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488 LAW OF TORTS: CHAPTER yy
\ler a duty to protect not only the invitee but also his goods from damg
defects in the premises, he is under no duty to protect the goods from the tis tt
by third parties, (2) that, as the motor-bicycle had not been delivered
possession of the defendant, and as the defendant was unaware th;
brought on to his premises, Je had not become a bailee of it, and was
liable as a bailee for its loss,
2. STRICT LIABILITY
2(A) Rationale of Strict Liability
There are many activities which are so hazardous that they constitute
danger to person and property of others. The law may deal with them in
It may prohibit them altogether. It may allow them to be carried on for the
their social utility but only in accordance with statutory provisions layi
safety measures and providing for sanctions for non-compliance. It may
to be tolerated on condition that they pay their way regardless of any fault:
is the doctrine of strict lability. The undertakers of the activities have to o
for the damage caused irrespective of any carelessness on their
liability is the foreseeable risk inherent ie the very nature of the acti
aspect, the principle of strict liability resembles negligence which is
foreseeable harm. But the difference lies in that the concept of
comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be ayoided by. taking re
precautions and so if the defendant did all that which could be done for
harm, he cannot be held liable except possibly in those cases where he
closed down the undertaking. Such a consideration is not relevant in ¢
liability where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he
avoided the particular harm by taking precautions, The rationale behind!
is that the activities coming within its fold are those entailing extra
others, either in the seriousness or the frequency of the harm threatened,
to conduct such an activity is in effect made conditional on its absorbing t
the accidents it causes, as an appropriate item of its overhead.’® %
2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
Strict liability has its origin in the case of Rylands y. Fletcher.”
were that the defendants who had a mill near Ainsworth in Lane:
improve its water-supply. They constructed a i
Sees, to do a Whew the reservoir was filled, water
neighbouring coal mine causing damage. The engineers
contractors. There was some negligence frie their part in not
mine shafts which they had come across during the constructi
it was through those shafts that the water flooded the plaintiff’:
were in no way negligent having employed competent engine
the engineers were independent contractors, the
vicariously liable for their negligence. The Court of
as showing no cause of action. But the court of
appeal. The judgment of BLACKBURN, J., of that co
=
24. Tinsley v. Dudley, (1951) 2 KB 18,
- TeccEae see Chapter 2, ttle 5, p. 30,
FLEMING, Torts, 6th edition, p. 302. Similar obs ations,
Union of india, 1987) 1 SCC 395, p. 431, a
27, (1868) LR 3 HL 330, NEGLIG!
ENCE
AND ALLIED TO}
PICS
489
vty 38 AAG
ve wt ad bythe House of
ee pe ons an sae
soit ‘escapes, mus! cod i a
i nt werable fOr Sul the d rng nai cae
fracknuRN ve er ie damage wl ects and terra th i ern
jo TE Pom hot) Maite cenmane sli 2 ce
bout, oF, WHOSE, ck grass oc Aine le ae ‘ re : es
rose olla 1S hose eb ipilooded, bud eaten di i : = =
eal a by the rt e filth bythe ree en ty ie mae ot
jed without s and noi ae " = ee
has ay Blt OF eee si sea
‘ere, harmless to other ght somethit pare isen “ =e an ae ;
om ine igo hom cere
Ma . it hi e :
cat for Ae fi nies t ‘ake ae a
just that ante i = : = |
eee oe ae doesn ers ala erty, ut basa
{orb CAIRNS while uid aur pegN ee no mischiet e gene! cs
Ee Se ae Soci
S rc aed Heal that no mi accru own
NoULTON in 7 the EY Coun vonsnaual 3 Back eae =
tbisprincipl case: “It i oe ickards +, Lothian i, | “
Se be ee et Ss bes y =
benefit rely be the ea enleieh isis tal a ri :
oe 5 Sine aig wae Tand is eter eee
wich ca y the def unity.” y use oF nea rat dn mee
This uses dam fendant sho fae in iin ee a
ee fe m easy Gates hause pddanees ie Be
2 Se i |
~ eens the ane absence, of vite ed sh
ais, ek Me deren ae i ae Be
Simin sseryathese ae ee i oa z
eee eee the ie en el oe a
= ee ee Tice ee “st ,
te ee eee ye aoa = |
= RC REN A oa ee
hin ance ings and that ee “ a 3
ved hat bP he HOUSE OL = Pa a :
recat the Rule ny root Oh upheld the decison Pore ss
a vinchts of ot Blane " ae a ae a 2 a
fold It wa causes 2 rs
te defendant Sot > the deena sale :
ee
yjured person ¥ ml
Asti sidail sine oe bla ®
ut
Fea
» te
ies erv. R)
he Roland
: ia piles) Ey 1 Bx 26! wed
jy, Plckards Lo faa Nath a mis
engines se a nas
i Lo ai irate "
Pesnanaliae ee
m Tram Co. Mo) x
C38
utside |
work «nol :
1 lt 5 per Ra ane
(1947) a ics
AC 15 (HL Shara
. ajiv Sharma. die
; WE Re, 175/2013)
‘hal
40 490 LAW OF TORTS CHAPTER xix
liable if he was just within them and that eseape in the context of the rule
escape from control and it was irrelevant where damage (ook place, These arg
Were rejected though it, was observed that they had considerable. force. on
reasoning that the rule itself was an. extension of the general rule and i Was
undesirable or there was no logical necessity to extend it further. The case cast
