ATP 5-19

Risk Management

NOVEMBER 2021

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication supersedes ATP 5-19 dated 14 April 2014.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

 This publication is available at the Army Publishing
Directorate site ([Link] and the
Central Army Registry site ([Link]
catalog/dashboard).
 *ATP 5-19
Army Techniques Publication Headquarters
No. 5-19 Department of the Army
Washington, D.C., 09 November 2021

Risk Management
Contents
Page
PREFACE.................................................................................................................... iii
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1 FOUNDATIONS OF RISK MANAGEMENT ............................................................. 1-1
Principles of Risk Management ................................................................................. 1-1
Application Levels of Risk Management ................................................................... 1-2
Steps of Risk Management ....................................................................................... 1-3
Chapter 2 RESPONSIBILITIES ................................................................................................. 2-1
Army Organizations ................................................................................................... 2-1
Commanders ............................................................................................................. 2-1
Executive Officers or Chiefs of Staff .......................................................................... 2-2
Chiefs of Protection or Operations Officers ............................................................... 2-2
Staffs.......................................................................................................................... 2-2
Army Leaders ............................................................................................................ 2-3
Individuals .................................................................................................................. 2-3
Chapter 3 APPLICATION TO TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES .......................................... 3-1
Planning Considerations for Troop Leading Procedures .......................................... 3-1
Risk Management Techniques for Troop Leading Procedures ................................. 3-5
Chapter 4 APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND RAPID
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS ......................................................................................................... 4-1
Planning Considerations for the Military Decision-Making Process .......................... 4-1
Risk Management Techniques for the Military Decision-Making Process ................ 4-1
Rapid Decision-Making and Synchronization Process ............................................ 4-16
Appendix A SAMPLE DD FORM 2977 AND INSTRUCTIONS ................................................... A-1
GLOSSARY ................................................................................................ Glossary-1
REFERENCES ........................................................................................ References-1
INDEX ................................................................................................................ Index-1

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes ATP 5-19, dated 14 April 2014.

ATP 5-19 i
Contents

Figures
Figure 1-1. A cyclical, continuous process for managing risk ........................................................ 1-3
Figure 1-2. Assessment steps and management steps ................................................................ 1-4
Figure 3-1. Risk management steps correlated to troop leading procedures ................................ 3-2
Figure 3-2. Parallel planning correlated with risk management steps ........................................... 3-3
Figure 3-3. Information flow in warning orders .............................................................................. 3-4
Figure 3-4. Example real-time risk assessment............................................................................. 3-6
Figure 3-5. Company warning order example ............................................................................... 3-7
Figure 4-1. Sample warning order ................................................................................................. 4-4
Figure 4-2. Sample graphic incorporating risk management information ...................................... 4-5
Figure 4-3. Sample running estimate incorporating risk management information ....................... 4-7
Figure 4-4. Rapid decision-making and synchronization process ............................................... 4-17
Figure A-1. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical road march scenario (page 1) ............................. A-4
Figure A-2. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical road march scenario (page 2) ............................. A-5
Figure A-3. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical aviation scenario (page 1) ................................... A-8
Figure A-4. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical aviation scenario (page 2) ................................... A-9
Figure A-5. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical aviation scenario (page 3) ................................. A-10
Figure A-6. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical field artillery scenario (page 1) .......................... A-13
Figure A-7. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical field artillery scenario (page 2) .......................... A-14

Tables
Introductory table-1. Risk management in the operations process ................................................... v
Introductory table-2. Army terms ..................................................................................................... vii
Table 1-1. Risk assessment matrix ................................................................................................ 1-7
Table 1-2. Levels of severity and examples of consequences ...................................................... 1-9
Table 1-3. Criteria for effective controls ....................................................................................... 1-12
Table 1-4. Examples of hazards and controls ............................................................................. 1-13
Table 1-5. Evaluation goals ......................................................................................................... 1-16
Table 4-1. Risk management in the military decision-making process ......................................... 4-2
Table 4-2. Sample consolidated preliminary risk assessment worksheet ..................................... 4-9
Table 4-3. Sample staff section risk briefing matrix ..................................................................... 4-11
Table A-1. Legend for Appendix A figures ..................................................................................... A-2

ii ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Preface
ATP 5-19 provides doctrinal guidance on managing risk within the conduct of operations. Administrative
risk management (RM) guidance and techniques are in AR 385-10. These two documents are designed to be
complementary, and in tandem, they provide guidance on the implementation of RM throughout the Army.
The principal audience for ATP 5-19 is all members of the profession of arms. Commanders, staffs, leaders,
Army Civilians, and individual Soldiers throughout the Army will use this publication. Commanders and
staffs of Army headquarters serving as joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to
applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or
multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.
Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S.,
international, and, in some cases host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels will ensure that
their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of armed conflict and applicable rules of engagement. (See
FM 6-27.)
AR 385-10 implements compliance with appropriate federal law and Department of Defense instructions. It
provides administrative policy on Army safety management procedures. The proponent of ATP 5-19 has
made every effort to keep this doctrine consistent with AR 385-10 and all appropriate laws, regulations,
instructions, and policies. Where Army doctrine differs, the laws, regulations, instructions, and policies take
precedence.
ATP 5-19 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both
the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 5-19 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked
with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Terms for which ATP 5-19 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in
the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent
publication follows the definition.
This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United
States, and United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.
The proponent and preparing agency for ATP 5-19 is the United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command. Send comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to
Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, ATCS-S
(ATP 5-19), 950 Jefferson Avenue, Fort Eustis, VA 23604-5700; by e-mail to
[Link] or submit an electronic DA Form
2028.

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 Introduction
In April 1998, FM 100-14 (now obsolete) introduced to the Army the first doctrinal publication on managing
risk. It detailed the application of a step-by-step process that would conserve combat power and resources.
In 2006, FM 5-19 (now obsolete) was released. This milestone publication improved and expanded the
doctrine to provide clear standards and guidance on how to apply the process for managing risk. The process,
then renamed composite risk management, was broadened to encompass all operations and activities, on and
off duty. ATP 5-19 retains the holistic approach that focuses on the composite risks from all sources, rather
than the traditional practice of separating accidents from tactical hazards and associated risks. With this ATP,
the holistic approach is better integrated into the Army’s decision-making processes. Integration and
education are mandated throughout the Soldier and Army Civilian’s career. The Army, as well as other
Services, has adopted the term risk management (RM) to align with joint terminology. The five steps of
RM—identify the hazards, assess the hazards, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement controls,
and supervise and evaluate—are used across the Services to help them operate as a joint force.
RM must be embedded in Army culture. Integrating RM into how we think is crucial to maintaining combat
power and ensuring efficient mission accomplishment. Proper use of this publication will support
standardization and institutionalization of techniques, tools, and procedures that lead to sound decision
making and valid risk acceptance by Army leaders at all levels. An Army leader is anyone who by virtue of
assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people by providing purpose, direction, and
motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. Army leaders motivate people both
inside and outside the chain of command toward action or to change their thinking when appropriate
(ADP 6-22). Engaged Army leaders are critical to successful RM.
The Army’s overarching framework for exercising command and control is the operations process—the
major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and
continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). Throughout the operations process, commanders and staffs
integrate the warfighting functions to synchronize the force in accordance with the commander’s intent and
concept of operations. Commanders and staffs use several integrating processes and continuing activities to
do this. RM is an integrating process. Army leaders first need to understand how RM generally fits into the
operations process. The operations process frames understanding of how RM is integrated with the more
complex decision-making processes. The five steps of RM follow a logical sequence that correlates with the
operations process activities (see introductory table-1). Steps 1 and 2 of RM normally have greatest emphasis
in the planning activity. Step 3 normally begins in planning and continues throughout the preparing activity.
The majority of step 4 normally occurs within the preparing and executing activities, with some continuing
emphasis in planning. Step 5 normally occurs during executing with some continuing emphasis in planning.
The assessment activity of the operations process is continuous. While the depiction in introductory table-1
is in a bar format, both processes are cyclical, fluid, and dynamic. Activities and steps can overlap or be
revisited during any operation.
Introductory table-1. Risk management in the operations process

Risk management steps Operations process activities

Step 1–Identify the hazards Planning
Assessing

Step 2–Assess the hazards Planning

Step 3–Develop controls and make risk decisions Planning and preparing
Step 4–Implement controls Planning, preparing, and executing
Step 5–Supervise and evaluate Planning and executing

Mission command is the Army’s approach to command and control. Commanders use mission orders to
enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the
conduct of unified land operations. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 v

Introduction

to be attained, not how they are to achieve them (ADP 6-0). The command and control warfighting function
is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat
power (ADP 3-0). RM is an integral part of both mission command and the command and control warfighting
function. RM is an invaluable tool for commanders and staff. It provides a systematic and standardized
process to identify hazards and react to changes within an operational environment.
All staff elements incorporate RM into their running estimates and provide recommendations for controls to
mitigate risk within their areas of expertise. RM integration during the operations process is the primary
responsibility of the unit’s protection officer or the operations officer. The commander has overall
responsibility for RM integration and is the risk acceptance authority.
This ATP emphasizes techniques for planning because a significant portion of RM must occur in the planning
activity. During planning, commanders, leaders, and individuals identify potential hazards and assess their
likely impact. Steps 1 and 2 of RM—identifying and assessing hazards—provide a structure to enhance
situational understanding and support developing sound courses of action and plans. Then, planners can state
how forces will accomplish a mission within a predetermined level of risk. Making optimal use of planning
time is essential for effective RM. The more thorough the planning, the more contingencies can be ready for
implementation. During preparation, leaders balance the risks (such as readiness, political, economic, and
environmental risks) against the costs of each course of action. At the same time, planners develop actions
that mitigate risk (controls), and leaders make risk decisions to eliminate unnecessary risks. Commanders,
leaders, and individuals should continually assess the risk level and effectiveness of controls throughout
execution. They should supervise the risk-related activities for which they are responsible and monitor other
activities directly affecting risk during operations. Any time or reason risk levels appear to rise or new hazards
occur, commanders and leaders should be prepared to order adjustments to activities, including the actions
that mitigate risk. Army leaders use continuous assessments to make adjustments. These cyclical processes
support making adjustments where and when needed. RM practitioners capture lessons learned to benefit
current and future operations.
This ATP focuses on the application of RM to troop leading procedures and the military decision-making
process. Chapter 1 emphasizes principles, levels, and steps of RM applicable to both. Chapter 2 outlines
general RM responsibilities of Army organizations, leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians. Chapter 3 explains
RM techniques in the context of troop leading procedures. Chapter 4 explains RM techniques in the context
of the military decision-making process. Appendix A illustrates the use of DD Form 2977 (Deliberate Risk
Assessment Worksheet).
This is a revision of ATP 5-19, dated April 2014. There have been many changes throughout the publication.
Major changes include—
 Alignment with current Army and joint doctrine.
 Addition of specific colors associated with risk levels.
 Updated examples of products used during the integration of risk management.

Unless specified otherwise, any mention of leaders refers to Army leaders. To avoid wordiness, the phrase
RM practitioners is used to encompass all individuals and organizations that use RM. This publication uses
the term operations to refer any type of military action or event, including operational, tactical, service,
training, or administrative military missions.
Introductory table-2 lists Army doctrinal terms that this manual has assumed proponency of, as well as non-
doctrinal terms used extensively within this publication.

vi ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Introduction

Introductory table-2. Army terms

Army terms Remarks
risk ATP 5-19 creates the new term and definition. Formerly a joint term.
control ATP 5-19 maintains proponency.
exposure ATP 5-19 maintains proponency.
probability ATP 5-19 maintains proponency.
risk decision ATP 5-19 maintains proponency.
risk tolerance ATP 5-19 maintains proponency.
severity ATP 5-19 maintains proponency.
level of risk Used based on plain English; not a defined term.
residual risk Used based on plain English; not a defined term.

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 Chapter 1
Foundations of Risk Management

This chapter begins by introducing principles of risk management. It continues with a

discussion of the levels of risk management and then concludes with the steps of risk
management.

PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT

1-1. Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance
risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). The Army uses risk management (RM) to help maintain combat
power while ensuring mission accomplishment in current and future operations. RM applies to operations
and to nonoperational activities.

Note. For information on RM application to nonoperational activities, see AR 385-10.

1-2. RM is the Army’s process for helping organizations and individuals make informed decisions to reduce
or offset risk. Using this process increases operational effectiveness and the probability of mission
accomplishment. It is a systematic way of identifying hazards, assessing them, and managing the associated
risks. Risk management is a primary task of the protection warfighting function (see ADP 3-37 for more
information on protection). Commanders, staffs, Army leaders, Soldiers, and Army Civilians integrate RM
into all planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of operations. The process applies to all types of
operations, tasks, and activities. Commanders ensure first-line supervisors apply the process where it has the
greatest impact. Individuals should also use the process for off-duty activities. Threat(s) are any combination
of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States
national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). The location, abilities, intent, and so forth, of a threat will
create specific conditions; these conditions are considered hazards within this publication. See paragraph 1-
17 for more information on hazards.
1-3. All members of the Army Profession apply RM: commanders and staffs, Army leaders, Soldiers, and
Civilians. This text adopts the phrase RM practitioners to include all individuals and organizations that use
RM to mitigate or eliminate risk. RM practitioners need not be formally trained in the RM integration process,
tools, and techniques in order to apply these steps.
1-4. RM outlines a disciplined approach to express a risk level in terms readily understood at all echelons.
Except in time-constrained situations, planners complete the process in a deliberate manner—systematically
applying all the steps and recording the results on the prescribed form, DD Form 2977 (Deliberate Risk
Assessment Worksheet). See Appendix A for examples of this form. Organizations develop data and use
charts, codes, and numbers to analyze probability and standardize the analysis of risk. They use this
standardization to manage risk in a logical and controlled manner over time. However, the five-step process
is compatible with intuitive and experience-based decision making. In time-constrained conditions,
commanders, staffs, leaders, Soldiers, and Civilians use judgment to apply RM steps and principles.
1-5. The principles of RM are—
 Integrate RM into all phases of missions and operations.
 Make risk decisions at the appropriate level.
 Accept no unnecessary risk.
 Apply RM cyclically and continuously.

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Chapter 1

INTEGRATE RISK MANAGEMENT INTO ALL PHASES OF MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1-6. Army forces must integrate RM throughout planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities.
Army units should use RM for on- and off-duty activities. Commanders must emphasize RM in planning
processes; they must dedicate sufficient time and other resources to RM during planning to ensure Army
forces manage risk effectively throughout all phases of missions and operations.

MAKE RISK DECISIONS AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL

1-7. A risk decision is a commander, leader, or individual’s determination to accept or not accept the
risk(s) associated with an action he or she will take or will direct others to take. RM is only effective
when the specific information about hazards and risks is passed to the appropriate level of command for a
risk decision. Subordinates must pass specific risk information up the chain of command. Conversely, the
higher command must provide subordinates making risk decisions or implementing controls with the
established risk tolerance—the level of risk the responsible commander is willing to accept. RM
application must be inclusive; those executing an operation and those directing it participate in an integrated
process.
1-8. In the context of RM, a control is an action taken to eliminate a hazard or to reduce its risk. If a
commander, Army leader, or any individual responsible for executing a task determines that the controls
available will not reduce risk to a level within the risk tolerance, that person must elevate the risk decision to
the next level in the chain of command. The approval authority should have the resources to implement the
controls and the authority to make the risk decision. Commanders disseminate the policy that establishes
clear approval authority for risk decision making, whether that authority is based on a command risk policy,
an Army or local regulation, or another source. Commanders establish local policies and regulations if
appropriate.

ACCEPT NO UNNECESSARY RISK

1-9. An unnecessary risk is any risk that, if taken, will not contribute meaningfully to mission
accomplishment or will needlessly endanger lives or resources. Army leaders accept only a level of risk in
which the potential benefit outweighs the potential loss. The process of weighing risks against opportunities
and benefits helps to maximize unit capability, save lives, and preserve resources. The appropriate level of
command makes risk acceptance decisions after applying RM and weighing potential gain against potential
loss. Commanders need not be risk averse. Forces may undertake even high-risk endeavors when
commanders determine that the sum of the benefits exceeds the sum of the costs. Commanders establish the
basis for risk acceptance decisions through RM.

APPLY RISK MANAGEMENT CYCLICALLY AND CONTINUOUSLY

1-10. RM is a cyclical and continuous five-step process, applied across all Army operations (including
training), individual and collective day-to-day activities and events, and base operations functions. RM
practitioners use this cyclical process (illustrated in figure 1-1) to identify and assess hazards; develop,
choose, implement, and supervise controls; and evaluate outcomes as conditions change.

APPLICATION LEVELS OF RISK MANAGEMENT

1-11. Army leaders use judgment to manage risk based on the situation. They approach RM at the appropriate
application level, using a deliberate approach or a real-time approach. The main factor that differentiates the
approach is the amount of time available for planning. A deliberate approach is more analytical but takes
more time; a real-time approach is more intuitive and tends to take less time. Regardless of the amount of
time available, Army forces manage risk throughout the operations process using the five steps of RM.

DELIBERATE RISK MANAGEMENT

1-12. Deliberate RM refers to situations in which ample time is available to apply the five-step process as
part of detailed planning for an operation. At this level, commanders, staff, Army leaders, and individuals
apply RM steps and principles analytically. Deliberate RM is most effective when done in a group. The joint

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 Foundations of Risk Management

operation planning process illustrates ways to integrate RM into planning at the deliberate application level
(see JP 5-0 for more information on joint operation planning). Other examples of deliberate RM include
integrated planning of unit missions, tasks, or events; review of standard operating, maintenance, or training
procedures; recreational activities; and the development of damage control and emergency response plans.
The discussion in this chapter emphasizes deliberate RM.

