SYMBIOSIS LAW SCHOOL

HYDERABAD
CONSTITUENT OF
SYMBIOSIS INTERNATIONAL (DEEMED
UNIVERSITY) PUNE

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

(CLINICAL COURSE III)
BA LLB
ACADEMIC YEAR- 2022-23
FIFTH YEAR

NAME: HAOVANGDONGLIEN KIPGEN

PRN: 18010323055
DIV: A
BATCH: 2018-23
PROGRAMME: BA LLB

OFFICIAL EMAIL ID: Haovangdonglien_kipgen@[Link]

Mobile No: 9612533053

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 List of cases

1. R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma, AIR 2000 SC 2912

2. Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC

110

3. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45

4. . Bhupinder Kumar Sharma v. Bar Association, Pathankot, (2001) 1 SCC 470
5. . Rajendra V. Pai v. Alex Fernandes, (2002) 4 SCC 212
6. . Dhanraj Singh Choudhary v. Nathulal Vishwakarma (2012) 1 SCC 741

7. An Advocate v. Bar Council of India, AIR 1989 SC 245

8. Radha Mohan Lal V Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) 2003 SCC OnLine
SC 199
9. HIMAKAT ALI KHAN V IISHWAR PRASHAD AARYA AND OTHERS…
(1997) 3 SUPREME COURT CASES 131
10. P.D GUPTA V. RAM MURTI (AIR 1998 SC 283)
11. AMICUS CURIAE V. PRASHANT BHUSHAN 2020 SCC OnLine SC 651
12. Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh v. Karupati Satyanarayana, AIR 2003 SC 175
13. Kaushal Kishore Awasthi v. Balwant Singh Thakur, AIR 2018 SC 199
14. D. S. Dalal v. State Bank of India and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1608
15. Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, (1976) 2 SCC 291

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 1. R.D. Saxena v. Balram Prasad Sharma, AIR 2000 SC 2912
Facts
Mr. Saxena, the appellant, was an attorney licenced to practise in Madhya Pradesh. The State
Cooperative Bank had hired him on a retainer basis. A few years later, the bank ended the
retainership and demanded the handover of every one of its papers and documents. The
Appellant provided them a combined bill of about INR 97,000 rather than providing such a
refund. He also told the bank that he wouldn't give up the data and files until the debt was
fully cleared. Ultimately, the parties' attempt to negotiate ended in failure. The State Bar
Council received complaints from the bank. The issue was forwarded to the Bar Council of
India since the State Bar Council's one-year window had passed. The Bar Council of India's
Disciplinary Committee found the appellant liable for professional misconduct, fined him
INR 1,000, and put an 18-month suspension on his practise. The Supreme Court then heard
an appeal in the case.
Issues
Whether the action of retaining of files and documents by the advocate results in professional
misconduct?

Analysis
The appellant claimed that because his provided invoices was not yet repaid, he can exercise
the "right of lien" over the bank's documents and records.  The Bar Council of India,
nevertheless, argued that because the bank had been a public institution, the Appellant had an
obligation to restore their documents. The Bar Council of India stated that the Appellant had
engaged in professional misconduct and needed to be disciplined as a result. The bank, on the
other hand, however argued that there were no charges left for it to pay, even though the
appellant had included increased costs in his invoices. They argued that there was no such
lien for an advocate.
According to Article 22 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court declared that every petitioner
in the nation has the right to choose an attorney of his choice. Furthermore it mentioned that
this included the freedom to choose a new advocate without getting prevented by the need to
keep certain files or documents. In its reasoning, the Court also made note of the fact that
certain detaining only due to unpaid fees constituted a professional misconduct offence as
defined by the Advocates Act of 1961. The Court further supported its stance by using the
Indian Contract Act, 1871's definition of "goods," concluding that a client's documents are
not "goods" and therefore cannot be subject to a lien. The Appellant had a moral obligation to
help customers within the bounds of professional and ethical behaviour, the Court claimed.
The Appellant's actions were unlawful and required retribution since the Bar Council of India

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Rules solely authorise an advocate to deduct a client's money on account of fees—not a right
of lien over his papers or records.
Conclusion and decision of the court
The Bar Council of India's determination that the appellant had engaged in professional
misconduct was supported by the court, which rejected the appeal. The Advocates Act of
1961 calls on all advocates to abide by a code of ethics, which the Court also noted.

2. Pandurang Dattatraya Khandekar v. Bar Council of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC

110

Facts
A group of 12 attorneys filed a suit against two advocates. The two lawyers, Pandurang
Dattatraya Khandekar and A.N. Agavane, who are members of the Maharashtra Bar Council,
have been charged with professional misconduct. They were accused of arranging for a
couple to remarry even though they hadn't signed a legally binding divorce agreement.
Additionally, they had asked for a fee of Rs. 100 in consideration for an affidavit they
allegedly swore under oath before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Pune, in which they
claimed to have dissolved their previous marriages and had only thereafter been married
according to Hindu rites and customs. They were told that this would suffice to establish both
their marriage and prior divorce.
Second, it was claimed that the attorneys wrote an affidavit on part of their aged client saying
that she had given her granddaughter the deed to her property. Other attorneys instructed the
client that stamp duty and registration fees had to be paid based on the land's market worth,
but they advised against "spending an exorbitant amount on stamp duty and registration fees."
The advocates had supplied bad legal advice in both cases. The Bar Council of India's
Disciplinary Committee took up the case and determined that this constituted professional
misconduct. Both attorneys were barred from working for a two-month term by the
committee. The Supreme Court heard an appeal that was recommended.
Issues
Whether the advocates were guilty of professional misconduct?
Whether the word Wrong advice and improper legal advice had a difference?
Analysis
The Supreme Court distinguished between bad legal counsel and inaccurate legal advice. The
Court ruled that professional misconduct could not exist when there was carelessness but no
moral impropriety. However, an advocate would commit professional misconduct if they
acted negligently and with moral turpitude in order to jeopardise the interests of their client.
The Bar Council of India has stated that the preparation of a false affidavit for the client in
the present case constituted professional misconduct. The role of the clients themselves in the
swearing-in of an affidavit had not been taken into account by the Bar Council. The Supreme
Court highlighted how the client gave the attorneys specific directions for the affidavit, and
that the client was prepared to swear to it. The Court ruled that although the evidence

