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Abstract

Debate in the United Nations Security Council at 55 MUN V will be following the approach
of an open agenda which will be predicated upon three topics. The committee may decide
upon one of the subsequent topics based upon their significance vis a vis international
security and global peace. There will be committee debate and documentation on each topic
as per their order of importance.
The three topics further expanded upon in detail in this study guide are:
➢ Threats to international Peace and Security: Preventing and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism
➢ Instability in Latin America: The Mexican Drug War
➢ Tackling the Somali Conflict

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TOPIC A

Threats to International Peace and Security: Preventing and Combating the Financing
of Terrorism

Overview: Definition and Key Terms

When defining ‘terrorism’ it is imperative to take into account when is the use of violence
legitimate bearing in mind who the victim is, who the aggressor is and for what means the
violent acts are being carried out. Such are the circumstances that still constraint the UN
Member States from formally accepting an international legal definition of terrorism. While
the subject of this definition remains inherently controversial, most definitions seem to
systematically lack accountability and hold a biased approach towards state governments and
exclude them from the definition. Although the recurrent ideological connotation of terrorism
seem to indicate towards the statement that, ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s Freedom
Fighter’.
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, signed on 9
December 1999, defines terrorism in its Article 2.1.b as “any . . . act intended to cause death
or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the
hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context,
is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do
or to abstain from doing any act.”
The United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 1566 of October 2004, elaborates this
definition, stating that terrorists acts are “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed
with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose
to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons,
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.”
In the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, terrorism is defined as, “Any act or
threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an

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individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear
by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or seeking to cause
damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupying or
seizing them, or seeking to jeopardize national resources.”
The European Union defines terrorism for legal/official purposes in Art.1 of the Framework
Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002). This provides that terrorist offences are certain
criminal offences set out in a list comprised largely of serious offences against persons and
property which, ‘Given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an
international organization where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a
population; or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or
abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental
political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international
organization.

Needless to say that the common elements that emerge from these definitions are that it
characterises terrorist acts as atrocities directed towards a population with the means of
wreaking havoc in order to achieve a geo-political agenda of its own by jeopardizing national
resources and exposing the general public to grave danger. And the fact that it aims at
undermining a government or international organisation by destabilising political structures of
a state.

Another term to take into account is ‘Freedom Fighter.’ A person who takes part in a resistance
movement against an oppressive political or social establishment is what generally constitutes
a freedom fighter and the United Nations has yet again failed to verify the distinction between
a ‘terrorist group’ and a ‘freedom fighter.’ Such as in the topic of this committee where Hamas
is seen as a group of freedom fighters and territorial heroes for the Palestine by Palestinians, at
the same time they are regarded as a terrorist group, disrupting and being a menace to law and
order by inaugurating violent attempts towards the Israeli population and state government.
To be precise, the financing of a terrorist organisation comes from the collection of provisions
and funds from various actors with the aim of aiding terrorist groups in carrying out mass
atrocities to terrorize a population(s) and assist them to impair national and international peace
and security to fulfil their own agendas. Such an illegitimate use of the financial sector does
nothing but further escalate the situation and put more innocent lives at risk. With the
intensification of the terrorist threat over the recent years and the concurrent evolution of
terrorist financing typologies, it has become pertinent upon the international community to
tackle the flow of monetary finance to terrorist organizations. Efforts to counter the financing
of terrorism need to rely more on financial intelligence sharing between countries and enhanced
coordination between the public and private sector, with enhanced detection schemes and
stricter laws denoting the financial funding of terrorist organizations as illegitimate resulting
in severe legal action if committed.

Case Study A: Hamas

Association in Conflicts (Historical Context and Current Crisis)
A decades-long territorial dispute remains persistent till this very day. The Israel Palestine
conflict is one that has been placed under the spotlight many times and yet still remains
unresolved. And the only way to reach a plausible solution and intercept the mass human rights
atrocities is by accommodating and taking into account the demands of the stakeholders
involved to allow for a peace agreement. But we yet again find ourselves at a crossroads upon
discovering the major stakeholders to be Hamas and the State of Israel. Heroes to a few and a

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dangerous villain to others, the international community has quite distinctive views about the
role of Hamas and what they identify them as. The United States and European Union have
designated Hamas a terrorist organization because of its armed resistance against Israel.

Hamas is a militant movement and one of the Palestinian territories’ two major political parties.
Dozens of other countries have designated Hamas a terrorist organization, though some apply
this label only to its military wing. It governs more than two million Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip. Iran provides it with material and financial support, and Turkey reportedly harbours some
of its top leaders. Its rival party, Fatah, which dominates the Palestine Liberation Organisation
(PLO) and rules in the West Bank, has renounced violence. The split in Palestinian leadership
and Hamas’s unwavering hostility toward Israel have diminished prospects for stability in
Gaza. With the Al-Nakba beginning in 1948, came a time of mass displacement of indigenous
Palestinians. ‘Nakba’ in Arabic is loosely translated to ‘catastrophe’ in which more than
750,000 Palestinians were forcefully displaced and pushed into refugee camps in East
Jerusalem, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria etc. Zionists began buying and illegally
occupying Palestinian land in order to form a Jewish homeland. Then commenced WWI in
which the British vowed to the Zionists to give them the ultimate British support in establishing
a Jewish national home in Palestine. After the war ended the British remained true to their word
and conquered Palestine allowing Jews to emigrate into the land. This biased position of the
British caused the Palestinians to revolt in 1936 against British and Zionist occupation, which
proved of little significance since the political and military situation of the Palestinians
sabotaged three years later when the British dismantled their constitutional leadership. The
British also began limiting Jewish immigration into Palestine thus leading the Jews to create
their own military forces which would come to be known as the IDF (Israel Defence Forces).

Tensions started to escalate after the British left in 1948 alerting the United Nations to
immediately step in and divide the land into two separate states of Israel and Palestine. But
with the farewell of the British on May 14th 1948, the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians erupted,
Zionists declared the state of Israel, but surrounding Arab nations declared war for Palestinian
Liberation. Though the Palestinians were greater in number and had the support of the
surrounding Arab nations, Israel also had foreign military, financial and political support. By
April 1949 more than 500 villages and 10 cities were captured by the Israelis.

Over the following years, tensions rose in the region, particularly between Israel and Egypt,
Jordan, and Syria. Following the 1956 Suez Crisis and Israel’s invasion of the Sinai Peninsula,
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria signed mutual defence pacts in anticipation of a possible mobilisation
of Israel troops. The Six-Day war then took place between Israel and Syrian-Egyptian forces.
After the war, Israel was able to take over the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip, the West Bank
and East Jerusalem, Jordan and Golan Heights from Syria.

Finally, in 1979, following a series of cease-fires and peace negotiations, representatives from
Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords, a peace treaty that ended the thirty-year
conflict between Egypt and Israel. Even though the Camp David Accords improved relations
between Israel and its neighbours, the question of Palestinian self-determination and self-
governance remained unresolved.

In 1987, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip rose
up against the Israeli government in what is known as the first intifada. The 1993 Oslo I
Accords mediated the conflict, setting up a framework for the Palestinians to govern
themselves in the West Bank and Gaza, and enabled mutual recognition between the newly

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established Palestinian Authority and Israel’s government. In 1995, the Oslo II Accords
expanded on the first agreement, adding provisions that mandated the complete withdrawal of
Israel from 6 cities and 450 towns in the West Bank. From 2000-2020 waves of violence and
mass killings between Israel and Palestine took root that ended in a ceasefire in 2014 but
again escalated soon after.

The United States hosted Israel and several Arab states for ministerial talks in Warsaw, Poland,
about the future of peace in the Middle East. Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas rejected the
accords; Hamas also rejected the agreements. In October 2020, an Israeli court ruled that
several Palestinian families living in Sheikh Jarrah were to be evicted by May 2021 with their
land handed over to Jewish families. The atrocities carry on even today, at this very moment
Israeli settlers continue to settle on illegally occupied Palestinian land. West Bank Palestinians
live under military law which has caused them to have checkpoints, curfews and arbitrary
arrests. While in Gaza, Palestinians live under a blockade imposed by Israel. The apartheid
continues and Nakba Day is celebrated on May 15th annually.

Escalation of Violence Leading to Breaching of International Law and Security/Human

Rights Violations
Hamas and the State of Israel are both equally guilty for the human rights violations they have
collectively carried out. It’s true that the war crimes that Israel has committed are far more
nefarious than that of Hamas but it is still imperative to address both sides of the brutal acts
they have carried out, threatening international peace and security.

ISRAEL
1. ILLEGAL ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ON OCCUPIED LAND
Laws Violated: Geneva Conventions IV, Article 49(6) (1949). It is illegal to colonise
occupied land or transfer non-indigenous population to that land.
Israeli Actions: Immediately following the 1967 war, Israel began building Israeli
civilian settlements on Palestinian lands, eventually building over 200 settlements
throughout the occupied territories, and settling over 450,000 Israeli civilians in them,
displacing hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians from their own legally owned
lands. In addition, Israeli citizens live in hundreds of Israeli settlements on occupied
land not originally given to them in the UN Partition Plan, displacing hundreds of
thousands of Palestinians

2. ILLEGAL TO TAKE LAND BY FORCE & CLAIM SOVEREIGNTY:

Laws Violated: U.N. Charter, Article 2(4) (1945); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations…, Principle 1 (1970).
Israeli Actions: In violation of the UN Partition Plan, Israel took an extra 15% of the
land in 1948, and then, following the 1967 war, Israel confiscated East Jerusalem and
the Golan Heights.