Figure 1-1. A cyclical, continuous process for managing risk

REAL-TIME RISK MANAGEMENT

1-13. Army forces plan for all anticipated risks, but during execution, new risks can arise unexpectedly.
Real-time RM refers to immediate management of hazards as they occur, usually during execution of an
operation or performance of a task. In time-constrained conditions, intuitive decision making tends to replace
deliberate planning. Soldiers may only have time for a quick mental or verbal assessment of the new or
changing situation. Real-time RM and deliberate RM have the same foundation. Leaders must master the
principles and steps of RM. They must practice applying them during planning and execution in time-
constrained situations so real-time RM becomes second nature.

STEPS OF RISK MANAGEMENT

1-14. The five steps of RM are—
 Step 1–Identify the hazards.
 Step 2–Assess the hazards.
 Step 3–Develop controls and make risk decisions.
 Step 4–Implement controls.
 Step 5–Supervise and evaluate.

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 1-3

Chapter 1

1-15. Steps 1 and 2 of RM are assessment steps—risk assessment is the identification and assessment of
hazards (first two steps of risk management process) (JP 3-26). Steps 3 through 5 of RM are management
steps (see figure 1-2).
1-16. The goal of the process is managing risk. However, to manage risk, RM practitioners must first identify
and assess hazards. It is preferable to divide complex missions into subtasks and then identify and assess
hazards and manage risk for each subtask.

Figure 1-2. Assessment steps and management steps

STEP 1—IDENTIFY THE HAZARDS

1-17. A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or
loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Hazards create the potential for harmful
events that can cause degradation of capabilities or mission failure. Hazards lead to risk whenever people
interact with equipment or their environment. Hazards exist in all types of environments and activities—
including combat, stability, base support, training, garrison activities, and off-duty activities. An approach to
identifying a hazard is to consider how the condition can lead to a sequence of specific events or an accident-
loss scenario.
1-18. An accident-loss scenario consists of three elements—source, mechanism, and outcome—that expand
on the description of the hazard. The source, or cause, is a condition (such as a wet roadway) that is a
prerequisite to a mishap. The mechanism, or effect, is how the source manifests itself (such as by a vehicle
hydroplaning). The outcome, or undesired event, is the result of the mechanism occurring due to the source
being present (such as the vehicle leaving the roadway and striking a tree). To determine original hazard
(sometimes known as the root hazard or root cause), RM practitioners consider system inadequacies in areas
such as support, standards, and training, or leadership and individual failures. For example, tripping is not
considered a hazard because another condition or circumstance caused the fall. To identify the hazard, the
RM practitioner must ask why a person would trip in a certain location. Repeated questioning should lead to
the logical answer. When there is no longer a logical answer to the question, the original hazard has been
identified.

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 Foundations of Risk Management

1-19. Mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available,
and civil considerations (METT-TC)—serve as a standard format for identifying hazards, on- or off-duty.
The factors of METT-TC are institutionalized in the Army. They are part of the common knowledge imparted
through the Army’s professional military education and the Civilian education system. Some other resources
and tools support the identification of hazards include—
 Experience and other experts.
 Regulations, manuals, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and policies.
 Accident data.
 War-gaming what-if scenarios.
 Data from risk assessment matrixes.
 Readiness assessments.
 Cause and effect diagrams.
 Change analysis.
 Energy trace and barrier analysis.
 Logic diagrams.
 Mapping techniques.
 Training assessments.
 After action reviews (AARs).

1-20. Mission variables, also called the factors of METT-TC, are used primarily as part of the military
decision-making process (MDMP) or troop leading procedures (TLP) for planning operations. In addition,
they provide a pattern for addressing threat-based and accident-based hazards and associated risk for any
activities, on- or off-duty.

Mission
1-21. The nature of the mission may imply specific hazards and risks. Some missions are inherently more
dangerous. Army leaders look for hazards associated with the complexity of plans and orders from higher
headquarters, such as a particularly complex scheme of maneuver. The use of a fragmentary order in lieu of
a detailed operation order or operation plan may also increase risk due to the possibility of misunderstanding
mission guidance. Hazardous off-duty activities may include sporting or recreational activities or various
means of travel. Junior leaders have a particularly important role in making assessments that address the
behavior of individuals under their supervision.

Enemy
1-22. Commanders look for enemy presence or capabilities that pose hazards and risks to operations by
leveraging surveillance and reconnaissance activities, as well as aspects of the intelligence warfighting
function such as information collection and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (known as IPB).
Commanders must use this information to evaluate what the enemy or outside influences could do to defeat
or spoil an operation. Information collection and intelligence preparation of the battlefield supports threat-
based risk assessments by identifying opportunities and any constraints the operational environment offers
to both enemy and friendly forces. These informational tools help develop a picture of enemy capabilities
and vulnerabilities.

Terrain and Weather

1-23. Whether planning an operation or taking leave outside of the local area, Army leaders should include
the aspect of terrain. The factors of observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key and decisive
terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment are used to identify and assess hazards affecting operations.
Pre-trip and pre-combat inspection checklists are useful in making assessments associated with activities
before executing an operation or performing a task. Common terrain hazards are elevation, altitude, road size
and surfaces, curves, grades, and traffic density.

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Chapter 1

1-24. Weather can also create specific hazards and risks. Common weather hazards are cold, ice, snow, rain,
fog, heat, humidity, wind, dust, visibility, and illumination. Army leaders and individuals assess these factors
for activities both on- and off-duty.

Troops and Equipment

1-25. When assessing risk during operations, the variable troops is used to identify hazards and risks
associated with the level of training, staffing, and equipment maintenance and condition. This factor also
includes hazards related to morale, availability of supplies, and services. Moreover, it includes hazards related
to the physical and emotional health of each individual.
1-26. For identifying hazards during activities not part of operations, the troops variable can include Soldiers,
their dependents, Army Civilians, and other people inside or outside the activity. Examples of hazards include
intoxicated drivers, sexual assault, domestic violence, substance abuse, sexually transmitted diseases, and
other behavioral or medical factors that could affect mission readiness.

Time
1-27. To avoid or mitigate the hazards and risks associated with limited time for planning, commanders
should allow subordinate commands two-thirds of the available planning time. Subordinate commands need
adequate planning and preparation time to develop and implement controls. Insufficient time for planning or
preparation may lead to accepting greater risk. (For activities not directly related to operations, insufficient
planning or preparation time usually results from haste rather than availability.)

Civil Considerations
1-28. The variable civil considerations expands the consideration of hazards and risks to include those that
a tactical task may pose to the civilian populace and noncombatants in the area of operations. It includes the
critical requirement to protect civilians. The objective is to reduce collateral damage to civilians and
noncombatants. In addition, the presence of a large civilian population and its day-to-day activities create
hazards during operations. High civilian traffic densities may present hazards to convoys and maneuver
schemes. Moreover, planners must assess such diverse elements as insurgents, riots, and criminal activity.
Legal, regulatory, or policy considerations may introduce hazards that affect operations and other activities.
Commanders and staffs also must weigh the importance of protecting civilians from violence during
operations.

STEP 2—ASSESS THE HAZARDS

1-29. To assess hazards, RM practitioners consider how identified hazards (conditions) could lead to harmful
events and how those events would affect operations. They envision the potential for the events and their
predictable effects. When hazards are assessed and risk levels are assigned, the resulting analysis is a
measurement of risk—probability and severity driven chance of loss, caused by threat or other hazards.
Risk levels reflect a combination of the probability of occurrence and the severity of the adverse impact.
Probability and severity are independent measures of hazards. In other words, estimating probability has no
direct relationship to estimating severity.

Probability and Severity Defined

1-30. In the context of RM, probability is the likelihood an event will occur; it is assessed as frequent,
likely, occasional, seldom, or unlikely. Severity is the expected consequences of an event in terms of
injury, property damage, or other mission-impairing factors; it is assessed as catastrophic, critical,
moderate, or negligible. A risk level is a type of score that assesses the odds (probability) of something
going wrong and the effect (severity) of the incident when it occurs.

Risk Levels
1-31. Planners assess hazards (the conditions and the events that could result)—and assign associated risk
levels—during mission analysis; course of action (COA) development; COA analysis; and the orders

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 Foundations of Risk Management

production, dissemination, and transition steps of the MDMP. Commanders and staff must consider aspects
directly or indirectly related to the mission that could affect risk during operations. The result of this
assessment is an initial estimate of a risk level for each identified hazard, expressed as—
 Extremely high.
 High.
 Medium.
 Low.
Planners determine the level of risk by using the risk assessment matrix (illustrated in table 1-1).
1-32. Planners apply three substeps in step 2, using the risk assessment matrix:
 Estimate the probability of a harmful event or occurrence from a hazard.
 Estimate the expected severity of an event or occurrence.
 Determine the level of risk for the estimated probability and severity.

Table 1-1. Risk assessment matrix

First Substep of Step 2—Estimate the Probability of an Occurrence

1-33. Probability is an estimate, based on the information known about the hazard and on the hazard-related
occurrences experienced by others in similar situations. The RM practitioner estimates the probability levels
of harmful events occurring for each hazard, taking into account all relevant factors— including the mission,
scheme of maneuver, and frequency of similar occurrences. Probability estimates take into account the
current situation and previous similar situations. For the purpose of RM, the five levels of probability are—
 Frequent (A).
 Likely (B).
 Occasional (C).
 Seldom (D).
 Unlikely (E).

Frequent
1-34. Probability is assessed as frequent if a harmful occurrence is known to happen continuously, regularly,
or inevitably because of exposure. Exposure is the frequency and length of time personnel and equipment
are subjected to a hazard or hazards. For example, given about 500 exposures, without proper controls, a

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harmful event will occur. Increased exposure—during a certain activity or over iterations of the activity—
increases risk. An example of frequent occurrence is a heat injury during a battalion physical training run,
with a category 5 heat index and nonacclimated Soldiers.

Likely
1-35. Probability is assessed as likely if a harmful occurrence is expected to happen several or numerous
times—the event commonly happens because of exposure. For example, given about 1,000 exposures,
without proper controls, the harmful event will occur at some point. Examples include detonation of
improvised explosive devices, wire strikes for aircraft, controlled flights into terrain, and unintentional
weapons discharges.

Occasional
1-36. Probability is assessed as occasional if a harmful occurrence is expected to happen sporadically or
intermittently because of exposure—the event is neither common nor uncommon. A unit may or may not
complete a deployment without the harmful event happening. Examples include unexploded ordnance
detonation and fratricide—the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly or neutral personnel by friendly
firepower (ADP 3-37).

Seldom
1-37. Probability is assessed as seldom when a harmful occurrence resulting from exposure is infrequent—
the event is remotely possible and could occur at some time. Usually, several things must go wrong at once
for the harmful event to happen. Examples include heat-related death in a temperate environment or
electrocution by low voltage.

Unlikely
1-38. Probability is assessed as unlikely if a harmful occurrence resulting from exposure is possible but
improbable. Planners assume it will not occur, but the occurrence is not impossible. Examples might include
detonation of containerized ammunition during transport.

Second Substep of Step 2—Estimate the Expected Severity of an Occurrence

1-39. A severity level is a prediction of the effects of a harmful event on combat power, mission capability,
or readiness. The severity level does not consider probability; severity is an estimate of the loss that would
follow the envisioned event. The RM practitioner estimates the level of severity for each anticipated
occurrence based on knowledge of the results of similar past occurrences. For the purpose of RM, severity is
assessed at one of four levels:
 Catastrophic (I).
 Critical (II).
 Moderate (III).
 Negligible (IV).

Catastrophic
1-40. Severity is estimated as catastrophic when consequences of an event, if it occurs, are expected to
include death, unacceptable loss or damage, mission failure, or the loss of unit readiness.

Critical
1-41. Severity is estimated as critical if the consequences of an event, if it occurs, are expected to include
severe injury, illness, loss, or damage; significantly degraded unit readiness; or significantly degraded
mission capability.

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Moderate
1-42. Severity is estimated as moderate if the consequences of an event, if it occurs, are expected to include
minor injury, illness, loss, or damage; degraded unit readiness; or degraded mission capability.

Negligible
1-43. Severity is estimated as negligible if the consequences of an event are expected to include minimal
injury, loss, or damage; little or no impact to unit readiness; or little or no impact to mission capability.
(Table 1-2 summarizes examples of catastrophic, critical, moderate, and negligible severity.)
Table 1-2. Levels of severity and examples of consequences
Level Sample consequences
Catastrophic  Complete mission failure or the loss of ability to accomplish a mission.
(I)  Death or permanent total disability.
 Loss of major or mission-critical systems or equipment.
 Major property or facility damage.
 Unacceptable collateral damage.
Critical  Significantly degraded mission capability or unit readiness.
(II)  Permanent partial disability or hospitalization of at least 3 personnel.
 Extensive major damage to equipment or systems.
 Significant damage to property or the environment.
 Significant collateral damage.
Moderate  Degraded mission capability or unit readiness.
(III)  Minor damage to equipment or systems, property, or the environment.
 Lost days due to injury or illness.
Negligible  Minimal injury or damage.
(IV)  Little or no impact to mission or unit readiness.
 First aid or minor medical treatment.
 Little or no property or environmental damage.

Third Substep of Step 2—Determine the Level of Risk

1-44. After identifying and analyzing hazards, RM practitioners determine the level of risk for each hazard.
Using the standard risk assessment matrix (table 1-1, page 1-7), practitioners assess the level of risk as
extremely high, high, medium, or low. To make this determination, they combine probability and severity
levels estimated for each hazard. The vertical axis on the left side of the risk assessment matrix (table 1-1)
shows severity, with the Roman numerals I through IV representing severity levels. The horizontal axis across
the top of the matrix shows probability, with the capital letters A through E representing probability levels.
Where each Roman numeral and capital letter intersects, the combination correlates with one of the four
levels of risk. The level of risk is not an absolute measure of the relative danger of a given operation, activity,
or event. Moreover, considerations for determining the initial level of risk include effects beyond the
immediate situation. The assessment of a level of risk in step 2 is an initial assessment; practitioners will
revise the level of risk when they complete step 3.

Extremely High Risk

1-45. Extremely high risk refers to expected loss of ability to accomplish the mission if exposure occurs
during operations. A determination of extremely high risk (sometimes recorded as EH) results from three
possible combinations of probability and severity. The first combination assessed as extremely high risk is a
probability estimate of frequent for an envisioned event that would have catastrophic consequences in terms
of severity (IA). The next involves a probability estimate of likely for an event that would have catastrophic
consequences (IB). The third combination is a probability estimate of frequent for an event expected to be of

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critical severity (IIA). For an assessment of extremely high risk, the consequences could extend beyond the
current operation. When a risk is assessed as extremely high, practitioners carefully weigh the potential loss
against the potential gain from continuing the COA. Black will normally be used if the practitioner desires
to represent extremely high risk with a color.

High Risk
1-46. High risk refers to significant degradation of mission capabilities in terms of the necessary standard,
inability to accomplish all parts of the mission, or inability to complete the mission to standard if exposure
occurs during operations. A determination of high risk (sometimes recorded as H) results from five possible
combinations of probability and severity. The first two combinations assessed as high risk involve envisioned
events for which the severity of the consequences would be catastrophic, and probability is estimated to be
occasional (IC) or seldom (ID). The next two combinations involve events for which severity would be
critical, and probability is estimated to be likely (IIB) or occasional (IIC). The final combination involves
events expected to have moderately severe consequences, with a probability estimate of frequent (IIIA). An
assessment of high risk implies that serious consequences will follow a hazardous event, if it occurs.
Commanders carefully weigh the risk against the potential gain of the COA. Red will normally be used if the
practitioner desires to represent high risk with a color.

Medium Risk
1-47. Medium risk refers to the expectation of degraded mission capabilities in terms of the necessary
standard and reduced mission capability if exposure occurs during operations. A determination of medium
risk (sometimes recorded as M) results from five possible combinations of probability and severity. The first
combination assessed as medium risk involves a probability estimate of unlikely for an event expected to
have catastrophic consequences (IE). The second is a probability estimate of seldom for an event expected
to have consequences of critical severity (IID). Additional combinations assessed as medium risk involve the
expectation of moderately severe consequences for events with probability estimates of likely (IIIB) or
occasional (IIIC). Finally, an event that would cause negligible loss with a probability estimate of frequent
(IVA) is assessed as medium risk. Yellow or amber will normally be used if the practitioner desires to
represent medium risk with a color.

Low Risk
1-48. Low risk refers to expected losses that would have little or no impact on accomplishing the mission. A
determination of low risk (sometimes recorded as L) results from seven possible combinations of probability
and severity. The first combination assessed as low risk involves a probability estimate of unlikely for an
event that would have consequences of critical severity (IIE). The next combinations are events expected to
have consequences of moderate severity, with probability estimates of seldom (IIID) or unlikely (IIIE).
Finally, events expected to have consequences of negligible severity, with probability estimates of likely or
below (IVB, IVC, IVD, or IVE), are assessed as low risk. Either the event that would cause injury, damage,
or illness is not expected, or losses would be minor and would have no long-term effect. Green will normally
be used if the practitioner desires to represent low risk with a color.

STEP 3—DEVELOP CONTROLS AND MAKE DECISIONS

1-49. In step 3, RM practitioners develop and consider options for controls. During control development,
they consider the mitigating effects of the proposed controls. They reassess the initial level of risk and
determine a residual level of risk (risk after controls are implemented). RM practitioners continue developing
control options, considering their mitigating effects, and reassessing risk until they have determined the most
effective controls. The responsible commander at the appropriate echelon determines the risk tolerance for
the situation. The responsible commander makes risk decisions—to accept or not accept the risk (see
paragraphs 1-7 and 1-8)—based on the residual risk level. For example, the controls, when implemented, are
expected to reduce the residual risk levels from medium to low or from high to medium. Commanders must
always determine that the potential benefits of the action outweigh the potential cost.