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suggested that the advocates' behaviour was questionable, the Bar Council erred in
characterising it as professional misconduct. The Bar Councils of India and Maharashtra were
asked by the Supreme Court to coordinate and teach practitioners of the Bar who serve in
these settings. The Court further ruled that no lawyer may engage in any conduct that would
in any manner damage the public's trust in the "fidelity, fairness, and dignity" of the practice
of law.

Conclusion and decision of the court

The court determined that the evidence used by the Disciplinary Committee in this case was
more than sufficient. Even when the Disciplinary Committee concluded that the Appellant
had given inaccurate advice, there is still some disagreement about whether this constituted
professional misconduct. Considering this, the Court stated that it was unable to determine
whether or not there was moral turpitude or delinquency with "strict correctness." Therefore,
the Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Disciplinary committee and the Bar Council.

3. Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45

Facts
A working paper on behalf of the Bar Council of India was distributed at the National
Conference of members of the Bar Council of India and State Bar Councils. The working
paper addressed the issue of the legal strike. The article noted that bar associations had called
strikes in the past on both a state and national level in a number of occasions. The working
paper further stated that even though lawyers have the right to strike or boycott courts,
definite restricted circumstances must always be positioned on when practitioners should re-
establish their roles and the steps which need to be brought. This is because during a strike,
lawyers themselves suffer because they lose out on work.
In this instance, there were petitions arguing against the existence of a strike by attorneys.
While asserting that attorneys have this right, the U.P. Bar Council also believed that the
States and the Bar Council of India have the authority to penalise the practise. The Supreme
Court was asked to rule on the situation.
Issues
Whether an advocate can go on a strike?

Analysis
The Supreme Court cited two of its prior rulings on related matters, Mahabir Prasad Singh v.
Jacks Aviation (P) Ltd. (1999) 1 SCC 37 and Ramon Services Private Limited v. Subhash
Kapoor and Ors. (2001) 1 SCC 118. According to the Court, a lawyer who calls for a strike or
participates in one is acting improperly and negligently in regard to the interests of his or her
client. The Court further pointed out that by interfering with the courts' ability to operate

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efficiently, these attorneys contribute to the delay in the administration of justice.
Furthermore, the Court noted that only the U.P. Bar Council had argued that there was a right
to strike, adding that doing so would not be a behaviour that would invite disciplinary
punishment. Additionally, the Bar Council of India in this matter also had argued that there
are additional grounds why attorneys miss work, which include concerns with the bar's
independence, integrity, and dignity, legislation passed without addressing bar councils, and
difficulties relating to specific bar sections. The court disregarded the U.P. Bar Council's
position and ruled that no bar council, state or national, was authorised to advocate for a
strike or boycotting of the courts by defaming court procedures. In previous instances before
High Courts, the Bar Council of India has likewise expressed its opinion that it is against
using a strike, save in the rarest of situations endangering the dignity and independence of the
court and the Bar. It had also stated that, even in a rare instance, strikes ought to be orderly
and brief in order to minimise disruptions for the general public.
According to the Supreme Court's prior ruling and the Bar Council of India's position,
disciplinary action needs to be taken by the relevant Bar Council if such an act is committed.
Conclusion and decision
The Supreme Court ruled that attorneys do not have the power to advocate for a boycott of
courts or to go on strike. Furthermore, it was decided that no bar association or bar council
could allow gatherings where such strikes or boycotts were being called for. Accordingly, the
petitions were adjudicated.

4. Bhupinder Kumar Sharma v. Bar Association, Pathankot, (2001) 1 SCC 470

Facts of the case
This was a case regarding disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Bhupinder Kumar Sharma, an
advocate enrolled with the Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana. Mr. Sharma was engaged in
an alternate business of photocopying and documentation in the court compound, and acting
as the proprietor of a Coal Briquettes business. The Bar Association of Pathankot made a
complaint to the State Bar Council of Punjab and Haryana, which constituted a Disciplinary
Committee.
The Disciplinary Committee ruled that Mr. Sharma’s name should be removed from the State
Bar Council’s rolls. Mr. Sharma appealed the order before the Bar Council of India, which
upheld the State Bar Council’s order. Mr. Sharma preferred an appeal before the Supreme
Court of India under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
Issues
The Supreme Court had to consider two questions. Firstly, whether Mr. Sharma had
committed professional misconduct. Secondly, whether the punishment for such misconduct
has to be proportional to the nature of misconduct involved, and the circumstances of the
person who had committed it.
Anlysis

