Military Aircraft Incident Procedures
Military Aircraft Incident Procedures
Notice:
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Compliance Record
Equality and Human Rights Impact Assessment (EqHRIA)
17/01/2018
Date Completed / Reviewed:
Information Management Compliant: Yes
Health and Safety Compliant: Yes
Publication Scheme Compliant: No
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Contents
1. Purpose
8. Distress Signals
13. Cordons
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26. Helicopters
Appendices
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1. Purpose
1.1 This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) supports the Police Service of
Scotland, hereafter referred to as Police Scotland, Specialist Operations
Policy.
1.3 This SOP does not cover the policing of airports or aircraft accidents or
incidents at or in the close vicinity of airports. For further information in
relation to these, please see the Policing of Airports SOP and the relevant
major incident plan. Bomb calls for aircraft in flight and hi-jack procedures are
also covered in the Policing of Airports SOP. Procedures specific to the police
air support unit are contained within the Air Support Unit SOP.
1.4 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), also known as drones, are not covered by
this SOP. For further information, see the UAS guidance available on the
force intranet, or contact a force Civil Aviation Authority Liaison Officer
(CAALO) or Air Accident and Incident Advisor (AAIA). Both can be contacted
via a police control room or by e-mailing OSD Aviation Safety
(OSDAviationSafety@[Link]).
1.5 This SOP should be read in conjunction with the force Major Incident Plan.
2.2 When a Police Scotland control room receive a call regarding any aircraft
accident or incident, an AAIA must be contacted immediately. Early
notification to an AAIA will optimise the opportunity for the AAIA to consider
the safety implications for responders attending the scene and to contact them
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directly via Airwave before their arrival, to provide advice before responders
interact with the accident or incident scene.
2.3 A Police Scotland AAIA must be informed immediately a police control room
becomes aware of any;
Aircraft in distress (an aircraft crew who declare an emergency)
Aircraft which is reported missing or overdue at its destination
Air accident or incident, including ground incidents and reports of
unmanned aircraft incidents
Need for airspace restriction to be implemented and managed in response
to any kind of incident (e.g. crime scene which is exposed to UAS activity,
Marauding Terrorist Firearms Incident etc.)
2.5 For aircraft in distress, missing aircraft, air accidents or urgent airspace
restriction matters, if no AAIA is on duty or the on duty AAIA’s are not
available, an off-duty AAIA must be contacted without delay.
2.6 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS’s), better known as drones, are also aircraft
in law and the person controlling one is a pilot. The law regarding the use of
UAS’s is complex, so if staff at the police control room receive a call relating to
the use of a UAS, they should contact an AAIA for advice.
2.7 Once an AAIA has been made aware of any air incident, they will make direct
contact with the attending officers and provide advice and guidance on the
following;
Searching for missing aircraft
Approaching an air accident scene or scenes,
General Health and Safety,
Risks associated with the particular incident / aircraft,
Protocols concerning cordons etc.,
The preservation of evidence and
Where a UAS is concerned, legal and procedural advice.
2.8 For air accidents and certain other incidents, the AAIA is responsible for
informing the AAIB. The AAIA will thereafter liaise with the AAIB or Defence
Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) and Royal Air Force Liaison Officer for
Scotland (RAFRLO) in cases involving a military service aircraft.
2.9 Where necessary, AAIA’s will attend the scene to record evidence with or on
behalf of other investigative authorities.
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2.10 During any incident involving an air accident, an AAIA Incident Co-ordinator
will co-ordinate AAIA activities in support of the PIO and to act in the interest
of Police Scotland and other emergency responders. Subject to approval by
the senior officer in charge of the incident, AAIA’s will deploy in teams of two
to the scene or scenes and the total number of AAIA’s deployed will depend
on the scale of the incident. The number of scenes, predicted amount of work
at each scene and environmental conditions will determine how the AAIA co-
ordinator advises the deployment of the AAIA teams.
2.11 Emergency Procedures Advisor (EPA) - The PIO should seek the
assistance of an Emergency Procedures Advisor (EPA) at an early stage, to
assist with advice on the managing the scene with regards to the Forward
Control Point (FCP), Rendezvous Point (RVP), traffic management at the
scene, Partnership working, translators services, Survivor Reception and
Family and Friends Reception Centres, any evacuation of properties which is
required etc. The EPA is contactable through the police control room and will
support the PIO in all aspects of the role. EPA’s train PIO’s, so to have an
EPA at the scene is a valuable asset.
3.2 During an event or the response to an air accident or any other kind of major
incident, the CAALO, through the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and
Department for Transport (DfT), may request that an appropriate volume of
airspace be restricted ‘in the public interest’. This may protect the scene from
aerial threats where pictures from above may compromise the safety or
security of those working within the scene, or stop ariel images revealing and
making public information which may otherwise be used as specialist criminal
knowledge.
3.3 Where airspace restrictions are granted, the CAALO will then take legal
ownership of the management of that restricted airspace on behalf of the
senior police officer in charge of the event or incident. More information
regarding airspace restriction and management is available at Section 26 in
this SOP.
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4.2 UK Police Services’ Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams have a common
approach to the recovery of victims in such circumstances. They are trained
to recover the victims in the most difficult and harrowing of circumstances, but
to work methodically and ensure the forensic recovery of human remains.
4.3 The task of recovering deceased victims from air accidents must be carried
out by UK police Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams. The police control
room will contact the on-call DVI representative at an early stage, in
circumstances where it becomes clear that their expertise is required. DVI
teams will work with the AAIA’s at the scene to ensure their work carried out
safely and is accurately recorded.
5.2 The force control rooms and thereafter the AAIA will liaise with the Distress
and Diversion cell in the event of an air accident or incident.
