149, 170, 206, North Vietnam, 88, 94, 109, 116,
213, 214 126, 127, 139, 142, 156, 162,
National Education Television, 143 165, 175, 184, 190
National Press Club, 195
National Security Council, 38, 38n76,
109, 110, 110n30, 111n34, 132, O
132n3, 158, 158n93 O’Brien, Lawrence, 146, 146n51,
Neustadt, Richard, 26, 26n37, 38, 148, 148n57
38n75, 54, 54n137, 55, O’Donnell, Victoria, 15n2, 16,
66, 66n191 16n4, 19n16
New Deal, 81, 82, 84, 171n22, 173 Orren, Garry, 27n40, 42, 42n89,
Newsweek, 74, 117, 182, 203, 42n90, 42n91, 43, 43n96, 43n99
237, 238n36 O’Shaughnessy, Nicholas, 15–19,
New York Herald Tribune, 74 15n1, 16n7, 17n8, 18n11
New York Post, 104 Owen, Henry, 205, 205n14
  INDEX  261

P 199, 199n124, 209, 209n32,

Pach, Chester, 28 226, 229
Panzer, Fred, 48, 71n7, 83n47, 198, Roberts, Juanita, 102
198n123, 204, 204n12 Roche, John, 167, 212, 212n45
Panzer, Frederick, 2n1, 4, 71n7, Rockefeller, Nelson, 48, 48n113,
83n47, 83n49, 153n73, 179, 204
154n80 Romney, George, 166n5, 181,
Peabody, Endicott, 64 194, 204
Pearson, Drew, 8, 55, 73, 78, Roosevelt, Franklin D, 7, 40, 50, 66,
115, 133 81, 82, 84
Pearson, Lester, 115 Roosevelt, Theodore, 94
Pelly, Thomas, 117 Rostow, Walt Whitman, 97n96, 134,
Percy, Charles, 160 134n8, 149, 150n61, 151, 152,
Pleiku, 101, 110, 110n30, 120 167, 176n40, 176n42, 185,
Pope Paul VI, 145, 197, 203 185n75, 188, 189n88, 193,
Pratkanis, Anthony, 15, 15n3, 205, 212, 217–219,
17, 17n9 217n64, 218n65
The President’s Men, 143 Rottinghaus, Brandon, 47, 47n112,
Public Broadcasting System, 143 63, 63n177, 89n68, 119,
119n72
Rowe, 140
Q Rusk, Dean, 20–21, 54, 86, 87, 124,
Qualter, Terence, 21–23, 132, 132n1, 133, 141, 142, 145,
21n23, 22n27 145n48, 146, 146n49, 148, 151,
Quayle, Oliver, 2, 8, 45–47 152, 175, 175n39, 177, 177n46,
189, 193, 197, 197n118, 211,
212, 219, 219n68, 229, 229n14,
R 230, 230n15
Rather, Dan, 201 Russell, Richard B, 56, 62, 137, 155,
Ray, James Earl, 222 156, 234
Reagan, Ronald, 26n37, 33, 40, 98,
160n100, 166n5, 237
Redmon, Hayes, 154, 154n80, S
167, 167n12 Safer, Morley, 73
Reedy, George, 6, 9, 36–38, 45, 69, Saigon, 61, 124, 190, 213, 214
75, 75n26, 76n27, 78n31, 105, Salinger, Pierre, 6, 55, 78n31, 175
111, 113, 174, 175, 228, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 105
231, 232 Salisbury, Harrison E, 162, 162n106,
Reston, James “Scotty”, 10, 108, 109, 165, 185
109n25, 113, 113n45, 140, San Antonio Speech-29 September
140n33, 148, 148n56, 173, 1967, 184, 185n76, 185n77,
173n33, 185, 192, 192n96, 187, 187n80, 187n81, 187n82,
194–196, 194n106, 196n113, 188, 207, 209, 219
262  INDEX

Schlesinger, Arthur, 53, 58 Tet Offensive, 61, 66, 67, 201–224,

Schwarzenegger, Arnold, 138 212n47, 213n52, 233, 234, 238
Secretary of Defense, see McNamara, Thant, U, 176
Robert; Clifford, Clark Thomas, Helen, 73
Securities and Exchange Thomson, Oliver, 21
Commission, 103 TIME Magazine, 4, 9, 75n22,
Selma, Alabama 75n24, 122n84, 123, 125,
Selma Marches, 120, 121 125n95, 125n97, 126n107,
Senate Committee on Foreign 140n30, 157, 157n88, 166,
Relations, 148 166n4, 173, 179, 179n52,
Sevareid, Eric, 155 181n60, 182, 203n5, 210n34,
Shapiro, Robert, 45, 45n103, 211n38, 211n39, 226
235, 236n30 Tower, John, 160
Sheehan, Neil, 58, 61, 124, 162, 192, Towle, Michael, 37
195, 216, 217, 232 Truman, Harry S, 3, 3n2, 32, 47n108,
Shriver, R Sargent, 138, 58, 136n16, 189
138n24, 138n25, 139, Trump, Donald J., 3, 89n66
139n27 Turner, Kathleen, 9, 35, 35n62, 70,
Siff, E, 56 70n2, 71, 73, 73n14, 75, 75n25,
Sigelman, Lee, 35 76, 88, 88n63, 110, 110n30,
Sirhan, Sirhan, 201 112n39, 114, 114n46, 116, 136,
Smith, Hedrick, 217 136n16, 137, 137n18, 140,
Sparks, William, 167, 169, 140n32, 140n34, 147, 147n54,
169n18 147n55, 150n65, 151n68,
Sparrow, B, 83 173n32, 174, 174n35, 184,
Spragens, W C, 129 184n72, 196n114, 197,
Stanton, Frank, 73, 74n17, 198n120, 208n28, 220, 221n79,
228, 228n9 222, 222n88, 226, 227, 227n5,
State Department, 116, 128, 145, 230, 230n16
150, 205, 218
Steele, John, 182
Stevenson, Adlai, 20, 112 U
Stuart, Mel, 228 United Press International, 36,
Sutherland, Jack, 182 116n58, 153n72, 161n103
University of Michigan, 18n14, 69,
80, 81, 81n41, 81n42, 81n43,
T 94n83, 126
Tallahassee Democrat, 111 University of Wisconsin, Madison, 126
Taylor, Maxwell, 128, 129n115, Updegrove, Mark, 136
146, 166, 173, 186n78, 190 U.S. News, 182
Taylor, Philip, 16, 22, 80 USS Pueblo, 201, 210–212,
Territo, Dorothy, 105, 105n13 211n37, 224
  INDEX  263