Some doubt on the question whether a person could recover damages for
injuries on the basis of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. on
rule in Rylands’v, Fletcher was again considered by the House of Lords
COMDnage Water Co. Ltd. v, Eastern Counties Leather Ple. The plaintiff ig
case was a company licensed to supply water in the Cambridge area. The
supply was taken by borehole extraction from underground strata. The d
another company engaged in manufacture of fine leather. ‘The tanning w
defendant were at a distance of 1.3 miles from the plaintiff's borehole. The d
ised a volatile solvent known as perchlorethene (PCE) for degreasing p
tanning works, PCE. seeped into the ground beneath the defendant's wo
thence having been conveyed in percolating wate the direction of the b or
contaminated the water available from the borehole. The time taken for PCE to
from the tannery to the borehole was 9 months. The defendant started
from 1950. PCE was introduced into a tank at the base of dry cleaning |
Spillage of PCE in small quantities took place during topped up process up
could not then be foreseen that small quantities of PCE spilled on the co
of the defendant’s works will enter the underground strata beneath the wo
be carried by percolating water to the defendant’s borehole 1.3 miles
spillage would have been expected to evaporate rapidly in the air.
contaminated was never held to be dangerous to health. In 19
directives to the member states relating to the quality of water
consumption. This directive was implemented in the United Ki
1985. After 1985 the water from the borehole ceased to be
not be lawfully supplied because of presence of PCE. The
taken out of commission and the plaintiff claimed damages. The
damages was essentially based on nuisance and strict liability 1
Fletcher. The claim was negatived on the ground that damage of th
by the plaintiff was not foreseeable. The House of Lords
by the Privy Council in Wagon Mound No. (2) that, fo
essential to establish a claim for damages in nuisance.
held that irrespective of whether the rule in Rylands v. Flet
aspect of nuisance or as a special rule of strict liability, it was app
view that foresceabi
prerequisite of liability in damages under the
spilled till 1976 was still in existence in the substrat
when the claim was filed and was being tried
to the borehole, It was, therefore, argued that si
even after it has become known, the defendant
nuisance or under the strict liability rule in Ryla
not accepted on the reasoning that the PCE.
beyond the defendant's control long before,
making it unlawful to supply water contami
Jong before it became known that PCE was bein
33. (1994) 1 AUER 53 (HL),
34. (1994) 1 AMER 53 (HL), p. 72,
38. (1994) 1 AMER 53 (HL), p. 76, NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED Topic 4
és oy
pole by underground percolating water. Thi
«oe coetion for which the defendant could not be made tae
Zagora! Peer, held that storage of substantial quantiti able." The House of
Ya oul be regarded 26a lasic ease of oneal ge tat Es age
iss SHOU posing strict liability fi se and there could be
ection nips 3 ty for foreseeable damage caused in the event of
is was held fo be a case of
eee sare yi Picts ; ;
Tin Ryland v. Fletcher as also considered by f
Te Stockport MBC: The pain in this me eaten Lords in
Tors Femibankment on a stretch of a disused railway line. The defendant local
dene? er purchased the line with the plain continuing to have ihe right of
Fee ae hich wa upped ei a rma) deta
Mock 0 s supplied with wate i
1 4 he defendant had goustricted ewes He ey taea he el eat
‘any negligence of the defendant the water pipe whicl :
Wihoul a8) rd discharged considerable quantities of ee Heo
= fethankment. The plaintiff was compelled to do considerable work to remedy
eon and claimed damages on the basis of the rule in Ryland y. Fletcher. The
si? ords in negativing the claim held that the provision of a water supply to a
ts ck of flats did not amount t0 a Special hazard constituting an extraordinary
i Pend. But the House of Lords did not accept the submission thatthe rule ha
ws idance in the 21st Century and should be abolished as done in Australia
They expressed the view that it only needed clarification,
4s clarified in Transco the rule was a sub-species of nuisance, The rule required
gaan occupier of land had brought on to his land or was keeping, there some
fineerous thing which posed an exceptionally high risk to: neighbouring
il it escape and which amounted to an extraordinary and unustal use of the land
judged by the standards appropriate at the relevant place and time and that there had
feer escape, on to some other property causing damage which was a foreseeable
timsequence of the escape. The rule has no application when the defendant acts
tnder statutory authority or when the escape is as a result of Act of God or because
ithe intervention of a third party. The case also supports the doubt which was
‘expressed in Read v. J. Lyans & Co.,"° that the rule is not concerned with liability for
personal injuries and holds that the doubt is now settled and the rule being a species
‘fmuisance does not apply for recovery of damages for personal injuries.”