6.2 The force control rooms and AAIA will liaise with NATS and/or the local Air
Traffic Control (ATC) equivalent where necessary when responding to an air
accident or incident.
7.2 In the case of crashed civil aircraft (or in certain other circumstances involving
military accidents or where an accident nearly occurred), notification of the air
accident or incident will be passed by the AAIA to the AAIB at the earliest
appropriate stage.
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7.3 Where there has been a fatality, or an incident which is likely to result in a
fatality, where the incident occurred in unusual circumstances or where there
is a public interest case, the AAIB will send an investigation team to the scene.
This team may include large numbers of investigators, engineers and other
aviation experts. The number of investigators depends entirely on the nature
of the incident or how the investigation progresses.
7.4 The investigation team(s) will usually comprise of a small advanced party who
will attend the area of the crash as soon as possible, followed by the main
body of the investigation team thereafter.
7.5 The AAIB may take 8 to 24 hours to arrive on scene, depending on the time of
day of the incident and the incident location.
7.6 The AAIA and the MIT will liaise with the AAIB representatives throughout the
incident response and inquiry stages, but it is important to understand that the
AAIB run a parallel inquiry, which is independent of the police inquiry.
7.7 The AAIB inquiry seeks to establish what happened and identify any safety
lessons to be learned. The AAIB do NOT seek to apportion blame and are
obliged by law not to pass certain information to the police inquiry team. To
pass information to the police would be to commit an offence.
7.8 The AAIA can provide information on the relationship between the Police and
AAIB inquiries.
8.2 Police contact with the NMOC must be through the police control room, or the
AAIA.
9. Distress Signals
9.1 When an aircraft crew require immediate assistance a number of signals may
be used:
Visual signalling by any means of the international distress signal
(... --- ...); or
A succession of red flares; or
Sound signalling of the international distress signal by any means other
than radio.
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10.2 The police control room should also pass the name and Airwave Point to Point
number for a Police Officer attending or at the scene and for the PIO, if
appointed to the AAIA so direct contact can be made.
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12.1.1 Where the police control room becomes aware of an aircraft in distress, or
where an air crew has declared an emergency, the airport to which the aircraft
intends to land at must be informed as per the Airports Policing SOP.
12.1.2 The police control room must also inform an AAIA immediately.
12.1.3 The officers at the receiving airport will be notified of the situation and the
AAIA will monitor the incident and consider the range of advice required if the
aircraft has an accident at the airport, or where the aircraft does not come
down where intended.
12.2.1 Missing aircraft can be reported to the police by anyone, but usually reports
are received from;
The aerodrome or other airfield where the missing aircraft was expected to
arrive
Missing air crews family members or friends
Other aviators
Air Traffic Control (ATC)
Distress and Diversion cell
12.2.2 When an aircraft is reported missing, the police control room must create an
incident and notify an AAIA.
12.2.3 If a general location is known for the last reported position of an aircraft, local
officers should be made aware and respond on the ground. A PIO should be
appointed to organise local resources and consider what action will be taken
should an air accident locus be discovered. The AAIA will contact the PIO
directly to provide advice.
12.2.5 It should be kept in mind however that the police helicopter is not equipped to
winch or carry people additional to the ASU crew. The crew of a missing
aircraft, if located, may require immediate medical care, therefor early
consideration must also be given to the police control room contacting the
NMOC and requesting MCA SAR assets are dispatched. This is particularly
important where the air accident or incident may have resulted in the crew
entering water. The MCA SAR should be contacted immediately if recovery of
persons from the water is a possibility.
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12.3.1 When an air accident occurs the police control room will dispatch local
resources to attend the scene or scenes and must inform an AAIA without
delay. It is crucial that the AAIA be given as much notice as is possible in
order to gather safety information relating to the specific aircraft that has come
down, if known, and to provide either specific, or generic advice to first
responders. It is safest to get that advice to responders before they reach a
scene, or in a case where there is more than one aircraft, or the aircraft has
broken up in flight, there will be more than one scene on which to advise.
Detective Officers should also be made aware of the accident at the earliest
possible opportunity.
12.3.3 Where fire-fighting is on-going, the senior fire fighter at the scene will be in
command of the inner cordon, sometimes referred to as the ‘hot zone’ and
Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) will lead the incident until the fire is
extinguished and the inner cordon area stabilised. The PIO will still be
responsible for overall co-ordination of the incident and will take over charge
once SFRS are satisfied with the situation in the inner cordon. The EPA will
provide advice where required on the role of the PIO within the multi-agency
approach to dealing with air accidents.
12.3.4 It should be noted that, with regard to off aerodrome air accidents or incidents,
the fire service only attend on a very small percentage of occasions, because
there is no fire involved at the point where the aircraft is discovered. On the
vast majority of occasions, the AAIA will provide safety advice relating to the
crashed aircraft, at the scene. If the scene is in a remote location, the Police
Scotland and local voluntary Mountain Rescue Teams (MRT’s) may provide
safety advice in relation to accessing and working in such an environment.
12.3.5 For air accidents or incidents at sea, or inland tidal water, the MCA will initially
take the lead role and co-ordinate rescue and recovery activities. The MCA
are not an investigative authority and the PIO will still co-ordinate all land
based activity and multi-agency work relating to the incident. This will be done
from the most appropriate location. Again, an AAIA and EPA can advise the
PIO in the early stages of the enquiry, on a case by case basis. Detective
Officers will again lead such investigations in the early stages and so local
DO’s should be notified as early as is practicable.
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12.4.1 Police Scotland will retain primacy at all aircraft crash and accident sites in
Scotland. In the event of a military aircraft accident, the Deputy Chief of
Defence Staff Duty Officer (DCDSDO) will be responsible for the Ministry of
Defence (MOD) Aircraft Post-Crash Management (APCM) procedures. The
DCDSDO will retain command and control of all military personnel until they
are deployed at the scene.