V 146n49, 146n50, 146n53, 147,

Valenti, Jack, 6, 9, 37, 38, 38n71, 51, 147n55, 149, 149n59, 150,
51n130, 53, 53n134, 55n143, 150n63, 150n64, 152–156,
81, 81n41, 81n43, 107, 107n22, 152n69, 152n70, 152n71,
114–117, 114n49, 115n52, 156n83, 156n86, 157n87,
116n57, 117n61, 131, 134, 157n89, 158, 158n92, 158n93,
134n9, 135n10, 136, 136n14, 159n94, 159n95, 159n96,
141, 141n36, 144, 144n45, 145, 160–162, 162n105, 162n107,
145n46, 152, 157, 158, 158n90, 165, 166, 166n6, 170n20, 171,
173, 173n34 172n31, 175, 175n38, 175n39,
Van Zandt, James, 50 176, 176n40, 176n42, 178,
Vance, Cyrus, 110, 181, 182 179n51, 180, 180n56, 182–185,
Viet Cong, 61, 89n66, 142, 156, 180, 185n76, 185n77, 187n80,
212, 214, 216 187n81, 187n82, 188, 188n84,
Vietnam, 1, 2, 5, 5n7, 6, 8, 9, 9n13, 188n86, 189n88, 190–192,
11, 14–16, 20, 26, 28, 29n47, 190n90, 190n92, 190n93,
35n62, 36, 36n64, 38n73, 191n94, 193n99, 193n100,
38n76, 41, 41n86, 45, 47, 193n101, 194, 194n102,
47n112, 49, 51, 52, 52n131, 194n105, 195, 195n111,
54n138, 55–69, 56n144, 197n118, 198, 202, 204,
56n145, 56n146, 57n148, 208–212, 212n44, 212n45,
57n151, 58n152, 58n153, 212n46, 213n48, 213n49,
58n154, 59n157, 59n162, 213n50, 213n52, 214,
60n165, 61n168, 61n169, 214n54, 214n55, 215, 215n56,
62n172, 62n174, 64n182, 215n57, 216n59, 216n60,
66n190, 70n2, 73, 73n14, 216n62, 217, 217n64, 218,
73n16, 77, 83, 85, 87, 87n58, 218n65, 218n66, 218n67,
87n60, 88n61, 88n62, 88n64, 219n69, 219n71, 220–222, 224,
89, 89n66, 89n68, 91, 93, 226, 227n6, 229, 229n12, 230,
95–97, 95n89, 96n93, 96n95, 232–235, 232n21, 233n25,
99, 101–132, 110n31, 235n28, 235n29, 236n30,
111n34, 112n40, 112n41, 237, 238
115n51, 118n68, 118n69, Vietnam War, 1, 8, 11, 14, 15,
118n70, 119n72, 119n73, 27, 49, 56, 56n145, 58,
123n88, 123n89, 123n90, 58n152, 59n162, 60n165, 62,
124n91, 124n93, 126n108, 62n174, 66n190, 73n16, 85, 96,
128n110, 128n112, 128n113, 125, 132, 172n31, 176n40,
128n114, 132n1, 132n2, 132n3, 212n44, 213n50, 214n55,
134, 135, 135n13, 137, 137n21, 215n56, 222, 227n6,
139–142, 139n29, 140n33, 232n21, 236
141n35, 142n37, 142n38, 144, Voting Rights Act, 121, 122,
144n45, 145, 145n47, 145n48, 122n85, 155
264  INDEX

W 121n78, 136, 137n17, 160,

Wallace, George, 82, 204 160n101, 193, 198, 232, 232n22
Washington Post, 3, 4, 9, 72, 72n11, Wilson, Woodrow, 81
76, 79n33, 138, 138n25, 143, Wirthlin, Richard, 40
143n40, 143n41, 143n43, Woods, Randall, 9, 65, 65n185, 227,
161, 173, 176, 177, 187, 227n3, 228n7
187n81, 197
Wattenberg, Benjamin, 167, 206
Watts Riots, 125, 181 X
Wechsler, James, 114 X, Malcolm, 234
Westmoreland, Gen. William, 9,
52, 52n132, 61, 61n166, 139,
156, 156n84, 156n85, 159, Y
159n96, 162, 192–195, Yarborough, Ralph, 109, 109n27,
192n98, 193n99, 194n104, 155, 155n82
194n106, 195n108, 195n109, Youngblood, Rufus, 115, 115n50
195n110, 199, 210, 212, Youngstown Sheet and Tube v.
213n48, 214, 215 Sawyer, 32
Wheeler, Earle, 95, 139, 139n29, Yuravlivker, David, 117
159n96, 186, 193, 212
White House Press Corps, 36, 74,
174, 175 Z
Wicker, Tom, 8, 66, 66n192, 76, 109, Zeitz, Joshua, 225
109n26, 111, 111n35, 111n38, Zorthian, Barry, 124, 124n93, 151