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The Court upheld that Bar Council of India’s view, that the rules of the Bar Council of India
clearly specified that no advocate can be a full time salaried employed person or a person
carrying on any other business. He should not be personally engaged in any business but as
per the rules. In the BCI’s view, the nature of such business is inconsistent with the dignity or
nobility of profession.
The Court stated that Mr. Sharma had not only engaged in three concurrent businesses in
violation of his conditions for enrolment with the State Bar Council, but had also submitted a
false affidavit regarding such engagements to the State Bar Council. This amounted to the
suppression of material facts. The Supreme Court focused on the nobility of the legal
profession, and stated that engaging in alternative businesses while being enrolled as an
advocate disrespected and struck at the very sanctity of such nobility. Further, suppressing
material facts and submitting false affidavits was also held as a ground to disbar someone
from continuing their enrolment with the State Bar Council.
While considering the degree of punishment to be imposed, the Court held that the
circumstances of the person under scrutiny for disciplinary action should be considered. In
the instant case, as the circumstances involved a person who was suffering from partial
disability, the Court stated that the disbarment should be for a period of five years, and not
permanent.
Conclusion and decision of the Court
The Court upheld the views of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India. It held that
Mr. Sharma’s engagement in alternate businesses while being enrolled as an advocate is a
form of professional misconduct, and invited disciplinary proceedings. The Court stated that
the disbarment for such misconduct should be for a period of five years.
5. Rajendra V. Pai v. Alex Fernandes, (2002) 4 SCC 212
Facts of the case
Certain village lands were undergoing proceedings for acquisition by the Government. The
Appellant, an advocate, was also from one of the villages undergoing large scale acquisition.
Totally, there were over one hundred and fifty persons whole lands were subject to these
proceedings. As Appellant was also belonging to one of these villages, he possessed a
personal interest in defending these lands from being acquired. The villagers, on the other
hand, also put their faith in the Appellant-advocate to demand a fair compensation for their
lands being acquired.
However, after some time, three out of the one hundred and fifty persons filed a complaint
against the Appellant for professional misconduct. They stated that as an advocate, he
solicited more work from the villagers and demanded a contingent fee which depended on the
compensation that the villagers would finally receive at the conclusion of the acquisition
proceedings. They further said that the advocate attempted to identify certain persons to open
a bank account, in which he wanted the cheque for the compensation to be deposited. Further,
it was alleged that the Appellant withdrew this amount by falsely identifying himself.
Given these facts, the Appellant was held guilty for professional misconduct and violation by
the Bar Councils of Maharashtra and Goa, as per Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
Subsequently, the decision was appealed before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar

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Council of India, which stated upheld this decision. The result was that the Appellant’s name
was to be removed from the state rolls. The Appellant-advocate approached the Supreme
Court after being aggrieved by this decision.
Issues
There were two relevant issues. Firstly, whether the decision of the State Bar Council and the
Bar Council of India were valid in the case. Secondly, whether the order to remove the
advocate’s name from the rolls was proportional to the degree of contravention?
Analysis
In this case, the central consideration was that the Appellant-advocate had a personal interest
in the litigation he was involved in, and his family property was also at stake. The State Bar
Council and the Bar Council of India considered these acts to be that of professional
misconduct, and also amounted to solicitation of work. The Court also specifically relied on
the past decisions of the State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India related to these
matters.
Further, in addition to the fact that solicitation and personal interest amounted to professional
misconduct, the Court also stated that an advocate’s past conduct is also relevant in
understanding the punishment for his misconduct. Contrary to the opinion of the State Bar
Council and the Bar Council of India, the Court stated that debarment should not be
permanent. The Court stated that debarring an advocate’s entire career is extreme, and
punishment should be proportional; specifically, the court stated that, “the punishment given
to the appellant in the totality of facts and circumstances of the case is so disproportionate as
to prick the conscience of the Court.”
Further, the Court also disagreed with the opinion and approach of the State Bar Council and
the Bar Council of India that punishment is penalty; rather, the Court held that the
punishment in disciplinary proceedings is meant to deter future misconduct from the accused
and other advocates.
Conclusion and decision of the Court
The Court held that the acts by the Appellant-advocate amounted to professional misconduct.
However, the punishment was modified and reduced to seven years.

6. Dhanraj Singh Choudhary v. Nathulal Vishwakarma (2012) 1 SCC 741

Facts of the case
The Respondent in this case was a client of the Advocate (who is the Appellant in this case).
The Respondent approached the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh alleging that the Appellant
had committed professional misconduct. A Sale Deed had been attested by the Advocate, in
which he stated that “in the Western side of the saleable property, one shop adjacent in
occupation of the Respondent-complainant had been transferred by the vendor to the
Appellant-advocate by giving him the ownership right.” However, the said vendor’s father

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had already entered into another deed to make a sale of the property to the Respondent in
exchange for INR 2,00,000/- as consideration.
A suit for specific performance had also been filed for enforcing the above second sale deed.
The Appellant was aware of this. Knowing this, the Appellant had filed suit against the
Respondent on behalf of the vendor’s father, asking for the shop to be vacated as the
Respondent was actually the tenant of the vendor’s father.
The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh levied punishment
on professional misconduct. However, the State Bar Council appealed the decision before the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, which ordered the suspension of the
advocate for a period of one year. A cross-appeal filed by the Appellant-advocate before the
Bar Council of India was dismissed.
Issues
The Supreme Court of India considered three issues in this case. Firstly, if the Appellant-
advocate had actually purchased the property in question. Secondly, whether the Appellant-
advocate had filed a suit to evict the Respondent-complainant deliberately, in the name of
another person. Thirdly, whether the actions of the Appellant-advocate amount to
professional misconduct.
Analysis
In this case, the Appellant-advocate had attested an affidavit which contained facts that were
false to his knowledge. The State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India had declared this
action to be that of professional misconduct covered under Section 35 of the Advocates Act,
1961. The Supreme Court also adhered to this view. The Court relied on the case of V. C.
Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan and Ors., where the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of
India had discussed bad faith on behalf of advocates who act against their own clients by
withholding money, make false representations and deceive them.
Further, the Supreme Court stated that provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 will
not apply to the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India,
as it is not made applicable through the Advocates Act, 1961. The court further stated that
that it is essential that no compromise be made with the nobility of law which affects the faith
of the public in the rule of law. The Court echoed the Bar Council’s opinion that
“unprofessional conduct by an advocate has to be viewed seriously in light of the twin
objectives of punishment for professional misconduct which are deterrence and correction.”
The Court went on to state that in line with the opinion of the State Bar Council, the charge of
misconduct is both grave as serious as it involved an act which was not only undesirable but
highly unethical. The Appellant Advocate’s specific connivance with the vendor herein was
in utter disregard of his position as an advocate at the Court, ignoring or disregarding
professional ethics or morality. However, the Court noted that punishment or penalty was to
be levied in accordance with the degree of misconduct.
Conclusion and decision of the Court
The Supreme Court held that the Appellant-Advocate was to be suspended from his practice
for three years for professional misconduct. The Court held that to both deter and correct the

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fraudulent activity, the punishment was to ensure reinstatement of faith and respect of the
people towards the legal profession.