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 3. ILLEGAL ISRAELI PRACTICE OF ETHNIC CLEANSING:
Laws Violated: Forbidding civilian populations the right to return to their homes
following the end of armed conflict is in direct violation of international law and UN
resolutions. Geneva Convention IV, Articles 45, 46 & 49 (1949), UN resolutions 194
(III) (General Assembly; 1948) & 237 (Security Council; 1967).
Israeli Actions: Since 1910, in different ways, the Zionists and then Israel have taken
Palestinian lands, forced native populations from their land, and then refused the
Palestinian landowners or tenants’ residency or employment on them. Following
fighting in 1948 and then again in 1967, Palestinian civilians who wished to return to
their homes in Israel and the Occupied Territories were forbidden re-entry (“right of
return”), confining them to increasingly smaller areas of Israel and Occupied
Territories. The Israeli government enacts laws, and employs its military to keep
approximately 750,000 Palestinian Arab civilians from returning to their homes
following the end of fighting both in 1948 and in the occupied territories in 1967. Israel
then violates UN resolutions ordering them to respect Palestinians’ right to return to
their homes.

4. MASSIVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (HR):

Laws Violated: U.N. Charter, Article 1 (1945); Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations…, Principle 5 (1970).
Israeli Actions: Studies by UN, I.C.J., and International H.R. organizations have found
that Israel violates the human rights of Palestinian people on a massive scale, including
torture, imprisonment without charges or trial, land confiscation, harassment at
checkpoints, unwarranted civilian shootings, not punishing Israeli settlers’ crimes
against Palestinians, unwarranted disruption of medical care, commerce, employment,
free movement, destruction of public and private property, family separation, etc.

5. VIOLATIONS OF U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS:

Laws Violated: Israel has violated 28 resolutions of the United Nations Security
Council (which are legally binding on member-nations U.N. Charter, Article 25 (1945);
a few sample resolutions - 54, 111, 233, 234, 236, 248, 250, 252, 256, 262, 267, 270,
280, 285, 298, 313, 316, 468, 476, etc.
Israeli Actions: Israel has violated many U.N. Security Council resolutions especially
relating to its occupations, land annexations, military aggression, human rights
violations, etc.

HAMAS
1. USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS:
Laws violated: 2007 Paris “Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed
Forces or Armed Groups”, The 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
includes;
➢ Articles 28 and 29, which refer to the right of the child to an education.
➢ Article 36, which protects the child against all forms of exploitation.

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 ➢ Article 38(2), which prohibits children under the age of 15 from directly
engaging in hostilities.
➢ The 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict
“exists to strive for the promotion and protection of the rights of the child.”
➢ Article 1 prohibits the conscription of children under 18 into the armed forces.

Hamas Action: From a young age, Palestinian children are indoctrinated by the Palestinian
leadership. Hamas-controlled media encourage young viewers to seek death through war and
violence or become martyrs by sacrificing their lives for Jerusalem. Much of the indoctrination
of Palestinian children takes place during summer camps run by armed groups like the al-
Qassam Brigades.

2. CONSTRUCTING MILITARY EQUIPMENT AND CARRYING OUT MILITARY

OPERATIONS IN CIVILIAN PLACES PUTTING THEM IN HARM'S WAY:

Laws violated: Hamas’ tunnel system is in direct violation of international humanitarian law,
specifically the 1977 Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention;

➢ Article 51 calls for the protection of the civilian population.

➢ Article 57 specifies a duty to minimise incidental loss of civilian life and
injury.
➢ Article 58 orders that precautions be taken against the effects of attacks on
civilian populations, including prohibiting the location of military objectives
near populated civilian areas.

Hamas Actions: UNRWA condemned the Hamas tunnel system after a passageway was
found 7.5 metres below the Zeitoun Prep A Boys School.

Bloc Formation/Stakeholders (Apart from the Palestinian and Israeli population)

➢ Hamas played the central role along with the then Opposition leaders including
Benjamin Netanyahu (current prime minister) in Israel in scuttling the 1993 peace deal.
Hamas carried out suicide bombings in Israel after the peace accord was signed, and
launched a massive campaign against Yasser Arafat’s secular political movement.
Hamas is opposed to two-state solution accepted by the Palestinian Authority and the
United Nations. The peace scheme provides for the existence of both Israel and
Palestine. Hamas does not recognise Israel’s right to exist. Its map for the state of
Palestine includes the territories of Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas has strong
backing from countries in the Middle-East or West Asia. In the early years, Jordan was
the biggest supporter of Hamas, which had its headquarters in that country. But in 1999,
Jordan expelled Hamas from its territory accusing it of using the country as a military
base for its operations in Gaza and the West Bank. Hamas shifted to Syria as it launched
the second Intifada in 2000. But Hamas fell out with the Asad regime of Syria when it
faced a civil war and international pressure. Hamas now has its leadership base in Qatar,
which is also said to be its biggest financier. Besides Qatar, Hamas has the support from

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 Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. They were the most vocal critics of Israel at the
UN. Further, there are a host of organisations that give generous donations to Hamas,
which is facing sanctions from a number of countries including the US and the UK, and
an economic blockade in Gaza by Israel and Egypt since 2007.

➢ Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs both are spilling blood over the same land. Israel’s
failure to give the Palestinians the equity and aid that could bring stability and
compromise on some equivalent of a two-state solution. Israeli politics have declined
from an effective democracy to something beginning to approach a “chaos-crazy,”
focused more and more on opportunistic annexation, security forces, and the use of
force over the peace process.

➢ After the creation of Israel in 1948, powers such as Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Arab
countries were stakeholders in Palestinian political power.

➢ In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) came up to organise a struggle

against Israel and formation of a state of Palestine. The conflict between the major
Palestinian political parties Fatah and Hamas has been a particular focus. Palestinian
national unity is critical to the success of a two-state solution and the conflict has
fractured Palestinian democratic institutions and fed a spiral of intra-Palestinian
human rights abuses. And while the PLO accepts the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338 and also recognizes the state of Israel to rightfully exist in
peace and harmony, Hamas fails to meet the same conditions.

➢ Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the United States has been the largest
provider of assistance to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, providing
more than $7.6 billion in economic development and security funding—in addition to
humanitarian assistance. In addition to financial and military aid, the United States
also provides large-scale political support to Israel, having used its United Nations
Security Council veto power 42 times against resolutions condemning Israel, out of a
total 83 times in which its veto has ever been used.

Socio-economic Impacts of the conflict

1. SOCIAL EFFECTS:-
From January 2006 to February 2007, internal Palestinian violence, characterized by
tensions between the main Palestinian factions, armed confrontations between
established security organs, the creation of new security bodies, the proliferation of
weapons in the Gaza Strip and the hardening of political positions, caused 248
fatalities, of which 20 were children; 1,350 injuries were recorded.8 It should be
noted that the most significant increase in Palestinian deaths and injuries was a result
of intra-Palestinian violence. The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator
for the Middle East Peace Process calculated a tenfold increase in 2006 over 2005.

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 ➢ As at March 2006, over 9,400 Palestinian political prisoners remained in Israeli
prisons, 421 of whom had been imprisoned for over 10 years. Since January
2006, Israeli authorities have arrested an average of 500 Palestinians per month
in serial raids on towns, particularly Bayt Hanun, Nablus and Jenin.
➢ About 120 Palestinian women political prisoners remain in Israeli jails,
including two under 18 years of age.10 According to the United Nations
Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), 8 female detainees have given birth
in prison; 3 are imprisoned with their babies; 31 are not allowed to care for their
children; 6 have been deprived of family visits; and 8 have been diagnosed with
chronic psychological problems.
➢ From March 2006 to the end of January 2007, in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army
damaged 3,077 refugee shelters and demolished 210, affecting 3,356 families.
This is a major deterioration from 2005, when 116 shelters were damaged and
37 were demolished.
➢ Food insecurity disproportionately affects women and children. A study
conducted by UNRWA in September 2006 revealed that 57.5 percent of
children from 6 to 36 months and 44.9 percent of pregnant women in the Gaza
Strip were anaemic. Of children under 5, 22 per cent were vitamin A-
deficient;37 20 per cent showed signs of iodine deficiency (32 per cent in the
West Bank and 3 per cent in the Gaza Strip); and 4.1 percent suffered from
clinical vitamin D-deficiency (rickets) in the Gaza Strip. The increased
incidence of non-communicable diseases, such as diabetes mellitus,
cardiovascular diseases and cancer represents an epidemiological shift that
imposes additional burdens on the scarce human and financial resources.
➢ The public workers’ strike disrupted education services. The majority of public
schools were totally or partially closed, affecting some 70 percent of students.
➢ Since family coping mechanisms are exhausted, children and women
(especially pregnant women) are most vulnerable to domestic and gender-based
violence.
➢ In occupied East Jerusalem, as elsewhere in the West Bank affected by closures
and the barrier, many families are reluctant to let their daughters go through the
degrading experience of waiting at checkpoints or barrier crossing points, to be
searched and subjected to harassment by Israeli soldiers, or have to walk long
distances to avoid such experiences. Consequently, families are now much more
likely to pressure young women to drop out of school and not pursue a higher
level of education.

2. ECONOMIC EFFECTS:-
➢ The number of Palestinians living in poverty in the occupied Palestinian
territory is estimated at 64 per cent.41 The most pronounced increase was seen
in the Gaza Strip, where 87.7 per cent of households live below the official
poverty line.

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 ➢ Palestinian GDP declined by approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter of
2006, compared to the same period in 2005. That decline was considerably
less than was initially expected, mainly on account of both official and private
inflows, including increased humanitarian assistance. Effects were felt the
hardest in the Gaza Strip, where closures and poverty rates have been most
prevalent.
➢ Poverty, unemployment, closures and land loss are all causes of the current
Palestinian housing shortage. However, a bigger crisis is looming: 401,867 of
the households in the occupied Palestinian territory will need to build new
housing units during the next 10 years. Official statistics, however, reveal that
only 117,909 households will be able to do so.
➢ The 15-week public workers strike over unpaid wages further crippled health
services and put more pressure on clinics run by international and non-
governmental organisations.
➢ According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the financial resources
of the Palestinian Authority shrank by 60 per cent, from $1.2 billion in the
third quarter of 2005 to $0.5 billion by the same quarter of 2006. This decline
put significant strain on Palestinian institutions, particularly those providing
basic public services and security, and all but halted salary payments to
approximately 165,000 Palestinian Authority employees (supporting an
estimated one quarter of the Palestinian population).