12.4.2 Once the MOD arrive at the scene, it is the MOD Post Crash Management
Incident Officer (PCMIO) who will be the senior MOD representative and will
assume command and control of all MOD personnel and their activities.
12.4.3 The MOD PCMIO will attend the scene as soon as practicable, departing from
their parent unit within three hours of being notified of the incident.
12.4.4 The MOD PCMIO will provide command and control of military personnel at
the scene until a Site Clearance Certificate is signed. This could be some
weeks after the date of the incident in question.
12.4.5 A military Aircraft Recovery Officer (ARO) and Joint Aircraft Recovery and
Transportation Squadron (JARTS) team will be provided to assist the MOD
PCMIO and PIO. The ARO will control inner cordon activity at the site in
behalf of the MOD PCMIO.
13. Cordons
13.1 All aircraft crash sites, regardless of aircraft size, have the potential to contain
an exceptionally dangerous mix of hazards. Aircraft present a significant
hazard to health, even if they appear to be relatively undamaged following an
air accident or incident. The nature of some aircraft hazards are listed at
Section 18.
13.2 Survivor, first responder and public safety have primacy when dealing with any
stage of an air accident or incident. Once a scene has been risk assessed by
trained personnel, made as safe as is possible through risk mitigation and staff
provided with the appropriate level of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for
their role at the scene, the dignified recovery of deceased victims must be
completed as soon as is safely possible. Staff at the scene should continually
dynamically risk assess the scene to optimise risk mitigation.
13.3 The task of recovering deceased victims must be carried out by UK police
Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams.
13.4 The police control room will contact the on-call DVI representative at an early
stage in circumstances where their work requires to be carried out.
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13.5 Each air accident or incident scene (including airport ground incidents at
aerodromes) should initially be treated as crime scenes. Furthermore, the
investigation site to which an aircraft is removed will also be treated as
extremely hazardous and may also be a crime scene.
13.7 Poor protection of evidence from the outset of an incident may lead to
causation factors being missed and may contribute to further incidents if the
loss of evidence causes a missed opportunity to identify a causation factor
which may be common to other aircraft.
13.9 The AAIA will instigate procedures for the airspace above the scene or scenes
of an air accident to be restricted and managed. This will be achieved through
a CAALO. Consideration of the restriction of airspace is vital to ensure Police
Scotland control all cordon dimensions of the crime scene, both horizontally
and vertically. Airspace restriction must be sought as a matter of urgency
and the AAIA will advise the PIO in this regard.
13.9 Where there is a fire, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service will have control of
the inner cordon and will dictate the inner cordon size. The Scottish Fire and
Rescue, Fire Incident Commander (FIC) or National Inter-agency Liaison
Officer (NILO) will liaise with the PIO and AAIA regarding cordon sizes.
13.10 Where there is no fire, or where the fire service cannot attend the scene, initial
inner cordons sizes will be decided upon by either the PIO who will be advised
by an AAIA.
13.11 Information has been removed due to its content being exempt in terms
of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, Section 35, Law
Enforcement.
13.12 Once the outer cordon and safe routes within the cordon have been
established, no persons should be allowed to enter it until it has been
assessed by qualified experts. Even then, only essential personnel may enter
the outer cordon with the authority of the person in charge of the scene. The
only exception to this is for SFRS personnel to fight fire or assess fire risk.
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scene closer than the advised cordon size in order to save life, they should
approach the scene;
From upwind, in other words with the wind blowing from behind them,
blowing any smoke, vapours or airborne fibres (which may well include
MMMF’s and/or radioactive debris) away from them.
With the possible exception of incidents involving a helicopter,
officers should also approach by walking downhill towards the scene, if
possible, as fluids and vapours (that may be extremely dangerous to
inhale) may seep downhill.
13.14 Where a helicopter has been involved in an accident or incident and may
still have its rotor blades rotating, responders should keep in mind that the
bladed may cause fatal injuries if contact is made.
13.15 Where a helicopter is on a slope, the rotor blades may rotate very close to the
ground because of the angle of the helicopter to the ground and the blades
may not be visible due to high rotation speeds.
13.16 Responders should not approach any helicopter in operation, but they must
not approach a helicopter with rotating blades following an accident or
incident until advice has been sought from an AAIA, regardless of the
circumstances.
13.17 Other than with helicopters with rotating blades, if officers do assess
scene risks and make a decision to approach the scene in urgent
circumstances to save life,
No personal Airwave radio should be taken within 20 metres of the
aircraft or part thereof and
No vehicle Airwave should come within 50 metres of the aircraft or part
thereof.
No person should get within 20 metres of any debris at a military
aircraft accident or incident. If munitions were aboard the aircraft, physical
or electronic disturbance of damaged munitions may cause a devastating
explosion. Munitions may not be immediately identifiable, so it is
recommended that responders remain at the safe cordon distance.
13.18 If emergency responders feel any ill effects whatsoever when getting close
to a scene, they must withdraw immediately and inform the control room
without delay. If police officers become aware of any other emergency
responder feeling any ill effects, they should advise the police control room of,
What the ill effects were and
In what location the ill effects were felt.
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14.1 For air accidents or incidents where a death occurs, or where criminal
involvement is suspected, a Crime Scene Manager (CSM) will be appointed,
who will manage the scene appropriately. The following paragraphs are for
information and reference where no CSM has as yet been, or will be
appointed.
14.2 Experience indicates that aircraft crashes in or on the fringes of urban areas
attract particularly large crowds and effective outer cordons, organised early in
the incident should keep such crowds of people away from the scene in the
interest of responder and public health and safety and to protect evidence.
14.3 The removal of, or interference with any small and apparently insignificant
item may result in the loss of vital evidence of the cause of the accident.