t Red by i
The above discussion of authorities leads to the conclusion” that if the defendant
makes ‘non-natural use’ of land in his occupation in the course of
escape of something which causes foreseeable damage 10, petson Of
the defendant's premises, the defendant is liable ae
se”
negligence on the basis of the rule of strict liability ounded
[Link] difficult to define the expression “non-natural use” @
cae ee
(ee
> phaseematt
*~
a
Be ALY. ss Mes
36 (1994)1 ANER 53 (HL), p. 77.
3 (9901 AUER SH). p. 19.
208) 3 WLR 1467 (HL).
4, sacl Fort Authority v. General Jones Pty. Lid (1994) 179 CLR $20.
Af SEP 489 ext and footore 32. 48
(28) 3 WLR 1467, p. 1473, 1474 (para 9) (LORD BRIGHAM) Il
Sots 52) Lox HoBHOUSE. 2
{047 fiber Donal Nolan, “The Disinctiveness af Rylands v Flt
a y a
For sutementof the rule see also MC. Mehta v. Union of India (1981) VSEES |
CHA
was said in Rickards v, Lothian’® that it must be some special use tl TE
into play increased damage to others and must not be merely the cy
Of ti
492 LAW OF TORTS
| The concept of non-natural use is flexible. A particular use whit) We gf!
mee a sah, back may be quite natural now. Consideration hie ya
surroundings, circumstances and purpose all enter in the determing!™:
question whether particular use is natural or non-natural, ‘The ni
Sescape” which was stressed most emphatically in the case of Read y, 1,
about an unfortunate and illogical distinction between the persons are
those just outside the dangerous premises. It has halted the develqn!
general theory of liability in the English law in contrast to American
rule is stated to be that “one who comes on an ultra-hazardous
another whose person, land or chattels the actor should
harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm re:
from that which makes the activity ultra-hazardous, although the ut
exercised to prevent the harm.”*? The House of Lords in Ca
case" took notice of the above criticism but declined to extend the
observing that it is more appropriate for strict liability in respect
risk to be imposed by Parliament than by courts.” The
nuisance does not apply for recovery of damages for personal
In India the rule has been considered by the Supreme Court in some
applied to personal injuries. It has even been extended ni
of use of motor vehicles on the road.
In State of Punjab v. Modem Cultivators” where dan
of water from a breach in a canal the Supreme Court
construction of a canal system is an ordinary use and not
was decided in favour of the plaintiff on the finding of n
modify the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. It was so held in
Lid. v. State of Gujarat” which was a case of damage
from a reclamation bandh constructed by the State of Guj
area of land from salty water of sea. This case too was
that this was non natural use of land but on the
negligence which lay in defective planning and
Rylands v. Fletcher was again referred to
v. Union of India,’' but the case was ¢
which was held to have laid down
apart from being of binding authority.
The strict liability rule in Rylands v. F
Supreme Court in Kusuma Bi
Lid.,”* by relying on some general ob’
SZ
(1913) AC 263 108 LT 225: 29 TLR 281 PC)
(1947) AC 156 (HL). Sce text and footnote:
fmetean Restatement “Anicle $19 Rest
‘G, Torts, 6th edition, p
(1998) AUER S3 (HL)
peek 1 a RAE 75, 76,
text and footnote 4,
AIR 1965 SC 17. me e.