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First Substep of Step 3—Develop Controls

1-50. After assessing each hazard, Army leaders or individuals develop one or more controls that either
eliminate the hazard or reduce the risk (probability and severity of loss) from a harmful occurrence. In
developing controls, Army leaders must consider the reason for the hazard, not just the hazard in isolation.
Controls can take many forms but normally fall into one of three categories:
 Educational controls.
 Physical controls.
 Hazard elimination controls.

Educational (Awareness) Controls

1-51. Educational controls are based on the knowledge and skills of units, organizations, or individuals. They
include awareness of the hazard and control. Effective educational controls are implemented through
individual and collective training that ensures performance to standard.

Physical Controls
1-52. Physical controls take the form of barriers and guards or signs to warn individuals, units, or
organizations that a hazard exists. Special controller or oversight personnel also fall into this category.

Hazard Elimination Controls

1-53. Hazard elimination controls include positive actions to prevent exposure through substantial reduction
or the total elimination of the hazard. The three methods of control implementation, in order of preference,
are—
 Engineering.
 Administrative.
 Personal protective equipment (PPE).

1-54. The preferred method is to control the hazard at its source, through engineering. Engineering is
preferable because, unlike other controls, it generally focuses on the individual who is exposed. The concept
behind engineering controls is that, to the extent feasible, engineers or Army units design the equipment or
work environment and the task to eliminate hazards or to reduce exposure.
1-55. If engineering cannot eliminate the hazard, units apply administrative measures aimed at reducing
exposure. Examples include additional relief workers, exercise breaks, and rotation of workers. Normally,
units use administrative controls in conjunction with others that more directly prevent exposure or control
hazards.
1-56. When units cannot eliminate exposure during normal operations or maintenance work through
engineering, and when safe work practices and other forms of administrative controls cannot provide
sufficient protection, a supplementary method of controls is the use of PPE. PPE may also be appropriate for
controlling hazards while units install engineering and administrative controls. Using PPE requires hazard
awareness and training on the part of the user. Individuals must be aware that the equipment does not
eliminate the hazard. If the equipment fails, exposure will occur. Individuals ensure equipment fits. They
maintain equipment in a clean and serviceable condition to reduce the possibility of failure. They document
the maintenance of PPE.

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Criteria for Effective Controls

1-57. Effective controls meet the eight criteria of effectiveness (see descriptions in table 1-3):
 Feasibility.
 Acceptability.
 Suitability.
 Support.
 Explicitness.
 Standards.
 Training.
 Leadership.
 The individual.

Table 1-3. Criteria for effective controls

Criteria Description
Feasibility The unit has the capability to implement the control.
Acceptability The benefit gained by implementing the control justifies the cost in resources and time.
The assessment of acceptability is largely subjective. Past experience, the commander’s
guidance, or other external restrictions influence the assessment.
Suitability The control removes the hazard or mitigates the risk to an acceptable level.
Support Adequate personnel, equipment, supplies, and facilities necessary to implement the
control are available.
Explicitness The control clearly specifies who, what, where, when, why, and how each control will be
used.
Standards Guidance and procedures for implementing the control are clear, practical, and specific.
Training Knowledge and skills of personnel are adequate to implement the control.
Leadership Army leaders are ready, willing, and able to enforce standards necessary to implement
the control.
The Individual personnel are sufficiently self-disciplined and capable of implementing the
individual control.

Sources of Controls
1-58. RM practitioners have many sources of controls available to them, they include:
 Regulations
 Accident data from the United States Army Combat Readiness Center.
 Center for Army Lessons Learned.
 Safety program records.
 AARs, including previously used RM worksheets.
 Personal experience.
 SOPs.
 Tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Examples of Controls
1-59. Whether conducting deliberate or real-time risk assessment, RM practitioners identify all essential
aspects of controls precisely—including who, what, when, where, and how. Table 1-4 shows examples of
preliminary documentation identifying who, what, when, where, and how for sample hazards and controls.
RM practitioners completing DD Form 2977 must, at a minimum, document the what, who, and how aspects
on the form.

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Table 1-4. Examples of hazards and controls

Hazard Control
Who: Supervisors, Army leaders, drivers, operators.
What: Ensures loads are secured in accordance with load plans and
applicable manuals or publications.
Unsecured or unstable loads Where: In the assembly area.
When: Before vehicle is allowed to leave.
How: Emphasize cargo center of gravity, ammunition, and
pyrotechnics.
Who: Supervisors, Army leaders, drivers, operators.
What: Inspect and correct unsafe conditions.
Unsecured hatches or ramps Where: In the assembly area or motor park.
When: Before executing operations (during preparation).
How: Secure with locking pin or latch devices.
Who: Supervisors, Army leaders, drivers, operators.
What: Position is no higher than nametag defilade unless engaging
Unsecured crew or passengers targets; all persons wear seatbelts or harnesses as appropriate;
exposed during operations on equipment is stowed and secured according to load plans.
rough terrain (tracked vehicles) Where: In the assembly area or motor park.
When: Before and during operations (preparation and execution).
How: Spot-check vehicles and crews.
Who: Supervisors, Army leaders, drivers, operators.
What: Establish and enforce standards; train vehicle operators to
pass other vehicles only at safe places and times while considering
road visibility and traffic conditions.
Improper passing Where: In assembly areas and vehicle staging areas.
When: Train operators and drivers before licensing; brief operators
and drivers during preparation (before execution).
How: Verify training and licensing of drivers and operators; enforce
standards.
Who: Supervisors, Army leaders, drivers, operators, Soldiers.
What: Establish and enforce standards for operation of vehicles in
congested areas (bivouac sites, forward operating bases,
maintenance areas, assembly areas, and battle positions).
Where: Assembly areas, motor parks.
Improper ground guiding
When: Before licensing drivers and operators; before deployments or
exercises.
How: Require use of ground guides while operating in limited
visibility, backing vehicles, moving vehicles in bivouac, and
conducting maintenance; and during assembly and battle positions.

Residual Level of Risk

1-60. After RM practitioners identify effective controls, they return to the risk assessment matrix (see
table 1-1, page 1-7) to determine the residual level of risk for each hazard and the overall residual risk for the
operation. They should continue analyzing the hazards and proposing options to reduce or eliminate risks
until they have identified the most effective controls (see criteria in table 1-3, page 1-12). A given hazard’s
initial risk level may be lowered several levels through the implementation of planned controls. For example,
a hazard with an initial risk of extremely high and highly effective controls emplaced may be lowered to a
residual level of medium. The appropriate level of command must approve the mission, making a final risk
decision based on the residual level of risk. Planners should sort hazards and controls under consideration
according to residual risk, placing the highest risk hazards first. This allows decision makers at the

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appropriate level of command to identify the highest risk hazards easily. Decision makers should keep in
mind that the residual level of risk is valid (true) only if forces implement the controls.
1-61. As RM practitioners continue identifying options for controls, they continue reassessing hazards. They
may find that some proposed controls do not significantly lower the risk level of a given hazard. However,
they should implement controls that provide even slight benefits if those benefits outweigh the costs.
1-62. The overall residual level of risk for a mission combines the residual level of risk for all identified
hazards. The residual level for each hazard may differ. The overall residual level for the mission will be equal
to or higher than the highest residual level for each hazard. The responsible individual must consider the
number and type of hazards present. In some cases, for example, a commander may determine that the overall
residual level of risk is higher than any one hazard. The assessment could be based on a number of lower risk
hazards, if in combination they present a higher risk. For example, commanders may determine that a mission
risk assessment should have medium risk level even when all hazards have a low residual level. Based on the
complexity of required controls and the potential synergistic effect of all hazards, a commander may
determine the level of risk for a mission is high when the residual level for the individual hazards ranges
from low to medium.

Note. While mathematics and analytical tools are helpful, Soldiers always need to apply sound
judgment. Technical competency, operational experience, and lessons learned weigh higher than
any set of alphanumeric codes.

Second Substep of Step 3—Make Risk Decisions

1-63. The purpose of RM is to provide a basis for individuals and leaders to make sound and informed risk
decisions. To make those decisions, they must know the established risk tolerance and the potential gain.
Ultimately, commanders are responsible for determining the risk tolerance within the command and for
making risk decisions for operations, missions, or tasks. The appropriate level commander or other leader
must make risk decisions about specific hazards and controls, consistent with risk tolerance guidance.
Decision makers must balance risk against expected gains. When Soldiers are off duty, a risk decision may
be a personal one. Individuals use RM to evaluate hazards, mitigate risks, and weigh costs versus benefits of
an action both on and off duty. (For further guidance on the appropriate risk acceptance authority and
nonoperational RM integration, see AR 385-10. In addition, Soldiers should consult local regulations, SOPs,
or other command policy.)

STEP 4—IMPLEMENT CONTROLS

1-64. Soldiers normally implement controls during the preparation activities of the operations process. Army
leaders establish how the controls will be implemented and who will manage them. They ensure selected
controls are translated into briefings and curricula and then integrated with training. They direct trainers to
develop practical training solutions. They ensure units receive safety equipment and instructions on its use.
Army leaders ensure subordinates fully understand and implement the controls. They ensure the implemented
controls are maintained to standard. Examples of ways to disseminate guidance and ensure implementation
of controls include—
 Overlays and graphics.
 Drills for vehicle and aircraft silhouette identification.
 Rehearsals and battle drills.
 Refresher training on intensive threat and friendly vehicle identification for all anti-armor and air
defense weapons crews.
 Installation and maintenance of communications links for key civilian organizations.
 Operation of convoys with a prescribed minimum number of vehicles.
 Provisions to carry weapons and wear body armor and helmets when outside secure compounds.
 Mishap awareness, safety briefings, and warnings.

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STEP 5—SUPERVISE AND EVALUATE

1-65. Primarily, step 5 involves ensuring that controls are implemented and performed to standard. RM
practitioners apply this step to validate that selected controls support achieving the end state. They identify
weaknesses of controls and make changes or adjustments based on performance or changing situations,
conditions, or events. However, supervision and evaluation are not limited to controls. Like other steps of
RM, supervision and evaluation must occur throughout all phases of any operation or activity. RM
practitioners supervise and evaluate all aspects of RM continuously.

First Substep of Step 5—Supervise

1-66. Supervision is a primary means of regulating forces. Step 5 fully integrates supervision into RM.
Higher level leaders ensure lower level leaders responsible for implementing controls understand their
responsibilities. They ensure subordinates understand how, when, and where to implement controls. Leaders
supervise and monitor controls. They verify implementation and make sure controls remain in place.
1-67. Situational understanding is a critical component of RM when identifying hazards. Situational
understanding is equally important in supervision. Leaders ensure that complacency, deviation from
standards, or violations of policies and controls are not allowed to threaten success. They ensure Soldiers
monitor factors such as fatigue, equipment serviceability and availability, and the weather and environment.
If they identify more hazards during operations, they can propose controls to eliminate or mitigate them.
Commanders and leaders exercise supervision to maintain situational understanding. This helps them
anticipate, identify, and assess any new hazards and develop or modify controls as necessary.
1-68. An extraordinary degree of discipline is needed to avoid complacency from boredom and
overconfidence when personnel are performing repetitive tasks. Individuals are inclined to neglect controls
used for a prolonged period. For example, when units first begin performing stability tasks, the hazards posed
by improvised explosive devices are readily identified, and controls established and enforced. However, over
time and with success (no accidents or incidents) complacency may set in. When this happens, established
controls lose their effectiveness. The threat of terrorism is another example. When individuals live or operate
in an area not considered a high threat area, or when they operate in a high threat area for an extended period
without incident, their vigilance and situational awareness tend to wane. Other examples of long-term hazards
include climatic extremes; chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material; contaminated waste; or
diseases common to an area of operations.

Second Substep of Step 5—Evaluate

1-69. RM practitioners conduct evaluation during all phases and activities of operations, including after
AARs and other assessments at the end of an operation. Evaluation supports several goals, including but not
limited to—
 Determining if risk levels changed during operations.
 Adapting to changes in the situation.
 Monitoring effectiveness of controls.
 Making corrections to control implementation.
 Improving the application of RM principles in current and future operations. (See additional
examples in table 1-5 on page 1-16.)

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Table 1-5. Evaluation goals

Sample goals Specific examples
Identify hazards not already Consider changes in personnel, equipment, the environment, or the
identified during the initial risk mission that affect the initial risk assessment. Reassess the
assessment, or identify hazards controls.
that evolved during an operation,
mission, event, or activity.
Assess effectiveness in supporting Did the controls positively or negatively affect training or mission
operational goals and objectives. accomplishment? Did the controls align with doctrine (principles,
tactics, techniques, and procedures)?
Assess the implementation, How well was information about how to implement the controls
execution, and communication of communicated? Did all who needed to know about them get the
the controls. message? Were adequate training and safety equipment provided?
Assess the accuracy of residual Were the residual levels of risk on the worksheet correct? Did the
levels of risk and the effectiveness controls have the effects predicted? Why or why not?
of controls.
Take action to correct ineffective Improve communication, implementation, and execution in all
controls or respond to new practical ways possible, such as through briefings, training, or
hazards. equipment maintenance. If original risk assessments no longer suit
the situation or new hazards arise, perform new risk assessments.
Reevaluate risks and controls Initiate new risk assessments for new missions or circumstances.
when the resources, tasks, or
operational environment changes.
Ensure application of risk Did units integrate the process throughout all phases of the
management principles. operation? Were risk decisions accurate? Did the appropriate level
of command make the decisions? Were unnecessary risks taken? If
so, did the benefits outweigh the cost in dollars, training benefits,
and time?

Feedback
1-70. An evaluation by itself is not enough. Organizations must establish a feedback system to ensure
controls are, were, or will continue to be effective; any hazards identified during operations are analyzed;
and appropriate corrective action is taken. Feedback informs all involved as to the effectiveness of controls.
Organizations should collect data on RM efforts. RM practitioners can share feedback in the form of
briefings, lessons learned, reports, or benchmarking. Without feedback, Army leaders cannot know if
forecasts were accurate, contained minor errors, or were completely incorrect.

Tools and Techniques

1-71. Commanders, Army leaders, and individuals have responsibilities for supervision and evaluation of
operations and activities. Techniques may include pre-combat checks or pre-combat inspections, spot-checks,
situation reports, back-briefs, buddy checks, and close oversight.
1-72. AARs provide a forum for assessing the completed mission or operation. Soldiers conducting AARs
should include results on the effectiveness of RM with emphasis on assessing the controls. Maintain a copy
of the appropriate DD Form 2977 with AAR records in order to improve future mission effectiveness.
1-73. Based on evaluation and feedback on the effectiveness of RM during operations, practitioners develop
and disseminate lessons learned for incorporation into future plans, operations, and activities. Lessons learned
from RM—including DD Form 2977 and other RM worksheets—should be captured and retained for later
use.

Tracking and Documentation

1-74. To maintain continuity with mission tasks and requirements, organizations should track RM in a
standardized manner. They should use DD Form 2977 for all deliberate assessments. See Appendix A for
samples of DD Form 2977 and instructions on its use. Appendix A contains sample scenarios and examples

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of how to use the DD Form 2977 in various situations. In addition to providing an Army standard, continuous
use of this form reinforces effective RM. It helps commanders, Army leaders, and all individuals integrate
the five-step process into operations. Units can tailor additional tools to use RM information appropriately
for a particular operation, mission, activity, or event.

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 Chapter 2
Responsibilities

This chapter discusses responsibilities of Army organizations, commanders, executive

officers, chiefs of protection or operations officers, staffs, Army leaders, and
individuals.

ARMY ORGANIZATIONS
Army organizations at every level must understand and apply RM during all activities. The five-step
process—identify the hazards, assess the hazards, develop controls and make risk decisions, implement
controls, and supervise and evaluate—is most effective when used consistently, across all echelons.
Commanders, staff officers, Army leaders, individual Soldiers, and Army Civilians each contribute to the
mission. Within any organization, an individual’s responsibility for RM depends on the nature of the
operation or activity.
Army leaders at every level should require subordinates to integrate RM into operations. In Army
operations, making risk decisions is primarily the responsibility of commanders and Army leaders. At
battalion level and above, staffs support commanders. Staff officers must incorporate RM in their planning
and assessments. Organizations and individuals operate within the acceptable level of risk established by
their leaders—the risk tolerance—and provide feedback to them (see paragraphs 1-44 through 1-48 for risk
levels). (See FM 6-0 for fundamentals of staff organization, operations, duties, and responsibilities.)
Army leaders at every level should encourage subordinates to use RM for off-duty activities. In non-
tactical or off-duty activities, individuals are responsible to make risk decisions. However, commanders still
set parameters through SOPs, policy letters, and other guidance.

COMMANDERS
The commander’s responsibilities for RM are to—
 Ensure organizational elements are able to perform duties to standard and to minimize human
error, materiel failure, and environmental effects.
 Establish a force protection policy and publish a commander’s safety philosophy with realistic
safety goals, objectives, and priorities.
 Ensure the commander’s training assessment considers the protection requirements. Select and
ensure implementation of long-term, short-term, and near-term control actions to improve force
protection.
 Ensure individuals have the RM training needed for their position and responsibilities. (See the
United States Army Combat Readiness Center website, [Link] for a list of RM
and safety training resources.)
 Ensure the staff integrates RM into the planning, preparing, executing, and assessing of all
operations, and encourage RM use off-duty.
 Establish the overall risk tolerance within the command.
 Establish the risk tolerance for each mission—if not already set by the higher command.
 Make risk decisions, normally by approving risk assessment worksheets for tasks or missions.
 Select, monitor, and enforce implementation of controls for hazards likely to result in loss of
combat power.