14.5 Officers should record a note of where each person was within the aircraft
before they were removed. This may be of vital evidential importance.
14.7 Clothing worn by aircraft occupants can also be important and should always
initially treated as forensic evidence. Advice should be sought from the senior
Investigating officer in this regard.
14.9 In the case of an aircraft from abroad, the UK Border Force must be informed
and involved in the decision process regarding property from the aircraft. The
EPA will assist the PIO in arranging translation services for any persons who
do not speak English as a first language.
14.10 The remains of the aircraft will very likely be required for expert examination to
establish the cause of the accident or to investigate the possibility of a crime.
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14.11 Only the following persons should be allowed access to the scene and aircraft
remains at the appropriate stages of the incident, subject to the approval of
the police officer in charge at the scene:
Relevant emergency services’ and other medical personnel
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service representatives
Department for Transport Inspectors of Accidents (AAIB)
H.M. Customs and Excise officers
Technical representatives of aircraft operators or manufacturers, properly
authorised by the Inspector of Accidents in charge
Repair and salvage parties properly authorised by the Inspector of
Accidents
15.2 The PIO and AAIA will liaise regarding how the cordon of such a scene is
established and run, but the RAF MRT may assist in securing the outer
cordon. The RAF MRT can also provide crucial advice on hazards within the
cordon and are a valuable asset for the PIO.
15.3 It should be noted that the RAF MRT may take several hours to attend a crash
scene in Scotland and once positioned in a cordon, RAF MRT members have
no authority to require the public to remain outside that cordon. The Police
Scotland MRT where appropriate, or police officers where the scene is not in a
remote and /or mountainous environment will augment the RAF MRT
personnel in a cordon.
15.4 There is no reason for any other military personnel to be within the cordon
area until approval has been given by the senior police officer in charge at the
scene and the military Post Crash Management Incident Officer (PCMIO) who
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will deploy from either RAF Lossiemouth in the north of Scotland, or RAF
Boulmer in the north east of England.
15.5 The RAFRLO can provide the PIO with guidance on any other military
personnel who may legitimately request access to the accident site.
17.2 This process will be initiated by the military without any specific request being
made by the police, but it is for the police officer in charge of the enquiry to
authorise such a hand over of duties.
18.2 For both fixed wing (planes) and rotor wing aircraft (helicopters, gyrocopter),
officers should never approach an apparently serviceable aircraft before being
briefed by the air crew or competent ground crew.
18.3 If an aircraft has been involved in an accident or incident, officers should get
the advice of an AAIA prior to getting close to the aircraft.
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18.4 There are many hazards at the site of an air accident or incident and not all
will be immediately apparent. These hazards exist to both people and the
environment and whilst we concentrate on the threat to people in this
document, any environmental threat should be reported at an early stage to
the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and their advice sought.
The AAIA and the EPA will advise on SEPA involvement.
18.5 Fire, Man-Made Mineral Fibres (MMMF’s), asbestos fibres, fuel, vapours,
explosives, metal fragments, stored energy devices (batteries, gas cylinders,
hydraulic systems etc.) and radioactive material may all be present, or a
combination of some may be present at the site. Even if just one of the
hazards is potentially present, the advice of an AAIA should be sought before
approaching the aircraft.
18.6 The safest way of approaching such a scene is for the attending officers to
stop a safe distance from the downed aircraft, as discussed at Section 13 –
Cordons and contact an AAIA via Airwave. The AAIA will provide information
regarding what health and safety precautions should be taken to assist
personnel at or near the incident.
18.7 The standard advice is never get close to an aircraft which has crashed
without full Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (e.g. robust footwear, Tyvek
suits, doubled up rubber gloves taped at the cuffs, FFP3 standard face masks
and eye protection) appropriate to the extent of damage to the aircraft.
However, it is acknowledged through experience that officers assess the
location and situation for themselves and individual officers may feel that it is
necessary to risk their own safety in order to establish if life can be saved.
18.8 The AAIA will provide advice for both Civil and Military aircraft.
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18.9 Fire
18.9.1 It must be assumed that any fire will involve toxic materials in addition to the
obvious risk from heat and burning. The level of risk attached to other
hazards discussed hereafter can increase following a fire, as fire changes the
properties of hazards, often making them more dangerous.
18.10.1 Modern aircraft design involves the use of many man-made mineral fibres that
in certain conditions pose a significant health hazard (combustible and
carcinogenic). Aircraft crash sites should not be approached except under the
advice of an AAIA, but if an officer makes a dynamic risk assessment that, in
order to save life, they must be aware that they run the risk of breathing in
MMMF’s. Without using an appropriate quality of respirator – (FFP3), MMMF
which are breathed in can cause long term health issues.
18.10.2 The threat from MMMF’s is worse the more the components break up or
following a fire.
18.10.3 The PIO should be alert to the possibility of cross contamination of MMMF
from other emergency service personnel or contaminated casualties.
18.11 Fuel
18.11.1 In the event of an aircraft accident or incident, a large quantity of fuel may be
released between the point where the fuel system loses structural integrity, to
the final resting point of the aircraft and possibly widespread in that area and
in water courses. In warmer weather, fuel vapour will be generated more
rapidly and ignite more readily.
18.11.2 Fuel and fuel vapour may drift downhill and travel downwind. Fuel vapour is
heavier than air and can form an explosive atmosphere in confined spaces.
18.11.3 Doors and windows of buildings affected by fuel spillage or fuel vapour should
be opened and any sources of potential ignition turned off. The safe
evacuation of premises will be facilitated if required.
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18.11.5 If there is a smell of fuel vapour, do not use your Airwave radio (see 13.7 for
safe Airwave distances). Move to a location that is up wind from where you
smell the fuel and ensure it is safe to pass a message to the control room
informing them as best you can of the location of the smell of fuel. The AAIA
will ensure that the appropriate advice is passed to responders in order to
mitigate risks with regards to fuel or fuel vapours.