Evolution of the Political Dynamics of the Conflict

➢ The political representation of the Palestinians have weakened after the violence in
Jerusalem and war in Gaza. The political loss was also seen on an international level.

PAST UN ACTION
➢ The “two-state solution” would create an independent Israel and Palestine, and is the
mainstream approach to resolving the conflict. The idea is that Israelis and
Palestinians want to run their countries differently; Israelis want a Jewish state, and
Palestinians want a Palestinian one. Because neither side can get what it wants in a
joined state, the only possible solution that satisfies everyone involves separating
Palestinians and Israelis.
➢ The “one-state solution” would merge Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip into
one big country. It comes in two versions. One, favoured by some leftists and
Palestinians, would create a single democratic country. Arab Muslims would
outnumber Jews, thus ending Israel as a Jewish state. The other version, favoured by
some rightists and Israelis, would involve Israel annexing the West Bank and either
forcing out Palestinians or denying them the right to vote. Virtually the entire world,
including most Zionists, rejects this option as an unacceptable human rights violation.
➢ 1993 Oslo Accords that kicked it off, the peace process is an ongoing American-
mediated effort to broker a peace treaty between Israelis and Palestinians. The goal is

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 a “final status agreement,” which would establish a Palestinian state in Gaza and the
West Bank in exchange for Palestinians agreeing to permanently end attacks on
Israeli targets — a formula often called “land for peace.”

If the peace process fails, Israel, the West Bank, and potentially even Gaza could become a
single de facto state, as it’s not clear how separate Israeli and Palestinian states could be
established absent some kind of legal agreement to keep them distinct. That means one of
two things: either Israel ceases to exist as a Jewish state, or the Palestinians become
permanent second-class citizens in an Israel that includes the West Bank and potentially even
Gaza.
For Israel, which sees itself as both Jewish and democratic, this poses an existential crisis. If
Arabs outnumber Jews and are allowed to vote, then it’s the end of a Jewish state. But if
Arabs outnumber Jews and aren’t allowed to vote, then Israel is no longer a democracy.
That’s the force of the South Africa analogy many commentators have used: a Jewish state
that represses an Arab majority would feel an awful lot like a form of apartheid. The
comparison is particularly troubling for Israelis, who are concerned about being boycotted
and sanctioned in the international sphere in the way South Africa’s racial regime was before
its demise.

CASE STUDY B: Lashkar-e-Taiba

Association in Conflicts (Historical Context and Current Whereabouts)
➢ Loosely translated to “Army of the Pure” is an Islamist militant group that took root
in Pakistan in the late 1980’s as a militant wing of Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad, an
Islamist organization influenced by the Wahhābī sect of Sunni Islam. It sought
ultimately to establish Muslim rule over the entire Indian subcontinent. Though based
in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba initially operated in the Indian state of Jammu and
Kashmir, on the Pakistan-India border.
➢ Lashkar-e-Taiba made its first incursions into Jammu and Kashmir in 1993. In the late
1990s it was alleged that Lashkar-e-Taiba received funding from agencies of the
Pakistani government, an allegation the government denied. The group began
operating in the Jammu region, which had large numbers of non-Muslims. Working in
conjunction with Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba began a program of attacks
against Hindus and Sikhs.
➢ Lashkar-e-Taiba attacks were often aimed at civilians. Beginning in 1999, Lashkar-e-
Taiba conducted a series of suicide attacks against Indian security forces, often
targeting seemingly secure headquarters.
➢ In 2006 July 11, multiple bombs tore through Mumbai’s commuter train system
during the evening rush hour, killing more than 180 people and injuring some 800
more.
➢ The group lost more allies in 2001, after the September 11 attacks on the United
States led to the removal of the Taliban government in Afghanistan by U.S.-led
military forces. On December 13 that year, Lashkar-e-Taiba undertook a suicide
attack on India’s parliament complex in the capital, New Delhi, in conjunction with
Jaish-e-Mohammed, another militant group. Due to that the US was forced to then
declare it a terrorist organization and in fear of ending up in an unstable relationship

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 with the US, the Pakistani government then banned the group in 2002 and arrested its
leader, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed.
➢ Two years later, 10 gunmen landed boats in Mumbai, spread out to popular tourist
destinations, and began shooting people.
➢ Formal charges were brought against those Lashkar-e-Taiba operatives detained in
Pakistan in October 2009; the trial did not begin until May 2012, however, because of
various delays and controversies, including accusations that one of the defence
lawyers had a fake law degree. The Pakistani government did not link Saeed with the
attack conclusively, however, and he claimed to have renounced violence. He was
nonetheless repeatedly placed under house arrest.
➢ Lashkar-e-Taiba remains ideologically committed to violence and is still a well-
resourced and well-networked organization capable of carrying out major terror
attacks.
➢ The Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps are presently located at a number of locations in
Pakistan. These camps, which include its base camp, Markaz-e-Taiba in Muridke near
Lahore and the one near Mansehra, are used to impart training to militants.

Distinct Ideology that Underwrites Islamic revanchism, Justifying Collaboration with

Other Terrorist Groups
➢ Lashkar-e-Taiba followers are proponents of Ahl-e-Hadith Islam, a South Asian form
of Salafism. The group differs from other Pakistan-based Salafi-jihadist organizations,
most notably by publicly renouncing sectarian violence against other Islamic sects.
Lashkar-e-Taiba leaders also prohibit members from waging jihad against Muslim-
controlled Pakistan, arguing that jihadi efforts should be focused on non-Muslims.
This diverges from many Deobandi-jihadist groups that support an insurgency within
Pakistan, such as TTP. Such ideological alignment with the Pakistani government has
been a major contributing factor to Lashkar-e-Taiba’s continued survival given its
loyalty to the state of Pakistan and willingness to protect its patron.
➢ Followers of Ahl-e-Hadith consider violent jihad to be an obligation for all Muslims
so long as Muslim holy lands remain under the control of non-believers. Dawa, or
nonviolent outreach and proselytization, is another significant component of Ahl-e-
Hadith.

Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Ability to Successfully Refrain from Co-dependency on Pakistan or

any other (Inter)national Organisation and instead continue Operating on its own terms
by Mobilising their own Resources
➢ Lashkar-e-Taiba’s ability to raise funds independently from mosques in Pakistan and
businesses and charities in the Middle East and Europe has allowed it greater freedom
of action than existed during the 1990s.
➢ Its main headquarters is sustained today not so much through contributions by the ISI
but rather through local collections complemented by money from Saudi charities and
Pakistani expatriates in Europe and the Middle East.

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 ➢ Lashkar-e-Taiba has raised funds from a range of private financiers, Islamic
nongovernmental organisations, regional and international businesses (both licit and
illicit), and organised crime.

Past UN action regarding Lashkar-e-Taiba

➢ Lashkar-e-Tayyiba was listed on 2 May 2005 pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of
resolution 1526 (2004) as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the
Taliban for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or
perpetrating of acts or activities.
➢ It has been a prey to many UN sanctions.

Major attacks and social impacts of Lashkar-e-Taiba’s violent approach

➢ July 11, 2006: Seven coordinated pressure cooker bombs were detonated on Mumbai
commuter trains (180 killed, 800 wounded).
➢ November 26, 2008: Ten gunmen carried out a coordinated attack of shootings and
bombings against a railway station, a popular restaurant, a hospital, two hotels, and a
Jewish Center in Mumbai. The attack lasted 60 hours and became known as 26/11
(164 killed, 308 wounded).
➢ February 13, 2010: Indian authorities speculate that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba may have
contributed surveillance and planning for the bombing of a German bakery in Pune (9
killed).
➢ February 21, 2013: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba claimed responsibility for an explosive device
that detonated in a crowd in Hyderabad city, India (16 killed, 100+ wounded).
➢ December 14, 2014: Approximately 2,000 assailants believed to be Taliban, (TTP)
and Lashkar-e-Taiba fighters attacked security outposts in Kunar province,
Afghanistan (18 killed, 22 wounded).
➢ September 18, 2016: LeT claimed responsibility for an attack on a military
headquarters in Uri, Jammu, and Kashmir, India (24 killed, 17 wounded).

Expected Outcome if Lashkar-e-Taiba is Left Unchecked and Revolutionises

➢ With the group’s already independent nature it is only a matter of time and will before
it fully executes its planned out operations against specific targets.
➢ There is also the possibility that Lashkar e Taiba may turn to actions more in line with
global jihad against Western targets, to include attacks against the United States.
➢ If Pakistan fails to cooperate with the organisation it raises the possibility that Lashkar
e Taiba may change its policy from opposing its patrons.

CASE STUDY C: Hezbollah

Association in Conflicts (Historical Context and Current Crisis)
Hezbollah is a Shiite Muslim political party and militant group based in Lebanon, where its
extensive security apparatus, political organization, and social services network fostered its
reputation as “a state within a state.” Founded in the chaos of the fifteen-year Lebanese Civil
War, the Iran-backed group is driven by its opposition to Israel and its resistance to Western
influence in the Middle East.

12
With its history of carrying out global terrorist attacks, parts of Hezbollah—and in some
cases the entire organization—have been designated as a terrorist group by the United States
and many other countries. In recent years, long-standing alliances with Iran and Syria have
embroiled the group in the Syrian civil war, where its support for Bashar al-Assad’s regime
has transformed Hezbollah into an increasingly effective military force. But with Lebanon’s
power brokers facing public discontent as the nation verges on failure, Hezbollah’s role in
Lebanon could change.