7. An Advocate v. Bar Council of India, AIR 1989 SC 245

Facts
In a lawsuit to collect INR 30,098/-, a lawyer was defending his client. A young colleague
had been given this case's brief at the pertinent moment. However, according to the client (the
Complainant), the lawsuit was purportedly dropped without the client's permission at a later
date, claiming that the conflict was resolved outside of court. The younger co-worker had
been practising alone throughout this period of seclusion from his senior.
The State Bar Council was contacted by the complainant. The State Bar Council's
Disciplinary Committee started investigating into the complaint, but the deadline for the
Committee to provide a decision had passed. The Bar Council of India received the matter
after that. Depending on the allegation submitted by the Complainant, the Bar Council of
India's Disciplinary Committee found the younger colleague guilty of professional
misconduct and banned his practise for three years. Nevertheless, before beginning to gather
evidence in the case, the Committee did not formulate any questions or accusations. The Bar
Council of India's Disciplinary Committee's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court of
India.
Issues
"First, is it necessary to draught a charge informing him clearly of the kind and character of
the professional wrongdoing alleged against him?
Second, can a judgement of guilt and a penalty of this kind be applied to him in the absence
of an allegation, finding of dishonesty, or mens rea? Thirdly, is it necessary to establish the
accusations and the verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Fourth, does the benefit of
the doubt theory apply?
Analysis
In this instance, when the accused advocate withdrew the lawsuit in good faith, thinking that
his client had given him permission to do so, the court established specific parameters to
determine if misconduct had occurred. To consider whether carelessness constitutes
misconduct in all circumstances, the Court cited its past rulings on advocates' negligence.
The Court ruled that because there may be penalties (such suspension and fines) as a result of
the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee of a Bar Council, they should be handled
as such. In light of this, the Court said, the "doctrine of the benefit of doubt" would apply to
such a process and direct the Disciplinary Committee's conclusion. The Court ruled that it
must be determined in each of these situations whether "negligence simpliciter would
constitute misconduct."
The State Bar Council and the Bar Council of India's methods, which involved moving
forward without charging anyone, were rejected by the court. The Disciplinary Committees
have expressed their opinions against using the theory of benefit of the doubt and proving

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facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, they had not given consideration to the
severity of the punishment in relation to the claimed misbehaviour. In its ruling, the Supreme
Court condemned these strategies.
Conclusion and decision of the court
The Bar Council of India was given the case back by the Supreme Court so that it might
make the best judgement possible in light of the relevant facts and evidence. The Bar Council
of India's prior ruling was overturned.

8. Radha Mohan Lal V Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench) 2003 SCC OnLine SC
199
Facts
The case's facts reveal that the High Court of Judicature in Rajasthan found the appellant
Radha Mohan and his lawyer Sualal Yadav guilty of civil contempt of court and
sentenced them to 3 months of simple imprisonment plus a $1,000 fine, with an additional
15 days of imprisonment if the fine wasn't paid. The remark that was made in front of this
Hon'ble Court's sole judge on a civil revision petition served as the foundation for this
contempt. According to the statement, the appellant and other petitioners filed a motion
and complaint against HMJ R.S. Kejriwal, asking the chief justice to transfer the case to a
bench without Mr. Kejriwal's participation or membership because they believe that if the
matter is heard by a bench without Mr. Kejriwal, the administration of justice will be
properly "non-impartial" and "impartial." The formation of this revision petition was
brought about by the interim order that was issued in the civil suit brought by the
appellant Radha Mohan Lal and others to ensure that the RSC does not restrict access to
the temple. Radha Mohan gave a good undertaking that an affidavit would be filed by him
and that it would do so within a week as soon as this contempt action was scheduled for
hearing before the justice board. The appellant made a commitment to retract the
accusations he had levelled against HMJ R.S. Kejriwal and to issue an unqualified
apology. The matter was brought before the Hon. Supreme Court of India (hereafter
"SC"), which is why this appeal is being made.
Issues
The main questions in this case are: I Is it legitimate for the advocate-appellant to
continue making his allegations on the grounds that he has a responsibility to his client to
assert and submit that whatever instruction his client gives the court does not amount to
contumacious behaviour? And (ii) if Section 8 of the 1971 Contempt of Court Act
(hereafter, "1971 Act") is applicable in this situation.
Rule of law
(i)Art. 19 Constitution of India(hereinafter “constitution”) says about the essence of free
speech,

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 (ii) S.6 of 1971 Act says complaint against the judges of inferior courts when there is no
contempt,

(iii) S.7 of 1971 Act says Except under limited circumstances, publication of information
pertaining to chambers or closed-door procedures is not considered contempt.