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Chapter 2

 Elevate the risk decision to the higher command if the residual level of risk for a mission rises
above the risk tolerance established by the higher command, or if implemented controls fail to
keep the mission within the higher command’s risk tolerance.
 Provide appropriate guidance, and ensure adherence to the risk tolerance at all levels within the
command.
 Ensure organizations conducting AARs evaluate RM integration and effectiveness.
 Determine if unit performance meets force protection guidance. Determine effectiveness of
controls; make necessary changes to guidance and controls. Ensure changes are fed back into the
training management cycle and guidance for operations, including unit SOPs.

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS OR CHIEFS OF STAFF

The responsibilities of the executive officer or chief of staff for RM are to—
 Provide RM guidance and oversee the application of RM throughout staff direction and tasking.
 Facilitate and monitor RM staff coordination between command elements and echelons.
 Ensure quality and timeliness of staffing products for the commander, making decisions under the
commander’s guidance.
 In the absence of the commander, assume the commander’s responsibilities (see paragraph 2-4).

CHIEFS OF PROTECTION OR OPERATIONS OFFICERS

The chief of protection—or the operations staff officer in units without a protection cell—in
coordination with the safety officer or safety manager integrates RM into operations. In organizations with
organic professional safety personnel, the safety officer or safety manager, as part of the commander’s
personal staff, provides technical RM expertise to the commander and staff. Organizations without organic
safety personnel obtain this support from trained unit safety officers. The RM responsibilities for these staff
officers are to—
 Monitor the conduct of training and operations during execution, looking for variances from the
protection plan or scheme of protection. Advise the commander when they detect protection
activities that appear to be below standard.
 Understand, visualize, and identify protection priorities.
 Develop goals, objectives, and priorities for the command’s force protection policy.
 Develop protection measures of performance and effectiveness related to RM and safety input for
the commander’s training assessment, in collaboration with the safety officer or safety manager.
 Identify and assess hazards and propose controls for each COA during planning and preparation
for operations.
 Integrate and synchronize protection tasks and systems to increase the probability of mission
success.
 Incorporate mitigation measures to reduce operational risk to mission.
 Assess unit RM and force protection performance during training and operations. Provide
recommended changes to force protection guidance and controls.
 Capture lessons learned from RM. Retain worksheets for use during future operations.

STAFFS
A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable
(ADP 5-0). Each staff element is responsible for integrating RM into its running estimates and plans. The
staff responsibilities for RM are to—
 Provide RM support to meet operational requirements.
 Provide clear and practical procedures and standards for each task of the mission-essential task
list (known as METL).
 Provide necessary training for task performance to standard.

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 Responsibilities

 Identify force protection shortcomings and develop control actions.

 Apply the RM five-step process cyclically and continuously throughout operations.
 Develop and implement controls selected by the commander.

ARMY LEADERS
Leader responsibilities for RM are to—
 Enforce mission-essential task list task performance to standard. Adopt an incremental (crawl-
walk-run) approach in planning and executing training.
 Ensure all personnel are trained and competent in the integration of RM. Automated on- and off-
duty RM tools and surveys are available from the United States Army Combat Readiness Center
website, [Link]
 Implement and maintain the controls selected by the commander and assess their effectiveness.
Notify the higher command if, after implementing controls, the leader assesses the residual risk
level as above the risk tolerance (see paragraph 1-7). Leaders do not accept residual risk above the
risk tolerance set by their command.
 Apply and promote RM integration into all activities of the operations process.

INDIVIDUALS
The individual’s primary role in RM during operations is to support commanders and leaders by rapidly
identifying and communicating hazards and risks that arise and may affect the mission. This usually takes
the form of providing immediate feedback to the leader as the operation progresses and hazards are
encountered. During the performance of tasks, the individual becomes a primary source for actively
identifying, reporting, and assessing hazards. Depending on the context, short written messages, hand and
arm signals, or radio transmissions are effective means of communicating first-hand information to leaders.
There will be situations, however, when individuals or small groups must exercise individual initiative or
make risk decisions within the context of orders. All Soldiers and Army Civilians must understand how to
use the five-step process to enhance mission accomplishment and to reduce or eliminate loss.
All individuals should be alert for hazards and address them promptly. Individuals may not always be
responsible to prepare a DD Form 2977 or use a matrix. They will rely on and implement risk guidance from
their leaders to determine potential changes in the risk level. The most significant responsibility of individuals
is to be observant and report hazards or changes in risk level. To do this they must know the mission and
commander’s intent. The responsibilities of individuals are to—
 Sustain self-disciplined duty performance and personal conduct.
 Maintain and observe RM controls selected by the commander and leader.
 Use risk assessment tools provided online by the United States Army Combat Readiness Center,
as directed ([Link]
 Request support through the chain of command to implement or maintain controls beyond personal
capability.
 Adhere to RM procedures established by the command.

In operations, individuals rely on risk parameters established by commanders and Army leaders.
However, in off-duty situations, individuals must make their own risk decisions. All individuals should
understand the five-step process as a life skill applicable to their activities. The principles of RM are as
relevant in personal situations as they are in the military decision-making process or troop leading procedures.

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 Chapter 3
Application to Troop Leading Procedures

This chapter discusses planning considerations and risk management techniques for
troop leading procedures, focusing on risk management application by leaders of
company-size and smaller units. Then, it explains the rapid decision-making and
synchronization process in relation to risk management application.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR TROOP LEADING

PROCEDURES
3-1. Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission,
develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). TLP provide small-unit leaders a framework for
planning and preparation. Small unit leaders integrate RM during all Army operations. RM is integral to
planning and preparation. The RM principles and five-step process help leaders identify hazards, assess risk,
and make sound risk decisions.
3-2. The key difference between TLP and the MDMP is the time and staff resources available to perform
the process. The MDMP (discussed in Chapter 4) is used at command levels where staffs and time are
available to perform a thorough review and assessment. In the MDMP, commanders and staffs—usually at
battalion level and above—develop formal COAs and publish written orders. In contrast, unit leaders use
TLP to execute the plans and orders developed through the MDMP. Army leaders or commanders typically
use TLP with minimal support and limited time. The eight steps of TLP are—
 Step 1—Receive the mission.
 Step 2—Issue a warning order (WARNORD).
 Step 3—Make a tentative plan.
 Step 4—Initiate movement.
 Step 5—Conduct reconnaissance.
 Step 6—Complete the plan.
 Step 7—Issue the order.
 Step 8—Supervise and refine the plan.
Figure 3-1, page 3-2, depicts graphically how the RM steps can fit into and support TLP.
3-3. Normally, the first three steps (receive the mission, issue a WARNORD, and make a tentative plan) of
TLP occur in order. However, the sequence of subsequent steps is based on the situation. The tasks involved
in some steps (such as initiate movement and conduct reconnaissance) may occur several times. The last step,
supervise and refine the plan, occurs throughout operations. RM occurs continuously throughout operations,
with varying emphasis on different steps at different times. The supervision (during operations) and
evaluation (during and after operations) must feed back into the system (see figure 3-1, page 3-2). Through
feedback, leaders ensure corrections are made during the current operation and in future operations.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-1. Risk management steps correlated to troop leading procedures

3-4. The amount of time available to a commander or leader often dictates the level of detail that can go
into plans. Army leaders should attempt to provide lower level units two-thirds of the planning time available.
To maximize the time available, leaders often pass information in the form of WARNORDs to their
subordinates. This allows their subordinates to begin parallel planning of the TLP with the MDMP. Figure
3-2 depicts parallel planning correlated with RM. The type, amount, and timeliness of RM information passed
from higher to lower levels of command may have a significant effect on the level of detail used by lower
unit leaders.
3-5. The time between receiving the mission and initiating the WARNORD can significantly affect the time
available for a subordinate unit to conduct risk assessments and implement appropriate controls. While
battalion and higher level headquarters (HQ) have specialized staff sections conducting risk assessments,
companies and platoons may have only one or two people performing assessments. Higher level leaders
should provide subordinates sufficient time and details to conduct each of the five steps of RM. Particular
attention should be given to step 4 of RM (implement controls). Leaders need to ensure the proper person,
with adequate resources, is tasked with emplacing and maintaining controls. Aligning SOPs and ensuring
regular use may reduce the time needed for planning at each level. Commanders and staffs at all levels should
act on requests for information as quickly as possible to minimize planning delays at subordinate units.

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 Application to Troop Leading Procedures

Figure 3-2. Parallel planning correlated with risk management steps

WARNING ORDER
3-6. A WARNORD is a preliminary notice that provides subordinate commanders and leaders the
additional time to conduct assessments, perform parallel planning, and begin preparation in anticipation of a
coming mission. Under normal conditions, a battalion HQ will issue at least three WARNORDs to its
subordinate units. The first WARNORD is issued on receipt of the mission, the second on completion of the
mission analysis, and the third when a specific COA has been approved. Subordinate commanders and leaders
can expect to receive sufficient information in a WARNORD to initiate their preparation and assessments.
Figure 3-3, page 3-4, depicts examples of RM considerations for each WARNORD in this series.

First Warning Order

3-7. In the first WARNORD, commanders and leaders should expect broad, general information with
minimal risk guidance. This WARNORD may be a base order or it may simply take the form of a full overlay.
It may consist of a map with graphic control measures depicting controls (see paragraph 1-8) established by
the higher HQ. Army leaders should be alert to any controls that will require coordination with adjacent units.
The subordinate commander or leader must review this WARNORD carefully to determine specific actions
or implied tasks needed to implement these controls. Risk guidance normally is provided in paragraph 3.d.,
Coordinating Instructions.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-3. Information flow in warning orders

Second Warning Order

3-8. On completion of the mission analysis, Army leaders will issue the second WARNORD. Risk guidance
will be more detailed in this WARNORD. It may contain the results of the initial risk assessments prepared
during the mission analysis. Risk information in this order may consist of both graphic control measures and
mission tasks. These should address specific hazards and controls for the entire operation. Lower level
commanders and leaders must initiate immediate action to integrate this guidance into their planning. At this
time, the Army leader should begin to conduct a deliberate risk assessment and initiate any physical controls
directed by the higher HQ. Subsequent WARNORDs may follow, depending on the time available, mission
changes, and other factors.

Ongoing Risk Management and Warning Orders

3-9. RM is an ongoing and iterative process. It continues from the receipt of an initial WARNORD to the
receipt of the final operation order (OPORD). Information and assessments are continually revised and
updated to reflect the current situation. The process of receiving, distributing, revising, and updating the
hazards, risks, and controls for both threat (tactical) and hazard (accident) risk continue simultaneously until
the final order is issued. The key is to provide subordinates with the most current and complete information
pertaining to hazards and controls for the existing situation and all foreseeable contingencies. Commanders
and leaders at all levels must ensure that each successive WARNORD contains sufficient RM information to
help subordinate commanders and leaders with their planning and preparation for the operation. To be
effective, commanders and leaders must remain especially alert for those controls that require coordination
with adjacent and supporting units.

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 Application to Troop Leading Procedures

RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR TROOP LEADING

PROCEDURES
3-10. Paragraphs 3-11 through 3-30 detail some of the techniques for applying the five steps of RM to the
eight steps of TLP. Although RM is to be integrated into every step, the process is integrated most heavily in
the first four steps. Further, the basics of RM integration remain the same throughout the steps of the TLP.

STEP 1 OF TLP–RECEIVE THE MISSION

3-11. Commanders and leaders can receive a mission in several ways. These depend on the available time,
mission changes, and other factors of METT-TC. The WARNORD is a common vehicle used when time
permits. When the situation does not allow sufficient time for execution of another iteration of the TLP, a
fragmentary order (FRAGORD) to the previous OPORD may be used.

Situations with Adequate Planning Time

3-12. Risk assessments made when adequate time exists must be deliberate and detailed using DD Form
2977. This form should accompany the completed OPORD. It may be referenced in the various staff annexes.
Commanders and leaders may use the form to capture RM information from higher HQ and their own RM
data. Commanders and leaders will ensure their forces follow the risk tolerance and control guidance
established by higher HQ and detailed within the approved DD Form 2977. The DD Form 2977 is a stand-
alone document that identifies, explains, and clearly defines the RM aspects of the associated OPORD,
WARNORD, or FRAGORD.

Situations with Inadequate Planning Time

3-13. Battlefield dynamics within an operational environment often produce situations where immediate
decisions are required. Commanders and leaders often have little or no time to make a deliberate application
of RM. In these situations, they perform real-time risk assessments. A real-time risk assessment may be
performed mentally. It may be transmitted verbally or in writing via a FRAGORD. Figure 3-4, page 3-6,
shows an example of a real-time risk assessment passed from company to platoon level. Only the essential
information should be included in the FRAGORD. Include risk guidance from the commander. As in the
example, an overlay may be included with the risk assessment, to portray the location of hazards clearly. It
may be incorporated within a FRAGORD issued by the company to the platoon.

Conduct Initial Risk Assessment

3-14. At this point in the TLP, the commander or leader makes an initial risk assessment that compares the
potential for threat (tactical) and accidental hazards against the factors of METT-TC. It is important to search
actively for potential hazards that may arise during initial movement, performance, and consolidation
activities. RM information and guidance from the higher HQ must be included in this assessment.

Allocate the Available Time

3-15. During this step, commanders and leaders must estimate the available time to plan, prepare for, and
execute the operation. A reverse planning process is used to identify and allocate adequate time for all of the
major events of the operation. As a rule of thumb, leaders use one-third of the available time for their planning
and leave two-thirds of the time for subordinates to conduct their planning and preparation. It is especially
important that time estimates be realistic and as accurate as possible.

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Chapter 3

Figure 3-4. Example real-time risk assessment

STEP 2 OF TLP–ISSUE A WARNING ORDER

3-16. The WARNORD sequence and RM information in the order may be addressed in terms of its
applicability to the MDMP. Frequently, WARNORDs are given verbally with only a few notes and a graphic
overlay. Figure 3-5 provides an example of a platoon WARNORD with RM information included. The RM
information in this example is general and should be expanded as subsequent guidance is received from
higher HQ or as the situation changes. In this example, the leader includes an initial assessment of the
potential for fratricide. This could be changed or expanded on receipt of the final order.

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 Application to Troop Leading Procedures

[CLASSIFICATION]

WARNORD #2 for Operation FOX

1. Situation. The enemy reinforced mechanized battalion is moving south in an attempt to capture the
Green River Bridge. The 110th Support Brigade, now located at tactical assembly area (TAA) IVAN,
provides support.
2. Mission. Our company has been ordered to conduct a relief in place with 1-52 Armor, within battle
position (BP) 50, to support flanking attacks by B and C companies. O/O, the battalion, will conduct a
hasty attack on the enemy support brigade vicinity TAA IVAN. End state will be the consolidation of the
battalion within TAA IVAN and control of main supply point MIAMI.
3. Execution. A/382 Infantry (Mechanized) will start point (SP) in order beginning with 1st Platoon, using
the fording site as the crossing site, and set within BP 50 from west to east, with platoon leaders or their
designees conducting battle handovers.
TIME SCHEDULE
 Company warning order brief—081000 March 2021.
 1st Platoon SP, Route HAWK—081800 March 2021.
 1st Platoon fords Green River—081830 March 2021.
 Battle handover complete—082200 March 2021.
THREAT RISK—HIGH: Small, dismounted elements may have flanking cover along the route.
HAZARD RISK—LOW: Green River fording site and conditions are optimal.
FRATRICIDE RISK—LOW: Good communication and optimal forward-looking infrared (known as FLIR)
conditions allow above average ID.
4. Sustainment. No change.
5. Command and Signal. No change.
ACKNOWLEDGE:

[Commander’s last name]

[Commander’s rank]

[page number]
[CLASSIFICATION]

Figure 3-5. Company warning order example

STEP 3 OF TLP–MAKE A TENTATIVE PLAN

3-17. Commanders and leaders ensure their mission and end state nest with those of their higher HQ. While
the commander’s intent focuses on the end state, the concept of operations focuses on the method or sequence
of actions by which the force will achieve the end state. The concept of operations expands on the mission
statement and commander’s intent. It is within the commander’s intent and concept of operations that the
staff must focus planning and integrate RM most ardently. Implementing controls and supervising their
implementation begin before executing the operation.

Task Organization
3-18. From a RM perspective, commanders and leaders routinely examine higher HQ missions or orders to
determine the level of risk. The leader will evaluate the abilities of the unit and may request support. If the

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Chapter 3

leader has the required abilities available, that leader may task-organize forces in a way that minimizes the
hazards and risks while providing the proper capability at the best time and place on the battlefield.

Command and Support Relationships

3-19. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use
subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. The closer the command or support relationship, the more
leaders must consider other forces not organic to their organization when identifying and assessing hazards.
Other units may increase or decrease hazards on the battlefield as well as the overall risk, depending on
mission and operational factors.

Commander’s Intent
3-20. The commander’s intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the
desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate
and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even
when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). Many consider the commander’s intent, along with
the mission statement and concept of operations, to be the most important portions of an OPORD. It gives
guideposts to planners and subordinate leaders for further planning and implementation.

Concept of Operations
3-21. The concept of operations paragraph describes, in general terms, how the unit will accomplish its task
or tasks from start to finish. It should identify all mission-essential tasks, the decisive points of action, and
the main effort. This paragraph should be no longer than six sentences. It will not include risk guidance but
will give generalized guidance on how the commander wants to see the operation unfold.