Experts say that Hezbollah’s international network is expanding, but that the group isn’t
eager for outright war with Israel or the United States. Instead, some analysts say, Hezbollah
would rather rely on covert operations and terrorist activities. Even Hezbollah’s threats of
retaliation for the 2020 U.S. drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, the head of the
IRGC’s elite Quds Force, have not materialised into reprisals.

Hezbollah is led by Hassan Nasrallah, who took over as secretary-general in 1992 after Israel
assassinated the group’s cofounder and previous leader, Abbas Al-Musawi. Nasrallah
oversees the seven-member Shura Council and its five subcouncils: the political assembly,
the jihad assembly, the parliamentary assembly, the executive assembly, and the judicial
assembly. The US state department estimates that Hezbollah has tens of thousands of
members and other supporters worldwide.

Hezbollah controls much of Lebanon’s Shiite-majority areas, including parts of Beirut,

southern Lebanon, and the eastern Bekaa Valley region. Although Hezbollah is based in
Lebanon, its manifesto clarifies that its operations, especially those targeting the United
States, are not confined by domestic borders. The group has been accused of planning and
perpetrating acts of terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets abroad, and there is evidence
of Hezbollah operations in Africa, the Americas, and Asia.

Iran provides most of Hezbollah’s weapons and funding; it sends the group some $700
million per year, according to 2020 State Department estimates. Hezbollah also receives
hundreds of millions of dollars from legal businesses, international criminal enterprises, and
the Lebanese diaspora.

ISRAEL
Israel is Hezbollah’s main enemy, dating back to Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon in
1978. Hezbollah has been blamed for attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets abroad, including
the 1994 car bombings of a Jewish community center in Argentina, which killed eighty-five
people, and the bombings of the Israeli Embassy in London. Even after Israel officially
withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it continued to clash with Hezbollah, especially in
the disputed Shebaa Farms border zone. Periodic conflict between Hezbollah and Israeli
forces escalated into a month-long war in 2006, during which Hezbollah launched thousands
of rockets into Israeli territory.

Hezbollah and Israel have yet to relapse into full-blown war, but the group reiterated its
commitment to the destruction of the Israeli state in its 2009 manifesto. In December 2018,
Israel announced the discovery of miles of tunnels running from Lebanon into northern Israel
that it claims were created by Hezbollah. The following year, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli
army base - the first serious cross-border exchange in more than four years. In August 2021,
Hezbollah fired more than a dozen rockets in response to Israeli air strikes in Lebanon; it was

13
the first time the group claimed responsibility for rockets fired into Israel since the 2006
Israel-Hezbollah War.

Hezbollah has attacked Israel with sophisticated anti-ship and anti-armour weapons, which
Western officials suspect are supplied by Iran.

SYRIA
Hezbollah finds a loyal ally in Syria, whose army occupied most of Lebanon during
Lebanon’s civil war. The Syrian government remained as a peacekeeping force in Lebanon
until it was driven out in the 2005 Cedar Revolution, a popular protest movement against the
foreign occupation. Hezbollah had unsuccessfully pushed for Syrian forces to remain in
Lebanon, and has since remained a stalwart ally of the Assad regime. In return for Tehran’s
and Hezbollah’s support, experts say, the Syrian government facilitates the transfer of
weapons from Iran to the militia.

Hezbollah publicly confirmed its involvement in the Syrian Civil War in 2013, joining Iran
and Russia in supporting the Syrian government against largely Sunni rebel groups. More
than seven thousand Hezbollah militants are estimated to have fought in the pro-Assad
alliance, which has been instrumental in the survival of the Assad regime.

Human Rights Violations by Hezbollah

Both Hezbollah’s strength and popularity make it all the more important that it be held
accountable for its conduct during the war. Although both the UN’s Human Rights Council
and the Lebanese government have called for Israel to be held accountable for its crimes,
they have not done so for Hezbollah. This failure sends Hezbollah a message that it can act
with impunity while undermining the protection of civilians caught in fighting involving
armed groups around the world.

The tragedy of this war – the approximately 1,000 Lebanese and 39 Israeli civilians killed
and the reduction of much of southern Lebanon to rubble – is a direct product of Israel’s and
Hezbollah’s utter disregard for their obligations under international humanitarian law. Human
Rights Watch documented Israel’s systematic failure to discriminate between military and
civilian objects in its aerial bombardment campaign, in some cases to the point of war crimes.

Hezbollah launched thousands of rockets on densely populated cities, towns and villages in
Northern Israel, using a variety of unguided rockets, often referred to as “Katyushas,” which
cannot be targeted at military objects with any degree of precision because of their limited
technology. When firing these rockets into civilian areas, Hezbollah knew that the likelihood
of hitting a military target was slim to none, while the likely result would be the death and
injury of civilians. Such attacks were at best, indiscriminate attacks on civilian areas, and at
worst, direct attacks against civilians. Either way, they were serious violations of
international humanitarian law and probable war crimes.

Hezbollah publicly defended its attacks on Israel, insisting that many of its rockets were
targeted at military objects. But this does not excuse the many other rockets indiscriminately
launched into civilian areas. Hezbollah also sought to justify its attacks on Israeli civilians by
claiming they were legitimate reprisals under certain interpretations of Islamic law. Such
statements are disappointing, to say the least, from an organisation that has otherwise prided
itself on having forced Israel to withdraw its military forces from Lebanon in 2000 without
attacking civilians. They also are short-sighted: violations of international humanitarian law

14
happen in almost every war, so if a violation by one side excused violations by another, every
war would degenerate into attacks on civilians. That’s why reprisals against civilians are
never permitted under international humanitarian law. Hezbollah also denied doing anything
to endanger Lebanese civilians without countering specific charges that they have fought or
stored weapons in civilian areas.

In the wake of the war, the United Nations Human Rights Council, primarily at the
instigation of Arab and Muslim member states, moved swiftly to establish a commission of
inquiry to investigate Israel’s violations of the laws of war. But in a startling display of self-
defeating bias, it refused to examine Hezbollah’s conduct. That one-sided response
undermined the credibility of the UN’s strongest human rights mechanism at a time when it is
the most needed to compensate for Lebanon’s inability or unwillingness to undertake such an
investigation on its own. As a result, no official body is investigating Hezbollah’s conduct
during the hostilities or demanding that Hezbollah answer for it.

Socio-Economic Impacts
The economy faced four extraordinary challenges. First, public sector debt had reached such
elevated levels that a default had become a question of when, not if. Second, the banking
sector, having lent three-quarters of deposits to the government, had become functionally
bankrupt and increasingly illiquid. Third, the productive economy had experienced virtually
no growth for an entire decade — a development with acute socio-political implications.

GDP is estimated to have contracted by 25% in 2020, with an additional 10-15% decline
forecast for 2021. When measured in USD, the Lebanese economy may end up shrinking
from $60bn in 2018 to $15bn in 2021. An extreme form of wealth destruction is taking place
with the Lebanese de facto losing the majority of their bank savings. Meanwhile, four out of
every ten Lebanese are out of work, and half the population is under the poverty line.

Lebanon also depends more than ever on remittances from its diaspora – and a large majority
of these expatriates earn money in the Gulf monarchies; nearly 550,000 in total, including
almost 350,000 in Saudi Arabia. Lebanon sorely needs those remittances amid the end of
international subsidies and the restrictions banks have imposed on dollar withdrawals.
Saudi Arabia’s embargo on imports from Lebanon is also a severe blow; the country could
face lost revenue to the tune of $300 million a year. It’s not an exporting country – but 10
percent of what it exports goes to Saudi Arabia. So by striking at Lebanon’s wallet, Saudi
Arabia is reminding the country that its complacent attitude to Hezbollah can quite literally
cost it dearly.

The Lebanese pound has lost more than 15 percent of its value since the start of 2022,
pushing desperate families already struggling to afford food, electricity and fuel deeper into
poverty and with a tank of fuel for a small car now costing more than a month's salary on
minimum wage.

As the Lebanese pound continues to plummet in value, the price of food, fuel and medicine is
increasing at an alarming rate. A single tank of gas for a small car now costs more than an
entire monthly salary on minimum wage.

Lebanon's descent into financial ruin began in 2019, the result of a poorly managed spending
binge that pushed up debt, political paralysis as rival factions squabble and foreign lenders'
reluctance to bail the country out unless it reformed.

15
The World Bank ranks the crisis as among the most severe globally since the mid-19th
century, devastating a country once seen as a wealthy and liberal outpost in the Middle East
before civil war broke out from 1975 to 1990.

About 80% of the population of 6.5 million are considered poor; in September, more than
half of families had at least one child who skipped a meal, UNICEF said, compared with just
over a third in April.
The currency has lost more than 90% of its value and banks have locked savers out of
accounts. By some estimates, state debt reached 495% of gross domestic product in 2021, far
above levels that crippled some European states a decade ago.

Past UN Action
A United Nations-brokered cease-fire came into effect on August 14, 2006. Based on United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 passed a few days earlier, the cease-fire is
intended to be monitored by the Lebanese Armed Forces in conjunction with an expanded
U.N. peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The international community initially hesitated to
contribute troops, though it appears now that enough countries have stepped forward to
significantly expand the existing UN force (UNIFIL).

On July 18, 2006, the Senate passed [Link]. 534, which, among other things, calls for the
release of Israeli soldiers who are being held captive by Hezbollah or Hamas; condemns the
governments of Iran and Syria for their continued support for Hezbollah and Hamas; urges all
sides to protect innocent civilian life and infrastructure; and strongly supports the use of all
diplomatic means available to free the captured Israeli soldiers. On July 20, 2006, the House
passed [Link]. 921, which also condemns Hezbollah’s attack on Israel and urges the President
to bring sanctions against the governments of Syria and Iran for their alleged sponsorship of
Hezbollah.

In September 2004 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, which called for
disarmament of all Lebanese militia, but Hezbollah refused to lay arms "while Israel remains
a threat".