Analysis

Analysis of the following instances reveals that despite Radha Mohan Lal being found guilty
of contempt, the Apex court was gracious enough to spare him from receiving the simple
incarceration penalty since he submitted an apology, which was accepted by the court (civil).
The appellant Sualal Yadav's case is highly distinct, and the appellant continued in using the
same strategy before the Supreme Court and the High Court, according to the court's analysis
of the situation. It is unfortunate to say that he "labours" the false belief that it is not only his
obligation but also a constitutional requirement to say and submit to the court anything his
client instructs him to. Regarding the appellant's conduct, the court stated that it is
unfortunate that despite dedicating so much time to the legal profession, the appellant
continues to hold the false belief that an attorney must follow the instructions of the client
and say whatever is requested of them, and that too without being held accountable in spite of
having a firmly established position to the contrary. The court's analysis of the fact that "free
expression" can never be and can never be equated with making baseless and irresponsible
remarks against the legal system and courts is blatantly evident. It has been correctly stated
that the language used was unambiguous on the definition of "contempt." And as a result,
people have less respect for judges and justices. The study was based on the sentence, which
was a $1,000 fine plus three months of house arrest with the possibility of an additional 15
days in jail if there was a default. It was thoroughly examined that, although fining a bar
member hurts, there are situations when this is the only option available to further the
interests of justice. However, the 81-year-old appellant's age was noted by the opposing side
of the court and was a significant factor in the sentence being reduced. Due to the appellant's
advanced age and the fact that he is no longer actively practising law and has already spent a
day in jail, the court reduced the sentence to a fine, with the proviso that if it is not paid, an
additional 15 days in jail would be served to complete the justice.

According to the judgement, the appellant will only get a fine of $1,000 and 15 days of
simple jail if the fine is not paid. Cri. App. Nos. 445 and 449/1993, decided on the
aforementioned conditions.

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Opinion

The Hon'ble SC correctly concluded in the aforementioned instance that it is incorrect for the
advocate to serve as the client's "mouthpiece." Even if the lawyer creates pleadings or signs
petitions on behalf of the client with statements that embarrass the court without first
confirming that such reasons exist, they are still in contempt of court. So, as a competent
council, he should have advised his client rather than considering such a frivolous
application. It is unquestionably accurate to say in the cadena of judgements rendered by the
Honorable SC that public faith in the legal system is what gives India its actual power. The
ultimate duty of an advocate is to protect their clients, thus I totally agree with the court's
decision to sentence the appellant despite the fact that he was only repeating what his client
had informed him. The appellant was severely criticised by the Court for his use of coarse
and veiled language that endangered the independence of the court, which is a fundamental
principle of the Constitution. Therefore, the researcher humbly accepts the Honourable
Court's decision.

9. HIMAKAT ALI KHAN V IISHWAR PRASHAD AARYA AND OTHERS…

(1997) 3 SUPREME COURT CASES 131

Facts

The respondent, Ishwar Prasad, was a practising lawyer in Badaun when, according to the
case's facts, he attacked Radhe Shyam, one of his opponents, with a dagger in the Munsif
Courtroom during lunchtime. A gunshot was also heard during this incident, which led to his
trial for crimes under the IPC in accordance with Section 307 after an investigation and
"Section 25 of the Arms Act." A forged letter purporting to be from the Hon. Governor was
used by the respondent to ask the Hon. Court to suspend his punishment or sentence in
accordance with Article 161 of the Indian Constitution after he had already received three
years of hard labour. He was successful in getting his conviction overturned, and he was later
released. Later, the sessions judge discovered that the letter was a forgery. As a result, the
sessions judge filed a complaint against the respondent with the Uttar Pradesh Bar Council,
pleading with them to take the issue seriously and render justice. After the State Bar Council
issued its decision, the advocate was forbidden from practising law in any Indian court for a
period of three years. However, this ruling was overturned on appeal, which is why Hikmath
Ali Khan is presenting his current appeal to the Honourable Supreme Court.

Issues

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The two main issues in this case are: I Does Ishwar Prasad fall under the provisions of
Section 35 of the Advocates Act of 1961, and (ii) Can a person convicted of an offence
involving moral turpitude be barred from being admitted to the State Roll of Advocates under
Section 24 of the Advocates Act of 1961?

Rule of Law

(i) Section 35 (3)(b)(c)(d) Advocates Act, 1961 which basically talks punishment for
the advocates for the professional misconducts and
(ii) (ii) Section 307 IPC says about the attempt to murder.

Analysis

According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court's view, attorneys play a crucial role in our society.
They play a significant role in the justice delivery system and are held in high regard by the
general public. The Honorable court also noted that every member of society is bound by a
specific code of conduct that they are required to uphold; as a result, an advocate who is
performing his or her duty has a responsibility to the client, the opposing party, the court, and
—most importantly—to the society and to oneself. It should be highlighted that whatever
wrongdoing Ishwar Prasad did falls under the category of professional misconduct and was
quite grave in character. The Hon'ble Court cited Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961,
which talks about debarment/disqualification of the advocates, in this where the Hon'ble
Court noted the magnitude of this section and said that the person who is involved in such
offences that have moral turpitude shall be disqualified. The court decided to give the penalty
of eliminating the name from the roll of advocates and explicitly indicated that respondent is
worthless of remaining in the profession. The Hon'ble Court noted that the misconduct falls
under the category of "serious offences" and "outlined" the options that are available under
Section 35(3) of the Advocates Act of 1961. The Hon'ble Court also noted with particular
emphasis the need to focus on Section 24 A of the Advocates Act of 1961. If someone has
been found guilty of a crime, including ethical baseness, they cannot be admitted as an
advocate on the State list of advocates. The Supreme Court decided that Ishwar Prasad Arya's
misconduct was so egregious that his name should be struck from the list of attorneys as a
result.

The ruling/decision clearly states that the appeal is allowed, the impugned order dated
08.09.1985 that was made by the BCI's disciplinary committee in DC's appeal No. 17 and 17-
A of 1984 is set aside, and the order dated 25.03.1984 that was made by the UP's Bar Council

14
Disciplinary Committee Case No. 40 of 1983 is upheld and modified so that the respondent is
now permanently barred from practising law. There are no cost orders.