Implementing Controls to Mitigate or Eliminate Risk

3-22. RM practitioners implement appropriate controls to mitigate or eliminate risk. Commanders are
responsible for the implementation and maintenance of controls. Commanders expect staff and subordinate
leaders to implement and maintain the controls to standard. A method to supervise and evaluate the
effectiveness of controls may be as important as their implementation. Active leader participation at the
lowest levels is a critical element in ensuring control implementation and maintenance. Leaders and staff
should develop and employ the most effective controls for a given set of circumstances, while abandoning
those found less effective. They ensure controls are correctly implemented and determine their effectiveness
by tools such as the after action review.

STEP 4 OF TLP–INITIATE MOVEMENT

3-23. Movement of forces may begin in stages or en masse. The same five-step process for RM is applied at
the real-time application level, due to time constraints. At a minimum, during execution leaders complete
real-time RM mentally and transmit controls and risk decisions verbally to subordinates. Leaders keep in
mind that the depth of RM planning has a direct effect on performance under demanding conditions.
3-24. The individual’s primary role in RM is to support commanders and leaders in the rapid identification
and communication of hazards and risks that arise and may affect the mission. This usually takes the form of
providing immediate feedback to the Army leader as the operation progresses and hazards are encountered.
During the execution of the operation, the individual becomes a primary source for actively identifying,
reporting, and assessing hazards. Short written messages, hand and arm signals, or radio transmissions are
all effective means of communicating first-hand information to Army leaders. However, individuals or small
groups are expected to act alone when necessary, making risk decisions within the context of orders. This is
why it is imperative for Army leaders to ensure every individual understands how to use the five-step process
to enhance mission accomplishment and reduce or eliminate loss. Being skilled in a real-time application of
RM, both on and off duty, is critical at the individual and small-group level.

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 Application to Troop Leading Procedures

STEP 5 OF TLP–CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE

3-25. Throughout the preparation for and execution of an operation, leaders continuously improve their
situational understanding. Often this requires aggressive and continuous information collection. Sources of
information about threats include reconnaissance, intelligence, local populace, and experience or expertise
of the leader and staff. Army leaders at lower levels may need to depend on higher HQ for the majority of
their information and intelligence. However, it is the lower level leader’s responsibility to apply the
information gathered to this point of operation on the battlefield. Likewise, it is the leader’s responsibility to
integrate that information and information about the unit’s capabilities and limitations to assess risk and
implement appropriate controls within the appropriate guidance. Without a staff, the commander must remain
more flexible and assign information collection duties as individual and mission capabilities within the
command allow. Often, direct information collection (including reconnaissance) begins early in the planning
cycle and must continue through preparation and execution. Through information collection, leaders and
staffs continuously plan, task, and employ collection assets and forces to collect timely and accurate
information that answers commander’s critical information requirements and other information requirements.
Relevant and timely requests for information must be made to higher HQ. These requests may focus directly
or indirectly on risk reduction (tactical or nontactical).
3-26. The force as a whole is often most vulnerable to surprise and enemy attack during preparation— when
forces are concentrated in assembly areas, when leaders are away from their units, and when troops are
concentrated together during rehearsals. Security missions—screen, guard, cover, and area security—are
essential during preparation. Safety and security work in tandem. The leader must continually assess the risk
and implement appropriate controls to counter the threat. Preparation activities help units plan for the
unexpected and are a major part of RM (see ADP 5-0 for more on preparation activities). Well-conducted
rehearsals, pre-operational checks, and pre-accident plans minimize the risk from unexpected events.

STEP 6 OF TLP–COMPLETE THE PLAN

3-27. During step 6 of TLP, the leader ensures all guidance is captured and made deliverable in a clear and
concise order. The leader completes a plan based on the reconnaissance and any changes in the situation. The
leader should review the mission, as received from the commander, to ensure the plan meets the requirements
of the mission and stays within the framework of the commander’s intent. The plan must specify identified
hazards, controls to be implemented, who is responsible for implementing and maintaining them, how and
when they will be implemented, and who will supervise.

STEP 7 OF TLP–ISSUE THE ORDER

3-28. The order must be disseminated so that all units receive and acknowledge its receipt. An order not
received is an order not given. Army leaders must ensure that subordinates understand the mission, the
commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and their tasks. This includes the risk tolerance, controls, and
limitations set. Army leaders may require subordinates to repeat all or part of the order or demonstrate on the
terrain model, sand table, or sketch to gauge their understanding of the operation. One-on-one or en masse
backbriefs may also be used to ensure understanding. RM must be integrated thoroughly into the plan, and
the risk guidance plainly stated. Including a current and completed DD Form 2977 as an attachment or annex
to the order is a best practice, to ensure critical risk-related information gathered and addressed in planning
is forwarded to the point of operation.

STEP 8 OF TLP–SUPERVISE AND REFINE THE PLAN

3-29. Army leaders supervise the unit’s preparation for combat by conducting rehearsals and inspections.
Army leaders will address points of conflict as well as any changes during this time. Refining the plan as
changes occur is critical. Time may not allow for written changes at this point. The leader must ensure all
involved thoroughly understand any changes made to the plan. From this point on, real-time RM becomes
more likely, as available planning time will not be sufficient for deliberate RM.
3-30. Rehearsals can be an invaluable aid in ensuring mission accomplishment. During rehearsals, key
personnel walk through the operation and address contingencies. The leader should conduct rehearsals on
terrain that resembles the actual ground. Rehearsals include having junior leaders brief their planned actions

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Chapter 3

in execution sequence to their senior leaders and their peers. This allows the senior leader to make
modifications and others to visualize the operation as the leader intended. Rehearsals may be conducted at
several levels, beginning at the crew level, with key players attending the next higher level rehearsal.

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 Chapter 4
Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and
Rapid Decision-Making Process

This chapter discusses risk management planning considerations and techniques for
the military decision-making process.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MILITARY DECISION-

MAKING PROCESS
4-1. Effective RM during operations depends on full integration into the MDMP and the overall operations
process; RM is not a stand-alone process. The military decision-making process is an iterative planning
methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action, and produce an operation
plan or order (ADP 5-0). Application of each of the five steps of RM into operational planning should be
seamless. (See ADP 5-0 and FM 6-0 for fundamentals of the operations process and the MDMP.)

GENERAL RISK MANAGEMENT EMPHASIS DURING THE MDMP

4-2. Each of the five steps of RM tends to require emphasis at different times during the MDMP (see
table 4-1, page 4-2). While Army planning doctrine places the beginning of formal RM in mission analysis,
leaders can begin identifying hazards upon receipt of the mission. The representation in table 4-1 is not
intended to be prescriptive; the steps of RM are dynamic and cyclical. RM is an adaptable integrating process.
Army planners use RM to identify, assess, and control hazards, reducing their effect on operations and
readiness.

GENERAL SEQUENCE OF THE MDMP AND RISK MANAGEMENT STEPS

4-3. Commanders and staffs normally identify hazards in each sequential step of the MDMP. They
determine existing and potential hazards through the steps of mission receipt, mission analysis, and COA
development and analysis. During orders production, preparers should clearly describe significant hazards in
orders so they are documented and forces can understand them precisely. Commanders and staffs assess
hazards in conjunction with mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, and orders production.
Results of risk assessments (including residual levels of risk and controls selected for mitigating hazards)
may be included with the orders. Commanders and staffs develop controls and make risk decisions during
COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval. Staffs implement RM controls
during the last step of the MDMP. This step includes orders production, dissemination, and transition. Army
leaders continuously assess the effectiveness of controls and changing or unexpected situations or events.
They adjust operations as necessary to remain within the risk tolerance.

RISK MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES FOR THE MILITARY

DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
4-4. Paragraphs 4-5 through 4-66 discuss selected techniques for applying RM during the MDMP. The
MDMP is, at its core, inherently a risk mitigation process for potential or future operations. Risk in operations
is constantly assessed with options presented to mitigate unnecessary risk and increase the chances of mission
success. RM is integrated throughout the MDMP.

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Chapter 4

STEP 1 OF THE MDMP–RECEIPT OF MISSION

4-5. The MDMP starts with the receipt of a mission. Missions can be provided in formal, written orders or
directives, or they can be informal and communicated by more expeditious means. Commanders consider the
following elements of concern to RM:
 Risk tolerance.
 Mission variables or operational variables.
 Controls from higher HQ.
 Coordination of controls with adjacent units.
Each commander must ensure a thorough understanding of the mission, including the senior commander’s
intent and the risk tolerance, while not overly restricting subordinate initiative or ability to turn potential risk
into opportunity. A commander receiving a mission will analyze it and assign subordinate missions. The
combined risks identified for these additional missions and tasks may modify the overall residual risk for the
mission, possibly to a higher level than the risk tolerance.
Table 4-1. Risk management in the military decision-making process
Risk management steps
Identify the Assess the Develop Implement Supervise and
Military hazards hazards controls and controls evaluate
decision- make risk
making process decisions
steps
Receipt of
mission X

Mission analysis X X

Course of action
development X X X

Course of action
analysis X X X

Course of action
comparison X

Course of action
approval X
Orders
production,
dissemination, X X X X X
and transition

Risk Tolerance in Orders

4-6. Each commander receiving an order must know the level of command that determines the risk
tolerance and can make the risk decision for a mission. The staff examines the WARNORD from higher HQ
to identify the risk tolerance (the level of risk the responsible commander determines is acceptable—see
paragraph 1-7) for the mission. The commander should express the risk tolerance as a level of risk—
extremely high, high, medium, or low—that each subordinate commander can accept. If risk rises above the
level authorized at that level, the commander must elevate the issue to seek further guidance or resources.
Commanders must be careful not to overly restrict the initiative of subordinates, understanding that
conditions may change rapidly.

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 Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and Rapid Decision-Making Process

Mission Variables or Operational Variables

4-7. Upon receipt of mission, commanders may anticipate the need for additional assets. Commanders may
ask their higher HQ for asset support to mitigate risk. The higher HQ may have access to assets that
subordinate elements do not. This is particularly true of intelligence, reconnaissance, and weather elements
that can see specific battlefield hazards. During mission analysis, staffs will use the factors of METT-TC
(mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations)
and PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and
time) as frameworks for identifying hazards and determining assets needed.

Controls from Higher Headquarters

4-8. The WARNORDs and the operation order specify controls implemented by the higher HQ. The
commander must carefully assess the impact of these controls on the mission, particularly in terms of required
coordination, manpower, and equipment constraints that might detract from the primary mission. If Soldiers
encounter a significant problem during the execution of an operation and they believe it is related to a control,
they should notify the appropriate leader.

Coordination of Controls with Adjacent Units

4-9. In some circumstances, such as passage of lines, river crossing, or security operations, a unit’s primary
mission may be to implement a control that reduces the risk to the higher HQ’s mission. This requires
coordination with adjacent units to identify hazards and controls and define procedures for the tasks. It is
imperative that the method and time for control implementation, as well as critical communication methods,
are set between the unit implementing the control and units involved in other aspects of the mission. The
supported command should coordinate all actions to support its mission.
4-10. The commander’s initial guidance from higher HQ should address the following considerations:
 Risk tolerance. Commanders must specify the level of risk (extremely high, high, medium, or low)
subordinate commanders are authorized to accept. This should be stated clearly within standing
guidance, coordinating instructions, or set as a separate paragraph.
 Hazards already identified and categorized by METT-TC and related controls that may affect the
unit’s mission.
4-11. The WARNORDs are important to RM since it is the subordinate commander’s first opportunity to
identify and address the risks that may be associated with the operation. Allowing subordinate commanders
more time to plan and conduct risk management at their level increases their ability to identify risk, gather
and emplace controls, and ultimately succeed. Figure 4-1, page 4-4, shows an example of how RM
information may appear in a WARNORD. This information should be brief and clear. It should identify risk
tolerance, significant hazards and guidance, risk acceptance authority, and any controls directed by the higher
HQ or the issuing HQ. Detailed information on how the risk tolerance was determined is not normally
included in the WARNORD but can be found in the order itself. It is critical that any RM guidance provided
in the initial WARNORD is understood by the executing command so planners and subordinates understand
the risk tolerance. This puts the onus on subordinate commanders to inform their superior command when
they cannot accomplish their mission within the parameters established.

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Chapter 4

[Required information reduced to conserve space. See ADP 6-0 for plans and orders format details.]
Warning Order #1-30
(U) References. Cite local operation plan, required maps, and any additional relevant resources.
(U) Task Organization. See Paragraph 1d.
1. (U) Situation.
a. (U) Area of Interest. None
b. (U) Area of Operations. None
c. (U) Enemy Forces. At 250300Z January 2021, company-sized insurgent forces seized the host-nation airfield at
V1 (ES 095818). Enemy unit is believed to have only small arms capability (below 14.5mm) and no indirect fire
capability. The insurgent forces are not believed to have any dedicated air defense artillery capability.
d. (U) Friendly Forces.
(1) Host Nation. The 12th Royal INF has moved into blocking position behind phase line HOUND.
(2) Army Forces. 1st Brigade 4th INF Division conducts air assault to secure airfield and destroy all insurgent
forces occupying objective (OBJ) FOX.
e. (U) Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Organizations. None
f. (U) Civil Considerations. None.
g. (U) Attachments and Detachments. None.
h. (U) Assumptions. None.
2. (U) Mission. At 020430Z February1221 1-5 INF conducts air assault into landing zone (LZ) 5 and attacks along
AXIS VIPER to secure OBJ EAGLE.
3. (U) Execution.
a. (U) Initial Commander’s Intent. No change.
b. (U) Concept of Operations. 1-5 INF conducts air movement from pickup zone (PZ) 2 along AXIS RED to LZ 5
with two companies. Conducts tactical movement along AXIS VIPER and deliberately attacks to seize OBJ EAGLE. Be
prepared to air assault one reserve company no earlier than 020500Z February. Overall risk level: Medium.
c. (U) Tasks to Maneuver Units.
(1) 4th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) conducts air assault for two companies of 1–5 INF from PZ 2, along
AXIS VIPER and into LZ 5 with a wheels-on-LZ of 020430Z February. BPT conducts air assault of one additional
company from PZ 2 along AXIS GREEN to LZ 7 no earlier than 020600Z February wheels on LZ.
(2) 4th CAB provides LZ security during air assault and BPT provides direct fire support with at least one team of
attack helicopters on station for route security of AXIS RED and close combat attack support of 1–5 INF from air
assault completion through the securing of OBJ EAGLE.
(3) B/146th Field Artillery Battalion provides direct support to 1–5 INF, 020100Z–021200Z February
d. (U) Coordinating Instructions.
(1) Time line.
020100Z February—Mission update at 1st Brigade 4th INF Division tactical operations center (key
representatives).
020335Z February—First UH-60s (utility helicopters) wheel down at PZ 2. 020350Z February—Load-up
complete and lead aircraft wheels up.
020420Z February—LZ 5 security call from 4th CAB security team. 020430Z February—Troops unload in LZ 5.
(2) Orders group.311600 January.
(3) Priority of fire. TRPs 001, 002, 004, and 006.
(4) Risk guidance.
Hazard: Multiple large power lines crossing AXIS RED.
Control: Hazard maps updated; walkthrough and sand table completed with all aircrews.
Hazard: Insurgent forces covering LZ 5 and along AXIS VIPER.
Control: 4th CAB secures LZ 5 and makes LZ clearance call in accordance with execution matrix and
communications card.
Hazard: Enemy strength beyond that anticipated at OBJ EAGLE.
Control: One team of attack helicopters on station and one reserve assault company prepared to air assault
into LZ 7.
4. Sustainment. No change.
5. Command and Signal. No change.
[Sample truncated and font reduced to conserve space; see ADP 6-0.]

Figure 4-1. Sample warning order

[CLASSIFICATION]

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 Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and Rapid Decision-Making Process

4-12. Eventually, planners will incorporate the guidance in the WARNORD as they develop COAs and
plans. The WARNORD may or may not include a graphic depiction of controls essential to the operation.
However, planners may include RM information in the graphics (see example in figure 4-2).

Figure 4-2. Sample graphic incorporating risk management information

STEP 2 OF THE MDMP–MISSION ANALYSIS

4-13. As commanders and staffs develop situational understanding, their application of RM is crucial. Staffs
should integrate RM into the steps and products of mission analysis. As they maintain running estimates and
other assessments, they should continuously integrate RM considerations. They should continue to apply RM
throughout operations, during planning, preparation, and execution. Paragraphs 4-15 through 4-38 describe
ways that staffs can apply RM during selected steps of mission analysis.

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Chapter 4

Analyze Higher Headquarters Plan or Order

4-14. Staffs examine and analyze orders from higher HQ to identify any changes from the original
WARNORD and any follow-on or implied missions. They confirm with higher HQ specific hazards
categorized by the mission variables (METT-TC), and higher HQ identifies controls along with resources for
implementation. Depending on the organizational level, the order may address the hazards and controls in
one general risk assessment or in a risk assessment for each staff annex. If a commander decides to conduct
Army design methodology as part of mission analysis, the commander and staff should consider RM within
the analysis of the operational environment. They should review several factors before beginning to write
supporting risk assessments:
 Operational time line.
 Missions of adjacent units.
 Controls identified in the coordinating instructions of the order not already standardized in the unit
SOP. Staffs should check these controls closely for special recognition and fratricide prevention
measures. They should request further information from higher HQ, if needed.
 Running estimates. Each running estimate should contain risk guidance and risk assessments that
address hazards and controls given in the order and all others that arose during development of the
estimate. Figure 4-3 illustrates how RM information may be included in a sample running
estimate.