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) initially imposed sanctions in relation to
Lebanon in 2005 in response to the terrorist bombing in Beirut in February 2005 that killed
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. The UNSC imposed additional
sanctions in 2006 in response to the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in July 2006.

16
 Questions a Resolution must answer:

Q1) What can terrorism be defined as today and what actions should be deemed terrorist
activities?
Q2) Is it necessary to derive a detailed analysis to label an organisation “terrorist” based on
its rationale?
Q3) How can the stakeholders' motives be justified?
Q4) Should a third party organisation be developed to adjudicate the legitimacy of terror
funding?
Q5) Can the humanitarian hazards of terrorist organisations be mitigated?
Q6) What is the effectiveness of international intervention in curbing the issue?
Q7) How successful have past UN efforts and resolutions been in tackling various terrorist
activities across the international community?

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 Topic B

Instability in Latin America: The Mexican Drug War

Introduction
The war on drugs is an international effort to eradicate the supply and demand for illegal
substances, ranging from the relatively benign marijuana to much more dangerous drugs like
crack cocaine. The prohibition of these substances is tied to various international treaties,
which require participants to work together to stop international drug trafficking and limit
and even criminalise the possession, use, trade, and distribution of drugs outside of medical
and scientific purposes within their own borders. Although the war on drugs was launched
with the good intention of stopping drugs that many around the world see as dangerous, it's
been linked to many unintended consequences.

Since 2006, powerful drug trafficking organisations in Mexico have enveloped the nation in a
cycle of violence that's led to as many as 80,000 deaths. After so many deaths, drug cartels
and other criminal organisations are still able to cash into the black market and finance their
violent operations around the world. The success of these brutal operations is pinned down to
the black market and their supply of illicit drugs to these organisations by providing them
with a massive source of revenue that pays for hitmen, guns, and bribes.

Root Causes of the Drug War

The United States adopted an anti-drug campaign when former President Richard Nixon
officially declared a “War on Drugs” in 1971. Nixon regarded illegal drugs as “public enemy
number one,” presumably due to an increase in recreational drug use in the 1960s. However,
the War on Drugs may have been launched as a political assault against certain groups,
specifically African Americans and hippies.

Regardless of true motivation, concern over the negative effects of domestic drug use on
society and the economy began to increase. Powerful international drug organisations, most
prominently the Medellín cartel, also posed a threat at the time. Due to these concerns,
former President Ronald Reagan declared drug trafficking a national security threat in 1986.
This declaration initiated the U.S. securitization of drugs.

The crack cocaine epidemic and related violence in the mid-1980s were pivotal in the
formation of many hard-line anti-drug policies in the United States. Determination of
narcotics trafficking as a national security issue resulted in tougher drug laws, greater
military involvement, heightened interdiction efforts at the borders and overseas, and broader
anti-drug measures in Latin American and other source and transit countries.

US Policies Regarding the Drug Trade in Latin America

The United States plays a significant role in attempting to subdue illicit drug production.
Eradication may occur by force or be encouraged voluntarily by the following three methods:
manual plant removal, the use of herbicides, or biological control using pathogens or
predators. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
provides assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Guatemala for their own aerial and manual
eradication programs (U.S. Department of State).

18
The “National Drug Control Strategy 1991” recommends manual or herbicidal eradication
efforts, crop substitution, alternative income options, and developmental projects that
heighten living standards. Eliminating drug production at its core, has proven to be the most
effective method of tackling the issue uptil now. U.S. policy also aims to reduce supply
through interdiction.

Drug interdiction involves attempts to interrupt illegal drugs in the process of being smuggled
by land, air, or sea from 5 producing countries into the United States. The U.S. Army, Air
Force, and Navy, along with Coast Guard counternarcotics teams, are regularly deployed to
track down and capture drug smugglers. The Coast Guard uses drones to locate vessels
transporting drugs. The U.S. military also trains Latin American militaries and law
enforcement agents, in order to build a large, well-equipped network to stem the flow of
illicit drugs coming into the U.S. from Latin America.

Dismantling Drug Trafficking Organisations (DTOs)

In the early 1980s, the U.S. military became increasingly involved in interdiction efforts to
help law enforcement agencies attack the threat of powerful DTOs. Many arrests and
extraditions, as well as the seizure of drugs, guns, and cash have resulted from U.S. efforts to
dismantle these complex organisations. U.S. federal agencies and allies share intel and
investigatory leads to exploit the vulnerabilities of DTOs. In addition, the U.S. has channelled
aid, by providing training and equipment, so Latin American countries may help in the fight.
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies identify and target illicit financial activities
and money laundering networks utilised by 6 DTOs.

National financial program initiatives target the monetary flow back to international drug
supply sources (Drug Enforcement Administration, n.d.). Financial Investigation Teams
(FITs) carry out these initiatives, as well as conduct more complex financial investigations
(Drug Enforcement Administration). Pat US action also includes ‘Plan Columbia’. The
Colombian drug and security crisis was the basis for Plan Colombia which would serve the
purposes of drug interdiction and democracy development in Colombia.

Mexico
The collapse of major drug cartels in Colombia increased the significance of Mexican DTOs
as a national security threat because Mexico became the main transit location for cocaine. In
2007, the Mexican-American presidents agreed to the development of the Mérida Initiative, a
cooperative security initiative with Mexico and Central America designed to combat drug
trafficking, transnational crime, and terrorist threats in the Western Hemisphere. This
initiative continued the trend of a supply-side focus for foreign drug control policies in Latin
America, as the majority of U.S. aid was designated for law enforcement and military
equipment.

As a result of the concentration of drug trafficking, Latin America has the world's highest
crime rates, with murder reaching 32.6 per 100,000 of population in 2008. Violence has
surged in Mexico since 2006 when Mexican President Felipe Calderón intensified the
Mexican Drug War. Alongside that, corruption facilitates the operation of Mexico’s vast and
powerful criminal-business enterprises while simultaneously debilitating the state’s efforts to
confront them. While in the case of Colombia the Drug War has substituted a pre-existing
conflict, in Mexico there was no conflict before the government decided to take on drug
traffickers. The drug war was declared in the name of security, even though violence in

19
Mexico had steadily decreased since the 1990s. Besides the murders, Mexico is experiencing
a humanitarian crisis in regards to forced disappearances: the number of Mexicans who have
disappeared is unclear, but the most prudent estimates put the number at around 40
thousands.

In many Mexican states and municipalities the army has substituted the police in the control
of public order, and Mexico is a militarised country that is experiencing an internal conflict
that sees concentrated peaks of violence and disappearances in specific regions. While the
murder rate in Mexico is in line with the levels of other Latin American countries, its growth
is unprecedented, as it has almost tripled in 10 years. Analysing the state’s efforts to curb the
drug war, it is often met with contradiction when state officials or even the government are
found guilty of cooperating with these illegitimate organisations.

Impacts of the Ongoing Mexican Drug War and the Current Situation in Latin America
In the case of the Mexican Drug War, it has been indicated that a decrease in GDP per capita
equals 0.5% in states with military operations. The true political reasons for launching a
large-scale drug war remain unknown. Some claim that the Mexican Drug War was a
political strategy to legitimise Calderón’s presidency after a rather narrow electoral victory of
only 0.56%. Other academics suggest it was a desperate action to attend to existing security
concerns. One fact, however, is that President Calderón encountered a more complicated
national security threat than all of his predecessors. Mexico’s democratisation process
decentralised political power and made it impossible to negotiate effectively with DTOs,
leaving severe power vacuums. Consequently, drug-related violence increased across
Mexico, although at very controllable levels. There has been an estimation of 17.1% of all
drug-related homicides in Mexico because of additional revenue from cocaine-trafficking.

According to a July 2020 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, about 125,000-
150,000 homicides were organised crime-related from 2006 to 2018.
Furthermore, however successful some minor schemes of the United States have proven to
be, these “partial victories” of the drug war have caused negative consequences, like the
“balloon effect”. Policy experts define the “balloon effect” as a government’s effort to
impede drug cultivation or trafficking in one country, triggering it to “balloon out” to other
countries or regions.

Only recently Mexico has dissolved a special unit trained by U.S. authorities to fight drug
cartels because it was infiltrated by criminals. Another police unit, which received training
from the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, was disbanded more than a year
ago. In December 2020, Mexico announced steps to restrict the activities of foreign agencies
like the DEA, following a dispute over the arrest of a former defence minister in Los Angeles
for drug trafficking.

The results of prohibition and the drug war in Latin America, describing the policies and their
human impacts, and pointing toward alternative approaches consistent with protecting human
rights and achieving social justice have shown significant impacts when describing the
current state of Latin America which includes the following:

➢ forced crop eradication

➢ criminalization and mass incarceration
➢ corruption and organised crime

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 ➢ police violence
➢ militarization of law enforcement and other civilian functions

Conclusion

Regardless of the measures taken by the US to curb the instability rising in Latin America,
there has been inefficiency in the dealings of the drug war. There are hypotheses for
recognising the true root causes for the lack of efficacy. Whatever the reasons may be, the
instability in regions like Mexico due to drugs needs to be effectively addressed for the safety
of the citizens.

It is said that the US supply-side policies in Latin America have been continued as a
mechanism through which to maintain regional hegemony, as well as attempting to curb the
supply of illicit drugs. It is also said that voter preference influences policy decisions
regarding anti-drug laws. Lastly, a hypothesis states that bureaucratic inertia has driven the
continuation of a supply-side focus of the War on Drugs.

Questions a Resolution must answer:

Q1) How can the impacts of cartel propaganda and exercises be tackled?
Q2) How effective have the paramilitaries and local authorities been in curbing the war?
Q3) How can humanitarian grievances caused by the issue be countered?
Q4) How successful have past international and UN efforts been in achieving peace in Latin
America?