Opinion

The researcher wholeheartedly concurs with the Supreme Court's ruling. As said, advocating
is a noble profession and one of the ones that is most responsible, lucky, and respected in
society. Anyone working in this field should oppose dishonesty and corruption and
endeavour to get their customers' problems resolved fairly. The repute and dependability of
an advocate are determined by his personal behaviour. They advocate for the bar and the
bench to cohabit together. As a result, any attorney who commits gross professional
misconduct harms the standing of all other honourable lawyers and should be fired.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the appellant is appropriate.

10. P.D GUPTA V. RAM MURTI (AIR 1998 SC 283)

Facts

The claim arises from a prior legal dispute in which a man named Srikrishan Das passed
away and left behind property that was pledged by two other people through Wills, including
Gupta's client Adv. Vidyawati, who is thought to be the deceased's sister. The disputed
properties were acquired by the appealing party, the Advocate, and his son-in-law by an
enrolled deal deed from Vidyawati, his client, and were then sold at a significantly higher
price via an enrolled deal deed. In Delhi, where the attorney practises law, Murti, the
petitioner in the property dispute, filed an offence charge against Adv. Gupta. The Bar
Council of India's Disciplinary Committee (DC), which found the Advocate guilty of
misconduct and sentenced him to a one-year suspension in accordance with Section 35 of the
Act, was challenged by the Advocate in court. After being delayed for a considerable amount
of time under Section 38 of the Act, the Bar Council of Delhi's DC did not decide the issue.

Issue

Is it conceivable that the Advocate acted improperly when they bought the property in
question on the client's behalf?

Is a one-year sentence suspension excessive given what he did?

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Legal provisions

Section 35, Advocate Act, 1961: Punishment of advocates for misconduct,

Section 36B, Advocate Act, 1961: Disposal of disciplinary proceedings

Section 38, Advocate Act, 1961: Appeal to the Supreme Court

Analysis

After the DC of the Delhi Bar Council was unable to resolve the matter within a year of the
complaint being made under Section 36B, the case was originally brought to the Bar Council
of India under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961. According to Section 35 of the Act, the
Advocate was found guilty of professional misconduct, and the Supreme Court received an
appeal. The Supreme Court eventually determined that the Appellant's argument lacked
merit. It is incorrect that the charges are vague and that you don't have possession of the item.
The accusations are unambiguous, and the fact that he does not really own the land does not
excuse his actions in making the contentious property purchase in the first place. "A legal
advisor has a responsibility of reasonableness not only to his client, but also to the court and
the other party in the case," the Supreme Court declared. Justice must be administered in a
stream that is maintained clean and free of contaminants. It must be kept tidy at all times. The
Bench is not involved with administration of justice. The Bar is likewise affected. Being a
member of the bar is the most frequent reason for judges to enrol. No one should be able to
disagree with a legal advisor's advice.

His display of acquiring the contested property in the current instance raises serious concerns
about his professional direct and bought offence to the equity organisation. As a result, the
choice made by the BCI was praised.

11. AMICUS CURIAE V. PRASHANT BHUSHAN 2020 SCC OnLine SC 651

Facts
16
The defendant in this case is Prashant Bhushan, a Senior Advocate with the designation, who
has expertise pursuing public interest litigation (hereafter "PIL") in cases involving several
high-profile cases. A suit with the Hon'ble Apex Court of India, dated July 22, 2020, was
filed against him and Twitter Inc. in relation to the two tweets that Prashant Bhushan sent,
which were directed at the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India (hereafter "CJI"). These tweets
mostly focused on the judiciary's demise, despite claims to independence, as well as the role
the Indian Court plays in preserving democracy. The Twitter-affiliated company banned both
tweets. According to the order dated July 22, 2020, the respondent was the subject of suo
motu proceedings for contempt B. It was argued before the Apex Court that the tweets were
of a derogatory nature, damaged the reputation of the Honorable SC and CJI, and placed the
"administration of justice" in a small box of disrepute. They also had the potential to reduce
the authority of the temple of justice, particularly in the eyes of the general public. While the
case was still pending, the respondent claimed that his tweets were just an outburst of rage
about the "incongruity" that existed between the CJI's careless behaviour in not wearing a
mask while riding a motorbike and his abstention from the court's physical hearing in
COVID-19. The respondents also argued that the contempt proceedings brought against him
were simply an attempt to stifle his freedom of speech and disregard his fundamental rights
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (hereinafter "constitution"). This was in
reference to his first tweet, while in his second tweet, he explicitly stated that it was just his
idea or opinion questioning the role of the court in telling "democratic ideals" during the
period from 2014 to 2020.

Issue

The questions in these cases are I whether the tweets posted by the respondent fall under the
court's definition of "healthy criticism" or have undermined the public's trust in the illustrious
institution; (ii) whether such tweets directed at the CJI fall under the definition of criminal
contempt; and (iii) whether Twitter has any role in undermining the true value of the Indian
judiciary.

Rule of law

The rules of law are I S.15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, which specifies taking criminal
contempt into consideration in other cases, (ii) R.3(c) of the Rules to Restrict Proceedings for
Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975, which specifies the possible actions the court may

17
take in cases with criminal subject matter other than those covered by R.2, and (iii) Art. 129
of the Constitution, which designates the SC as the court of record.