18.11.6 With regards to missing aircraft in remote locations and poor visibility a smell
of fuel can indicate a general location for the aircraft. Keep in mind such a
smell may also be attributable to the presence of SAR aircraft.
18.12.1 Jet engines are fitted to a large number of aircraft, including helicopters.
Responders need to be aware that some aeroplanes have jet engines with
propellers attached and so the presence of propellers does not mean that the
aircraft has no jet engine, as is a common misconception.
18.12.2 Depending on the angle you approach a jet engine, it may not sound as
though it is operating, and so great caution must be exercised if you ever have
to approach an aircraft with jet engines running.
18.12.3 At an accident or incident, you must not get closer than 20 metres away
from the front of a jet engine which is operating – you may get sucked into
the engine which can result in death.
18.12.4 You must not get closer than 100 metres away from the rear of a jet
engine which is operating – you will suffer the effect of ‘jet blast’, which
means you will be severely burned by the extremely hot air and you will likely
be blown off your feet by the force of the rapidly moving hot air. As a result of
either, you may suffer severe injury or be killed.
18.13.1 Ejection seats are fitted to some military aeroplanes. Sometimes private
buyers purchase military aeroplanes when they end their service with the
military. The end result is that military and some privately owned aeroplanes
have occupant ejection systems present in their aircraft.
18.13.2 Before an ejection seat and its occupant can leave the aircraft, the window
over the cockpit, referred to as the canopy, is forced open, or off of the aircraft
prior to the occupant(s) being ejected.
18.13.3 This removal of the canopy can be achieved in one of two ways.
18.13.4 Firstly, canopy’s can be fitted with explosive cord which, when detonated will
destroy the canopy sending chards of various sized Perspex, at potentially
high velocity, away from the aircraft.
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18.13.5 Secondly, a canopy can have rocket motors fitted which will eject the entire
canopy prior to the main seat ejection. Both methods can present fatal
hazards to personnel in the vicinity.
18.13.6 Ejection seats are fired from the aircraft by explosive charges, and in some
cases complementary rocket motors, thereby projecting the seat and occupant
at great speed from the aircraft. The occupant should then descend under a
parachute, however, the seat (which can weigh over 90 kilograms) will fall
under gravity and may present a hazard to people and/or property on the
ground.
18.13.7 On a case by case basis, not all the explosives will activate on the seat or
canopy. This may be because there was no requirement for an individual
explosive to fire, or there may have been a fault.
18.13.8 There are two important things to remember with regards to ejection systems;
If activated, the ejection seat or seats and the canopy may be some
distance from the main wreckage of an aeroplane and must be found as a
matter of urgency, the advice of an AAIA must be sought on this point.
Whether separated from a crashed aircraft or not, the canopy and ejection
seats are to be treated as extremely dangerous. Canopies and Ejection
Seats must not be interfered with by any emergency responder. Only
RAF MRT or specialist RAF personnel are trained to approach assess
and / or handle ejection seats and canopies. No emergency
responders are currently trained to handle these objects, so do not
accept that they are if you are told so.
18.13.9 A 100 metre cordon must be placed around both the canopy and any ejection
seat which is found, that includes an ejection seat which still has an occupant
in it.
18.13.10 Accidental activation of the ejection sequence can cause fatal injuries to
responders and seat occupants.
18.13.11 Crash helmets are not to be removed by anyone other than a medically
qualified person unless it is necessary to preserve life.
18.13.12 Aircraft fitted with ejection seats may be identified by the following markings: a
red equilateral triangle having 9” sides and apex pointing downwards situated
on each side of the fuselage. The word “DANGER” on each side of the
triangle and the words “EJECTION SEAT” are normally inscribed in the
triangle.
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18.14.1 Crashed light civil aircraft may be equipped with a BRS. This is sometimes
known as a ballistic parachute. The device incorporates a parachute which is
deployed by a rocket. The BRS can be activated by the pilot during flight to
bring a damaged or out of control aircraft safely to the ground. However, an
un-deployed BRS on a crashed aircraft is a significant hazard to responders.
Even once deployed, the parachute of the deployed BRS becomes a
significant hazard once the aircraft lands.
18.14.2 The force AAIA will advise you regarding conduct around an aircraft fitted with
a BRS.
18.15.1 Some aircraft tyres can be pressurised to 250 psi and can deflate explosively if
damaged by fire or impact. You must be careful around detached aircraft
wheels and do not interfere with them in any way.
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18.16.1 The police will maintain a safety distance of at least 2 metres from any
wreckage because of the possible radiation hazard from damaged equipment,
which may contain radioactive material. Where there has been a fire, the
hazards from breathing in radioactive material are increased significantly.
18.16.2 It has been mentioned many times, but the importance of placing an
appropriate sized cordon round the air accident scene, and for emergency
responders to remain outside the cordon and remain upwind and uphill if
possible cannot be overstated.
18.17.1 Military aircraft may be fitted with various explosive devices and occasionally
carry high explosive bombs and other weapons on training flights. In accident
conditions and particularly if subjected to fire, there is an increased risk of
explosion. No attempt should therefore be made to move or interfere with
them otherwise than by qualified armament personnel.
18.17.2 The force AAIA will provide safety advice regarding armed military aircraft, but
it may take some time to confirm if an aircraft is armed, therefor there will be
an assumption that any military fast jet which crashes is armed and there will
be a complete evacuation of persons to 400 metres, with a further
evacuation of people who do not have hard cover out to 800 metres.