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 TOPIC C

Tackling the Somali Conflict

Introduction to the Somali Conflict

It has been 31 years since the eruption of the Somalia conflict following the demise of the
government of Siaad Barre - a military leader and the President of Somalia who led a coup
following the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermake; he is remembered as a brutal
dictator whose regime fostered conditions leading to the 1991 civil war. During this period, the
conflict fluctuated in terms of its intensity, the nature of actors involved as well as its
dimensions and dynamics.

While in the past, clan politics and rivalry between various warlords fuelled and entrenched
the conflict, in recent times the conflict has increasingly taken the shape of a conflict between
those that allegedly advance different forms of Islam. Another notable development is also the
extension of the conflict from inland areas to the sea off the coast of Somalia. The coastal water
of Somalia is now the most pirate-infested sea, posing a serious threat to maritime security and
trade.

This conflict is not a sudden and inexplicable eruption. Rather, it is a result of the interplay of
multiple historical, social and political processes that has shaped the political and socio-
economic structure of Somalia. To adequately understand the conflict and identify its
implications for peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, it is imperative to examine
the processes or factors that underlie Somalia’s highly complicated conflict.

Historical Overview and Root Causes of the Conflict

Although they cannot be explained by colonialism alone, most conflicts in Africa trace their
origins back to the colonial history of the countries of the continent. The conflict in Somalia is
no exception to this.

Like almost all African states, the Somalian state is the creation of European conquest and
colonisation of Africa in the late 19th century. Although the people of Somalia inhabited the
region that today forms part of the state of Somalia since time immemorial, the state of Somalia
as we know it today came into being only after the establishment of European colonial rule.
When the European colonial administration was established in the region, the people of
Somalia were arbitrarily divided into five distinct colonial units.
These units were:

➢ French Somaliland, which today forms the Republic of Djibouti which borders the Red
Sea;
➢ British Somaliland, the territory under British colonial rule which later became
independent in June 1960 and joined with Italian Somaliland to form the state of
Somalia;
➢ Italian Somaliland, the territory colonised by Italy and became independent in July
1960 to become the Republic of Somalia together with British Somaliland;
➢ The Northern Frontier District, which formed part of Kenya’s crown colony;

22
 ➢ The Ogaden region, conquered by Menilik of Ethiopia between 1887 and 1895 and
which later became an integral part of the Ethiopian territory;

British Somaliland, which is now the self-declared independent state of Somaliland,

predominantly inhabited by the Isaaq clan, became independent in late June 1960. When in
early July 1960 Italian Somaliland, which presently covers central and southern Somalia,
became independent, the two territories joined to form the Republic of Somalia. There are
certain consequences that this colonial experience had for Somalia. One can identify at least
four such consequences that in important ways account for the crisis that unfolded in Somalia.

Firstly, the colonial administration established in this region resulted in the division of the
people of Somalia into various sovereign territories. This has continued to affect not only the
domestic politics of Somalia but also, and most importantly, its relations with its neighbours,
particularly Ethiopia. This was expressed in the nationalist aspiration of post-independence
Somali leaders for establishing Greater Somalia by bringing together Somali people from all
the various territories, including Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. Domestically, the colonial
experience led to the emergence of a nationalist government engaged in a massive military
build-up.

In 1977, Somalia went to war with Ethiopia in which it was defeated, a loss with deeper
political consequences for Somalia. This expansionist policy of Somalia also lies at the heart
of the involvement of neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia in the Somalia conflict. Clearly,
it is imperative that peacemaking initiatives in Somalia should adequately address the security
concerns that Somali irredentism generally gives rise to in the region. In this regard, it is
imperative that the ongoing peace process in Djibouti addresses the legitimate concerns of
Ethiopia, including the ending of Somalian support for rebel groups opposed to the government
in Addis Ababa. Indeed, as the record of numerous failed initiatives illustrates, this is one of
the tests for the success of almost any peacemaking initiative in Somalia.

Secondly, as in other parts of the continent, colonial rule institutionalised a centralised state
system in the image of the European nation-state. This introduced political and social
relations/structures unknown to the Somalis’ religious and clan-based political tradition and
social organisation, and undermined and transformed such indigenous structures. As the state
exercised dominant control over political power and economic resources within the whole
territory, its institutionalisation as the primary, if not the only, locus of political and economic
power set the stage for rivalry and antagonism as various groups vied for control of the state
machinery or for political dominance. In the context of Somalia, the traditional social
structures, consisting of the clan and sub-clan system, became political instruments in this
struggle. In this way the colonial system also changed the role of clans.

Thirdly, Somalia inherited the divergent colonial traditions of the British and the Italians.
Although this duality was covered in the enthusiasm and rhetoric of Somali unity in the early
years of the formation of the Republic, the difference in colonial administration and hence
political traditions became a source of tension for elites from the two territories. 6 Owing to
their exposure to the administration of the colonial state and political mobilisation through the
establishment of the Somali Youth League, the ruling political elite of post-colonial Somalia
has come predominantly from these clans. The people in the north were not only marginalised
but they were also subjected to repeated violence and repression by the state. This underlines
the secessionist tendencies in and eventually the declaration of independence by Somaliland in
1991.

23
As a result, the inequality inherited from colonialism has further been entrenched in post-
colonial Somalia. The inter-clan mistrust and hostility this engendered not only constitutes the
root of the conflict but is also among the central factors that have continued to fuel the Somali
crisis.

The confluence of various factors, including the inequalities between members of various
groups in terms of their access to political power and resources; Barre’s authoritarian and
patrimonial rule; and the loss of the 1977 War with Ethiopia, led to the emergence of armed
clan-based Movements. After the 1978 coup attempt, coup plotters who escaped Barre’s
execution fled to neighbouring Ethiopia and established a **Majerteen-based** guerrilla
movement known as the ‘Somali Salvation Democratic Front’. In 1981, another opposition
movement known as the ‘Somali National Movement’ (SNM) was established by Issaq exiles
in England, which later became a guerrilla movement operating from Ethiopia. Subsequently,
Many other clan-based armed groups that cooperated with the SNM came into being. Among
these was the Hawiyebased United Somali Congress (USC).

The course of the fighting by the various movements, particularly the SNM, against Barre’s
regime changed in 1988. This was a result of the signing of an agreement between Ethiopia’s
Mengistu Haile-Mariam and Siaad Barre in which they committed themselves to stop
supporting each other’s oppositions. This prompted the SNM forces operating from Ethiopia
to launch an offensive against Barre’s government. The brutal response of Barre, including the
indiscriminate bombing of Issaq-inhabited territories in the north, further pushed members of
the group into supporting the rebel movement. By the end of 1990, various parts of Somalia
had fallen into the hands of the various clan-based rebel movements. The attack of government
forces in Mogadishu to wrest power from Barre by the faction of the USC led to fierce fighting.
This fighting, in which more than 4 000 people died, forced Barre to flee the country before
any particular group or coalition of various forces was able to fill the power vacuum. In the
absence of a workable agreement on the question of succession from Barre or on sharing of
power, while some movements continued to control the territories they took from Barre’s army,
others fought for controlling the capital and to establish their own government. The fighting
between the forces of Aideed and his rival Ali Mahdi Muhammad for controlling Mogadishu
claimed the lives of over 14 000 people, caused huge damage to the establishments of the city
and left Mogadishu divided into two.

Amid this confusion, Somaliland declared itself to be an independent state under an SNM
government. In the process, Somalia descended into a state of anarchy and fighting, involving
continuously multiplying numbers of clan-based warlords and militias as well as Islamist
fighters, which has to this date continued to hamper the re-establishment of a normal
functioning state structure.

**Majarteen is a sub-clan and one of the major clans of Somalia**

Impacts of the Somali Conflict

1. Media Situation
Despite the peace and tranquillity enjoyed by the people in the regions of Somaliland, the
media is one part of the society that continues to experience hardship and ill treatment in the
disguise of media licensing. The authorities appear to be uncomfortable with the idea of
freedom of expression. Arrest of journalists without charges became a norm within the

24
authorities. The presidential and security forces pick on journalists to react so that they can
justify their disproportionate heavy handedness at a later stage. In spite of proclaimed
democracy by the Somaliland authorities, the media houses are operating in an environment
of tension, pressure and fear.

Apart from the killings of the journalists also there have been gross media violations and
repressions imposed on both journalists and the media houses further worsening the already
risk surrounding media in Somalia. Hizbul Islam insurgent group imposed restrictions on
radio stations. The group banned music and jingles, describing them as un-Islamic. They also
made direct threats to journalists working in the government-controlled territory, who could
not immediately obey their orders. The order got into effect on 13th April 2010, ten days
after it was issued. Most of the radio stations in Somalia stopped playing music. In July first
2010 Hizbul-Islam again banned radio stations from airing programs on the country’s
national Day.

The security existing in the Punt land semi-autonomous region of Somalia couldn’t afford to
guarantee for journalists to exercise and do their job freely. In Puntland, in general, all the
printing media operating in the area including the most influential newspaper in Puntland
called “Shacab” disappeared and was closed down. Many radio stations in Puntland receive
censorship and intimidation on daily bases.

2. Impacts on Somali Residents

In recent years Somalia has earned the humiliation of being ranked ‘one of the worst places
in the world to be a woman’, the worst place on Earth to be a mother and ‘one of the worst
places in the world to be a child.' Contributing factors cited include high female illiteracy,
widespread Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), early and forced marriages, high levels of
maternal and infant mortality, inadequate health services, high incidence of rape and other
forms of Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV), poverty, malnutrition, displacement,
armed conflict and social, economic and political gender inequality.

Although Somali society sets exacting standards for men, war and instability since 1991 have
severely curtailed their opportunities to live up to these standards and that this has important
consequences for women and children, as well as for men.