Analysis

According to the Hon'ble SC's assessment, the 1st tweet, that also asserted that the Hon'ble
CJI "ride a 50 lakh motorcycle belonging to a BJP leader at Raj Bhavan, Nagpur, without a
mask or helmet," was sent on June 29, 2020, was made in the truest sense of the word in his
individual capacity. As a result, this twitter post cannot be classified as criminal contempt
under the act, which defines criminal contempt as "any attempt which does or tends to scan
However, the SC made clear that the tweet's latter portion was an attack on the court's judicial
and administrative power because it required immediate action to prevent mass gatherings
due to the novel COVID 19 virus, which forced the suspension of the entire judicial system's
physical hearings. After the physical mode was suspended, the virtual mode then began. .
Here, the Honorable SC cited the case of Arundhati Roy's Case, in which it was stated that
when a fair criticism is made in good faith for the benefit of the general public, even if it is
directed against a judge or the entire judicial system, in these kind of cases the court ought to
be aware of the context of the statements and should take into account all the relevant facts,
circumstances, and current intent. The court should also investigate if the individual giving
the comment has the necessary expertise in that sector. When the court took a broad view of
the tweet, it noted that the second tweet (dt. 27th June 2020) was not made under the eye of
good faith and that the respondent—despite being a lawyer—acted very negligently and that
twitter post cannot be granted. The second tweet was a direct attack and criticism against the
country's highest organisation and the highest judicial person.

In the ruling, it was determined that Twitter India acted as a middleman between the author
and the platform and was therefore not responsible, while Mr. Prashant Bhushan was found
guilty of criminal contempt. A fine of Rs. 1 was imposed, which the respondent must pay by
December 15 of this year or face a three-year practise ban and a three-month jail sentence.
Mr. Prashant Bhushan is the first accused contumnor, and he is found guilty of criminal
contempt of court.

Opinion

18
It is rightly believed that the foundation of the judicial system in the nation is predicated on
the cornerstones of trust and confidence that the public holds in it. The power of contempt
that exists in the democratic judiciary in India enables the courts to function in an effective
manner while also protecting the self-esteem of the judges. Since there is no definition of
"scandalising the court" in the judgments' language, it has been assumed that criticism that is
offered in "good faith" is not criticism, but once again, the term is not defined. Part III grants
the "right to freedom of speech and expression," and a balance must be struck between that
basic right and the court's authority to intervene in cases where it is being criticised. The
researcher's understanding points him in the direction that the Apex Court's judgement in the
case was appropriate and accurate. The researcher thinks that the respondent's tweets were a
direct attack on the temple of justice and the Hon'ble Mylords rather than a simple expression
of good intentions.

12. Bar Council of Andhra Pradesh v. Karupati Satyanarayana, AIR 2003 SC 175

FACTS
Mr. K. Satyanarayana represented the plaintiff in an original lawsuit. The plaintiff was
awarded victory in the lawsuit. A petition for execution was started in order to realise the
decreed sum. In the execution procedures, the Respondent had been paid a total of Rs. 14,600
on several days, but she failed to reimburse the complaint. The Disciplinary Committee
determined that the Respondent's retention of funds was a disciplinary infraction and ordered
that his name be struck from the State Bar Council's rolls after the Complainant notified the
Andhra Pradesh Bar Council of the matter.
The Bar Council of India's Disciplinary Committee heard an appeal on this decision. The
State Disciplinary Committee's factual conclusion that the sums had not been paid to the
complaint was supported by the Bar Council of India. However, the Bar Council came to the
decision that the Respondent had not engaged in any professional misconduct, despite the
possibility that he had been negligent but not in a way that was immoral. The BCI's
Disciplinary Committee overturned the State Council's order and declared the delinquent
innocent of both professional misconduct and disciplinary violations. The case was appealed
to the Supreme Court by the Andhra Pradesh Bar Council.
ISSUES

The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the actions by the Respondent were
actually a disciplinary violation and whether it amounted a form of professional misconduct.

RULE OF LAW

19
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Advocates Act, 1961.
ANALYSIS
The Respondent was an advocate registered with the State Bar Council, his client was the
decree holder, and as the decree holder, he was eligible to obtain financial compensation,
according to the Court's thorough analysis of the case's facts. The advocate continually
invoked financial hardships, among other things, to justify continuing to withhold this money
despite having received these funds and knowing they should have been handed to his client.
However, he continued withholding this money while citing various financial issues, etc. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the Bar Council of India and stated that withholding such large
quantities of money constituted grave misconduct. The Bar Council of India had claimed that
this was simply negligence and not misconduct. The Court ruled that by classifying the act of
professional misconduct as an act of negligence, the BCI ignored it. The Bench ruled that the
BCI's conclusion that the advocate had no intention of stealing his client's money was not
only "unfounded and perverse," but also lacked serious consideration.
OPINION
According to the court, the delinquent's failure to pay the stipulated sum to the complaint
constitutes a flagrant instance of professional misconduct. The advocate's name had been
ordered to be taken off the rolls, according to the Court, given the significant and grave
nature of the misbehavior. As a result, the appeal filed by the Andhra Pradesh Bar Council
was accepted.

13. Kaushal Kishore Awasthi v. Balwant Singh Thakur, AIR 2018 SC 199
FACT
In a civil action regarding the Respondent's ancestors' property, the Advocate (the Appellant)
represented the Respondent (the case's Complainant). He attempted to sell his ancestral
property after receiving it, but the Advocate objected in front of the Deputy Registrar. The
property was not entirely owned by the complainant, and its market worth was less than that
indicated in the sale deed, which was the basis of the objection.
The complainant took the advocate's activities against the advocate to the Chhattisgarh Bar
Council. Before the State Bar Council, the complainant begged for disciplinary action. As a
result of the Disciplinary Committee's finding that the Advocate had engaged in professional
misconduct, his licence was suspended for two years. The Bar Council of India heard an
appeal, which confirmed the Advocate had engaged in improper conduct. The Bar Council of
India, however, shortened the suspension's duration to one year and levied a fee of INR
25,000. Before the Indian Supreme Court, the advocate chose to appeal.
ISSUE

The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether the advocate had committed professional
misconduct as alleged by the Complainant.