18.18 Airbags
18.18.1 Some seatbelts in small aircraft contain occupant airbags. The seatbelts
containing airbags are usually broad and thicker than normal car type
seatbelts. They are connected to a pressurised container which delivers air to
the airbag in the event of an accident. Great care must be taken if entering a
small aircraft not to disrupt airbag seatbelts which may not have activated.
They should be treated as stored energy devices and advice from an AAIA
must be sought before entering the aircraft.
19.1 There is significant media interest in any air accident and as the size of the
aircraft increases, the number of potential casualties increases or if the aircraft
is a military or display aircraft, the media interest increases as well.
19.2 From the outset of an air accident, Police Scotland’s Media team should be
made aware at the earliest possible opportunity. Social media means that air
accidents are normally widely reported on various web sites and in turn on
major news providers at a very early stage. With this in mind, Police
Scotland’s media team require the earliest practicable notification of such an
incident.
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19.3 The EPA will assist the PIO to keep Police Scotland media staff up to date and
will help arrange a suitable Forward Media Point at the scene, located near
to, but outside the outer cordon.
19.4 Media representatives and the public should not be prevented from taking
images of a crashed civil aircraft from outside the outer cordon. Details of
persons taking the images should be recorded so that image copies may be
obtained later if necessary to assist in the subsequent inquiry.
19.5 At the scene of a crash involving a military aircraft, certain features of such
aircraft and the equipment they carry may be classified and any unauthorised
disclosure of this information could be against national or public interest.
19.7 Information relating to press staff who take images should be given to the
Military PCMIO on arrival who will, if necessary, report to the Ministry of
Defence.
19.8 If a person does not identify himself to the satisfaction of a police officer, or
does not appear to be who they claimed to be should not be treated as a
genuine press or broadcasting representative but should be dealt with under
the terms of the following paragraph.
19.9 Persons other than authorised representatives of the news media wishing to
take images of the accident scene or anything contained within it should be
warned that the scene of an air accident involving a service aircraft may be a
“prohibited place” within the meaning of the Official Secrets Act 1911 and,
accordingly that images may be taken only with the prior approval of the
senior officer of the Military Service Team.
19.10 In the case of a foreign military aircraft, e.g. an United States Air Force
aircraft, the provisions relating to “prohibited places” do not apply and any
warning regarding recording images should be that the possibility that
obtaining or communicating to any other person images or information about
the crashed aircraft may contravene Section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act
1911. If films or photographs are taken before such approval is given, the
person may be arrested and their image capturing device may have to be
handed over to the police. The names and addresses should be taken of any
such persons who take photographs and those who fail to identify themselves
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to the satisfaction of the police should have their cameras and any data
collection device or film seized.
19.11 An air accident scene is a crime scene like any other and members of the
public, including all members of the press must not be allowed within the
outer cordon at any air accident or incident scene under any circumstances.
To allow entry will compromise public and emergency responders’ safety.
20.2 The welfare of all Police Scotland staff and officers involved in the incident
must be considered at all times.
20.3 Whilst there is a lawful duty to carry out the necessary police activities at such
scenes, the challenging circumstances should be dynamically risk assessed
and managed with the wellbeing of emergency responders in mind at all times.
Ensuring officers and staff are clothed in appropriate PPE and clothing for the
weather conditions at the earliest practicable opportunity is of paramount
importance. The provision of appropriate hot and cold food and fluids, toilets
and wash areas are vital and adequate breaks and physical and mental health
support at the scene(s) must be considered given the task which must be
carried out. This ideally means the provision of a quiet area, away from the
scene, to allow workers from the scene time away to rest or reflect.
20.4 Representatives from Health and Wellbeing staff, religious and/or faith
representatives, the Scottish Police Federation, UNISON and any other
department or organisation who can provide Police officers and staff with
support should be considered for notification at an early stage.
20.5 Post incident care of all Police staff and officers involved must also be
considered. At the appropriate point following an incident, the senior
investigating officer should appoint an individual to manage the Trauma Risk
Management (TRiM) process and all efforts should be made to ensure all
Police Scotland personnel involved in the incident are offered appropriate
support. For additional information, refer to the Firearms – Post Deployment
Procedures SOP and the Trauma Risk Management SOP.
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21.2 For a military aircraft accident, the MOD will nominate a Service Inquiry Panel
(SIP) that will, working alongside the, DAIB, conduct a role similar to the AAIB.
21.3 The police co-ordination role in the investigation will ensure the many
agencies involved, which will bring similar areas of expertise, work effectively
together and in consultation with each other, to ensure roles and
responsibilities are agreed and utilised effectively. It should be noted that the
AAIB, the SIP and the DAIB’s roles are to investigate accidents for the
purpose of improving aviation safety, not to apportion blame.
21.4 The Procurator Fiscal’s authority in the investigation will take precedence,
therefor Police Scotland, as agents of Crown Office, have primacy in the
investigation until the police investigation team and Procurator Fiscal dealing
with the incident are satisfied that no further police involvement is required.
22.2 The way in which this will be done will be entirely dependent on the
circumstances and an effective strategy for carrying out this task will be
established by the senior police officer.
22.3 Notification to the next of kin of deceased victims in a military aircraft may be
carried out by the nearest Service unit. This applies to all passengers,
whether military or civilian, but does not apply to deceased victims who were
not passengers, but on the ground. Should the aircraft be a civil one on
charter to one of the Services, the same rules apply.
22.4 Where foreign nationals are concerned definitive police information will be
passed through the appropriate consulate or embassy regardless of any
independent arrangements made by the airline or their agents.
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23.2 Similarly, only fatal accidents involving microlight aircraft and hot air balloons
are normally investigated by the AAIB. These aircraft are considered to be
used as a sporting activity and the relevant Associations have been delegated
responsibility by the CAA to investigate fatal or serious accidents involving
such aircraft.