Sees ges NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED TOPICS
493
i, (1987) 3 SCC 234, t0 apply to cei ish
ns rs road, in addition to no fault lability senate rovided te moe
i jes Act, without the necessity of establishing any neg! iaaen :
snot the motor vehicle causing the accident. “tie: gor elizenee on the
ai izing of a jeep due to tyre-burst when the
the dependants of the victim could have: hen
spsation on NO acl basis aes sist S2A of the Act unless t
fence, The case was, however, decided when the Mest!
oo force. The tribunal negatived negligence but allows espe had
ion on no fault basis under the corresponding provision ot section 140 of
iene Act The claimants went in appeal to the Hish Geen where they lost and
; lost and,
re, they went up in further appeal to the Suen anothe
fron secon 163A was added tn the Mose gee gu 1984 ano
m sation on no fault basis but on quite liberal
tbhat
rn
alowed to them under section 163A had it been applicable. In view of this decision «
claimant can claim compensation on no fault liabi ity under section 140 or section
163A of the Act or under the rule of strict liability of Rylands v. Fletcher After
iaoduction of section 163A which provides for compensation on liberal terms, it is
tardy likely that any claim would be filed (where the deceased’s annual income was
HORS. 40.000) under the strict liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, where certain
cefences would be open which are not open to a claim under section 1
I63A. Use of a motor vehicle on the road cannot be sai f
ol use of either the vehicle or the pe 5 eee kc
state (ot cannot also be said to have escaped from land or premises in occupation
st the owner of the motor vehicle. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the conditions
applicability of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher are e
ing out of the use of a motor vehicle on t
Mviands v. Fletcher to cover the case
would have been easier to apply the 4
[re imption of negligence as was done in
i, [(1948) 2 All ER 460] which was
Tage ely referred in Krishna Bus Se
ieee Bench judgment Deepal Girisl
prog; apart from sections 140, 163A"
rem the claim for compensation can
the cult M.V. Act” the court said provi
‘laim on fault liability.” The case of J
guidge bench of the Supreme Court i
CA. 2526 of 2007 decided on If
held (para 1
°F the vehicle is therefore sine-qua
fe ae SRW
Samy
4 AoE SCC 791 p. 799,
A2004 56 2107 yn 2120, 2121 : 2004 (3) St '!
CHAPTER yy
seotion 166 of the Act.” It is submitted that the case of Kusuma Bey
reconsideration. "edi
inciple of Rylands y. Fletcher applies to a proprietor who sto
amend i it iesabek therefrom and injures a person or the ondin sty
property. It does not apply to the case of injury done to a peculiar trade Use of
unnecessarily so constructed as to be affected by minute currents or
Fl
494 LAW OF TORTS
force. The Supreme Court applied the strict liability rule of Rylandy
against the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board ing case where a eye!
trocuted by a live electric wire lying on the road.”” The court also
See that the live wire was lying on the road due to clandestine nt a
stranger could not be availed of by the Board to negate its strict liability.” The
has statutory authority to transmit electricity, therefore, it is submitted thatthe,
bald HAVE: been more appropriately decided on the basis of negligence which
M a C
held to exist.” The court in Sushil Kumar's case relied upon ‘
decision®” which was decided essentially on the interpretation of Articles 1957,
1054 of the Quebe code” and not on the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher.
their Lordships said that in construing these Articles of the Code “Ryla
Fletcher and Nicholas v. Marsland have better be left out of account,”
Kumar's case was distinguished in SDO Grid Corporation of Orissa |
Timiduoram” on the ground that there was a finding of negligence in that cas
claim should never be entertained in a writ petition and should
civil suit. The court clearly held that “the mere fact a
58. Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways C6
Telephone Co. v. Baker, (1893) 2 Ch 186: SO WLR 657: 86LT 457,
MP. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, AIR 2002 SC $51; Followed :
Another, AIR 2010 MP 26 : (2010) 93 AIC 323 : (2010) 2 MPLI 536; 5
Assam AIR 2014 Gau 4; Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam
“Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Lid. v. Master Duda (Civil First Appeal No.