Large parts of the Horn of Africa have been hit by one of the most severe droughts of the past
40 years. The Somali inhabited lowlands of Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya are particularly
affected, leading to widespread food insecurity and displacement. Rising global food prices
and political instability in the region have complicated the crisis response. While projected
needs for relief aid remain alarmingly high, donors have struggled to mobilise humanitarian
assistance.

Deaths due to malnutrition and preventable disease will continue to predominate over those
due to violence. Crumbling public health systems and limited humanitarian relief exacerbate
the situation. Vaccine-preventable diseases continue to be a leading cause of death and
morbidity among children.

3. Consequences of Civil War in Somalia

From 1997 to 2005, Somalia surpassed Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq in reports of attacks
against aid workers. The UN and many nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) now operate
remotely from Nairobi.

25
The election of a new president and reformulation of parliament in 2009 brought renewed
optimism for stabilisation. Yet Somalia continues to remain a fragmented region consisting of
two effectively independent states (Puntland and Somaliland), a small area governed by
transitional authorities and the greater part overseen by Islamist groups.

The stark lack of humanitarian space and current insecurity has now undermined the impact
of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, a country where half of the population is dependent on
health relief and food aid. The government has been unable to implement the rule of law, and
external aid constantly faces the threat of diversion. Moreover, inter-clan politics ensure that
humanitarian engagement remains complex. Sections of the population have been left to deal
with the devastating consequences without adequate access to aid.

Current State and Dynamics of the Conflict

Following the controversial intervention of Ethiopia to oust the Union of Islamic Courts
(UIC) forces, the military wing of the UIC known as ‘al Shaabab’, meaning ‘the youth’,
opened a successful insurgent attack, leading to one of the bloodiest conflicts witnessed in
Somalia since the 1990s. After two years of such fighting that bogged down the Ethiopian
army, the Islamist insurgents regained control of most parts of south central Somalia,
including parts of the capital, Mogadishu (which is the most populous city of Somalia). The
al Shabaab forces, leading this insurgency, currently enjoy the military upper hand in most
parts of south central Somalia, including Mogadishu.

The internal infighting between various factions of the TFG has further weakened the TFG
and its legitimacy. The feud between the former president and the prime minister reached a
crisis level bringing the TFG to the brink of collapse in August 2008. Despite the mediation
efforts by Ethiopia, this continued to undermine the TFG and the negotiations in Djibouti.
After huge pressure from various actors, the president, Abdulahi Yusuf, resigned from his
post in late December 2008. As Yusuf was the major obstacle in the negotiations between
TFG and ARS-Djibouti, his resignation created a new opportunity to move the Djibouti
process forward. Many of the matters with respect to which the TFG and ARS-Djibouti
concluded an agreement, and highly opposed by Yusuf, have therefore been implemented.
Indeed, in late January 2009, the Somalia Transitional Parliament was expanded to include
200 ARS-Djibouti members, and in a surprising turn of events the former leader of the UIC,
Sheikh Sharif, was elected as president of Somalia’s unity government.

Despite this positive development, militarily, the Somali government remains weak. It lost
most parts of Somalia to the Islamic insurgents. After losing Baidoa to al Shabaab forces, its
presence in Somalia, supported by AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia - a
peacekeeping mission operated by the AU/African Union in Somalia with approval by the
UN) forces, is now reduced to parts of Mogadishu, and even here it is under constant attack
from opposition forces determined to overthrow it.

The conflict during the past two years has also brought about a serious humanitarian crisis.
According to UN sources, the Somalian situation has become the worst humanitarian crisis in
the world. It was reported that more than 10 000 people have lost their lives over the course
of the past two years. The number of Somalis who are in need of emergency food aid is about
3,2 million, constituting more than 40 percent of Somalia’s population. Hundreds of
thousands of Somalis have crossed to neighbouring countries, particularly Kenya and
Djibouti, and live in highly populated refugee camps. Many more others have been internally

26
displaced. The available space for humanitarian activities is increasingly narrowing as more
and more humanitarian workers are being killed or taken hostage.

This recent conflict has also seen the perpetration of serious human rights abuses and the
violation of norms of international humanitarian law.

Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in December 2006, although successful in dislodging the

UIC forces, did not lead to the stabilisation of Somalia and the consolidation of the TFG. It
unleashed an ‘Iraq-style’ insurgency and widespread anti-Ethiopian sentiment among
Somalis. Although Ethiopia’s original plan was to withdraw its forces once some degree of
stability had been achieved and international forces had been deployed, with the deteriorating
security situation hindering the consolidation of the TFG and the international community
failing to deploy the required type and level of peacekeeping force, Ethiopian forces extended
their intervention for more than two years. In the process, not only was Ethiopia forced to
bear a huge financial burden for maintaining its forces but it endured increasing casualties to
its forces. Most importantly, Ethiopia’s continued military presence radicalised many
Somalis, pushing many of them into supporting the insurgency. Eventually, it was realised
that the continuing presence of the Ethiopian forces was costly for Ethiopia and unhelpful for
negotiating peace in Somalia.

It came as no surprise that one of the terms of the Djibouti agreement was the withdrawal of
Ethiopian forces followed by the deployment of a UN force. As the UN failed to mandate
such a force and with the armed resistance bolstering, Ethiopia announced in December 2008
its decision to withdraw its forces without condition.

The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces brought both negative and positive dynamics to the
current situation in Somalia. It raised fears that it might create a power vacuum, which might
lead to Somalia’s takeover by radical forces and the collapse of both the AMISOM and the
on-going UN-led Djibouti peace process. Indeed, following Ethiopia’s announcement,
contributing countries to AMISOM expressed their concern and called the AU to reinforce
AMISOM. The AU and the parties to the Djibouti process, the TFG and ARS-Djibouti,
allegedly requested Ethiopia to extend its presence in Somalia. On the positive side,
Ethiopia’s withdrawal initially created further opportunities for moving the Djibouti process
forward and stabilising Somalia.

Since much of Somalia’s support for the armed resistance spearheaded by al Shaabab was
inspired by the anti-Ethiopian sentiment that Ethiopian intervention inflamed in Somalia,
with the withdrawal of Ethiopia many expected that it was unlikely that al Shaabab would
continue as a cohesive force if it continued to refuse negotiation and pursues the military
option. ‘The announced withdrawal (of Ethiopia),’ observes a Crisis Group International
report, ‘provides a window of opportunity for the political process. It will at least loosen the
glue that has held the factions together, so that infighting is likely to increase and an outright
military victory to become more difficult.’

This early expectation that al Shabaab forces will come to the negotiating table is not,
however, without its challenges. Al Shaabab is listed as a terrorist group by the US and this
may hinder negotiating with al Shaabab. There is also the challenge of how to prevent
hardliners within al Shaabab from using the current humanitarian and security situation to
recruit individuals willing to lay down their lives for pursuing extremist agendas. Indeed, as
events in subsequent months showed, the early expectation was not realised as the al Shaabab

27
rejected the new administration and heightened its fighting against the TFG and the
AMISOM.

Moving on to the nature of the conflict, one identifies that the Somalia conflict exhibits
certain salient characteristics. They are:
➢ Collapse of the state
➢ Militarisation
➢ Clan orientation and multiplicity of parties to the conflict
➢ Lack of identifiable political objectives
➢ Rise of religious fundamentalism
➢ The emergence of war economies

Internal Actors
1. The TFG
Following the collapse of the Barre regime, 13 Somalia National Reconciliation Conferences
(SNRC) were internationally sponsored and hosted in a bid to resolve the Somalia crisis. The
14th Reconciliation Conference held in Eldoret Kenya established the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia in 2004, following two years of negotiation led by the
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a sub-regional body made up of the
larger Horn of African Countries.

The parliament of the TFG is composed of representatives of various clans, major warring
factions and members of the failed Transitional National Government. Like its predecessors,
within Somalia it has more opponents than supporters. Its opponents include members of the
TNG who felt marginalised with the installation of the TFG and, most importantly, the
Hawiye clan leaders and warlords that saw the TFG as a Darood-dominated entity disposed
towards oppressing and dominating the Hawiye. This underscores both the limits of the TFG
as a genuinely representative and inclusive government and the continuing role of clan
membership in Somalia’s conflict.

The other weakness of the TFG is its dependence on the support of external powers, more
specifically Ethiopia, a country that many Somalis consider as a longstanding enemy of
Somalia. Even after its expansion in early 2009, the TFG continues to rely for its survival on
external support. It maintains its tenuous presence in Somalia for anything but the presence of
AMISOM, which has proved to be the life-line of TFG. Probably the weakest point of the
TFG has been its lack of presence in Somalia. It has rather been a government in exile. Both
the peace process that led to the formation and final establishment of the government took
place outside of Somalia. TFG relocated to Somalia only in June 2005 but conditions in
Mogadishu were too dangerous to allow the government to establish its presence in the
capital. This was not only due to continued insecurity of the capital but also because
Mogadishu was controlled by warlords opposed to the ex-president.

The strongest side of the TFG compared to other previous governments may lie not in the
extent of its legitimacy and support within Somalia or in the cohesion within its structures. It
has none of these qualities. Rather its strength lies in its recognition by the international
community as the legitimate government of Somalia and in the support that it enjoys from
influential actors such as Ethiopia and the US. Despite its multiple weaknesses, the UNSC

28
and the AU continue to affirm that the TFG is the only route to peace and security in
Somalia.

The TFG appeared to have gained additional, albeit limited, strength with the expansion of its
composition to include various new actors, most particularly the faction of the Alliance for
the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) that is party to the Djibouti Agreement of June 2008. In
the latest round of talks held in Djibouti from 22 November, the two parties concluded a
power-sharing deal.