Perform Initial Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

4-15. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the
portions of the mission variables of threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of
interest and for a specific mission. By applying intelligence preparation of the battlefield, commanders gain
the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in
time and space (ATP 2-01.3). Led by the intelligence officer, the entire staff—including the safety officer or
safety manager—participates in developing and sustaining an understanding of the enemy, terrain and
weather, and civil considerations. Intelligence-gathering efforts help identify options available to friendly
and threat forces. This should include identifying and recommending controls for common hazards, hazards
due to gaps in intelligence, and hazards from enemy intelligence gathering.
4-16. The risk assessment considerations for the steps of intelligence preparation of the battlefield are—
 Define the operational environment. As the intelligence staff assesses areas of interest and
intelligence gaps, it determines risk in the current operational environment. In addition, the staff
anticipates likely changes in the operational environment and forecasts accompanying risk.
 Describe the effects on operations. The intelligence staff performs risk assessments to help manage
hazards from terrain, weather, and civil considerations. They perform risk assessments for hazards
related to all operational variables simultaneously. For example, hazards may be associated with
enemy and friendly avenues of approach, battle positions, and engagement areas.
 Evaluate the threat. The intelligence staff performs risk assessments to ascertain how the enemy’s
organization and combat power might adversely affect the unit’s mission. Although the focus is
on the potential for the enemy’s actions to create hazards, the staff must also consider how such a
hazard will limit or impede friendly action.
 Determine threat COAs. Using the information gained, the staff performs a risk assessment to
determine the level of risk associated with each enemy COA.

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 Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and Rapid Decision-Making Process

[Required information reduced to conserve space. See ADP 6-0 for plans and orders format details.]

1. SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Area of Interest. Identify and describe factors of the area of interest that affect functional area considerations.
b. Characteristics of the Area of Operations.
(1) Terrain. State how terrain affects a functional area’s capabilities.
Risk Assessment Note: State the level of risk (extremely high, high, medium, or low) created from hazards
associated with the military aspects of terrain. Include types of controls to reduce the risk to or below the
level set by guidance (the risk tolerance).
(2) Weather. State how weather affects a functional area’s capabilities.
Risk Assessment Note: State the level of risk (extremely high, high, medium, or low) from hazards
associated with the military aspects of weather. Include types of controls to reduce the risk to or below
the level set by guidance (the risk tolerance).
(3) Enemy Forces. Describe adversary’s disposition, composition, strength, and systems within a
functional area. Describe adversary capabilities and possible courses of action (COAs) and their effects
on a functional area.
Risk Assessment Note: State any particular tactical risk hazards that may result from enemy disposition or
capabilities.
(4) Friendly Forces. List current functional area resources in terms of equipment, personnel, and systems.
Identify additional resources available for the functional area located at higher, adjacent, or other units.
List capabilities from other military and civilian partners that may be available to provide support within
the functional area. Compare requirements to current capabilities and suggest solutions for satisfying
discrepancies.
Risk Assessment Note: Be alert to any hazards that may be created by units operating forward or adjacent
to friendly forces. Weapons capability and limitations must be examined closely, especially for issues
such as overhead fire, no-fire zones, limits of advance, and others. Avoid making assumptions.
(5) Civil Considerations. Describe civil considerations that may affect the functional area, including
possible support needed by civil authorities from the functional area as well as possible interference
from civil aspects.
c. Facts/Assumptions. List all facts and assumptions that affect the functional area.
2. MISSION. Show the restated mission resulting from mission analysis.
3. COURSES OF ACTION.
a. List friendly COAs that were war-gamed.
b. List enemy actions or COAs that were templated and affect the functional area.
c. List the evaluation criteria identified during COA analysis. All staffs use the same criteria.
Risk Assessment Note: Ensure accident and tactical hazards and risks are included for each COA.
4. ANALYSIS. Analyze each COA using the evaluation criteria from COA analysis. Review enemy actions that affect
the functional area as they relate to COAs. Identify issues, risks, and deficiencies these enemy actions may create
with respect to the functional area.
5. COMPARISON. Compare COAs. Rank order COAs for each key consideration. Use a decision matrix to aid the
comparison process.
Risk Assessment Note: Ensure the decision matrix clearly shows the level of risk and the priority hazards
and controls for each COA.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS.
a. Recommend the most supportable COAs from the perspective of the functional area. Prioritize and list issues,
deficiencies, and risks, and make recommendations on how to mitigate them.

[Sample truncated and font reduced to conserve space; see ADP 6-0.]

Figure 4-3. Sample running estimate incorporating risk management information

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Chapter 4

Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks

4-17. A task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals, units, or organizations.
Staffs apply RM to the review of specified, implied, and essential tasks to understand—
 How specified tasks within the order are addressed and prioritized, and controls are to be
implemented for all identified operational hazards.
 How implied tasks are synchronized to support the specified tasks and avoid creating additional
hazards.
 How to prepare and coordinate risk assessments to support the identified tasks.

Review Available Assets and Identify Resource Shortfalls

4-18. The staff conducts an in-depth analysis to determine if the current task organization and resources are
sufficient to support mission accomplishment within the risk tolerance. Staffs consider whether insufficient
manpower, skills, supplies, or positioning of units pose risks to the mission. Staffs strive to identify and
overcome these shortcomings and lower the residual risk through controls.

Determine Constraints
4-19. A constraint is a restriction placed on the command by a higher command. A constraint dictates an
action or inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander (FM 6-0). The order
from higher HQ should address hazards to the overall mission and provide specific controls in the main body
or annex. Any staff risk assessments must consider these constraints. Constraints may increase risk, place
additional or increased hazards before the commander, and influence control implementation.

Identify Critical Facts and Develop Assumptions

4-20. Facts are known information about a current situation. Assumptions are beliefs based on experience
that a specific reaction will result from an action. As the mission or operation develops, some assumptions
may or may not become facts. Assumptions are necessary to continue planning and are constantly reviewed
to confirm or deny their validity. Any assessment based on assumptions must be adjusted to accommodate
the situation with appropriate controls constantly assessed for effectiveness as assumptions are confirmed or
denied. From the RM perspective, staffs should perform risk assessments to determine the likelihood that
any assumption could lead to a new hazard that affects the risk level.

Begin Risk Management

4-21. While begin risk management is a step of mission analysis, this does not mean RM is entirely limited
to mission analysis or even to planning. Planners determine how to integrate RM considerations into each
step of planning as well as throughout the operation. This step of mission analysis may be the staff’s first
formally documented risk assessment effort. The staff compiles into a preliminary worksheet all the risk
assessment information acquired during—
 Analysis of the order.
 Development of the information collection plan.
 Determination of specified and implied tasks.
 Review of available assets.
 Determination of constraints.
 Identification of critical facts and assumptions.

4-22. The final risk assessment must be recorded on DD Form 2977. The form provides the construct for
identifying and recording hazards, the analysis, and the suggested controls from each running estimate. Staffs
can use a simple, preliminary assessment worksheet to summarize essential information from each staff
section or for each subtask.
4-23. Any preliminary risk assessment worksheet should include identified hazards, their assessed levels,
and suggested initial controls from each running estimate. It should present them in a visual format easily
joined with other staff assessments for the mission analysis brief. A consolidated matrix displays the various

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 Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and Rapid Decision-Making Process

running estimates along with the hazards, assessment levels, and suggested controls. The matrix helps the
staff see the overall direction the RM effort should take to support the mission. The matrix leads to the final
DD Form 2977, which helps synchronize the overall RM effort. Table 4-2 depicts an example of a partially
completed preliminary worksheet (steps 1, 2, and part of 3 of the five-step process). The final version would
consolidate the risks and proposed controls identified by each staff section.
Table 4-2. Sample consolidated preliminary risk assessment worksheet
Staff estimates Hazards identified Initial assessment level Proposed controls
Movement and High water levels and High risk: Water levels Consider making
maneuver estimate swift current make are not expected to drop bridge security a key
fording the Usee River for the next 48 hours. enabler and evaluating
extremely dangerous. sites for deploying
Mobility and
three armored vehicle-
countermobility
launched bridges
during phase I of the
operation.

Intelligence estimate Host nation; 125th High risk: Intelligence Consider designating a
Infantry Brigade lacks collection of enemy forces military intelligence
electronics intelligence in 125th Infantry Brigade’s company in direct
Synchronization plan
collection capability. sector is extremely support of, 125th
limited. Infantry Brigade until
Confidence in knowledge phase III of the
of enemy force size, operation.
capability, and intention is
low.

Fires estimate TBP (to be prepared) TBP TBP

Sustainment estimate TBP TBP TBP
Protection estimate TBP TBP TBP

Develop Initial Commander’s Critical Information Requirements and Essential Elements of

Friendly Information
4-24. During mission analysis, the staff identifies gaps in information required for further planning and
decision-making during preparation and execution. Commander’s critical information requirements (known
as CCIRs) include friendly force information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. An
essential element of friendly information (known as EEFI) is an element of friendly force information that,
if compromised, would jeopardize mission accomplishment. This information, if obtained by enemy forces,
would increase the risk of the operation. During mission analysis, the staff develops information requirements
based upon such importance. Staffs may nominate certain requirements to the commander to become a
commander’s critical information requirement or an essential element of friendly information.

Develop the Initial Information Collection Plan

4-25. A supporting risk assessment worksheet may be prepared with the information collection plan. The
risk assessment information developed along with the information collection plan is used during the conduct
of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and security operations. Gaps in the information collection plan
lead to increased risk. Therefore, controls are needed to mitigate or eliminate such risk. Controls may be
applied to—
 Surveillance and reconnaissance assets.
 Task organization shortfalls.
 Fire support coordination measures.
 Medical evaluation provisions.

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Chapter 4

Update Plan for the Use of Available Time

4-26. As updated information arrives, the commander and staff examine the mission and its associated tasks
within the allocated time line. Commanders should provide adequate planning time at lower echelons. From
the aspect of tactical risk, the windows of opportunity may be fleeting, not always allowing for formal RM
integration.
4-27. Army leaders should avoid executing certain tasks during periods when exposure will be the greatest.
From a risk perspective, hazards caused by terrain and weather conditions may be equal to or greater than
those posed by enemy forces.

Develop Initial Themes and Messages

4-28. Commanders and their units coordinate what they do, say, and portray through themes and messages.
A theme is a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the purpose for military action. Themes tie
to objectives, lines of effort, and end state conditions. All of these incorporate a risk versus reward
determination by the commander. Coordinating themes and messages can reduce risk and amplify possible
reward.

Develop a Proposed Problem Statement

4-29. A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. The
problem statement is the description of the primary issue or issues that may impede commanders from
achieving their desired end states.

Develop a Proposed Mission Statement

4-30. The chief of staff (or executive officer) or operations officer typically prepares a proposed mission
statement for the unit based on the mission analysis. The commander receives and approves the unit’s mission
statement, normally during the mission analysis briefing.

Present the Mission Analysis Briefing

4-31. During the mission analysis briefing, staff members present relevant information that supports accurate
situational understanding. Each staff section provides relevant risk assessment information that demonstrates
the hazards identified, proposed controls, and how the controls will affect mission accomplishment. In some
cases, initial risk assessment information may be general. However, during COA development and analysis,
staffs expand and refine the information. Any staff section can use a simple risk briefing matrix (illustrated
in table 4-3) to present initial risk assessments for the mission analysis. An in-depth assessment of hazards
need not be specified separately at this time. The thorough assessment of the hazards and control
implementation capability may not be possible without further staff coordination. For the mission analysis
briefing, the focus is on giving the commander relevant information that includes hazards that could
jeopardize the mission. This briefing should help other sections in coordinating efforts for mitigating
identified hazards and developing effective controls.

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 Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and Rapid Decision-Making Process

Table 4-3. Sample staff section risk briefing matrix

Intelligence staff section Hazards identified Proposed controls
risk assessment
Ensure the large-caliber artillery
A snow slide could make
targets only fire into the northern
ROUTE TANGO impassable for
portions of OBJECTIVE WOLF.
Battlefield and effects an extended period.
Use direct-fire, lethal weapons on
targets on the south side of
OBJECTIVE WOLF.
Critical resupply may be
Task 1–1 Cavalry to the start point
destroyed before 1–1 Cavalry
en route to the blocking positions
secures ROUTE WHISKEY.
south of ROUTE WHISKEY as
Enemy combat power
soon as the reconnaissance
elements clear to PHASE LINE
TOM.

Task a reconnaissance or
Jamming may deny friendly maneuver element to provide an
Intelligence-gathering
unmanned aircraft system on-order mission to screen the
capabilities and gaps
coverage in SECTOR ALPHA. southern flank of friendly troops
throughout phase III.
Limit radio traffic to authorized
transmissions using secure means
of encryption. Offset mobile
Enemy intelligence-gathering Enemy electronic surveillance repeaters and radio frequency
capability capability is unknown. jammers through line-of-site areas
set as protection priority, before
main body movement through
them.

Develop and Issue Initial Commander’s Intent

4-32. The commander’s intent is one of the most important portions of an order. It includes the operation’s
purpose, key tasks, and conditions that define the desired end state. It links the mission, concept of operations,
and tasks to subordinate units. A clear commander’s intent facilitates a shared understanding and focuses on
the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment. During execution, the commander’s intent
spurs disciplined initiative within set parameters.
4-33. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives
(JP 3-0). It may include unit strength and readiness. Army leaders should make risk decisions with the
commander’s intent in mind.

Develop and Issue Initial Planning Guidance

4-34. The commander’s planning guidance may be written or oral. In either form, it is imperative that the
commander clearly state and define any risk guidance. This will ensure complete understanding and avoid
miscommunication. The planning guidance may include risk tolerance as well as other guidance directly
related to RM.

Develop Course of Action Evaluation Criteria

4-35. Evaluation criteria address factors that contribute to success or failure. They normally include risk
criteria and support COA analysis and comparison. The commander may place much more weight on one or
more criteria, depending on the intent and guidance from the higher echelon commanders.

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Chapter 4

Issue a Warning Order

4-36. The staff places special emphasis on alerting subordinate units to any special controls that will require
extensive preparation time. Some of the planning time gained by subordinate units may be used to identify
hazards, develop controls, and devise the most efficient means of control implementation. (Refer to figure
4-1, page 4-4, for an example of RM information included in a WARNORD.)

STEP 3 OF THE MDMP–COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

4-37. During the mission analysis, RM practitioners focus on identifying and assessing hazards (steps 1 and
2 of RM, see Chapter 1). In COA development, RM practitioners continue to identify and assess hazards but
also begin to develop controls and make risk decisions.

Evaluation Criteria for Courses of Action

4-38. Planners evaluate COAs and their associated control options for managing risk, using the criteria
identified in FM 6-0 and detailed below:
 Feasibility.
 Acceptability.
 Suitability.
 Distinguishability.
 Completeness.

Feasibility
4-39. The COAs are considered feasible if they can be completed within the parameters of the time, space,
and other resources available to the operation. Hazard controls must also be feasible in order to be of use
during the operation.

Acceptability
4-40. In the context of RM, acceptability refers to risk tolerance (defined in paragraph 1-7). Army forces
measure levels of risk as extremely high, high, medium, or low (described in paragraphs 1-44 through 1-48).
The levels express the probability and expected severity of a hazardous event. Commanders refer to the risk
assessment matrix (table 1-1, page 1-7) as they establish the risk tolerance for the mission. Planners refer to
the risk assessment matrix to estimate the level of risk for identified hazards related to each COA. For
commanders and staffs to consider a COA acceptable, the residual level of risk (the combination of
probability and expected severity of a hazardous event) should be equal to or below the risk tolerance. For
example, if the commander establishes a risk tolerance of medium, acceptable COAs must have estimated
risk levels of medium or low. Risk levels can change as planners propose control options and reassess
probability and severity (see steps 2 and 3 of the process, in Chapter 1).

Suitability
4-41. COAs must be appropriate and fitting for the task or mission. Even if the level of risk for a particular
COA, with its proposed controls, meets acceptability criteria, the COA may not be suitable. For example, a
control that requires additional time or resources likely will have a negative impact on future operations and
therefore may not be suitable.

Distinguishability
4-42. Each COA should differ significantly from other COAs. The use of reserves, task organization, timing,
and the maneuver scheme all affect mission accomplishment and the residual risks. Planners must consider
each independently in terms of the level of risk or potential benefits.

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Completeness
4-43. Each COA must be a stand-alone description of tasks necessary for success in current and subsequent
operations. Although referring to previous risk assessments is sometimes appropriate, planners should
analyze each situation independently. They should not reuse previous assessments heedlessly. Even when
situations are similar, previous assessments and controls will likely need modification.

Subordinate Processes of COA Development

4-44. Development of a COA involves eight subordinate processes (see FM 6-0). Paragraphs 4-45 through
4-53 discuss selected RM considerations for each subordinate process.

Assess Relative Combat Power

4-45. Commanders and planners conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Army forces generate
combat power by converting potential into effective action. The elements of combat power are leadership,
information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.
The goal is to continuously generate and apply combat power to accomplish the mission at minimal cost. The
command uses RM to minimize loss and maintain capability for current and subsequent missions.
4-46. To assess relative combat power, planners initially make a rough estimate of force ratios of available
maneuver units. Planners then compare friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses, and vice versa, for each
element of combat power. From these comparisons, they may find particular vulnerabilities an enemy could
exploit; these will need protection. These weaknesses are equivalent to hazards, and planners need to apply
RM to them.

Generate Options
4-47. Based on the commander’s guidance and the initial results of relative combat power assessment, the
staff generates options. Options focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of their most probable adoption or
on those stability tasks that are most essential to prevent the situation from deteriorating. The staff determines
sustainment and controls needed to create and maintain combat power for the decisive operation and shaping
operations. The staff should coordinate to ensure optimal use of assets for risk mitigation. Optimal risk
reduction measures are often found at the most fundamental levels of operational development.