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RULE OF LAW
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Advocates Act, 1961.

ANALYSIS
An advocate is not permitted to buy or bid on any property with which the advocate has a
professional association, according to Rule 22 of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1961. This
prohibition's breach in the present case was taken into account. The Supreme Court ruled that
the restriction on the behaviour covered by Rule 22 of the Rules only applies to the degree to
which the action interferes with the advocate's ability to practise law. This means that the
restriction would not apply if an advocate bought a property in their individual capacity or if
the property had nothing to do with their case.
The Bar Council of India's prior rulings on the conduct of attorneys were not cited by the
Supreme Court in this case. The Court instead relied on its own reading of the Rules. Thus, it
rejected the Bar Council of India's conclusion that the lawyer had engaged in improper
conduct. The aforementioned property was not being sold in accordance with any court order
in which the appellant was involved. Therefore, it was decided that it is also necessary to look
at an advocate's capacity at the time of an act that is claimed to be professional misconduct.
OPINION

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Bar Council of India. The Court stated that
the advocate had not committed professional misconduct.

14. D. S. Dalal v. State Bank of India and Ors., AIR 1983 SC 1608
Fact
The State Bank of India complained to the Delhi Bar Council about an attorney (the
Appellant), claiming that he and his coworkers had engaged in unethical behaviour. The
appellant and his associates worked for Singh & Company, a Delhi-based business of
attorneys and solicitors. The business was hired by the bank to represent it in a High Court
lawsuit to collect a sizable quantity of money. As a result, the bank also trusted the law firm
with the original paperwork related to their case.
After the initial update from the firm detailing their case, the bank was fully in the dark. To
learn the status of the lawsuit, they later engaged another advocate. The suit was returned by
the bench to the firm for the removal of objections when it turned out that the lawsuit had
first been filed late. Bench then gave the firm the full file back to be properly removed. The
lawsuit was not, however, re-filed. Despite these facts, the firm has repeatedly billed the firm,
including for professional services. Before the State Bar Council, the bank claimed that the
firm had stolen large sums of money.

21
The case was transferred to the Bar Council of India after the State Bar Council's window to
hear it closed. The firm and the accused attorneys failed to show up once more, the case was
decided ex partely against them, and their names were struck from the Bar's rolls.
Rule of law
Adovate act 1961
Issues
The case was transferred to the Bar Council of India after the State Bar Council's window to
hear it closed. The firm and the accused attorneys failed to show up once more, the case was
decided ex partely against them, and their names were struck from the Bar's rolls.
Analysis
The facts of the case and the evidence given to the Disciplinary Committee were mainly
relied upon by the court. Instead of relying on past rulings, it concentrated its analysis on the
current case. Prior to filing an appeal with the Supreme Court, the advocates in the case even
neglected to show up for their own hearings before the Disciplinary Committee. It was
deemed a clear instance of professional misconduct when a client's case was kept completely
secret from him.
The Bar Council of India had likewise ruled the appellants guilty of misconduct on the same
grounds. The respondents (the firm of solicitors and advocates) "had consistently used the
methods of non-cooperation with a view to protract the proceedings needlessly," according to
the Bar Council of India. The Bar Council of India had issued a directive ordering the
removal of the advocates' names from the Bar's rolls after stating this. The Court
unequivocally upheld this Bar Council of India conclusion and declared that there was no
need to tamper with this order.
Opinion
The Court denied the lawyers' appeal. Based on the circumstances of the case and the
information presented to it, it found no reason to differ with the findings and judgement
reached by the Bar Council of India.

15. Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, (1976) 2 SCC 291

FACT
Regarding the conduct of attorneys within the courthouse, the High Court of Bombay had
complained to the Maharashtra Bar Council. The behaviour that was criticised involved job
soliciting. The defence attorneys for the accused used to congregate at the criminal courts'
entrance and try to find business there. These advocates frequently snatched briefs, got into
verbal and physical fights, and made a commotion inside the building. In an ongoing effort to
steal business from one another, lawyers also engaged in a fight of undercutting one another
on rates.
The State Bar Council's Disciplinary Committee had determined that the sixteen attorneys
accused of engaging in such behaviour had in fact engaged in improper conduct. For a three-

22
year period, they were barred from participating in practise. The Bar Council of India
overturned this judgement, but only after considering the merits of eight advocates' cases.
The Supreme Court of India then heard an appeal in the matter.
ISSUE

The Court considered three issues. Firstly, whether the requirement of “reason to believe”
was met by the Bar Council before the Disciplinary Committee was assigned the case.
Secondly, whether the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India had rightly applied
the law in its decision. Thirdly, whether the Respondent-advocates had committed
professional misconduct.

RULE OF LAW
ADVOCATE ACT 1961.
ANALYSIS
In its appellate ruling, the Bar Council of India had cited Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India
Rules, which outlines the conditions that must be met to prove professional misconduct.
According to this Rule, the advocate must have requested assistance from a specific person
regarding a matter. According to the Bar Council of India, professional misconduct could not
be proven unless these conditions were met, i.e., solicitation from a person regarding a
matter. By using this logic, the Bar Council of India overturned the State Bar Council's
finding that the attorneys had engaged in improper conduct.
The Court declared that although the "primary function" of the legal profession was to aid in
the administration of justice, it was crucial that advocates upheld the ethos, dignity, and
reputation of the field. As a result, the Court declared that the Bar Council of India had
improperly applied Rule 36 of the Bar Council of India Rules.
OPINION
Although the "principal duty" of the legal profession, according to the Court, is to assist in
the administration of justice, it is imperative that advocates uphold the spirit, honour, and
reputation of the profession. The Court ruled as a result that Rule 36 of the Bar Council of
India Rules had been wrongly applied by the Bar Council of India.

23