(SB), [Link] J. Rajasthan High Coun; The Meghalaya Energy Co
Sangma (2015) 150. AIC 713; Gandra Tiga & Others v. State
No.1243/2003) Decided 15.04.2015 (SB) [Link] J. Orrisa High
Board v. Thomas Devaswamehira House & Others (201 65 :
Kumar alias Rohit Kumar y. State of Himachal Pradesh (CWP No:
Rajiv Sharma & Sureshwar Thakur JJ (as per Rajiv Sharm
Dilbung Tondon v. State of Manipur & Others (Writ Petit
J. Manipur High Court; Smt. Bhakti Acharjee & Other
Decided 12.09.2014 (SB) S:Talapatra J. Tripura High
‘Managing Director, Grid Corporation of Orrisa & O
‘LMahanty & [Link] JJ. (as per $ Pujahari J.) Orv
Jammu & Kashmir & Others (LPS No,229/2012) Dec
Singh Thakur J. (as per [Link] CJ); Madhya Pra
(2014) 3 MPLS 216; Raman v. State of Haryana
Electricity Board, Jabalpur v. Laxman (2013) 3 8
(2013) 127 AIC 943. +
7. MP. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, ATR
earlier decision in W.B. Electricity Boad v,
Followed in Ramesh Singh Pawar v. Madhya Pr
(Chuni Lal & others v. State of Jammu and
‘others v. Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivan
Tamil Nadu (2012) 114 AIC 707.
See text and cases in footnote 9, p, 568;
Transco ple v. Stockport, (2003) 3 WLR I
. Supra, footnote 74.
‘Quebe Railway, Light, Heat and Power Co
‘Quebe Railway, Light, Heat and Power Co
. (2005) 6 SCC 156, p. 160(para 8): ee
NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED, TOPICS
495
ne belonging to the appellant deceased
be aniidied by italbee not suet adh ans
wil uired to examine as (6 whether th ve ad on com ee
nome Meipavortnanpaiate le Wire had sapped as a result of
conta on th the aire peas aT {Ut OF Which the deceased h
me Renton The ie ora that the case of Sushil Kumar
ea rons reasonable and prevalent that (bring cy
a uy
ie ws ee wg we be a se ech in @ natural Td nt
unl to exercise reasonable care to erenn. fies thereon accruing, i
BY sible for damage not due to his own default.” It has also been
during bad weather, where there i? % thas
eer he pole itis the duty of the electricity denh, 0! electric: wires being
‘oppo from the pol t t
tt
422
x
=
More English and Indian Cases Relating to Rylands y Fletcher
setting up such heavy vibrations as
bl feng 0 the plaintiffs, with
tira down in compliance with a dangerous
ints were responsible as insurers for all
shntions, they had so created.°”
Under the principle of Rylands v, Fletcher,
upon premises and carries on a danger
fez without negligence on his part, these sul
eee in their neighbourhood." It is immate
‘danger at the time when he brings and uses th
ttllabe for using wood-blocks coated with
. Gri
SC
sy orPoration of Orissa Ltd. and Ors. 8. Tim
Sel the same effect ar: Grid Corporal
ts 298; Tamil Nadu. ‘Electricity Board v.
Nasi». Rangoon Indian Telegraph Asser
Board v. Kunnavammal |
Eleciriciy
Plctricity Board, (2012) 4 CTC
=s Bs me
Wnetays Co..(1908)2 KB 14,
Voy at End & Electric Co. v. London
Md.» Belvedere Fish Guano Cos (I a |
496 LAW OF TORTS CHAPTER yy
i keep such a thing under control at his peril.”! The
thin isch Hable to cause fire should have begn brought by the defend.” #*tom
coiies in the course of some non-natural user.” If a person uses a traction his
Ly emits sparks in spite of all precautions being taken to prevent their nie
he will be liable if another person's hayrick be selon fire by the sparks, oe
ground that such an engine is a dangerous machine.
‘The principle of Rylands v, Fletcher is followed in several Indian cases,
le in Rylands v. Fletcher applies only if the defendant brings or accu
on hig own land something that is Iikely to escape and do mischief,
{question whether that was done by the defendant wilfully or negligently,
71. Musgrove v. Pandelis, (1919) 2 KB 43 : 38 TLR 219: 120 LT 601.
72. Mason v. Levy Auto Parts, (1967) 2 All ER 62 : (1967) 2 QB 530.
73. Powell v. Fal, (1880) 5 QBD 597 : 43 LT 562.
7A. -A suit for damages was held to lie against a proprietor who penned back the water of
4 bund upon his land, so as to inundate the land of his neighbour, without his
Becharam Chowdhary v. Pububnath Jha, (1869) 2 Beng LR (Appx.) 53. The defendant