Array Forces
4-48. For each option, the initial array identifies the number of units needed and possible ways to execute
tasks of decisive action. If the number of units arrayed exceeds the number available, and the difference
cannot be compensated for with other factors, the staff determines whether the COA is feasible. Ways to
decrease identified risks during this step may include requesting additional resources, executing tasks
required for the COA sequentially rather than simultaneously, or transferring the risk to an area with reduced
likelihood of exposure.

Develop a Broad Concept

4-49. The broad concept describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the mission within the commander’s
intent. It concisely expresses the how of the commander’s visualization. It will provide the framework for
the concept of operations. Larger risk controls, such as specific force alignment and general mission guidance
may be contained within the broad concept. This will eliminate the requirement to implement smaller, less
effective controls later in the process and at lower levels of command. This should save planning time for the
commander and staff.

Assign Headquarters
4-50. After determining the broad concept, planners create a task organization by assigning forces to HQ.
They consider the types of units to be assigned to the HQ and its ability to control them. Planners consider
organic staff and internal support capabilities. This ensures the commander has the assets needed. To ensure

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Chapter 4

success, planners identify larger hazards and their associated risks and assign the command best able to
mitigate or eliminate them.

Develop COA Statements and Sketches

4-51. The COA statement clearly portrays how the unit will accomplish the mission. The RM focus should
be on the overall risk. A paragraph titled Risk may be included as the last paragraph of each COA. Should
the commander require more detailed information concerning specific hazards and controls, each staff
section’s risk assessments—or the overall mission risk assessment—should be ready for review and further
development.

Conduct a COA Briefing

4-52. A COA briefing will include several areas (see FM 6-0). RM will be imbedded within many of these
areas. A comparison chart of COA strengths and weaknesses may focus on risks and will give the commander
enough information to formulate questions and make assumptions based on information already known. The
COA briefing further informs the command and may lead to further staffing and requests for information
from the higher HQ. Enough time must be added into the planning cycle to act on new guidance. An overall
COA risk assessment is useful for the commander to pinpoint those areas requiring additional consideration
and action.

Select or Modify COAs for Continued Analysis

4-53. After the COA briefing, the commander usually selects or modifies those COAs for continued analysis.
This may include or be limited to adjusting the COA to better address risk. The commander also issues
planning guidance to the staff, such as time limitations or a change in commander’s intent. If commanders
reject all COAs, the staff begins again with the commander’s guidance. If the commander accepts one or
more of the COAs, staff members begin COA analysis. The commander may create a new COA by
incorporating elements of one or more COAs developed by the staff. The staff then prepares to war-game
this new COA. The staff incorporates RM into any directed modifications and ensures all staff members
understand the new or modified COA. During this period, conditions may have changed. The staff at all
levels should continually manage risk.

STEP 4 OF THE MDMP–COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS

4-54. COA analysis (war-gaming) enables commanders and staffs to identify difficulties, coordination
problems, and probable consequences of planned actions for each COA being considered. It helps them to
synchronize combat power and resources, identify and mitigate risk, exploit opportunities, reduce friction,
and improve COAs. COA analysis may require commanders and staffs to revisit parts of a COA as
discrepancies arise. COA analysis not only appraises the quality of each COA, but it also uncovers potential
execution problems, decisions, and contingencies.
4-55. War-gaming further allows the staff to synchronize the six warfighting functions for each COA. It also
enables the commander and staff to—
 Determine how best to maximize the effects of combat power while protecting friendly forces and
minimizing risk of collateral damage.
 Further develop a visualization of the operation.
 Anticipate operational events.
 Determine conditions and resources required for success within risk guidance.
 Determine when and where to apply force capabilities.
 Identify coordination needed to mitigate hazards and produce synchronized results.
 Determine the most flexible COA.

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 Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and Rapid Decision-Making Process

STEP 5 OF THE MDMP–COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON

4-56. The COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and evaluating the advantages and
disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. Staff members each present their findings to the other
staff members for their consideration. Using the evaluation criteria developed during mission analysis and
refined during COA development, the staff outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and
disadvantages. Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the COAs identifies their benefits,
requirements, and associated risk with respect to each other.
4-57. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success against
the most likely enemy COA, the most dangerous enemy COA, the most important stability task, or the most
damaging environmental impact. The selected COA generally—
 Poses the minimum risk to the force and mission accomplishment.
 Places the force in the best posture for future operations.
 Provides maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.
 Provides the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.
 Provides the most secure and stable environment for civilians in the area of operations.

STEP 6 OF THE MDMP–COURSE OF ACTION APPROVAL

4-58. After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA to best accomplish the mission while
maintaining combat power. If the commander rejects all COAs, the staff starts COA development again. If
the commander modifies a proposed COA or gives the staff an entirely different one, the staff develops and
analyzes the new COA, while integrating RM, then presents the results to the commander with a
recommendation.
4-59. After approving a COA, the commander issues the final planning guidance. The final planning
guidance includes a refined commander’s intent (if necessary) and new commander’s critical information
requirements to support execution. It also includes any additional guidance on priorities for the warfighting
functions, orders preparation, rehearsal, and preparation. This guidance includes priorities for protection,
resources needed to mitigate risks and preserve freedom, as well as ensuring continuous sustainment.
4-60. Commanders include the risk they are willing to accept in the final planning guidance. Commanders
discuss acceptable risk with adjacent, subordinate, and senior commanders as time and communications
allow. However, commanders still obtain the higher echelon commander’s approval to accept any risk that
might imperil accomplishing the higher commander’s mission.

STEP 7 OF THE MDMP–ORDERS PRODUCTION, DISSEMINATION, AND TRANSITION

4-61. The staff turns the selected COA into a clear, concise order with the required supporting information.
The COA statement becomes the concept of operations for the plan. The COA sketch becomes the basis for
the operation overlay. Planners use their knowledge, experience, skills, and judgement to fill in missing
details for any part of the operation not analyzed during COA analysis. This includes hazards that may have
been overlooked but do not increase the accepted level of risk. If time permits, the staff may conduct a more
detailed analysis of the selected COA to more fully synchronize the operation and complete the plan. The
staff writes the OPORD or OPLAN using the Army’s OPORD format. The discussion in Chapter 1 on the
steps of RM applies to orders production. Chapter 3 contains additional information about WARNORDs and
RM. Appendix A provides sample tactical scenarios with sample DD Form 2977s.
4-62. Prior to the commander approving the plan or order, the staff ensures the plan or order is consistent
and nested with the higher echelon commander’s intent. They do this through—
 Plans and orders reconciliation.
 Plans and orders crosswalk.

4-63. Plans and orders reconciliation occurs internally as the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire
plan or order. This reconciliation ensures that the base plan or order and all attachments are complete and in
agreement. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. They ensure the identified hazards are addressed

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 4-15

Chapter 4

as approved and that the control actions and responsibilities are clearly articulated. If staff members find
discrepancies or gaps, they take corrective actions.
4-64. During the plans and orders crosswalk, the staff compares the plan or order with that of the higher and
adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure the plan meets the superior commander’s intent.
The crosswalk identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. If staff members identify discrepancies or gaps,
they take necessary corrective action.
4-65. The final action in plan and order development is the approval of the plan or order by the commander.
Commanders normally do not sign attachments; however, they should review them before signing the base
plan or order. The commander may attach a completed DD Form 2977 if they believe it will more clearly
communicate their guidance.
4-66. Commanders review and approve orders before the staff reproduces and disseminates them, unless
commanders have delegated that authority. There should be no delay in dissemination of orders, as increasing
planning time at lower levels will inherently reduce risk during execution. Subordinates immediately
acknowledge receipt of the higher order. If possible, the higher commander and staff brief the order to
subordinate commanders in person. The commander and staff conduct confirmation briefings with
subordinates immediately afterwards, ensuring complete understanding. Confirmation briefings can be
conducted collaboratively with several commanders at the same time or with single commanders. These
briefings may be conducted in person or by other means including radio, telephone, or video teleconference.

RAPID DECISION-MAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS

4-67. The rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP) is a technique that commanders and
their staffs commonly use during execution. While identified here with a specific name and method, the
approach is not new; its use in the Army is well established and tested. The RDSP is closely tied to the real-
time level of risk management integration (see Chapter 1). Both the RDSP and the real-time level of risk
management integration are designed to enable the user to make the best decisions possible in a compressed
timeframe. These skills can only be developed through training and practical use on a regular basis.
Commanders, staff, and every individual best develops this capability through training, practice, and review.
When using the RDSP technique, the following considerations apply:
 Rapid is often more important than detailed analysis.
 Much of it may be mental rather than written.
 It should become a battle drill for the current operations integration cells, future operations cells,
or both.
4-68. While the MDMP seeks the optimal solution, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the RDSP seeks a
timely and effective solution within the commander’s intent. Using the RDSP lets leaders avoid the time-
consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing COAs. Under the RDSP, leaders
combine their experience and intuition to reach situational understanding quickly. Based on this, they develop
and refine acceptable COAs.
4-69. The RDSP facilitates continuously integrating and synchronizing the warfighting functions to address
ever-changing situations. It meets the following criteria for making effective decisions during execution:
 It is comprehensive, integrating all warfighting functions.
 It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander’s intent
and concept of operations.
 It allows rapid changes to the order or mission.
 It is continuous, allowing commanders to react immediately to opportunities and threats.

4-70. The RDSP is based on an existing order and the commander’s priorities as expressed in that order.
The RDSP includes five steps. The first two may be performed in any order, including concurrently. The last
three are performed interactively until commanders identify and decide on a COA (see figure 4-4). While a
decision maker must consider the hazards in each of the steps, RM should be implemented in whole, using
the real-time level of application, during the latter three steps of the process.

4-16 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Application to the Military Decision-Making Process and Rapid Decision-Making Process

Figure 4-4. Rapid decision-making and synchronization process

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 4-17

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 Appendix A
Sample DD Form 2977 and Instructions

This appendix discusses requirements for documenting deliberate risk management. It

describes the overall structure of the prescribed form. It supports application of risk
management techniques in tactical tasks by illustrating use of the prescribed form.

DOCUMENTING RISK MANGEMENT

A-1. DD Form 2977 is the Army’s standard form for deliberate risk assessment. Aviation; explosive;
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear; and other highly technical activities may require additional
specialized documentation. However, when coordination may occur across sections, commands, or services,
DD Form 2977 is the standard for the majority of Army and joint operations. It allows units to track hazards
and risks in a logical manner. Army forces use this form to document RM steps taken during planning,
preparation, and execution of any type of operation, including training and combat. DD Form 2977 is
designed for the entire Army and the other Services. It provides standardization for joint operations and
assignments. It may be filled out electronically or free hand. It is the standard way of capturing the
information analyzed during the five steps of RM. It helps the user in thinking through the five steps and then
sharing the resulting assessment. It is a living document. Pen and pencil changes on hard copies are acceptable
and encouraged since changes will occur during operations.

STRUCTURE OF THE FORM

A-2. DD Form 2977 is available electronically at [Link] and may be generated, routed,
and approved by users across all service components at [Link] DD Form 2977 consists
of three or more pages (see examples in figures A-1 through A-6, beginning on page A-4). The first page
provides areas for identifying the operation or mission, preparer information, an area to capture information
used in the five steps of RM, identification of the overall residual risk level, and approval authority
information. Block 1 (Mission/Task Description) should include the date or dates of the mission, whereas
block 2 (Date) expresses the date the form was prepared. Blocks 4 through 9 may be reproduced or reduced
by row through the use of the (+) and (-) buttons. New rows will be placed below all existing rows and
reductions will always occur from the top. The user may reproduce these blocks as many times as needed to
capture all tasks, subtasks, and identified hazards. The page following block 12 provides a standard risk
assessment matrix, an area for review (used for ongoing operations), an area to capture feedback and lessons
learned, and an area for additional comments or remarks. The last page provides instructions for completing
each block of the form. Several blocks will expand in order to capture all input from the preparer or approval
authority. Block expansion, coupled with additional blocks 4 through 9 will often result in additional form
pages. Page numbers, found at the bottom of the pages, will change as needed to account for expansion.

EXAMPLES OF OPERATIONAL USE OF DD FORM 2977

A-3. This appendix presents a road march scenario, an aviation scenario, and a tactical field artillery
scenario. Each scenario is accompanied by a form with sample data. Table A-1 is the legend for each of the
figures accompanying each scenarios.

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 A-1

Appendix A

Table A-1. Legend for Appendix A figures

1LT first lieutenant 1SG first sergeant
AR Army regulation ASO aviation safety officer
ATP Army techniques publication BN battalion
CDR commander COL colonel
CPT captain EH extremely high
FARP forward arming and refueling point FM field manual
H high L low
LD line of departure LTC lieutenant colonel
M medium MED medical
NCO noncommissioned officer NCOIC noncommissioned officer in command
NVG night vision goggles OIC officer in command
OPORD operation order PCC precombat check
PCI precombat inspection PMCS preventive maintenance checks and
services
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants S-2 battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3 battalion or brigade operations staff officer SOP standard operating procedure
TB technical bulletin TC training circular
TM technical manual

APPLICATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN TACTICAL TASKS

A-4. RM is a universal process used for managing risk at every level of effort from the individual to large
units or organizations. Its application is blind to the cause of the hazard. Whether it comes directly as the
result of an enemy action or threat-based activity or as the result of other factors (hazard-based), RM attempts
to identify, assess, and control factors that may adversely affect the capabilities of a military unit or
organization. Additionally, RM application ensures the leader at the appropriate level approves the action or
operation.

Note. The risk approval authority may be different within different theatres or commands.
Commanders may reserve the right to approve certain missions (despite a lower residual risk).

A-5. This appendix provides general, notional examples. They are not deliberate risk assessments that have
been used in operations. To view deliberate RM worksheets that have been used in operations, access the
United States Army Combat Readiness Center’s Joint Risk Assessment Tool at [Link]

TACTICAL ROAD MARCH SCENARIO

A-6. This notional tactical road march scenario, page A-2–A-3, is the basis for the sample DD Form 2977
illustrated in figures A-1 and A-2, pages A-4 and A-5. Only the first two pages of the sample are shown.
Legend for figures is in table A-1.

Conduct a Tactical Road March

Unit’s mission. Company A, 3-69 Armor, conducts a tactical road march along ROUTE
PACKERS to occupy the zone of separation designated by the United Nations no later
than 03002Z July 20XX, to conduct peace enforcement operations.

Situation. The battalion intelligence staff officer developed a modified combined

obstacle overlay and produced an obstacle and mine overlay indicating the presence
of many known (marked) and unknown (unmarked) obstacles and minefields

A-2 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Sample DD Form 2977 and Instructions

throughout your area of operations and spanning your route of march. Intelligence
indicates enemy armed forces are operating in three-to-five person reconnaissance
teams. Contact with the enemy is unlikely, but if made, the enemy is expected to break
contact and not fight.

Conditions. As the company commander of A Company, 3-69 Armor, you have just
received a warning order dated 011400 July 20XX from your battalion commander.
The unit has been in country for ten days and is combat ready. The battalion conducted
extensive pre-deployment training. It is prepared for the terrain, consisting of
moderately sized rolling hills and cool, wet conditions. The roads are unimproved, with
sharp curves and steep embankments. Temperatures have been in the mid-50s to 60s
during the day and mid-40s at night, with four straight days of rain.

Facts.
 The company commander and platoon leaders have been assigned ten months.
 The company is task-organized into two tank platoons and one mechanized platoon
with an engineer section (with combat engineer vehicles and armored combat
earthmovers, an air defense artillery section, and a military police section).
 The two tank platoons do not have mine rollers.
 The two tank platoons and mechanized platoon are used to working together.
 The other elements were assigned when you entered the theater.
 All vehicles are in good condition.
 Map reconnaissance indicates the objective is 20 kilometers (12 miles) away.

Mission analysis.
 Terrain and weather. The roads are unimproved, with sharp curves and steep
embankments. They are generally bordered by open terrain that would provide little
cover and concealment for dismounted troops. The weather forecast calls for rain to
continue several days. Overcast conditions will limit natural illumination.
 Enemy. Enemy armed forces are operating in three-to-five person reconnaissance
teams equipped with direct weapons (individual weapons, machine guns, and a very
limited number of outdated anti-tank missiles and anti-armor weapons).
 Troops. Experience level is high within the tank and mechanized units. The
experience level of the troops recently attached to you is unknown.
 Civil considerations. The area is sparsely populated and the local nationals are
supportive of our mission.
 Time. 13 hours to start point.

Risk assessment.
 Threat-based risks. Land mine potential; small arms antitank rocket ambush.
 Hazard-based risks. Rain and cold, limited visibility, limited surface traction, narrow
roads, fatigue of troops, and inexperienced personnel.

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 A-3

Appendix A

Figure A-1. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical road march scenario (page 1)

A-4 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Sample DD Form 2977 and Instructions

Figure A-2. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical road march scenario (page 2)

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 A-5

Appendix A

TACTICAL AVIATION SCENARIO

A-7. This notional tactical aviation scenario, page A-6–A-7, is the basis for the sample DD Form 2977
illustrated in figures A-3, A-4, and A-5, pages A-8, A-9, and A-10. Only the first three pages of the sample
are shown. Legend for the figures is in table A-1, page A-2.