2. The ICU/ARS/Al Shabaab

For over 15 years, warlords, their militias and clan leaders were the dominant actors in
Somalia’s political landscape, which was characterised by lawlessness, fighting, criminality
and anarchy. This was until 2006. This year saw the emergence of a new force in Somalia
known as the ‘Islamic Courts Union’ (ICU) as a strong actor to be reckoned with. The ICU
had a very simple beginning. It was originally conceived as a response of civil society
including business to the lawlessness that engulfed south central Somalia following the
collapse of the state in 1991. The Sharia Courts started as judicial bodies to deal with crimes,
and ‘evolved to provide education, health care and public services’. Until 2006, their political
significance was largely limited.

What transformed the ICU and its military wing al Shaabab into their current political posture
in Somalia were various developments in the country in 2006. The first was the high degree
of strength and autonomy that the courts have come to assume from their clans. Externally,
this provoked fear that it would lead to the emergence of a Taliban-like regime in Somalia.
The most important of such developments that brought the courts into prominence was the
establishment of a US-backed alliance of clan militia leaders who sought to capture suspected
al Qaeda operatives who were believed to be enjoying a safe haven in Mogadishu protected
by Somalian hard-line Islamists. This group was also meant to counter the notable influence
that the courts were gaining within Somalia. The attempt of this US-sponsored alliance of
warlords in Mogadishu, known as the ‘Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-
Terrorism’ (ARPCT), to suppress Islamists precipitated a clash with local Islamists and the
courts. In this conflict, the clan militias of the ARPCT were decisively defeated within some
months leading to the ICU assuming control over Mogadishu and most of South-central
Somalia from June 2006 until their expulsion by Ethiopian forces.

During the seven-month period that they were in control of Mogadishu and other parts of
South-central Somalia, they were credited by many for bringing some degree of security and
order and for having brought south-central Somalia under one authority. These achievements
earned them reasonably widespread popular support among war-weary residents of
Mogadishu and other parts of south-central Somalia. The ICU was not, however, just an
Islamic movement alone. It had a strong clan foundation particularly among the Hawiye.

Moreover, the ICU was not a cohesive force. Instead, it was a loose coalition of various
forces that espoused divergent political, religious and economic orientations and interests.
They included ‘progressives who embraced democratic values; opportunists who used the
court’s power for personal advancement; socially conservative **salafis** whose agenda is
focused on public morality; those who want an Islamic state but do not advocate violence;
and jihadists’.

29
Emboldened by the military success of the ICU, these elements of the ICU leadership became
vocal and started to make radical pronouncements and to enforce strict Islamic rules
concerning public morality. These hardliner leaders, represented by Hassan Dahir Aweys (a
US-designated terrorist, leader of the terrorist group known as as ‘Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya’
and a veteran of the 1977 Ogaden war against Ethiopia) declared a Jihad on Ethiopia. They
established close links with and supported rebel groups opposed to the Ethiopian government
and, most importantly, made irredentist claims against the Somali region of Ethiopia, calling
for a greater Somalia. With all these pronouncements, as well as by establishing a closer
alliance with Ethiopia’s arch enemy Eritrea, ‘which,’ according to Menkhaus, ‘was eager to
use the ICU to wage a proxy war’, Aweys and his hardliner associates ‘did everything they
could to provoke a war with Ethiopia.’

These also took measures to enforce conservative Islam. They shut down groups watching
soccer matches. They also shut down theatres showing supposedly “pornographic” movies.
They banned the popular stimulant in many parts of the Horn of Africa called Khat. Together
with their refusal to co-operate with US authorities to surrender al Qaeda operatives and
suspected terrorists, all of these actions led the US to accuse the ICU of having the tendency
to establish a Taliban-like state.

Although the ICU lost the control they established over most parts of south-central Somalia
and Mogadishu following the Ethiopian offensive in December 2006, they were not totally
crushed. They reconstituted themselves as the ARS using Eritrea as their base until they split
into two in mid-2008 following the relocation of the group led by Sheikh Sharif to Djibouti to
participate in the Djibouti peace process. The ARS-Eritrea has very close links with the major
insurgent movement, called al Shabaab which was the hard line Islamic military wing of the
ICU, that achieved particular political prominence in the aftermath of Ethiopia’s successful
military victory over the ICU.

In order to tackle this conflict, for the government to achieve legitimacy and for the peace
process to succeed, they should not continue to focus merely on the increasingly weakening
and hated warlords. They should embrace other sectors of Somali society and should build on
the strategies used by the ICU for encouraging and providing financial and material support
for local actors to provide services that Somalis have been deprived of for so long. It is also
imperative that the TFG is transformed into a truly national and inclusive government that
offers genuine representation for various clans, particularly the Hawiye. They should try to
win the support of these Somali actors following diplomatic means and not by using military
coercion.

**Salafis are a group of people who believe in the purest Islam followed by the early
Muslims**

External Actors
A further complicating factor that those involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping have to
wrestle with is the multiple external dimensions of, and external actors involved in, the
conflict. This is an equally important dimension of the Somali conflict that has received
inadequate attention but is increasingly playing an important part in the ongoing conflict. The
external dimension of the conflict and the involvement of external actors is attributable to at
least three factors.

30
Firstly, it is the security concern that the conflict in Somalia raises for some of Somalia’s
neighbours, particularly Ethiopia. The second is the power struggle for dominance in the
Horn of Africa between various countries. Thirdly, there is the war against terrorism.

Somalia and Ethiopia have a longstanding history of conflict. The two countries fought a
bitter war in 1977 in which Somalia was defeated. The relationship between the two countries
has been very problematic. It is believed that Somalia hosted and supported rebellion
movements fighting governments in Addis Ababa. This was, in particular, concerned with the
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF),
the two rebel movements that have been active in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Moreover,
Ethiopia blamed the bombing attacks that took place in Addis Ababa in the 1990s on al ithad
al Islamia, a terrorist organisation that was active in Somalia of which Awyes was a leader.
Ethiopia suff ered various terrorist attacks and undertook repeated military operations into
Somalian territories to clamp down on rebel groups operating from the Somalian border.

Authorities in Addis Ababa also feared that its regional rival powers and enemies, including
Egypt and Eritrea, may use the existing situation in Somalia to mobilise Somali actors willing
to destabilise Ethiopia.

In the context of the rise of the ICU, these security concerns have been aggravated. The ICU
had allegedly established close links with the two rebel movements that have been waging an
armed struggle for the secession of Ogaden from Ethiopia. It was also reported that the courts
provided support to these organisations and to Ethiopia’s major rebel armed group, the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). In the course of Ethiopia’s advance to remove the ICU from
Somalia, the two organisations claimed on many occasions that the forces of the ONLF and
WSLF ‘claimed to have acted against Ethiopian troops en route to Somalia in order to
demonstrate solidarity with the Courts.’ The support that the ICU exhibited for the OLF was
more disturbing for the authorities in Addis. It is generally considered that the OLF may use
any support to undertake attacks that may seriously destabilise the country.

Although this brought hope for a negotiated settlement, the Al Shaabab declared that they
will continue with their military attacks against all foreign forces present in the country. Al
Shaabab is in control of most parts of Somalia and seems determined and capable of taking
control of the whole of Somalia militarily. As a result, it is not disposed to allow AMISOM’s
presence to be used to bring it into negotiating a political deal with the dysfunctional but
internationally-recognised TFG and allied forces. This also sends a message to the AU and
the international community that their initiatives for expanding AMISOM and/or for
establishing a UN mission to replace AMISOM, is not welcomed.

Apart from this, as already noted, the Ethiopian withdrawal created a positive dynamic for
the Djibouti peace process. Indeed, it should be noted that Ethiopian withdrawal forms part of
the implementation of this process. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of its forces from
Somalia, Ethiopia will continue to be an interested party in the Somali conflict, whose
interest and contribution should be accommodated in the Djibouti peace process.
Nonetheless, its involvement in the peace process, necessary as it is, may not always have a
positive impact on the efforts for achieving peace in Somalia. The challenge for the Djibouti
process is how to strike the right balance between the need for achieving peace in Somalia
and addressing Ethiopia’s security concerns to the satisfaction of the government in Addis.

31
The US has a much narrower concern underlying its involvement in the Somali conflict. This
relates to its war on terror. The US government has listed al Shaabab as a terrorist
organisation. It believes that there are al Qaeda elements that were given protection by
Islamists in Somalia. The US also expressed concern over the aspiration of hard line Islamists
to establish an Islamic state that will enforce strict Sharia laws. It fears that this might lead to
the rise of a Taliban-like regime in Somalia.

Conclusion
In conclusion, it can be said that a few actions need to be executed for this conflict to cease
exacerbation.
➢ There is a need for a continued and more robust and positive international
engagement in Somalia from all international actors, including the UN, the EU, and
the Arab League.
➢ Emphasis should be put on achieving ceasefire and bringing al Shaabab to the peace
process and consolidating the role and impact of the international force present in the
country.
➢ Efforts need to be directed both to alleviate the suffering of millions of Somalis and to
pursue a multipronged approach for addressing the different dimensions of the
conflict.
➢ The role that traditional institutions, including clan membership and religion play
should also be acknowledged and adequately harnessed.
➢ The imperative of establishing peace in Somalia further requires that the root causes
and contributing factors are made to have a bearing on efforts for making peace and
undertaking peace operations in Somalia.
➢ The US government should reconsider its general listing of al Shaabab as a terrorist
organisation.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer

Q1) What role do recognised stakeholders play in the Somali conflict?

Q2) How is the Djibouti process going to proceed forward and comprehensively address all
aspects of the Somali conflict?
Q3) What measures can be taken in order to combat the humanitarian crisis within Somalia?
Q4) What role can traditional institutions (i.e. clan membership and religion) play in terms of
arresting the ongoing fighting?
Q5) Is external involvement evoking complications in this conflict? If yes, how should it be
catered to?
Q6) How should the future status and relations of the relatively stable and autonomous parts
of Somalia be addressed whilst keeping in mind the current crisis in South-Central Somalia?
Q7) How successful have past UN peacekeeping efforts been in tackling the Somali Crisis
since the late 1900s?
_________________________________________________________________________

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