23.3 Should such an accident occur, the same processes as described in previous
paragraphs will be followed by Police Scotland. The AAIA will notify the
AAIB’s duty Inspector. The AAIB Inspector will decide on the course of action
with regards to who will be the appointed investigation body from the AAIB
side. Whether the independent investigator is from the AAIB or the relevant
Association, assistance will be provided by Police Scotland officers and staff.
23.4 As with conventional aircraft, the preservation of all evidence is vital and the
scene and wreckage must not be disturbed unless absolutely necessary to
save life. Scene advice will be provided to first responders by an AAIA.
24.2 Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides the opportunity for authorised
officers to stop, detain and search aircraft, passengers or crew, to establish if
the subjects are involved in the Commission, Preparation or Instigation of an
act of terrorism. This power is in addition to any additional statute, Common
Law or By-Law, which may be appropriate to the circumstances.
24.3 Full details of the aircraft route, aircraft type and registration number along
with passengers and crew details should be obtained.
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24.5.2 If out with office hours, 24/7 assistance can be sought via the on call Border
Policing Command Inspector who may be contacted through a police control
room.
25.2 Border Force secures the UK border by carrying out immigration and custom
controls for people and goods entering the UK.
25.3 Project ‘Pegasus’ is a joint initiative by the National Crime Agency, Police
Scotland and UK Border Force, to address terrorist and criminal threats to the
aviation community.
25.4 There is no recipe for terrorist, criminal, or suspicious activity. If it seems odd,
report it, the smallest thing can be significant.
25.5 Should officers locate a subject of interest, 24/7 Immigration checks can be
made via the UK Border Command and Control Intelligence Unit on 0161 261
1640. Alternatively contact can be made with UKBF located at Edinburgh,
Glasgow and Aberdeen Airports.
25.6 Intelligence should be submitted to the SID including the header ‘Pegasus’ or
‘Lightning’. Consideration should also be given to contacting local Divisional
Intelligence Units or the 24/7 National Intelligence Branch (NIB) Unit,
contactable through a police control room.
26. Helicopters
26.1 Landing Site for use in Emergency Role
26.1.1 On occasion it may be necessary for Police, Ambulance, MCA SAR or even
military helicopters to land at or near to a locus in order to carry out a vital
function such as transport patients or deliver some vital staff or resources.
26.1.2 Emergency service personnel must be made aware of the dangers of working
with helicopters. Considerations for ground personnel include, but are not
limited to:
Rotor down wash and associated flying debris
Main and tail rotor blades
Hot exhausts and jet efflux
Noise
Effects of sloping ground
Wind Direction
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26.1.3 Once landed, ground staff must never approach the helicopter under any
circumstances, unless provided with a safety brief by a helicopter crew
member and being specifically invited to approach the helicopter with the pilots
consent. This is true whether the helicopter appears to be operative or not.
26.1.4 Take great care if the ground on which the helicopter has landed is not
completely level as the rotor blades may be rotating very close to the ground
with the obvious danger of critical injuries or more likely death if contact with
rotating rotor blades is made.
26.1.5 You may not be able to see helicopter blades or tail rotor blades if they are
rotating.
26.1.6 When such a scene landing has to be made, the location the helicopter
touches down must be carefully considered and officers on the ground may
have to provide assistance to the commander of the helicopter with regards to
suggesting a landing site, possibly a back-up landing site and then securing
the chosen site.
26.1.7 Whilst the safety of a helicopter and its passengers and any decision to land
remains the responsibility of the pilot in command, remember the Police have
overall responsibility for scene management at all land based incidents.
Public safety on the ground must be a police priority at all times.
26.2.1 It will usually be best if a site off of a road can be chosen for a helicopter
landing. There are various reasons for this such as the amount of space
available for the aircraft. There are a few things that officers on the ground
should check before recommending an off road site for landing. These
include;
A clear area approximately 50 metres by 50 metres (about half the size of
a football pitch) is best, close by the locus of the incident
The area should be free from obstructions such as bushes or loose debris
The ground should be firm and reasonably level
There must be no overhead wires at all within the area and any overhead
wires on the periphery of the landing area must be notified to the air crew.
This is particularly important during times of reduced visibility or darkness
Ground staff and air crew should be confident that there is nothing
underground at the landing site which may make it dangerous, such a
underground gas pipes or abandoned mine access, the land owner may
be able to advise in this regard
The landing area must be secured and every effort made to prevent
access by any person or animal
If a fence surrounds the landing site, access over or through the fence
should be available to the air crew
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26.3.1 Helicopters should not land on a road unless the following requirements can
be complied with:
Where a landing is made on a road it must be secured by the Police prior
to landing
Prior to landing on the road, radio or verbal communication should have
taken place with the Police (via the other emergency services, Rescue
Co-ordination Centres (RCC) or Air Traffic Control (ATC), where
necessary) to confirm the road is secure and the pilot has authority to
exercise his discretion to land
Minimum amount of time shall be spent on the road by the helicopter
sufficient to fulfil its emergency function
Officers should make every effort to ensure there are no obvious weak
points on the road in the area in which the helicopter will land, e.g. drains,
large pot holes etc.
26.3.3 Officers must not approach the helicopter unless provided with a safety brief
by a helicopter crew member and being specifically invited to approach the
helicopter with the pilots consent. This is true whether the helicopter appears
to be operative or not.
26.4.1 It is likely that any helicopter landing during reduced visibility or hours of
darkness will land whilst the crew are using night vision equipment.
26.4.2 The crew may request land based officers at the landing site illuminate the site
in some way when the helicopter is approaching from some distance, but once
the crew have established where they are going to consider landing, all
lighting at the site must be extinguished. Ground lighting will blind any air
crew using night vision equipment and ground officers must keep this in mind
and make sure not to use lighting until the helicopter is safely landed and the
crew have indicated that they are no longer wearing night vision equipment.