Relocate a Forward Area Refueling Point

Unit's Mission. The petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ordnance platoon (3-5 Platoon),
F Company, 1-3 Combat Aviation Brigade (Attack), will conduct forward area refueling
point (FARP) operations to support a nighttime AH-64D Apache Longbow deep attack
mission. The FARP will relocate using four 2-3 Combat Aviation Brigade UH-60 Black
Hawk helicopters. Movement will be from (NK 560029) to (NK 598031) and have the
FARP operational no later than 040230 Sep XX. Expected operation at location will be
12–24 hours.

Situation. The Peoples' Army of Moldavia has stepped up operating tempo in your
area. Since their last forward advance, enemy artillery has become a greater threat to
the assets of 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade. Enemy strength continues to increase with
new conscripts. Friendly patrols have discovered new enemy positions constructed for
air defense artillery or surface-to-air missiles. If enemy sites become operational,
friendly aviation operations will be in serious jeopardy.

Conditions. The F Company 3-5 Platoon leader was at the National Training Center
two weeks and has been conducting tactical tasks only three days. It is now 032100
Sep XX, and orders are to emplace a jump FARP and have it operational by 040230
Sep XX. Four UH-60s are on site to move all equipment and eight personnel to the
location. There are four 500-gallon fuel blivets, and the requirement is to operate four
refueling points at once, using two forward air refueling equipment systems. The
platoon is seriously overextended, with other commitments to the battalion and only
eight people to accomplish this mission. Two have recently transferred in from 16th
Combat Aviation Brigade, have had minimal training with the unit, and have never
conducted FARP operations with AH-64Ds. The weather has been dry and hot, with
no forecasted precipitation. The temperature is averaging 93 degrees Fahrenheit (34
degrees Celsius) during the day and 68 degrees Fahrenheit (20 degrees Celsius) at
night. There will be moderate illumination during the operation.

Facts. As the 3-5 Platoon leader for four months, you have planned and participated
in two field training exercises before this National Training Center rotation. The squad
leaders have conducted risk assessments; therefore, you know the following:
 Results from the safety risk assessment identified 10 percent of the platoon's
Soldiers at a high or extremely high risk level for accidents (below standards due to
lack of training and self-discipline issues).
 The platoon has supported numerous FARP and petroleum, oil, and lubricants
support missions over the past year, but only two were night operations using night-
vision devices.
 The new FARP location has sparse vegetation and scrub brush. Dust and brownout
conditions are likely. No one from the platoon is familiar with this site.

A-6 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Sample DD Form 2977 and Instructions

Mission analysis.
 Mission. Relocate FARP operations to support an AH-64 night deep attack.
 Enemy. Possesses indirect artillery with capability to effectively engage jump FARP
site and possible air defense artillery and surface-to-air missile capabilities. Enemy
scout elements with modified civilian pick-up trucks and small arms may be in the
area.
 Terrain. Plateau affords easy access, but is exposed on all sides. The weather is dry
and hot, with no forecasted precipitation. The temperature is averaging 93 degrees
Fahrenheit (34 degrees Celsius) during the day and 68 degrees Fahrenheit (20
degrees Celsius) at night. There will be moderate moon illumination throughout the
operational period.
 Troops. Two of your troops have little or no experience performing this task. Most of
the Soldiers are first term enlistees with less than 3 years of service. Previous
training assessments indicate acceptable levels of proficiency for six of the Soldiers.
Number of available Soldiers to accomplish the mission is limited due to
overextended support commitments.
 Time. Lack of training time due to enemy threat.

Risk assessment.
 Threat-based risks. Air defense artillery threat; terrain exposed to enemy fire (direct
and indirect).
 Hazard-based risks. Insufficient and inexperienced personnel; limited visibility and
unfamiliar terrain.

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 A-7

Appendix A

Figure A-3. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical aviation scenario (page 1)

A-8 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Sample DD Form 2977 and Instructions

Figure A-4. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical aviation scenario (page 2)

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 A-9

Appendix A

Figure A-5. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical aviation scenario (page 3)

A-10 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Sample DD Form 2977 and Instructions

TACTICAL FIELD ARTILLERY SCENARIO

A-8. This notional field artillery scenario, page A-11–A-12, is the basis for the sample DD Form 2977
illustrated in figures A-6 and A-7, pages A-13 and A-14. Only the first two pages of the sample form are
shown. Legend for figures is in table A-1, page A-2.

Deliver Field Artillery Fires

Unit's Mission. Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 138th Field Artillery Regiment provides
direct support field artillery fires to 3d Brigade Combat Team's movement to contact by
240400 Feb XX, to locate and destroy the Slinker Division of the Mudolvian Republican
Guard.

Situation. It is now 211200 Feb XX. Bravo Battery has been in the southwest Asian
theater since 29 December. The enemy's Slinker Division has been preparing and
improving defensive positions, incorporating tank ditches, minefields, and other
obstacle belts since late September. After almost four weeks of air strikes, intelligence
estimates enemy combat power at 85 percent with full operational capability to employ
persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents by 122mm artillery.

Conditions. Bravo Battery is at 102 percent personnel strength. Ninety-five percent of

its Soldiers have never participated in a combat operation. In November, the battery
received the new M109A7 Paladin. The first training exercise (firing) with this system
was on 3 January. Gun crews are well trained in crew drills, but section chiefs still need
training on the new electronic equipment that came with the M109A7. Soldiers are
acclimated to cool night weather in the desert. The predicted weather for 24 February
is strong wind (over 30 knots) causing sand storms, with visibility less than 50 yards.
No precipitation is predicted.

Facts. The commander has been in command for thirteen months, and Soldiers have
fired over 3,000 rounds safely in the M109A6, but they have fired only 250 rounds
from the M109A7. Based on training and experience, you know the following:
 The Slinker Division has excellent counter-battery acquisition systems and is well
trained in processing counterfire missions.
 The dust and wet weather has caused numerous failures of the electronic devices
on the M109A7 and in your fire direction center systems.
 During the mission readiness exercise, evaluators found several performance
issues within the fire direction center. As a result, the commander rates the battery's
fire direction center as partially trained in manual fire direction procedures.
 Battery has not conducted collective training with other 3d Brigade Combat Team
maneuver elements on breaching or reducing obstacles. The battalion has no
organic engineer assets.
From experience at the Combat Maneuver Training Center and National Training
Center, leaders know there will be little time for sleep or rest in a movement-to-contact
operation.

Mission Analysis.
 Mission. Provide conventional artillery fires in direct support of 3d Brigade Combat
Team’s movement to contact.

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 A-11

Appendix A

 Enemy. The Slinker Division is at 85 percent combat power. It has been preparing
and improving defensive positions and incorporating obstacles (tank ditches,
minefields, and obstacle belts). It is fully capable of delivering persistent and non-
persistent chemical agents by 122mm artillery. It is well trained in counterfire
missions.
 Terrain. May encounter enemy obstacles. Severe winds (30+ knots), sandstorms,
and dust may limit visibility to less than 50 yards. Dust and wind-driven rain can
cause equipment malfunctions.
 Troops. Personnel strength is at 102 percent. Ninety-five percent of the Soldiers
have never participated in combat operations. The fire direction center is partially
trained in manual fire direction procedures. Crews are well trained in crew drills;
however, they lack experience with the new equipment. The Soldiers are acclimated.
 Time. Approximately three days to prepare.

Risk Assessment.
 Threat-based risks. Enemy obstacles; enemy counter-battery capabilities.
 Hazard-based risks. Inexperienced personnel; fire direction center training needed;
Soldier fatigue; adverse environment.

A-12 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Sample DD Form 2977 and Instructions

Figure A-6. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical field artillery scenario (page 1)

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 A-13

Appendix A

Figure A-7. Sample DD Form 2977 for tactical field artillery scenario (page 2)

A-14 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Glossary

The glossary lists terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint
definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which ATP 5-19 is the
proponent are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent publication for other terms
is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAR after action review
ADP Army doctrine publication
AR Army regulation
ATP Army techniques publication
COA course of action
DA Department of the Army
DD Department of Defense (form)
FARP forward area refueling point
FM field manual
FRAGORD fragmentary order
HQ headquarters
JP joint publication
MDMP military decision-making process
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, and civil considerations
OPORD operation order
PPE personal protective equipment
RDSP rapid decision-making and syncronization process
RM risk management
SOP standard operating procedure
TLP troop leading procedure
WARNORD warning order

SECTION II – TERMS
Army leader
Anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people by
providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.
(ADP 6-22)
command and control warfighting function
The related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of
combat power. (ADP 3-0)

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 Glossary-1

Glossary

commander's intent
A clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that
supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting
commanders act to achieve the commander’s desired results without further orders, even when the
operation does not unfold as planned. (JP 3-0)
constraint
(Army) A restriction placed on the command by a higher comman. A constraint dictates an action or
inaction, thus restricting the freedom of action of a subordinate commander. (FM 6-0)
*control
(Army) An action taken to eliminate a hazard or to reduce its risk.
end state
The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 3-0)
*exposure
The frequency and length of time personnel and equipment are subjected to a hazard or hazards.
fratricide
The unintentional killing or wounding of friendly or neutral personnel by friendly firepower.
(ADP 3-37)
hazard
A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of
equipment or property; or mission degradation. (JP 3-33)
intelligence preparation of the battlefield
The systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil
considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. (ATP 2-01.3)
military decision-making process
An iterative planning methodology to understand the situation and mission, develop a course of action,
and produce an operation plan or order. (ADP 5-0)
mission command
(Army) The Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making
and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. (ADP 6-0)
operations process
The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing,
executing, and continuously assessing the operation. (ADP 5-0)
*probability
The likelihood an event will occur; it is assessed as frequent, likely, occasional, seldom, or unlikely.
*risk
Probability and severity driven chance of loss, caused by threat or other hazards.
risk assessment
The identification and assessment of hazards (first two steps of risk management process). (JP 3-26)
*risk decision
A commander, leader, or individual’s determination to accept or not accept the risk(s) associated with
an action he or she will take or will direct others to take.
risk management
The process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with
mission benefits. (JP 3-0)
*risk tolerance
The level of risk the responsible commander is willing to accept.

Glossary-2 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Glossary

running estimate
The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is
proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.
(ADP 5-0)
*severity
The expected consequences of an event in terms of injury, property damage, or other mission-
impairing factors; it is assessed as catastrophic, critical, moderate, or negligible.
threat
Any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States
forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. (ADP 3-0)
troop leading procedures
A dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an
operation. (ADP 5-0)

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 Glossary-3

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 References

All websites accessed 1 July 2021.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. August 2021.
FM 1-02.1 Operational Terms. 09 March 2021.
FM 1-02.2 Military Symbols. 10 November 2020

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online at [Link]
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 17 January 2017.
JP 3-26. Joint Combating Terrorism. 30 July 2020.
JP 3-33. Joint Task Force Headquarters. 31 January 2018.
JP 5-0. Joint Planning. 01 December 2020.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army publications are available online at [Link]
ADP 3-0. Operations. 31 July 2019.
ADP 3-37. Protection. 31 July 2019.
ADP 5-0. The Operations Process. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 31 July 2019.
ADP 6-22. Army Leadership and the Profession. 31 July 2019.
AR 385-10. The Army Safety Program. 24 February 2017.
ATP 2-01.3. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 01 March 2019.
FM 6-0. Commander and Staff Organization and Operations. 05 May 2014.
FM 6-27/MCTP 11-10C. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare. 07 August 2019.

WEBSITES
United States Army Combat Readiness Center website. [Link]
United States Army Combat Readiness Center Risk Assessment Tool. [Link]

PRESCRIBED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, Department of Defense forms are available via the Executive Services
Directorate website at [Link]
DD Form 2977. Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet.

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 References-1

References

REFERENCED FORMS
Unless otherwise indicated, DA forms are available on the Army Publishing Directorate (APD)
website at [Link]
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.

Index-2 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

control development, 1-50–1-59, See also evaluate,

A
4-28, 4-49 develop initial themes and
accept no unnecessary risk messages, 4-28
(principle), 1-9 control effectiveness criteria, 1-57
controls in orders from higher develop the initial information
adequate planning time for collection plan, 4-25
deliberate risk assessment, headquarters, 4-8
3-12, 4-12, 4-26, 4-66 coordination of controls with E
allocate available time, 3-15 adjacent units, 4-9–4-12 educational controls, 1-51
apply risk management cyclically course of action approval—step 6 estimate the expected severity of
and continuously (principle), of the MDMP, 4-58–4-60 an occurrence, 1-39–1-43
1-10, 2-1–2-3, 4-20, 4-54 course of action comparison— estimate the probability of an
appropriate command level for step 5 of the MDMP, 4-56–4-57 occurrence, 1-33–1-38
risk decisions, 1-7–1-8, 1-11, course of action development— evaluate (within step 5 of risk
4-8–4-10, 4-19, 4-60 step 3 of the MDMP, 4-38–4-54 management), 1-67–1-72, 4-38
and residual level of risk, 1-60 critical severity estimate, 1-41 evaluation criteria, 4-38–4-43
assess the hazards—step two of cyclical and continuous risk
risk management, 1-29–1-48, exposure definition, 1-34
management (principle), 1-10
1-61–1-62, 4-21–4-23 extremely high risk, 1-45
D
assessment steps of risk F–G
management, 1-14 DD Form 2977, 1-57, 1-73–1-74,
See also identify the hazards 2-10, 3-12, 4-22–4-33, 4-65 frequent probability estimate, 1-34
and assess the hazards A-1–A-2 H
DD Form 2977 examples, A-5,
B hazard definition, 1-17
A-6, A-7, A-8
begin risk management (within hazard elimination controls, 1-53–
deliberate risk management 1-56
step 2 of the MDMP), 4-21–
application level, 1-12
4-23 high risk, 1-46
determine constraints, 4-19
C determine risk level, 1-31–1-32, I–K
catastrophic severity estimate, 1-44–1-48 identify critical facts and develop
1-40 determine specified, implied, and assumptions, 4-20
command and support essential tasks, 4-17 identify the hazards—step 1 of
relationships, 3-19 develop a proposed mission risk management, 1-17–1-28,
commander’s intent, 3-20 statement, 4-30 1-67–1-68, 4-20
and subordinate commanders,
complete the plan—step 6 of TLP, develop and issue initial
4-11
3-27 commander’s intent, 4-32–4-33
implement controls—step 4 of risk
concept of operations, 3-17, 3-21, develop and issue initial planning
4-49, 4-61 management, , 1-64
guidance, 4-34
implementing controls within step
conduct initial risk assessment, develop commander’s critical
3 of TLP, 3-22
3-14, 4-31 information requirements and
during IPB, 4-16 essential elements of friendly inadequate planning time for
conduct reconnaissance—step 5 information, 4-24 deliberate risk assessment,
3-13
of TLP, 3-25–3-26 develop controls and make risk
decisions—step 3 of risk initiate movement—step 4 of TLP,
control categories, 1-50–1-56 3-23–3-24
management, 1-49–1-63, 4-18
control definition, 1-8
develop course of action
evaluation criteria, 4-35

09 November 2021 ATP 5-19 Index-1

Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

integrate risk management into all orders accompanied by DD Form risk decision definition, 1-7
phases of missions and 2977, 3-12 risk levels, 1-31–1-32, 1-45–1-48
operations (principle), 1-6
P–Q risk management definition, 1-1
issue a warning order (within step
2 of the MDMP), 4-36 parallel planning correlated with risk management emphasis in the
risk management steps, 3-4– MDMP, 4-2
issue a warning order—step 2 of 3-5
TLP, 3-16 risk management in TLP, 3-10
perform initial, 4-15–4-16 risk tolerance definition, 1-7
issue the order—step 7 of TLP,
3-28 physical controls, 1-50 risk tolerance in orders, 4-6
present the mission analysis See also risk levels
L briefing, 4-31
likely probability estimate, 1-35
S
probability definition, 1-30
low risk, 1-48 seldom probability estimate, 1-37
probability levels, 1-31–1-36
severity definition, 1-30
M R severity levels, 1-37–1-41
make a tentative plan—step 3 of rapid decision-making and supervise (within step 5 of risk
TLP, 3-17–3-22 synchronization process, 4-67– management), 1-66–1-68
make risk decisions at the 4-70
supervise and evaluate—step 5 of
appropriate level (principle), real-time risk assessment (during risk management, 1-65–1-74
1-7–1-8 TLP), 3-13
See also develop controls and supervise and refine the plan—
make risk decisions real-time risk management, 4-67– step 8 of TLP, 3-29–3-30
4-68
make risk decisions—in step 3 of
real-time risk management
T
risk management, 1-63
application level, 1-13 task organization, 3-18, 4-50
MDMP steps correlated with risk
receipt of mission—step 1 of the TLP steps, 3-2
management steps, 4-2–4-3
MDMP, 4-5–4-12 TLP steps correlated with risk
medium risk, 1-47
receive the mission—step 1 of management steps, 3-3–3-5
mission analysis—step 2 of the TLP, 3-11–3-15
MDMP, 4-13–4-37 U–V
residual risk levels, 1-60–1-62
mission variables in risk unlikely probability estimate, 1-38
management, 1-20–1-28, 4-7 review available assets and
update the plan for the use of
identify resource shortfalls, 4-18
moderate severity estimate, 1-42 available time, 4-26–4-27
review facts and assumptions,
N 4-37 W–Z
negligible severity estimate, 1-43 risk assessment definition, 1-13 warning order and risk
risk assessment matrix, 1-29, 1-44 management planning, 3-6–3-9,
O 4-11–4-12
risk assessment worksheets,
occasional probability estimate, warning order example, 3-16, 4-36
4-21–4-23, 4-25
1-36

Index-2 ATP 5-19 09 November 2021

 ATP 5-19
09 November 2021

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

MARK F. AVERILL
Acting Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2130803

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve. Distributed in
electronic media only (EMO).
PIN: 104084-000