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27.1.1 When any incident occurs, it is widely recognised that the police force for the
area in which an incident is occurring has been shown to be best placed to
assess the overall situation and to appreciate what wider effects an incident
may have. For that reason, police in the UK have been allowed the status of
Emergency Controlling Authority (ECA) enabling them to directly request and
subsequently monitor, manage and in some cases enforce flying restrictions.
27.1.2 It has therefore been agreed nationally that in the case of emergency
response incidents or policing of events overseen by the police, the
appropriate Chief Constable, or his Depute at the time, should be designated
as Emergency Controlling Authority (ECA).
27.1.3 Police Scotland are therefore an ECA and when an incident occurs, Police
Scotland is trusted to use this overarching appreciation of incidents and is
granted the authority to directly request and subsequently monitor, manage
and in some cases enforce flying restrictions. CAALO’s carry out this role on
behalf of the force.
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27.2.3 The CAALO may apply for the most appropriate method of making the
airspace safe in a given location for a given set of circumstances. Depending
on the type of airspace restriction requested, the CAA will challenge the
CAALO on the reasons for the request and ensure all other legal options or
mitigations have been considered and discounted as inadequate to achieve
the lawful objective.
27.2.4 Following consultation between the CAALO and the CAA, the CAA will
approach the DfT for a restriction of flying regulations to be made. Before
making a regulation the DfT will need to be satisfied that it is justified in the
public interest and to do this they may consult with the Police Scotland
CAALO directly. The DfT also reserves the right to consult the Scottish Office
if advice is needed about the actions of any ECA.
27.2.5 There are two options open to the CAALO when considering the public interest
with regards to public and airspace safety.
27.3.1 The law relating to Temporary Danger Areas (TDA) and the statutory
restriction of flying is governed by the Air Navigation Order 2016. The
establishment of a TDA should discourage aircraft crews not directly
concerned with the incident from flying in the immediate vicinity. A TDA has
the advantage of being very readily applied, but does not provide powers to
prevent flying through the TDA by civil aircraft.
27.3.2 If a TDA fails to achieve the objective of inhibiting unnecessary flying, then
statutory ‘Restriction of Flying Regulations’ may require to be brought into
force, but it is stressed that these regulations can be justified only on the
grounds of public interest (which can include the interest of preserving safety
on the ground and in the air) or national security or defence.
27.3.4 Because of the legal process involved in the making of the Statutory
Instrument for a RA(T), there will inevitably be some delay before the TDA can
be changed to a Restricted Area (Temporary) (RA(T)).
27.4.1 In the majority of cases, a TDA may be considered and even tried, but a TDA
may not suffice as there is no enforcement capability. Recent experience has
shown that a RA(T) is the most effective way of optimising aviators
compliance with a requirement not to enter a volume of airspace deemed
necessary to restrict in the public interest.
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27.4.2 For any planned event or operation, or in response to any incident or accident
or any other situation where Police Scotland senior management consider
there to be any form of threat to the public safety or security in the air, a Police
Scotland CAALO will provide advice regarding a possible restriction of
airspace.
27.4.3 The CAALO will liaise with the senior police officer involved in planning the
event, operation, or in the response to an incident and if there is a strong
public interest case, the CAALO will seek to obtain the appropriate level of
restriction for airspace.
27.4.4 Where the planning team for an event or operation decide that a RA(T) is a
justifiable requirement, the planning team should contact the CAALO 100
days prior to the date the RA(T) is required to begin. This is because the
CAA and DfT processes take that length of time to complete. It is possible to
obtain a RA(T) with less notice than 100 days, but the shorter notification will
have to be justified to the CAA and DfT.
27.4.6 In every case where a RA(T) is being considered, the CAALO will provide
advice to the senior officer involved, but restrictions on flying are likely to be
necessary only where there is an exceptionally strong public interest case.
For example, where there is a serious and immediate danger to life and/or
property, e.g. a siege or other major criminal incident involving firearms or
explosives, a major disturbance at a penal establishment or a civil emergency
where unauthorised over-flying is likely to be dangerous to aircraft or hamper
rescue work. It is the responsibility on the CAALO to ensure Police Scotland
managers are provided the correct advice, to enable them to be fully satisfied
that justification to a high enough standard exists to make the application.
27.4.8 Where any restriction has been placed on flying, the CAALO will always look
to end the restriction at the earliest possible safe opportunity, whether an end
time and date was provided by the CAA or not.
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28.2 Before considering a request, the CAALO will need to obtain information on
the operator and pilot of the aircraft and the ‘public interest’ case being put
forward by the person requesting the flight. Depending on the nature of the
reason for the restriction, it may be necessary on public safety grounds, for the
CAALO to obtain details of who will be on board an aircraft and what hazards
may be aboard before considering any request.
28.3 Any permission for over flight granted by the CAALO may stipulate some or all
of the following conditions;
Time flight within the area is permitted from and to
A designated area to operate an unmanned aircraft from and to
Type of aircraft to be operated within the restricted area at any given time
Primacy of aircraft within the restricted area at any given time
An area in which the aircraft may be flown within the restricted area
Conditions in relation to sharing the restricted area with other aircraft
Conditions in relation to the standard of risk assessments submitted by a
pilot to the responsible CAALO, for a flight within the restricted area
Details of the person or organisation responsible for operating the aircraft
Details of a specific aircraft being allowed to fly
28.4 The above list is an example and is not exhaustive. Any requests for
information will be necessary to ensure public safety.
28.5 Every effort will be made by the CAALO to provide the pilot with printed
information of conditions applicable to any permission to enter the restricted
airspace.
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Appendix ‘A’
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Appendix ‘B’
Risk Assessments
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Appendix ‘C’
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Appendix ‘D’
Glossary of Terms
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